To whom do the Kalevala and its epic poems belong? Where are the origins of the epic poems? How do we understand the relationship between Finns and Karelians? Is the Finnish language closely related to the Karelian language? These questions were intensively discussed not only in Finland but also in the Soviet Union, and between Finland and the Soviet Union, in the 1940s and 1950s.

This dissertation addresses repertories of Soviet imperial rule in Soviet Karelia, where the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic existed from 1940 to 1956, by scrutinizing the controversy over the Kalevala and pan-Finnik kinship among Soviet intellectuals in Soviet Karelia, Leningrad, and Moscow and between Soviet and Finnish intellectuals.

The dissertation is based on varieties of archival materials from Russia, Finland, and Estonia to understand how the Soviet Union grafted pan-Finnic ideology/heimoaate onto the Soviet national ideology to justify its rule in Soviet Karelia and influence Finland to challenge Finland and the Finns to claim the central place of the Baltic-Finnic world after the Second World War.

This doctoral dissertation argues that the Soviet Union “tamed” Greater Finland by picking up useful elements—in particular the pan-Finnism ideology and hierarchy— from it to justify its rule in the Soviet-Finnish borderlands, as the Finns did before and during the Second World War. The dissertation also demonstrates how Soviet Finns, Karelians, and Veps held multiple positions to resist and challenge the pan-Finnism ideology and hierarchy, which the “collusion” between the Soviet Union and Finland imposed on them.
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TAMING GREATER FINLAND
Pan-Finnism, the Soviet -Finnish Kalevala Controversy, and the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic, 1940-1956

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Taming Greater Finland: Pan-Finnism, the Soviet-Finnish Kalevala Controversy, and the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic, 1940–1956

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Doctoral Programme in History and Cultural Heritage
Faculty of Arts
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Summary

This dissertation discusses repertories of the Soviet imperial rule in Soviet Karelia from 1940 to 1956, when the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic existed there, by scrutinizing the controversy over the Kalevala and pan-Finnic kinship within the Soviet Union and between Finland and the Soviet Union. Utilizing Russian, Finnish, and Estonian archival materials and secondary sources, this work studies how the Soviet Union grafted pan-Finnic ideology grafted onto the Soviet national ideology to justify its rule in Soviet Karelia but also to influence Finland to claim the central place of the Baltic-Finnic world after the Second World War.

This dissertation is made up of four parts. Part 1 describes the historical trajectory of the controversy from the early 19th century to the late 1930s, when the pan-Finnism ideology and the Kalevala appeared in the Grand Duchy of Finland as Finnish national projects and imperial Russian productions and helped Finland and Finns become the center of the Baltic-Finnic world after the independence, which was however followed by the Russian nationalism and Russian-Karelian friendship and later Russo-centric Soviet internationalism. Part 2 scrutinizes the early years of the Karelo-Finnish Republic, which rehabilitated repressed Soviet Finns and Finnish culture but saw again the rise of Russian-Karelian friendship during the Finnish occupation of Soviet Karelia. Part 3 demonstrates postwar Soviet utilization of pan-Finnism through discussions on the Soviet Kalevala centenary jubilee and Karelian-Finnish kinship within the Soviet Union and between Finland and the Soviet Union to reify the Soviet friendship of peoples and the shift of center from Finland to the Soviet Union in the Baltic-Finnic world. Part 4 concluded the dissertation with the final years of the Karelo-Finnish Republic, which saw both contradictions and persistence of the Karelo-Finnish and the Soviet Kalevala as the symbol during and after Stalin’s reign.

As a conclusion, this doctoral dissertation argues that the Soviet Union manipulated and modified the pan-Finnic ideology and hierarchy to make them adaptable to the Soviet ideology of the “friendship of peoples” and to stabilize Soviet-Finnish borderlands. This utilization of the hierarchy kept Soviet Karelians and Veps under Finns and demonstrated collusion of the Soviet and Finnish national ideologies. Nevertheless, the hybrid of pan-Finnic and Russian-centric Soviet ideologies created rooms for the Karelians and Veps to hold multiple positions to challenge the superiority of Finns (either in Finland or in the Soviet Union). This rule of differences is a repertory of the Soviet imperial rule in Soviet-Finnish borderlands, which has long consequences beyond the period of the Karelo-Finnish Republic. At the same time, this manipulation was challenged both from within Soviet Karelia and from Finland already during the Stalinist time and the Moscow leadership itself damaged it by its practical approach to Finland.
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Introduction

Aims and General Background

When the People’s Government of Finnish Democratic Republic led by the old Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen “proposed” that the Soviet Government conclude a treaty of mutual support and friendship on 1 December 1939, the day after the Red Army started to advance over the Soviet-Finnish border, the “new” Finnish government justified this in realizing an “age-old national dream of the Finnish people of reunification with the Karelian people in a united and independent Finnish state.” The treaty undersigned on the next day said that the Soviet Union agreed to transfer to the new Finnish Democratic Republic “the districts dominated by the Karelian population in Soviet Karelia” to fulfill the “national wish [natsional'nym chaianiiam]” of the Finnish people.1 After 19 months, on July 11, 1941, two weeks after Finland declared war on the Soviet Union, the Finnish Marshall C. G. Mannerheim issued the Order of the Day No. 3, which called Soviet and Finnish Karelians to join in the Finnish Army to realize “freedom of Karelia and a greater Finland [suuri Suomi],” which he had promised in 1918 and for which “White Sea and Olonets Karelia have waited for 23 years.”2 Despite differences between the two countries in many respects, they shared a common goal: the Finnish and Karelian peoples with their native lands must be brotherly united in a Finnish state.

This, probably, sounds quite odd to those who know that Russia up until today has repeatedly condemned “Greater Finland [Suur-Suomi]” as nationalistic, chauvinistic, and fascist “adventurism” to violently annex Russian/Soviet Karelia and Karelians into Finland. Some claim, it is just a geopolitical trick of Stalin and his cronies to transform Finland or at least to make Finland accept Soviet demands by hinting at Soviet Karelia and Karelians while they repressed Soviet Finnic peoples in Soviet Karelia. Others believe that the Lenin-Stalinist Soviet project created a Karelian people and would have realized a Greater Finland if Finland had received the Red Army and Soviet power. These geopolitical points of view from above, however, do not explain how those who were twisted around the Kremlin’s finger survived and understood the radically and suddenly changing world.

This doctoral dissertation addresses Soviet rule over Finnic peoples, among others Karelians, in Soviet Karelia, the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic, from 1940 to 1956. It investigates how the

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Soviet political and scholarly elites responded the challenge of “Greater Finland” from Finland, grafted pan-Finnism onto the Soviet national ideology, and implicitly and selectively employed this notion for ruling Soviet Karelia and the Finnic population living there and further for the propaganda toward Finland. The main attention goes to Soviet Finno-Ugric scholars and their academic works, their relationships with the Communist Party elites, their controversy among themselves and with Finnish elites, and political use of these works. Firmly tied with the Soviet ideology, these negotiations among those elites decisively contributed to the discourse which articulated the Karelo-Finnish people, Karelian people, Finnish people, and their relationship with the Russian people, and the Soviets. From this point of view, this dissertation aims to contribute to recent discussion on empire, nations/nationalities, and imperial borderland policy in Soviet/Russian studies.

This study, however, will go beyond the framework of Soviet/Russian studies and argue some important issues in Finnish historiography as well, because this dissertation discusses the Kalevala, Finno-Ugric studies, and pan-Finnism. The discussion on the Kalevala and Greater Finland has mainly remained within Finnish national history and still unknown topics for many non-Finnish readers. Nonetheless, Soviet political and scholarly elites seriously discussed those topics to justify the Soviet rule in Soviet Karelia and to undermine what Finnish “bourgeoisie” claimed before and during the Second World War. Furthermore, pan-Finnism includes the discussion on the Finnish-Estonian brotherhood and friendship. Therefore, this dissertation partially touches also how the Soviets saw the symbols of this Finnic brotherhood during the early Cold War years. Though not going deeply into questions concerning Finnish and Estonian historiographies, this study sheds a new light on the Kalevala and Greater Finland discussions by scrutinizing what the Soviet elites discussed on these issues and how they saw what the Finnish elites discussed at that time.

This point of view to include Finnish historical issues offers a new insight into the discussion on Soviet imperial, multinational/ethnic character and its entanglement, and collaboration with the Finnish national and nation-state project on the borderlands. Several recent studies on this topic have concentrated on non-Russian nations and their union republics which became independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This approach nonetheless tends to be a teleological account of coming “nations” in that how some ethnic/national groups came to a nation in the end. The case of the Karelo-Finnish Republic will offer an example to observe how the people having a union republic failed to be a “nation” by scrutinizing national discourse of the Karelo-Finnish caught between the Finnish and the Russian and embraced by the discourse of the Soviet. Furthermore, treating Pan-Finnism makes it possible to discern how this pan-national ideology and discourse born and nurtured in the area around Gulf of Finland challenged and influenced the Soviet project in the Karelo-Finnish Republic and to articulate transnational interactions in the world of Baltic Finns beyond Soviet-Finnish borders.

In short, my doctoral dissertation analyses the Karelo-Finnish Republic standing at a
crossroads of the Soviet nationalities policy, the Soviet policy toward Finland, and the Soviet-Finnish transnational network. The notions of pan-Finnism and Greater Finland connected these three issues, and the Kalevala and Finno-Ugric studies are the foundation of the two Finnish nationalist ideologies but also parts of the Soviet national ideology. The dissertation shows that the Soviet Union did not destroy Greater Finland but tried to tame it.

Research Questions and Previous Studies

Locating this dissertation in historiography underlines the aims and significance of this dissertation. This study aims to fill historiographical gaps in these three areas: Soviet history, Finnish (and partially Estonian) history, and history of the Soviet-Finnish relationship.

First, this dissertation is a contribution to the discussion on empire and nationalities in Soviet/Russian historical studies. From the 1980s on, with increasing criticism against the totalitarian interpretation of Soviet history, attentions went to Soviet nationalities problem in the context of social history such as modernization and nation-making. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and opening of former Soviet archives, the number of studies on this topic has drastically increased and the number of nationalities in focus in those studies have diversified. Some important works set the course of discussion by showing how the 'leadership coped with non-Russian national leaders and nationalisms during the Revolutions and Civil War. These works, mainly discussing Leninist and pre-war Stalinist nationalities policy, stress an experimental aspect of the early Bolsheviks to overcome nationalisms by deliberately (and often ad hoc) supporting and violently disciplining non-Russian national elites and cultures in order to mobilize their loyalty to Soviet power and strengthen then class-identity for making the “new Soviet man.” These general works were joined by a number of case studies on Russian and non-Russian nations/nationalities going through the Bolshevik experiment. These case

4 This study emphasizes separate, individual occurrences of nationalism and thus use the plural, “nationalisms,” for that purpose.
6 Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca: Cornell
studies have offered more nuanced explanation for Soviet practices of nationalities policy at the local level, center-local negotiations, making of national borders and nations/nationalities, and violence against indigenous and diaspora groups. Accordingly, one of the basic questions of late Stalinist and post-Stalinist nationalities policy is how and to what extent this early Soviet nationalities policy continued to nurture non-Russian nationalisms within the framework of Russian centrism and Soviet superiority over other nationalisms even after the late 1930s. Case studies have revealed how Leninist-Stalinist indigenization nationalities policy was “quietly” practiced in the borderland republics such as Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic, and Caucasian countries even during the late Stalinist repression, Sovietization, deportation and “Russification,” and further after Stalin’s death.

What is common to those works is that they focus on the national republics and nations which would become the post-Soviet independent states and nations, and therefore tend to be a teleological account of coming nations, but it failed to fully demonstrate what hindered nation-building within the Soviet Union, though it is impossible to completely avoid a teleological narrative. In addition, those previous studies have not addressed interaction between the borderlands and neighboring countries, while discussing the center-periphery relationship within the Soviet state. In this respect, the experiment in the Karelo-Finnish Republic is a valuable example of how the Soviet power tried to forge a “nation” lacking enough resources and failed but left long-term impacts on


indigenous nationalities and culture, and how Finland, the neighboring country, influenced the Soviet project in Soviet Karelia.\(^9\)

Curiously, the Karelo-Finnish Republic has been forgotten even in most studies of Soviet/Russian Karelia. A post-Soviet official history of the Republic of Karelia pays little attention to the meaning of this Karelo-Finnish period of the region, though it does not fail to feature the establishment of the Karelo-Finnish Republic in 1940.\(^10\) Post-Soviet studies on Soviet Karelia have concentrated on the 1920s and 1930s and, among others, Kauppala’s and Kangaspuro’s works and collected articles edited by Takala and Vihavainen have shown that the Red Finns who fled Finland after the Civil War carried out their own “Red” Greater Finland project in Soviet Karelia by modernizing the local economy, seeking political and economic autonomy, and the “Finnization” of the Karelians.\(^11\) The fact that Moscow again manipulated the idea of Greater Finland in the wake of the Winter War suggests persistence of this notion in the mind of Moscow leaders even after the era of the Red Finns in Soviet Karelia. Others have argued that the Karelo-Finnish Republic was just a make-up of Stalin’s miscalculation in the Winter War. Needless to say, the history of Soviet Karelia in the 1940s and 1950s has yet remained understudied.\(^12\)


Osmo Hyytiä’s work on the Karelo-Finnish Republic is a pioneering and important contribution to this problem and reveals many unknown facts on the Republic by using declassified archival documents in the 1990s. The problem is that this work fails to put the Republic in the context of Soviet historical studies and is rather a product of the time, when some Finnish scholars were searching for “lost Finnishness” in Russian Karelia to find a clue for situating Finnishness in the post-Cold War World. Thus, the work has failed to discern the confrontation between Finnish culture and Karelian culture, and their relationships with that of the Russian. Articles by Vihavainen, Laine, and Zakharova have rightly situated the Republic in this context and suggested some exceptional aspects of the Republic in the Soviet nationalities policy, but they have not deepened their analysis with a good quantity of archival materials. Roughly speaking, Finnish scholars have not paid enough attention to Russian factors in the Republic, and Russians have not considered Finnish factors. In contrast, it is essential that both factors be taken into consideration when addressing the nationalities issues in the Republic.

This is the point to focus on in the scholarly discussions of the Karelo-Finnish people and culture, because it was local intellectuals and scholars that confronted this entanglement between the Finnish, the Karelian, the Karelo-Finnish, the Russian, and the Soviet peoples and cultures. Recent studies have paid more attention to the role of scholars, intellectuals, and artists in nation/empire-building in the Soviet Union and to the relationship between the center and borderland periphery. Scholarly and intellectual discussions occupy an important place in Soviet history, especially during the postwar Stalinist years, because they became the target of the ideological campaign of the Communist Party.

14 Zakharova, “À la recherche,”; Articles by Irina Takala and Timo Vihavainen and by Antti Laine, both in Vihavainen and Takala, *V sem’i edinoi.*
15 In her study on Russian Karelia, Marina Vitukhnowskaia rightly set this Karelian question into the context of the national and imperial borderland policy of the Russian Empire and Russian policy toward Finland. Marina Vitukhnowskaia, *Rossiiskaia Karelia i karely v imperskoi politike Rossii, 1905–1917* (SPb.: Norma, 2006).
Leningrad. Especially, those studies concentrating on the ideological campaign against philologists have tended to stress the binary explanation between “repressing” party power and “repressed” scholars and intellectuals in the two capitals and other major cities. Admitting the difficult situation those scholars fell in, this study will show another dimension of this campaign by scrutinizing what the Karelo-Finnish scholars did with leading Leningrad scholars who faced serious attacks but contributed to the discussion on the Karelo-Finnish people and culture supported by the local Party elites. In other words, this study shows that local elites and scholars took advantage of a little space for maneuvering which was created by Stalin’s geopolitical strategy and manipulation of nationalism in the north-western borderlands.

Folkloristics and Finno-Ugric linguistics were important disciplines for the Republic, because Soviet Karelia had rich folklore and dialect traditions. Among others, the Soviets claimed Soviet/Russian Karelia as the birthplace of the Kalevala as the Karelo-Finnish epic in the Soviet Union. There have been studies on the history of Soviet folkloristics mainly by folklorists, which is, however, not yet organically associated with the discussion on nationalities issues in the Soviet Union. On the contrary, many scholars have already paid attention to linguists’ role in early Soviet nation building including that in Soviet Karelia. In Soviet Karelia, the role of the Finnish and Karelian languages was critical not only in the local nation building but also in the discussion of the Finno-Ugric linguistic family in the Soviet Union, which once denied this notion of linguistic kinship as a fascist one. Discussion of the Kalevala draws together the scholarly discussions, political and ideological issues, and nation-building in the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Second, my dissertation will shed a new light on several key issues in Finnish historiography: the Kalevala, Karelians, and Greater Finland. Soviet Kalevala and Finno-Ugric studies highlight the contested character of the Karelo-Finnish Republic between Finland and the Soviet Union. Russian/Soviet Karelia has occupied a special place in Finnish history, especially in its nationalist and expansionist ideology, Greater Finland.

The idea and practice of Greater Finland has mainly been discussed in the context of Finnish history. This discussion has included intellectuals’ and scholars’ contribution to this nationalist


ideology. Of course, scholars have paid attention to political use of the Kalevala and the history of Finnic peoples. Thus, recent Finnish historians have tended to regard Greater Finland or pan-Finnism (Tribe ideology or Kinship ideology/Heimoaate) as racist and even “Holocaustic” by putting them into the context of history of interwar European fascism or Far Right. These recent studies have obviously compared this Finnish nationalist project with Nazi Germany and other fascist- or nazi-like rightist movements but ignored how the Soviet side interpreted and used Greater Finland and, at least partially, reproduced what the Soviet Union had long propagated about Greater Finland. In addition, almost all previous works have treated this discussion as a purely national issue and stopped their discussion with the end of the Second World War. Interestingly, despite fierce controversy on the Kalevala and Baltic-Finnic languages between Finnish and Soviet scholars in the interwar years, few studies have addressed this issue by taking both sides into consideration.

Indeed, the Kalevala, above all the political use of the Kalevala, has been a difficult and controversial question in Finnish historiography. It is William Wilson who addressed history of the Kalevala and the Kalevala researchers in terms of its use for Greater Finland in interwar and wartime Finland and only recently have Finnish scholars started to accept Wilson’s critical point of view on the relations between the Kalevala, scholarship, and politics. What those studies have neglected, however, is the Kalevala discussion in the Soviet Union and between Finland and the Soviet Union. Though


The latest work by Anneli Sarhimaa addresses the problem of “Finnization” of the Karelian speaking population in Finland, a topic which has been ignored for decades. But her work as well does not take Soviet Karelians into consideration. Anneli Sarhimaa, Vaiettu ja vaiennettu: karjalankieliset karjalaiset Suomessa (Helsinki: SKS, 2017).

22 Simo Muir and Hana Worthen, eds., Finland's Holocaust: Silences of History (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2013); Näre and Kirves, Luvattu maa.

Wilson notices that Otto Kuusinen’s interpretation of the Kalevala seems like the one by Finnish nationalists in that both stress the Kalevala as the collective voice of the people, his argument lacks a broader Soviet ideological and historical context of Kuusinen’s interpretation. My study further develops this view of Wilson’s by synthesizing both Finnish and Soviet points of view about the Kalevala and Finnic kinship, and it will show how both the Finns and the Soviets had built on a dialogue and made their own Kalevala and pan-Finnic hierarchies.

Likewise, though not the main aim of this dissertation, Estonians played no less of an important role in this discussion. Especially in terms of folkloristics and Finno-Ugric linguistics, Finnish scholars enjoyed great influence on their Estonian counterparts from the late 19th century, which was an indispensable period of the Finnish-Estonian kinship/brotherhood. Many studies on this topic end up with the Soviet “re-annexation” of Estonia in 1944 and restarted their narrative from the mid-1950s, when Finnish-Estonian academic communication resumed. Curiously, these blank years coincided with the existence of the Karelo-Finnish Republic, which tried to establish the interaction with Estonian scholars during the years to include them to their effort to “tame” Greater Finland. Discussion of the role of scholars in the Karelo-Finnish Republic will answer these questions.

Finally, addressing this Soviet-Finnish “dialogue” needs reconsideration of previous studies on Soviet-Finnish relations. Previously, following the main trend of the Cold War studies, the traditional type of international history has led the discussion, and many historians have concentrated on statesmen, diplomats, political parties, military issues, intelligence and so on. Criticizing and supplementing the traditional studies, the cultural approach to the Soviet-Finnish relationship has produced many works on mutual images, propaganda, individual contacts and so on.


26 For example, Timo Vihavainen, ed., Venäjän kahdet kasvot: Venäjä-kuva suomalaisen identiteetin
further accentuated by in the recent trend of transnational history and cultural diplomacy of the Cold War, which criticizes the “traditional” understanding of the Cold War binary opposition and regards the Iron Curtain as what Michael David-Fox calls the “semipermeable membrane” that “some goods, peoples, knowledge, and models from the outside world selectively and in different ways crossed the borders of communist countries.” These works treating the Soviet-Finnish relations informed by the new approaches, however, tend to focus on “less” ideological issues such as scientific knowledge, technology transfer, and economic cooperation and often avoid or make little account of the ideological confrontation and negotiation which characterize the Cold War and thus fail to grasp historical and ideological factors which had been structuring the Soviet-Finnish/Russian-Finnish relations.

Then, how is it possible to integrate ideological issues, transnational interactions, and national issues into one framework? Recent discussions on modern empires have paid attention to entanglements between empires on imperial borderlands. Indeed, some works have seen the Russian Empire/Soviet Union in the context of empire studies, that is, comparing it with other empires. Again, as Blitstein has indicated, the Soviet Union not only competed with and learned from other contemporary empires but also faced the challenges from neighboring “nationalizing” nation-states, some of which had an ambitious expansionist pan-national ideology. In principle, the Bolsheviks feared and condemned any pan-national movements, but if useful they quietly supported and manipulated them to win the indigenous peoples or influence the neighboring countries. The

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Bolsheviks took a similar strategy when they gained a chance to construct their own bloc in Eastern and Central Europe. Recent scholarship has shown that the Soviet Union could not ignore the inter-war European nationalist legacies and tried hard to graft these legacies onto its socialist/Soviet ideology to rule its bloc and own empire by “cooperating” with local elites of socialist East European countries. Seeing in this context, in the northern-western area of the Soviet Union, it was the (Soviet) Pan-Finnism project that the Soviet Union utilized for the rule over Finnic peoples within the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Union appealed to Finns in Finland to join. Focusing on the controversy over the Kalevala and the Karelian people was advantageous to grasp the Soviet-Finnish competition for Soviet Karelia.

Viewing the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as an empire reminds us that Finland is not only a new nation-state but also one of the post-imperial states which succeeded pasts, institutions, elites, ethnic and religious complexity, and mixed economies from the former empire they belonged to. The Kalevala, Greater Finland, and pan-Finnism are Finnish national but appeared in the Russian Empire and were inherited by both Finland and the Soviet Union. These factors were so persistent that some Finnish elites continued to seek their Pan-Finnic interactions even after the Second World War by constructing friendship between Finland and the Soviet Union. Some have started to treat the history of the post-war Soviet-Finnish academic and cultural interactions but have not addressed the question: how did these Finns pursue both the Soviet-Finnish friendship and their dream, and how did the Soviet counterparts reply them? If we note that Soviet/Russian historiography has not studied the Finnish influence on the Karelo-Finnish Republic, we must note the same of Finnish historiography, for they too have not addressed the Soviet influence on the Kalevala and Karelian controversy in Finland. Nevertheless, this inquiry into interactions between Soviet domestic “inter-national” policy in Soviet Karelia and foreign, international policy toward Finland is an answer to a question posed by David Brandenberger on how Soviet internationalism at home and abroad was interconnected.
To fill the gaps mentioned above, my doctoral study first scrutinizes the scholarly works and discussions on the Kalevala and the Finnic language kinship by Soviet scholars and situates them in the Soviet geopolitical and political contexts. Second, this study pays attention to negotiations between the Party leadership/bureaucrats and the Soviet scholars on the political use of scholarly works. Despite this unequal power relationship, the Party could not one-sidedly impose its will on them and, therefore, had to negotiate with them to create national cultures, histories, and symbols. Both the party elites and scholars were “actors” who struggled for the power to give a “right” definition to ambiguous national culture and symbols. Finally, my dissertation analyzes the impact of the scholarly works and activities of Finnish scholars and of the Soviet-Finnish relationship on these negotiations within the Soviet Union. In other words, my study will focus its attention on the Soviet-Finnish competition over the Kalevala, its poems, the Finnic kinship, and the representation of the pre-revolutionary Finnic intellectuals such as Elias Lönnrot by addressing this Soviet-Finnish controversy and rereading important Finnish and Soviet texts.

This approach makes it possible to grasp resilience of the Soviet ideology and “collision” between Finnish and Soviet pan-Finnism, which became apparent during the period of the Karelo-Finnish Republic, when an important shift occurred in the center of the Finnic world from Finland to the Soviet Union, which “tamed” but did not destroy Greater Finland.

Important Terms, Methodology, and Sources

It is essential to define important terms used in this dissertation to make the discussion as clear as possible. Discussing nationalities questions require clarification of how the dissertation understands empire, nation, nationality, and national identity in Soviet/Russian and Finnish contexts. Furthermore, the terms Heimoaate/Pan-Finnism, and Suur-Suomi/Greater Finland are no less important and complicated to be defined both for Finnish and non-Finnish readers.

The concept “empire” in this study is not a political label (such as “empire of evil”) but rather it is defined by several characteristics for understanding the relationships between imperial core(s) (St. Petersburg or Moscow) and peripheries (Finland or Russian/Soviet Karelia). Empire rules vast territories and peoples of various language, religious, and ethnic belongings with a universal ideology. In their influential work on empire, Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper have maintained that empire incorporates diverse peoples into the polity while sustaining or making distinctions and hierarchies among them through its imperial repertoires with which empires flexibly rule a heterogenous population and manage its vast polity.36 More specifically in the context of Russian and

Soviet history, Suny and Kivelson have recently argued that to maintain an essential degree of cohesion empire needs to convince those are under rule by not only violence and coercive power but also discursive, symbolic power to legitimize its rule on diverse populations.\(^{37}\) Furthermore, in his classical study of empire, Michael Doyle defines empire as a “relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society,” and the relationship is between “a metropole and a periphery penetrated by transnational forces and actors.”\(^{38}\)

As Alexander Motyl has aptly described, in this imperial relationship, empire heavily relies on the core-periphery relations to maintain its rule while lacking relations between the peripheral units or between them and nonimperial polities like “an incomplete wheel, with a hub and spokes but no rim.”\(^{39}\)

On the contrary, nation and nation-state are often described as an antithesis of empire from which many nations and nation-states appeared. As classical studies on this topic have discussed, nation is a homogenous, egalitarian, and inward-looking group forming a political community based on a common culture (including past and memories), a clearly demarcated territory, common legal rights and duties, appearing with the development of print-capitalism and political, economic, and military modernization in which political and intellectual elites play an important role. Since nation cannot appear \textit{ex nihilo}, it often has pre-modern ethnic roots; what Anthony Smith called \textit{ethnie} at its core, from which nation can draw important resources such as past, custom, myths, and symbols to legitimate its existence.\(^{40}\) National identity is one of social identities and provides with a sense about who I am in terms of nation/nationality and to which nation/nationality one affectionally attaches oneself.

This contrast between empire and nation/nation-state is reflected in understanding these terms in two countries. In the Finnish context, the nation is translated into \textit{kansa}, which also means the people. In addition to several ethnic minorities (above all legally recognized Swedish-speaking one) the nation consists of Finnish/Finnic-speaking tribes, \textit{heimot}, which are defined as a community formed by relatives descending from imagined common ancestors and by those who speak the same “dialect,” share the habits, and live in the same area.\(^{41}\) Within the Finnish nation-state and nation these tribes/\textit{heimot} (including the Karelian-speaking tribe) are treated equally in terms of legal status and


\(^{41}\) This definition is a moderated version of the definitions in \textit{Iso tietosanakirja IV} (Helsinki: Otava, 1932), 562; \textit{Nykysuomen sanakirja (I: A-I)} (Helsinki: WSOY, 1951), 403.
they are expected to speak and write the common Finnish language. In the Soviet context (heavily influenced by Stalin’s 1913 formula), nation corresponds to the Russian words natsiia or narod, though the latter also means the people, according to which the nation is a “historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”

In the multinational/ethnic polity, the advanced peoples (for example the titular nations of the union republics), in Soviet understanding belong to the nation, while a broader term natsional’nost’ as a “population group united into a nationally self-conscious community” is translated into nationality and includes also such smaller, “underdeveloped” ethnic groups as Karelians and Veps. Everyone’s natsional’nost’/nationality was indicated in the Soviet passport, while citizenship is translated into grazhdanstvo in Russian.

Recent studies, it will be noted, have also argued similarities between empire and nation/nation-states: many nation-states emerged as a result of conquests and colonization which nationalism-ideology disguises while empires have an imperial people who feel “something special or unique about their empire” like nationalists in relation to their nation.

These shed light on “imperial nations,” especially Russians in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, whose efforts to build such a pro-imperial nation at the imperial core benefits and supports the empire’s rule but, at the same time, competes with the empire in various entangled spheres. This point of view highlights the fact that Russian nationalists if in a privileged position were not always satisfied with their empire which utilized them for its sake but was cautious of their activities. These differences and similarities between empire and nation-state help to articulate Soviet-Finnish entanglements on the borderlands this study addresses.

In many cases nation-states like Finland have such “fellow” ethnic groups who are eligible for membership from outside the borders, and sometimes they have claimed those groups and the territory they lived to be included in the nation and nation-state. This study understands Greater Finland/Suur-Suomi as an expansionist ideology to “liberate” and unite “tribes of Finland [Suomen heimot]” from outside Finland and annex territories (or, in the Estonian case, form an alliance or form a union state) they lived in and geographically defined as Fenno-Scandia. As a translation of Heimoaate, literally translated as “tribe ideology,” I utilize the term “pan-Finnism,” which unlike the term “Greater Finland” dreams and seeks a non-territorial, cultural unity of the Finnic and further

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43 Firsch, Empire of Nation, 106.
44 Kumar, Visions of Empire, 27–30. Some Finnish historians have recently started discussion on the colonial aspect of the Finnish nation-state on the peripheries. Rinna Kullaa et al., eds., Kolonialismi Suomen rajaseuduilla (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2022).
Finno-Ugric peoples. It is true that Greater Finland and Pan-Finnism have common features, and both are closely connected. Furthermore, Russian and Soviet propaganda mixed up these two terms to attack Finnish “separatists, nationalists, and fascists” and thus Finns do not use the term “Pan-Finnism.” Considering the trajectory of this term, however, this dissertation uses “Pan-Finnism” to underline the difference between territorially expansionist Greater Finland and non-territorial, cultural Pan-Finnism and pay more attention to how the ideology was seen by the Soviets, who faced similar pan-nationalisms in their Eurasian borderlands.

Attention to Greater Finland and pan-Finnism makes it possible to grasp a more complicated picture of entanglements among nation/nation-state, imperial nation, and empire and makes a good fitting with recent discussions on transnational history which emphasize links and flows of peoples, ideas, products, and processes that operate over, across, beyond or in between polities and societies. Pan-ism is defined as a “type of nationalist movement that aims to create a large-scale union, be it geographically, ethnically, linguistically, culturally, or religiously bound” and it rose “when the legitimacy of newly emerging nation-state boundaries was still being contested and challenged the existing sovereignty and geographical boundaries.” Given that pan-Finnism and Greater Finland look toward the East (Russia and the Soviet Union), pan-nationalism could combine imperial and national motives and by doing so become “mediators” between them while potentially hampering both projects.

As to the research method, this study scrutinizes the role of ideology and political elites and intellectuals in nation/nationality issues in empire and nation-state. Nation or nationality at the periphery of empire is articulated by the negotiations between the authority in the center and periphery, on the one hand, and intellectuals/scholars, on the other. Intellectuals consciously or unconsciously play the creative and constitutive role in nation-making by bringing “together disparate cultural elements, selected historical memories, and interpretations of experiences, all the while silencing the inconvenient, the unheroic, and the anomalous.” Taking into consideration broader socio-economic-geopolitical structure, this study mainly analyzes intellectuals/scholars as active agents of nation-buildings and national ideologies.

This study regards ideology not as dogmatic and static but as discourse that legitimates a given arrangement of power and property but is negotiable by various actors. In the context of Soviet

50 Ronald G. Suny, “On ideology, subjectivity, and modernity: disparate thoughts about doing Soviet
studies, the so-called totalitarian school of the Cold War era applied to their analysis ideology as a single rigid doctrine through which Soviet leaders ruled and controlled its population. This understanding of ideology as distortion of reality in favor of the dominant power, however, saw criticisms from “revisionist” social historians, and ideology lost its popularity as an analyzing tool for the Soviet state and society. With the opening of former Soviet archives and adopting “linguistic and cultural turns” in the 1990s, some historians brought back ideology in a more nuanced form.\(^{51}\)

Informing by discourse analysis, cultural studies, and sociology, those historians have come to regard ideology as rather a discourse, worldview, or performance than an instrument to rule from above.\(^{52}\)

While avoiding the discursive “determinism” of reality, this understanding of ideology as “historically informed discourse” makes it possible to understand how ideology functioned or was produced and consumed in Soviet world. Because of its flexibility, this ideology as historically informed discourse becomes an object of negotiations by various actors including political elites and intellectuals having their own interests.\(^{53}\) Since ideology is a medium through which people understand and influence outer world, when connected to collective identity such as national identity, “ideology informs people about who they are, and whom they think the ‘other’ is.”\(^{54}\)

This understanding of ideology enables us to grasp not only how ideology justifies the power to rule its subjects by unifying various social groups and constituting hierarchies but also how various actors under the rule conflict and collide over questions central to the reproduction of these social


\(^{52}\) Michael David-Fox has offered six but to some extent mutually overlapping characters of ideology for Soviet history to overcome the split between ideology as doctrine and as either discursive or cultural. See his “The Blind Men and the Elephant: Six Faces of Ideology in the Soviet Context,” in Michael David-Fox, Crossing Borders: Modernity, Ideology, and Culture in Russia and the Soviet Union (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 82–93.

\(^{53}\) This notion comes from Bourdieu’s understanding of language, symbol, and power. Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays toward a Reflexive Sociology trans. by Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), especially chapter 8; Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power trans. by John B. Thompson (Cambridge, 1991). Although Bourdieu here describes “symbol,” ideology/dominant discourse as well as symbol can be an object for which various agents with their social position and interests compete. These agents and their language reify the discourse and give a concrete meaning to symbol as a result of struggles, competitions and negotiations among actors.

groups and hierarchies, which is potentially dangerous to the rulers. This makes it possible to grasp how ideology as power works while avoiding a unilateral imposition of ideology from above, and how ideology as discourse is negotiated by various groups and actors by not ignoring unequal power relationships among them.

These negotiations are to be understood as “dialogic” in a Bakhtinian sense, that is, one actor cannot enforce one’s interest on another, but their relationship is an interactive one. In the Soviet Union, as a rule, the Party was the dominant power and the scholars of Stalinist time have been depicted as the victims. This leads to a notion that the Party power imposed its will on them whenever it wanted in the late Stalinist era. Nevertheless, this Bakhtinian notion helps to grasp the interdependency between the Party elites and the scholars, while not underestimating the unequal power relation between them. In addition, Finland participated in these “dialogues/negotiations.” Even though this Finnish influence should not be overemphasized, my study will clarify these dialogical negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland as well. Therefore, this study analyses the dialogical negotiations among the Moscow leadership, the Republic leadership, scholars in Petrozavodsk, Leningrad, and Tartu, and the Finnish elites.

Important research materials are the primary sources from major archives in Russia, Finland, and Estonia. Since this study focuses on political and scholarly discussions on the Kalevala and Finnic kinship in the Soviet Union, it is essential to utilize archival documents of the Communist Party organizations, academic, and cultural institutions in Petrozavodsk, St. Petersburg, and Moscow, which deal discussions on language and cultural issues in the Karelo-Finnish Republic. Main archival documents come from the National Archive of the Republic of Karelia (Local Communist Party and Soviet organization) and the Research Archive of the Karelian Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Karelian branch of Soviet Academy of Sciences), which highlight discussions within Soviet Karelian party, soviet, and academic organizations and offer personal correspondence among scholars and party elites. These documents are supplemented by archival documents in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Decisions and discussions in Moscow and Leningrad party organizations and academic institutions set the course of discussion in Petrozavodsk, and Karelo-Finnish scholars and intellectuals kept contacts with especially their Leningrad counterparts. Therefore, this study utilizes the former Soviet communist party archives (RGASPI and RGANI) and the archives of academic and literary organizations (ARAN and RGALI) in Moscow and the Leningrad party archive (TsGAIPD SPb) and academic and literature archives (SPF ARAN, TsGALI SPb, RO IRLI) to study

discussions within the party organizations at universities and academic institutions, and personal letters among scholars and intellectuals. Furthermore, this dissertation relies also on the documents from VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) to study Finnish-Soviet scholarly interactions.

Scrutinizing transnational interactions between Finland and the Soviet Union requires investigating Finnish archival documents. The National Archive of Finland and the Literature Archive of the Finnish Literature Society have rich personal documents of scholars and intellectuals (mainly letter exchanges) who actively took part in discussions on the Kalevala and the Finnic kinship and corresponded with Russian/Soviet scholars. To study discussions about the Kalevala centenary jubilees in 1935 and 1949, this dissertation makes use of documents in the Kelevala Society archive and the archive of the Communist Party of Finland and of Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL) from the People’s Archive. Furthermore, Estonian archives (the Estonian Cultural Archive in Tartu and the National Archive in Tallin) offer documents concerning Estonians’ participation in the Soviet Kalevala centenary jubilee in 1949 and correspondence with Petrozavodsk and Leningrad scholars in the 1940s and 1950s.

In addition to those archival sources, this dissertation utilizes sources such as central and local newspapers, literary journals, academic publications, conference papers, festival pamphlets, and memoirs published in Russian, German, Swedish, Finnish, and Estonian. Since this study focuses on discussions within the Soviet Union, it heavily depends on previous studies done by Finnish and Estonian scholars on the Kalevala controversy, Greater Finland, and Estonian-Finnish brotherhood. Nevertheless, this dissertation tried to reinterpret major Finnish texts which previous studies have intensively discussed in a new context of Soviet/Russian-Finnish dialogue.

Part 1 explains the background of Soviet-Finnish entanglements on the borderlands and Soviet-Finnish controversy over the Kalevala and pan-Finnism from the early 19th century to the late 1930s to demonstrate the emergence of Finland as the center of the Baltic-Finnic world. Chapter 1 shows how the Kalevala and pan-Finnism appeared and expanded not only as a Finnish national cultural project but also as products of imperial Russian rule. This Finnish project leaned toward Germanic/European direction and reached Estonia and Russian Karelia, while Russian imperial and national scholarship began to challenge the Finno-centric Kalevala and pan-Finnism. Chapter 2 deals with the period of early Soviet and independent Finnish years, when independent Finland tried to realize Greater Finland and “nationalize/Finnize” a new nation-state and the Soviet leadership received the Red Finns in Soviet Karelia and Leningrad region for socialist modernization. As highlighted in the 1935 Old Kalevala jubilees, both White and Red Finns demonstrated its cultural might to defend its independence or complete building socialism and took care of other Finnic “brothers,” while they were challenged by Russian-centric Soviet ideology and Soviet Karelians with its “older brother”
Russians.

Part 2 investigates the years of the Second World War, when the Karelo-Finnish SSR was established after the Winter War and faced Finnish occupation of Soviet Karelia during the Soviet-German war. As happened in Ukraine and Belorussia, Moscow brought pan-Finnism and Greater Finland to Soviet Karelia in the wake of the Winter War. This sudden change in Soviet Karelia was followed by Finnish occupation and “accidental” realization of Greater Finland, which chapter 4 scrutinizes. While the Finns practiced Greater Finland in occupied Soviet Karelia and received Estonian and Ingrian Finnish refugees, it was extremely difficult for Soviet Karelians and Finns to continue studying Finnish and promoting Finnish culture in evacuation and Russian-Karelian friendship and Karelian nationalism overwhelmed Karelo-Finnishness.

Part 3 discusses negotiations for the Kalevala and Finnic kinship within the Karelo-Finnish Republic, between the Republic and Moscow and Leningrad, and between the Soviet Union and Finland. As chapters 5 and 6 show, the Republic leadership and elites were assigned to stress the Russian-Karelian friendship immediately after the liberation of Soviet Karelia, but quietly began to include Soviet Finnish elements in this Russian-Karelian friendship discourse to build the Karelo-Finnish people and the Kalevala as the Karelo-Finnish epic, especially after the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish treaty in 1948. Chapter 7 addresses the 1949 New Kalevala centenary jubilees, when the Karelo-Finnsh Republic tried to show that the Kalevala and pan-Finnic hierarchy were arranged and grafted onto the Soviet national ideology under the ideological pressure of late Stalinist campaign.

Part 4 addresses the last years of the Karelo-Finnish Republic, when the Republic had to defend the Finnic kinship and Soviet pan-Finnism attacked by the ideological campaign, on the one hand, and by other disciplines and those Finnic intellectuals put under the Finns in the pan-Finnic hierarchy, on the other. Furthermore, as chapter 9 shows, Stalin’s death and post-Stalinist partial liberalization immediately cast doubt on the existence of the Republic. However, various actors skillfully convenient places for themselves between the Soviet and pan-Finnic hierarchies, even after the Republic was downgraded in 1956.
Part 1

Finnish Nationalism, Pan-Finnism, and the Kalevala in the Russian Empire and Post-Imperial Borderland from the Early 19th Century to the End of the 1930s

Chapter 1: Finnish Nation, the Kalevala, and Pan-Finnism in the Russian Empire

The Russian Empire in the 19th Century and its Rule over Diversified Subjects

After the victory over Napoleon, the Russian Empire emerged as a great power in Europe. Territorial expansion resulted in further entanglements and conflicts with other empires: the Hapsburg and later the German Empires in the West; the Ottoman, Iranian, and British Empires in the South; and then the Qing and Japanese Empires in the Far East. Accordingly, borderlands became even more important, given that the Russian Empire faced a challenge from the idea of nationalism. Since the Romanov dynasty had been based on the myth of calling the foreign rulers and the Petrine Europeanization and rationalization, the idea of nationalism could potentially ignite not only non-Russian intellectuals and elites but also Russian ones. Indeed, nationalism might endanger the cooperations between St. Petersburg and local nobles on the borderlands. St. Petersburg took advantage of cooperating local nobles who enjoyed high social, economic, and military status in local society and who were generally well-educated and functioned as important channels through which European institutions and ideas were imported.

It was the reign of Nicholas I that responded nationalism by formulating so-called “official nationality” to tighten its militarist control over society and cement the loyalty to tsar by expressing “Russian national soul, displaying a bond between tsar and people that had existed since Muscovy” through, for example, music and ceremony to compete with nationalisms. After the Polish uprising in 1830–31, Sergei Uvarov, Germanophile Minister of Public Education, formulated the famous triad “Orthodoxy, Aristocracy, Nationality” as the official ideology of the Empire. He and the tsar, however,

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understood the risk of this use of Russian national project to provoke non-Russian nationalisms, on the one hand, and Russian nationalism and pan-Slavism, on the other hand, which might threaten the triad and the legitimacy of Romanov autocracy.4

Greatest challenge for the empire came from Russian Poland and the area of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which are often compared with the Grand Duchy of Finland. While Finland was located on the periphery of the Kingdom of Sweden, Polish nobles occupied the dominant place in the old Polish-Lithuanian Republic. Furthermore, while both elites and people in Finland were Lutheran and ethnically and linguistically different from Slavs, religious and ethnic situation in the former Polish-Lithuanian Republic was far more complicating: many of them spoke Slavic but included substantial number of Jews; Polish nobles were Catholic, but indigenous peasant population was Orthodox, Uniate, or Catholic.5 Indeed, after the 1830–31 Warsaw uprising, St. Petersburg abolished the army, the parliament, and the universities and installed ten Russian provinces [guvernia] in 1837. In the southwestern borderland area, this effort paradoxically stimulated Little Russian/Ukrainian nationalists and activists to articulate Ukrainian national idea which was different from All-Russian and Great Russian national ones, on the one hand, and Polish one, on the other hand.6

Poor performance in the Crimean War convinced the new tsar Aleksander II to relax censorship and initiate a series of reforms from above, among others, the abolition of serfdom and the installment of the local self-administration zemstvo. The 1863 Polish Uprising, however, not only outraged Russian nationalists but also pushed the authorities to repress Polishness and Ukrainian national activities which were suspected of secret connection with Poles. Imperial officials deployed the so-called “Russification” policy among Polish nobles and Lithuanian peasants, and Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants were bound more tightly with all-Russian national community in terms of religion and language.7 At the same time, this measure benefited young Lithuanian intellectuals to articulate their own national identity.8

The emergence of the German Empire in 1871 brought new geopolitical and security

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6 Serhiy Bilensky, Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian Political Imagination (California: California University Press, 2012); Johannes Remy, Brothers or Enemies: The Ukrainian National Movement and Russia from the 1840s to the 1870s (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).


challenges to the empire’s European borderlands. In addition, the expansion to Central Asia (Tashkent, Buhara, Kokand in the 1860s) further diversified subjects of the Empire. Expansion of infrastructure and communication from the late 19th century offered these non-Slavic and non-Orthodoxy people opportunities to have interaction with wider communities such as global Muslim community for the Volga-Ural Muslims. These changes intensified efforts of the empire to integrate multi-ethnic and religious people into a more coherent community, while competing with many ideologies: Slavophile and pan-Slavism, non-Russian nationalisms, pan-Islam, pan-Turkism, populists [narodoniki], and socialism. To be a “Russian” tsar, Aleksander III thus relied on the Russians by approaching Russian national past (Muscovite Rus’) and Orthodoxy, which put pressure on local nobles and indigenous people, in particular in the Baltic provinces but also in Poland and the Caucasus. The Grand Duchy of Finland and Finnic people in Russia, too, found themselves in these dynamic relationships between tsar, imperial ruling elites, local nobles, national intellectuals, and indigenous people.

The Grand Duchy of Finland and the Emergence of the Finnish Nation within the Russian Empire

To understand the controversy over the Kalevala and Finnish-Karelian kinship, it is important to overview the development of the Grand Duchy and Finnish national movement within the context of the imperial Russian rule. In 1809 the Grand Duchy of Finland acquired an autonomous position within the Empire and its elites had been cautiously loyal to tsars, who paid special care to Finland. To secure peace and stability in Finland, Aleksander I approved the legal system and institutions inherited from the Swedish era with a Government Council (the Senate/Senaatti since 1816). It was tsar alone that could determine the nature of administration in Finland and Finnish issues were discussed by the Government Council in Finland, general-governor in Finland (also the chairman of the Senate) appointed by tsar, the Commission for Finnish Affairs in St. Petersburg, and tsar, bypassing the Imperial Council of Ministries. To borrow Robert Schweitzer’s apt phrase, Finland’s special status was “like a prematurely finished chapel of an unfinished cathedral.”

