

5

Putnam's transcendental arguments

Sami Pihlström

When I was invited to contribute an essay to this Festschrift honoring Professor Panu Raatikainen, a long-time friend and colleague whose contributions to both Finnish and international philosophy I admire very much, I not only immediately said yes but also knew that I should write on a topic related to Hilary Putnam's philosophy. This is because Panu and I have discussed Putnam's views (among, of course, many other things) since we first met in the early 1990s. I have vivid memories of the graduate seminar taught by Ilkka Niiniluoto at the University of Helsinki in fall 1991, which both Panu and I attended. Panu was, in fact, the opponent of my seminar presentation on Putnam's internal realism – a hotly debated topic in those days – and Ilkka, of course, was both his dissertation supervisor and mine. As far as I remember, my seminar paper focused on the ways in which Putnam criticized metaphysical realism and defended internal realism in some of his seminal work on these issues collected in *Realism with a Human Face* (Putnam 1990), a book that had just come out with fresh formulations of ideas he had developed since the late 1970s, and Panu's thoughtful critical comments raised fundamental issues challenging Putnam's epistemic conception of truth, in particular. What Panu's own presentation in the same seminar explored I unfortunately cannot recall.

I suppose Putnam has always been something like a philosophical hero for both Panu and me. However, we differ in our "favorite" Putnams. For Panu (if I am right), Putnam's philosophy reached its culmination in the 1970s when Putnam defended the causal theory of reference (with a canonical formulation in the famous 1975

article, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”),¹ functionalism in the philosophy of mind, and an influential version of scientific realism based on the “no miracles” argument – and then it was at least partly downhill from there on. While I also very much appreciate those lasting earlier achievements (among the many that Putnam reached but also self-critically reconsidered during his long career), I have always found the Putnam of the 1990s closer to my own philosophical temperament (borrowing a term from William James, one of the great old pragmatists, about whom Putnam wrote a number of important essays). This is the Putnam whose internal realism had already been established (throughout the 1980s) to the point of starting to fade out or merge into something he later came to call “commonsense realism” (with a significant touch of pragmatism), the Putnam who had finally (partly due to the influence of his wife Ruth Anna Putnam) recognized his crucial indebtedness to the pragmatist tradition, and had even started to see his own work as continuing it, and the Putnam who had become sharply critical of the fact-value dichotomy and even willing to contribute to the philosophy of religion, utilizing not only Kantian, pragmatist, and Wittgensteinian sources but also his inherited Jewish tradition.²

Putnam’s thought, clearly, is not the only philosophical interest Panu and I share,³ but it is undoubtedly the point at which our philosophical concerns most explicitly converge. Although nowadays our paths unfortunately cross relatively infrequently, I am sure our discussions and disagreements on realism – a major Putnamian theme whose relevance of course extends far beyond Putnam’s work – in the 1990s were significant for both of us. These shared interests have also led us both to enormously appreciate the work of our teacher, Ilkka Niiniluoto; in fact, Panu and I co-edited (in collaboration with other colleagues) two Festschrifts for Ilkka when he turned 50 (in 1996) and 60 (in 2006). Not only Ilkka’s version of critical scientific realism in general but also his criticisms of Putnam in particular (cf. Niiniluoto 1999) have presumably had an equally lasting impact on Panu as they have had on me.

Putnam, realism, and conceptual relativity once again

One of Putnam’s best-known arguments for internal realism and against “metaphysical realism” is the so-called Carnapian world argument, which he developed in the 1980s (see Putnam 1987, 1990) but revisited in later work (see, e.g., Putnam 2004, 37–38, 78–84). This is also the key argument that Panu insightfully criticized in a paper in *Dialectica* (Raatikainen 2001). Panu’s criticism focuses on Putnam’s appeal to

¹ This essay is collected in Putnam 1975.