Pro-Petersburg Finnish elites had to manage pro-Stockholm and anti-Russian elites and students who were influenced by revolutionary upheavals. In 1819 they had to manage the

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disturbances in Turku when a clash took place between students and Russian soldiers stationed there. Taking advantage of the Great Fire in Turku in September 1827, St. Petersburg and governor-general Zakrevskii decided to move Imperial Aleksander University (the University of Helsinki after the independence of Finland) to Helsinki to attract students’ interest in Russia by cutting tie with Sweden and train bureaucrats loyal to tsar. Seeing the Polish Uprising from St. Petersburg, R. H. Rehbinder, minister of the Finnish Affairs in St. Petersburg, condemned it as a thoughtless act and worried about negative influence on discussions about reform in Finland, among others, the opening of the next Diet. Likewise, the upheaval in 1848 assured leading Helsinki elites that students’ loyalty must be directed to both freedom (not revolution) and tsar.

The Crimean War and the accession of Aleksander II to the throne promoted autonomy and the status of Finnish language in the Grand Duchy of Finland. For St. Petersburg, to support the Fennoman movement meant to counter pro-Swedish elites and students influenced from pan-Scandinavism. The Crimean War encouraged pan-Scandinavism among some Swedish elites who wanted to regain Finland by appealing to the pro-Swedish Finnish elites. This troubled St. Petersburg and those Finnish elites who feared that tsar would approach Finnish elites with suspicion. Johan V. Snellman, a leading Fennoman ideologue, argued against those Swedes and Finns who hoped for independent Finland included in the Scandinavian neutral alliance and criticized the Fennomen for their spoiling Swedishness. In return, Aleksander II decided to extend the power and authority of the Senate and finally called the long-awaited second Diet in 1863, which approved that the Finnish language would hold the equal status as the Swedish language with the 20-year transition period. These changes assured the loyalty of the mainstream of Fennoman movement to the tsar, who became a respected and beloved symbol for the Finnish nation.

In addition, the “Great Reform” boosted industrialization in the Grand Duchy and urbanization of Helsinki. In his visiting Helsinki in 1856, Aleksander II assigned the Senate economic modernization of the Grand Duchy. While Poles lost their own currency replaced by the Russian ruble, the Finnish currency markka was introduced in 1860, which later went off the Russian ruble and, guaranteed by the Russian Empire, joined in the gold standard system in 1878, earlier than the ruble

12 Max Engman, Pitkät jäähyväiset: Suomi Ruotsin ja Venäjän välissä vuoden 1809 jälkeen (Helsinki: WSOY, 2009), 172–73.
16 Raimo Savolainen, Sivistyksen voimalla: J. V. Snellmanin elämä (Helsinki: Edita, 2006), 570–89.
did in 1897. This change made it possible to establish connection with European financial market, raise funding, and export timber. The first commercial bank *Suomen Yhdyspankki* started its activity in 1862.\(^{18}\) In the same year, the first railway Helsinki-Riihimäki-Hämeenlinna opened, which was extended to St. Petersburg in 1870.\(^{19}\) From the point of view of the whole Russian Empire, this treatment of the Grand Duchy further complicated its policy to streamline and establish the united monetary, financial, and customs system.\(^{20}\)

Yet, splits surfaced within the Fennoman movement because of the relaxation of censorship and liberal trend of the time. Liberal and moderate fraction of the Fennoman movement came to put more emphasis on Swedish and Christian legacy for the Finns and criticize the Fennoman mainstream for their “narrowness” and conformist attitude to Russia. While securing the loyalty of the Fennomen, tsars and general-governors utilized also the liberals to seek rapprochement with Sweden and stability in the Grand Duchy.\(^{21}\) Through cooperation with these two parties and maneuvering the conflict between the liberal and the Fennoman mainstream, the general-governor Adlerberg and pro-Petersburg elites succeeded in reinforcing autonomy of the Grand Duchy by consolidating the authority of the Diet, without whose ratification the law concerning the Grand Duchy, including the military conscription, could not come into force.

In the shadow of German threat, Russian-Finnish institutional and national confrontation came forward. St. Petersburg was gradually taking a step towards integrating the Grand Duchy in the Empire. On the one hand, Slavophiles and Russian nationalists demanded securing both imperial and Russian national interests and began to criticize “privileges” the Grand Duchy enjoyed. On the other hand, more radical Fennomen entered the university, demanding immediate and total dominance of the Finnish language not only in the university but also in the administration and social life. The Fennoman students won the majority in the student union for the first time in 1880, and the 1885 manifesto ordered that the Finnish language be used in the administrative procedure and official correspondence, the same status as the Swedish language.\(^{22}\) This new impulse decisively influenced the younger generation born in the 1860s and 1870s, to which distinguished figures like future presidents, intellectuals, and artists such as Pehr E. Svinhufvud, Juho K. Paasikivi, and Jean Sibelius belonged.

The appointment of Nikolai Bobrikov as general-governor in 1898 and the publication of the February Manifesto in 1899 marked a start of the so-called “years of repression [Sortovuodet].” The February Manifesto made it possible to skip approval of the Diet when St. Petersburg enacts

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\(^{18}\) Markku Kuisma, *Venäjä ja Suomen talous* (Helsinki: Siltala, 2015), 84–89.

\(^{19}\) Klinge, *Keisarin Suomi*, 247, 250.


\(^{22}\) Klinge, *Keisarin Suomi*, 296–301.
a law concerning the entire Empire including the Grand Duchy. This shocked the contemporary Finns who saw the Manifesto a serious violation of the law and mutual relationship between tsar and the Finnish subjects. This Manifesto and Bobrikov’s rule brought serious rifts in Finnish political scene and society. Radical Fennomen called themselves the Young Finns [Nuorsuomalaiset], who criticized the Old Finns [Vanhasuomalaiset], who wanted rather moderate social reform and took a compliant attitude toward Nicholas II. This “Russification” policy drove the Swedish-Finnish language conflict away and put forward the binary opposition between the Finnish nation and Russian “threat.”

It is worth mentioning, as an example, biography of a famous Old Finn, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 7th president of Finland. Paasikivi, or originally Johan Gustaf Hellstén, was born in 1870, when his father was a farmworker and peddler, but he later made a success in textile business, taking advantage of the start of industrialization. Paasikivi studied at the famous Normaalilyseo in Hameenlinna, where Swedish-speaking Fennoman teachers, such as linguist Arvid Genez, eagerly offered education to future Fennoman elites such as future linguist and minister Emil N. Setälä, and Johan changed his name into Finnish, Juho. When he entered the Imperial Aleksander University, he chose to join the Hämäläinen Student Union, a moderate Fennoman group, whose inspector was Danielson-Kalmari, a leader of the Old Finns, who was trying to calm down the students worrying about “Russification” in Finland and the Baltic provinces. Paasikivi studied Russian language and literature and went to Velikii Novgorod in 1891 to practice Russian for half a year. After working as a jurist, he joined in politics as a member of the Old Finnish Party.

In addition to the language controversy and Russian question, social question became another important factor in considering political and social constellation in the Grand Duchy from the late 1890s. For peasants and workers, both Svecomen and Fennomen represented upper and middle classes whose native language was Swedish, dominating the Diet, bureaucracy, big companies, and the university. The Workers Party of Finland was established in 1899 and renamed the Social Democratic Party of Finland [SDP] in 1903 with a socialist party program which demanded a reform of the Diet and the extension of suffrage while pledging to be a “national” and “patriotic” party. Finnish workers’ movement attracted not only workers but also many tenant farmers in the countryside. On the one hand, the moderate wing of the SDP came to cooperate with other parties to gain their seats at the Diet. On the other, the radical left-wing persisted in demanding the universal suffrage.

One of these radical socialist students was Otto W. Kuusinen. Kuusinen was born in 1881 in Laukaa, near Jyväskylä. In Laukaa, where industrialization brought an economical gap among the

inhabitants, Wilhelm Kuusinen, father of Otto Kuusinen, was a landless tenant farmer and later moved to Jyväskylä to find a fortune as a tailor. Otto Kuusinen started his study in Jyväskylä lycée, founded in 1858 as a Fennoman project. The Jyväskylä lycée produced talented Fennoman students, including future minister of Foreign Affairs Rudolf Holsti and socialist leader Edvard Gylling. Receiving Fennoman and patriotic education, Kuusinen performed and published poems on the Kalevala and praised for freedom of individual and Finland in the student journal Oras. Kuusinen’s activities during the student years showed how Finnish socialism was inseparably combined with nationalism. While joining in the board of newly established the “League of Finnishness [Suomalaisuuden liitto]” in 1906, Kuusinen began to work for an SDP newspaper and initiated a socialist youth newspaper with Gylling and Yrjö Sirola after the Great Strike in 1905.

The Great Strike in 1905 revoked the February Manifesto but also brought the Social Democrats to the reformed, unicameral Diet [Eduskunta] with the universal suffrage to both men and women over 25-year-old. The General Strike seemed to reify a national unity against imperial oppression and forced the general-governor Obolensky and Nicholas II to issue the November Manifesto. The November Manifesto was a victory for both the Old Finns and the Constitutionalists, who were, however, perplexed by the strike and formation of the Red Guards by social democrats and workers. This rise of social democrats and the “people” were clear after the SDP won the first election (80 seats out of 200, 37%) for the reformed Diet in November 1906. In addition, the General Strike intensified the old rivalry between Swedish-Western cultural and intellectual orientation and purely Finnish-popular orientation and political struggle between Swedish Party-Young Finns and Old Finns. These issues in Russian-Finnish relations and conflicts in Finland were reflected in the controversy over the Kalevala and pan-Finnism.

The Kalevala and Pan-Finnism in the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Russian Empire

The controversy over the Kalevala and pan-Finnism started in the Grand Duchy of Finland, but its repercussion went beyond its borders. The coming of 19th century saw Romanticism spreading

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to the northeastern periphery of Europe, which stimulated a small part of intellectuals to seek language, history, and culture of indigenous people. Poems, songs, folklore, and the vernacular had a special meaning and made great contribution to nation-building. Since a cycle of Scottish Gaelic epic poems, known as the Ossian, was published by the Scottish poet James Macpherson in the mid-18th century, finding and collecting folklore and creating a national epic became a politically and culturally important assignment for European intellectuals. One of these intellectuals was Johanne Gottfried von Herder, who praised the Ossian and Macpherson for restoring the essence of the people by finding out the spirit of ancestors in languages, folk poems, and songs.\(^{28}\)

To answer Herder’s call, many intellectuals began to collect and edit folklore and indigenous languages to discover (or create) national past and literature/epic. As works by Brothers Grimm represent, those intellectuals saw a strong affinity between folklore and the concept of language family and, indeed, philologists applied Indo-European linguistics, comparative linguistics/grammar, to the study of oral culture to address the problem of affinity among various tales and find out the archetypal form \([\text{U}r\text{f}o\text{rm}]\) of “national, indigenous” tales and the place these tales originally appeared.\(^{29}\) This trend encouraged both Swedish-speaking Finnish intellectuals in Turku and Helsinki, Estophile Baltic-German and Estonian intellectuals in Dorpat/Tartu, and Russian intellectuals to seek “genuine” Finnish, Estonian, and Russian “national” culture and language from indigenous oral materials.

As Max Engman has aptly described, efforts to locate Finland and the emerging Finnish nation in history took place in the geopolitical and cultural transformation of the early 19th century, when the “old Nordic \([\text{d}e\text{t} \text{g}a\text{m}l\text{a} \text{N}o\text{r}d\text{e}n]\)” retreated and it was replaced by Scandinavia and Northern Europe as a collective of small states in the European periphery, while newly “discovered” Slavs were emerging in Eastern Europe and Germany, shifting toward Poland, strengthened its position in Central Europe. This transformation confronted Finnish intellectuals with the question: where is Finland to be included: Russian and Eastern European or new Northern European?\(^{30}\) The Kalevala has been closely connected with this question, since before the publication of the Kalevala Swedish-speaking and native Finish intellectuals began to collect folk poems and tales from peasants, in particular Karelian peddlers from the Russian part of Karelia, not from the western side of Finland, where such folklore tradition had been lost.

Elias Lönnrot was not only famous for the Kalevala and the Kanteletar, but also famous for his humble and native Finnish-speaking origin. Lönnrot worked for enlightening the Finnish-speaking people, on the one hand, and wrote for Swedish-speaking elites to highlight the importance of the


culture of Finnish-speaking people, on the other. While doing his work as a doctor, he completed his candidate work on Finnish folklore about Väinämöinen, a mythical figure (would-be hero of the Kalevala) and started his expeditions to Finnish and Russian Karelia to collect folk poems, or epic poems from Karelian singers between 1828 and 1833. The Old Kalevala in 1835 gave a great impact on contemporary Finnish elites and intellectuals, though many of them could not understand it. By adding newly collected epic poems, Lönnrot completed the New Kalevala in 1849, which was more understandable and consistent in its language and narrative, and rich in content. Lönnrot showed that the Finnic-speaking people were once one tribe [heimo] as a homogeneous community in pre-Christian, Pagan heroic age, and the heroes of the Kalevala, ancestors of the Finns, did heroic deeds through their battles over the mythical item, Sampo, against dark, cold, and evil force in the land of Pohjola. With the Christianity coming, the hero Väinämöinen left Finland, leaving “the Kantele behind; the fine music for Finland; for the folk eternal joy; the great songs for his children.” With the arise of the Finnish nation in the future, Väinämöinen will come back, as he declares on his departure:

“Just let the time pass
one day go, another come
and again I’ll be needed
looked for and longed for
to fix a new Sampo, to
make a new music
convey a new moon
set free a new sun
when there’s no moon, no daylight
and no earthly joy.”

The Kalevala not only gave a history, a heroic past to the Finns but also soon became an important material for forming the Finnish standard literary language and literature. In 1843, the Finnish language was introduced as a subject in primary and high schools. The Kalevala, with the eastern “dialects” used in Karelia, influenced the ongoing controversy over the written Finnish language which had been based on the western dialects. Since the Kalevala demonstrated pre-Christian

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35 Kaisa Häkkinen, Agricolasta nykykieleen: Suomen kirjakielen historia (Helsinki: WSOY, 1994), 64.
antiquity of the eastern dialects, the dominance of the western dialects came into question. The language used in the Kalevala-related poems made a huge impact on Finnish vocabulary and names such as Aino and Ilmari, which spread to popular use from the late 19th century.

To propagate the Kalevala heroes and important stories, leading intellectuals published shortened versions of the Kalevala for youth and children, dictionaries, and guidebooks. Among others, the “Book of Our Country [Maamme kirja]” by Sakari Topelius was the first book for many children to experience the Kalevala heroes and world. Maamme kirja was used as the most basic schoolbook from 1881 to 1944 and presents children a basic description of the Finnish language, history, geography, landscape, major tribe groups [heimot], and minorities in Finland to cultivate patriotic spirit. Topelius used the Kalevala heroes and stories to depict the forefathers of the Finns as history. Accordingly, Topelius treated the Kalevala poems as authentic past story and legacy which had been handed down from generation to generation, not mentioning the fact that Lönnrot actively modified the original poems and language and even created new poems to make the narrative understandable and national.

Not only the Kalevala but also Lönnrot himself became a role model for educated and civilized Finns. In addition to his humble origin, he attracted many contemporaries and future generations by his moderate, diligent, and restrained character, devotion to national deeds, and balanced attitude to important political and social problems. Believing in the authenticity of the epic poems, Lönnrot was so moderate that he never insisted the Kalevala as his own work. Furthermore, Lönnrot did not dismiss the importance of the Swedish language for Finland and the Finnish nation. This positive image was spread by Maamme kirja, which introduced him as “one of the famous and beloved men Finland has ever seen. […] Through him the people of Finland have learned to feel their dark ancient times and gained courage to stay original [omintakeisena] as an independent people together with other peoples.” Lönnrot maintained a balance between the Svecomen and the Fennomen and between those who came from western and southern Finland and those from eastern Finland.

At the same time, because of its symbolic value, Lönnrot and the Kalevala were sometimes a source of conflicts when the rivalries between the Svecomen and Fennomen and within the Fennomen intensified. In the early 1870s, a plan to purchase the painting of the “song of Väinämöinen” by the painter R. W. Ekman bitterly split the student union along the language and party lines. Furthermore, when the student union was planning a celebration for Lönnrot’s 80th birthday (April 9, 1882), the Fennomen, now dominating the student union, and Svecomen students clashed each other

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35 Häkkinen, Agricolasta nykykielen, 15.
38 Sakari Topelius, Maamme kirja, ed. by Vesa Mäkinen (Helsinki: WSOY, 1981), 182.
over the language in which a memorial album would be written and what form the publication would take. Demanding more militant anti-Swedish Finnishness, one Fennoman student insisted that Lönnrot be thanked as not a friend of Swedishness nor a symbol of peace in the album, while radical Svecomen saw the Kalevala and Lönnrot as uncivilized barbarity of Finns, a part of “Turan,” and degeneration of Swedish culture.41

Still, Lönnrot is an integral symbol for the national unity, at least for elites and students. This is well illustrated in a short story of the writer Juhani Aho, “To Helsinki [Helsinkiin],” published in 1889, in which Lönnrot represents as a national symbol embracing Swedish- and Finnish-speaking students and elites. This work illustrates the first journey of the main character Antti Ljungberg, a Fennoman freshman from a Swedish-speaking family but with a Finnish first name, heading for Helsinki from his native provincial city of Kuopio to start his study at the Imperial Aleksander University. It was the ship “Elias Lönnrot” that carried young students to Helsinki, to a new, wider world, a course to civilization. On the ship, Antti felt relax to chat with his Swedish-speaking friends and a captain who deplored increasing number of “uncivilized, dirty, poorly dressed” Finnish-speaking students flooding into the university. At the same time, Ljungberg studied hard Finnish in his high school years and respected the Finnish language, and the eagerness and diligence Finnish-speaking students showed. Lönnrot is a symbol carrying the youth, future Finland, to unknown yet hopeful future by integrating both Finnish and Swedish speakers into one nation.42

This narrative is a typically Finnish national one but, seen from outside the Grand Duchy, in particular Karelia, Estonia, and Russia, other pictures come forward. Indeed, such national narrative has ambiguous boundaries with non-national elements. The concept of Finnic and Finno-Ugric kinship attracted scholars’ attention before the establishment of Grand Duchy and idea of the Finnish nation.43 St. Petersburg was the leading center of Finno-Ugric studies before Helsinki, Tartu, and Budapest appeared as new rising centers in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century.44 The idea to seek “eastern” roots of the Finns was favorable for St. Petersburg in that the belonging of Finns would shift from Sweden to Russia, where many Finno-Ugric people lived, and St. Petersburg could mobilize Finnish intellectuals to study Finno-Ugric peoples in Russia. For those Finnish elites, to approach Russia and other Finno-Ugric people was a good chance to demonstrate their ability to exist without Swedes who scorned “Russians

44 Michael Branch, “The Academy of Sciences in St Petersburg as a centre for the study of nationalities in the North-East Baltic,” in National History and Identity: Approaches to the Writing of National History in the North-East Baltic Region Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed., Michael Branch (Helsinki: SKS, 1999), 122.
as Mongols and Finns as Kalmyks.” Among others, Sjögren was the pioneer of Finno-Ugric studies and paved the way to the Kalevala for Lönnrot and the Ural-Altai theory for Matthias Castrén.

Sjögren’s career and works are a good example of common interests between St. Petersburg and pro-St. Petersburg Finnish elites. He spent most of his academic life at the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg to study Finnic people and culture. He could collect and study ethnographic and folklore materials, including some epic poems which were later used in the Kalevala and met Feodor Glinka, who had been exiled in Petrozavodsk due to his connection with the Decembrists. Sjögren shared one of his works, including some Kalevala poems, with Glinka, who translated the poems into Russian. His activities made Lönnrot’s expeditions to Russian Karelia easier by offering information about how to reach great Karelian epic singers. He argued that the ancient Karjala/Korela tribe mentioned in the Russian Chronicle was ancestor of Russian Karelians, Izhors, the Savakkio and Äyrämöinen Finns in Ingria. He also “discovered” Veps by acknowledging that their language is different from the language the Karelians spoke. This view was accepted both in St. Petersburg, Germanies, and Finland and the Karelians obtained “their own past” for the first time thanks to his works.

This exploration into the roots of Finno-Ugric language family was followed by Matthias Castrén, one of the founders of the modern Ural (Finno-Ugric)-Altai linguistics and theory, and the father of Turanism. Thanks to his legendary expeditions to Siberia and contribution to national intellectual deeds, Castrén was already a living national hero and became the first professor of Finnish language and literature at the Imperial Aleksander University in 1851. He is also famous for his theory which gave a great impact on the contemporaries by presenting that the Finnic speakers were related to not only Samoyed but also Turkic and Mongolic speaking people and their common cradle was the Altai and Sayan Mountains of southern Siberia. This grand theory was exciting one for the Finns who had seen themselves alone in the sea of Indo-European peoples but suddenly found “related kin groups” across Eurasia to the Far East.

45 Sihvo, Karjalan kuva, 60–61.
47 Branch, Sjögren, 192–206.
For St. Petersburg, Castrén was one of the founders of “Russian” Finno-Ugric and Altaic studies. As early as 1840, the St. Petersburg intellectual Yakov Grot wrote to Pletnyov, rector of St. Petersburg University, about Castrén as a possible candidate to planned expeditions to Siberia. In 1844 Castrén received the Demidov prize for his philological achievement, and Sergei Uvarov, president of Imperial Academy of Sciences, decided to dispatch him to Siberia expeditions. Sjögren, too, recommended him to the Academy and made an effort to publish his writings after his expeditions and early death. This editing work was continued by Anton Schiefner, Reval/Tallinn-born Baltic-German philologian working at the Imperial Academy of Sciences, who translated the Kalevala into German in 1852 and published 7-volume of Castrén’s diaries, letters, notes, and writings.

Seen in this context, the Kalevala was a product not only of the on-going Finnish nation-building in Europe but also of making a hierarchy among Finno-Ugric people, with the Finns on the top, within the Russian Empire. Lönnrot’s imagination and project were stimulated by those ethnic Karelian peddlers called Laukkuryssä (ryssä is a derogatory term of the Russian in Finnish) who came from White Sea Karelia to Finland for seasonal business and sometime performed their folklore to Finnish intellectuals. In White Sea Karelia, outstanding Karelian singers offered him not only their long and rich epic poems but also contributed to the idea to make a whole by uniting epic poems. Inspired by Sjögren’s works, Lönnrot himself interpreted stories out of the Kalevala poems as pre-Christian history of ancient Finns (Häme-Finns, Karelians, and Estonians), who had common origin somewhere in Asia and moved westward led by the Kalevala heroes.

For the Finns, the Kalevala and the Karelian singers were a ticket for the European community of nations but also offered tradition “as a classificatory concept or mediating force in the alignment of premodernity to modernity” by lending itself “to the articulation of other asymmetries that have been useful in the construction of modernity and social inequality” such as unsophisticated/educate, oral/literate, and European/Oriental. And an exclusive access to the oral creative products of the Karelians gave the Finnish intellectuals an advantage of developing “metadiscursive regimes” over the Karelians and other Finnic people for the conceptualization, management, and rendering of oral traditional texts that organizes intellectual interventions, key

elements in the symbolic construction of modernity. Indeed, Lönnrot saw the Karelians as even less civilized than the Finns and thought that the Karelian peddlers could gain “Bildung [sivistys]” in the Grand Duchy. In fact, those Karelian peddlers were seen as “Russians” and Finnish newspapers demanded punishments against those illegal Karelian peddlers and criticized them for their “barbarity” and goods of poor quality.

Sakari Topeilus in his 1844 essay carefully manifested a hierarchy and inequality among the Finnic people and eastern roots of the Finns as “pan-Finnism”:

“Two hundred years ago few would have believed that the Slavic tribe would attain the prominent (and constantly growing) position it enjoys nowadays in the history of culture. What if one day the Finnish tribe, which occupies a territory as vast, were to play a greater role on the world scene than one could expect nowadays? […] Today people speak of pan-Slavism; one day they may talk of pan-Fennicism, or pan-Suomism. Within such a pan-Finnic community, the Finnish nation should hold the leading position because of its cultural seniority […]”

This manifestation of pan-Finnism is reaction/response toward pan-Germanism, pan-Scandinavism, and pan-Slavism but as cultural, not political, one to claim the place for Finnic peoples and culture led by the Finnish nation in the world. In addition, this manifestation was in harmony with loyalty to the tsar and empire and did not exclude Swedish culture from the Finnish national community. In his poem and writings in the 1840s and the 1850s, especially during the Crimean War, Topelius emphasized that the future of Finland and of the Finnic people was in the Russian Empire and praised tsar Nikolai I and the Empire. In response, St. Petersburg agreed to appoint Topelius to the professor of Scandinavian, Finnish, and Russian history after Nikolas I’s visit to the Imperial Alexander University in March 1854.

The Kalevala and Lönnrot had impact on Estonian nation-building as well. Finns have tended to focus on the Kalevala and Lönnrot when narrating the Kalevipoeg and Kreutzwald. Even before the publication of the Old Kalevala in 1835, Friedrich R. Faehlmann and other Baltic-German intellectuals started to collect folklore about the hero Kalevipoeg and the Learned Estonian Society


[Gelehrte Estnische Gesellschaft/Õpetatud Eesti Selts] became an important forum to discuss the project of the Kalevipoeg. Friedrich Kreutzwald, born in a serf family, went to German-language school after the liberation of the serfs in the Baltic provinces and Germanized his name (originally Ristomets) for social promotion. Kreutzwald entered the University of Dorpat in 1826 and became a doctor. Kreutzwald became interest in Estonian folklore during his university years and started to publish it in the 1840s.\(^{60}\) The Old Kalevala was received by the Learned Estonian Society, which urged intellectuals to give history and national epic to the people.

The role of the Finns and the Kalevala in the making of the Kalevipoeg, however, should not be overemphasized. The Old Kalevala was cheering news for them but very few could read Finnish. Many intellectuals learned its content only from a German-language presentation on the Kalevala by Henrik Holmberg, a Finnish student, and partial and incomplete German translation of the epic by Nikolai Mühlberg in 1840.\(^{61}\) Even Kreutzwald found it difficult to read Finnish and learned the Kalevala from Shifner’s German translation but borrowed it for only eight days in March 1853.\(^{62}\) Lönnrot travelled to Estonia in 1844 to study Estonian “dialects” for his on-going project on the Swedish-Finnish dictionary. He also met Kreutzwald in Võru, where Kreutzwald was working as a doctor. While Lönnrot left nothing about this meeting, Kreutzwald mentioned this meeting in his letters to his colleagues, which suggest that the meeting was not so fruitful.\(^{63}\) Lönnrot gave advice about “creating” an epic to Fachlmann, who was then studying the episodes about the departure of Vanemuine. Lönnrot was pessimistic about the situation and future of the Estonian “people” because of the serious gap between them and the upper classes in comparison with the situation of the Finnish people and language in the Grand Duchy.

This notion of Pan-Finnic hierarchy and the Fennoman movement entered the next phase, when a new generation came forward, many of the new generation were imbued with the Fennoman movement and pan-Finnism in a more radical way. August Ahlqvist together with three other Fennoman students established a Finnish newspaper Suomettar, where, influenced by Topelius’s Pan-Finnism and Castrén, he once wrote about the unification of the Finno-Ugric peoples after the collapse of the Russian Empire.\(^{64}\) Ahlqvist’s dream for the united Finno-Ugric peoples decisively changed

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\(^{64}\) Matti Klinge, “August Ahlqvist (Oksanen) ja hänen elämäntyönsä,” in *Suomen kieli, Suomen mieli: August Ahlqvist vaikuttajana*, ed. Jaakko Anhava (Helsinki: SKS, 1993), 12. In this famous tale (*Satu*), Ahlqvist wrote in 1847, he portrayed five sisters representing Finnic tribes (*VA*/*g*/*f*/*m*/*u*: \textit{Perma}, \textit{Aunus}, \textit{Ukri}, \textit{Suometar} / VAPAUS means “freedom” in Finnish), born and lived together in Altai but forced to be dispersed, some were Russified, but united again around *Suometar* (Finn), who
after he studied the Finno-Ugric peoples in Russia. In his expedition to study Finno-Ugric peoples in Russia and Siberia (1854–58), he was disappointed at the backwardness of the “relatives [sukulaiset]” of the Finns because of their long-time contacts or merging with Russians. This experience convinced him that the Finno-Ugric peoples would offer little help to the Finnish nation-building and that Finns/the Finnish language should develop as a European nation/language. This change of mind is understandable given the on-going events of his time; the spread from Scandinavia of racialist views, according to which Finns belonged to the Turan and were related to Mongolians.\textsuperscript{65} The professor of esthetics Fredrik Cygnaeus in 1863 underlined the luckiness of the Finns, thanks to Sweden, for avoiding “Mongolian barbarism,” given the situation of other Finno-Ugric “tribes” in Russia. Topelius as well in 1872 wrote a poem “The original bond [Den originala skuldsedeln]” to remind readers of “forgotten Finno-Ugric tribes” left underdeveloped and what Sweden did for Finland.\textsuperscript{66}

In his 1875 summer speech at the 400\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Olavinlinna, a historic place of Swedish-Novgorod/Russian confrontation, Ahlqvist insisted that Finns had “an obligation of gratitude [kiitollisuudenvelka]” to Sweden for its historical and cultural legacy and formed a Swedish-Finnish common front against the East. Ahlqvist said that “A glance at the Karelians in Ononets and the White Sea” and what the serfdom “left the Estonians for the entire their lives” showed the possible alternative for the Finns and the fortress Olavinlinna was a symbol of defending freedom, not of Swedish feudalism.\textsuperscript{67} Yrjö Koskinen for his part criticized Ahlqvist of betraying the Fennoman and helping the Swedish-speaking in power and justified his loyalty to the tsar necessary for further development of the Finnishness.

Difference and similarity between their views on Finnish nation-building and pan-Finnism reflect in their attitude toward the Estonians. Following Lönnrot, both Ahlqvist and Yrjö-Koskinen as well visited, Estonia, the “brother-people [veljeskansa]” in September 1854. Kreutzwald was ready to publish the Kalevipoeg in November 1854, which was, however, rejected by the censorship in Dorpat. Leaning this, Ahlqvist offered help to publish it in his hometown Kuopio. With the ease of censorship Kreutzwald managed to publish the Kalevipoeg together with the German translation between 1857 and 1861 in Dorpat. Thanks to his network with Baltic-Germans, Kreutzwald could find German buyers in Petersburg and Moscow and won the half Davidov prize in 1860 with the recommendation by Shifner and Ferdinand J. Wiedemann, Baltic-German philologists, working at the Imperial Academy of Science. In Finland, Ahlqvist actively advertised the Kalevipoeg and in cooperation with Shifner arranged the publication of the popular version of the Kalevipoeg without the German translation by a Kuopio publisher in 1863, which would be a well-known episode of “brotherly help”

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\textsuperscript{67} Engman, \textit{Språkfrågen}, 87–88.
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As a contrary to Ahlqvist’s stress on linguistic-literary brotherhood, Yrjö Koskinen stressed the state and national boundaries and compared the Fennoman movement with the Estonian national activities. After being appointed as the professor of general history in 1863, Koskinen visited Tartu in the spring of 1867 and met leading Estonian intellectuals such as Kreutzwald and Johann Jannsen, one of the earliest leaders of the Estonian national movement and his daughter–poet Lydia Jannsen (later Koidula). Seeing a parallel between the Fennoman’s struggle against the ruling Swedish establishment and that of the Estonians’ against the Baltic Germans, Koskinen encouraged the Estonians to struggle against the Baltic Germans, which caused a refute by Woldemar von Bock, a leading Baltic German who insisted on a common struggle of Germans, Finns, and Estonians against “Moscoviches” and justified “Germanisation” of Estonians which naturally happened because of the threat of “Russification.” Koskinen then gave support to the Estonian intellectuals especially when they carried out the first general Estonian “Song Festival” in 1869 as far as this support did not harm the Fennoman movement and cause suspicion in the imperial authority. Though Koskinen himself did not participate in the festival, the festival also heard popular Finnish songs including the *Maamme/Vårt land*, future Finnish and Estonian national hymn composed by the German-born Fredric Pacius.

This support of Koskinen was, however, with the assumption that the Estonians should follow the way the Finnish “older brother” was going forward. Koskinen was disappointed with the fact that the Estonians actively studied neither Finnish nor what was going on in Finland, and Kreuzwald and Jannsen were in favor of cooperating with Baltic Germans to “civilize” the Estonian people. The Finnish orthography and language were easier for Estonians to study and adopt, otherwise German would be the “pan-Finnic language [la langue panfinnique],” Koskinen complained to Koidula in his letter. Studying history of the Estonians, especially the serfdom in the Baltic, Koskinen was pessimistic about the present and future of the Estonians. While the Estonian “people” saw Koskinen an upper-class “Finnish-German [soomesaksa],” Koskinen saw the Estonian people as if they were children.

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70 Zetterberg, *Suomen sillan kulkinjoita*, 243–82; The song *Maamme* was composed by Pacius in 1848 in response to a students’ request to write a popular music for the patriotic poem of Runeberg. In their journey to Tartu in 1867 Koskinen and Julius Krohn introduced this song to Koidula, who later translated the original poem in Swedish into German for her father, and Jannsen made the Estonian lyrics to the song, “My fatherland, my happiness and joy [Mu isamaa, mu õnn ja rõõm].” Erkki Salmenhaara, “Fredrik Pacius ja *Maamme*-laulu,” in *Soi sana kultainen.Vårt land*, eds. Laura Kolbe et al. (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 1998), 43–52.


Against the background of “Russification” policies, the view on the Kalevala and the poems gradually changed within Finnish intellectual circles and started to lean toward western, Scandinavian, European origins of the Kalevala poems. With Topelius and Lönnrot in retirement, younger scholars influenced by the European trend of realism started to challenge the authenticity of the Kalevala and the eastern origins of its poems with their more “scientific” approach. Facing the criticism by Svecomen about the authenticity of the Kalevala, Fennoman scholars had already started to collect variants of the Kalevala poems to seek the wholeness of the Kalevala related folklores. It was Aksel A. Borenius-Lähteenkorva that publicly referred to the possibility of moving the Kalevala poems from western Finland to White Sea Karelia in 1873. It was, however, Julius Krohn that guided the “scientific” study of Kalevala poetry informed by an evolutionist notion to show an international background of the Kalevala poems, contrary to the popular notion of the Kalevala as purely Finnish/Finnic cultural inheritance.

Julius Krohn was born in a German family and his father Leopold move from St. Petersburg to Kiiskilä, near Vyborg, a multiethnic city, which had communities of Baltic Germans alongside Russian nobles with summer cottages. Like contemporary cosmopolitan intellectuals, he spoke German at home but learned Russian and went to a Fennoman gymnasium in Vyborg, where he became a Fennoman influenced by pro-Finnish teachers and reading the Kalevala. Taking distance from politically oriented Fennomen, he liked to be “literature-romantic Fennoman (kirjallis-romanttinen fennomania)” and studied the Finnish language and folklore from Elias Lönnrot. Julius Krohn was critical of a romanticist, “unscientific” approach to the Kalevala and folk poems, though he as well initially believed the Karelian, Ladoga origins of the Kalevala poems. Julius Krohn tried to show two things: the Finns created the Kalevala poems as their own national literature, different from Swedish culture; the Kalevala poems belong to the realm of universal culture, that is European culture. Krohn’s argument therefore made it possible to set the origins of the Kalevala poems within Finland and justified Yrjö-Koskinen’s nation-building within the Finnish borders. At the same time he argued that the poems originated from the Finnish people but were borrowed from abroad and spread toward the east and then north and accordingly concluded that the Kalevala poems did not reflect the past of the Finnish people/nation but rather the Kalevala heroes were personification of natural phenomena, universal ones.

Due to this universal, western orientation, he underlined the national character of the Kalevala and poems even more to convince his contemporary Fennomen of the importance of the

73 “Missä Kalevala on syntynyt?,” Suomen Kuvailehti 23, December 1, 1873, 269–74. See also Sulkunen, Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 194; Sihvo, Karjalan kuva, 169–73.
75 Lassila, Ihanteiden isänmaa, 67.
76 Sihvo, Karjalan kuva, 173; Sulkunen, Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 197, 200.
77 Wilson, Folklore and Nationalism, 57.
Kalevala as the national epic/literature. Furious at Koskinen and Julius Krohn, Ahlqvist published a work in 1887 “the Karelian character of the Kalevala [Kalevalan karjalaisuus],” which bitterly criticized them and defended Lönnrot and his idea about the eastern origins and thus national character of the Kalevala poems.78 Julius Krohn thus stressed that the poems were the “common, precious tradition of the whole people [kansa] of Finland from the time when the tribes and dialects were not yet separated from each other.” And these tribes of Finland had long developed the old poems into such complete and collective form which Lönnrot discovered in Russian Karelia. As to artificial character of the Kalevala, Julius Krohn was in favor of the idea that Lönnrot represented the whole poetic tradition of the Finnish nation as “the last folk singer [viimeinen runonlaulaja]” through whom the spirit of the nation [kansanhenki] came to word and saved the creative works in which the previous generations of the nation had been engaged.79

This project was succeeded by Julius’s son Kaarle Krohn, who, as the first professor of folkloristics at the Imperial Aleksander University and later the chairman of the SKS (Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura/The Finnish Literature Society), developed the Finnish Kalevala and folklore studies to an international level with his geographical-historical methodology. Kaarle Krohn initially took an evolutionist approach, the poems developing from smaller units in the west to the complete epic cycle in White Sea Karelia and discussed the Western Finnish and Estonian origins of the poems and their migration to White Sea Karelia through Karelian Isthmus, Ingria, and Olonets Karelia. His methodology, later named “the Finnish school of folkloristics,” boasted to demonstrate the single original place and time of a folklore by comparing an enormous number of the variants of tales, ballades, riddles, and epic poems and sorting them out in geographical and historical order.80 His argument on the Christian and Scandinavian influence on the poems puzzled his fellow Fennomen, but Kaarle Krohn refuted those who discussed the Kalevala as a creation of Lönnrot such as Macpherson’s Ossian by arguing that Lönnrot followed the ways the folk singers performed and developed the poems. Thus, acknowledging the contribution of the “Karelian tribe” to the development, Krohn underlined that the honor belonged to the “whole Finnish people [koko Suomen kansalle].”81

Krohn’s argument added much to the Finnish-Estonian brotherhood by including Estonians in the history of the Kalevala poems and of the Finns. Utilizing poems related to the Kalevala found in an Estonian-speaking area, Kaarle Krohn concluded that the poems originated in southwestern

78 August Ahlqvist, Kalevalan karjalaisuus (Helsinki: Suomen yliopisto, 1887).
79 Lassila, Ihanteiden isänmaa, 174–89; Wilson, Folklore and Nationalism, 54–56; Sulkunen, Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 197–204.
Finland but also in northwestern Estonia and moved eastward through Finland and Estonia and thus the “Estonian brothers” as well partially had the right to the Kalevala.\textsuperscript{82} What made this argument possible is the Estonian-Finnish intellectual interaction from the 1870s when the notion of the Finnish-Estonian language kinship was spread among the Fennophile Estonian intellectuals. The rhetoric “the bridge of Finland [\textit{Soome sild}]” originally appeared in the Kalevipoeg: the hero Kalevipoeg goes to Finland to rescue his kidnapped mother and cut down a big oak tree to make a bridge between the two countries. This rhetoric and term “kindred brother [\textit{suguvend}]” spread by the poem “\textit{Soome sild}” Lydia Koidula dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the SKS in 1881. Recommended by Kreutzwald, Hurt moved to the Imperial Aleksander University and initiated a project to call hundreds of Estonian people to gather folklore.\textsuperscript{83} Hurt was followed by Oscar Kallas, who earned a doctoral degree in 1901 with his dissertation on how originally Estonian epic songs moved to Finland and transformed.\textsuperscript{84}

This was supplemented by more active commitments in Russian Karelians and other Finnic populations. Criticizing the western orientation of the Kalevala studies, those intellectuals studying Finno-Ugrian peoples were determined to seek eastern roots of the Finns. They founded the Finno-Ugrian Society in 1883, which was expected to demonstrate the right of the Finns to be a European nation to Europeans who saw the Finns as “barbarian Mongolic-Turanian race.”\textsuperscript{85} The Imperial Aleksander University decided to establish the professorship of Finno-Ugrian languages in 1893 by appointing Arvid Genetz, who went to White Sea Karelia in 1872 and was shocked by backwardness of White Sea Karelians and increasing Russian influence.\textsuperscript{86} His poem “Children of Väinölä [\textit{Väinölän lapsen}]	extsuperscript{87}” is, contrary to Ahlqvist’s pan-Finnic poem, very pessimistic about the fate of Finnic peoples, “children of Väinölä [the homeland of the Kalevala heroes]” and ”the people of Greater Finland,” scattered by surf [\textit{hyrsky}] and surging waves [\textit{tyrskyt}] which cut off the roots of \textit{Sampo} as a big tree. And the ghost of Väinämöinen the Old sings, “If there were the spirit of kinship [\textit{heimoushenkia}], then could be born the bridge, my people united with each other.

Following Lönnrot and Genetz, August Ervasti, a Fennoman journalist, traveled to White Sea Karelia and Arkhangel’sk in 1879 and published a travelogue which aimed to provide readers with information about “the Finns behind the border [\textit{rajantakaiset suomalaiset}].” Ervasti stressed common racial and social characters between the Finns and White Sea Karelians. Worrying rapid advance of Russian influence, Ervasti bitterly criticized Koskinen of his “indifference” to Karelia and the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{82} Kaarle Krohn, \textit{Kalevan runojen historia}, 26–27.
\bibitem{83} Kari Alenius, \textit{Ahkeruus, edistys, ylimielisyys: virolaisten Suomi-kuva kansallisen heräämisen ajasta tsarinvallan päättymiseen (n. 1850–1917)} (Oulu: Pohjoinen, 1996), 90–92.
\bibitem{85} Salminen, \textit{Aatteen tiede}, 10–20. See also Sulkunen, \textit{Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura}, 192.
\bibitem{86} Sihvo, \textit{Karjalan kuva}, 184–85.
\end{thebibliography}
Karelians and of betraying Lönnrot, who shifted the Finns’ gaze from West to East and always stood by the Karelian tribe “in whose veins the same blood as ours runs.” Likewise, a photographer and journalist Into Inha brought the Finns clearer, Romantic image of the Kalevala world, White Sea Karelian singers, and the landscape. Inha carried out an expedition to White Sea Karelia in 1894 by following the same route and places Lönnrot took and visited and made over 200 photos including the ones of Miikhkali Perttunen, a son of Arhippa Perttunen. Believing the Kalevala as a document on the ancient Finnish heroic age, Inha criticized Krohn’s argument, stressing that scholarship should serve the people.

In this way, while the Finnish nation and nation-state were seeking its roots in the West through Kalevala poems, challenging Swedish superiority, the Finnish national intellectuals were constructing a pan-Finnic hierarchy, expanding south and east and resisting the pressure from Russian nationalists and imperial authority. By “scientifically” approaching to the “relatives” and “brothers” in the East, the Finnish nation headed for the Western, European civilization. This is the point of clashes and cooperation with the imperial and Russian national visions and ideologies, which had another point of view on Finland, the Finns, the Finnic peoples, and the Kalevala.

“Nationalizing” Russian Empire and the Controversy over the Kalevala and Pan-Finnism

Contrary to the Kalevala as the national symbol in Finland, the Kalevala for Imperial Russian scholars was one of national epics as proof of rich ethnic/national cultures of the Russian Empire. Forerunners of Russian folkloristics such as Feodor Buslaev and Leonid Maikov started their folklore studies by investigating the so-called Kiev cycle of the Russian heroic epic [byлина] and the Tale of Igor’s Campaign, which were closely tied with the construction of the history and literature of the Russian middle age. Especially Aleksander Veselovsky and Vsevolod Miller included Finnish folklore into their studies on Russian heroic epics and their understanding of the boundaries between the Russian, the all-Russian, and the Imperial Russian. At the same time, folklore is an important source for heated controversy over defining and imagining imperial and national boundaries among Slavic and non-Slavic populations in the western and southern borderland: Poles, Little

88 Sihvo, Karjalan kuva, 192-93. Evasti also criticized the huge project of collecting all Finnish dialects by the SKS and the Kotikielen seura, which excluded “dialects” in Russian Karelia, the “wall” and “frontline” having defended the Finnish language from Russia for centuries, and the Finns had the “obligation of gratitude” toward the Karelians in Russia. Häggman, Sanojen talossa, 77–78; Sihvo, Karjalan kuva, 200.
89 Häggman, Sanojen talossa, 110-11.
Russians/Ukrainians, Baltic Slavs, Belarussians, and Russians.

Russian folklore, especially bylina, attracted Slavophile intellectuals who found the Russian national character but could not find the narrators anywhere. It was Pavel Rybnikov who “discovered” living bylina narrators around lake Onega and collected many folktales, songs, and others in the 1860s. Since bylina described stories of Kiev and Novgorod heroes called bogatyri such as Sadko, Rybnikov increasingly showed his attachment to Russian peasant culture in the North and to ancient Rus’, seeing the peasants and narrators as “descendants of the people of Great Rus’.”\(^91\) With Slavophiles shaping itself in the mid-1850s, this series of publications by Rybnikov tremendously influenced the discussion of Russianness [russkost’] and Slavdom and encouraged other Slavophile intellectuals, among others Aleksandr F. Gil’ferding, to go to Karelia for collecting further Russian folklore.

After the reign of Nicholas I and the Crimean War, the Slavophiles including Gil’ferding started to seek more openly Russian national/popular culture by resisting the official ideology of Nicholas I and etatist understanding of Russian history. In addition to this Russian state-people question, the Slavophiles faced the question of all-Russian people and the empire in the western borderlands as a battlefield against the Polish nobles over the borderland and indigenous population. After the Polish uprising in 1830–31, imperial officials found the idea of Little Russian within the all-Russian nation and an ally among the Little Russian intellectuals on the left bank Dniepr to defend the interest of the empire. With the short-lived liberalism of Aleksander II, those intellectuals who were sympathetic to the Little Russian idea became active not only in Kiev but also in St. Petersburg, supported by the imperial authority, to establish new newspapers and associations to compete with Polish culture and Catholics. The Polish revolt in 1863 further pushed this effort to strengthen and win the loyalty of the Orthodox Slavic population in the southwestern borderland.\(^92\)

Gil’ferding’s interest in Russian bylina in Olonets Karelia, on the one hand, and in the Finnish question in the Empire, on the other, reflected this controversy over the empire borderlands and all-Russian nation. His relationship with other Slavophiles developed into a Pan-Slavism, when he worked in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Poland. In addition, as an enlightened bureaucrat, he was engaged in the educational reform in the Polish Kingdom before and after the revolt and developed a program of “liberating” Slavic folk identity among Polish, Ukrainian, Belarussian, and Lithuanian people by promoting Orthodoxy and the Cyrillic alphabet to marginalize Polish aristocratic, Catholic, and Latin influence. Gil’ferding thus saw Little Russian and Belarussian nationalisms as regionalism within the all-Russian nation, not as separatist projects, and the coincidence between the imperial and the all-Russian interests.\(^93\)

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\(^93\) Khenryk Glembotskii, “Aleksandr Gil’ferding i slavianofi’skie proekty izmeneniiia natsional’nokul’turnoi identichnosti na zapadnykh okrainakh Rossiskoi imperii,” *Ab Imperio*, no. 2 (2005), 135–
This view of Gil’ferding finds an analogy with the Baltic provinces and the Grand Duchy of Finland, where the Baltic German and Swedish nobles gained benefits from the tsars’ policy and felt sympathy toward pan-Germanism and pan-Scandinavism, though the indigenous Finnish people, like their Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian counterparts, had had no fatherland outside Russia and morally 

[nравственно] belonged to Russia. Gil’ferding maintained that Russia was a Finnic-Slavic joint creation by a mutual agreement to have a “common supreme power” in the beginning of the state in which the Finnic tribes existed as “undividedly merged [неразделенно соединёнными]” with the Russian people, not as an “enslaved [порабощенным]” nationality.” This was demonstrated by the fact that many Finnic tribes now spoke Russian and were completely merged [слились] with the Russian people.94 Gil’ferding criticized the tsarist policy in Finland of keeping “deathlike silence [гробовое молчание]” about the nationality issue in Finland and believed that only the Great Russian recognition of and participation in the Finnish nationality would win “fraternal [братолюбивым]” recognition from the Finnish nationality.95 Defending the integrity of the Empire and the unity of the all-Russian nation, Gil’ferding headed for Oloents Karelia to find bylina as sources for the all-Russian nation.

This kind of inclusive all-Russian nation/state nexus developed into the Russia-centered pan-Slavism whose supporters started to believe Russia was a messiah to salvage both the West and South Slavs facing the rise of uniting Germany, Magyarization, and the Ottoman rule, and also non-Russian nationalities “without history” in Russia.96 Nikolai Danilevskii in his 1869 work, “Russia and Europe,” defined Russia as a cultural-civilizational entity in opposition to the Greco-Roman and German-Romance civilization. Russia and Russians had peacefully “united [соединяя]” those tribes or nationalities who were not even on the earliest phase of historical life such as the Chud’, Ves’, Cheremis, and Mordvin. Since the Finnish tribe [финское племя] in Finland had never lived a historical life as other Finnic tribes in Russia, to “unite” them would not mean “conquest [завоеование].” Rather, Finland was “gifted [дарована]” a complete individuality [отдел’ност’] and autonomy [самостоятель’ност’], while Finland did not pay even “one kopeck” to Russia. Danilevskii underlined that Russia and her humanitarianism [гуманитарность] always held out a helping hand to Finland and, quoting the remark of a Swede, Russia “artificially” called [вызовы] Finnish nationality and to this end composed [сочиня’] the Kalevala.97

This pan-Slavic understanding of the Kalevala and the Finns is an extreme one, and it was

95 Gil’ferding’s letter to Ivan Aksakov dated May 6, 1862, in Golos’ minuvshago, 2 (February 1916), 209–11.
Yakov Grot that introduced a more balanced view on them to the St. Petersburg intellectual society in the mid-19th century. Grot participated in the 200th anniversary of the Imperial Aleksander University in 1840, which was remembered as the best moment of Finnish-Russian friendship. Grot was appointed professor of Russian literature, language, history, and statistics at the Imperial Aleksander University to bring Finnish intellectuals and students even closer to the Empire. Grot was sympathetic to the Fennophile intellectuals in Helsinki and established relationships with them. Among others his personal friendship with Lönnrot encouraged him to study Finnish and travel many places in Finland with him. Grot, neutral to the Slavophile-Westerner controversy, observed originally Finnish characters in the lifestyle and characters different from Swedish and Russian ones, which Lönnrot represented in his modest, peasant-like simple, hardworking manner.

This reflects in how Grot presented the Finns (in Finland) and the Kalevala to the Russian readers in his 1840 piece in the St. Petersburg journal Sovremennik. Indeed, St. Petersburg had many Finnic-speaking inhabitants called Chukohnets or Chukhny such as Ingrian Finnish and Votic serfs, Estonians, Finnish artisans, and peasant merchants from eastern Finland and thus the terms Chukhny and Finny [Finns] were often used interchangeably. But Grot was not inclined to a racist view on the Finns and wrote to Pletnyov that he found “similar roots” in Russian and Finnish languages through the dialogue with Lönnrot. This is a clear contrast to such Polish pan-Slavists as Adam Mickiewicz and Cyprien Robert: Mickiewicz saw the Russians as a Slavic ally with the Poles against Tatar-Mongolians, while Robert stressed the difference between the “purely Slavic” Polish and Ruthenian languages and the Muscovite dialect mixed with Finnic and Mongolic words. But both Mickiewicz and Robert regarded the Finns or Finno-Ugric people racially inferior to the other Indo-European peoples.

Grot as well could not avoid the Romanticized and paternalistic gaze at the Finns but his inclusive view on the relations between the Russian and Finnish peoples preceded how imperial Russian scholars received the Kalevala. The Moscow University docent Leonid Bel’skii published the first complete Russian translation of the Kalevala in 1888, but this project had been supported by

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Buslaev. Critical of seeing a hierarchy within the Indo-European languages, Buslaev showed interest in Finnish folklore and was responsible for Finnish students coming to study the Russian language from the mid-1850s and recommended that Bel'skii complete this project. Bel'skii thus saw the common mythological and popular foundation between the Kalevala and the Russian bylina when he wrote that Väinämöinen as the God created trees and plants and the youngest and cheerful Lemminkäinen was a mixture of little brother-like figure in Russian folktales and of the Don Juan-like bylina hero Alyosha Popovich in the introduction to the Russian translation of the “Finnish” epic.  

This view to find similarities between the Finnish epic on the one hand and the Russian bylina and other Eurasian epics on the other hand informed the next generation of imperial folklorists. Aleksandr Veselovsky has been known for his internationalist approach to literatures and epics of both West and the East. Veselovsky studied Western European and Byzantine literature and philosophy and became professor at St. Petersburg University in 1872. Theodor Benfey’s study on the borrowing of Oriental fairytales to Occident determined his interest in the relation between Asian and European literatures. Veselovsky adapted Benfey’s method to the imperial Russian context to explore Russia’s place between East and West and how epic developed from tribal mythological to heroic epic borrowing motives and themes and reflecting “historical conditions” the people experienced. Though he did not have enough time and sources to compare various national epics including the Kalevala in Eurasia, his project was critically succeeded by his pupils in Soviet times.

No less important contribution to the Russian folkloristics and the Kalevala discussion was made by another pupil of Buslaev, the Moscow folklorist Vsevolod Miller, representing the so-called historical school of Russian folkloristics. He originally studied the Iranian borrowings in the Russian bylina and later the Kiev and Novgorod bylina to find the prototype of the bylina heroes in Russian history. Miller discussed that the Novgorod colonization of the European North tremendously influenced the Novgorod bylina and its spread in the Russian North including Russian Karelia. Miller examined almost all major subjects and heroes of the Russian bylina such as Il’ia Muromets and Dobryn’ Nikitich. Contrary to Veselovsky mainly specializing in West European literature, Miller’s interest went to the Russian bylina and medieval history and he was accordingly interested in

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104 T. G. Ivanova, *Istoriiia russkoi fol’kloristiki XX veka: 1900-pervaia polovina 1941 g.* (SPb.: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2009), 151. In particular, his family experience (his grandfather was from Königsberg/Kaliningrad) and study in Germany were the decisive factors in forming his research interests and critical attitude toward abstract German idealism. G. A. Time, “Pervye nemetskie vpechatlenia A. N. Veselovskogo,” in *Aleksandr Veselovsky. Aktual’nye aspekty nasledii: issledovaniiia i materialy*, eds. V. E. Bagno et al. (SPb.: Nauka, 2011), 210–18.
The boundaries of the Russian/Slavic and the non-Russian/Slavic. Miller and Veselovsky, inspired by Julius Krohn’s works, approached the Finnic folklores to find the boundaries between the Russian/Slavic and the Finnish/Finnic in the north-western periphery of the Russian Empire. Chronologically, it was Miller who insisted that there was Finnic influence among the Slavic people and vice versa around Lake Ilmen, one of the central areas of early Varangian trade and rule over the Slavic and Finnic tribes, by pointing out the similarities between the Finnish epic and the Russian/Novgorod bylina, Sadko. Miller wrote that recent research had shed light on Finland, “kingdom in the dark [temnoe tsarstvo],” and assumed to find close connections also between the Russian bylina and Finnish folklore, not only between the Finnish and the Estonian folktales.107 According to Miller, Väinämöinen playing the kantele to Ahti, “king of the billows,” amalgamated with Sadko playing the gusli to the marine tsar at Lake Ilmen near Novgorod, which indicates the popularity of Väinämöinen and Ahti among the Slavic peoples near Lake Ilmen as well.108

Veselovsky had a similar interest in the Finnic epic folklore to understand the inter-national character of Il’ia Muromets and the boundaries the Russian national. Veselovsky paid attention to the Finnish variants of bylina and tales of Il’ia Muromets collected in Finnish and Russian Karelia. Despite the existence of only a few examples, Veselovsky pointed out the international aspect of the bylina of Il’ia Muromets but at the same time the need if difficult to address the question to what extent the Russian people adopt Finnic elements.109 To write this article, Veselovsky not only studied Julius Krohn’s works but also asked Kaarle Krohn for help with establishing the existence of the poetic version of the saga about Il’ia from Ilomantsi, a Finnish Karelian town. Kaarle Krohn was ready to ask his relatives in St. Petersburg to translate a part of Julius’s work for Veselovsky.110 Both Miller and Veselovsky, though quite superficially, compared the Russian bylina with the Finnish/Finnic folklore in the context of empire and the all-Russian question.

This is primarily the result of the development of the Russian bylina studies and of non-Russian folklore studies, but two articles were published during the time, when the Grand Duchy was facing the “Russification” policy of Aleksander III and the Finnish discourse of the Kalevala and Finnish nation was shifting westward. The article by Miller received a critical reply from Iosif Mandel'shtam. After graduating at the Imperial Kharkov University and teaching Russian literature at

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107 Vsevolod Miller, “Otgoloski finskago eposa v russkom.” Zhurnal ministerstva narodnego prosveshchenia Chast’ CCVI, (December 1879): 122–23. As examples of Russian and Finnish similarity, Miller raised the similarity between Pohjolan Louhi of the Kalevala and Baba-Yaga, and found the name Kaleva in the name of a Russian bogatyr’, Kolyvan’.
110 Kaarle Krohn’s letter to Veselovsky (dated October 2, 1888), in Nasledie, 358–59. Other letters told that Krohn visited Veselovsky in Petersburg when he gave a lecture there in December 1888 and as well on the Christmas of 1891. See his letters dated December 16, 1888; February 23 (March 7), 1889; January 11 (23), 1892, in Nasledie, 359–61, 364–65.
St. Petersburg Imperial University, Mandeľshtam became a professor of Russian language and literature at the Imperial Aleksander University in 1896. He criticized Miller for his superficial comparison between two epic heroes, Sadko and Väinämöinen. As a liberal intellectual, Mandel'shtam tried to bridge the Russian and Finnish liberal forces, while criticizing both conservative reactionaries in Russia and anti-Russian forces in Finland, and thus understood what Miller’s comparison politically implied.

Entanglement of National and Imperial under the Threat of “Pan-Finnism” and “Russification”

These two points of view on the Kalevala and Lönnrot, the Finnish national view and imperial/Russian ones, intertwined on the 100th anniversary of the birth of Lönnrot in 1902. It functioned as a national symbol to defend its autonomy and European values from the “Russian attack” but also to mediate various groups fragmented in Finnish society during this period. For this anniversary the Old Finns in the SKS were planning to erect a statue of Lönnrot in the central area of Helsinki, which had already a statue of Aleksander II (Russian), Runeberg (Swedish-speaking Finn), and Friedrich Pacius (German). The Fennoman students started to suspect Runeberg’s national symbolic value and sought Lönnrot as a united symbol of the Finnish nation and Fennomania, more Finnish than Topeius and Runeberg but less aggressive than Snellman. In addition, since Svecomen pointed out Lönnrot’s active role in creating the Kalevala to question its popular authenticity, Fennomen increasingly underlined Lönnrot just as a modest recorder and collector of the poems.

Thus, the sculptor Emil Vikström originally planned the statue of Lönnrot to represent “professor” and “writer of the Kalevala” put above the statue of Väinämöinen but finally changed it as “moderate recorder” equal and close to Väinämöinen. The statue was incomplete in April 1902 because of the reluctance of Bobrikov and the authority of Helsinki City dominated by the Swedish-speaking Finns.

In this context the Old Finn intellectuals articulated Lönnrot as a national symbol against the Swedish-speaking elites and the imperial Russian elites but not to question the popular authenticity of the Kalevala poems. In his small contribution to a journal, Kaarle Krohn illustrated Lönnrot like “innocent, childlike” genius who did not understand the difficulties of what he had done for the Finnish nation, which was why he as a “child of the people” could be close to the singers of the people. In other words, he was neither a learned man nor a creative versifier [luova runoniekka] and thus his

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112 On Mandel'shtam in Helsinki, see Klinge, Keisarillinen Aleksanteri Yliopisto, 455, 867–69.
113 Lauri Puntila, Ruotsalaisuus Suomessa: aatesuunnan synty (Helsinki: Otava, 1944), 108.
114 Häggman, Sanojen talossa, 154–66.
views on the Kalevala poems and the past of the Finnish/Finnic peoples were not scientific ones. Oskar Kallio’s small biography for the centenary also explained that the Kalevala was “not a scientifically precise collection of folklore but truly a national book.” Still, Kallio identified the Finnish nation with Lönnrot, who was born poor and “found” and explored Finnish and Russian Karelia, and in his late years brought harmony between the eastern and western dialects by establishing the Finnish standard spelling. “Entire Finland,” thus when he died, “felt like losing the best son; far away in cottages of Kajaani and Russian Karelia sadness was so deep and sincere [as in Finland].”

For the imperial Russian intellectuals, the Kalevala and Lönnrot were sympathetic popular symbols but its exclusivist interpretations based on only Western, European values were awkward ones. One such intellectual, Vladimir Gordlevsky, was born to the family of a Russian officer stationed in Helsinki and studied there until he entered Moscow University and Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages, where he started to study Turkic philology to be later a Soviet academician in this field. His early years in Helsinki enabled him to learn both Finnish and Swedish and establish a Finno-Ugric network with leading Finnish philologists. The Imperial Russian Orientologists were very critical of Europe-centric Oriental studies in the West and saw Russia as a space where there was no boundary between East and West by promoting non-Russian native scholars in the imperial peripheries, which had obviously a strong affinity to Veselovsky’s scope on Eurasian literatures and epics. Gordlevsky belonged to the group of Moscow Orientologists around the Lazarev Institute, where he had Feodor Korsh and Vsevolod Miller as mentors.

In 1903, Gordlevsky published a piece “The Memory of Elias Lönnrot [Pamiati Eliasa Lenruta],” which was dedicated to him and his deeds for Finnish national culture but critical of recent views of the leading Finnish scholars on the Kalevala poems and Lönnrot. As in Finland, Gordlevsky depicted him as a person of humble origin, with the same worldview as the Karelian folk singers had. Critical of the Swedish-speaking ruling class in Finland, Gordlevsky concluded that the Kalevala was thus a popular epic giving shape to the democratic spirit. Furthermore, contrary to Kaarle Krohn, Gordlevsky underlined the education and literacy Lönnrot acquired, which could save the Kalevala. Gordlevsky was also critical of the views on the western origins of the Kalevala poems and sympathetic to Lönnrot and Ahlqvist in that the motherland of the Kalevala poems was Russian Karelia. The important difference is that Gordlevsky stressed the difference between “Western Finns (Tavastians)” and “Eastern Orthodox Finns (Karelians)” and pointed out that the Finnish folklorists

overstressed the Scandinavian-Baltic-Germanic influences to put the Finns on a higher rank than their “own relative, eastern Finnish tribes [svoini sorodichami, vostochnymi finskimi inorodtsami]” to enter the family of the cultured European peoples.\(^{119}\)

Gordlevsky’s letter to Kaarle Krohn reveals what Gordlevsky saw in the “national” ways the Finns describe Lönnrot, somewhat foreign for imperial Russian intellectuals. In his letter Gordlevsky regretted that he lacked enough resources to introduce the life of Lönnrot and felt “many gaps [många luckor]” between him and the Finnish scholars in knowledge on the history of Finland and Lönnrot. Gordlevsky wrote that he had read the draft of Kallio’s biography of Lönnrot, which evoked in him “a so to speak historical fatalism (providence) [en så att säga historisk fatalismen (förtsyren)],” incomprehensible to the Russians who lacked such sources.\(^{120}\) In other words, Gordlevsky could not share with himself this “nationalist” feeling Lönnrot evoked among the Finnish nation and saw him not as a Finn but as one of rather broader people within the space of the Russian Empire. In addition, given that erecting the statue of Lönnrot was “obstructed” in Helsinki, Gordlevsky could not understand why the Finnish scholars underestimated the role of Lönnrot, who wished “peace and love” between Fennoman and Svecoman students “like his student years,” and sought the origins of Kalevala poems in Scandinavian and Germanic culture, not in Russian Karelia.\(^{121}\)

This gap between the imperial and the national structured the forthcoming Soviet-Finnish controversy over the Kalevala, Lönnrot, and the Finnic kinship. Major actors in this controversy from the Russian/Soviet side were born in the late 1880s and 1890s and studied under Veselovsky at St. Petersburg Imperial University. Viktor M. Zhirmunsky was familiar with German literature and studied at Tenishevskoe Uchilishche famous for the liberal teaching staff. Excited by the 1905 Revolution and the opening of the State Duma in 1906, Zhirmunsky had a chance to take part in a school excursion to Olonets Karelia and felt nostalgic for Rus’ and bogatyr’. When the group saw Shlissel’burg, a Novgorod fortress built in the 14th century against Sweden, Zhirmunsky was amazed at the fortress and its towers which had stood for centuries as “silent witnesses of the past glory of Russia, dumb witnesses of her grief” and cries and groans of the epic heroes “never to be heard across Rus’,” because “there victors held festivities. There black crows peck bogatyr’ sinking into a slumber,” he wrote in his diary. Onega and other lakes and Kivach impressed him and its famous waterfall, the way water falls from so high through “combs of black cliff,” was like “a dying bogatyr’ in heavy chains.”\(^{122}\) Vladimir Propp, the future Soviet folklorist, was born in St. Petersburg, his father was Volga German from the Saratov Gubernia and studied at Annenschule, a St. Petersburg gymnasium.


\(^{120}\) SKS Kirjallisuuden arkisto, collection of Kaarle Krohn, Gordlevsky’s letter to Kaarle Krohn dated February 1 (14), 1903.

\(^{121}\) Gordlevsky, “Pamiati Eliasy Lyonruta,” 80, 108.

for children of German origins. At St. Petersburg Imperial University Propp initially studied German literature but changed his major to Slavic-Russian studies because of his “attachment to Russia” and growing “disgust” for German “rudeness and narrowness” around him.\textsuperscript{123}

In addition, Slavic linguists increasingly showed interest in the Finno-Ugric languages. It was Dmitry Bubrikh that is regarded one of the founders of Soviet Finno-Ugric studies, but he started his academic career as a Slavic philologian under Aleksei Shakhmatov at St. Petersburg Imperial University. To understand the old Russian language written in the Primary Chronicles, Shakhmatov followed Rybnikov and Gil’ferding by carrying out two expeditions to Olonets Karelia in the 1880s to study northern dialects, the “most archaic form” of Russian language he believed. There on the western shore of Lake Onega Shakhmatov found such strong Finnish influence on the local dialects that he concluded that they were Russified Finns.\textsuperscript{124} Shakhmatov was interested in geographical boundaries between Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian languages/dialects and therefore started to study boundaries between Russian and Eastern Finnic languages as well and in his later years he took part in opening the Finno-Ugric course at Saratov University and became a correspondent member of the Finno-Ugrian Society.\textsuperscript{125} Following his mentor, Bubrikh studied Russian dialects in Poland, and, as recommended by Shakhmatov, later shifted to the Udmurt language, in which he found strong influence from the Russian language. Contrary to Finnish Finno-Ugric linguists shifting from West to East, Russian/Soviet (future) Finno-Ugric linguists approached Baltic-Finnic languages from the East.

\textbf{Karelia and Karelians between “Pan-Finnism” and “Russification”}

While Finnish and Russian intellectuals approached Russian Karelia from West and East, indigenous Karelians were not ready to produce their own intellectuals to claim their own epic poems and language. White Sea Karelia administratively belonged to Kem’ uezd in Arkhangel’sk guberniia and can be divided into the borderland area scarcely populated by White Sea Karelians and the White Sea coastal area relatively densely populated by Russians and Russified Karelians. The language White Sea Karelians spoke was called Karelian proper, close to neighboring Finnish Savo dialect due to their geographical and historical proximity.\textsuperscript{126} In the early 1860s Kem’ uezd counted a population of about 33,000 and, according to the 1897 census, had 35,390 inhabitants of which about 19,200

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{123} A. N. Martynova, ed., \textit{Netzvestnyi V. Ia. Propp} (Spb.: Aleteiiia, 2002), 7–8.
\item \textsuperscript{124} V. I. Makarov, “\textit{Takoe ne byst’ na Rusi prezhe...}”: \textit{Povest’ ob akademike A. A. Shakhmatove} (Spb.: Aleteiia, 2000), 106–7.
\item \textsuperscript{125} N. A. Agafonova, “\textit{Mordovskii etnograficheskii sbornik}” A. A. Shakhmatova kak istochnik izucheniia rzianskikh dialektov,” \textit{Finno-ugorskii mir}, 1 (2016), 12–18.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Leskenen estimated that this group began to appear in the 9th century under the influence of the iron culture from the West and later of Varangian and Slavic impact. Heikki Leskenen, “Karjala ja karjalaiset kielentutkimuksen näkökulmasta,” in \textit{Karjala: historia, kansa, kulttuuri}, eds. Pekka Nevalainen and Hannes Sihvo (Helsinki: SKS, 1998), 353–55.
\end{itemize}
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spoke Karelian as their native language. From the second half of the 19th century, White Sea Karelians gradually adapted themselves to trades between Finland, White Sea Karelia, and Murmansk region and later forestry and seasonal labor. As a result, successful White Sea Karelians made a fortune and some of the most successful could move to Finland.  

White Sea Karelia and Olonets Karelia remained a periphery of the Grand Duchy and Russia. As Kauppala and Vitukhnovskaia have summarized, modernization in Finnish forestry and agriculture decisively widened the economic and societal gap between Finland and Russian Karelia and the imperial politics toward Finland was advantageous and lead to Finnish modernization in terms of expansion of the railway network and timber, sawmill, and food export (butter, milk and meat) to Russia, while St. Petersburg saw little importance in developing Russian Karelia until the early 20th century.  

Voknavolok/Vuokkinemi area, where Lönnrot and other Finns visited legendary epic singers, was close to the border as the westernmost part of the Arkhangel'sk guberniia and connected intensively with other White Sea Karelian villages such as Kostomuksha and Ukhta (in Russian Karelia) and Finnish Karelian towns and further with the Gulf of Bothnia. Lacking infrastructure, church network, and their own zemstvo, authorities in Kem’ and Arkhangel’sk faced difficulties deploying doctors and schools: Kem’ uezd had only 57 non-zemstvo primary schools [obshchestvennye shkoly] in the beginning of 20th century, many of which were in the White Sea coastal area.  

Olonets guberniia with its own zemstvo since 1867 was better integrated into the development of industry and the school network of the empire. Olonets guberniia had seven uezds (Olonets, Petrozavodsk, Povenets, Pudozh, Vytegra, Kagropol’, and Lodeinoe Pole) and the Karelian population was concentrated in three uezds (Olonets, Petrozavodsk, and Povenets) and spoke two dialects: Livvi (northeastern and eastern coast of Ladoga and Olonets Isthmus) and Ludian (east of the Livvi-speaking area and west to lake Onega), both of which were influenced by Russian and Veps and especially Ludian is a mixed language of Karelian and Veps. Olonets guberniia had the first four-years school [Glavnoe narodonoe uchilishche] in Petrozavodsk (95 pupils) opened in 1786 and a smaller one in Olonets (24 pupils) in 1787 and the Petrozavodsk school became the first gymnasium in 1808. The zemstvo and educational reform in the 1860s and 1870s bolstered an expansion of schools: 146 zemstvo schools (7,986 pupils) in 1890, 246 zemstvo schools (11,745 pupils) in 1905, and 408 zemstvo schools (11,468 pupils) in 1913. A more important role in education was played by the Olonets eparchy, which set up 176 primary schools before the installment of the zemstvo, and by the Olonets

129 Korablev, Istoriia Karelii, 327.
Theological Seminary, which partially taught also in Karelian (Livvi dialect), produced many village-school teachers. Despite the increasing number of the zemstvo primary school, the church schools numbered 327 (8,852 pupils) in 1913.  

Both the Olonets civil and religious authorities paid much attention to the education of Karelians and Veps. In the eyes of Russian intellectuals, both Karelians and Veps so thoroughly adapted themselves to the Russian peasant way of life that they saw them “Russians.” Influenced from Il’minskii’s method about the education of non-Russian ethnic groups, inorodtsy, in Kazan’, the authorities tried to educate Karelian children at the earliest stage in Karelian as the oral instruction language and teachers were expected to have the knowledge of Karelian especially in the Olonets Theological Seminary. For this aim, Peterburg Committee of Literacy [Peterburgskii komitet gramotnosti] launched the project of publishing an elementary book for literacy and religion in Karelian (with the Cyrillic alphabet) in the mid-1860s and published a Karelian-Russian prayer book. From the 1890s, as the Il’minskii method gathered criticism, Olonets gubernnia authority began to discuss that the instruction in Karelian hindered the pace of teaching and teachers were no longer required the Karelian knowledge. However, Arkhangel’sk eparchy continued the Il’minskii method and published an ABC book for White Sea Karelians to translate church books into Karelian. 

Being anxious about “Russification,” Finland started to pay attention to Orthodox Karelian-speaking population on the borderlands and White Sea Karelians in Finland. In 1880 the Grand Duchy had about 38,700 Orthodox believers, nearly 1.9% of the population, mainly in Finnish Karelia and Karelian Isthmus. The Lutheran church and Fennoman activists were active in converting Orthodox Karelians to integrate them into the Lutheran Finnish nation and the Sortavala Teacher Seminary started its activity in 1880 to produce teachers for both Orthodox and Lutheran Karelian speaking populations. In addition, Paavo Ahava (Afanas’ev) and his fellow White Sea Karelians established the Union of White Sea Karelians in Tampere in August 1906, which had 627 members, of which 120 were White Karelian peddlers. They distributed their journals and publications and gave financial support to the projects of construct roads and post network between Finland and White Sea Karelia. They also opened a school in Voknavolok and other ones in Ukhta and Ukhta uezd, aiming to send Karelian children later to the Finnish seminary and university. 

Active Fennomen put even more Finnishness mixed with pan-Finnism against the threat of “Russification” on the Russian-Finnish borderland. While being an important battlefield between Svecomen and Fennomen, Vyborg city and area became the one against “Russification” from the late

131 Iliukha, Shkola i detstvo, 178–82.
19th century. While Fennomen had opposed a plan to erect a statue of the Swedish marshal Tyrglis Knutsson known as a conqueror of Karelia and founder of Vyborg fortress, the plan realized in 1908 and the statue competed with a statue of Peter the Great erected in Tervaniemi, an island in Vyborg, for the bicentennial of the Russian occupation of Vyborg in June 1910. So Finnish politicians and activists were determined to “nationalize” the Karelian Isthmus and the local population, especially Karelians and Orthodox believers who they regarded were not adequately Finn and thus could not resist “Russification.” To challenge the bicentennial of “Russian” Vyborg, the borderland city Terijoki (Zelenogorsk from 1949), 50 km from Petersburg, hosted the Festival of Song, Music, and Sport in June 1910, to which “tribe sisters and brothers” Hungarian and Estonian guests were also invited. As Mikko Uotinen, one of the organizers of this festival, stated, only nurturing interaction with “tribes of Finland, Hungarians, and Estonians” made it possible to highlight the Finnishness of the “people of the border [rajan kansa]” who were “foolish” and lacked “civility [sivistys].”

Both religious and civil authorities in Russia soon took measures to remove the Finnish influence. Rightist nationalist newspapers such as “Okrainy Rossii” loudly criticized Finnish “separatism” and “liberal” general-governors in Finland for their failure in integrating Finland into the empire through Russian language and removal of the privileges the Grand Duchy enjoyed. Another newspaper Novoe vremia associated this “pan-Finnism” with other pan-movements the empire was facing and sensationalized activities of “pan-Finnists” from Finland in Ingria, Estonia, and Karelia. Sergii (Ivan Stragorodskii, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus’ from 1943 to 1944) as archbishop of Finland and Vyborg struggled to stop the conversion of Orthodox believers in Finland by accelerating the Finnish translation of religious texts and introducing Finnish education in the church schools. Furthermore, Sergii and his followers promoted closer ties with Arkhangel’sk and Olonets eparchies to confront the threat of “pan-Finnism.”

Caught between the Finns and the Russians, the Karelians on both sides started to find their standpoint. Between the Lutheran church and the Holy Synod, the Finnish Orthodox church struggled to integrate the Finnish Karelians into the Finnish nation through education and service in Finnish but kept the Orthodoxy as an integral part of the Finnish Karelian identity against the Lutheran Finns,

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136 Vitukhnovskaia, Rossiiskaia Karelia, 305–6.
137 Vitukhnovskaia, Rossiiskaia Karelia, 127–47.; Iliukha, Shkola i detstvo, 187–89.
especially their feeling of superiority over “underdeveloped” Karelians. For Karelians, *Väinämöinen* had been a popular figure in their songs before he became popular among the Finns.\(^{138}\) The Karelian Iivo Härkönen was born in 1882 in Suistamo village in borderland Karelia (today Suojärvi district of the Republic of Karelia) and graduated from the Sortavala Teachers Seminary and became a secretary of the Union of White Sea Karelians to be engaged in propaganda and education activities in White Sea and Olonets Karelia. Influenced by Julius and Kaarle Krohns, who visited his native village to write down folklore from his grandfather, Härkönen collected folklore in Olonets and tried to find a place for the Karelians between Finland and Russia.\(^{139}\) Others such as Viktor Evseev chose the Russian side of Karelia: Evseev, future Soviet Karelian folklorist, was born in 1910 to a Livvi-Karelian family in the village of Jehkilä near Suojärvi and his father had come there from Vokhtozero/Vohtjärvi in Olonets *gubernnia* to work in forestry but later moved to Petrozavodsk to join in the construction of the Murmansk railway. Evseev went to the Russian-language primary school, but his sisters and other relatives remained on the Finnish side.\(^{140}\)

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**Chapter 2: Greater Finland, Finnish-Karelian Kinship, and the Kalevala in Soviet-Finnish Borderlands, 1917–1939**

For both Russian/Soviet and Finnish history, the revolutions in 1917 and the independence of Finland have been seen as one of the most important events of the era, the time of self-determination and social revolution. Recent discussions, however, put the collapse of the empires and the birth of new nation-states in a longer period of political, social, and economic upheavals and violence from World War I to civil wars/liberation wars during and after the war as a result of entanglements and collapse of Eurasian land empires.\(^{141}\) This happened not only in Europe but also in the Caucasus as a “shatterzone of empires” and in Siberia and the Far East. The Bolsheviks struggled to secure their power and rule at first in the Russian heartland and then headed for the former imperial borderlands.\(^{141}\)

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to fill the power vacuum and to export revolution. This tremendous power vacuum prompted not only other great powers but also smaller nations to enjoy their own dreams to gain more territories that covered “our” peoples.\(^\text{142}\) In the north-western borderlands it was Greater Finland that played a key role in reorganizing the geopolitical and ideological scene there as an expansionist, politicized, and militarized ideology, and the idea of Pan-Finnism was tightly integrated into this expansionist and revisionist ideology.

WWI made four land empires (Ottoman, German, Hapsburg, and Russian) play ethnic/national cards to mobilize their loyalty for the war effort and weaken the war effort of the rival empires. When the Imperial Army occupied Eastern Galicia, the Russian military authority replaced the Greek-Catholic church with the Russian-Orthodox church and the Russian nationalists and pro-Russian Ukrainians pushed an all-Russian nation as an idea to integrate Ukrainians including Ruthenians in occupied areas. The Habsburg Empire allowed the formation of a Polish Legion led by Józef Piłsudski and of the so-called Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters in summer 1914 and financially supported the Ukrainian émigré organizations. The German Empire, too, promoted local national cultures and languages in their occupied areas, while over two million evacuees from Belorussia remained Orthodox and nationally minded relief organizations took care of over 200,000 displaced Lithuanian evacuees in Russia.\(^\text{143}\) This dynamic interplay between imperial competitions and national movements within the empire prepared civil wars, revolutions, and independencies after the Russian Revolution.

**Greater Finland and Pan-Finnism after Finnish Independence**

As Pertti Haapala has argued, the Grand Duchy was far from the main battlefields with its male subjects not mobilized to the Imperial Army and industry was generally successful thanks to the orders by the Imperial Army and a huge Russian market left by the expatriation of German rivals. The war brought many work opportunities in southern coastal construction sites and metal industries. These contributed to social and economic stability in the Grand Duchy until 1917.\(^\text{144}\) Those mainly

\(^{142}\) Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, “Introduction: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands,” in *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*, eds. Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 4–8.


German- and Swedish-speaking students and activists who hoped to win an independent Finland headed for the German Empire to receive a military training for a coming war of independence. These “jaegers [jääkärit],” however, attracted little sympathy in the Grand Duchy, where many saw independence as unrealistic, and the political elites hoped for the rehabilitation and expansion of autonomy in return for loyalty to the Tsar and Empire during the war.¹⁴⁵

The independence of Finland seemed realistic only from summer-autumn 1917. The February Revolution brought joy and hope to Finland too, but the mood gradually changed with the deteriorating economy (especially the grain supply from Russia stopped and inflation escalated), social and military order.¹⁴⁶ In addition, the loss of the Tsar—the Grand Duke symbolized breaking the most important link between Finland and the Empire, and the Russian Provisional Government and the Finnish Senate could not find a common ground regarding the future of Finland.¹⁴⁷ As a result of the October parliament election, the SDP lost 11 seats (from 103 to 92 seats) and the four bourgeois parties and the Agrarian Union Party [Maalaisliitto] won the majority, which led to further political rivalries between the parties. The left wing of the SDP and workers were further radicalized by the October Revolution, which was realized as a general strike in Finland, and shortness of provisions.¹⁴⁸

This independence was followed by a short but very bloody civil war from the end of January, which left a traumatic divide in interwar Finland and beyond. The Finnish Civil War claimed about 36,000 (more than 1% of the population) lives in the battles, terrors (one third of the total victims), and malnutrition and diseases in the concentration camps. The “White” Senate led by bourgeois politicians evacuated to the city of Vaasa and the Civil/White Guards had strong holds in central and northern Finland, while the radical wing of the SDP set up the Delegation of People’s Commissars of Finland [Suomen Kansanvaltuuskunta] and the Red Guards seized major industrial cities including Helsinki, Tampere, Vyborg, and Turku in southern Finland. The jaegers and volunteers joined the White Army organized by Carl Gustav Mannerheim from Germany and Sweden. With this military superiority, the Whites captured Tampere in early April and the German Baltic Sea Division reached Helsinki on 13 April, which forced the Red leadership to flee to Petrograd.¹⁴⁹ The presence of 42,000 armed Russian soldiers waiting for returning to Russia fostered fear and Russian-hate among the

Whites by mixing up Russians, Bolsheviks, and the Finnish Reds. This image and memory as the “War of Liberation” from the Russians/Bolsheviks dominated the interwar years and beyond.\footnote{150 Tikka estimated the number of Russian soldiers fighting in the Civil War somewhere between 1500 and 4000. Tikka, “Warfare and Terror,” 105. On the Russian-hate, see Outi Karemaa, Vihollisia, vainojoja, syöpäläisiä: venäjälisviha Suomessa 1917–1923 (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1998), 41–117. On the memory of the Finnish Civil War during and after the Civil War, Seppo Hentilä, Pitkät varjot: muistamisen historia ja politiikka (Helsinki: SKS, 2018), 60–73.}

Attempts to realize either Red or White Greater Finland went side by side with the Finnish Civil War and broader imperial competitions. The so-called “Tribe Wars [heimosodat]” of Finland is an extension of the Finnish Civil War influenced from pan-Finnism and Greater Finland and part of violent transformation of Central and Eastern Europe.\footnote{151 Aapo Roselius and Oula Silvennoinen, Villi itä: Suomen heimosodat ja Itä-Euroopan murros 1918–1921 (Helsinki: Tammi, 2019).} Some activists and jaegers started to propagate Greater Finland to Germany soon after the beginning of WWI, but, after the declaration of Finnish independence, it became topical within small circles of activists, Karelians in Finland, businessmen, students, and military officers. The Finnish Civil War accelerated the effort of those stakeholders to drag the White Army and the German Empire into their plan to annex Russian Karelia. On 23 February, Mannerheim issued his famous Order of the Day to “all the Karelians of Finland and White Sea Karelia” that we “are strong enough to maintain our freedom and defend our brothers in White Sea Karelia” and would fight until a legal order is established to “create a powerful, great Finland [mahtavan, suuren Suomen].”\footnote{152 Hannes Ignatius et al., eds., Suomen Vapaussota vuonna 1918. IV (Helsinki: Otawa, 1923), 429.} His Order of the Day gave a green light to preparation for a military expedition to White Sea and Olonets Karelia, which went parallel with Germanophile Finns’ efforts to call German intervention in the Finnish Civil War.\footnote{153 Jaäskeläinen, Itä-Karjalan kysymys, 76–93; Vahtola, “Suomi suureksi – Viena vapaaksi,” 21–71.}

This “White” Greater Finland competed with a “Red” Greater Finland during the Civil War. Expecting world revolution, Lenin and other Bolsheviks had worked for a socialist Finland as a good example of Leninist self-determination by supporting the Red Finnish government as they challenged the Ukrainian Central Rada by setting up a Soviet Ukrainian government in Kharkiv in early 1918.\footnote{154 Jääskeläinen, Itä-Karjalan kysymys, 76–93; Vahtola, “Suomi suureksi – Viena vapaaksi,” 21–71.} To conclude a state treaty with the Soviet government in February, the Red Finnish government sent a delegation with a draft. This draft aimed to include both White Sea and Olonets Karelia, “the territory on the eastern side of the border, populated by the Karelian tribes of Finnish origin,”\footnote{155 A detailed account of the development of non-Russian nationalities in the early months of 1918, see Vladimir P. Buldakov, Khaos i etnos. Etnicheskie konflikty v Rossii, 1917–1918 gg.: usloviia voznikhoveniia, khronika, kommentarii, analiz (M.: Novyi khronograf, 2010), especially February and March 1918.} in a socialist

\footnote{155 Paragraph 15 of the second variant of the draft of the treaty (on February 3–12 (16–25), 1918) prepared by the Red Finnish government was discussed in the Sovnarkom. M. V. Zelenov and N. A. Lysenkov, eds. Rossiia i Finliandiia: ot protivostoianiia k miru. 1917–1920 (M.: ROSSPEN, 2017), doc. 72, 193–94.}
Finland. Sulo Wuolijoki later recalled that when he headed for Petrograd for signing the treaty Otto Kuusinen encouraged him to do the best so that the population of Karelia could get an opportunity to have a referendum. While Wuolijoki was skeptical about a “positive” result for Finland, Kuusinen said half in joke: “Yes they vote for joining in Finland if we promise them ten markka and a railway.” Though Lenin postponed the settlement about Russian Karelia, the Red Finnish newspapers hinted at a future settlement of Russian Karelia.

For those officers including Mannerheim himself not interested in pan-Finnism, the aim of the expedition to Russian Karelia was mainly to secure the rear of the White Army. In addition to this strategic reason, a delicate position of Finland between the Entente, the Central Powers, and Sweden required careful judgement whether the White Finnish government would officially send troops to Russian Karelia and the Murmansk railway, which the British Navy tried to occupy. In fact, Russian Karelia was attractive for the White Finnish elites and businessmen as a supplier of rich and cheap forest and water resources, with which the Finnish forestry and paper industry desperately sought another market after the Russian market collapsed. Furthermore, treatment of Russian Karelia became a card in domestic political struggle for the future polity of independent Finland since pro-German politicians like Svinhufvud and Paasikivi hoped for a monarchy with a German prince to secure German commitment to Finnish security and support for the Finnish annexation of Russian Karelia.

For these reasons, the Finish expedition to Russian Karelia in 1918 resulted in a half-hearted attempt. After Mannerheim’s Order of the Day, the Karelians in Finland and Pan-Finnic activists activated their plans to occupy Russian Karelia, but even before the military expedition they were split as to how to treat Russian Karelia: some insisted on its annexation to Finland, advantageous for the Finnish elite, while others hoped for an independent Karelia or an autonomous Karelia within Finland, better options for the White Sea Karelians. The “volunteer” expedition led by the Russian-born Colonel Carl Malm expedition crossed the border on 21 March but was disappointed that the White Sea Karelians in Voknavolok and other villages did not consent to send a request of liberation and annexation to Finland and to revolt against the Bolsheviks, since they had already heard that “Germans and Finns” were bringing war to White Sea Karelia. In the village Kimasozero/Kiimasjärvi a commander of the second company Toivo Kuisma made a speech by quoting the Kalevala and Genetz’s poem, “Children of Väinölä,” to appeal the kinship but the listeners were “completely tired.”

158 Jääskeläinen, Itä-Karjalan kysymys, 100–79; Polvinen, J. K. Paasikivi I, 360–87; Kuisma, Sodasta syntynyt, 91–130.
and some were even hostile.¹⁵⁹

Even more shocking was Ukhta, where the village dwellers very coldly received them. The pan-Finnic activists and intellectuals organized schools, meetings, and festivals to win support and many young scholars joined these activities such as folklorist Väinö Salminen and musicologist, future chairman of the Kalevala Society, Armas Väisänen. The biggest festival was a “Tribe Festival [Heimajuhla]” organized by the Civility Society of Karelia on July 12–14, where the writer Ilmari Kianto performed his famous poem “Finland to be great, White Sea to be free [Suomi suureksi, Viena vapaaksi].” However, once his effort was denied in Kesten’ga/Kiestinki, where the dwellers were afraid of losing the grain and peace the Britons promised, Kianto denounced them: “We have a great intention to echo “Suloisessa Suomessamme”! But I tell you that we do not sing the song because it is too sacred to be sung in this meeting. […] Tribe-brothers! The mark of slave is on your forehead! But there is nothing to be said. Farewell!”¹⁶⁰

Likewise, the folklorist Väinö Salminen in his Ukhta festival speech showed his gratitude to the White Sea Karelians for the Kalevala, which helped to awaken the Finnishness and finally separate Finland from Russia. With the language of Finnish-centric pan-Finnism, Salminen told, it was the time for Finland to repay this debt to the brother Karelians:

“All in touch with Finland, the Karelian people can remain and develop. It [the Karelian people] would not be a borderland, a foreign tribe for Russia, not a colony [alusmaa] for England, […]. Karelia needs Finland, Finland [needs] Karelia. […] We can now create a lost Greater Finland and can do this by violating no one’s rights and by keeping what belongs to us from the immemorial time, under the legs of the land of the Finns. These lands are yours, the descendants of the great poem-singers, never give them to foreigners.”¹⁶¹

The German surrender and following intrusion of the Red Army in the Baltic littoral directed the attention of the pan-Finnish jaegers, activists, and civil war veterans to the “younger brother” Estonians. Even before the October Revolution, Estonians in Helsinki and Petrograd such as Konstantin Päts enjoyed various ideas about an Estonian-Finnish state union or federation.¹⁶² After

¹⁶⁰ Vahtola, “Suomi suureksi,” 239–84. “Suloisessa Suomessamme!” is the first verse of Karjalaisten laulu [Song of Karelians], a Finnish Karelian folksong composed for the Savo-Karelia Student Union in the end of 19th century. The third verse reads how Väinämöinen’s kantele created the whole of nature, how Seppo Ilmarinen created the Sampo, and how Lemminkäinen’s sword flashed. The final verse reads: “When the persecution hits Finland very hard; then poor Karelia plays the griefs of Finland; And when a happy day for Finland dawns again; then great music of joy echoes from Karelia.”
the Red Army occupied eastern and southern Estonia in early January 1919, the Estonian Provisional Government led by Päts asked Sweden, Britain, and Finland to send weapons and troops. Fearing Bolshevik power in its southern neighbor, the Finnish government decided to grant credit and deliver weapons to Estonia and not to prevent Finnish volunteers from joining the Estonian Army. Estophile intellectuals such as the linguist Lauri Kettunen, jaegers, and activists lobbied the government and over 3,800 volunteers headed for Estonia between the end of December and early January 1919.163

The notion of Finnish-Estonian brotherhood always informed the communication between Finnish and Estonian actors in the negotiations about this volunteer expedition. In fact, the most important motivation for this support was to secure the independence of Finland and, less importantly, find a business chance in Estonia.164 Still, Santeri Alkio, the chairman of the Agrarian Union Party, wrote that Greater Finland was coming to birth, “Estonia, Ingria, Ononets, White Sea Karelia, and Karelia – there the might of Finland.” Welcoming Finnish volunteers, Päts as well stressed the common ancestors and epics between the two nations and dreamed of a Greater Finland [Suur-Soome] which would extend from the coasts of the North Sea to the southern border of Estonia and from the coasts of the Baltic Sea to those large lakes, where “our tribes” had lived from generation to generation.”165 This success of the expedition and securing the Estonian national border made the Finns confident about pan-Finnic ideology and some even boasted that Finland gifted independence to the Estonian brother.

This success to “liberate” the younger brother from the Red Army encouraged young veterans, students, and even teenagers to volunteer for another expedition to Olonets Karelia in spring and summer 1919, which again resulted in disappointment for many participants. The primary object of Mannerheim and the Minister of War Rudolf Walden was to occupy Petrograd before Britain and, as part of this plan, found it useful to take advantage of the situation in Olonets Karelia. The expedition approached Petrozavodsk in early June but had to retreat in the end of August.167 During the expedition, the first general election after independence gave 80 seats (from 92 seats) to the SDP, 42 seats (from 26 seats) to the Agrarian Union, and 26 seats to the new liberal Progressive Party. This meant a defeat for the authoritarian monarchists and in the first presidential election on 25 July Kaarlo Ståhlberg of the Progressive Party defeated the opponent Mannerheim, whom the activists and jaegers supported. This political change finally put an end to the Olonets expedition.