² For Putnam’s mature views on pragmatism and philosophy of religion, see Putnam 2008; Putnam and Putnam 2017. (I have discussed these aspects of his thought at some length elsewhere, e.g., Pihlström 2023, chapter 2.)

³ I have, for example, repeatedly returned to Panu’s very helpful small book in Finnish on the philosophy of the human sciences (Raatikainen 2004), which I reviewed for the journal *Tieteessä tapahtuu* and which I continue to find highly relevant regarding, e.g., the issues of value-dependence vs. value-freedom in research (see also, e.g., Raatikainen 2006).

mereology, arguing that Putnam confuses languages and theories when suggesting that using the language of mereology commits us to the existence of mereological sums. I will briefly pursue this issue not by responding to Panu's paper in any great detail, nor by examining Putnam's central works – a lot has been said about them – but by referring to Putnam's recent posthumously published collection, *Philosophy as Dialogue* (Putnam 2022), which contains a number of highly interesting critical comments by Putnam on other philosophers' views and criticisms of him (albeit no response to either Panu or me).

The key to the Carnapian world argument is that when imagining a world of three individuals (x_1, x_2, x_3), as soon as we allow the use of mereological language (enabling us to "count" the sums of individuals as individuals), we realize that there is no single privileged or definite answer to the question of how many objects there are in this mini-world. The "Carnapian logician" will say that there are three objects there, but the "Polish logician" employing mereology can claim that there are seven objects ($x_1, x_2, x_3, x_1+x_2, x_1+x_3, x_2+x_3, x_1+x_2+x_3$), or even eight (including the "null object"), in the "same" world. Panu pointed out that the mere use of mereological language as such does not yield this outcome; one has to theoretically postulate, in addition, that mereological sums exist (see Raatikainen 2001).

As sharp as Panu's response to Putnam is, I am (still) not entirely convinced that it succeeds in its criticism of what Putnam tried to demonstrate by means of his argument, viz., the phenomenon of conceptual relativity.⁴ I don't think Putnam intended to simply claim that the mere use of the language of mereology (or any logic or language, for that matter) guarantees that there are certain objects that the language enables us to speak of. Clearly more is needed for existence than language. Rather, the availability of a certain language enables us to formulate theories that may postulate some kinds of objects rather than some others. Mereology enables us to postulate mereological sums if we wish, but it does not guarantee that such postulations are plausible or accurate.

In a reply to David L. Anderson's criticisms of his views (in 1992)⁵ available in the posthumous collection, Putnam (2022, 108) maintains that "there is no fact of the matter as to whether numbers, or mereological sums, are objects or not [...] and no fact of the matter as to whether 'mereological sums exist'". If Panu intended to claim that the mere use of the language of mereology would, according to Putnam, fix the relevant ontology or bring about such a "fact of the matter", this seems to pre-empt Panu's charge.⁶ In a response to Simon Blackburn (in 1994), Putnam – using phrases

⁴ Raatikainen (2001) repeatedly speaks of "conceptual relativism", while Putnam consistently uses the expression "conceptual relativity", explicitly distinguishing between that phenomenon and any form of relativism. Panu's wording may be interpreted as suggesting that Putnam fails to adequately draw that distinction.

⁵ In this paper, I have provided no bibliographical information on the contributions by other philosophers to which Putnam responds in the material collected in Putnam 2022; all the details are available in that volume.

⁶ Admittedly, many of the formulations by Putnam over the years cited in Raatikainen (2001) are unclear and possibly misleading. Obviously, Panu made an important point simply by reminding us how important it is to distinguish between merely using a language and drawing up an ontology by that language-use.

such as “[i]f our ontology includes individuals but not mereological sums” and “if we adopt an ontology which includes mereological sums” (ibid., 124) – also seems to indicate that our merely having a language (e.g., mereology) is not the same thing as being committed to an ontology expressible by using that language. Certainly, the sheer use of the language of mereology does not miraculously create mereological sums into existence. The point of the example is different, namely, that there is no fact of the matter whether mereological sums exist because the very idea of there being such metaphysical facts of the matter (at some absolute or fundamental metaphysical level) is unclear at best and downright nonsensical at worst.