For those nationalists believing in Pan-Finnism and Greater Finland, this was a bitter betrayal. The new Republic seemed the best choice for many Finns, since soon after the German

165 Zetterberg, Viro ja Suomi, 187–89, 204; Ilkka, January 16, 1919.
166 Zetterberg, Kaksoisvaltion haaveilija, 56–60; Maaliit, January 9 and 16, 1919.
surrender Finnish politicians and industrialists were quick to seek the recognition of independence by Brit

Britain and the US, and find Western markets to export processed timber and paper necessary for the
post-war reconstruction with a weak Finnish markka and receive food aid from the US. Furthermore, the Finnish government and parliament had to consider a national reconciliation, facing the so-called Ahvenanmaa/Åland question, since the Swedish-speaking majority on the islands called
Sweden to add the islands to the kingdom to preserve their Swedishness, after seeing the “Finnization”
and anarchy and violence of the “Finno-Ugric people” in the Finnish Civil War and after. In Onolens
Karelia, the volunteers were disappointed and even angry at the ignorance of “Russians [ryssia].”
Onolens Karelians. In the eyes of the activists, the Helsinki political and military elites “betrayed” the
activists by “stealing” the victory in the Civil War.

Soviet Karelia and Red Finns from the Civil War to Peace

Facing interventions and civil wars in the borderlands, the Bolshevik Party had to build a
new socialist state within a collapsing state and society and this experience of the Civil War in Russia
strongly influenced an emerging Soviet state, its borderland and nationalities policy, and the mentality
of the Bolsheviks including Stalin himself. Lenin and Stalin as the Commissar for Nationalities dealt
with various nationalist groups to win the Civil War. Lenin and Stalin were more concerned with the
right to self-determination and had an idea to grant a territorial unit to each nationality as a solution to
nationalisms. And, as Jeremy Smith has argued, Lenin was more alert to the threat of “Great Russian
chauvinism” which angered non-Russian nationalities who had been oppressed, while Stalin believed
in the progressiveness of the Russian people and culture and the role of a centralized Russian state for
realizing socialism. At the practical level, however, granting an autonomous territorial unit was
negotiated by various actors on the spot as Daniel Schafer has shown in his study on the birth of the
Republic of Bashkortostan, the first Bolshevik experiment in early 1919. In the borderlands, foreign
policy mattered in addition to these local negotiations and Soviet Karelia is a good example.

Onolens and White Sea Karelians were more involved in the First World War than the Finns.
Until 1917 more than 28,000 men, almost half of working male population, was mobilized to the Army,
and many resources in Russian Karelia were absorbed by the construction of the Murmansk railway
from November 1914. The price of bread, meat, fish, and salt saw increase, double or three times and

170 Roselius and Silvennoinen, Villi itä, 224–31; Vahtola, Nuorukaisten sota, 371, 514.
171 Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National Question, chapter 2; Jeremy Smith, “Stalin as the
Commissar of Nationality Affairs,” in Stalin: A New History, eds. Sarah Davies and James Harris
working conditions and labor hygiene worsened, which activated the workers’ movement and liberal media. After the February Revolution, the Olonets zemstvo and civil organizations led by Kadets (members of the Constitutional Democratic Party) and socialists took power in Olonets, while the guberniia government succeeded the Arkhangelsk guberniia. On June 22, the soviet of peasant representatives and the soviet of Petrozavodsk city worker and soldier representatives were united into the Olonets Guberniia Executive Committee [Gubispolkom] with the Olonets Karelian V. M. Kudzhiev as chairman. White Sea Karelians held a meeting “tribe festival [heimojuhla]” on July 12–14, 1917, which made a draft of the future constitution of Russian Karelia and the majority wished to create a unified territory for the Russian Karelian population as an autonomous unit within Russia.

The October Revolution further divided Russian Karelians into various forces. The Bolsheviks took advantage of radicalized workers and soldiers amid the food crisis and speculation and, with left SRs, dominated the Olonets Gubispolkom. In White Sea Karelia, while some joined the Bolsheviks, others joined the Karelian Red Guards led by the Voknavolok Karelian and left SR Grigory Lezojev/Riiko Lesonen or the Finnish Red Guards led by Finnish workers and Red Finns who had fled Finland. The British intervention force reorganized the Red Finns into the Murmansk Legion and White Sea Karelian peasants and workers into the 600-men Karelian corps [Karel'skii otriad] to drive out the Finnish expedition. When the Intervention Army started to fight against the Bolsheviks after the German surrender, the Karelian corps was disbanded under the pressure of the Provisional Government of the Northern Region in Arkhangelsk, which stressed an imperial Russian territorial integrity and the role of the Russian North, the “northerner, descendants of the immigrants from ancient Novgorod, that is, the genuine representatives of the Great Russian nation.”

Amid the struggle among the Bolsheviks, the White Finns, the British intervention, and the Northern White Russians, the Russian Karelians sought their interest by fighting or collaborating with them. The local Bolsheviks and the Red Army units could not supply enough grain and started forced taxation and conscription in the Olonets Guberniia from the end of November 1918 for other fronts, and started confiscation of agricultural products from autumn 1919, which sparked peasant uprising and fleeing to Finland. The Karelian corps national committee [kansalliskomitea] held a meeting of representatives of 12 Volost’s of White Sea Karelia on 16–19 February in 1919 to declare an independent Karelian state and established the White Sea Karelia Provisional Government [Vienan

173 Dubrovskaya and Korablev, Karelia v gody pervoi mirovoi voin, 57, 93–116, 163–85.
174 Korablev, Istoriiia Karelii, 360–1; Dubrovskaya and Korablev, Karelia v gody pervoi mirovoi voin, 248–52.
175 Dubrovskaya and Kovalev, Karelia v gody pervoi mirovoi voin, 309–12.
väliaikainen toimituskunta] and called for help from Finland. The Red Army occupied Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Medvezhgorsk, and Poventsa until the end of February 1920 and approached White Sea Karelian villages and borderland areas under Finnish occupation.\footnote{Dubrovskaia and Kovalev, \textit{Karelia v gody pervoi mirovoi voin}, 322–23.}

The Soviet-Finnish approach to peace brought this pan-Finnic hierarchy to Soviet Karelia, even though there were many Red Finns who had established the Finnish Communist Party in August 1918 and thought that they would bring a socialist revolution to Finland and opposed Greater Finland as imperialist.\footnote{Jukka Nevakivi, \textit{Murmannin legioona: Suomalaiset ja liittoutuneiden interventio Pojhois-Veäjälle 1918–1919} (Helsinki: Tammi, 1970), 123. On the early years of the Red Finns in Soviet Russia, see Tauno Saarela, \textit{Suomalaisen kommunismin synty 1918–1923} (Tampere: Kansan Sivistystyön Liitto, 1996).} The Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin persuaded Lenin to immediately start negotiations for a peace treaty with Finland, which was following the Soviet-Polish confrontation but felt left alone after Estonia concluded a peace treaty with the Soviet government and Britain and France no longer agreed with Finnish intervention.\footnote{Rossia i Finliandiia, doc. 137, 301 (Chicherin’s report to Lenin on March 1, 1920); doc. 141, 306 (Chicherin’s report to Lenin on March 25, 1920); doc. 149, 310–11 (Chicherin’s report to Lenin on May 10, 1920).} At the same time, Gylling in Stockholm and Sirola in Moscow discussed a plan to set up a Petrograd- or Volga German-like worker’s commune for Soviet Karelia as a bridgehead of socialist revolution in Finland and Scandinavia. Moscow decided to establish the Karelian Workers’ Commune [\textit{Karel’skaia Trudovaia Kommuna}, KTK] in the Karelian population of Arkhangelsk and Olonets guberniia a few days before the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish peace negotiations in Tartu.\footnote{Rossia i Finliandiia, doc. 156, 313 (the decree of the VTsIK RSFSR on June 8, 1920), 461. On the international and domestic background of the establishment of the KTK, see Kangaspuro, \textit{Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu itselahlinosta}, 73–77; Kauppala, “Formirovanie i rastsvet avtonomnoi Sovetskoi Karelii,” 314–23.}

This peace treaty did not mean a peaceful transition both in Finland and Soviet Karelia. The Soviets led by the Rebola Karelian and member of the Karelian Revolutionary Committee Fjodor Pottoev/Pottonen violently established soviet organizations in “liberated” Rebola and Porosozero and initiated forced taxation and conscription, which caused objection and fleeing of the population and serious hunger in 1921. The Olanga volost’ meeting declared it would join Finland in April 1921. The three members of the Provisionary Karelian Committee “Uikki Väinämöinen” Vasili Sidorov, Osip Borisov, and “Ilmarinen” Jalmari Takkinen began uprisings in Olonets and White Sea Karelian villages, in which 500 Finnish volunteers including 28 jaeger officers joined from November 1921. Nonetheless, the Karelian population did not follow them and the Red Army with over 30,000 soldiers reoccupied Rebola in January 1922 and finally the students at the Petrograd International Military School led by the Red Finn Toivo Anttikainen ousted the partisans in February. As a result of this, Finland received 11,000–12,000 refugees from Soviet Karelia in total.\footnote{Harjula, \textit{Venäjän Karjala}, 220–57.}
Though indifferent to promoting Finnish culture in Soviet Karelia, the Karelian Workers Commune leadership, especially the Red Finns, had to consider this indigenization of Karelians in Finnish after this uprising. The Olonets guberniia Bolshevik organizations, dominated by the Russians, were hostile to the Red Finnish leaders “imposed” by the Soviet-Finnish relations, while many Red Finns in Soviet Russia regarded the Commune as an instrument for the Soviet-Finnish negotiations and were more interested in exporting socialist revolution to Finland and Scandinavian countries. Gylling took advantage of the uprisings to appeal further need to fight against “Great Russian chauvinism” and strengthen “Finnization” of Soviet Karelian leadership and defeated the Olonets Karelian Bolshevik Kudzhiev, who criticized Karelian autonomy as a cover for the Finnish Communist Party.183

**Nationalities Policy in Soviet Karelia and Nationalizing Independent Finland**

As Peter Blitstein has compared in his study, the Bolsheviks made a great effort to protect assimilation of numerous ethnic groups into larger groups through territorialization and cultural institutions to create a multinational socialist entity, which made a clear contrast with the new nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe and Balkan states.184 Unlike Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, Finland was one of the countries which were not bound to the minority treaty and in the international arena the most important minority question for Finland was the Swedish-speaking minority on the main land and the Åland Islands, where political and cultural autonomy had been granted, under the pressure of nationalization/Finnization as had happened in other newly independent nation-states.

The Bolshevik leadership launched an “indigenization [korenizatsiia]” policy in 1923 to win the loyalty of non-Russian nationalities and modernize them for building socialism by actively promoting the formation of nations/nationalities and fighting against the “great power (Russian) chauvinism” in backward regions. To this end, the Soviet state believed in what Francine Hirsch called “state-sponsored evolutionism” and mobilized local elites and ethnographic and language experts to study the populations to make borders within the Soviet state according to national lines and create national literary languages to combat illiteracy. In the borderlands which had the same nationalities or kindred peoples in neighboring “nationalizing” countries, this indigenization policy functioned as a showcase of minority protection and “flourishing” non-Russian cultures.185

In Soviet Karelia, the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [Karelian ASSR] was being formed in July 1923 as a result of the power struggle among various actors: the Red Finns, the

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Russians, the Karelians, the central political and economic authorities in Moscow and Petrograd, and the security and military authorities. Backed by Lenin, Chicherin, and Stalin, Gylling and his fellow Red Finns in Petrozavodsk could pursue his grandiose plan despite the opposition from the Russians and anti-Finnish Karelians. To this end, Soviet Karelian economy and society had to be modernized and illiterate Soviet Karelians had to be literate Soviet working men through the education of the Finnish language and culture. Praising the Soviet nationalities policy so far, Gylling appealed to Finns in Finland and in the Soviet Union, saying that a “more developed” socialist Finland would culturally and economically raise their “tribe brothers [heimoveljensä],” Soviet Karelians, Ingrian Finns, and other Finnic tribes on the Volga as the “leader, raiser, and supporter of the tribe drudges of Finland [Suomen heimoisten raatajien].”186 Although the idea of exporting revolution to Finland had waned, the Finnish language became one of the official languages together with the Russian language in the Karelian ASSR and the Karelians were obliged to learn and use the Finnish literary language.

The new independent Finland initiated active modernization and “Finnization” of the country, especially the Russian-Finnish borderland area on the Karelian Isthmus to remove Russian traits through education, economic transformation, and land redistribution.187 As a new nation-state, Finland sought modernization to create a coherent and homogeneous state and society, and this required “Finnization” of domestic peoples, institutions, and space. An extreme mode of this drive was the “pure Finnishness [aitosuomalaisuus]” movement, which mainly targeted Swedish-speaking elites and population who fought for the White side during the Civil War but demanded an autonomy and rights for their language by resisting the Finnization efforts.

While treating the Swedish-speaking population as a minority, the Finnish majority took it for granted to see the Karelians as Karelian-dialect-speaking Finns. Karelian-speaking children, for example in Salmi “kihlakunta” (more than 50,000 Karelian speakers), had to receive instruction in Finnish in school, while even the Russian-speaking children had a possibility to receive instruction in Russian in the school districts where more than 20% of the pupils spoke Russian until 1935.188 In addition, industrialization and increasing social and economic mobility with other regions promoted Karelian assimilation into the Finns and the Karelian language in Finland itself was quickly absorbed by Finnish words and sounds.189 Non-Finnish Finnic peoples were added by a flood of refugees from Soviet Karelia and Ingria (about 9,000 from Soviet Karelia and 6,000 from Ingria in 1923) who had to survive in a new country, and their own mutual-aid organizations concentrated on everyday life and

187 Lähteenmäki, Maailmojen rajalla, chapter 5.
188 Tapio Hämyinen, “Uskonnot ja kouluolot monikuttuurisessa läänissä,” in Karjala itärajan varjossa. Viipurin läänin historia VI, eds. Yrjö Kaukiainen and Jouko Nummiainen (Lappeenranta: Karjalan kirjapaino Oy, 2010), 152.
189 Sarhimaa, Vaietut ja vaiennetut, 96–103.
keeping their own culture and language.

Finnish and Karelian activists, veterans of the Tribe Wars, intellectuals, and students set up volunteer organizations to support Karelian and Ingrian refugees to help their life in Finland. At the same time, they expected to send them back to their native land once a Greater Finland should come true in the future, hoping that they as conscious pan-Finnic supporters would contribute to this deed. The largest and most influential organization of this kind is the Academic Karelia Society \[\text{Akateeminen Karjala-Seura, AKS}\], which made an enormous impact on Helsinki University students, political, and ideological scenes in the interwar years and after. According to a classical study by Risto Alapuro, the AKS had about 3,000 members between 1922 and 1944, many of whom came from Helsinki University (74%) and families of intellectuals, farmers, and bishops in the countryside. The Society openly stressed anti-Swedish, Russophobe, and anti-Communism/Bolshevik sentiments and appealed to Greater Finland to liberate Soviet Karelians and Ingrians and strengthen ties with the Estonians.\(^{190}\)

With the possibility of a Greater Finland waning, however, the language struggle came forward and the pure-Finnishness overwhelmed Greater Finland. Pure-Finnishness-oriented leaders of the AKS initiated “Finnization” of street names, family names, schools, bureaucracy, and the White Guard and Army officer corps dominated by Swedish-speaking jaeger officers and former generals of the imperial Russian Army including Mannerheim. The university law approved in 1923 stirred a heated controversy, since the law guaranteed at least 15 Swedish-language professorships and the right to read the basic courses and give personal instruction to students in the mother tongue. This frustrated both of the parties: about 70% of the students was native Finnish speakers already in the early 20th century, while Swedish-speaking elites and students criticized this forced Finnization and won support from other Scandinavian universities.\(^{191}\) The AKS won the leadership of the student union of Helsinki University and reached 879 members in 1925 (60 members in 1922).

The Kalevala and the Pan-Finnism in Finland and the Soviet Multinational State

In independent Finland, the Kalevala was more tightly integrated into the Finnish nation and state through special festivals such as Kalevala Day. Students and the SKS had been celebrating the day even before independence but the Kalevala Society \[\text{Kalevalaseura}\], established in December 1919, began distributing materials to local schools, cultural organizations, and associations for this

\(^{190}\) Alapuro, \textit{Akateeminen Karjala-Seura}, 58–82, 91–102.

day every year.\footnote{Hannes Sihvo, “Kalevalan päivä,” in \textit{Juhlakirja}, ed. Vento, 98–99. On the foundation of the Kalevala Society, see Kalleinen, \textit{Kansallisen tieteen ja taiteen puolestaa}, 18–29.} Setälä, one of the founders of the Kalevala Society and the first chairman, emphasized the Kalevala as a Finnish national cultural symbol but also pan-Finnism. In his speech on Kalevala Day 1920, he quoted the Finnic tale of a great oak shutting the sunlight, which is broken down by a small man from the sea to bring back the light to the world, reminding that this tale “has come true before our eyes” as the Russian oak was cut down by small nationalities, and the Finnish nation had to build the bridge to Estonia and the “preserver- and developer-tribe of our old poems, the tribe people of Karelia,” and also to the south-west and west.\footnote{Emil N. Setälä, “Iso tammi. Puhe Kalevala-juhlassa Helsingissä 28 P. Helmikuuta 1920.” \textit{Kalevalaseuran vuosikirja} 1, (1921), 7–11.}

In addition to the Kalevala, Setälä continued to enjoy great influence on Finno-Ugric studies as the chairman of the Finno-Ugrian Society from 1910 to his death in 1935, working at the same time as a member of parliament (until 1927) and Minister of Education (1925–26) and of Foreign Affairs (1926) and ambassador to Denmark and Hungary (1927–30). As a linguist he edited a new edition of the “Kinsmen of Finland [\textit{Suomen suku}],” which gathered the latest outcomes of Finno-Ugric studies and in which he stressed strong relevance between the language kinship and human one and a common origin of the Finno-Ugric peoples.\footnote{Artturi Kannisto et al. (eds.), \textit{Suomen suku}. I nidos (Helsinki: Otava, 1926), 45–47. But he also emphasized that language kinship was not the same as kinship in nature and rather basically a metaphor in the field of linguistics.} The new edition treated the Finns as an entity unlike the first edition of the “Kinsmen of Finland” by Julius Krohn published in 1887, who separated the Finns into two groups: the West Finns including Estonians and the East Finns formed of Savo and Karelian peoples to highlight the differences between the two Finns.\footnote{Julius Krohn, \textit{Suomen suku}. \textit{Maantieteellisät kuvaelmia XIV} (Helsinki: Kansavalistusseura, 1887).}

More radical pure-Finnish youth, in particular the AKS members, loudly voiced the Kalevala as a symbol of Finnish culture, Pan-Finnism, and Greater Finland. The editorial of \textit{Suomen Heimo} (a journal of the AKS) reiterated the gratitude of the Finnish nation to Karelia for the Kalevala on Kalevala Day of 1924 and in return the obligation of the Finnish nation to save the “brother tribe,” since the “Finnish nation is not yet what should be” until the “East Karelian parts of the Finnish nationality” belong to the Finnish nation and state.\footnote{\textit{Suomen Heimo}, 2 (1924), 25.} On February 25, 1923, at a meeting of the Estonian-Finnish University Club, Haavio delivered a speech to call for a cooperation among the tribes and relatives for the existence of the Finno-Ugric “race” and the “Finnish Empire [\textit{Imperium Fennicum}]” to resist the threat of the “empire of Russians [\textit{Ryssien valtakunta}].”\footnote{\textit{Ylioppilaslehti}, March 5, 1923.}

The Karelians in Finland had to adopt themselves to this treatment of the Kalevala as a purely Finnish symbol and to Finnization of their languages and themselves. The Civilizing Society
of Karelia had set the birthday of Lönnrot (the 9th of April) as the day of the foundation of the society and celebrated it every year but “welcomed” Kalevala Day as well. Iivo Härkönen, the chairman of the society, contributed a piece for Kalevala Day 1920 in the journal *Suomen Kuvalehti* to harmonize the Finnish and Karelian voices to celebrate “our great national epic.” For Härkönen, the Kalevala is a product of the “cooperation between Lönnrot and the singing tribes of the Finnish people” based on not only the Finnish language but also the “deeper, more characteristic, and more original situations of Finland.” Though there were some efforts to establish a written Karelian language, they failed since their “language” was regarded unnecessary and even dangerous for the Finnish nation-state even among the tribe organizations including the Karelian refugees.

Though not always being part of Greater Finland, Estonia as well was an important part of the Finnish pan-Finnism and attracted Finnish intellectuals and pan-Finnic activists and students. After the declaration of independence, Finland acted as an “older brother” to help Estonian nation-building. Finnish scholars were invited to the University of Tartu to help Estonians to “Estonianize/nationalize” the university by educating students and establishing cultural and scholarly institutes. The Finnish archeologist Mikko Tallgren and ethnographer Ilmari Manninen became professors at the University of Tartu, where they established Estonian archeology and ethnography and Lauri Kettunen worked as a professor of Baltic-Finnish languages until 1924 and, together with Setälä, Tunkelo, Kai Donner, raised distinguished Estonian linguists including Paul Ariste, Julius Mark, and Julius Mägiste both in Finland and in Estonia. In folkloristics, the Baltic-German Walter Anderson, who taught at Kazan’ University before the Revolution and fellow of the Krohn school, became a professor, but Kaarle Krohn received leading Estonian folklorists and literature scholars and students and contributed to establishing folkloristics in Estonia and Estonian studies in Finland.

This unequal relationship and brotherly attitude of Finns naturally caused dissatisfaction from Estonians. Indeed, the Estonian Liberation War was for the Estonians “their own war” and its victory is owed to the Estonian nation. According to Heino Arumäe, during the Estonian War of Liberation, Estonians saw not only their military contribution but also hooligan acts of drunken Finnish volunteers and were astonished by their atrocity against the Red Army soldiers, especially Red Finnish soldiers. Pan-Finnic students of Helsinki and Tartu universities set up several “tribe” organizations to deepen their relationship, but Estonian students and intellectuals were unsatisfied with lack of interests of Finns in Estonian culture and their arrogance, and did not understand their Russophobia.

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198 *Suomen Kuvalehti*, no. 9, February 28, 1920, 4.
and expansionist Greater Finland ambitions.\textsuperscript{203}

The birth of independent Finland and Estonia and irredentism for Soviet Karelia and Ingria crystalized in the controversy over the Kalevala in interwar Finland. This controversy between Kaarle Krohn and Setälä, as studied by Wilson and other folklorists, was a scholarly one but reflected a geopolitical and ideological conflict of a new independent Finland. During the days of early independence and the Civil War Krohn elaborated his theory of the folklore migration by adding a more nationalist character and came to argue that the birthplace of Kalevala poetry was southwestern Finland and northwestern Estonia, created by the pagan ancestors of the Finnish and Estonian nations under the Germanic and Christian influence. The poetry, completed there, was migrated eastward, and degenerated and fragmented on the way to Ingria and Russian Karelia.

The Kalevala heroes were thus historical figures like Finnish Viking warriors on the Finnish southwestern coastal area and even attacked the Gotland, as reflected in the Sampo robbery poems. By contrast, the epic poems discovered in Russian Karelia were mere remnants of this Finnish cultural achievement, though the Finnish nation had to thank the Karelians for “preserving” the poems. To broader readers, Krohn explained that the Kalevala heroes were warriors fit for militarized Finland and believed that “nationalized/Finnized, popularized” scholarship could contribute to the independent state.\textsuperscript{204} Setälä and Salminen rather emphasized a continued tradition of epic songs inherited from generation to generation within the Baltic-Finnic community and fiercely criticized Krohn and his followers of overemphasizing geographic character, ignoring historical and even racial continuity. Nevertheless, both parties emphasized gratitude to Karelians in preserving the epic poems.\textsuperscript{205}

In Soviet Karelia as well, early excitement of exporting revolution to Finland was waning and practical activities of making Red Finns started. The nationality policy in Soviet Karelia was a part of the union-wide modernization policy and the Red Finnish leadership was assigned to modernize Soviet Karelian society and economy by creating (and inviting from the outside) Finnish-speaking cadres and intellectuals. Despite opposition from Gosplan, the Karelian ASSR won some economic autonomy from the Moscow leadership and high-skilled Red Finns occupied leading positions in companies and administration. In fact, Soviet Karelia did not always attract other Soviet Finnic populations, since other militarist-internationalist Red Finns in Leningrad continued to scorn the Red Finnish project in Soviet Karelia, a “poor province,” and were hostile to the Kalevala because it was the symbol of Finnish nationalism and Greater Finland.\textsuperscript{206} The Red Finnish in Soviet Karelia thus

\textsuperscript{204} Uusi Suomi, April 30, 1919. See also Häggman, Sanojen talossa, 11–20.
\textsuperscript{205} Wilson, Folklore and Nationalism, 95–102.
\textsuperscript{206} On Red Finnish writers’ attitudes toward Soviet Karelia and the Kalevala, see Ylikangas, Rivit suoriksi! 161–68, 297–305.
issued an amnesty to the Karelian refugees in Finland (10,000 out of 12,000 came back to Soviet Karelia). They sought Finnish immigrants not only from Finland but also North American Finns, and they also used forced laborers from concentration camps in the Karelian ASSR.\textsuperscript{207}

The Soviet Karelian leadership tried thus to establish a network of non-Russian schools instructed in Finnish in a hurry. Lacking Finnish teaching cadres, the leadership was forced to allow the use of both Finnish and Karelian languages in public offices and schools, though the Red Finnish leadership opposed the idea of creating a Karelian written language. Like the pure-Finnishness movement in Finland, the Red Finns in Soviet Karelia wanted to remove the Russianness of the Karelians. While introduction of the Finnish language went relatively smoothly in White Sea Karelia, this policy divided opinions of the Olonets Karelians. Evseev later recalled that his father supported the Finnish written language for the Karelians, while his uncle believed that the Karelians should have their own written language as other Soviet nationalities and take the Russian language as the second language.\textsuperscript{208} This “Finnization” also faced fierce opposition from the Russian speaking population, the majority population especially in cities and factories and resent for the Bolshevik policy which enabled the Red Finns to get better salaries and higher positions and forced Russians to study Finnish.

This unique position of the Red Finns and the Finnish language was gradually challenged by the changing Soviet borderland and nationalities politics. While accelerating the class struggle and industrialization, the Soviet leadership was alarmed at the fact that the party propaganda and agitation effort was not appealing to the people because of its abstractness in dealings with class struggle history. This becomes especially apparent in the panic during the War Scare of 1927, which exposed how unsuccessful the Soviet propaganda effort was to mobilize the people as the leadership wanted.\textsuperscript{209}

Therefore, Soviet writers began to discuss how they could popularize the official party line and depict in literature “greater heroes” associated with great historical individual names. Because of this practical reason, Soviet ideology and propaganda gradually started to include past-oriented heroic stories into future-oriented class struggle stories. In addition, with the rising tensions caused by the Japanese Empire and Nazi Germany, preparation for a coming war demanded a universal Russian education as an efficient common communication tool in working places and the Army.

This shift was tightly connected with the nationalities policy. The deterioration of the Soviet-Polish relationship, especially coup d’états in Poland and Lithuania, caused panic and more vigilance toward the indigenization policy in Belarus and Ukraine. In March 1930 the Politburo decided to deport 3,000–3,500 families from the Polish–Belarussian border area and 10,000–1,5000 families from the Polish–Ukrainian border area to Kazakhstan. The Belarussian Communist Party, especially those who had been opposed to Belarussianization, launched a purge campaign against

\textsuperscript{207} Baron, Soviet Karelia, chapters 3 and 5.
\textsuperscript{208} Virtaranta, Kulttuurikuva Karjalasta, 116.
“nationalism, counter-revolutionary” intellectuals, government officials and artists in the republic. In Ukraine as well, a series of show trials and terrors targeted old-generation intellectuals and scholars who were accused of allegedly being associated with Ukrainian nationalist organizations. These attacks against local nationalisms coincided with rising voices of the Russian people who had felt themselves suffer from the indigenous campaign, in particular, the criticism against “Greater Russian chauvinism.”

Stalin was careful to defend the indigenization policy and to maintain the equilibrium between Russian nationalism and non-Russian ones, but the Soviet authority faced Russian and non-Russian discontents, both of which were nurtured by the indigenization policy. The Soviet media thus launched the campaign “the brotherhood of the peoples” between 1929 and 1931 to ease the tension, which was followed by the campaign of “the Friendship of the Peoples” from late 1935. According to Martin, instead of hatred for internal class enemies, the new emphasis on “the Friendship of the Peoples” denoted the nations’/nationalities’ “feeling of intimate, personal love” for one another and for Stalin. Thus, the friendship metaphor conveyed a new affective tie better than the brotherhood metaphor. This marked de-facto rehabilitation of Russian culture and nationalism to the central place of the Soviet multinational polity.

As Brandenberger and Blitstein have demonstrated, for the Russian nationalists, this friendship ideology had been obstructing the Russocentric drive, because this quietly continued to foster non-Russian nationalisms and national culture as long as they did not challenge the centrality of the Russian “old brother.” The 1937 Pushkin jubilee was momentous in that Pushkin became the national symbol for the Russians but also an important all-union symbol for which all Soviet nations/nationalities felt affection. Indeed, non-Russian nations/nationalities were encouraged to celebrate and be proud of their own pre-revolutionary national poets such as Taras Shevchenko (Ukraine) and Shota Rustaveli (Georgia). If no suitable prerevolutionary figures were found, they had to find Soviet-time figures such as Ianka Kupala (Belorussia) or traditional bards such as Dzhambul (Kazakhstan). Accordingly, national epics as well were praised especially as the cultural legacy of small nationalities such as the Kalmyk national epic Dzhangar, whose 500th anniversary the Kalmyk ASSR celebrated in May 1940. This emergence of “Soviet primordialism” went parallel with the Great Terror against non-Russian nations/nationalities, which particularly hit diaspora ethnic groups.

210 Rudling, The Rise and Fall, chapter 8.
212 Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, 441.
213 Brandenberger, National Bolshevism, chapter 3; Blitstein, “Nation-building or Russification?” 253–74.
in the borderlands such as Poles, Finns, Estonians, Greeks and so on.

These changes were also reflected in scholarship. In Soviet linguistics, with the launch of the First Five-Year Plan and the socialist offensive, Marr and his supporters accelerated their attack against other linguistic schools, especially the Indo-European comparative linguistic school and the concept of proto-language. Nikolai Marr was about to occupy the dominant position in Soviet linguistics with his “New Theory of Language.” Of his complex arguments, important elements are that language belongs to the superstructure and the Marrist linguistics denied the proto-language and the linear development of language family and argued that hybridization of languages would lead to a single proletarian language in the coming socialist future. The coming single proletarian language would liberate peoples in the Soviet Union from their ethnic identity strongly tied with their language, which was of crucial importance for long-time oppressed peoples such as Jews. In addition, Marr insisted that the dialects of the ethnic minorities should be respected as equal to the written languages. This Marxist linguistics was passionately welcomed by students and Komsomol youth who wanted to remove anything associated with the bourgeoisie and devote themselves to the building of socialism.216

This Marrist linguistics hit Soviet Finno-Ugric studies, which had lost Finland and Estonia and had to reestablish scholarly networks and scholars. This assignment was put in the hands of Dmitry Bubrikh, who had to comply with Marrist linguistics. Though not seriously engaged with the Finno-Ugric languages, Marr published a very short piece on the Finnish and Karelian languages after his short stay in Petrozavodsk in 1928. Marr found “phonetic interactions” between proto-Finnish and Karelian languages and the Caucasian “Japhet” languages and implied possible Caucasian origins of the Finnic languages to overcome the concept of the Finno-Ugric language family.217 Needless to say, for Finno-Ugric linguists it was difficult to deny the scholarly concept of the Finno-Ugric language family on which the discipline itself depends and Bubrikh needed to stress its rivalry with the “nationalist” ideology of the Finnish Finno-Ugric studies, while defending the discipline from Marrist criticism.

Since the Russian Revolution, traditional folklore had been regarded as “backward” peasant culture or remnants of the medieval court culture, which were destined to die out with the coming of socialist modernity and seen as incompatible with “progressive” proletarian culture. During early Soviet years, folklorists generally worked in peripheries to evacuate from the Civil War confusion and continued their works, which strongly marked the pre-revolutionary tradition including the Finnish school of folkloristics, or in Petrograd they sought experimental approaches to folklore. Some studied

the folklore of factory workers as Soviet folklore and others took a different approach from the traditional folklore studies. Vladimir Propp, influenced from the formalist philologists, published his famous structuralist study of folk tales, Morphology of the Folktale in 1928.\textsuperscript{218}

With the shift from class to national in Soviet identity politics, national folklores and epics (including the Russian ones) came to be regarded as important sources for national pasts, especially for those nationalities without “written history.” During the preparation for the first congress of the Soviet Writers’ Union (in summer 1934), A. A. Bolotnikov, an editor of the organ Literaturnaia Gazeta, stressed that folklore had to serve the class struggle and the cultural construction in national republics.\textsuperscript{219} A decisive event for Soviet national epics was Pravda’s criticism against the work of Dem’ian Bednyi “Bogatyri,” after which the Russian bylina heroes were rehabilitated as “popular representations of heroic characters of the Russian people,” not “bandits [razboinikov] of Kievan Rus’” of aristocratic origins.\textsuperscript{220} These changes encouraged Leningrad folklorists such as Azadovskiy, Anna Astakhova, and their students including Vasilii Bazanov and Chistov brothers to conduct intensive expeditions to Russian bylina and folklore narrators from the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR to Soviet Karelia.\textsuperscript{221}

In addition, the Marrist paradigm, heavily influenced by Veselovsky, offered Soviet folklorists the possibility to associate folklore with historical materialism and ethnography to locate the development of folklores within the context of socio-economic development.\textsuperscript{222} This influence from Veselovsky and Marr encouraged Soviet folklorists and philologists to present Soviet national folklores and epics within the context of Soviet Eurasian space and to criticize the Finnish school of its effort to find out the single birthplace of “national” folklore by “superficially” overstressing borrowing and migration of folklores and ignoring socio-economic factors in the development of folklore and epics. As described in a eulogy to Kaarle Krohn by the Soviet folklorist Nikiforov, Soviet folklorists highly evaluated Krohn’s theory and contribution to folkloristics.\textsuperscript{223} Nevertheless, Soviet folklorists started to challenge the Finnish school of folkloristics by criticizing the nationalist ideology they found at the core of the methodology.\textsuperscript{224}

This criticism was also directed at Finnish Finno-Ugric studies and its ideology in a way that ideology, politics, and scholarship were tightly connected with each other. The journal Sovetskaia

\textsuperscript{218} On Soviet folkloristics in early Soviet years, see Ivanova, Istoriia russkoi fol’kloristiki XX veka, 255–85, 342–48.
\textsuperscript{219} Ivanova, Istoriia russkoi fol’kloristiki XX veka, 520.
\textsuperscript{220} Pravda, November 14, 1936. See also Ivanova, Istoriia russkoi fol’kloristiki XX veka, 526–33.
\textsuperscript{221} Ivanova, Istoriia russkoi fol’kloristiki XX veka, 540–57.
\textsuperscript{222} Ivanova, Istoriia russkoi fol’kloristiki XX veka, 630–32; Howell, The Development of Soviet Folkloristics, chapter 7.
Etnografiia published an article which criticized Finnish and Estonian ethnographers, folklorists, and linguists of showing the proto-Finnic language and proto-types of Finnic folklores to prove the cultural and linguistic unity of Finno-Ugric peoples and the ideology “Greater Finland to Ural.” In Soviet eyes, Finnish Finno-Ugric studies and scholars “serve” the Greater Finnish imperialist ambition and the fascist and nationalist movements and organizations symbolized in such Finno-Ugric scholars and organizations as Kai Donner, the AKS, the SKS, and the Finno-Ugrian Society. This article also criticized the notion of the Finno-Ugric language and racial unity discussed in the works “Suomen suku.” and attacked the Finno-centric understanding of the Finnic and Finno-Ugric language family. It raised Lauri Kettunen as an example, whom the article criticized of scorning the Karelian and Votic languages as “mere dialects” of the Finnish “bourgeois” language and of denying a possibility of the Karelian written language, because the “Karelian language” had been influenced by the “stepmother [machekha]” Russia and separated from the Finnish family.225

Indeed, Soviet scholars saw Soviet Karelia from an angle different from the Finns. Requested by the Karelian ASSR leadership, the Soviet Academy of Sciences dispatched expedition groups led by the academician Dmitry A. Zolotarev to study the Soviet Karelian language, ethnography, and folklore. The Soviet researchers found that the borderland area (Ukhta, Voknavolok) had strong Finnish influence. Leonid Kapitsa, a younger brother of the Nobel laureate Pyotr Kapitsa, wrote to his family that Ukhta had become a “Finnish colony (…). All festive organizations had become purely Finnish.”226 They also found some “last” epic singers alive from whom they could write down far shorter and less rich epic songs than the Finns had done in the previous century. Like their Finnish counterparts, the Soviet scholars felt alarmed that Karelian epic singers were no longer motivated to perform after the Kalevala had come out and many songs and poems had already been published. Still, Zolotarev found in Karelia an important contact zone between the Finnic epic songs from Finland and the Slavic epic poems from Novgorod and between Finnic and Slavic languages.227

The 1935 Old Kalevala Jubilees in Soviet Karelia and Finland

The 1935 Old Kalevala jubilee in Soviet Karelia took place in a transitional period just before the time of the terror and friendship of nations/nationalities in the Soviet Union, following the relatively open rivalry (and cooperation) to an almost complete shutdown in Soviet-Finnish interaction.

In the Soviet Union, celebrating national cultural figures and symbols were about to begin from the mid-1930s. For example, in 1934 the Soviet Union celebrated the millenary of the Persian poet Ferdowsi, who left a great impact on Persian, Islamic, and Turkic culture and the national symbol of Persia/Iran, but Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Tadzhikistan also praised him as a predecessor of their own national culture. Unlike the Finnish-Soviet rivalry, the Ferdowsi millenary made it possible to exchange Soviet and Persian delegations to attend scholarly and cultural events of their counterparts and Ferdowsi himself became a symbol of Soviet internationalism.²²⁸ Five years later, when the Armenian SSR celebrated the millenary of its national epic “David of Sassoun” in 1939, the Armenian national epic was described as a Soviet national epic created by the ancestors of the Armenian people and the epic heroes fought against the “Arabian despot” and “foreign occupants” for the freedom and independence of the Armenian people.²²⁹ This makes a clear contrast with more open cooperation or rivalry with neighboring countries during the millenary of Ferdowsi and the centenary of the Old Kalevala.

Three important factors crossed at this jubilee: the fading Red Finnish dream of Finnization, the waning radical socialist cultural revolution, and the emerging Russian-Karelian primordial friendship.

The Red Finns in Soviet Karelia believed that the Kalevala was a symbol of the international working class and Soviet socialism, but naturally saw it as the national epic of the (Red) Finnish nation including Karelians. Gylling and Kustaa Rovio (the first secretary of the Karelian oblast' committee) shared this notion with the “bourgeois” Finnish intellectuals, despite the difference of their ideological and political orientations. It was difficult for other Soviet elites, however, to understand this notion of Finic kinship. For example, the Ukrainian leadership, especially Skrypnyk, who promoted “Ukranization” in the Ukrainian SSR, accused the Red Finnish Karelian leadership of supporting “Finnish chauvinism” in the early 1930s. Others wondered why the Red Finns did not try to put influence on Karelians in Finland through the Karelian language to spread socialism in Finland.²³⁰ Though the Red Finnish Karelian government set an ambitious plan to speed up Finnization, the famine in Ukraine and the assassination of Sergei Kirov, the head of the Leningrad party committee, led to a turnabout in Soviet Karelia, too. Oppositionists in Soviet Karelia launched their campaign to oust the Red Finnish leadership from early January 1935 and after the Kalevala jubilee, Andrei Zhdanov, new leader of the Leningrad party committee, criticized the Karelian party leadership of obstructing Russians’ activities in Soviet Karelia.²³¹ Finally, the VKP (b) decided to remove Rovio in

²²⁹ Pravda, September 15, 1939; David Sasunskii: jubileennyi sbornik, posviashchennyi 1000-letiu eposa (Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Arm FAN-a, 1939).
²³¹ Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu itsehallinnosta, 316.
August and Gylling in November 1935.

Accordingly, the Karelian party leadership propagated the Kalevala as a world epic of progressive socialist culture with the spirit of internationalism in which pan-Finnism and Finnish centrality were included.\textsuperscript{232} To stress the difference with the Finnish nationalists, the Karelian party leadership condemned Finnish “fascists,” along with their Estonian and German counterparts, of using the Kalevala as a weapon to invade the Soviet Union and to propagate “tribal, racial, and national unity of Karelians, Ingrians and other nationalities of the Soviet Union with Finns” to create Greater Finland.\textsuperscript{233} Contrary to the new Kalevala jubilee in 1949, however, the 1935 Soviet Kalevala jubilee was relatively open to interactions with Finland. The jubilee meeting organized by the KNII (Karelian Scientific-Scholarly Institute/Кarel'skii nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut) named “[M. A.] Castrén and [Julius] Krohn” as important Kalevala researchers and even invited the Finnish linguist Eemil A. Tunkelo to the Petrozavodsk jubilee.\textsuperscript{234} The instructions for propagandists say that the Kalevala epic poems were the product of centuries-long creation of the Finnish nationalities and appeared many centuries before the rise of the Finnish nation and the national formation of Karelians.\textsuperscript{235} Their descriptions of the Kalevala were not consistent about its ethnic/national affiliation: some wrote the Kalevala as the Finnish popular epic, while others did as the Karelian popular epic or Finnish-Karelian epic. As Rovio summarized, the Kalevala belongs to “the working class of the world,” above all.

Indeed, the Red Finnish Kalevala jubilee more openly competed with the Helsinki jubilee. The newspaper \textit{Krasnaia Kareliia} stressed “Our” jubilee confronting another jubilee in “fascist Finland,” which utilized the Kalevala for their “national-chauvinism” and “Greater Finland to the Ural Mountains” and reported the jubilee in Helsinki and recent political and ideological developments in “Finnizing” and “fascist” Finland. This marked a clear contrast with the 1949 Soviet Kalevala jubilee, which completely ignored the Finnish counterpart in Helsinki.\textsuperscript{236} This rivalry was further highlighted by the trial of Toivo Antikainen, who was arrested in Finland for his underground activities in November 1934 and whose trial started in February 1935. Soviet Karelian media condemned this process and reported protests breaking out in Nordic countries.\textsuperscript{237}

This ideological difference might be blurred by Elias Lönrot, who was described as a “collector” of the Kalevala epic poems who was of humble origin, though the Soviet side was not ready to indicate how Soviet Elias Lönrot should be narrated. The Red Kalevala jubilee focused on

\textsuperscript{232} NARK, f. p-3, op. 3, d. 358 (the Karelian oblast’ committee, the section of culture and propaganda), l. 1 (material on the jubilee for propagandists).

\textsuperscript{233} NARK, f. p-3, op. 3, d. 358, l. 3.

\textsuperscript{234} NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 3, d. 175 (Materials for the Centennial Jubilee of the first edition of the Kalevala), ll. 20 and 49.

\textsuperscript{235} NARK, f. p-3, op. 3, d. 358, l. 3.


the past and living Karelian epic singers and workers behind which Lönnrot remained. Indeed, he was a native Finn of humble origin and collected the epic poems and made the Kalevala for the Finnish nation-building, but the Soviet newspapers said little about his relationship with the Finnish bourgeoisie and national movement. Krasnaia Kareliia published a letter of Lönnrot to Grot preserved in a Soviet Karelian archive, but the Red Finnish jubilee ignored his interactions with Russia.²³⁸

Though Soviet media agitated aggressiveness of “fascist” Finland, the Finnish official jubilee was restrained not to provoke the Soviet Union and emphasized the cultural might of Finland to defend its independence. As in Soviet Karelia, a transition in foreign and domestic policies was taking place in Finland. In the early 1930s Finland saw the Lapua movement led by radical-right activists and inspired by fascism, which demanded banning communist activities. The movement achieved its major aim with the so-called Communist Law in November 1930 and the victory of Svinhufvud in the president election in January 1931. After a failed coups in Mäntsälä in spring 1932, the ideology and activities of the Lapua movement was succeeded by the fascist political party Patriotic People’s Movement [Isänmaallinen kansanliike, IKL] and other smaller fascist organizations.²³⁹ Many Finnish intellectuals initially took a neutral or sympathetic position on the Lapua movement, supporting its anti-communist character, but strongly opposed to its violent, extra-parliamentary activities. Since many of the AKS members were in favor of the Mäntsälä revolt, moderate nationalist members including Kekkonen, Haavio, and Vilkuna left the organization to protest their unlawful violence and belittling Finnishness activities.²⁴⁰

Finnish foreign policy took a decisive turn to Swedish and Nordic orientation in the second half of the 1930s because of the rise of fascism and Nazi Germany, on the one hand, and the threat of the Soviet Union, on the other. The language struggle saw a final compromise, and Kyösti Kallio defeated Svinhufvud in the 1937 president election as the first native-Finnish speaker. This was followed by the formation of the first coalition government of the SDP, the Agrarian Union, the Liberal Party, and the Swedish People’s Party, which satisfied both Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking leftist and nationalist parties. The far-right fascist organizations were fragmented and the IKL won only 8 seats out of 200 in the general election in 1939, losing 6 seats from the 1936 general election.²⁴¹

In his speech at the Kalevala jubilee, President Svinhufvud said that the Kalevala gave intellectual independence before Finland gained political independence but of course mentioned neither Greater Finland nor other Finnic nationalities in the Soviet Union and avoided anti-Russian

²⁴⁰ Virtanen, Fennomanian perilliset, 135–56.
²⁴¹ Silvennoinen et al., Suomalaiset fasistit, chapter 9.
and anti-Swedish discourse. Nonetheless, Finnish media, nationalists, and other related festivals were very critical against the official jubilee of ignoring “kindred peoples” in the Soviet Union. Väinö Salminen bitterly criticized the official jubilee of inviting “gentlemen” and Finnish Karelian performers who “knew nothing about the Kalevala and the ancient poems.” In his speech at the festival of song and music in Sortavala, a historic border city for Greater Finland and pan-Finnism, Kyösti Kallio, the chairman of the parliament, “regretted” that “singers of Distant Karelia [Kauko-Karjala] and Ingria” were not represented in centenary festivals and “members of our tribes” were “under repression.”

In the same Sortavala festival, Uno Harva, a professor of religious studies at the Turku Finnish University and a fellow of the Krohn school, conveyed the relationship between the Kalevala, the Finnish nation, and (Soviet and Finnish) Karelia in his speech:

“Every festival related with the Kalevala has a character of tribe festival at the same time, because the region under the old Finnish epic poetry tree has included all the tribes of Finland under its skirt. [...] The Kalevala and Karelia are inseparable from each other. [...] When the greatest national jubilee of the centenary year of the Kalevala is now organized here, on the shores of Lake Ladoga, in the midst of the Karelian tribe, this means that great poem singers of the Karelian tribe have done a wonderful thing for Finnish education and culture. [...] We are grateful to them, above all, for they have sung to awaken the Finnish national spirit from national dormancy, [...]. Long Live Karelia! Long Live Our Fathers’ Land!”

The Kalevala heroes were represented as the ancestors of the Finnish nation and historical warriors strong enough to defend the nation and to represent past “independent” Finland. As Seppo Knuuttila has discussed, leading folklorists in the 1930s depicted the heroic age of the Finnish nation in a way that emphasized masculinity, heroism, and nobleness by utilizing the Kalevala heroic epic poems. Martti Haavio argued that the heroic epic poems were artistic masterpieces, reflecting warlord culture in the “ancient independent Finland before Swedish occupation,” created by the aristocratic class in a class society. Accordingly, Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen were Finnish Viking leaders in southwestern Finland, heading for rich commercial centers such as Gotland as reflected in

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242 Speech by the President of the Republic, *Kalevalaseuran vuosikirja* 16, (1936), 34.
243 *Turun Sanomat*, February 27, 1936.
the epic song of the robust of Sampo. The folklorists were supported by the historian Jalmari Jaakkola, the first professor of Finnish history at the University of Helsinki, who argued that it was possible to show the Kalevala heroes, “Finnish warrior-traders,” as historical figures. Jaakkola’s pioneering historical work on ancient Finland published in 1935, which aimed to establish Finnish national history by removing Swedish and Russian factors, were relevant to the interwar “White” Finland and quickly spread in Finnish society. When parliament discussed the Kalevala on Kalevala Day 1935, MPs including the Minister of Education Oskari Mantere stressed that Kalevala studies were necessary to understand the “ancient life of our ancestors.”

Accordingly, Lönnrot remained a Finnish intellectual and cultural figure, a symbol behind these Kalevala warlord heroes. Militarization/masculinization of ancient Finnishness was a boom in interwar Finland and images of the Kalevala warriors were everywhere, in posters, advertisements, journals, novels, and paintings. In this context, Lönnrot was not so strong and powerful a national symbol as such Kalevala heroes, and Snellman was a more attracted figure for those radical pure-Finnishness students. Indeed, in the Old Kalevala official jubilee and related festivals, every speaker praised and thanked Lönnrot for saving the epic poems from oblivion and completing the Kalevala. And the literature researcher Antti Aarne completed the two-volume biography of Elias Lönnrot to celebrate the centenary of the SKS in 1931 and portrayed him as a national cultural symbol, a builder of the Finnish national spirit, culture, and language. Nonetheless, the 1935 Kalevala jubilee focused on the Kalevala heroes and epic singers and, as Salminen complained, Lönnrot was “completely forgotten.”

Furthermore, the pan-Finnic character of the Finnish Kalevala jubilee was highlighted by the presence of Estonians. For the supporters of the Finnish-Estonian friendship, the Kalevala jubilee was a good occasion to stress the brotherhood. August Annist, the Estonian translator of the Kalevala, stressed the oneness of all Finnic peoples under the Kalevala, which encouraged the Estonians to have and be proud of the Kalevipoeg. Annist called for the spiritual and cultural unity of all Finnic peoples, especially Finns and Estonians, who jointly created the Kalevala poems in ancient times. Worrying about the radicalism of geopolitical Greater Finland and deteriorating Finnish–Estonian relationships, but accepting the Finnic hierarchy, Annist advocated for more egalitarian, cultural solidarity among Finnic peoples with the Kalevala as a shared cultural legacy: “The Kalevala is not only Greater Finnish [suursuomalainen] but also Common Finnic [yhteissuomalainen], monumentum aere

250 Fewster, Visions of Past Glory, 320–64.
252 Turun Sanomat, February 27, 1936.
perennius of the spirit and culture, not only of ancient Finland and ancient Karelia, but also of ancient Estonia.”

There were indeed dissident voices from radical Finnish leftists and communists against this Finnish “imperialist,” “Greater Finland” interpretation of the Kalevala. Raoul Palmgren, a member of the Academic Socialist Society (ASS), a rival organization of the AKS, saw the Kalevala as an ideological weapon in the class struggle against the Finnish bourgeoisie which utilized the Kalevala as a war epic and instrument to justify Greater Finland. Palmgren thus argued that the proletariat class must claim the Kalevala as their own epic, depicting that Ilmarinen was a worker and Kullervo struggled for freedom from slavery, and Väinämöinen would return when socialism was realized. Not being a scholar, however, Palmgren and his leftist fellows as well identified the Kalevala past with the people’s past, not paying attention to the gap between the original poems and the Kalevala, which Sallamaa called a reproduction of the “bourgeois” Finnish scholarly view on the Kalevala.

For Soviet Finno-Ugric studies, both Red and White Finnish Kalevala jubilees seemed to implicitly share the pan-Finnic hierarchy and Greater Finland dream, both ignoring non-Finnic factors in the Kalevala poetry and Finnic languages and taking the Finnish superiority over other Finnic peoples for granted. Soviet Finno-Ugric scholars thus challenged both the Red and White Kalevala, but they were not yet ready to compete with the Finnish “bourgeois” science in particular and its powerful argument on Kalevala poetry and the Finnic community. In fact, starting in the late 1920s lively discussions on the creation of a written Karelian language had continued in Tverʹ (later Kalinin) Karelia within the RFSFR and Tverʹ Karelian who supported this idea had conflicted with the Red Finns who tried to spread the Finnish language there. Though it failed in the end, supporters of a Karelian written language became active in Soviet Karelia, too.

Bubrikh shared a sympathy with Marr toward dialects of small ethnic groups which had been disregarded by “greater” languages within the same language family. For Bubrikh, this dialect was the Karelian language, in which he found strong Russian influence. Bubikh’s publications in the early 1930s showed his consideration for Marr’s theory but also highlighted his discord with Marr. In his book “The Karelians and the Karelian language [Karely i karel’skii iazyk],” he thoroughly denied the existence of the proto-Finnic language and condemned Kai Donner, who mixed up his linguistic research with his nationalistic activity, and Lauri Kettunen, who “ridiculed” the idea to create the

written language for Karelians.\textsuperscript{256} Instead, he underlined the independent character of the Karelian language different from both the Finnish and Russian languages by criticizing also “Russian chauvinists” who overestimated the Russian influence on the Karelian language.\textsuperscript{257} His conclusion was that the Karelians should have their own written language, taking into consideration what both the Finnish and Russian language had achieved. Still, Bubrikh suggested that the Russian language, especially its scientific terms, was in fact the international language and thus Karelians had no reason to avoid it.

Bubrikh’s notion on the Karelian language and conformist attitude to Marr’s theory heavily influenced his Kalevala interpretation. In his introduction to the 1933 edition of the Kalevala in Russian, Bubrikh argued that the Kalevala was a product of Swedish-Finnish feudal economic-social basis and accepted Kaarle Krohn’s theory, since one could find strong influence from Catholicism and the Kalevala heroes represented the Finnish Vikings.\textsuperscript{258} Thus, he concluded, the Kalevala had nothing to do with the Karelians and other Finno-Ugric peoples in the East but was a product of the purely Germanic-Scandinavian and Finnish peoples, which showed the proto-language and proto-language family of the Finno-Ugric peoples unscientific.\textsuperscript{259} Bubrikh even described that current Finnish research on the Kalevala was “sincere and reliable” because the Finnish scholars now sought purely Finnish origins of the Kalevala epic poems by giving up their effort to find out the Karelian-Finnish origin of the Kalevala poems.\textsuperscript{260} This strictly class-oriented approach of Bubrikh stemmed from the cultural revolution and criticism against the Red Finns in Soviet Karelia, but it later troubled the participants of the 1949 Kalevala jubilee including Bubrikh.

Indeed, Bubrikh’s Kalevala interpretation was already outdated and irrelevant to a changing political atmosphere in 1935. The Leningrad folklorist Kagarov criticized Bubrikh of uncritically accepting Kaarle Krohn’s theory and of seeing the Kalevala as an aristocratic product, not a product of a classless, pre-feudal society.\textsuperscript{261} Convincingly, Red Finnish propaganda attacked Bubrikh, who fell into a “bourgeois-nationalist interpretation” and almost agreed with “the racist Aryan theory.”\textsuperscript{262} Krasnaia Karelia criticized Bubrikh of ignoring the fact that the epic poems survived only in Karelia and Estonia.\textsuperscript{263} The Finnish-language Leningrad journal Rintama also criticized Bubrikh of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{256} Dmitrii V. Bubrikh, \textit{Karely i karel'skii iazyk} (M.: Izdatel'stvo Mosobispolkoma, 1932), 5, 8, 12, 18.
\bibitem{257} Bubrikh, \textit{Karely i karel'skii iazyk}, 81.
\bibitem{259} Bubrikh, ”Iz istorii Kalevaly,” xiv.
\bibitem{260} Bubrikh, ”Iz istorii Kalevaly,” xvii.
\bibitem{262} NARK, f. p-3, op. 3, d. 358, ll. 4–5.
\bibitem{263} \textit{Krasnaia Karelia}, February 14, 1935.
\end{thebibliography}
underlining Christian influence on the Kalevala poems. Perhaps, the most authoritative voice on the Red Kalevala was Yrjö Sirola, who tried to deny Christian and Scandinavian influence on the Kalevala and argued that the Kalevala epic poems appeared among the Finnish nationalities during pre-Christian and pre-feudal society. Sirola’s view, however, lacked a solid scheme and empirical data to demonstrate Karelians’ contribution to the Kalevala epic poems. In this respect, Bubrikh was frank when he wrote in 1933: “We have just begun our research on the Kalevala poetry. We accept the results of works of the Finnish scholars, […]”

In contrast to the radical class-orientation, Viktor Evseev represented a younger generation and an ethnic minority educated during the indigenization policy and the cultural revolution, the second (and slightly the third) factor of the 1935 Kalevala discussion. He started his study of Finno-Ugric philology at Leningrad University from 1927, where Marr and Propp decisively influenced his scholarly orientation. Evseev recalled in 1946 that he and his friends organized a demonstration against Finno-Ugric researchers at Leningrad University and boycotted attending exams because the Finno-Ugric researchers did hold Marr’s theory in esteem but clung to comparative linguistics and proto-language family concepts. After that, he left the university for the newly established KNII in Petrozavodsk. When Tunkelo visited Petrozavodsk, Evseev worked as his assistant and kept in touch with him until 1935. As his letters to Tunkelo suggest, Evseev’s primary interests were the Karelian language and folklore and, as an Olonets Karelian, Evseev criticized the Red Finnish pedagogue Heino Rautio as “language bishop [kielipiispa]” for boasting of himself as a “gatekeeper of the purity of the Finnish language” and of insulting Soviet Karelians and Finns by calling them “disfigurers [runteilijoiksi] of the Finnish language.”

Consequently, Evseev was critical of both the Red and White Finnish leadership and Bubrikh from an ethnic Karelian point of view. In his short article, he criticized Bubrikh of accepting Kaarle Krohn’s theory that the epic poems discovered in Soviet Karelia were only the result of borrowing and remnants of the original poems. Showing some new Kalevala related poems he had recently discovered in Olonets Karelia, Evseev argued that the poems might appear and develop in Olonets Karelia as well. This study of Evseev offered the Red Finnish leadership in Soviet Karelia useful material to refute both Bubrikh and the Finnish nationalists by showing not only Karelian contributions to the Kalevala but also how the Red Finns had raised a new scholarly cadre like Evseev.

266 Bubrikh, “Iz istorii Kalevaly,” xvii.
268 Krylova, “Isoisäni ei ole muistomerkki,” 96.
269 Virtaranta, Kulttuurikava Karjalasta, 116.
praised Evseev’s works and new findings and condemned Väinö Salminen, who had allegedly scorned the KNII as “Olonets academy [Olonetskoi akademii]” and not trusted this sensational news. Indeed, in his interview in Krasnaia Karelia, Evseev ridiculed Salminen that he would not understand how new folklore findings were valuable for Kalevala studies. In addition, unlike his writings in 1949, Evseev in the early 1930s referred to neither the Russian-Karelian friendship reflected in the Karelian folklore nor the Karelian-Finnish kinship.

In sum, the old Kalevala jubilee in the Soviet Union was a cacophony which ideologically and nationally heterogenous actors voiced behind the concerted efforts to confront the “White” Finnish Kalevala jubilee. The confusion over the Kalevala reflected in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (the first edition) published in the late 1930s. The Encyclopedia describes the Kalevala as the “collected poems of the Karelian people” and the poems were written down mainly from Russian/Soviet Karelians by Lönrot, “a Finnish poet, collector, and scholar.” The Encyclopedia criticized Kaarle Krohn’s theory of the exclusively Finnish origins of the Kalevala poems but did not fail to mention that the Kalevala epic poems were also collected from Finnish Karelians, Ingrian Finns, and Estonians. At the same time, however, the Encyclopedia denied the unity of the Finno-Ugric peoples as “bourgeois Finnish Greater Finland” and criticized Finland for its “nationalization” and “assimilation” of the Karelian tribes in Finland for centuries by comparing the Karelian tribes in Russia keeping their “independence [samostoiatel’nost’]” and later forming a Karelian people.

After the Kalevala jubilee, Soviet Karelia saw a series of terror against all Soviet Finns (Red, North American, and Ingrian) and Karelians and chaotic changes in the nationalities policy. Zhdanov criticized the Red Finnish leadership for their affirmative attitude toward Finland and for the fact that the population did not understand which country their fatherland was. The positions of the Red Finns were filled by Karelians who would be, however, purged and arrested after the summer of 1937. According to Irina Takala’s study, about 9,500 were arrested and prosecuted, of which Soviet Finns comprised more than 30%, and the number of Soviet Finns fell to 8,322, 1.8 % of the whole population in 1939 (3.2 % in 1933). The Stalinist terror in Soviet Karelia hit Finns especially hard, many of
whom were arrested as Finnish fascist agents and nationalists, but also hit the Karelians in and outside Soviet Karelia. In the Kalinin oblast', in which the Karelian national district had been established in early July 1937, those Karelian leaders and intellectuals who struggled for creating a written Karelian language in the Cyrillic alphabet were arrested for interactions with Greater Finland and foreign agents.277

With the Red Finns purged and the Finnish language and culture banned in late 1937, a Karelian written language was being created using the Cyrillic alphabet and Russian-Karelian friendship was being emphasized. Though the constitution of the Karelian ASSR in June 1937 recognized three languages including Finnish as the official languages, the Finnish party newspaper Punainen Karjala was replaced by the Karelian newspaper Sovetskoi Karelia, based on the new Karelian language, hybrid of southern Karelian dialects, created by Bubrikh and his pupils in Petrozavodsk. Krasnaia Karelia celebrated this new Karelian newspaper and condemned “enemies of the people – bourgeois-nationalist and Trotskyist-Bukharinist fascist scoundrels” and “Greater Finnish bourgeois nationalists” for obstructing the creation of a common Karelian literature language for years.278 Bubrikh as well was arrested in January 1938 for being a Finnish fascist agent and creating a language nobody could understand.279

Accordingly, Soviet Finno-Ugric studies were forced into a difficult position and could not have a clear idea how to understand the Soviet Kalevala and Soviet Finno-Ugric peoples. Some linguists tried to separate the “bourgeois fascist” Finnish language as Suomi language from the Soviet Finnish language, but the newly opened Finno-Ugric philology section [otdelenie] at Leningrad University invited applications only to Karelian, Mari, and Mordvin, none to Finnish.280 When the office of Finno-Ugric languages at the Institute of Language and Thought discussed the term “Finno-Ugric languages,” the linguist Chkhaidze and other participants linked the term with “pan-Finnism,” which saw the Finnish culture superior to other Finno-Ugric ones and even insisted that Russians emerged as a result of mixture with the Finnic tribes. To refute the “pan-Finnic tendency” in the bourgeois Finnish Finno-Ugric studies, they argued that the Soviet Union needed to establish Marxist Finno-Ugric studies.281 But Chikhaidze had to admit, “We are, of course, not strong enough. […] We say that we are obstructed by the theory of the proto-language, bourgeois methodology on dialects, literary language and so on.”282 Likewise, they had to admit that they were not prepared to

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277 V. Vinogradov, Karel'skoe “delo”: Delo tak nazyvaemoi “Karel'skoi burzheazno-
natsionalisticheskoi, terroristichestscoi, kontrrevolutsionnoi organizatsii” (Tver': RIO uprpoligrafizdata, 1991).
278 Krasnaia Karelia, January 3 and 28, 1938.
279 Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu isehallinnosta, 335–42.
280 Krasnaia Karelia, July 5, 1938.
281 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 11 (Bubrikh archive), op. 1, d. 27, l. 45 (protocol of a meeting of the office of the Finno-Ugric languages June 14, 1938).
282 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 11, op. 1, d. 27, l. 123.
demonstrate a Soviet understanding of the Kalevala, though the Kalevala was a “political question” and the Soviet scholarship had to criticize “all theories on the Kalevala.”

Part 1 has demonstrated pan-Finnism and the Kalevala in the context of imperial and post-imperial borderlands in which Finland and Russia collaborated and clashed to show how the center of the Finnic world was taking shape in Finland. As chapter 1 has discussed, pan-Finnism and the Kalevala appeared at the crossroad of the Finnish effort of nation-building and the Russian imperial rule of Finland, from which a small number of Finnish elites benefited to articulate their own national identity, ideology, and symbols different from those of Swedes and Russians. In addition, these Finnish intellectuals made full use of their resources and imperial networks to discover and study other Finnic peoples, which contributed to the Finno-centric notion of the pan-Finnic hierarchy. This process went side by side with their loyalty to the tsars and their imperial elites who utilized this Finnish nation-building but also had to handle Swedish-speaking Finnish elites and Russian nationalists who were irritated with the advancement of the Finnish nation-building and the Finno-centric pan-Finnism.

With the rise of united Germany and St. Petersburg’s effort to take a grip on the borderlands, the imperial Russian-Finnish implicit consensus was slowly splitting, and in Finland a more European (Germanic-Nordic) orientation appeared, which influenced the European origins of the Kalevala poems and heroes and the sense to help and salvage Finnic kindred brothers in Karelia and Estonia from “Russification.” This shift provoked a reaction both from the imperial elite and Russian nationalists who started to call these “separatist” Finnish efforts “pan-Finnism” to deprive Karelians and Karelia of Russia and of the Empire and came to see the Karelians and Karelia an integral part of Russia and Orthodoxy. For imperial Russian intellectuals of anti-European centrism, the Kalevala and Finnic culture were to be understood within the inclusive, imperial, and Eurasian frameworks and for them exclusive national framework and understanding of Finnic peoples and culture were foreign. From amongst these imperial/national Finnish and Russian discourses emerged modern Karelian people and their future intellectuals.

Chapter 2 saw radicalization of Finnish nationalism, the Kalevala interpretation, and Greater Finland on the one hand and Bolshevik use of the Red Finns and Finnish culture for building socialism, on the other. To stabilize the Soviet-Finnish borderlands and build and export socialism, Bolsheviks utilized the Red Finns to defy the Finnish claim to Soviet Karelia and modernize Soviet Karelia and Karelians through the Finnish language culture. For the Red Finns, the Kalevala was a symbol of proletarian internationalism, which meant the Red Finnization of Karelians. In Finland, after the excitement of the “Tribe Wars,” Greater Finland and the Kalevala continued to inform nationalist intellectuals, activists/veterans, and students who were determined to take care of younger brothers in and outside Finland. The Kalevala was now the Finnish national epic and a symbol of Finnish nation-

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283 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 11, op. 1, d. 27, l. 101.
state, pan-Finnism, and Greater Finland. The Kalevala heroes became more militarized to defend the independence of Finland and remind pan-Finnism, while Greater Finland was being unrealistic.

The Old Kalevala centenary in Finland and the Soviet Union took place in a transition period. In Soviet Karelia, the Red Finnish leadership stressed a proletariat international, class aspect of the Kalevala, while facing fierce criticism from all-Union and Leningrad party organizations. Rivalry (and interactions) with “fascist” Finland were important to secure their project. The Finnish official jubilee presented the Kalevala as the symbol of Finnish independence and military might strong enough to defend it but restrained Greater Finland ambition. Outside the official jubilee, however, many actors enjoyed the image of Kalevala military heroes and openly called for support and gratitude for the Karelians and other Finnic peoples in the Soviet Union. In such tense and militarist times, Lönnrot stayed behind the Kalevala heroes, since his moderate and peaceful image did not match with the time. To refute both Red and White Kalevala, Russian and Karelian national views criticized the Finno-centric pan-Finnism by stressing the Karelians’ own character or Russian influences on the Karelians. Nevertheless, Soviet Finno-Ugric studies were not yet ready to compete with Finland to claim the “Soviet” Kalevala and Finno-Ugric peoples.
Part 2

Karelo-Finnish or Karelo-Russian? New Union Republic in Wars, 1939-1944

This part scrutinizes war years, when discourse on the Kalevala and pan-Finnism changed at a dizzying pace both in Finland and in Soviet Karelia. The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact drastically changed the geopolitical landscape in Europe and the fate of small states between Germany and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union quickly seized the chance to move its borders westward and southward. In this respect, Finland was no exception to face a Soviet demand to revise its border, which resulted in the Soviet-Finnish War/Winter War in 1939–40. The Winter War gave the Soviet Union only small territories with few inhabitants. Furthermore, the new Karelo-Finnish Republic saw Soviet Finns coming back from where they had been deported and experienced no further mass deportation from the new territories. It means that the Soviet Karelian leadership again put Finnish elites, language, and culture on the central place but with new status, a union republic, and integrate them into the Soviet family of nations/nationalities.

The new union republic offered a great opportunity for Soviet Finns and those intellectuals and scholars who were engaged in Finnic culture. True, for the local elites, this radical shift was a bolt from out of the blue and could not quickly understand what to do with newly installed Finnish elites, culture, and the new status. The partial rehabilitation of the Finnish elites and culture was unacceptable for the Slavic majority who had a negative image of Soviet Finns during the time of “Finnization” and Stalinist terror in Soviet Karelia. For the Karelians who had opposed the Finnish language, too, it was humiliation and unpractical that they were again forced to learn or make their children learn the Finnish language. Nevertheless, those who were engaged in Finno-Ugric studies were assigned to show kinship and historical commonness between Finns and Karelians to justify the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

The War against Nazi Germany and her allies, particularly Finnish occupation of Soviet Karelia, was a severe blow to this new project. The Karelo-Finnish leadership faced Finnish Greater Finland and could not help but hide its own Karelo-Finnish project and the Kalevala to concentrate on defeating “White” Finnish fascists and nationalists. For this very practical reason, the Russian-Karelian friendship overwhelmed the Karelian-Finnish kinship and gained momentum, which had an enduring impact on postwar Soviet Karelia. In this sense, the Karelo-Finnish Republic seemed to be a Karelo-Russian Republic during the war 1941–44. In addition, it is important to mention Finnish encounters with Soviet Finnic people. For many Finns, Soviet Karelia was the “promised land,” where their “tribes” would welcome them and wish to be welcomed into the Finnish nation.

The Winter War

As in the Baltic countries, Moscow’s interest in Finland primarily came from security concern over Leningrad, only 32 km from the Soviet-Finnish border, because Moscow believed that small states like Finland were vulnerable to pressure from anti-Soviet great powers, either Germany or Britain. In the 1939 October negotiations in Moscow, Stalin demanded a Red Army base on the Hanko Peninsula, 130 kilometers west of Helsinki, a series of territorial concession in the Gulf of Finland and on the Karelian Isthmus (2,761 km²), in addition to a mutual-assistance pact. After the Finnish side refused, Stalin made some concessions by giving up a mutual-assistance pact and even offering borderland territories populated mainly by the Karelians (5,529 km²) including Reboly and Porosozero. As Rentola has argued, when deciding to initiate a military action against Finland, Stalin was sure that Nazi Germany would keep neutrality but wrongly understood the Finnish military ability and the resilience the Finnish society and population showed and underestimated a possibility of British and French intervention in the war.

The Finnish Democratic Republic and its pact with the Soviet Union hailed the new republic as a “realization of a centuries-long dream of the Finnish and Karelian people,” but the declaration of the new Finnish government, broadcasted on December 1, stressed rather an end to the reactionary plutocracy in Finland, not referring to Soviet Karelia nor the Finnish-Karelian kinship. On the day before this declaration, the Communist Party of Finland as well issued a statement which also called the workers and peasants in Finland to stand against the bourgeois Finnish government. Denying such rumor that Finland would be incorporated into the Soviet Union, the statement assured that the Soviet nationalities policy did not allow such action and the People’s Government of Finland rather asked the Soviet government to realize the “centuries-long national dream” by incorporating the borderland regions into the new republic. The statement reminded readers that Lithuania had recently acquired Vilnius “from the hand of the Soviet Union” and the Finnish dream of unification of the Karelian tribe [plmeni] with the Finnish nation [natsiei] and state could be realized only by the “national policy of

2 Kimmo Rentola, Stalin ja Suomen kohtalo (Helsinki: Otava, 2016), 18–32, 60.
These promises and war radically accelerated the change which had already appeared in early 1939 in Soviet Karelia. The sudden birth of the Finnish Democratic Republic and the incorporation of large areas of Soviet Karelia into it threw the inhabitants into confusion. In his radio speech, Kuusinen called the people in Finland to join a popular front when his government reached Helsinki. To prepare this “liberation,” the Kuusinen government set up seven committees of the People’s Government in the area occupied by the Red Army. For this aim, Moscow assigned the leadership of the Karelian ASSR to support the Kuusinen government, the minister of the Karelian affairs Paavo Prokkonen (renamed to Finnish name from Pavel Prokof’ev), by providing Finnish-speaking cadres for “democratizing” Finland. Furthermore, the Finnish People’s Army was formed under the minister of the war Akseli Anttila and gathered such former Finnic offices who were deprived of their officer ranks and rights and arrested in the late 1930s. According to Kilin’s study, the number of the soldiers in the Finnish People’s Army amounted to 27,648 at the end of the war.

In fact, the Karelian population expressed dissatisfaction with this plan partly because of the ill-prepared propaganda and organization activities but also negative image and memory of Finns, either White or Red. According to a report (dated December 10) about reactions of local population from the Karelian NKVD to the Soviet NKVD, while some eagerly supported the Soviet government and the Red Army, others spoke against the Soviet “aggression” and a Soviet power in Finland. The report pointed out an “essential difference” between the Karelians and Finns in opinions about the ongoing “event.” The Karelians, the “indigenous residents of the Karelian ASSR,” were resisting the decision of ceding Karelian territories to the Finnish Democratic Republic, since the memory of Red Finnish rule and NKVD operation in 1937–38 and a “national hostility” between the Finns and the Karelians and Russians still existed. They regarded the new republic as simply Finland where Finns might kill, exploit, and force them to study Finnish and large part of Soviet Karelia would be incorporated into this Finland. A Karelian secretary of Tigverskii village soviet in Vedlozerskii raion said, “[…] [T]he new people’s government of Finland, apparently, will kick us, Soviet workers, out of the current place and put their own Finns. You will not get along with Finns. Finns, though related to us, Karelians, are very persistent and nasty, thus to keep living here is no problem for us.”

Indeed, the very leadership of the Karelian ASSR had little information about Moscow’s
plan regarding Soviet Karelia. The local media urged the local population to support the Kuusinen government and the new Finnish Republic, and the Petrozavodsk historian Mashezerskii wrote in *Krasnaia Kareliia* a piece the “friendship of peoples” to “remind” readers how the Finnish working people supported the socialist revolution in Russia and suffered from the Finnish plutocracy, and the Finnish Red Guards fought for the revolution and Soviet Karelia, and concluded that the Karelian people “passionately welcome” unification with the “kindred Finnish people under a united and independent Finnish state.”

The local party leadership, however, received many inquiries from propagandists, party members, and workers from *raions*. In meetings, the first secretary of the Karelian ASSR Kupriianov had to remove such misunderstandings that Soviet Karelia would be incorporated in a bourgeois Finland and those who did not want to stay in “bourgeois Finland” should move to Petrozavodsk.

On the contrary, the report continued, some Finns in Soviet Karelia, especially ones whose family or relatives were repressed, negatively reacted against the war and hoped for a victory for Finland, as some Finnish schoolboys, “hoodlums,” screamed when they were punished for bullying a Russian girl, “Just wait, our people will come, then we will not beat you, Russians, anymore.”

However, no less important, the report underlined an affirmative impact of the Kuusinen government and its declaration on the Soviet Finnish population. What is of vital importance for them was the future of Soviet Finns and their culture, not the “dream of the Karelians and Finns.” A Finnish worker said, “I really hope that a Soviet power will be established in Finland. It is then possible to build a new life together with Karelia and for us, Finns, it will be completely possible to have interactions with relatives living in Finland.” Likewise, another Finnish worker told, “If the Finnish and Russian people unite, this secures a complete victory for the Finnish working class. Then we, the Finns living in the USSR, will be freed from the special surveillance system and regain Finnish culture, newspaper, and studying in Finnish.”

The war ended with the Moscow Peace Treaty on March 12, 1940, and Finland ceded approximately 9% of its territory on the Karelian Isthmus and Finnish Karelia including Vyborg, Sortavala, Suojärvi, and Käkisalmi to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Finnish government had to resettle 422,000 Karelian evacuees, amounting to 12% of the total population.

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9 *Krasnaia Kareliia*, January 3, 1940.
13 The numbers are from Jari Leskinen and Antti Juutilainen, eds., *Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen* (Helsinki: WSOY, 2002), 821.
state or new dwellers, cultural assets in Vyborg, Sortavala, and among others the Valaam Monastery, and cutting-edge hydropower plants of Enso and Rouhiala and other paper mill and cellulose factories.¹⁴

Was this Soviet use of pan-Finnism and Greater Finland appealing to the people in Finland? Soviet Greater Finland was far less attractive than the sovereignty and independence of the Finnish nation and state, and the threat of occupation and following Sovietization, terror, and deportation.¹⁵ As Tuomas Tepora has discussed, the so-called “miracle of the Winter War” and “spirit of the Winter War” is a one-sided explanation about the experience of the Finns. True, the war and Kuusinen’s government did not divide the Finnish nation and overwhelmed the political, social, and memory conflicts that had existed for decades within Finnish society. While the Soviet propaganda raised revenge of the Finnish Civil War, the memory of the Years of Repression in Finland was more suitable to unite the people against Russia and the willingness of the workers (and even communists) to leave for the front with arms surprised not only the bourgeoisie but also the social democrat leadership. Some even talked about possible gaining Soviet Karelia as a term of coming peace agreement, when they had high hopes for successful defense and participation of Western countries to help Finland in early days of the war.¹⁶ The Kuusinen government was thus seen as a “puppet government” or “showcase” for the League of Nations and foreign countries to camouflage the aggression, and Kuusinen was labelled a “betrayer.”¹⁷

It is not yet clear to what extent the local leaders shared the idea on the new Republic with the Kremlin. According to Kupriianov’s memoirs, Stalin told him to ask Kuusinen for advice and study Finnish and Finland.¹⁸ Nonetheless, it was the local leaders who had to clarify the new orientation of the Republic concretely, especially about the status of the Finns and their language and culture, and its relationship with the Karelians. How will they reconstruct the legitimacy, future vision, and past of the new republic?

The Karelo-Finnish Republic and Reinstalment of Finnish Culture and Finnic Kinship, 1940–1941

The sixth session of the Supreme Soviet SSSR officially approved the establishment of the

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Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic on March 31, 1940. At the session, Zhdanov looked back the 20 years of the development of the Karelian people and support from the Russian people and raised two main reasons to justify this decision. The first one was that “new great assignments” to develop people’s economic and cultural level “will be successfully carried out.” The second, more important one, concerns the relationship between Finns and Karelians:

“[…] The districts which entered Karelia are not only Karelian but partially purely Finnish districts. The Finnish and Karelian people are tied with each other by blood racial-national glues [krovnymi rasovo-natsional’nymi uzami]. The reorganization of the Karelian Autonomous Republic in the Karelo-Finnish Union Republic will realize further economic and cultural development of these two kindred [rodstvennykh] people and strengthening of their brotherly friendly cooperation [sodruzhestva]. This marked the end of hostility and enmity between both people, which had been cultivated by the enemies of the Finnish and Karelian people for many years.”

This “Greater Finland/pan-Finnism” speech of Zhdanov came from the logic of the Winter War and the whole speech appeared in Krasnaia Karelia and Pravda on the next day, where the words the “Karelo-Finnish people” and the Kalevala as the “Karelo-Finnish popular epic” appeared for the first time. Krasnaia Karelia did not fail to mention the gratitude of the Karelo-Finnish people to the “great” Russian people, who would help the developments in the former Finnish districts. Otto Kuusinen became the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the KFSSR and other members of the “Kuusinen” Government became members of the Supreme Soviet of the KFSSR. Toivo Antikainen and Adolf Taimi, who had been in a Finnish prison for years, were released and handed over to the Soviet Union and became members of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. In early 1941, when an All-Union Agricultural Exhibition was held in Moscow, a guidebook for the pavilion of the Republic said that the new territories which Soviet had gained from Finland had “inhabitants which consist of Karelians and brotherly Finns who were related to them by blood.”

This new formulation of the Karelian-Finnish relations appeared in detail in Kupriianov’s speech at the first congress of the Karelo-Finnish Communist Party on April 24. Kupriianov pointed out that there would have been a chance to realize unification of the Finnish and Karelian people in a single republic when the Soviet government “gifted” independence to Finland. But Finland had been dominated by chauvinist-bourgeois-nationalists who had harmed unification of the Karelian and

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20 Krasnaia Karelia, April 1 and 12, 1940.
Finnish people and waged wars against the Soviet Union. The Republic could begin to concentrate on the cultural and economic developments by preparing cadres speaking Finnish, which, “of course, advanced further ahead of the Karelian language in its historical development.” In Soviet Karelia, the Finnish bourgeois nationalists carried out “forced Finnization [nasilʹstvennuiu finizatsiiu],” regarded the Karelian people as a “lower race [nizshei rasoi]” who lacked the ability to create cultural values and tried to implant hostility among them toward the Russian people, language, and culture. On the contrary, the Republic utilized the Finnish language to realize a truly close relationship between the two people by fighting, on the one hand, against the “appearance of bourgeois nationalism” by securing the Russian language teaching and, on the other hand, against the “appearance of great-power chauvinism” by having not only Karelian but also Russian comrades learn the Finnish language. Therefore, “creating a Karelian literary language is not a movement forward.”

This unequal Finnish-Karelian relationship was articulated by Inkeri Lehtinen in her speech in Finnish at the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the Karelo-Finnish SSR in July. Emphasizing an important role the Russian people played for the Karelo-Finnish people, Lehtinen maintained that the “whole Finnish people eternally has an “obligation of gratitude [kiitollisuudenvelassa]” to the Karelians for their preserving this epic [the Kalevala] for future generations” and their language, “our common language,” which “has enriched the Finnish language in many ways for centuries and given a notable contribution to the creation of the Finnish literary language by adding vocabulary-treasures and by tremendously influencing the present structure of the Finnish language.”

The establishment of the new republic accelerated the so-called “second Finnization,” that is, the rehabilitation and promotion of the Finnish language, culture, and cadres. The Finnish language again became one of the official languages of the Republic and the Finnish language party organ Punalippu began to be published. Republican party elites including Kupriianov and future general secretary Yuri Andropov (head of the Republic Komsomol) and bureaucrats were encouraged to intensively study Finnish both at the newly established Karelo-Finnish State University and at home. Finnish names, along with Russian names, appeared on streets, in movies, the radio broadcasting, and at the Finnish National Theatre (established in November 1940). What is more, as the most ambitious project, the bureau of the TsK of the Karelo-Finnish Party planned to switch the language of instruction from Karelian to Finnish in all national schools from the next school year (1940-41), as

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22 Gennadii N. Kupriianov, “Otchetnyi doklad Karelʹskogo obkoma VKP(b) na I sʹezde KP(b) Karelo-Finskoi SSR (Petrozavodsk, 1940),” cited in Vihavainen and Takala, V semʹe edinoi, 272–73.  
25 Kilin, Kareliia v politike, 221–22.  
26 Kilin, Kareliia v politike, 227.
a result of which 206 out of 806 schools in the Republic (15,314 pupils) were to be instructed in Finnish. Furthermore, former Finnish deportees were forced to resettle in the Republic mainly from the Murmansk oblast’ and Murmansk (4,033 Finns and about 3,000 other nationalities), which increased the number of Finns in the Republic to 12,544.27

This rapid growth of Finnish culture in terms of quantity, of course, did not guarantee the quality and caused confusion in schools. In March 1941 Iosif Sykiäinen, secretary in charge of propaganda, published a piece that he worried about the poor quality of the Finnish language teachers and their teaching in national schools and current mixed use of spoken and written language at classrooms, though the Finnish language was a “completely developed written language” which was “close to and understandable for the Karelians.”28 As before, national schools in Olonets faced greater difficulties than schools in White Sea Karelia due to their dialects and lack of qualified teachers and textbooks in Finnish.29 Kilin interpreted that this second Finnization found oneself in a rut due to its unrealistic schedule and uncertain prospects for the “Finnish question.”30

The Kalevala and the Karelo-Finnish Language Kinship

Still, scholars and intellectuals had to be seriously engaged in building Karelo-Finnishness through culture and scholarship to fill national content of the Republic. This unequal relationship between the Finnish and Karelian was apparent at the first congress of the Karelo-Finnish Writers on December 22–25. Understandably, party elites and writers stressed the importance of “progressive” Finnish literature and writers, which enabled them to raise “young” Republic and its Finnish-language literature, culture, and cadres. Iosif Sykiäinen publicly rehabilitated Aleksis Kivi and Minna Canth and did not hide solidarity with the working mass in Finland, because “Finnish bourgeois writers do not want to and, yes, are not able to learn the rich literature legacy of the Karelo-Finnish people.”31 Accordingly, both Hilda Tihlä and Lea Helo, two Red Finnish survivors of the Stalinist terror, were assigned to raise young Finnish and Karelian writers, produce works on the Finnish revolutionary movement, and translate Finnish classics into Russian. In addition, the congress assigned the Republic Writers’ Union to support the Russians to study Finnish and the Finns and Karelians to study Russian.32

Although the Republic party leadership spurred the “young” Karelo-Finnish writers to produce Karelo-Finnish literature as soon as possible, the most important was the Kalevala and its related poems and narrators, which could demonstrate seamless continuity in the Karelo-Finnish

27 Verigin, Kareliia v gody voennykh ispytaniy, 195–99.
28 Totuus, March 1, 1941.
29 Totuus, April 9, 1941.
30 Kilin, Kareliia v politike gosdarstva, 228.
31 Iosif Sykiäinen, “Kirjallisuusliikkeen tehtäväistä Karjalais-Suomalaissessa SNT:ssa,” Punalippu, no. 6 (1940), 4–17.
32 “Iz rezoliutsii pervogo s’ezda sovetskikh pisatelei KFSSR,” Na rubezhe, no. 1–2 (1941), 67.
people. Since the Karelo-Finnish SSR was established, scholars and writers had prepared publications on the Kalevala and related poems in hurry to present them as the Karelo-Finnish epic and poems. In autumn 1940 a new edition of the Kalevala was published, for which Kagarov wrote an introductory comment, arguing that the Kalevala was the Karelian-Finnish epic, and its poems were creations by the Karelo-Finnish people and came from both Karelia and Finland as “Lönnrot, Ahlqvist, and Julius Krohn” maintained. Kagarov thus criticised bourgeois Finnish researchers who denied Karelian origins of the Kalevala poems and believed in the “Finno-Ugric unity,” saying that the Kalevala should be approached from Marxist-Leninist standpoints. These points were reiterated by a reviewer V. Dmitrichenko, who stressed that the epic poems, “without doubt a creation of both Finns and Karelians,” existed both in Finland and Karelia. He remarked that the new edition celebrates the first anniversary of the Republic, where two kindred nationalities [rostvenne narodnosti] lived and worked.

Since the status of the Karelo-Finnis Republic was ambiguous and at least partially open to Finland, the Kalevala and the history of the Karelo-Finnish people were accordingly ambiguous and difficult to be articulated. Introducing the centennial of the Kanteletar to the Russian readers, Evseev picked up such epic songs that depicted how the ancient Karelo-Finnish people endured exploitation and patriarchal rule and dreamed a happier life and future in Finland and Karelia. He also featured the song “the journey of a man from Pohjola [Pohjolalainen matka],” which tells a story of a blacksmith who travelled Karelia and Finland, including Oulu/Uleåborg, Imatra, and Vyborg, and further Narva, Reval/Tallinn, and Riga. At the same time, the Finns in Finland were depicted as sympathizers of the Russian/Novgorod state and the Russian-Karelian alliance in those works.

Likewise, representation of Lönnrot and his role in the making of the Karelo-Finnish epic were not completely consistent. Kagarov argued that it was justifiable to regard the Kalevala as a collective creation of the people, because Lönnrot himself was of a humble family and a distinguished poet and singer like legendary Karelo-Finnish epic singers, though the Kalevala was, in fact, a collection of epic poems edited by an individual and a “mosaic creation” of Lönnrot. In a similar way, Evseev highly evaluated an active role by Lönnrot as a “Finnish writer or poet” who united and edited epic poems and songs to publish the Kalevala. Evseev, however, wrote nothing about to what extent Lönnrot participated in the creating process of the Kalevala, that is, whether he was just a

33 *Kalevala: Karelo-Finskii narodny epos* (Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'tvo Karelo-Finskoi SSR, 1940), iv–x.
34 V. Dmitrichenko, “Kalevala,” *Na rubezhe*, no. 4 (1941), 52–54.
36 Viktor Evseev, “Karelo-finskie runy,” in F. Egorov, ed., *Sampo: sbornik karelo-finskikh run* (Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’to Karelo-Finskoi SSR, 1940), vi. The same description about the Finns appeared in historical pieces on Novgorod-Swedish confrontation over Vyborg, for example, V. Shavel’’s newspaper piece in *Leninskoe znamia*, February 13, 1941.
38 Evseev, “Karelo-finskie runy,” iii.
collector, compiler, or creator of the Kalevala. Featuring the epic singer Arhippa Perttunen, Evseev highly evaluated his original epic poems, which Lönnrot wrote down but later changed the original structure to make the narrative consistent to publish them as the Kalevala. While the local writer V. Gudkov clearly wrote that the Kalevala was a popular creation and “prodigious product of the distinguished literature scholar Elias Lönnrot,” the local archeologist and historian Linevskii outspokenly criticized Lönnrot for his “unacceptable [nedopustimye]” acts, since he edited the original epic poems and even created his own ones to create a single storyline.

Contrary to this awkward Karelian-Finnish relationship, the Russian-Karelian friendship continued to be celebrated and became solid because of historical and cultural studies on the Russian state and people. The young Leningrad historian Igor' Shaskol'skii published a small piece which described how the “great” Russian people had struggled against the Varangians, Finns, Swedes, Germans, and Poles over the mouth of the Neva for centuries. In this historical narrative, Finland and the Anglo-French imperialist bloc waged a war against the Soviet Union to claim Leningrad and failed as other invaders did in the past. Even before the Winter War, the historian V. Pegov published a brochure on the Polish-Swedish intervention in Karelia in the early 17th century, which demonstrated how the Karelian people had defended their native land and the land of Rus’ since the 13th century and how the Moscow state and the Russians liberated the lands of Rus’ and Karelia from Polish-Lithuanian-Swedish “bandits” by helping local Karelians in the 17th century as the local Karelian peasant songs and legends depicted.

The Moscow historian Gadziatskii published a monograph “Karelians and Karelia in the time of Novgorod” in early 1941, arguably the first historical work on Karelia and the Karelians by a Russian historian after the 1907 work by Krokhin. Gadziatskii emphasized a relatively independent role of the Karelians in their historical struggle against the Finns/Em’ and Swedes and argued that trade and economic relationships and external pressures promoted the Karelians’ incorporatopm in the Novgorod state, and the Karelians were always “loyal brothers in arms [verynymi soratnikami]” of the Novgorodians, who fought against the Swedes and Finns. This close relationship between the two people promoted ethnic mixing [smeshannost’] and cultural mutual interactions, which reflected in the vocabulary of both languages, Russian loan words in the Karelian language, and their national epics such as similarities between “Gusl’ and Kantele, Sadko and Väinämöinen” as Vsevol’d Miller pointed out in the previous century.

40 A. M. Linevskii, Ocherki po istorii drevnei Karelii. Chast’ 1 (Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo Karel-Finski SSR, 1940), 93.
41 Igor’ Shaskol'skii, Bor'ba russkogo naroda za nevskie berega (M.: Gosudarstvennoe voennoe izdatel'stvo Narkomata Oborony Soiuza SSR, 1940).
42 V. Pegov, Pol'sko-shvedskaia interventsiia v Karelii v nachale XVII veka (Petrozavodsk: Kargoizdat, 1939).
43 S. Gadziatskii, Karely i Karelia v novgorodskoe vremia (Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe
In addition to political and ideological needs in the Republic, these historical works from Russian historians put pressure on the Karelo-Finnish philologists to find a friendly relationship among the Karelians, Finns, and Russians in Karelo-Finnish folk culture. Evseev tried to find examples of the friendship between the ancestors of the Karelo-Finnish and the Russian people. Evseev described even episodes from the time when the Karelo-Finnish tribes lived peacefully with each other and northern Slavic tribes in Karelo-Finnish historical popular songs. One of these songs, written down in Keksgol'm, depicted a story that a giant eagle brought the ancestors of the Karelo-Finnish and Russian people to Karelia, Finland, and Russia. In other songs and the Kanteletar, Evseev found such stories that the Karelo-Finnish people together with the Russian people struggled against the Finnish and Swedish feudal lords, kulaks, and the Russian imperial autocracy.44

Despite Evseev’s efforts, a huge gap between Russian folkloristics and Karelo-Finnish one was obvious in terms of quality and quantity. In the first congress of the Republic writers, Sykiäinen did not fail to point out insufficient situation in folklore studies and mentioned that Karelo-Finnish folklore has been collected “insufficiently”45 than Russian folklore in the Republic. This is true, given that Russian folklore studies in Soviet Karelia gathered its momentum even after the Winter War. Among others, Vasily Bazanov actively wrote about past and living Russian folksingers and folklorists in Russian/Soviet Karelia, where master folksingers like the Riabinin clan performed the bylina on Il’ia Muromets, Dobryni Nikitich, and Mikuly Selainovich which reflected the people’s dream, power, and love to the motherland, and even today the folksingers continued to create new bylina on Stalin, Voroshilov, Chapaev, and Toivo Antikainen.46

In the first congress of the Republic writers, the participants admitted that Republic folkloristics, especially Karelo-Finnish one, had to make an enormous effort to accomplish the new assignment to establish national culture. Azadovsky said that the Republic now saw the greatest and most fruitful [plodotvornoj] folklore works in the Soviet Union. In addition, he stressed that we needed to feature also past folklorists, “Gil’ferding, Rybnikov, Lönnrot,” and what they achieved, because Western scholars, too, studied them. At the same time, Azadovsky pointed out the miserable situation Karelo-Finnish folkloristics fell in by recalling the 1935 Old Kalevala Jubilee:

“Unfortunately, a very important problem has not yet been addressed until today – it is Karelo-Finnish folklore studies. I remember, five years ago, in this room, when I was for the first time in Petrozavodsk, that I spoke about the need to take actions to prepare researchers in this field. I spoke about the need to select some of young scholars to send them to Leningrad University. But, unfortunately, in this field we have done only a little up until today. We must take it into account that we do not have specialist

izdatel'stvo Karelo-Finskoi SSR, 1941), 187–90.