In other words, Putnam thus argues that it is, at least partly, a *conventional* matter whether mereological sums exist. But this is not to claim that it would be *merely* conventional, either; on the contrary, factuality and conventionality are deeply interwoven and interpenetrating.⁷ The relativity of objecthood that the Carnapian world argument in Putnam’s view demonstrates entails that existential expressions we use in our languages, such as “there are”, “there exist”, “there exists a”, and “some”, as well as their logical codification in the existential quantifier, “*do not have a single absolutely precise use but a whole family of uses*” (Putnam 2004, 37; original emphasis). In other words, the notion of an “object” is “inherently extendable”, and no sense whatsoever can be made of the notion of a “totality of all objects” (Putnam 2022, 108). It is only by endorsing this relativity (or conventionality), and thus rejecting what Putnam earlier (e.g., 1981, 1990) called metaphysical realism, that we can truly make sense of our practice of making existence claims at all. Moreover, as far as I can see, this is something that Putnam never fundamentally reconsidered even after having given up “internal realism”. I do not think he ever believed that the notion of a totality of all objects would make sense – even when he returned to something like commonsense or even metaphysical realism.

A transcendental argument against metaphysical realism?

My main aim is not, however, to defend Putnam’s argument for conceptual relativity or his complex views on realism more generally but to examine the philosophical status of his argumentation in this context. What I am tentatively proposing is that we may interpret at least some of Putnam’s central arguments as *transcendental arguments* in a loosely Kantian sense. Despite his obvious Kantian influences, Putnam himself never accepted those critics’ views who suggested that his internal realism could be regarded as a version of Kantian transcendental idealism.⁸ However,

⁷ This is a major theme in, e.g., Putnam 1990 and Putnam 2004. I cannot go into any details here, though.

⁸ In the editor’s introduction to Putnam 1990, James Conant distinguishes between four major influences in Putnam’s philosophy: Kant, the pragmatists, Wittgenstein, and Stanley Cavell. (Putnam also occasionally refers to the similarities between Kant and pragmatism, which I find important but will have to set aside here.) Taking the suggestion about Putnam’s Kantian background seriously, I once made an explicit effort along these lines, wondering why he could not endorse a pragmatic transcendental rearticulation of his views, in a

I would like to suggest – continuing the dialogue not only with Panu but with Putnam himself, although he can no longer respond – that Putnam's above-described defense of conceptual relativity, in particular, might be seen as a transcendental argument.

The basic idea is this. Putnam's arguments may be interpreted as seeking to demonstrate that unless we endorse conceptual relativity (along the lines briefly explained above), we can make no sense of the idea that the “same” situation or portion of reality may be described in different ways, postulating different objects. However, we do have to make sense of this idea, because otherwise we cannot even find our practice of referring to objects intelligible at all. Without conceptual relativity, we end up with the ultimately unintelligible ideas of “self-identifying objects” and an ontologically pre-structured “ready-made” world.⁹ In order to have a world of objects in the first place (something we may presumably take for granted), we must subscribe to conceptual relativity, because the very notion of objecthood can be made sense of only by accepting its “extendability”.

However, conceptual relativity as such does not exhaust the matter. One of the most important moves in Putnam's reflections on his Carnapian world arguments and its significance was his response (in 2001) to Jennifer Case's articles on conceptual relativity. Putnam endorses Case's distinction between *optional* and *non-optional* languages and regrets not having made that distinction earlier. While we are free to employ or not to employ a language such as mereology, he tells us, “[w]e are not, given the material and social worlds in which we live, genuinely free not to quantify over tables and chairs” (Putnam 2022, 97). Putnam seems to be saying that the distinction between genuinely optional languages and parts of language that we cannot avoid employing is itself constitutive of our mastering a natural language (*ibid.*). He thus seems to argue that being able to distinguish between optional and non-optional cases of language-use is a necessary condition for the possibility of meaningful language-use. This can be regarded as a transcendental argument, albeit a pragmatist one, referring to our participation in linguistic practices and its necessary conditions. The upshot appears to be that a metaphysical realist subscribing to a metaphysics of a fixed set of mind- and language-independent objects and properties out there in a “ready-made” world cannot make sense of such participation.