45 Sykiäinen, ”Kirjallisuusliikkeen tehtävistä,” 16.
Nevertheless, as happened in Finland, Soviet philologists were careful about political aspects of the Kalevala and Finno-Ugric studies. After this congress, both Petrozavodsk and Leningrad philologists discussed Evseev’s new “Karelo-Finnish” project on historiography of the Karelo-Finnish epic poems, but the participants were very cautious about finding historical pasts in the epic poems, historical and mythical songs related to the Kalevala topics, because this approach was rather political, and the same approach “bourgeois” folklorists had been taking. The Leningrad folklorist N. Andreev warned Evseev that epic poems were not “absolute historical sources” as historians liked to see in them and Bubrikh added, “epic poems do not help you to learn history, but history helps you to learn epic poems,” and thus “do not scrutinize the Karelo-Finnish epic as a historical source.” Furthermore, Andreev proposed Evseev that he should emphasize clearly “democratic elements” in LÖnnrot’s activities, not associating him only with the Finnish bourgeoisie.

To demonstrate the Kalevala as the Karelo-Finnish national symbol, the Kalevala and epic poems must be established in a new, Soviet way to compete the Finnish Kalevala. In the same meeting, Matvei Hämäläinen encouraged Evseev to complete this assignment so that Russian readers could learn the origins of Kalevala poems and reminded that there appeared the “most vulgar explanations [samye vul'garnye ob'iasneniia]” on the origins of Kalevala poems by such Finnish scholars as Salminen, “a true fascist,” in the centenary of the Old Kalevala in 1935. To accelerate the discussion in a quickly changing international surroundings, the Institute planned a scholarly session on the Kalevala by inviting Kagarov and representatives from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on June 21–22, 1941. Andreev welcomed this plan and proposed to have a presentation by Estonians, because he was sure that “they will react affirmatively.”

In the field of Finno-Ugric linguistics, rapid geopolitical changes brought puzzlement. Since the Karelo-Finnish Republic manifested the linguistic kinship between the Finns and Karelians, the Republic party leadership asked Bubrikh for an article readable for workers in the Republic to show a “historical unity [istoricheskoe edinstvo] of the Karelians and Finns.” Bubrikh prepared a scholarly piece which explained that the tribes which “spoke the same language with small variants” resulted in speaking the Finnish and Karel languages. These tribes, the “tribes-ancestors [plemena-predki] of

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48 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 3, d. 302, l. 40, 50, 55 (stenographic record of the meeting of the Council of the Institute of Culture, March 1–2, 1941).
49 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 3, d. 302, l. 40, 50, 54–55.
50 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 3, d. 302, ll. 61–62.
51 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 3, d. 303, l. 5 (protocol of the meeting of the Council of Institute, May 21–22, 1941).
the Karelians and Finns,” were finally divided between Sweden and Russia/Novgorod in 1323. The establishment of the KFSSR, therefore, would solve the “Karelo-Finnish questions.” This writing, however, baffled the party leaders who expected an explanation about a process of the formation of the Karelians “as a tribe [narakonosti] or nationality [natsional'nosti] (that is, developments of the Karelians to a nation [konsolidatsii karel v natsiiu]),” and reasons for the “introduction of the Finnish language as a state language in the Karelo-Finnish SSR.”

Still, this change brought also chances because of two Finno-Ugric new republics: Karelia and Estonia. In early January in 1941 Bubrikh planned to deliver a lecture on the development of Soviet Finno-Ugric studies to Estonian scholars to integrate them into the Soviet scholarly community. Bubrikh’s lecture, of course, denied the concept of the proto-language and proto-language family based on the notion of “eternal [ingovesse]” similarities among the Finno-Ugric languages. Nonetheless, Bubrikh left some rooms to discuss comparative linguistics and language kinship, pan-Finnism, to take advantage of including Estonian scholars to the Soviet Union, emphasizing, “Soviet Finno-Ugric linguistics does not raise any fundamental objection to the notion of common Baltic-Finnish [ühilääneresoome], common-Mordovian and others, developed by traditional science. [….] Archaic language formation allows various possibilities for the development of language systems.”

The “Interim Peace [Välirauha]” for Finland

The term Välirauha connotes a short period between the end of the Winter War and the start of the so-called “War of Continuation [Jatkosota].” Although few expected another war shortly after the Winter War, many in Finland were furious at the “injustice, unlawful” Soviet invasion and shocked by the terms of the Moscow peace treaty and felt alone finally without support from the West, in particular Sweden that, many Finns believed, did not help Finnish war efforts but also “refused” a transit of possible British and French forces. The Finnish political and military leadership sought a state alliance with Sweden after Denmark and Norway were occupied by Nazi Germany and the Baltic states were annexed by the Soviet Union. But both the Soviet Union and Germany opposed this idea, because Germany had already started to think including Finland in its war plan against the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union disliked joint Swedish-Finnish defense of the Åland islands. After the fall of Denmark and Norway, Finland could no longer expect British and American support in terms of security and trade.

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52 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 411, ll. 21–26 (Sykiäinen’s letter to Meshchaninov, dated March 8, 1941).
53 EKLA, f. 330, m. 277:3, 81, l. 6. The Estonian linguist Paul Ariste kept a copy of the summary of Bubrikh’s lecture.
54 Meinander, Kansallisvaltio, 104–7.
The Finnish leadership indeed faced pressure from the domestic leftists and the Soviet Union and this fear crystalized in the so-called “August crisis”: after the annexation of the Baltic countries, Moscow demanded permission to use the railway to transit Red Army units to the Hanko Naval Base and, from late July, the rumor circulated in Finland that the Red Army was preparing for another attack.57 Finnish communists and leftist social democrats established the “Society of Peace and Friendship of Finland-Soviet Union [Suomen – Neuvostoliiton rauhan ja ystävyyden seura, SNS]” in May and gathered about 15,000 members in August (35,154 in October). The Finnish State Police suspected this association to be a fifth column and arrested some of its leaders in early August, which caused massive demonstrations in major cities.58 To compete with this, a nation-wide Winter War veteran organization, the “Union of Brother-in-Arms [Asevelliitto], was established to overcome the Civil War divides by the experience and memory of the unity of the Winter War.59 In this highly insecure situation, the top Finnish political and military leaders started to seek a security guarantee from Germany.

Not knowing the Operation Barbarossa in detail, the Finnish inner circle prepared a plan for future Finnish eastern borders to convince the Germans. In April 1941 Ryti asked the renowned geographer and old AKS member Väinö Auer and later also the young historian Eino Jutikkala to make a report to justify Finland’s claim to “East Karelia” and the Kola Peninsula.60 Furthermore, in mid-May the Finnish ambassador in Berlin Toivo Kivimäki wrote to Ryti that “a German” was asking Finnish border wishes based on strategic and ethnographic sources and Ryti asked Jalmari Jaakkola and military experts to prepare a report on future eastern borders. Jaakkola discussed with Ryti and relied on the AKS leaders to quickly complete writing a history of Soviet Karelia in order to define future eastern border running from the Komi Peninsula to the south of Svir’ beyond the areas populated by the Karelians and Veps. To justify this, Jaakkola utilized the geographic concept of Fennoscandia, which includes the Kola Peninsula and Soviet Karelia in a Scandinavian geographic sphere and relied on a concept of Finland as an anti-Slavic/Russian, Scandinavian gatekeeper of the Western and Christian civilization.61

Many Finns had little information what was going on between the Finnish and German top circles and thus felt isolation and anxiety for future of the country. As Veikko Koskenniemi, professor

of literature at Turku University, illustrated, the Finnish nation was “forced to fight alone” and had to defend the value, freedom, and honor for which many young soldiers devoted their lives. For the pan-Finnic supporters, this “narrow” view seemed to ignore “lost” Karelia and the Karelian evacuees. In his speech on Kalevala Day 1941, Salminen lamented the loss of the Karelían Isthmus and Ladoga Karelia, the “land, homes, and lawns which were inherited from and cultivated by the fathers,” and the fate of Karelian evacuees who lost their homes. He thus criticized the “rest of Finland for chillily dealing with the people of Kalevala singers, the centuries-long gatekeeper of the Western civilization [sivistyksen].” Salminen reminded that the Kalevala poems were purely Finnish, not foreign borrowings, and the Finnish nation owed the Kalevala to the people of Karelia, the “final creator of the poems.” Even Salminen, however, did not pay attention to the Karelians and other Finnic people behind the borders. Thus, another war against the Soviet Union and occupation of Soviet Karelia were totally surprising for many Finns.

Chapter 4: Finnish Occupation and the Russian-Karelian Friendship, 1941–1944

The outbreak of the Soviet-German War (so-called Great Patriotic War in the Russian context) was a catastrophe for the Red Army, the population in the western borderlands, and Kremlin. The Soviet Union was fighting against the German “Hitlerist” fascists and imperialists with their Finnish, Hungarian, and Romanian “minions” whose subjectivity the Soviet propaganda did not recognize. In fact, the wartime Karelo-Finnish newspapers, both in Russian and Finnish, always described invaders and occupants as “German-Finnish” and “White Finnish guards, exploiters, robbers,” and “minions of German Hitlerist fascists,” while the Finnish people and soldiers were portrayed as victims being drawn into the war by Nazi Germany and pro-German Finnish rulers. In his speech at the third session of the Republic Supreme Soviet in February 1943, Kuusinen formulated that the “main enemy for the Soviet people, including the Karelo-Finnish people, is fascist Germany” and Finnish, Italian, Hungarian, and Romanian occupants were “vassals of German imperialism.”

According to Sergei Verigin, more than 530,000 inhabitants evacuated the Republic to other republics and oblast’s and 291 factories and firms evacuated to inner Russia. 80,500 inhabitants (including 16,784 children) remained in unoccupied areas in the Republic (July 28, 1942): the temporary capital of Belomorsk had 9,000 inhabitants, while the Kem’ and Belomorsk raions had 12,700 and 12,800 inhabitants, respectively, and the Pudozh raion had 36,800 inhabitants. In fact,

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64 Leninskoe znamia, February 21, 1943.
the Republic NKVD reported that some “hostile” Soviet Finns refused to be evacuated, among others, the Red Finnish writer Hilda Tihlä, who hoped to welcome the Finnish Army as liberator. According to the Finnish occupation authority, there were 85,705 Soviets (July 1, 1942) under Finnish occupation, of which Finns (including 269 Ingrian Finns) were 852. Since the number of Finns in the Republic before the war is estimated to be about 12,000, more than 90% of the Soviet Finns in the Republic evacuated.  

For Finland, another war against the Soviet Union was a “continuation” of the Winter War to recover the pre-Winter War border and “different” from Germany’s war to keep a good relationship with Britain and the US. The Finnish government declared neutrality but on June 25 declared a “defensive” war against the Soviet Union after the Red Army air force bombed Finnish cities to strike the German air force which had stationed in Finland and bombed Leningrad. The Finnish Army concentrated on recovering the pre-Winter War border: the Finnish III Corps under the German Army occupied Voknavolok/Vuokkiniemi on July 3 and the V Division reached the former border on Ladoga Karelia on July 23. On the Karelian Isthmus the IV Corps recaptured Vyborg on August 29. On the Ladoga-Onega front the Finnish Army occupied Petrozavodsk on October 1 and stopped after reaching Medvezh'egorsk on the northern shore of Lake Onega on December 6.

Though many Finns were excited by (and anxious about) a series of successes in the first months of the war, more realistic thinking and national security justification prevailed over unrealistic Greater Finland in the top political, military, and diplomatic circles. As the Finnish Army crossed the pre-Winter War borders, Finnish President and government had to explain war aims to the Parliament, where the majority parties, SDP and RKP (The Swedish People’s Party of Finland), had been opposing to being close to Nazi Germany and an “invasion” of Soviet Karelia beyond the pre-Winter War border, while the IKL, Kokoomus, and Maalaisliitto passionately welcomed a war against Bolshevism with Nazi Germany, occupying Soviet Karelia, and liberating the “tribes” there. Furthermore, Britain and the US put pressure on the Finnish government to stop advancing and reach a separate peace with the Soviet Union.

When the Wehrmacht stopped near Moscow in early December 1941, however, pessimists such as general Talvela became suspicious about a victory for Germany and started to consider a possibility of retreating from Olonets Karelia. After the battle of Stalingrad, more and more actors...
started to seek a separate peace with the Soviet Union and way out of the war by improving relations with the US and Sweden. On February 3, 1943, the Finnish government inner circle decided to seek a peace with Britain and the Soviet Union. Through agents in London, Stockholm, and Helsinki, Stalin and Beria received information on Finland. As early as early 1942, Soviet intelligence agents followed Finnish-German conflict of interests and reported that some social democrats demanded to stop “colonization” in occupied Karelia and seek a peace. In May Beria reported Stalin and Molotov that Walden (minister of war), Paasikivi, Mauno Pekkala (minister of finance) believed that Finland had better get out of the war immediately.

Finally, on September 19, 1944, the Soviet Union, Britain, and Finland signed the armistice in Moscow. As Rentola has summarized, Finland avoided Soviet occupation for three reasons: first, Finland was geographically not on the way to Berlin and after breaking the siege of Leningrad in January 1944 the Red Army thus concentrated on the Narva front, where both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht suffered enormous loss and battles continued until mid-September. Second, Moscow (or Soviet ambassador to Sweden Alexandra Kollontai) negotiated with Finland when Germany transferred ground and air force stationed in Finland to Germany to prepare for the Normandy landings. This made it easier for Finland to break off with Germany without being occupied, unlike Hungary and Italy. Furthermore, like Romania, Finland reached an armistice, when Stalin maintained alliance with Britain and the US and wanted to utilize Finnish and Romanian Armies to chase out the Germans. Finally, in Stalin’s eyes, the Finnish nation was determined to defend its independence and the memory of the Winter War was still vivid.

**Finnish Greater Finland Realized**

For active supporters of Greater Finland and pan-Finnism, the war against the Soviet Union was an unexpected chance. Even before the war, the Finnish inner circle and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared several propaganda materials in major languages to spread and justify the Finnish war aims in Germany and other countries (but not in Finland), and various "tribe activists” started to lobby their Greater Finland plans in Finland and Germany. For example, the chairman of *Itsenäisuuden Liitto* Martti Mustakallio, working with Estonian and Ingrian refugee activists in Finland, wrote that

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71 Manninen and Rumpunen, *Risto Rytin päiväkirjat*, 238.


Finland should support independent Estonia and include Ingria and East Karelia in Finland. He even dreamed a Mordvin Union Republic and a “Komi republic,” which would cover the area where the Finno-Ugric people lived. Likewise, Erkki Räikkönen traveled to Germany in early July to explain German high-ranking officials, including Alfred Rosenberg, that Leningrad must be destroyed, and Ingria, at least its northern part close to Finland, must belong to Finland.  

Greater Finland was not unconditionally welcomed by many Finns. Greater Finland and occupation meant imperialism and radial pure-Finnishness, in particular for workers and Swedish-speaking minority. Most symbolically, on July 10, 1941, Mannerheim issued the order of the day by quoting his order of the day in 1918. After Voknavolok/Vuokkinen was occupied, the AKS leadership and Karelian refugee representatives held a “national meeting [kansalaiskokous]” there to demonstrate that local participants “on behalf of White Sea and Onnets Karelia” decided to join Finland, and the liberation movement of Karelia [Karjalan vapausliike] was formed. These events caused lively discussions in major newspapers and the censorship authority interfered by issuing guidelines. Indeed, it was very difficult to explain the war aims and justify further sacrifice to go beyond the pre-Winter War border.  

To stage a national unity, the Finnish government held an information session at the Parliament to explain war and occupation aims. Prime Minister Rangell explained that the war was, above all, to correct the “injustice” of the Moscow peace treaty and occupation was for “regional security guarantees,” since the Soviet Union had built “East Karelia” as a fortress for aggression for years. Rangell continued, “parts of the people of Finland live in the occupied areas,” whose fate, too, concerned Finnish national security interests. Party representatives generally accepted the explanation: IKL member Salmiala said that the Finnish people had “sacred obligation as well as sacred right to continue the 1940 defense war to save its freedom and independence and defy the communism which again started an open aggression” and defined the ongoing war as a struggle for “security” and for rescuing the “tribes who has lived outside the border until today from sinking in the sea of Slavicness.” SDP member Väinö Voionmaa bitterly criticized other parties which welcomed the war and occupation, “militant Greater Finland,” but accepted the explanation and, as a supporter of pan-Finnism (or cultural Greater Finland), he saw similarities between the Soviet and Finnish pan-Finnism:

75 Manninen, Suur-Suomen ääriviivat, 147–58.
76 Suomen heimo, August 30, 1941, 170.
79 Stenographic record of Valtiopäivät on November 29, 1941, 1299–304.
80 Stenographic record of Valtiopäivät on November 29, 1941, 1321–323.
“[I]t will be inhumane and unnational [epäkansallista], if we forget parts of the Finnish people who have been forced to be in the war in East Karelia and are longing for liberation from centuries-long repression and darkness in this occasion. […] The Kalevala and our literary language forever represent a debt of gratitude which Finnish culture owes to East Karelia. […] The Soviet Union, too, can no longer deny the national right of the Karelians. The Moscow government decreed in 1939 that an “autonomous Finnish-Karelian Soviet republic” must be established, whose official language was Finnish. And the well-known newspaper “Pravda” wrote prophetically more than ever: “[T]he time has come to realize the centuries-long hope of the people of Finland and Karelia to unite in a united state of Finland…”.”

In fact, until late 1942, when a victory for Germany seemed impossible, Finnish officers and soldiers had used the language of the Kalevala and Greater Finland which they internalized through school education, the AKS activities, and the Army propaganda, to describe their experience in occupied Karelia. They found that their “kindred” people spoke so different a language that only Karelian dialect speaking soldiers could communicate. Furthermore, the Soviet Karelians took a cautious and restrained attitude toward “occupants” rather than welcomed “liberators.” In addition, even pro-Soviet Finnish soldiers were shocked by the poor living standard in occupied Karelia. Still, as Ville Kivimäki’s study shows, soldiers were so sympathetic and willing to help their “young” brothers/sisters that they wrote amateur poems inspired by Greater Finland and the Kalevala.

Pan-Finnic hierarchy and Greater Finland ideology informed the Finnish occupation policy because it relied on the AKS leadership, members, and supporters who had waited for a chance to seize the moment of Greater Finland for decades. Top political and military leaders discussed military administration for occupied Karelia with the AKS leaders and in early July gathered officers of the Karelian refugees to form a “tribe battalion.” Väinö Kotilainen, longtime executive manager of the major lumber industry company Enso-Gutzeit, became the head of the Military Administration of East Karelia. The Soviet population under occupation was divided into two groups, nationals (Finno-Ugric population) and non-nationals (Slavic population), and the latter was segregated in concentration camps. Even after the non-nationals were released, they were separated from the nationals and had to wear a red-colored armband. To strengthen Finnic character in occupied Karelia, the Military Administration discussed a possibility of settling Finnic refugees from Finland, Finno-Ugric nationalities from inner Russia, Finno-Ugric Prisoners of War, and North American Finns.

In addition to this demographic effort, propaganda and education towards the Soviet Finnic population were considered very important to foster their Finnish/Finnic identity and affection toward

81 Stenographic record of Valtiopäivät on November 29, 1941, 1317. Voionmaa’s attitude to the Finnish approach to Germany and the war, see Lähteenmäki, Väinö Voionmaa, 327–83.
83 Laine, Suur-Suomen kahdet kasvot, 141–56.
Finland and Greater Finland. Like Finland’s Independence Day, Kalevala Day was an important event uniting every “Finn.” Place and street names were recommended to be renamed after the Kalevala and the Kanteletar: Pushkin Street became Lönnröt Street and Zherzhinskii Street became Väinämöinen Street. The Finnish Military Administration put emphasis on removing Bolshevik and Russian influence from Soviet Finnic children through education. In schools, teachers from Finland were expected to raise the sense of Finnishness and Greater Finland, the Fatherland, and teach pupils that the Karelians were one of the tribes of Finland and the Karelian language was a dialect of the Finnish language. At the same time, education and propaganda stressed differences between the Russian and the Finnic people in terms of race and ideology and “heavily Russified” Soviet Finnic people must be “re-Finnized” as soon as possible through secular and religious (Lutheran) education and propaganda activities.

Indeed, Finns in occupied Karelia treated the Soviet Karelians and Veps as “innocent children” to be raised up. Siina Taulamo, a Finnish Karelian teacher working in a school in the Olonets village Bol’shie Gory/Suurimäki, recalled her days in her memoirs. She and her fellow teachers believed in their mission to civilize Soviet Finnic children through Finnish education and villagers in the community through her activities. To celebrate Kalevala Day 1943, she assigned her pupils to learn the third poem of the Kalevala, “the singing match,” by heart and staged a performance in costume of Väinämöinen and Joukahainen. In a notebook the Military Administration published in the end of 1942, three AKS members in charge of education and civilization wrote that “East Karelians are like small, maltreated children. […] One must deal with them in such a way that a skillful and sympathetic educator deals with those to be educated.”

Despite these efforts, it is arguable whether the “Finnization” was appealing to Soviet Finnic people under occupation. In their interviews after the collapse of the Soviet Union, those Soviet Olonets Karelians and Veps who lived under Finnish occupation told that communication with the Finns was difficult for those who had not received Finnish language education in the Red Finnish years. Asked about festivals which the Finns organized, the interviewed mentioned Christmas,

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84 Laine, Suur-Suomen kahdet kasvot, 160–61.
86 Recent study by Vuonokari-Bomström has shown that Finnish “civilization” officers in occupied Karelia acted both as liberators and occupants toward Soviet Finnic population who were treated as “kindred” targets to be saved, but at the same time as unreliable enemy nationalities. Liisa Vuonokari-Bomström, “Suomalaisena miehittäjänä Petrosoissa 1941–1944,” in Kullaa, Kolonialismi Suomen raja-seuduilta, 238–59.
Easter, Finland’s Independence Day, Juhannus/Ivanov den’, the birthday of Mannerheim’s, but did not refer to the Kalevala or Kalevala Day. They remembered that they studied Finnish history, geography, language, the national anthem, religious songs, and the Lutheran, but did not mention the Kalevala or other Karelian-Finnish poems.

Those who had strong “East” Karelian identity saw realizing Greater Finland differently and resisted Finnish-centric Greater Finland, while accepting it as a rule. When the Finnish Military Administration set up a newspaper for occupied Karelia, “Free Karelia [Vapaa Karjala],” East Karelian refugee activists tried to dominate its editorial occupied by leading AKS members to make the newspaper a Karelian one. The Finnish Military Administration, however, rejected the effort. After that the East Karelian activists set up a separate newspaper for East Karelians. In his diary, Mikko Karvonen (Ontoni Miihkali), an East Karelian refugee activist and teacher, described a scene of quarrel between Belarussian deportees and Olonets Karelian woman when he visited a village near Kaukojärvi, Olonets. The Karelian woman shouted the Belarussians who were afraid of the Finnish occupants: “Shut up your mouth, ryssät! You know, now it is our government!” Karvonen thought that the power had been shifted to our “own people [omalle kansalle]” and the “Karelians were masters in their land.”

His mixture of Finnish-centric Greater Finland with Karelian national consciousness crystallized in his gaze at the Veps, in whom he saw “old Finnish culture [vanha suomalaiskulttuuri]” still alive despite “Russification” and “Bolshevization.” At the same time, however, when a Veps boy shouted that his fatherland was the Veps land, he wrote, “Well, it is good. This is temporarily enough. To the small a small fatherland. As he grows up, the overall concept of fatherland crystalizes and expands from Lake Onega to the Gulf of Bothnia.”

Many Finnish intellectuals were excited by this opportunity. Worrying about a split on the home front and negative reaction from the West, the Finnish censorship authority requested that major newspapers stop discussing future borders, occupation, and Greater Finland as early as August.

The censorship was, however, not consistent and could not control the excitement for Greater Finland. Frustrated by the censorship in early war days, Enäjärvi-Haavio wrote to her husband, Martti Haavio, that she “finally” heard from the radio the words of Väinö Havas, a supporter of Greater Finland and member of Kokoomus, who died in a battle near Suojärvi, “Brother, now I see the dreams in our youth

90 For example, Golubev and Osipov, Ustnaia istoriia v Karelii, 53, 69, 111.
91 Golubev and Osipov, Ustnaia istoriia v Karelii, 51, 70–71, 111–12..
94 Karvonen, Salainen sotapäiväkirja Itä-Karjala 252–53.
being realized. Greater Finland will be soon reality.”

Even Olavi Paavolainen, a liberal and cosmopolitan writer, could not resist writing strong emotions he felt when he went over across the pre-Winter War border and saw Olonets Karelian houses, landscape, and sound in his diary.

For nationalist activist intellectuals like Veikko Heiskanen, well-known geodesist and chairman of the League of Finnishness, the new war is a war which Finns, Estonians, and Hungarians together fought side by side against a common enemy for the first time. Though Sweden was indifferent to Finnish war efforts, Heiskanen stressed, Finland was fighting for the “fatherland, religion, and Greater Finland” and for “Europe.” The linguist Martti Repola wrote that the Karelian “dialects” and the Finnish language are “almost the same language” by reminding readers of the proto-Finnic language but also the influence of the Kalevala and Finnish ancient epic poems. In this context, Repola believed that Gylling was right in introducing the Finnish literary language in Soviet Karelia and Bolshevik’s efforts to create a literary Karelian language doomed to fail.

To coordinate research in occupied Karelia, the State Scientific Committee of East Karelia [Valtion tieteellinen Itä-Karjalan toimikunta, VTIT] was set up in December 1941, through which more than 100 scholars were sent to expeditions in occupied Karelia. VTIT assigned the Finno-Ugrian Society, the Kalevala Society, and the Finnish Literature Society to make research plans in January 1942 and the societies emphasized the importance to clarify “national and historical cohesion” in Finland and occupied Karelia. For those younger scholars who was born after the end of the 19th century, this was the first time to enter Russian Karelia, while for the older generations this opportunity might be the last chance to resume their research. Tunkelo, at the age of 71 when the war broke out, went to Veps villages in 1942 and 1943 and Lauri Kettunen, who taught in Budapest during the war, had a chance to do research in Veps villages in 1943, where he met the Veps who still remembered his conducting research there before WWI. Aimo Turunen, a young linguist in charge of propaganda and education, advanced his doctoral research there. Folklorists hoped to study Veps and Ludian folklore in Olonets, which was believed to have already lost folklore tradition due to “Russification.”

Those intellectuals not only enjoyed their “promised land” but also faced realities they did

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97 Paavolainen, Syntkä yksinpuhelu, 123


100 Salminen, Aatteen tiede, 148; Kalleinen, Kansallislen tieteet, 90–91.

101 SKS kirjallisuuden arkisto, Turunen’s letter to Sulo Haltsonen dated August 15, 1942. See also Turunen’s memoirs, Aimo Turunen, Nuoruus rauhan ja sodan Karjalassa (Helsinki: WSOY, 1990), 242–54.

102 Häggman, Pieni kansa, 53–54.
not expect. Like the AKS active members, for those scholars who participated in the expedition to Olonets in 1919, this war was a continuation and unexpected chance to realize their dream, Greater Finland. Martti Haavio followed the Army’s advancement from Salmi, Olonets, Lodeinoe Pole to Petrozavodsk. After reaching the Svar’ and Lodeinoe Pole, Haavio wrote to his wife that with another Olonets expedition participant, the commander Paavo Talvela, he drank to Olonets and to Greater Finland, asking himself “Could more fantastic thing happen in an ordinary life?” In his diary, Haavio wrote that he was amazed by Olonets nature, landscapes like paintings of Akseli Gallen-Kallela, architectures, “smiles” in the face of Olonets Karelian children, women, and elders. Haavio found a “paradise of Karelia Romanticists [Karjala-romantikkojen paratiisi],” “better than Seurasaari” in Olonets Karelian villages. He realized the importance of Olonets Karelia, “colorful idiosyncrasy of unknown ancient memories,” which had been underestimated because of its poor epic poem tradition and “hopelessly Russified” and “racially decayed” people and culture.

At the same time, as supporter of pan-Finnism, Haavio saw pan-Finnic and Greater Finland efforts on the Soviet side. He could conduct research in Veps villages for a few days and met local Veps and deported Finnic people (Ingrian Finns and Estonians) but no epic singers. He published a book “The last poem singers [Viimeiset runonlaulajat],” which emphasized the importance of East Karelia and Karelian singers to the Finnish public but, at the same time, suggested that there no longer lived such Karelian singers in occupied Karelia due to the Bolshevik repression and Russification. In Petrozavodsk, however, Haavio had a chance to scrutinize a study by an evacuated Soviet Finno-Ugric researcher, which he “absolutely remembers until the end of my life,” and to study the abandoned university. Furthermore, when leader of a Soviet scout group, a Red Finn, was captured and shot, Haavio was “very shocked” when the Red Finn shouted, “Long Live, Greater Finland!” before being shot.

Contrary to Martti Haavio, young PhD candidate Väinö Kaukonen could carry out two research trips to White Sea Karelian villages, which seemed to change his mind about Soviet scholarship, the Kalevala, and Elias Lönnrot. He wrote down some Kalevala related poems and took pictures of “living” singers and narrators. Before going to White Sea Karelia, Kaukonen, an AKS member, believed that Finland would be “reunited” with the tribes and wished that he could rescue old heroic poems. He hoped that “Russification [venäläistyttämistyö]” and “Bolsheviks’ hatred for the civilizing efforts” had not destroyed the “national idiosyncrasy [kansalliseen omalaatuisuuteen]” in East Karelia. In Pirttilahti village, Kaukonen wrote down some Kalevala related epic poems from

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103 Martti Haavio’s letter to Elsa Enäjärvi-Haavio, dated September 7, 1941, in Eskola, Itään, 259.
104 Haavio, Me marssimme Aunuksen teitä, 51.
105 Haavio, Me marssimme Aunuksen teitä, 77, 103. Seurasaari is an open-air national museum in Helsinki, which gathered historic wooden buildings from various places in Finland.
106 Martti Haavio, Viimeiset runonlaulajat (Helsinki: WSOY, 1943).
108 Väinö Kaukonen, “Kalevalan laulumaiden Suomeen liittyessä,” Suomalainen Suomi, no. 6–7
Okahvie Antiipin, a daughter of the grandson of the legendary Kalevala singer Onterei Malinen, from whom Elias Lönnrot wrote down poems in 1833. Furthermore, in Latvajärvi Kaukonen met Iivana Perttunen, whose grandfather was the legendary singer Arhippa Perttunen, and found the monument dedicated to another legendary singer Miihkali Arhippainen by the SKS in 1909. During this expedition, Kaukonen learned that Soviet scholars had gathered many folk poems, tales, riddles, and proverbs, which were not yet published. In his report to the SKS, Kaukonen concluded that there were still epic singers alive in White Sea Karelia who “have kept centuries-long spiritual tradition of our people in their memory” and the SKS should invite them to Helsinki.

Greater Finland meant not only “East Karelia” and the Karelians but also Ingria and the Ingria Finns. Finnish Ingrian refugees and Greater Finland supporters were interested in the fate of Soviet Ingrian Finns and annexation of Ingria in Finland even before the outbreak of Soviet-German war. While over 28,000 Soviet Ingrian Finns and Germans in Leningrad were deported/evacuated to Siberia in autumn 1941, over 70,000 Soviet Ingrians were left under German occupation. In the beginning, both the German and Finnish leaderships regarded the Soviet Ingrian Finns as economic burdens but gradually saw them supplements to fill domestic shortage in the workforces and potential settlers to occupied Karelia. For humanitarian and economic reasons, the Finnish government assigned a Finnish group led by Vilho Helanen to organize transportation of the Soviet Ingrian refugees in Estonia to Finland, which brought finally over 63,000 Ingrian Finns to Finland from spring 1943 until June 1944.

Pan-Finnic activists tried to integrate those Soviet Ingrian Finns to Finland through the language of Greater Finland and pan-Finnism. Soviet Ingrian refugees in Finland went through discrimination and surveillance because the Soviet Ingrians were seen communists and some of them spoke Russian. To welcome the Soviet Ingrians, Veikko Koskenniemi stressed how rich epic tradition in Ingria contributed to Finnish national folklore. At the same time, Pentti Kaitera, chief person in charge of Ingrian Finnish transportation, wrote that the migration was “voluntary” one for those Ingrians and the Soviet Ingrians were obliged to adapt themselves to “social order in Finland,” although they would be treated “tribe brothers [heimoveljina]” who “has kept the Finnish language and Finnish blood without being mixed with the Russians.”

Furthermore, Greater Finland and pan-Finnic activities included supporting Estonians. With
the battle situation getting worse, the German authority tightened its control on Estonians and forcefully recruited Estonian “volunteers” to the Estonian SS Legion (established in the summer of 1942), which pushed young Estonian males to flee to Finland: about 4,000 Estonians fled to Finland between 1943 and February 1944 and 2,500 of them joined in the Finnish Army and fought against the Red Army on the Karelian Isthmus.\textsuperscript{114} The Estonian refugees in Finland were supported by former and active members of the AKS such as Helanen and Urho Kekkonen, chairman of the Finnish-Estonian Society, who criticized the Finnish state police for informing the names of refugees and brokers to the German authority in Tallinn.\textsuperscript{115}

The Finnish commitment to Estonia annoyed Germans, though the German political and military top circle played with an idea of uniting Estonia with Finland. Ribbentrop and the German ambassador to Finland von Blücher protested that Helanen was meddling in German rule in Estonia. An AKS member Heikki Brotherus wrote that Helanen was “ein fanatischer Chauvinist” for the Gestapo and Wilhelm Rabius, a SS representative in Tallinn, did not trust Helanen and the AKS because their “Finno-Ugric ideological line” was “in conflict with” the SS Germanic direction.\textsuperscript{116} Helanen wrote in his diary, however, that when he was invited to an evening party by German officers in Tallinn, an Estonian girl shouted to him, “Long live, Greater Finland!” and another Estonian girl continued, “Please don’t forget that we, too, wish to join in Greater Finland! [Älkää unohtako, että myös me tahdomme Suur-Suomen yhteyteen!]”.\textsuperscript{117} The Estonian daily paper Postimees interviewed with Helanen, who, of course, did not mention Greater Finland but told that Finland had followed Estonians’ struggle for freedom and the Estonian refugees who fled to Finland during the Bolshevik years were doing well in Finland.\textsuperscript{118}

Though further studies required, the war made it possible for Estonians to see other Finnic people. Ariste recalled in his memoirs that he and Julius Mägiste, professor of Finno-Ugric linguistics at Tartu University, had chances to study East Finnic speakers (Komis and Mordvins) who were captured in camps under German occupation.\textsuperscript{119} A few Estonian scholars had a chance to carry out expeditions to Votic villages in western Ingria under German occupation. Eerik Laid, director of the Estonian National Museum, visited Votic villages with three Estonian scholars (Gustav Ränk, Paul Ariste, and Ilmar Talve) in August-September 1942. All four scholars were impressed with “purely” Votic villages and ethnographic and linguistic treasures and met those Votics who remembered Setälä,


\textsuperscript{116} Quoted in Roiko-Jokela, “Heimotyötä ja virolaissympatioita,” in Roiko-Jokela and Seppänen, Etelän tien kulkija, 237.

\textsuperscript{117} The diary of Helanen quoted in Roiko-Jokela, “Heimotyötä ja virolaissympatioita,” 239.

\textsuperscript{118} Postimees, April 21, 1943.

\textsuperscript{119} Paul Ariste, Mälestusi (Tartu: Eesti Kirjanduse Selts, 2008), 231–32.
Salminen, and Kettunen and met many Finnic speakers such as Karelians, Finns, and Ingrians. For Ariste, this encounter with Votic people highlighted the differences between the Russians and the Finno-Ugric people. Ariste wrote in his diary that the Votics, though heavily Russified, were kind and modest “like the Finno-Ugric people in general,” different from the Russians in the same villages “intrusive and begging for everything.” Ariste concluded that the Votic and Karelian languages can be viewed as dialects, different variants of one language.

**The Karelo-Russian Republic?**

There were good reasons for the Soviet leaders to rely on the Russians and Russian nationalism, since the Baltics, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belorussia were under occupation and the people were captured or forced to choose collaboration or partisan. To mobilize the Soviet people, among others the Russians, Stalin appealed to Russo-centric Soviet patriotism and the friendship of the peoples. Pravda even wrote that the Russian people was *primus inter pares* and distinguished writers such as Ehrenburg and Simonov publicly praised the Russian people. In his speech on November 7, Stalin hailed past Russian heroes, “our great ancestors,” such as Alexander Nevsky and Mikhail Kutuzov, who drove foreign invaders out of Russia. Since Nazi Germany put almost all non-Russian Slavic populations under occupation, Stalin and the Soviet propaganda utilized pan-Slavism against “Teuton” occupants to highlight the solidarity not only among Soviet Slavic people but also with Poles and Czechoslovaks against Germans, Hungarians, and Romanians.

Humanities scholars were also voluntarily contributing to the promotion of Soviet patriotism/Russian nationalism. In sieged Leningrad, the young medievalist Dmitry Likhachev co-authored a pamphlet requested by the Leningrad party authorities to write how ancient Russians defended their cities from enemies. The pamphlet illustrated a continuity between ancient Kievan military stories and besieged Leningrad and tens of thousands of the copies were distributed both at the front and home front. In fact, as Brandenberger has discussed, the party ideologues were ambivalent to the rehabilitation of controversial Russian historical events, historical figures, and

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symbols. Aleksandrov, chief of the Agitprop section of the Central Committee, usually restrained Russo-centric tendency and carefully stressed the friendship and equality of the people and supported propaganda materials for non-Russian peoples. Nevertheless, Russian nationalism and statism were overwhelming.

Since many Slavic and Baltic soldiers and inhabitants were unavailable in the western borderlands, the Soviet leadership had to rely on non-Slavic soldiers and workforces from the Caucasus and Central Asian Republics. The Soviet propaganda machine thus worked hard to create affective bonds between the front and the home front both in Russian and non-Russian native languages through newspapers, letters, lectures, and literature. These forged bonds were expected to function not only within a nation/nationality but also between Russians and non-Russians and between nations and nationalities to perform the friendship of peoples and the Soviet people. For example, Pravda launched a campaign to publish a collective letter both in Russian and the native language between non-Russian national soldiers and the people they belonged to, starting from the Uzbeks in the end of October 1942 to the Armenians and Georgians in the spring of 1943. Kazakh epic heroes and mastery epic singers like Zhambyl were actively used to raise the morale of Kazakh soldiers at the front. In the summer of 1943 at a meeting of agitators in charge of non-Russian soldiers, Aleksandr Shecherbakov, the head of the Main Political Section of the Red Army, urged the participants to approach rightly “national specialties” of non-Russian commanders and soldiers by cultivating their heroic past and using national epics such as “the Jangal for the Kalmyks, the Knight in the Panther’s Skin for the Georgians, the David of Sassoun for the Armenians.”

Accordingly, the Karelo-Finnish leadership stressed the Russian-centric Soviet patriotism and the friendship of the Karelo-Finnish people with the “great Russian brother” and other Soviet nationalities. At the seventh plenum of the Republic Party Central Committee Iosif Sykiäinen reported that the Soviet agitation and propaganda work “had fundamentally changed” after the war broke out and was concentrating on anti-fascism, heroic past of the Russian people, and international questions. And the annual anniversary of the Republic no longer mentioned the Karelian-Finnish

126 David Brandenberger, “… It is imperative to advance Russian nationalism as the first priority: debates within the Stalinist ideological establishment, 1941–1945,” in Suny and Martin, A State of Nations, 275–99.
127 Brandenberger, National Bolshevism, chapters 8–10.
129 Pravda, October 31, 1942; Pravda, February 27, 1943 (A letter from the Armenian people to the Armenian soldiers); Pravda, March 20, 1943 (A letter from the Tadzhik people); Pravda, May 16, 1943 (A letter from Georgian soldiers).
130 L. S. Gatagova et al., eds., TsK VKP (b) i natsional’nyi vopros. Kniga 2 1933–1945 gg. (M.: ROSSPEN, 2009), doc. no. 318, 762–63.
131 Leninskoe znamia, July 8, 1942.
kinship and the importance of the Finnish language. When celebrating the second anniversary of the Republic, *Totuus* celebrated the “spiritual and cultural bonds” which “have been immensely strengthened between the Russian and Karelian people during the time of Soviet power.”  

The historian Nikolai Shitov contributed a long piece to remind readers of “heroic past of the Karelo-Finnish people,” “sons and daughters of the land of the Kalevala,” which was actually a history of joint struggles of the Karelian and Russian people against foreign invaders from Novgorod time to the present. When Stalin issued a famous order “Never step back [Ni shagu nazad]” to face German advancement in Volga, Stalingrad, and the Caucasus in summer 1942, Kupriianov tried to integrate the Karelo-Finnish Republic and Karelian front and home front into a larger Soviet/Russian war context “to help the South” and “defend Don, Kuban, Stalingrad, and Baku in the North, in Karelian forests.”

Demonizing Finnish occupation made the Russian-Karelian friendship even more an urgent topic to be stressed in propaganda, although all-union level Soviet media basically gave Finland merely a second-rank role in the Hitlerist coalition like other Axis allies. The Republic leadership obtained information on Finnish occupation from reports of the Republic NKVD agents and partisans and publicly criticized Finnish occupation policy for planting hatred between the Karelians and Russians by introducing a passport system and better salary payment for the Karelians, while putting “10,000 Petrozavodsk Russians” in concentrating camps. Kupriianov thus stated that this “racial hatred is foreign to the Soviet people.” Picking up a piece in the newspaper *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, Kupriianov equated these Finnish racial views and practice about the Russians and Finnic people with the German racist ones.

In fact, it was very difficult for the evacuated children to continue their studying Finnish in school in harsh conditions. M. Gorbachev, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic, inspected the conditions in the Arkhangel'sk oblast' (Niandomskii raion), where about 5,000 evacuees from the Republic lived. He found it necessary to ask the Arkhangel'sk party bureau to support the evacuees in village soviets. According to his report to the Republic party leadership, they lived in a miserable living condition without protecting themselves from coldness and hunger and children could not go to school due to the lack of clothes and malnutrition. This news reached

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132 *Totuus*, April 1, 1942.
133 *Leninskoe znamia*, November 1, 1942.
134 *Leninskoe znamia*, August 9, 1942.
135 On the image of Finland during the Soviet-German war, see E. S. Seniavskaia, *Protivniki Rossii v voinakh XX veka: evoliutsiia “obraza vraga” v soznaniit armii i obshchestva* (M.: ROSSPEN, 2006), 140–47.
137 *Leninskoe znamia*, February 23, 1943.
partisan groups on the Karelian front and a Karelian partisan Ia. Rugoev from the Kalevala raion wrote to Otto Kuusinen to ask him to improve the “inhuman reception [nechelovecheskii priem]” his family received in Iakushevskaya village, Arkhagel’sk oblast’, where the village soviet did nothing to provide his sisters and brothers with shoes and clothes to go to school.\(^{139}\) In this situation, to continue the Finnish language education was almost impossible, although the Republic publisher published two books in Finnish for school children during the war: a Finnish ABC book and the third edition of guidebook to the Finnish language by Otto Kuusinen in 1942.\(^{140}\)

The Soviet Finns were put in a difficult position. As other belligerent diaspora nationalities, Red and North American Finnish immigrants were presumably removed from the Red Army in autumn 1941 and officially all ethnic Finns were removed from field forces on April 3, 1943. The Soviet Finns were sent to labor armies of the NKVD or deployed to do propaganda works. They were also removed from partisan and espionage activities which required fluency in Finnish.\(^{141}\) The Karelian Ivan Petrov recalled that when he joined the editorial staff of the Karelo-Finnish propaganda newspaper “Sotilaan ääni” in April 1943, all the members were Finns except for himself and one Jew.\(^{142}\) According to a report from the Republic NKVD, 58 Finns (38 Karelians and 10 Russians, January 25, 1942) were registered in the special intelligence school [spetsshkola], disproportionally high number given the national composition of the Republic.\(^{143}\) The Finns, however, stayed behind the Russians and Karelians in journalistic and literary writings about heroic activities of the Karelo-Finnish partisans. Kupriianov wrote to Soviet Finnic readers that the “best sons” of the people of Karelia joined partisan groups, of which the Karelians composed half and the Russians did almost another half.\(^{144}\)

Furthermore, during the hardest time of the war, the Karelo-Finnish military correspondents used the metaphor of animals and insects to describe “White” Finns. This was clearly inspired by Il’ia Ehrenburg’s writings “Kill the Germans”, not separating the Nazis and German fascists from the ordinary “good” Germans, and other newspaper pieces calling the Germans “beasts and insects” during the Red Army’s disasters in 1942 and 1943.\(^{145}\) In fact, Ehrenburg called Finland the “livestock soldiers [skotoboitsy]” of Germany and featured Karl Gadolin, a Finnish fascist, a “reptile [gad]” which dreamed of Greater Finland, extinction of Russia, Europe united under Germanism, and the

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\(^{139}\) Klimova and Makurov, Po obe storony karel’skogo fronta, doc. no. 194, 272–73; Verigin, Kareliia v gody voennykh ispytanii, 245–46.

\(^{140}\) Pauli Kruhse and Antero Uitto, Suomea rajan takana 1918–1944: suomenkielisen neuvostokirjallisuuden historia ja bibliografia (Helsinki: BTJ Finland Oy, 2008), 310–12.

\(^{141}\) Golubev and Takala, The Search for a Socialist El Dorado, 162–63.

\(^{142}\) Ivan Petrov, “Rukopozhatie generala Kheinriksa,” Sever, no. 8 (1989), 84.


\(^{144}\) Totuus, May 6, 1942.

\(^{145}\) Berkhoff, Motherland in Danger, 174-75, 189–90.
destruction of Leningrad. Timonen picked up an Aro Saukko who planned to gain profit from rich nature in Soviet Karelia during occupation but became a prisoner of war, and called him a “wolf with two legs [kaksijalkainen susi]” which had greed for eating even after being captured. This dehumanization of Finns could not help but influence the image of Soviet Finns. Kalle Ranta recalled that a nurse in Leningrad cursed him as a “fascist kinsman still living in this liberated, hero city.”

In addition, for the Karelians and Veps, it was far more unacceptable to regard unconditionally the superiority of Finnish language and culture. “Thanks to the help by the older brother Russians,” the Republic and the Karelians came to be described as having been “grown-up” during the war, which makes a clear contrast with the prewar discourse of “young” and “immature.” In particular, Karelian journalists-writers made an effort to write how young, ethnic Karelian partisans “saw and experienced many things, learned to hate those who wanted to destroy our happiness, learned to love our fatherland, which gave happy and bright youth,” like a young Karelian girl Usti, who worked as a pioneer before the war but joined a partisan group for the “motherland” and “great and beautiful future.” In the end of September, 1943, the Republic presented two national martyrs: a 17-year-old Karelian partisan Mariia V. Melent'eva from the village Priazh and a 19-year-old Veps partisan Anna Lisitsyna from Sheltozero, whom the Supreme Soviet of the USSR posthumously awarded the hero of the USSR for their contributions in partisan assignments against Finnish occupants. The Republic Komsomol secretary Andropov praised them as “our pride” and boasted that “ordinary Karelian girls” became heroes of the country like other prominent Soviet partisan heroes such as Zoia Kosmodem'ianskaia and Ivan Zemnukhov. Likewise, Prokkonen called them “daughters of the Karelo-Finnish people” on the anniversary of the October Revolution.

Behind this overwhelming Russian-Karelian friendship, however, the local leadership somehow tried to carve a space for the Soviet Finns and Finnish-Karelian kinship. Otto Kuusinen was always careful to stress class differences between the “White Finnish barons and bourgeoisie” and the Soviet working people and include the Soviet Finns in the Karelo-Finnish national discourse in public writings and speeches. In his long newspaper piece, Kuusinen praised the two units composed of mainly Finns and Karelians which were awarded an honorary flag of the Republic Supreme Soviet. He hailed the Republic partisans for their bravery and brotherly inter-national friendship of 11 nationalities: Russians, Karelians, Ukrainians, Finns, Belarussians, and others. Kuusinen also mentioned that the Soviet Finns and Karelians under Finnish occupation flatly denied “any collaboration” with “fascist” occupants who tried to “trick and tempt” them.

146 Leninskoe znamia, June 26, 1942.
147 Totuus, March 25, 1942.
149 Totuus, February 2, 1943.
150 Leninskoe znamia, September 28, 1943; Totuus, October 5 and November 7, 1943.
151 Leninskoe znamia, June 23, 1942.
Though sometimes calling the occupants “Finns,” not the “White Finns,” the Karelo-Finnish media as well took care of the Soviet Finns especially after the battle of Stalingrad. Following Stalin’s 1942 remark that the Soviet people was free from racist hatred, Kupriianov wrote in May 1942 that the Soviet people believed in the equality of all races and people and racist policy was foreign. Commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Finnish Civil War [kansalaissota] on February 6, 1943, both Totuus and Leninskoe znamia reminded readers that the White Finns never gave up the ambition of Greater Finland and repeatedly repressed Finnish workers and invaded the Soviet Union by selling the country to Germany. At the third session of the Republic Supreme Soviet in February 1943, Kupriianov praised the “Finns, Karelians, and Russians representing all Soviet nationalities” in the Red Army and partisans and denounced the White Finnish media and occupants who brought racism to Petrozavodsk by dividing Finnic and Slavic people.

The Karelian-Finnish kinship, indeed, did not come forward during the war but Karelo-Finnishness could not always avoid ambivalence. Commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Finnish Civil War, Leninskoe znamia reported that American Finns at a trade union meeting in Minnesota sent a greeting to all “Karelians and Finns” in the Republic and the Soviet Union and appealed to the Finnish people in Finland to stop the ongoing war and collaboration with Hitler. Differences in the editorials in Totuus and Leninskoe znamia on the third anniversary of the Republic indicated delicate but unignorable character of the Karelian-Finnish kinship covered by Karelo-Finnishness and Soviet friendship of peoples. The editorial in Leninskoe znamia wrote that the Karelo-Finnish people called their “sons and daughters” to be heroes like Toivo Antikainen, the Karelian partisan hero Ivan Grigor’ev, and the Ingrian Finnish hero of the USSR Pyotr Tikiliainen/Pietari Tiikkiläinen, while Totuus editorial underlined brutality of White Finns, not mentioning either Soviet Finnish culture or the Karelian-Finnish relationships.

Accordingly, the Kalevala signified a national symbol of the Karelo-Finnish people even during the war but did not come forward and lacked concreteness in its interpretation and representation. True, the Kalevala was routinely mentioned as the Karelo-Finnish national epic and a treasure of the Republic in speeches and writings. And the place and the legendary pine tree where Lönnrot wrote down poems from Arkhippa Perttunen was close to the frontline and the young from this place, “descendants of the legendary singers,” were fighting as partisans and working as Komsomol member. These facts accentuated the Kalevala, the Karelian singers, and Lönnrot for the Republic during the war. The Kalevala, however, remained a future topic. At a meeting of the

152 Totuus, May 6, 1942.  
153 Totuus and Leninskoe znamia, February 6, 1943.  
154 Leninskoe znamia, February 23, 1943.  
155 Leninskoe znamia, February 6, 1943.  
156 Compare Leninskoe znamia with Totuus, March 31, 1943.  
157 Leninskoe znamia, July 16, 1943.
Republic writers and narrators in July 1943, Otto Kuusinen emphasized the need to study the “ancient epic of the Karelo-Finnish people” now, when the people showed heroism against German-Finnish occupants. Kuusinen summarized that stories in the Kalevala were a “struggle of the work-loving Kalevala people against the country of darkness and slavery,” a progressive worldview of Väinämöinen and other heroes, and dream about Sampo, which brought happiness to the people, but he was silent about national aspects of the Kalevala and the Karelian-Finnish kinship.\textsuperscript{158}

The war brought an opportunity to Soviet scholars to see a wider world and inspired them to build national histories of the Soviet people, including the Russian one. Many Moscow and Leningrad scholars were evacuated to Tashkent, Alma-Ata, Saratov, and other cities. The war and transformation of international/inter-national relations heavily influenced Soviet historical writings on the Russians and non-Russian people. One of famous cases is a controversial collection of essays by Moscow and Kazakh historians, the “History of Kazakh SSR,” in which some chapters challenged the “lesser-evil” argument on tsarist colonial rule in the Central Asia by advocating Kazakh “national” heroes such as Kenesary Kasymov, who resisted imperial expansion of tsarist Russia in the 1830s and 1840s.\textsuperscript{159}

Similar changes took place among folklorists and literature scholars, especially among those who were evacuated to the Central Asian countries and Siberia and discovered the “East.” The Institute of World Literature and Zhirmunsky were evacuated to Tashkent, where he started to study Uzbek and other Central Asian folklore, epics, and languages while continuing his prewar studies on German and English literature, as the Institute encouraged studying both Central Asian and “democratic” Western literature in addition to Soviet and Russian one during the evacuation.\textsuperscript{160} A young Moscow literature researcher Eleazar Meletinsky escaped German camp of POWs and, after arrest and forced labor in a Soviet labor camp, he reached Tashkent, where he continued his research on Ibsen and Scandinavian epics and myths under Zhirmunsky’s supervision. According to Meletinsky’s memoirs, Tashkent was full of leading scholars, writers, and artists, and he expanded his research interest to folklore and epics, and taught Western European literature at the Central Asian State University.\textsuperscript{161} Zhirmunsky published a piece on Uzbek epic poems that was aiming to bridge epics and epic heroes of the West with ones of the East within a framework of Soviet patriotism and friendship of the peoples.\textsuperscript{162}

Likewise, Azadovsky was evacuated to Irkutsk and lamented that the ongoing war

\textsuperscript{158} *Leninskoe znamia*, July 6, 1943.
\textsuperscript{162} Viktor M. Zhirmunskii, “Uzbekskii narodnyi geroicheskii epos,” *Novyi mir* 72, (1943), 127–33.
destructed what he had built in Soviet folklore studies. At the same time, however, he was excited to go to the Buriat-Mongolian ASSR for his study on Buriat-Mongolian folklore and literature and he was pleased that his colleagues were expanding their research interests. He wrote to Bogoslovskii: “[…] V. M. Zhirmunsky is earnestly studying on Uzbek folklore and studying the Uzbek language; P. N. Berkov is in Przeval'sk [at present Karakol in Kyrgyzstan] and studied Kyrgyz folklore there. Aren’t you inclined toward Kazakh folklore? If you, too, will seriously study local national folklore, I think, as a result of this general tumultuous stream, you will bring most valuable results, and studying national folklore, previously, as you well know, a field lagging behind (in the research plan), makes a big step forward.”

Similar hopes and discoveries were shared by the Finno-Ugric scholars in Leningrad and Petrozavodsk who went to the Karelian front or evacuated themselves to Syktyvkar with the Karelo-Finnish University. Ekaterina Laatikainen (Erika Latikainen), and Matvei Hämäläinen continued their works as editors of Russian-Finnish and -Estonian dictionaries and conversation readers for the Red Army. Laatikainen died during the blockade in November 1943 and Hämäläinen was transferred to the Red Army as an interpreter in March 1942 and became a Finnish POW during his special assignment in May 1944. The Veps linguist Nikolai Bogdanov joined the Red Army and saw the end of the war in Germany after entering the Communist Party in 1944. Bazanov became head of the Faculty of History-Philology at the Karelo-Finnish University evacuated to Syktyvkar and conducted an expedition of dialects and folklore in the Pechora area in Komi and unoccupied areas of the Republic with students. Later in the 1970s Bazanov recalled that the “most meaningful and unforgettable event” during the war was the three university expeditions to Pechora, Zaonega, and Pudozh areas.

The war and evacuation brought Bubrikh in Syktyvkar back to comparative linguistics and “kinship” in the Finno-Ugric languages. To meet front and home front demands to make non-Russian Red Army soldiers and workers learn Russian as soon as possible, comparative-historical linguistics

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164 Azadovsky’s letter to P. S. Bogoslovskii (September 13, 1942), in Gorelov, Iz istorii russkoi sovetskoi fol’kloristiki, doc. 91, 216–17.
168 Bazanov’s letter to Petrozavodsk historian M. Shuminov dated December 7, 1976, RO IRLI, f. 825, op. 1, n. 25, l. 2.
offered a good solution by emphasizing the importance of grammar during the war. After the evacuation the Karelo-Finnish University rector Mitropol'skii held the position of director of the Komi Pedagogical Institute, where the Karelo-Finnish University temporarily rented rooms. The Komi ASSR party bureau encouraged the University to cooperate with the Komi Pedagogical Institute and Teachers’ Institute to develop both Finnic and Komi linguistic and literature.\textsuperscript{169} It turned out that Komi students more than Karelians and Finns had a chance to study at the university in 1942 as the university leadership lamented: only 2 Karelians and 2 Finns studied as the first year student (40 applications from Karelians and Finns) while 17 Komis, 8 Jews, and 124 Russians studied at the first year course in 1942.\textsuperscript{170} Bubrikh intensively studied Komi, Udmurt, and Mari languages and became a research secretary of the Komi Scientific-Research Institute to train local indigenous students and researchers. Bubrikh from Syktyvkar wrote to Bogadanov that he “completely studied the Komi language” and was “writing a big grammar book on the Komi language.”\textsuperscript{171} In addition to the establishment of the Karelo-Finnish and Soviet Estonian Republic, this wartime trend informed Bubrikh’s postwar approach to the Karelian-Finnish relationship and Soviet Finnic “kinship.”

Part 2 discussed rapid changes in Soviet Karelia and the Soviet-Finnish relationships during the two wars. The Winter War haphazardly brought back the Soviet Finns who had been arrested and deported and “realized” the “centuries-long dream” of Finnish-Karelian unification. Since Moscow had to be satisfied with winning parts of Finnish Karelia and the Karelian Isthmus, Stalin established the Karelo-Finnish Republic to keep Soviet-Finnish issues open and, for this purpose, to utilize again the Karelian-Finnish kinship to justify the Winter War and to put pressure on Finland. In the Karelo-Finnish Republic, Finnish culture came forward again as more advanced one than Karelian culture, and Soviet Finnic children were again to study in Finnish in schools. The Karelo-Finnish political and intellectual elites had little time to demonstrate the Soviet Kalevala as the Karelo-Finnish national epic and a symbol of the Soviet Karelian-Finnish kinship.

Another war and Finnish occupation forced the Republic to silence Finnishness and to underline Russian national symbols and Russian-Karelian friendship. The Karelians were allowed to express their own culture and symbols within the framework of friendship with “great” Russian brother. Through the war, indeed, the Karelian people was “grown-up” in partisan groups, the Red Army, and at the home front “thanks to” the Russian people. Accordingly, the Finnish language and culture as


\textsuperscript{170} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, korobka 57, d. 629, l. 19.

advanced ones were irrelevant to the wartime reality, and the Kalevala and the Karelian-Finnish kinship were hidden during the war. Karelo-Finnish children could not study Finnish in difficult conditions.

This does not mean that the Republic abandoned Karelo-Finnishness during the war. The name of the Republic curved a space to keep quietly work for Soviet Karelian-Finnish culture for the small number of intellectuals and writers in unoccupied parts of the Republic and in places they were evacuated, although many Soviet Finns were removed from partisan groups and the Red Army. Furthermore, while engaged in occupation policies, Finnish intellectuals in occupied Karelia encountered Soviet Finnic people and found hints of Soviet nationalities policy in Soviet Karelia, which partially contradicted what they had believed. These wartime experiences on both sides of the Soviet-Finnish border informed postwar discussions on the Kalevala, the Karelian-Finnish kinship, and pan-Finnism in two countries.
Part 3

Taming Greater Finland: Negotiating the Karelo-Finnish and the Kalevala, 1944–1949

After the liberation of Petrozavodsk, the Republic soon resumed the interrupted project for the Karelo-Finnishness in severe material and economic conditions. The Republic leadership and intellectuals carefully and quietly rehabilitated Finnish factors and put them into Soviet imperial discourse. With the Cold War confrontation emerging, Moscow disciplined the borderland republics and repressed the so-called “local nationalism” including the Karelo-Finnish one. Among others, the republic had to deny expansionist Greater Finland ideology and the Finnish occupation by showing the “success” of the nationalities policy. As far as the titular “nation” was the Karelo-Finnish people, however, the Republic was expected to demonstrate “kinship.” Furthermore, the Republic had to persuade Finnish intellectuals in Finland to support the Soviet Union through cultural and scholarly works on Finnic kinship and the Kalevala while making them give up irredentist Greater Finland. In short, the Republic tried to “tame” Greater Finland ideology by selectively picking up its elements useful to rule the population and win the loyalty from pan-Finnic minded Finns in Finland.

This part explores how the national, Karelo-Finnish discourse took shape through the negotiations among Moscow, Leningrad, and Petrozavodsk, the central and Republican bureaucrats and intellectuals, and the Soviet and Finnish elites. Each actor pursued their own political, ideological, and academic interests. To achieve these aims, the Republican leadership and intellectuals made full use of the Republic’s status as a union republic and a borderland neighboring a non-socialist but “friendly” state. Furthermore, dramatic changes in the Soviet-Finnish relation and in Finland had significant influence on this issue and participated in these negotiations.

Chapter 5: Finns and the Kalevala behind the Friendship of Karelians and Russians, 1944–1947

For Stalin, Finland was a part of his Eurasian geopolitical scramble in the final phase of the war and early post-war years and the status of Soviet Karelia was dependent on Stalin’s policy toward Finland. Alfred Rieber categorizes Finland as a country in the “inner-perimeter,” where Stalin sought military bases and a friendly government which could function as a “political buffer and economic provider in rebuilding the Soviet economy.” At the same time, Finland belongs to what Rieber defines the “outer perimeter,” where, like Austria, the influence of the Red Army was limited, and Stalin sometimes bypassed local communists to directly deal with the local government for practical benefits. Nevertheless, while the Soviet policy toward Austria was dependent on its Germany policy, the Soviet
attitude toward Finland was not so much dependent on Sweden. At the same time, Finland was
different from such countries as Poland and Czechoslovakia, where Germans were deported, and
territories inhabited by nationalities similar to those in adjacent Soviet republics were annexed. In this
sense, Finland was a neutral state which stood at the boundary of both perimeters but within the Soviet
spheres of influence.¹

In Stalin’s mind, Soviet policy in the perimeters were firmly associated with the borderland
repúblics. Amid the “civil war” among Poles, Ukrainians, Jews, and the Red Army in the borderland
area Stalin let the Ukraine SSR “recover” its western territory annexed from pre-war Poland and add
the Sub-Carpathian region from Czechoslovakia for a “united” Ukraine. Likewise, to put pressure on
Turkey aiming for territorial concession and access to the Mediterranean through the Straits, Moscow
appealed for Armenian irredenta by calling Armenian diaspora to return to their “homeland,” the
Armenian SSR.² Stalin also continued to rely on the Azerbaijan interaction with the Iranian
Azerbaijan groups in North Iran to establish a friendly government in Iran and to win oil concessions
without conflicting with Britain and the US. Romania had to give up Bessarabia again to the
Moldavian SSR and Northern Bukovina to the Ukrainian SSR. In the Altai, the Tuvan People’s
Republic was incorporated into the RSFSR as an autonomous oblast¹ in October 1944. In a similar
way with the armistice in September 1944, Finland had to cede the Sortavala area back to the Karelo-
Finnish SSR and the Karelian Isthmus (Vyborg region) to the Leningrad oblast¹.

In this fluid situation in Eurasia, Stalin still played with pan-nationalisms to encourage
leaders of satellite countries to fight against Germany and Japan and win their loyalty. In his meetings
with Polish and Czechoslovakian leaders, Stalin stressed an all-Slavic unity against a Germanic threat
and sent a greeting for the “friendship and brotherly solidarity of Slavic peoples” and “the development
of democracy and consolidation of peace among peoples” to the first Slav Congress held in Belgrade
in early December 1946.³ Likewise, to put pressure on China in negotiations, Stalin let Khorloogiin
Choibalsan, the prime minister of the Mongolian People’s Republic, to support Osman Batyr, a Kazakh
nationalist who led an anti-Chinese insurrection in Chinese Altai from mid-1944, and to declare war
against the Japanese Empire in August 1945 by manipulating a pan-Mongolic dream to unite Inner
and Outer Mongolia. Taking advantage of Stalin’s strategy, Choibalsan for a moment could dream of
gathering Mongolic peoples in the Altai and Western China for his Greater Mongolia and during the
war against Japan the propaganda machine of the MPR loudly voiced not only the unification of Inner

¹Rieber, Stalin and the Struggle, 322. On the comparison with Austria, see Peter Ruggenthaler, The
²Rieber, Stalin and the Struggle, 322–38; Lehman, Eine sowjetische Nation, 76–81.
³On the first Slav Congress, Stefan Troebst, “Schwanengesang gesamtslavischer ‘Einheit und
Brüderlichkeit’: Der Slavenkongress in Belgrad 1946,” in Post-Panslavismus: Slavizität, Slavische
Idee und Antislavismus im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert, eds. Agnieszka Gąsior et al. (Göttingen:
and Outer Mongolia but also called out to the “Mongols” in Buryatia, North Xinjiang, and Tuva.4

What did Stalin expect from Finland after the armistice? Since the Red Army did not occupy Finland, he wanted to use the Finnish Army to drive out the German Army from Lapland and stabilize Finnish society to keep running the Finnish economy for Soviet war efforts and post-war reconstruction. For this aim, Stalin was satisfied with Mannerheim and later Paasikivi directly dealing with the Allied Control Commission led by Zhdanov.5 The armistice obliged the Finnish government to legalize the Communist Party of Finland (SKP) and release the communists and leftists who after their release faced radical fractions within the party, on the one hand, and were at a loss for what to do without a clear vision of the future or advice from the Soviet Union, on the other.6 As had happened in other countries liberated by the Red Army, the SKP sought a popular front strategy to split the SDP. This resulted in the leftist coalition Finnish People’s Democratic League [Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto, SKDL], which became one of the three victors in the first post-war general election in March 1945 with the Agrarian Union and SDP and gained key ministerial positions (Ministers of Internal Affairs, Education, and Defence). After Paasikivi became president in the end of March 1946, Mauno Pekkala from the SKDL became the prime minister to purge those who had repressed Finnish communists and were responsible for the war against the Soviet Union.

Stalin and Zhdanov, however, put priority on practical matters and strictly instructed the Finnish Communists to cooperate with other parties in parliament politics and even did not give support to the SKP’s commitment to strikes which would harm Finnish industries and war reparations as goods worth 300 million dollars in 1938 prices to be paid to the Soviet Union.7 Even though it was a heavy burden on the Finnish economy, the reparations brought workplaces to Finnish heavy industry, which soaked up many demobilized soldiers, and in January 1945 both countries concluded a barter-trade agreement to exchange Finnish nickel, cobalt, pyrite, and torpedoes for Soviet wheat, rye, sugar, oil, and consumer goods.8 Furthermore, the US Export-Import Bank decided to give 32 million dollars of credit to Finland, though both the US and British governments understood that Finland was within the Soviet sphere of influence and restrained themselves from intervening in Soviet-Finnish relations.9

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5 Rentola, *Stalin ja Suomen kohtalo*, 74–75.
With the memory of the Winter War in mind, Moscow did not put forward Soviet Karelia and Karelian as a diplomatic and political card toward Finland, fearing that it would destabilize Finland and in the long run the Soviet war effort as well as reconstruction.

Stalin, however, still considered the Karelo-Finnish SSR useful as a potential card toward Finland and did not want to change its status. Zhdanov and T. F. Shtyikov, political commissar of the Red Army who inspected the Republic in March 1944, were determined to deport the Karelians, Finns, and Veps under the occupation and liquidate the Republic. According to Kupriyanov’s unpublished memoirs, Shtykov insisted on resolving this question “in the light of the latest orders of Comrade Stalin,” which obviously suggested the deportation of the Kalmyks, the Ingushes, the Chechens, the Crimean Tatars who allegedly “collaborated” with Nazi German occupiers. Opposing Shtykov, Kupriyanov sent a report to Malenkov, Zhdanov, Shcherbakov, and Shamberg to defend the Soviet Finns, Karelians, and Veps who, as loyal Soviet patriots, fought against the Finnish occupiers and their “chauvinist” occupation policy both in the front and in the home front with the help of the “great Russian people.” Kupriyanov recalled that before the Secretariat meeting which would discuss this question, Malenkov told him that Stalin had read the report and had said that Kupriyanov was right and there was no analogy between the Karelians and the Crimean Tatars, though Stalin said, “he [Kupriyanov] is too sympathetic to the Karelians.” At the meeting, Malenkov concluded that what the Karelians did during the war could not be compared with what the Crimean Tatars did and there was no parallel between the Kalmyk ASSR and the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

This, of course, does not mean that Moscow let the Karelo-Finnish leadership stress Karelian-Finnish kinship in the Republic. Rather, the Orgburo of the TsK VKPb obliged the Karelo-Finnish party to make an exhaustive effort for the propaganda and political education among the population liberated from the occupation in order to remove the “remnants” of the occupation which implanted “hatred between the Russians and the Karelians,” and underline the friendship between the two peoples. The Karelo-Finnish party leaders were instructed, above all, to stress the Russian-Karelian friendship and, then, find the way to underline another friendship between the Finns and Karelians, which must coexist with the Russian-Karelian friendship.

As other western borderland republics, the Karelo-Finnish SSR saw the occupied area including Petrozavodsk destructed and immediately started the reconstruction to resume the pre-war project to build a “Karelo-Finnish” republic. According to the Gosplan, the Republic had only 177,904 (on August 1, 1944) inhabitants and had to accelerate the return of the evacuees to the Republic.

10 NA RK, f. r-3435, op. 3, d. 5, ll. 158–160.
11 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 88, d. 296, ll. 9–78 (Kupriyanov’s report to Shamberg dated August 18, 1944).
12 NA RK, f. r-3435, op. 3, d. 5, l. 188.
13 NA RK, f. r-3435, op. 3, d. 5, l. 193.
14 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 116, d. 169, l. 21 (protocol of the Orgburo meeting on August 31, 1944).
Between January 1 and July 20, 1945, the Republic received 35,468 evacuees (registered at Petrozavodsk, Soroka, and Medvezh’ia Gora registration points), but it was still far behind the pre-war population (686,333 on January 1, 1941 according to the Gosplan data). Due to the shortage in the work force in the Republic, the Sovnarkom USSR ordered each union republic and oblast’ government to return the evacuees, especially managers, specialists, and workers, to the Karelo-Finnish SSR before June 1, 1946. Needless to say, even at the beginning of 1947 the total population of the Republic was only 361,000 people, of which 173,000 were fit for work. The Republic needed a number of immigrants from outside the Republic regardless of their nationality. Thus, the propaganda was targeted not only on the indigenous population but also on the new, non-Finnic, Slavic immigrants.

Emphasizing Russian nationalism in the wartime propaganda did not slow down and reached a climax when Stalin praised the Russian people, “the most distinguished nation” among the Soviet nations in his famous speech at the Kremlin reception in May 1945. Russian national past and culture continued to be the main pillar of the Soviet family of nations, while non-Russian nationalisms gradually became a target of attack from Moscow. In autumn 1944, the Tatarstan oblast’ committee of the VKP(b) criticized local intellectuals and researchers for their works and interpretations of the Tatar national epic, the Idegei, and history of the Tatar people. This is because the epic is “khanate-feudal” and “anti-people” one and their historical writings denied a “progressive” significance of the incorporation of Kazan’ into Moscow by idealizing the Golden Horde as the “motherland” of the Tatar people and obstructing the friendship between the Russian and Tatar peoples. Prior to this, Aleksandrov, the head of the propaganda and agitation department of the TsK VKP(b), reported to Malenkov that the epic could not represent one specific people since its variants were found among Turkic peoples such as the Kazaks, the Uzbeks, the Karakalpaks, the Barabinsk Tatars, and the Crimean Tatars, and showed the hero Idegei like Genghis Khan as a feudal lord and an enemy of the Russian people. Thus,

16 NA RK, f. r-3149, op. 1, d. 3/21, ll. 11–12, cited in Karelia v velikoi otechestvennoi voine, 249–51.
17 Antti Laine, “Modernity in the 1940s and 1950s in the part of Karelia that was annexed from Finland on 13 March 1940,” in Moving in the USSR: Western anomalies and northern wilderness, ed. Pekka Hakamies (Helsinki: SKS, 2005), 36.
Aleksandrov concluded, the Idegei cannot be compared with other Soviet epics such as “the David of Sassoun, the Kalevala.”\textsuperscript{20} The local party especially pointed out that the Idegei reflected the “nationalistic” idea of unification of Tatar tribes in the Pontic Step.\textsuperscript{21}

Scholars and academic institutes in the Karelo-Finnish Republic were thus mobilized to carry out their assignment, but during the early post-war years the accent was still put on Russian-Karelian friendship rather than the Karelian-Finnish friendship and kinship. The Karelo-Finnish State University and the Karelo-Finnish branch of the Academy of Science of the USSR came back to the Republic in summer 1944. The university started a new academic year on October 2 (266 students registered in April 1945\textsuperscript{22}). The university rector Mitropolʹskii proposed in early September 1944 to the Republic Party leadership to continue the pre-war research on the Karelian dialects, which would show the “map of the most ancient interactions between Russians and Karelians,” and on the Russian and Karelian old literatures [\textit{slovesnosti}] including Kalevala poetry.\textsuperscript{23} This assignment, however, also required supports from outside of the Republic, since contacts with Moscow and Leningrad scholars remained suspended; despite that the Republic branch of Academy of Sciences had only early-stage researchers (only one doctor and three doctoral candidates). Shitov, the director of the Institute of Language, Literature, and History (henceforth, the Institute) at the Karelo-Finnish branch of Academy of Sciences, appealed to the TsK VKP(b) to give support to resume this project in March 1945:

“The important assignments, which the Republic addresses in the reconstruction, are the development and growth of the socialist culture of the Karelo-Finnish people. As you well know, the Finnish fascist occupiers tried to extinguish the socialist culture of the Karelo-Finnish Republic and to spread their own fascist culture among the population under occupation. The most responsible assignment for the Institute is to remove the legacy of this hostile activity in the cultural field. We must complete the assignments in all languages; Russian, Finnish, and Karelian. This is because it concerns the people's poem which our people must preserve and raise. The oral creation of the Karelo-Finnish people is the especially plentiful cultural legacy and, thus, the folklore sector occupies a prominent place in the Institute.”\textsuperscript{24}"

Shortage of resources was an obstacle to this assignment. According to the report from the Karelo-Finnish branch of Academy of Sciences to the Republic TsK in February 1947, the Institute spent much time setting research conditions in the first half of 1946. This report also pointed out the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 290, ll. 1–8.
\item \textsuperscript{21} “‘Idegeevoo poboishche’ TsK VKP(b),” \textit{Rodina}, no. 3–4 (1997), 116–18; Alf'iia Galliamova, \textit{Tatarskaia ASSR v period poststalinizma} (Kazan’: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 2015), 326–29.
\item \textsuperscript{22} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 1312, l. 22 cited in \textit{Karelia v velikoi otechestvennoi voine}, 418.
\item \textsuperscript{23} NA RK, f. r-1394, op. 3, d. 120/910, ll. 125–26, cited in \textit{Karelia v velikoi otechestvennoi voine}, 414–16. See also Titov, \textit{Akademicheskaia nauka v Karelii 1946–2006. Tom 1}, 36.
\item \textsuperscript{24} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 1599, l. 6
\end{itemize}
problem the Institute faced: lack of non-Russian research cadre. The Karelo-Finnish University was not ready to prepare non-Russian doctorates and had no non-Russian graduate student in the field of folklore and history, and only one national (non-Russian) graduate student in Finno-Ugric studies.\textsuperscript{25} This meant that the Republic lacked the researchers who would be able to use the Karelian and Finnish languages, which made it difficult to research Karelian and Finnish folklore and literature.\textsuperscript{26} The lack of non-Russian indigenous researchers both in the Institute and at the University remained the biggest obstacle to offering the “right” and authoritative national past and culture to the population and counter Finnish science.

Still, there were good reasons to have high expectations and motivation to demonstrate what Soviet science had achieved because of its closeness to Leningrad. In addition to a vivid memory of victory, the Soviet authority further cared for “privileges” of writers and scholars and gorgeously celebrated the 220\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Academy of Science of the USSR in 1945 by inviting guests even from foreign countries including Finland and stressing the achievement of Soviet science and the importance of cooperation with the West.\textsuperscript{27} Leningrad scholars were the most benefitted group in this respect: three academicians (Vinogradov, Tolstoi, and Shishmarev) and three correspondent members (Alekseev, Barkhodarov, and Bubrikh) were from among the Leningrad University professors.\textsuperscript{28} The Karelo-Finnish Republic also benefited from this highly acclaimed Leningrad scholarly community: the Karelo-Finnish University had Bubrikh as professor and invited young talented researchers like Kirill Chistov. For Leningrad folklorists, Petrozavodsk was a good place for young students and researchers for their study and research, because, as Chistov recalled what Azadovsky told him, Soviet Karelia was a land of Russian folklore and ideological pressure there was milder than in Leningrad.\textsuperscript{29}

At the same time, the Communist Party began to discipline intellectuals and scholars as the cooperation with the Allied countries became difficult after the war.\textsuperscript{30} During the transition period from war to peace, Stalin took a grip on his inner circle, military and government elites such as the war hero Georgii Zhukov and young party members who entered the party during the war in an ideologically loosened atmosphere, because Stalin strongly felt necessary to ideologically discipline

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2088, l. 109–11.
\item \textsuperscript{26} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2088, l. 120.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Druzhinin, Ideologiya i filologiya. T. 1, 205. From Moscow State University, only one academician (Vinogradov, who had a position also in Leningrad) and two correspondent-members were elected.
\item \textsuperscript{29} K. V. Chistov, Zabyvat’ i stydit’cia nechego (SPb: MAE RAN, 2006), 137–38.
\end{itemize}
them and move the party forward again. In April 1946 the Politburo decided to launch a new newspaper from the section [upravlenie] of agitation and propaganda of TsK VKP(b) to strengthen ideological work in journals, newspapers, art, and literature, and the new newspaper Kul'tura i zhizn' appeared. In addition, Zhdanov, following Stalin’s instructions, demanded his propaganda staffs strengthen their centralized, ideological control over arts and literature, which was crystallized in the 1946 August resolution of the TsK about the Leningrad journals Zvezda and Leningrad, sending a warning to Soviet writers and intellectuals to strictly follow the party line and not to “kowtow [nizkopoklonstvo]” to the bourgeois culture of the West. This criticism extended to Leningrad University and literature scholars, above all, Boris M. Eikhenbaum, head of the course of Russian literature.

The 1946 November meeting in Leningrad made clear the gap between the high motivation to show Soviet achievement and superiority on the one hand, and the difficulties the Republic had been facing on the other. To prepare its five-year plan, the Institute asked leading Leningrad scholars to join in the meeting held in Leningrad on 20–23 November. In his report about the plan, Shitov emphasized the importance of having the project on history of Karelia completed in 1950 and to carry out the centenary jubilee of the new Kalevala in 1949 and pledged the Leningrad scholars to help the Karelo-Finnish scholars, because the Institute did not have the possibility to “receive authoritative instructions from Moscow and Leningrad scholars.”

After listening to this “ambitious” plan, Mark Azadovsky said that the plan was unrealistic given that “the situation in our study on K[arelo]-F[innish] folklore is catastrophic in the [Soviet] Union” and would fail unless we could somehow raise 2-3 researchers in 3-4 years, first, by training them under Azadovsky and Bubrikh in Leningrad and “in the end by sending them to Finland for 1-2 years to let them work in archives and libraries, attend lectures of specialists of folkloristics” since “Finns occupy the first place in Europe in the field of folkloristics.” Furthermore, Azadovsky proposed to hold a preliminary meeting for the preparation of the Kalevala jubilee by inviting himself, Bubrikh, Astakhova, Propp, Bazanov, and Karelo-Finnish writers and scholars, also including Meletinsky, who was “a man of great erudition, able to utilize great materials of the epic of the northern peoples: Sweden, Denmark,” and hinted that Shishmarev might write on the Kalevala and the Finnish

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32 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1057, l. 3, cited in Stalin i kosmopolitizm, 44–45.
33 On Zhdanov’s report at a meeting of the propaganda department on April 18, 1946, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 377, ll. 1–72, cited in Stalin i kosmopolitizm, 46–50.
35 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 14, ll. 9–14 (Stenographic record of the 1946 November meeting).
36 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 14, ll. 50–51, 53.
school of folkloristics in 1931–32. Following Azadovsky, Bazanov as well stated that it would take 15 years to raise such specialists by sending them to Finland and Sweden, because the Republic was quite low in resources, unlike other national republics, and unable to train national cadres. This led Shitov to the idea that the Karelo-Finnish Republic had to fundamentally reconsider the nationalities policy to raise scholars who were able to use the Finnish language:

“True, here it is quite urgent to set this assignment for improving Finnish ability to the scholarly cadres of our republic and the Russian comrades as well, which the First Congress of the Communist Party of Bol'sheviks of the K-F SSR brought forward. This assignment, frankly speaking, has been ignored to much extent in our republic, though we cannot settle this assignment without fluency in Finnish in terms of scholarly work in Karelia and of raising the culture of our people. […] I suppose that we must ask that this be taken into consideration and applied to the Russian comrades who will study at the Institute. (Azadovsky and Bubrikh: Right!) […] Bubrikh remembers how they prepared valuable cadres until the war [in the Republic]. But now the preparation of Finno-Ugric scholars… only one person! […] I think that I am right if I say, perhaps, not one of the brotherly republics is in such a situation in terms of the question of preparation of scholarly cadres as our republic is.”

This meeting in Leningrad encouraged Petrozavodsk scholars to come back to the question of raising national scholarly cadres. At the meeting of party organization of the Base (the Karelo-Finnish branch of Soviet Academy of Sciences) on December 11, 1946, Shitov shared with the participants what Leningrad scholars said and emphasized the need to be seriously engaged in this question: “Prof. Azadovsky said that [we] must gather the best students and send them for study to Leningrad, even to Finland, the staff of the Institute as well. […] We must learn all neighboring languages so that we can read literature concerning questions on history, language, and literature of the K-F SSR.”

To this end, in early 1947, Shitov sent a report to Kupriianov to get further support from the leadership. Not mentioning the idea of sending students to Finland, Shitov asked Kupriianov to consider the republic’s status with high potential to be a centre of Finno-Ugric studies capable of competing with Finland. He wrote that the Republic was tremendously left behind other union republics in the research fields. While underlining the rivalry with Finnish bourgeois scholars, Shitov then stressed the importance of taking advantage of Finnish scholarly works. Reminding his listeners of Zhdanov’s criticism, Shitov stated that we had to struggle with the bourgeois ideology not

37 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 14, ll. 82–83.
38 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 14, l. 57.
39 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 14, ll. 188–89.
40 NA RK, f. p-109, op. 3, d. 3 (protocols of the party organization of the Base), l. 3.
41 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2088, l. 127.
only within our republic but also beyond the border. “Our books,” he wrote, “have to influence the worldview of, say, the bourgeois Finnish researchers in a distinct way. All the progressive researchers abroad, above all, will rely on our books.”

Shitov introduced one example of the influence from bourgeois Finnish studies on the Soviet Union: the latest research on the Veps language by E.A. Tunkelo. As the result of his pre-war and wartime expeditions in Soviet Karelia, he published a 922-page book on the history of Veps phonetics in 1946. Shitov showed this study as an example of the challenge the Soviet researchers were facing:

“In this way Finnish linguists wrote down dialect materials from the Soviet Karelian population during their temporary occupation of our Soviet raions and published it in 1945-46 as a form of dictionary (They also sent one copy from Finland to the Institute). These facts tell that the bourgeois Finnish researchers are trying to get ahead of the young Karelo-Finnish science and to lead it in the favorite direction for the Finnish bourgeoisie by using our materials. Of course, they do not find such people among staff of the Institute.”

According to Shitov’s account, however, the Soviet researchers have to not only criticize and deny the bourgeois Finnish research but also make use of them for the Soviet science to overcome the Finns. In terms of quantity, it was difficult to surpass the bourgeois Finnish science because “the University of Helsinki has been preparing research cadres for almost 100 years. Finland has a number of great researchers with a world-wide reputation in the fields of Finnish and Karelian folklore, literature, Finno-Ugric studies, and history of Finland and Karelia.” Therefore, the Soviet researchers have to surpass the opponent in quality. Shitov continued:

“We are obliged to take a critical attitude toward what the bourgeois Finnish science created and is creating, to scrutinize the works by Finnish researchers from the standpoint of the Leninist-Stalinist methodology, to pick up from them only what is valuable and useful for the Soviet people and to create completely new works that raise our Soviet science to a newer and higher level than what science abroad has achieved.”

Bubrikh as well lobbied Kupriianov, in a similar way as Shitov did, to establish the Finno-Ugric department at the Karelo-Finnish University and publish his work on contemporary Finnish phonetics, which was essential especially to teachers of Finnish language in the Republic. He wrote to Kupriianov and stressed the need to surpass the Finnish linguistics:

42 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2088, l. 128.
43 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2088, l. 129.
44 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2088, l. 128.
45 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2088, l. 129.
“Nowadays the study of Finno-Ugric languages in the USSR has made rapid progress, which has not only academic but also political meaning: it is absolutely required that the leading position in the study of Finno-Ugric people shift from Finland to the USSR. […] Further development of Finno-Ugric language studies depends on, first, the amount of publications in Finno-Ugric language studies in each republic and, second, the amount of higher education which prepares the cadres of relevant specialists. Without them, it is impossible to think that the USSR would gain the leading position in the study of the Finno-Ugric people.”

Bubrikh underlined the competitive character of Finno-Ugric studies not only with Finland but also with the other Finn-Ugric republics within the Soviet Union to promote Finnish culture of the republic:

“Concerning the above mentioned problems, it is my obligation to inform you as follows:

1) Scientific-research work on the Finnish and Karelian languages in the KFSSR should be further expanded. […] With regard to the publication of Finno-Ugric academic products, at present, the KFSSR is ranked lowest among the Soviet Finno-Ugric republics. […] While the Mordovian, Udmurt, Mari, and Estonian Republics have already developed a large amount of publications on Finno-Ugric literature, the KFSSR has not yet published anything in the Finno-Ugric discipline except for Bubrikh’s dialect questionnaire. […]

2) The KFSSR possesses the most plentiful possibilities to create academic cadres for Finno-Ugric studies. The republic has the university while Mordovia, Udmurt, Mari, and Komi only have the pedagogue institutes. Needless to say, regarding the higher education which prepares for the cadres of Finno-Ugric studies, the KFSSR is ranked lowest among the Soviet Finn-Ugric republics. Other Finno-Ugric republics systematically raise specialists of this field.

Stubbornly, I would like to draw your attention to the necessity of establishing the Finno-Ugric department at the faculty of philology of the Karelo-Finnish State University and, through the Party and Komsomol, to promote the recruitment 95 national students to this department in 1947.

In this way, the intellectuals made full use of the Republic’s political and geopolitical situation and its status to pursue their intellectual activities. This activity interested the local leadership, which had to show how the Soviet power supported the culture of small people to other republics and Moscow. It may be true that the leadership and intellectuals were seriously engaged in their academic activity to eradicate the remnant of the “bourgeois” Finnish science and to show their superiority over Finland. Nonetheless, it is also true that the persistence of the powerful “bourgeoisie” in Finland

46 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2568, ll. 35–36.
47 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2568, ll. 36–38.
contributed to the Soviet research on Karelian-Finnish culture. Then, one would ask, what kind of discourse these negotiations shaped?

Karelia and Karelians as Unbreakable Parts of Russia

One of the most powerful discourses in the post-war Republic was to describe Soviet Karelia and Karelians as unbreakable parts of Russia. During the final phase of the war, scholars had already started multidisciplinary efforts to reinterpret the origins of the Russian state and East Slavs to reconsider their earlier history, especially to put more stress on the significance of the pre-Rurik development of the Russian “state” and its Slavic character. One of the targets was the Norman theory: the academician Derzhavin denied such arguments that Finnic tribes occupied some areas (e.g. Smolensk) of Rus’ before the Slavic people immigrated, and lowered the significance of the Finnic tribes in the formation of the great Russian nation.⁴⁸ More influentially, discussing the origins of the Russian state, the historian Grekov also underlined the importance of the pre-Rurik formation of the Russian “state” and cities, and the fact that Varangians were Slavinized and assimilated into local Slavic (and Finnic) populations before moving southward to Kiev.⁴⁹ Accordingly, the history of Karelia and Karelians, especially Olonets Karelia, was expected to show the presence of Russian people and culture there and peaceful co-existence with Karelian people in ancient times.

For the Russian-Karelian friendship, Petrozavodsk folklorists were eager to publish old Russian folklore which demonstrated this antiquity of Russian Karelia and how Russian folklorists contributed to Russian/Soviet sciences by recording Russian folklore in Karelia since the 19th century. In May 1945, Leninskoе Znamia published a column by Bazanov, who was now in charge of Russian literature at the Karelo-Finnish University. He introduced and praised the activity of Glinka as the first Russia poet of Karelia and Rybnikov as the founder of Russian folklore and bylina study in Russian Karelia. They were following their contemporary, progressive Russian intelligentsia such as Chernyshevsky and Dobroliubov and thanks to their activities, Karelia won the fame “Iceland of Russian epic.”⁵⁰ Furthermore, Bazanov and Astakhova started to publish a series of Russian folklore collections written down in pre-revolutionary and Soviet Russian Karelia to popularize and introduce them to broader readers.⁵¹ This intensive study on pre-revolutionary Russian folklore went side by side with works on Soviet folklore, among others folklore of the Great Patriotic War. In fact, Bazanov

⁵⁰ Leninskoе znamia, May 25, 1945.
⁵¹ The first of them was, Vasiliy Bazanov, ed., Izbrannye prichitaniia (Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo Karelo-Finskoj SSR, 1945).
reiterated local folklorists’ war-time discoveries of Soviet folklore about people’s love for Stalin, the Red Army, and the Motherland, and hate for fascist Germany and Hitler. For those Petrozavodsk and Leningrad folklorists, however, pre-revolutionary Russian folklore, especially bylina, was no less important for showing the development of Russian folklore in Karelia and Karelia’s central role in Russian folklore.

Without doubt, it was Bubrikh that could give high cultural and academic prestige to the Republic and a scientific justification to this discourse. Soon after his return to Leningrad in March 1945, Bubrikh made public his latest study on the formation [sformirovanie] of the Karelian people at Leningrad University. Bubrikh discussed that the present Karelian people had two origins in the ancient ethnic groups: Korela and Ves’. Rejecting the view that the Karelian people came from a single ethnic group from Finland, he presented a more complicated process bringing Ludian and Livvi Karelians from Ves’ and Korela, and the Karelian proper (White Sea Karelian) from Korela. He concluded that the formation of Karelian people took place under the protection and influence of the Great Russian/Novgorod state, which was tolerant toward ethnic diversity of the population, and demonstrated the historical tie between the Russian and Karelian peoples. After four months, he also provided the Karelo-Finnish leadership with the same topic at a meeting of the Karelo-Finnish University celebrating its fourth anniversary. This led to his book “The Origins [proiskhozhdenie] of the Karelian People” in 1947, which added further information about the development of the Russian and Karelian people within the Russian state since the Novgorod years and which Leninskoe znamia had eagerly advertised since 1945. These new works reinforced the dominant discourse on this historical tie showing that Russian “brotherly” support for the Karelian people enabled fragmented ethnic groups to form a single national entity.

This unequal Russian-Karelian friendship was supplemented by an ethnic Karelian point of view. Immediately after the war, militaristic and warlike descriptions were still dominant and

52 Leninskoe znamia, August 19, 1945.
54 The Leningrad historian Igor’ Shaskol’skii, who listened to this presentation by Bubrikh, summarised the impact of Bubrikh’s new argument: “By the early 1940s, Russian and Finnish researchers understood that Karelian people in Karelia and Tver’ had formed a single ethnic entity since ancient times. (…) [Bubrikh’s] Study on Karelian dialects led researchers to the conclusion that in the Karelian language one can find not the process of the liquidation of a single Karelian speech (rech’), but the process of the approach of two entirely differentiated types of speech, one of which belonged to the Veps language.” Igor’ P. Shaskol’skii, “D. V. Bubrikh i ego teoriia proiskhozhdeniia karel'skogo naroda,” in D. V. Bubrikh: K 100-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia, ed. Georgii M. Kert (SPb.: Nauka, 1992), 78–81.
55 NA RK, f. r-1178, op. 2, korobka 4, d. 46, l. 98ob (protocol of meeting of the scholar’s collegium on July 20, 1945). The title of Bubrikh’s presentation is “the Russian state and the origins of the Karelian people.”
aggressively denied the “fascist” propaganda during the occupation. In his publication in 1946, Evseev picked up the poems and songs on the past wars against foreign invaders and the friendship of peoples, and stressed the Finnic-Slavic (finsko-slavianskikh) friendly relation and criticized Jalmari Jaakkola for his argument that the Karelian-Finnish epic has no common grounds with Slavic culture. To refute the Finnish scholars, Evseev showed the epic poems and historic songs which told of the Kalevala heroes’ struggles against German-Swedish feudal lords and Napoleon with Russians and tsars. Though stressing the Russian-Karelian friendship, he underlined that the past Karelian people, like Kullervo, together with the Russian Tsar and people, stood against Swedish feudal lords and even entered the land of Finland. In this way, Evseev depicted the Karelian people more vividly than the Finnish people. In other words, this work illustrated that the ancient Russian state and tsars, with the help of Karelian-Finnish heroes and Karelian and Russian people, liberated Finland and Finns from German and Swedish landlords. Reviewing this work, the writer Gennadii Fish stressed how Russian culture influenced the culture of small peoples and their endeavors toward peace, cooperation, and friendship.