Metaphysical realism can, then, (only) be transcendently refuted – just like you have to adopt transcendental idealism in order to argue against transcendental realism in Kant's original formulation of transcendental philosophy (see Allison 2004 [1983]). To make that distinction is already to have taken a transcendental turn and thus to have embraced something like transcendental idealism. Of course, Putnam does not and cannot say this in so many words, due to his firm resistance to the transcendental vocabulary.

book symposium on Putnam 2004 (see Pihlström 2006). Putnam's (2006) response to my paper emphatically denied that any transcendental idealism could be read into his account. I further reflect on these issues in Pihlström 2009.

⁹ One of Putnam's classical earlier papers on this issue, “Why There Is No Ready-Made World”, is available in Putnam 1983.

The distinction between optional and non-optional languages is significant also because conceptual relativity, as Putnam acknowledges in his reply to Case, is a special case of the “wider phenomenon” of pluralism (Putnam 2022, 99). Here the examples are closer to the real world we are familiar with in both everyday and scientific experience than the Carnapian language vs. mereology example: for instance, the “contents” of a given situation or state of affairs, such as my room, can be described by using the scheme of everyday description speaking of desks and chairs and by using the scheme of fundamental physics, speaking of fields and particles. Putnam writes: “That we can use both of these schemes without being required to reduce one or both of them to some single fundamental and universal ontology is the doctrine of *pluralism*; and while conceptual relativity implies pluralism, the reverse is not the case.” (Ibid., 99–100.)

Pluralism, in an ontologically relevant sense (and in my terms rather than Putnam’s), is a transcendental condition for the possibility of human language-use as we know it: we must be able to use “these schemes”, without a single absolute reductive ontology, in order to be able to engage in the practices we do engage in – that is, for example, to be able to simultaneously live in the world of the ordinary objects in a room and engage in research in theoretical physics (possibly in that very room). Pluralism itself thus operates within what we may call *transcendental pragmatism*, which analyzes the necessary conditions for the possibility of our engagement in our practices (and thus the necessary conditions for the possibility of something we take as given).

A transcendental argument for pragmatic pluralism (against metaphysical realism) need not, and should not, invoke optional languages and conceptual relativity in the way the Carnapian world argument does; Panu is right to point out that bringing a highly special conceptual scheme such as mereology to the picture creates new problems rather than solving any. Rather, this argument for pluralism most plausibly starts from non-optional natural languages and our unavoidable commitment to the (potential) plurality of ontologies that may be formulated within them.¹⁰ As Putnam himself says, we are not free to avoid quantifying over tables and chairs, and it is this non-optionality (instead of optional languages like mereology) that a genuinely transcendental argument for pluralism should be grounded in, with full awareness of the pragmatic need to also employ highly specialized languages in scientific contexts.

What is at issue – even in the case of optional languages – is the *availability* of some ontology, such as mereology (the “existence” of mereological sums), rather than its actuality (given the use of the relevant language). Different ontological commitments are *enabled* by our choosing (within our practices, for pragmatic reasons) certain schemes. It is within the use of the relevant scheme that we can then further inquire into the matter and critically discuss the ontological postulations

¹⁰ We may find interesting parallels between Putnam’s and William James’s pragmatic pluralisms, even though James’s views hardly explicitly influenced Putnam’s in this specific respect. On James and pluralism, see, e.g., Pihlström 2023, chapter 3.

we ought to, or ought not to, make. In this sense, ontology remains “internal” to our schemes and practices.

Realist philosophers like Panu may at this point remind us that it is one thing to say that we have to use a plurality of languages or schemes and quite another thing to say that this yields a plurality of (acceptable) ontologies. However, this is again where Putnam's transcendental philosophy should surface more explicitly than it does. A full-blown “Kantian pragmatist” can argue that there is no privileged or fundamental level of metaphysical theorizing apart from our use of the schemes we use or the practices we engage in; by assuming there is such a level we also assume that the idea of “the totality of all objects” (or something similar) would make sense, and here Putnam's arguments strike with their full force. Ontology is – in Putnam's earlier vocabulary – “internal” to such uses of and engagements with our practice-embedded schemes. Putnam himself might have acknowledged that some versions of his internal realism did go too far to the Kantian direction, but even this he was reluctant to admit.

Another problem a realist might raise emerges from the fact that Putnam seems to unproblematically help himself to a pre-given ontology of (say) states of affairs when speaking about the different ways in which the “same” state of affairs (e.g., the three Carnapian individuals, or the contents of a room) could be described by using different schemes (see, e.g., Putnam 2022, 109). Here, however, he explicitly denies that any such ontology of either states of affairs, events, or anything else can be given priority (ibid.). No one description can be privileged. This is the very point of the ideas of conceptual relativity and pluralism.

Furthermore, one reason for attributing something like a transcendental idealism – or, better, transcendental pragmatism – to Putnam is that he continued even in the 2000s to endorse a certain kind of “mind-dependence” of properties.¹¹ This is clear in his 2001 reply to Charles Travis, in which he explicitly notes that he agrees with Travis's view according to which “[a] property (the sort of thing we describe as ‘a way that objects might conceivably be’) requires *interpretation*”, while “the reasonableness of property-interpretations [...] depends on the human interests and practices that figure in the particular contexts of speaking”; moreover, this “mind-dependence” of properties “goes all the way down” and is thus “*deep*” (Putnam 2022, 67; original emphases). I agree with this, of course, and these statements provide, in my view, a useful summary of how a pragmatist might look at the metaphysics of properties. But I also think, *pace* Putnam, that a reasonable pragmatist interprets this mind- or interpretation-dependence transcendently, analogously to the way in which empirical reality is taken to be dependent on the human cognitive faculty in Kant's transcendental idealism (which, according to Kant, is fully compatible with empirical realism). If interpreted in any other way, mind-dependence becomes a

¹¹ In this context, he speaks of the mind-dependence of properties rather than objects, but I see no reason why the argument could not be extended to the mind-dependence of objects as well, given that the very notion of an object is “infinitely extendable” and that it is up to us (or our “mind”) to make such extensions.

highly implausible factual, causal, or empirical claim, and no pragmatist or realist should suggest that any objects or properties are mind-dependent in that sense.

A transcendental argument for realism (about truth)?

While Putnam, as we just saw, never accepted the suggestion that his own views on realism would come even close to Kantian transcendental idealism (even if pragmatically “softened” or “naturalized”), he did acknowledge that his own famous “brains in a vat” argument, according to which (simplifying dramatically) we cannot possibly be brains in a vat because we could not refer to brains and vats and could thus never truly say or think that we are brains in a vat if we were (see Putnam 1981, chapter 1), is a close relative of a transcendental argument, in a fallible and empirically contextualized sense:

In spite of the fallibility of my procedure, and its dependence upon assumptions which might be described as ‘empirical’ (e.g. the assumption that the mind has no access to external things or properties apart from that provided by the senses), my procedure has a close relation to what Kant called a ‘transcendental’ investigation; for it is an investigation [...] of the *preconditions* of reference and hence of thought – preconditions built in to the nature of our minds themselves, though not (as Kant hoped) wholly independent of empirical assumptions. (Ibid., 16; original emphasis.)

Thus, Putnam did, at least in a qualified sense, accept the possibility of arguing transcendentially, although (as far as I know) he wrote little explicitly on transcendental arguments. It should not therefore have been impossible for him to view his own argumentation in favor of pluralism (and against metaphysical realism) as transcendental in an analogous sense. Those arguments, too, address the preconditions of reference and thought, particularly of reference and ontological thought about objects or reality.

More generally, Putnam can be said to have engaged in transcendental argumentation not only in his defense of pragmatic pluralism but also in reminding us that we cannot just give up our realistic understanding of truth as something that cannot be reduced to epistemic concepts such as justifiability under ideal epistemic conditions (as he at one point, at the peak of his internal realism, himself maintained). Transcendental reflection thus cuts both ways, both in favor of a certain kind of realism and against metaphysical forms of realism that go too far. Again, Putnam himself, however, never explicitly explicated the transcendental status of these arguments.

In particular, it may be suggested that for a pragmatist and pluralist like Putnam, a transcendental argument is needed to block the possibly threatening Rortyan slippery slope into a radically pragmatist conception of truth that in the end gives up

the concept of objective truth entirely. If this is a correct analysis, then we can draw a simple moral: if you want to be a Putnamian pragmatist, and not a Rortyan one, you had also – despite Putnam's doubts – better be a transcendental philosopher!

That we just cannot get rid of the notion of truth does not mean that truth would have to be defined as correspondence with a metaphysically pre-structured reality. Putnam's own arguments against standard forms of realism and for an ontologically relevant pragmatic pluralism have given us good reasons to avoid such metaphysically realist theories of truth. But even if we do subscribe to some form of pragmatism about truth, this does not entail that the objectivity of truth would or could be sacrificed; moreover, we should remember that the notorious "pragmatist conception of truth", as formulated by James and others, does not abandon objectivity or even "agreement with reality", either (cf. Pihlström 2021).

While maintaining¹² that all truths we human beings can understand are "made true by conditions that are, in principle, accessible to some human beings *at some time or other*" (Putnam 2022, 105; original emphasis), Putnam finds it "absurd to suppose", with antirealists, that "there *could not* be intelligent beings so much smarter than we that some of their thoughts could not even be understood by us; and surely [...] some of those thoughts could be *true*" (ibid., 104). This could again be rephrased as a transcendental argument. In order to avoid absurdity in our use of the concept of truth, we must accept the possibility of truths reaching far beyond any human capacities of cognition and understanding. This is necessary for our being able to use the concept of truth in the ways we (arguably inescapably) have to use it in our linguistic practices – for example, in speaking about the possibility of intelligent beings smarter than us thinking true thoughts incomprehensible to us. This, according to Putnam, by no means threatens the view (which he around the time of this particular argument still saw as crucial to his internal realism) that the concepts of truth and warranted assertibility are interdependent (ibid., 106–107).

However, this would only be to endorse the "spirit" of Kant's empirical realism, not any full-blown Kantian doctrine. Putnam explains:

But that does not mean that I accept Kant's transcendental claim that space and time are "inside us," or the idea that our knowledge fails to reach to the "intrinsic properties" of the "things in themselves," claims whose intelligibility I have repeatedly challenged. Like Peter Strawson,¹³ I believe that there is much insight in Kant's critical philosophy, insight that we can inherit and restate; but Kant's "transcendental idealism" is no part of that insight. (Ibid., 107.)

I have to say it is a disappointment that Putnam seems to have taken Strawson's Kant as a (at least roughly) correct picture of Kant's transcendental idealism. He could

¹² In his response to Anderson cited above.

¹³ The reference, of course, is to Strawson's 1966 volume, *The Bounds of Sense*.

have been more open to a transcendental rearticulation of his own arguments, if he had found his Kant in, say, Henry Allison's one-world reading instead of Strawson's influential but (according to many later scholars) flawed account.¹⁴

Employing the concept of truth, at any rate, is no more dispensable in our practices than our habit of referring to tables and chairs. We cannot "cope" (borrowing one of Richard Rorty's favorite terms) without remaining committed to the objectivity of truth. We may thus even speak of truth as playing a transcendental role in our practices: a sincere commitment to pursuing the truth is a necessary condition for the possibility of our genuine participation in not only practices of inquiry but of thought itself. On the other hand, a fallibilist pragmatic pluralist must acknowledge the possibility that even our most deeply entrenched transcendental commitments may change in the course of history. It remains an open philosophical question whether we can even coherently pose the question of whether it would be possible for us to "live" without a robust concept of truth, and what this would mean.¹⁵

Conclusion

The purpose of this brief discussion has not been to persuade Panu or any other realist philosopher to endorse a form of pragmatism or transcendental idealism (which remain realist in their own way, though). I have only tried to suggest, by drawing attention to some of Putnam's arguments (including those that I discussed with Panu already in the early 1990s) and some of his responses to his critics recently collected in a posthumous volume, that our engagement with the realism issue may enormously benefit from taking seriously the transcendental argumentative strategy which Putnam himself arguably employed but only in a very qualified sense acknowledged as his own. It would be an entirely different ask (which I have tried to undertake in some of my own work over the years and decades, presumably in a continuous implicit dialogue with realist friends like Panu – and of course Ilkka) to demonstrate that transcendental arguments for a pragmatic pluralism are both philosophically sound and capable of securing a sufficiently robust notion of objective truth.

¹⁴ My own attempts to develop a Kantian pragmatist approach are indebted to Allison (2004 [1983]); see, e.g., Pihlström 2009. Allison's "anthropocentric" (as distinguished from "theocentric") formulation of transcendental idealism is particularly relevant to Putnamian engagements with realism.

¹⁵ Thus, it also remains a task for a transcendentially sensitive pragmatist philosophy to explore a question like this.

References

- Allison, Henry E. (2004) [1983]: *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*. Revised and enlarged edition. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.
- Niiniluoto, Ilkka (1999): *Critical Scientific Realism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pihlström, Sami (2006): "Putnam's Conception of Ontology". *Contemporary Pragmatism* 3:2, 1-15.
- Pihlström, Sami (2009): *Pragmatist Metaphysics: An Essay on the Ethical Grounds of Ontology*. London and New York: Continuum.
- Pihlström, Sami (2021): *Pragmatist Truth in the Post-Truth Age: Sincerity, Normativity, and Humanism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pihlström, Sami (2023): *Humanism, Antitheodicism, and the Critique of Meaning in Pragmatist Philosophy of Religion*. Lanham, MD: Lexington.
- Putnam, Hilary (1975): *Mind, Language and Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Hilary (1981): *Reason, Truth and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Hilary (1983): *Realism and Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Hilary (1987): *The Many Faces of Realism*. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
- Putnam, Hilary (1990): *Realism with a Human Face*. Ed. James Conant. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- Putnam, Hilary (2004): *Ethics without Ontology*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- Putnam, Hilary (2006): "Replies to Commentators". *Contemporary Pragmatism* 3:2, 67-98.
- Putnam, Hilary (2008): *Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Putnam, Hilary (2022): *Philosophy as Dialogue*. Eds. Mario De Caro and David Macarthur. Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Putnam, Hilary and Putnam, Ruth Anna (2017): *Pragmatism as a Way of Life: The Lasting Legacy of William James and John Dewey*. Ed. David Macarthur. Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Raatikainen, Panu (2001): "Putnam, Languages and World". *Dialectica* 55, 167-174.
- Raatikainen, Panu (2004): *Ihmistieteet ja filosofia*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Raatikainen, Panu (2006): "The Scope and Limits of Value-Freedom in Science". In Heikki J. Koskinen, Sami Pihlström, and Risto Vilkkö (eds.), *Science - a Challenge to Philosophy?* Peter Lang, 323-331.