Karelian-Finnish Friendship in the shadow of the Russian-Karelian Friendship

Nonetheless, regarding Bubrikh and Evseev only as a bulwark of this dominant discourse is a one-sided perspective. Their academic works tacitly contributed to the discourse on the Karelian-Finnish kinship. For example, newspapers and journals, as during the war, continued to avoid quoting Zhdanov’s speech on the Finnic kinship on the annual anniversary of the Republic. Behind the scenes, however, both political and scholarly elites were concerned about the lack of both studies and native, local scholars on Karelian and Finnish topics. In his works, Bubrikh admitted that Finnish and Karelian people had a common origin, though Bubrikh and the party propaganda appealed to the Russian-Karelian connection rather than Karelian-Finnish one. According to his account, a part of the Finnish people and the Karelian proper formed Korela in ancient times, but he rather asked: “why not get interested in the fact that the two-thirds of the Karelian population in the Republic are Ludian and Livvi originated from Ves’, which had relations with the Russian state?” In other words, Bubrikh admitted (as before) that the one third of the Karelian population had less connection with the Russian state and more connection with other Finnic tribes, which later would form the modern Finnish nation.

This need for studies on the Karelian-Finnish kinship was actual given for what happened in non-Russian, national school. Reviewing the 1945-46 academic year, Beliaev, Republic Minister of Enlightenment, worried about the situation in national schools, which demonstrated the bad

58 Bubrikh, Proiskhozhdenie, 5–6.
performance of both students and teachers using Finnish and, accordingly, low scores in exams of the Russian language. The situation was even worse in Olonets and Vedlozero/Vieljärvi, where the influence of the occupation remained. This resulted in the very small number of Karelians and Finns at higher educational institutions, which made it more difficult to raise national cadres in the Republic. Even in September 1948 only 18 Karelians and Finns (89 Russians, 4 Ukrainians, 3 Jews) registered at the Karelo-Finnish State University, and 63 Karelians and Finns (165 Russians, 16 Ukrainians, 4 Belarussians) in the Teachers Institute [Uchitel'skii Institut]. To improve the situation, the Institute asked the Republic leadership to support the publishing of a textbook on Finnish phonetics by Bubrikh for teachers and students of the Finnish language.

The most important event for the Karelian-Finnish kinship was the first all-union conference of Finno-Ugric studies at Leningrad State University from January 23 to February 4, 1947. Bubrikh summarized the aims of this conference: to establish a forum for Soviet Finno-Ugric studies “Sovetskoe finnougrovedenie” and to gather scholars and 54 presentations from Finno-Ugric republics and others. For the future cooperation and coordination among the scholars, the conference selected members of the working committee for the Finno-Ugric philology including Meshchaninov, Bubrikh, and Ariste. A leitmotif of this conference is the Russian state, the Russians and the Finno-Ugric peoples: Leningrad historian Mavrodin gave a general historical overview on the relationship between the Finno-Ugric people and the Russian state, according to which the Baltic-Finnic tribes joined Rus’ before the formation of the Russian state but other Eastern-Finnic and Ugric groups under the rule the Kazan’ Khanate or the Siberian Tatar Khanate joined in the multinational Russian state after Russia’s unification of both Khanates. Only within the Russian state, the Finno-Ugric peoples could realize their cultural and economic development, he concluded. Many presentations primarily discuss the relationship between the Russian and the Finno-Ugric.

Despite this Russo-centrism, establishing a network and institution for Finno-Ugric studies was a significant step for the collective identity of the Finno-Ugric peoples. In an ethnographer’s eyes, the conference was “very positive,” given a long hiatus. Explaining the conference to the Karelo-Finnish leadership, Bubrikh stressed the term “the Finno-Ugric peoples” as defined by a patriotic attachment to the USSR in addition to linguistic and historical similarities. Contacts with various non-Finno-Ugric “partners,” among others, the Russian language, are more important than the “original

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59 Totuus, May 11, 1946.
60 NA RK, f. r-1411, op. 4, d. 127/1116, ll. 102–3 (Annual Report from the Department of Statistics of the KFSSR to the Central Statistics Department of the SSSR).
61 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2088, l. 134.
64 N. Volkov’s review of the conference in Sovetskaia Ethnografiia, no. 2 (1947), 219.
system” of the Finno-Ugric language (or the ancient contacts within this system) itself, which resulted in great differences among the Finno-Ugric languages. Clarifying this complex process was a key to understanding the formation of the Finno-Ugric peoples.65 Furthermore, he continued, the current situation was meaningful not only for the Finno-Ugric peoples of the Soviet Union but also for the Finno-Ugric peoples abroad, since they “have to make an effort to live peacefully and in cooperation with the USSR.”66 This is why the Soviet Union has to show its Finno-Ugric studies as more progressive than the Finnish ones, which was “politically very important,” Bubrikh underlined in another report before the conference. In his opinion, including Finnish scholars to this conference was too early, because the Soviets had to include Estonian scholars and consolidate the Soviet point of view about Finno-Ugric studies, though in the future perhaps there will be “an international conference.”67

In fact, Bubrikh planned to make Petrozavodsk the next place to host another all-union Finno-Ugric conference. He proposed the Karelo-Finnish leadership host the next conference in Petrozavodsk in mid-1948, and the third conference in Tartu in early 1950.68 The Petrozavodsk historian Andriainen welcomed this proposal because at the Leningrad conference he talked with Estonian scholars who “enthusiastically hoped to come to us and get familiar with the way of scholarly-scientific works” and the next conference might invite scholars from “Estonia, Sweden, Norway.”69 Some local scholars were not confident to host the conference because the Republic was not ready in terms of working conditions and of the number of presenters and scientific works.70 Nevertheless, Shitov concluded that the Institute “must [nado]” prepare for the conference and to decline this proposal was “wrong.”71 The local Finnish newspaper as well hoped that the Leningrad conference stimulated local Finnic youth to study the Finno-Ugric languages at the University and increased national cadres.72 In this way, the Finno-Ugric people was step by step going forward without conflict with Soviet patriotism and the Russo-centrism, and the Karelo-Finnish Republic was joining in this movement, which tacitly prepared for Karelian-Finnish kinship.

More publicly the Karelo-Finnish leadership started using the Red Finns as a Soviet and Karelo-Finnish national symbol to bring back the Finnish character to the Republic. On February 18, 1947, Gardin, the head of the history section of the Institute, sent a proposal about “the eternalization of the memory of Antikainen, the 25th anniversary of the battle of Kimasozero” to Kupriianov,

65 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 46, l. 18.
66 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 46, l. 17.
67 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 46, ll. 39-44 (Bubrikh’s report, December 28, 1946).
68 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 46, l. 24.
69 NA RK, f. p-109, op. 3, d. 3, l. 64 (protocol of the party organization of the Base, February 26, 1947).
70 NA RK, f. p-109, op. 3, d. 3, l. 24.
71 NA RK, f. p-109, op. 3, d. 3, l. 64 (protocol of the party organization of the Base, March 31, 1947).
72 Totuus, May 21, 1948.
Prokkonen, and Kuusinen. Gardin explained the importance of his proposal, stressing the Soviet and class character of Antikainen’s achievement in the battle of Kimasozero in 1922. According to his explanation, almost all workers in the Republic had heard of Antikainen’s death but were perplexed with the fact that no official announcement had been published, which caused rumors about his death. “With his glorious and splendid life,” he stressed, “he gained the respect of the Soviet people. [...] The eternalization of the memory of Antikainen will help to raise our people along with the tradition of the revolutionary heroism of our past.” Gardin thus requested to publish a biography on him and a book of collected memoirs of the participants of the battle and to mention 8 Finnic communists who participated in Antikainen’s raid in 1922 and who were still living in the Republic. In addition, Gardin described that Antikainen was the symbol of the uncompromising struggle against the Mannerheimist gang for the sake of the Finnish working people.

On March 6 the Republic Party bureau approved the plan for the anniversary, accepting many of Gardin’s proposals and ordered the raion party committees and Petrozavodsk city committee to organize lectures and meetings about Antikainen, “loyal son of the Karelo-Finnish people.” Leninskoe Znamia wrote that Antikainen’s heroic achievement became poems and tales not only among internationalists abroad but also elsewhere in Karelia like the poems of the Kalevala heroes. The newspaper published Gardin’s piece, which told that his victory with the Red Army made it possible to save the socialist revolution and to realize the Lenin-Stalinist national policy in Karelia, which led to the establishment of today’s Republic. Antikainen brought the victory in the Civil War in Karelia with the help of the “Great” Russian people and the friendship between the Russian and Karelian peoples. To commemorate Antikainen and this event, the Karelo-Finnish party decided to organize a ski competition in the Republic in January-February every year. The Karelo-Finnish leadership was making Antikainen into a Soviet, Karelo-Finnish symbol, which expressed the Russian-Karelian and the Karelian-Finnish friendship, though not the Karelian-Finnish kinship.

Still, Antikainen had another role to represent a connection with Finland. The Karelo-Finnish State Publisher published a biography of Antikainen with the forewords by Wilhelm Pieck, veteran German communist and future president of GDR, and by Armas Äikiä. Äikiä paid attention to his role as a catalyst for the friendship between the USSR (or Russia) and Finland. According to him, Voinov’s book showed that Antikainen struggled for the friendship between Russians and Finns and, furthermore, for the liberation of Finnic peoples in Soviet Russia: Karelians, Ingrians, and Veps.

73 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2569, l. 47.
74 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2569, l. 48.
75 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2569, ll. 48–49.
76 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2569, l. 47.
77 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2381, l. 21.
79 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2381, ll. 21–22.
Therefore, this book will be read by both all nationalities of the Republic and citizens of Finland. In the same vein, following Antikainen, other Red Finns came to reappear in writings in the Republic. The two Republic newspapers and journals started to publish parts of the old Finnish Bolshevik Adolf Taimi’s memoirs, which told of his involvement in the revolutionary movement in Finland and Russia and his exile to Siberia where he encountered Sverdorov and Stalin. In this way, Red/Soviet Finnish symbols started to find their place in the new surroundings of post-war Soviet Karelia.

To understand this treatment of Soviet Finns in the Republic, one needs to take into consideration what was happening in Finland, too, which was disappointing for those who had hoped for an immediate socialist revolution or communist takeover in Finland. Under the Allied Control Commission, the Finnish Government disbanded “fascist” organizations such as the AKS and the IKL, which Moscow condemned as “Hitler’s agent” and “the party of Greater Finland expanding to Ural, even Yenisei.” In addition to the reparation payment, Finland had to resettle about 422,000 refugees from the Karelian Isthmus, Petsamo, Finnish Karelia (ceded to the Soviet Union), Lapland (due to the Lapland War) and the Porkkala region (leased to the Soviet Union) and deal with a housing shortage. After the victory in the first post-war general parliament election the SKP and SKDL launched a purge campaign in various fields: bureaucracy, police, university, schools, and the army. For example, the new Interior Minister Yrjö Leino from SKDL started a quick reform in the State Police [Valpo] by purging some top officials and recruiting socialist/communist background staffs. The National Radio Company’s [Yleisradio] governmental board selected Hella Wuolijoki as general director, which was followed by the reform of radio programming, including more liberal and leftist advisors and guests and Soviet topics. Furthermore, the Finnish communists and leftists were determined to “democratize” schools by purging textbooks, curriculum, and “fascist” and “anti-Russian” teachers under the three Ministers of Education from the SKDL from April 1945 to May 1948.

As many studies have shown, however, this effort to purge the Finnish state and society was limited to some distinguished figures. The Maalaisliitto, in particular Kekkonen and his supporters, with the SDP, dragged the communists and their leftist allies into the parliamentary politics and tried

80 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2381, ll. 4–5.
81 For example, Adolf Taimi, “Lokakuunn aattona Suomessa,” Punalippu, no. 5 (1947), 163–73; Leninskoe znamia, February 1, 1948.
83 Holmila and Mikkonen, Suomi sodan jälkeen, 102–9.
86 Jukka Rantala, Sopimaton lasten kasvattajaksi!: Opettajiin kohdistuneet poliittiset puhdistuspyrkimykset Suomessa 1944–1948 (Helsinki: SHS, 1997), 63–79.
to build a direct connection with the Soviet Union, bypassing the communists. The SDP resisted the communists’ attempt to win the support of workers well and finally secured the leadership and majority of the SAK (the Finnish Federation of Trade Unions) in 1947.\(^{87}\) As for purging the University of Helsinki, the Finnish President and Government persuaded the rector, Rolf Nevanlinna, who was the chairman of the SS volunteer committee in Finland from 1942 to 1943, to resign but secured the chancellor Antti Tulenheimo, and removed a former IKL member Vilho Annala but could not remove another IKL member Bruno Salmiala, who had a professorship.\(^{88}\) Lacking experienced and qualified cadres and consistent support from the Soviets, the Finnish communists could not carry out the purge of state and local bureaucracy, school inspectors and teachers; they could only resort to mass demonstrations outside the parliament, which the Finnish people associated with a negative memory of the right extremists of the 1930s.\(^{89}\) And finally, the Finnish Government succeeded in having “national” trials, “The War-Responsibility Trials [Sotasyyllisyysoikeudenkäinti],” conducted under the Finnish law by negotiating with the Allied Control Commission directly or through the communists. As Ruth Büttner concludes, by early 1946 the Soviets learned that they could not make the Finnish elites powerless, and the Finnish elites found more rooms for maneuver than they expected in negotiating with the Soviets.\(^{90}\)

This development in Finland was disappointing for the Karelo-Finnish Republic, which was expected to give support to pro-Soviet forces in Finland. The Republic sent the Karelian writer Jaakko Rugojev as a special correspondent to Helsinki and followed the process of the Finnish Trials. The newspaper *Totuus* featured Rugojev’s reports, which called for the severe punishment for those who destroyed “our Republic, our villages, our capital city” not only during the last war but also in 1918 and 1922. Rugojev condemned the Finnish social democrats and the rightists who defended the accused and obstructed not only the process but also peace and democracy in Finland.\(^{91}\) Thus, he concluded that, although the decision of the court was a great step forward, we have to continue to fight against the remnants of fascism in Finland.\(^{92}\) Kuusinen later also mentioned the Finnish Trials in his speech at the 18th plenum of the Republic TsK in January 1947. He was satisfied with the rise of the SKP and pro-Soviet organizations such as the Finland-Soviet Union Society and the fact that anti-Soviet politicians like Ryti, Linkomies, and Tanner were now in jail. Kuusinen warned, however, that the treatment of fascists was mild in Finland and American and British reactionaries were trying to take advantage of this situation in Finland.\(^{93}\) As far as Moscow controlled the main issues in the

\(^{89}\) Holmia and Mikkonen, *Suomi sodan jälkeen*, 171–87.
\(^{90}\) Büttner, *Sowjetisierung oder Selbständigkeit?*, 17, 252.
\(^{91}\) *Totuus*, January 1 and 15, 1946.
\(^{92}\) *Leninskoe znamia*, February 24, 1946.
\(^{93}\) *Leninskoe znamia*, February 5, 1947.
Soviet-Finnish relationship, some of the few ways the Republic influenced the Finns was propaganda, and artistic and scientific works including the one of the Kalevala.

**The Kalevala and the Karelian-Finnish Kinship**

The most sensitive and difficult issue is how to treat the Kalevala, the national symbol of the Republic but also the symbol of Finnish nationalism and occupation. Indeed, newspapers and journals criticized how Finnish “fascists” made use of the Kalevala, but they rarely presented how the Soviet Union, the Republic approached the Kalevala. Thus, immediately after the war, celebrating the 110th anniversary of the Old Kalevala on February 28, 1945, Evseev was busy in demonstrating how wrong the Finnish nationalist interpretation was rather than what the Soviet interpretation of the Kalevala was. According to his newspaper piece, the Finnish “nationalist” scholars, among others Jalmari Jaakkola, used the Kalevala poems as a historical source of western Finnish, even German origins to justify the occupation and denied Slavic factors reflected in the Karelian-Finnish epic poems. He showed as an example an epic song performed by K. Ananina of Kimasozero/Kiimasjärvi, in which one sometimes encounters such scenes that Väinämöinen the Old, like Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great in the Slavic songs, declined silver offered by German merchants, but the Kalevala heroes received trophies seized in wars against the Germans. Evseev argued that this was a common motif with Slavic poems and songs and reflected economic and cultural interaction between Slavs and Baltic Finns and their wars against Scandinavian and German foreigners. Out of the vivid memory of the last war, Evseev picked up such poems and songs which depicted the battle of Novgorod and the Karelians against the Teutons in the 13th century and how the Russians and Karelians took fortresses in Vyborg from the Swedes.

However, it was not yet clear how to demonstrate the Kalevala as a Soviet epic, a member of the Soviet family of national epics and as the Karelo-Finnish epic. Among the scholars, there was a consensus that the New Kalevala centenary in 1949 would be the occasion to show the Soviet point of view on the Kalevala to both the Soviet people and Finland. In the 1946 December meeting in Leningrad, Shitov disclosed a plan to have a preliminary session in 1947 for the 1949 jubilee scholarly session to discuss the Kalevala. Despite his critical evaluation and concern about the scale of the project, Azadovsky supported this plan and invited Bubrikh, Astakhova, Propp, Zhirmunsky, and himself to set a basic outline of the jubilee, because the jubilee session “of course, will evoke some reactions and judgment in foreign publications, mainly, in the Finnish ones.” Furthermore, Shitov said that Kuusinen had already agreed to give a presentation “the Kalevala – the epic of the Karelo-

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95 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 14, l. 14.
96 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 14, ll. 167–69.
Finnish people” and some Estonian scholar would talk about the Kalevala and the Etonian people, and Bubrikh, Evseev, and the Soviet Finn Helmi Lehmus would also join in the jubilee session.97

After this meeting, the Institute submitted a report about the five-year plan of the Institute to the Section of Propaganda and Agitation of the TsK KFSSR. The plan reasoned that while the Finnish scholars put enormous energy into studying the Kalevala, the Soviet folklore studies had no study on the Kalevala and raised no scholar on the Karelian folklore, which was a “strange” ignorance and “underestimation” of the national folklore. Therefore, the report urged the support for the preliminary session in 1947 and the jubilee session in 1949. In addition, the report said that, in his personal conversation with the Petrozavodsk historian Andriainen, Kuusinen had proposed to expand the topic of presentations in the jubilee session and publish a “new, scientific” Russian translation of the Kalevala, since Bel’skii’s translation is “not precise enough” and does not convey “all the beauty of the content” of the epic. The literature section of the Institute was willing to prepare in 1947 the collection of variants of the Kalevala epic poems, the publications of “Elias Lönnrot” and “Lönnrot and the Kalevala” in Russian, and the collected Karelian folklore in all three languages (Finnish, Karelian, and Russian).98 Judging from expected presenters and tentative titles of the presentations for the 1947 preliminary session, the Institute aimed to show the Kalevala in the world context (“the Kalevala in world literatures,” “the mythical foundation of the Kalevala”), Soviet context (“the Kalevala and the epics of the Soviet people”), Russian context (“the Kalevala in Russia”), Finnic context (“the Kalevala and the epic of the Estonian people”), Karelian context (Evseev’s presentation), and Karelian-Finnish context (“the language of the Kalevala epic poems,” “Lönnrot and the Kalevala”).99

In fact, Zhirmunsky began his ambitious project to describe the development of socialist Eurasian epics and literatures by overcoming East-West binary opposition and Western/European centrism deeply rooted in Western sciences. Zhirmunsky criticized the “bourgeois,” “fascist” theory of the aristocratic origin of epics and stressed the role of the “people” and the “performers” in creating, developing, and popularizing epics as his studies on the Kirgiz national epic Manas and Uzbek epic performers demonstrated.100 At the same time, he declared to overcome the theory of borrowing [zaimstvovanie] and stressed the social and historical process epics went through and aimed to present both a general outline and specifically national course of the development of epics by comparing numerous eastern and western epics.101 Though not specializing in Finnic literatures and folklores, he was willing to include Finnic case studies into his general study of Eurasian literatures and epics.

97 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 14, ll. 37–38.
98 NA RK, f. 8, op. 1, d. 2569, ll. 8, 27–28.
99 NA RK, f. 8, op. 1, d. 2569, l. 27.
In Russian context, it was Propp and Azadovsky that led Soviet and Russian folklore studies in Leningrad. Propp had been engaged in historical aspects of the folktale, which resulted in his publication “The Historical Roots of Magic Tale [Istoricheskie korni volshevnoi skazki]” in 1946 and turned his attention to the Russian heroic poem to contribute to the history of the Russian state and people. Denying the genetical, “nationalistic” explanation of the development of epics, he put the Russian heroic epics into comparison with other national epics, among others, epics of Siberian and Far-Northern nationalities, and argued that folklorists could show the people’s way of life and thought, and its historical development before the formation of the Russian state which historical documents could not demonstrate.\(^{102}\) It is not clear what Azadovsky had in mind on his presentation, but Astakhova and Bazanov in their research encountered the Karelian-Finnish folklore in Russian Karelia and were preparing for presentations on the relation between Russian folklore and the Karelo-Finnish one. Politically important and sensitive was the treatment of the Karelian and Finnish folklores in Russian Karelia and, another Finnish national symbol, Lönrot, in presentations by Evseev and Lehmus. As the title of his presentation suggests, Evseev had to clarify a specific Karelian moment of the Kalevala epic poems, while emphasizing the Kalevala as the Karelo-Finnish epic and Russian-Karelian friendship.

To claim the Kalevala as a Soviet national epic, the Soviet jubilee had to clarify the difference between the Soviet Kalevala and the Finnish Kalevala, and thus could not ignore the post-war discussion on the Kalevala in Finland. Though the post-war purge did not hit Finnish scholars and intellectuals so much as in other “liberated” countries, there inevitably happened important changes in various fields after the war. In particular, the Humanities scholars had to break away from the prewar and wartime research paradigm and reconsider the Finnish/Finnic-Russian/Slavic relationship in the past, which they had been reluctant and unwilling to discuss. The University of Helsinki resumed the professorship of Russian literature and language in January 1946 (abolished in 1919) and Valentin Kiparsky, who gained this post, published an influential work “Finland in Russian Literature [Suomi Venäjän kirjallisuudessa].”\(^{103}\) Paavo Ravila, joining the Finland-Soviet Union Society in 1944, distanced himself from the idea to see only the language as the marker of the nation and argued that historical experience of independence and the fact being independent now had a great importance for the Finnish nation, as a European country, to co-exist with Russia and to be an intermediator between East and West.\(^{104}\) Accordingly, the Finnish-Karelian kinship lost momentum after the war and Finns


\(^{103}\) Klinge, Helsingin Yliopisto 1917–1990, 160.

\(^{104}\) Paavo Ravila, “Kansallisuuskysymksemme,” Valvoja, (1945), 263–70. See also, Häggman, Pieni kansa, pitkä muisti, 84–85.
lost interest in the Karelians who were now competitors for better workplaces, food, and housing in Finland and could be a sensitive issue in the Soviet-Finnish relationship.\footnote{Jenni Kirves, “Pyhä ja kirottu sota: Suur-Suomi-aatteen uho ja tuho aikalaisten kokemana,” in Näre and Kirves, \textit{Luvattu maa}, 360–61.}

The Kalevala was no exception in this change, and Finnish intellectuals were busy in removing nationalistic and wartime images of the Kalevala and turning their attention to Lönnrot. For the first Kalevala Day lecture after the war in 1945, the Kalevala Society invited the Uppsala scholar Björn Collinder to remind them of the role Sweden played in the making of the Kalevala and what the Kalevala meant for the Swedes. Delivering a greeting from the Government, the Minister of Education Uuno Takki thanked Lönnrot for giving the force and hope through the Kalevala to the nation facing the burden and reconstruction after the war.\footnote{Björn Collinder, “Kalevala ja Ruotsi,” \textit{Kalevalaseuran vuosikirja}, 25–26 (1945–46), 19–41; Takki’s speech, 319-21. Swedish and Scandinavian orientation were important for SDP, which needed support from Scandinavian social democratic parties to win the struggle against SKP. Mikko Majander, \textit{Pohjoismaa vai kansandemokratia? Sosiaalidemokraatit, kommunistit ja Suomen kansainvälinen asema 1944–1951} (Helsinki: SKS, 2004), 225–51. Helsinki University leadership also encouraged students to take advantage of fluency in Swedish and study in Swedish for future. Klinge, \textit{Helsingin Yliopisto 1917–1990}, 162–65.}

On Kalevala Day 1946, Ville Pessi, the general secretary of the SKP, called for regaining the “democratized” Kalevala from the reactionary force. It was Väinö Kaukonen that initiated an open controversy over the Kalevala. Returning from occupied Karelia, Kaukonen bitterly criticized the pre-war and war-time folklorists, among others Martti Haavio, and their use of the Kalevala for Greater Finland, and disclosed a new thesis, “the Kalevala as Lönnrot’s epic,” at the annual ceremony of the Student Union of the University of Helsinki on 26 November 1946. Kaukonen insisted that seeing the Edda and Homer’s epics as a model, Lönnrot intentionally created the Kalevala to have a Finnish epic, and selectively used epic myths and poems fit for his project and edited them, which resulted in an “organic whole” different from what the poem singers originally performed. Lönnrot named this product the Kalevala, which is therefore the epic of Lönnrot.\footnote{Väinö Kaukonen, “Kalevala Lönnrotin eepoksena,” \textit{Kalevalaseuran vuosikirja}, 27–28 (1947–48), 78–94.}

The lecture was immediately published in \textit{Vapaa Sana}, which welcomed Kaukonen’s thesis as a serious blow to the ideology of Greater Finland, while non-leftist newspapers attacked his thesis and its political intention.\footnote{\textit{Vapaa Sana}, November 26, 1946; \textit{Ilta Sanomat}, November 30, 1946.}

Kaukonen himself did not take part in political activities but actively contributed to leftist newspapers and journals on this topic.\footnote{Väinö Kaukonen, “Kalevalan ja kansarunouden päivä,” \textit{40-luku}, no. 1–2 (1947), 9–10.}

While Kaukonen, as a literature researcher, turned to Lönnrot, others tried to find a new direction in Russian-Finnish folklore interactions. Hoping to discover further such interactions, Viljo Mansikka was revisiting the old, pre-revolutionary question of Russian-Finnish folklore interactions, especially borrowing from the Kalevala related poems to the \textit{Sadko}. Likewise, Väisänen translated a Sadko poem into Finnish with a commentary which also reminded of mutual influence between
Russian bylina and “Finnish” epic poems, not unilateral borrowing from one to the other. Doctoral students as well followed this trend: Iivar Kemppinen, working at the education section of the SKDL, submitted a doctoral thesis which focused on a Kalevala poem “Sulhonsa kylvettäjä” and showed that this poem had its origins in the East (Karelian Isthmus, Ingria, White-Sea Karelia), not in the west, and provocatively criticized Kaarle Krohn’s school for ignoring the move of the poems from the East including the Slavic world to Finland. This provocation and a number of basic mistakes in the dissertation annoyed Harva and Jaakkola, who harshly criticized the dissertation, singling it out for its “many mistakes” and for insulting Krohn, and Jaakkola insisted on refusing him the doctoral degree. Haavio, acting the opponent at the defense, rejected the dissertation, which Vapaa Sana denounced as “propaganda.” In a far less controversial way, another PhD seeker Penttinen defended his thesis “Sotasanomat” in 1947, which also argued the “eastern” origins of the poem by using Soviet materials obtained through the VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries).

This attention to the relationship between the Russians and Finns (and losing interest in the Finnish-Karelian kinship) widened the gap with the Soviet understanding of the Soviet-Finnish relationship. This gap is clearly visible in the meeting between Stalin and the Finnish cultural delegation on October 8, 1945. In exchanging opinions about the Finnish intelligentsia, the Finns were very optimistic to “reeducate [perevospitat’]” the Finnish intelligentsia in ten or shorter years, while Stalin was stressing the difference between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union: “Anti-Soviet atmosphere in the Finnish intelligentsia is partially explained by the politics of the tsarist autocracy toward Finland. The politics of the Soviet Union toward Finland is another one and our politics help to reeducate the Finnish intelligentsia. The Finnish people – an able people, they understand this change in politics.” Replying to Stalin, Johan Helo, head of the delegation, “recollected some traditions about the friendship between the Russian and Finnish people,” for example, how the Finns helped the Russian revolutionaries in the struggle against the tsarist autocracy. Other Finns such as Hertta Kuusinen praised the Russian people, “very good foundation for the friendship.” While welcoming those words and praising the Russian people as “patient [nastoichivyi] people,” Stalin never failed to remind the Finns that the Soviet Union was a multinational state: “Do not idealize the Russian people. The Russian people, as other peoples, has their own inadequacies.”

111 Uusi Suomi, January 22, 1947 (Harva’s comment); Helsingin yliopiston keskusarkisto, Historia-kielitieteen osaston arkisto, pöytäkirjat 1946–47 (Jaakkola’s review January 15, 1947).
113 Yrjö Penttinen, “Sotasanomat: Inkeriläinen kansanruno ja sen kansainvälistä taustaa” (PhD dissertation, the University of Helsinki, 1947).
114 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 5379, l. 2.
not win alone. They won together with the other peoples.”

This gap between Finnish and Soviet accents more clearly appeared in the correspondences between Evseev and Friedrich Ege. Ege was a German socialist who had been exiled in Helsinki since he fled Germany in 1933 and spent the years of the Finnish war against the Soviet Union in jail. After his release, he actively joined in the leftist intellectual circle and was interested in the controversy over the Kalevala. To ask Soviet interpretation on the Kalevala, in June 1945, Ege sent a letter to the VOKS. In his letter, Ege asked how the Soviet scholars evaluated the Krohn’s theory of the Kalevala poems, since he “simply could not believe it” and thus wondered if the Kalevala poems had something in common with Russian folklore. If so, Ege further asked, “Is it possible to say that the Kalevala plays an intermediary role [Mittlerolle] between Russian and Finnish folklore?” In his reply, Evseev stressed that the Kalevala was an “independent [samostoiatel’nogo] poetic creation of the Karelian people” and the “motherland [rodina]” of the Kalevala poems was eastern Finland and the Karelo-Finnish Republic. Ege’s another letter (dated May 14, 1946) pointed out, “Today, when now in the end the chains have fallen from Finland, it is possible to stand openly against the chauvinistic, unscientific distortion [Vergewaltigung] of the Finnish scholars,” though “[T]he Finns are, yes, very stubborn and the long education of hate against all what the Soviet Union (or Russia in general) represents has dragged the citizens to a totally wrong direction, to the end: two meaningless and grave [verhängnisvolle] wars.” Thus, he needed help from the Soviet point of view on the Kalevala. In his reply, Evseev wrote that he would be happy if Finland “totally sincerely” began to be engaged in the problem of the reflection of the Slavic-Finnic interactions in the Kalevala poems.

This exchange illustrates two points. First, even the leftist intellectuals in Finland occupied themselves with the relationship between the Russians and the Finns and ignored the Karelians, which articulated Evseev’s identity as Karelian. Even after reading the reply from Evseev, Ege did not change his attention from the Russian-Finnish relationship and wrote to Kiparsky that he could not be satisfied with the “Finnish” theory of the Kalevala, and that he had now no doubt that “there must be interactions between Finnish and Russian folklore.” Second, Evseev directly found that a new force in Finland waited for the Soviet interpretation of the Kalevala, which was not yet ready but expected to come out in the coming Kalevala jubilee.

From 22 to 24 June 1947 the Institute hosted a preliminary session for the Kalevala jubilee.

115 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 5379, ll. 8–9.
116 The VOKS forwarded the letter with a Russian translation to Bazanov, following advice from professor I. N. Rozanov, who led the folklore group at the Institute of World Literature. ARAN, f. 397, op. 1, d. 138, ll. 1–4 (Rozanov’s reply to the VOKS); GARF, f. r-5283, op. 20, d. 145, l. 133.
117 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2088, ll. 30–37.
118 SKS Kirjallisuuden arkisto, Friedrich Ege Archive, Ege’s letter to Kiparsky, dated April 27, 1947.
by inviting the Republic party leaders including Kupriianov and scholars from Leningrad and Tartu.¹¹⁹
The date is important since the ideological campaign had already started to target some prominent
philologists in Leningrad but had not yet been in full swing. On March 28, 1947, the Politburo
approved establishing the “court of honor [sudy chesti]” in ministries and government agencies
including the Academy of Sciences to monitor “anti-patriotic, anti-state, and anti-social” activities.¹²⁰
And on 9 June the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a new law about the state
secret which aimed to strictly control any leakage of almost all information to foreign countries and
make contacts with foreigners more difficult and dangerous.¹²¹ These measures prepared for the so-
called “Kliueva-Roskin Affair,” in which Stalin and Zhdanov brought to the court of honor two
prominent scientists on cancer, who had allegedly leaked their latest research to American researchers
in early April.¹²² This resulted in a secret letter from the TsK VKP(b) on July 16, which warned the
intellectuals, above all, scholars about “kowtowing and slave-mind [rabolepie]” to the West and
demanded strengthening party-political work to foster Soviet patriotism among them.¹²³ However,
even in Moscow and Leningrad, pressure on philologists was not yet harsh until Aleksandr Fadeev’s
attack against Veselovsky and his “school” on June 27 and the participants of the preliminary session
were still so optimistic that they would show the achievements of the Soviet philology both to the
Soviet and Finnish people.¹²⁴

In his opening remark, Meletinsky reminded the participants that prominent Russian
scholars such as “Buslaev and Veselovsky” expressed interest in the Kalevala and their remarks on
this question were still important. It is true that the Finnish scholars had made a great achievement in
the studies of the Kalevala and the variants of the epic poems, and knowing their works, among others
the “Finnish school of Kaarle Krohn,” was essential. “However,” Meletinsky summarized a basic
direction of the Soviet view on the Kalevala and criticism of the Finnish school:

“[W]e must stress that the general conclusions of the Finnish scholars are wrong. The dominant view
in the Finnish bourgeois science regards the motherland of the Kalevala as south-western Finland, but
in the Karelian narrators, whose creation is first of all reflected in Lönnrot’s Kalevala, they saw only
mechanic disseminators [peredatchikov] of the Finnish epic poems. The dominant view of the Finnish
bourgeois science set the beginning [zarozhdenie] of the songs at a relatively late period of the feudal
medieval period and found even strong Christianity-Catholic influence on the Kalevala epic poems.
This point of view, to a great extent, resulted in a narrow reactionarism. Many times, the

¹¹⁹ The invitation list is NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 67, l. 2, 7.
¹²⁰ Stalin i kosmopolitizm, doc. 37, 108–9.; Anatolii S. Sonin, Bor’ba s kosmopolitizmom v sovetskoi
¹²¹ Stalin i kosmopolitizm, doc. 40, 118–19; Sonin, Bor’ba s kosmopolitizmom, 35–36.
¹²² Sonin, Bor’ba s kosmopolitizmom, 42–71.
¹²³ Stalin i kosmopolitizm, doc. 43, 123–28.
¹²⁴ Druzhinin, Ideologiia i filologiia. T. 1, 505–28.
Kalevala has been used as a weapon of the chauvinistic propaganda. It was enough to remember the 100th anniversary of the publication of the first edition of the Kalevala in Finland, 1935.”

Meletinsky pointed out that the Finnish school rests on “exclusively formalistic logic” and “superficial approach” and does not consider “enormous historical and social influence” on the epic poems, assuming a single origin in Finland and ignoring the “well-known fact that the epic poems have up until today lived a lively life in a highly-artistic form in the territory of Karelia and Estonia.” Therefore,

“[T]his problem has to be set and resolved by Soviet science, first, because the stage principle of the studies of social phenomenon – language and folklore, is a conquest [zavoevaniem] of the Russian Soviet science (beginning from Veselovsky and Marr), and, second, because in the very territory of the Soviet Union living epic folklores have been preserved up to today – folklores of Finnic, Slavic, Turkic, and Mongolic peoples, who offer the most precious material for the comparative studies of epic.”

Sharing this basic direction, Zhirmunsky stressed the significance of putting the Kalevala into a Soviet Eurasian framework. He criticized Krohn and his school for their interpretation of the Kalevala poems as the feudal-aristocratic origin, since the Kalevala heroes are not warriors but working peoples: Väinämöinen is a “magic singer, shaman” and Joukahainen a “hunter.” And there was no evidence which supported Krohn’s argument that the retrieval of the Sampo represented the attack of Finnish Vikings on Gotland. Likewise, he was “skeptical” about the mechanical borrowing from Scandinavia and Christianity and the geographical origins Krohn liked to utilize. Rather Zhirmunsky underlined the active, improvising, creative role of the people and the pre-feudal, peasant society in the making of the epic poems, best reflected in rich, numerous variants of the epic poems, which was common to the folklore of the Central Asian peoples. Thus, Zhirmusnky stressed that the Karelian source [ochag] was no less important, and, as Finnish folklorists began to claim after the war, there was need to “show the Kalevala, as sung among the people” in Soviet Karelia by publishing the variants of the Kalevala poems. This was supported by the linguist Nikolai Bogdanov, who rejected a geographical “origin [proiskhozhdenie]” of the Kalevala: “The Kalevala – the Karelo-Finnish popular epic. Its poems belong to the people. The creator of the Kalevala – the people.”

To demonstrate the role of Soviet Karelia and of the Karelians, Evseev presented a paper on the result of his collection of variants in Soviet Karelia. Evseev tried to demonstrate the Karelian

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125 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, ll. 6–7.
126 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, l. 11.
127 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, ll. 28–32.
128 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, l. 37.
“moment” of the Kalevala related poems, since such poems appeared in various eras not only in Finland and Karelia but also in earlier periods among the ancient Finnic tribes who lived next to the Slavs. The poems were thus constantly under the mutual influence among the Finnic peoples and between them and neighboring peoples, but Evseev found, for example, that the poems about the hunter Ilmoilline were typical of Olonets Karelian poetic tradition and spread there. Arguing back against the Finns, Evseev aimed to show a whole Soviet “Karelian,” national epic tradition: “[F]innish philologists tried speaking about allegedly collapsing [razlagaiushchem] influence of Russian culture on the development of a southern Karelian epic tradition. 30 years earlier, V. Salminen had published an article, which told about the poorness of the epic tradition in southern Karelia, and then in 1935 he had again tried to assure that the alleged disappearance of the poems in southern Karelia could be explained by the Russian influence.”

For the Soviet national ideology, it was not enough to focus only on the Karelian and the Karelo-Finnish. Instead, there had to be a challenge to the Finnish Greater Finland. The Soviet Kalevala jubilee needed to show a Soviet version of pan-Finnism harmonized with the Soviet ideology. Tartu folklorist Elmar Päss’s participation in this preliminary session was scholarly and politically important. In his presentation “the Kalevala and the Kalevipoeg” Päss proposed to propagate the Kalevala-related poems in Estonia and its Estonian singers and the common motives between the two epics, publish a map of Kalevala related poems and a new Estonian translation of the Kalevala, plan lectures on the Kalevala and the Kalevipoeg in schools and the University of Tartu. He also recommended including the leading Estonian researchers Laugaste, Ariste, and Normann in the jubilee publication. Impressed by this proposal, Zhirmunsky said: “If the Uni. of Tartu would be included in the jubilee of the Kalevala, this would [sic!] be indeed an important, new demonstration of the Stalinist friendship of peoples of our Union, contribution to general problems. […] All of this would be very, very valuable and important, to contribute and supplement the jubilee, which is being prepared, and would be good if the work of your authors would be included into the five-year plan of scientific organizations of Estonia.”

Another important question is how to treat Lönnrot, an emerging national symbol in Finland but also a symbol of the Karelo-Finnishness. The participants put priority on the people, rather than Lönnrot. Indeed, Zhirmusnky did not fail to mention his deed both as a scholar and as a person, saying that his work was not for folklorists “but for the people and the people in the K-F and Finland, and all over the world read the Kalevala of Lönnrot in the translation and is impressed. […] In Lönnrot on the one hand, we see talent and, on the other hand, a grown-up among the people, almost a singer, a very

129 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, ll. 73–74, 111.
130 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, ll. 169–70.
131 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, ll. 57–60.
132 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, l. 61.
successful combination.” Bogdanov more clearly put Lönroth in a lower place than the people: “[W]e must not be silent about the meaning of Elias Lönroth either, collector of these poems, and his work. Even if this work is to some extent artificially done, this work is, as V. M. [Zhirmunsky] has said, acknowledged by all progressive humanity. Our jubilee must praise the achievements of Lönroth.” Zhirmunsky added that the jubilee must not mix up Lönroth’s Kalevala with the people’s poems. It was “fortunate” that Lönroth is from the people, but the jubilee must separate the “popularization of the monumental achievement of Lönroth” from the “wide popularization [shirokaia populiarizatsiia]” of the popular poems and give a priority to the people and the original poems.

This is why the session participants hoped to publish an anthology of “original” Karelian popular poems, but Kuusinen, in addition, insisted publishing a new Russian translation of the Kalevala and suggested correcting Lönroth’s Kalevala by “retriev[ing] some things excluded from the basic lines of the Kalevala.” Both Zhirmunsky and Propp opposed this plan of a new Russian translation because Zhirmunsky believed that Bel’skii’s translation was a “very good one” and a better way would be to assign the famous Soviet writer Marshak a new edition of the Kalevala. Propp agreed with Zhirmunsky, though he indicated it should be published without an introductory article, because the one by Bubrikh in 1933 “had caused some controversy” and there was “no need” to write such an article.

Summarizing what the session came to agree upon, Meletinsky concluded the session with two main points: first, the jubilee had to show that the main conclusions of the Finns were “absolutely wrong”; second, it had to present “truly popular Karelo-Finnish epic in its natural form.” One has to study the “Karelian period of the Karelo-Finnish epic, the concrete Karelian epic,” on the one hand, and “the Kalevala as a literature,” on the other hand. These two approaches seem quite close to the trends in Finland, though, in Finland, Lönroth was coming forward, taking the place of the Kalevala as the Finnish national, heroic past. To make a clear difference from the pan-Finnism supporters in Finland, it was essential to show that the people-singers and poems were still living and continued the epic tradition by creating new poems under Soviet rule. Thus, further expeditions in the Kalevala raion were required to publish a two-volume collection of Karelian epic poems by adding new variants of the Kalevala poems. Furthermore, the Soviet jubilee could take advantage of the Estonians by comparing two “brother” epics, a Soviet version of pan-Finnism. To make this pan-Finnism Soviet,

133 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, ll. 33–34.
134 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, ll. 37–38. Underline in the quote by Okabe.
135 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, l. 193. Kuusinen was not present at the session, but S. I. Lobanov (director of the Karelo-Finnish State Publisher) met him in Moscow and forwarded this message to the participants at the session.
136 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, l. 194, 196.
137 NA KarNTs, f. 1, op. 4, d. 55, ll. 210–12.
138 NA RK, f. r-1934, op. 6, d. 242/1211, ll. 34–36 (report about the preliminary session by Bogdanov and Meletinsky to Sykiäinen).
the jubilee must integrate the Russian bylina tradition into the discussion on those topics for the comparison between the Russian and Karelo-Finnish epic traditions.

After the preliminary session, the Republic Government Committee for the Jubilee was launched. According to the list the Republic Minister of Enlightenment Beliaev submitted to the Republic Council of Ministers (March 20, 1948), the Government Committee included Kuusinen (the chairman), Iosif Sykiäinen (the vice chairman), Beliaev, V. S. Chepurnov (the rector of the Karelo-Finnish University), Chistov (research secretary), Bogdanov, Meletinskii, Leningrad researchers (Propp, Zhirmunskii, Bubrikh), Karelo-Finnish writers (Timonen, Jaakkola, Huttari, and Rugoev), and Karelian singers (Mikheeva, Nikiforova). Kuusinen was assigned to patronize the speakers of the academic session, which meant that the papers would be supervised by Kuusinen, Sykiäinen and Chistov without any intervention from the Party bureaucrats. The original plan for the jubilee, submitted by the Institute to the Republic Party, was large-scale. It was scheduled to have 20 papers at the session, to publish two-volumes of collected papers before the session for discussion, and to publish the Kanteletar as well in Russian.

Nonetheless, the jubilee was not yet widely propagated and only Totuus (Leninsko Znamia ignored this session) reported this preliminary session by summarizing some papers with clear political accent. At this phase, Totuus was yet ambiguous the relations between the epic poems and Lönrot and just denied Kaukonen’s post-war argument about the Kalevala. According to Totuus, Propp’s presentation “the Kalevala in the history of the development of epics” insisted that the Kalevala should not be studied independently as Lönrot’s epic but be compared with variants of the Kalevala epic poems. Such comparison, Propp said, enables the researchers of the Kalevala to clarify the past of the Karelian-Finnish people. That is an “honourable assignment to the Soviet researchers.” Totuus also emphasized the importance of Estonians’ contributions since the Kalevala had a huge influence on the Estonians and the Kalevipoeg and the Kalevala would play an important role for the further development of both peoples (the Karelo-Finnish and Estonian peoples). In the same vein, the Soviet Estonian newspaper Õhtuleht reported this session and frankly pointed out the influence of the Kalevala on Kreutzwald and the Kalevipoeg and expected active participation from the University of Tartu, the Estonian Academy of Sciences, and Estonian scholars. In this way, the political and scholarly elites were motivated to make the Soviet jubilee a demonstration of the Soviet scholarly achievement and reification of the Soviet national ideology, above all, Soviet pan-Finnism.

139 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3101, l. 12.
140 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2569, ll. 44–46.
141 Totuus, July 2, 1947. In addition, the newspaper announced that the tentative title of Lehmus’s paper was “Elias Lönrot and the Kalevala,” that is Lönrot came forward.
142 Õhtuleht, August 9, 1947. In his letter to Evseev, Päss wrote that he gave a manuscript of Evseev’s presentation to Laugaste in Tartu and contributed a piece about the session for the newspaper. NA RK, f. r-3717, op. 1, d. 22/261, l. 2 (Päss’s letter to Evseev, dated September 3, 1947).
Chapter 6: Negotiating the Kalevala and Finnic Kinship 1947–1949

The US-Soviet confrontation further accelerated with the Truman doctrine in February 1947 and the announcement of the Europe Recovery Plan (the Marshall Plan) in June 1947, which made it clear that the United States would commit herself in European recovery and security. Moscow was dissatisfied with the fact that US and British authorities in Germany unilaterally halted reparations from American and British zones of occupied Germany to the Soviet Union in May 1946 and reacted to the Marshall Plan by establishing the Cominform in September 1947, in which Zhdanov criticized the West and clearly declared an ideological binary rivalry between East and West. Moscow also started to force communist leaders of Eastern Europe and the Balkan to abandon the “national road to communism” and move to monopolize the power by excluding their allies, which culminated in the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. This move prompted Western European countries to oust communists from their governments and Washington came to a determined step to support non-communist parties, first of all, in the Italian general election in April, for which Stalin, however, did not allow the radical parts of the Italian communists to take direct counter actions such as general strikes and insurgency.  

This further accelerated Moscow’s urgency to discipline the countries under the Soviet spheres of influence and accordingly replaced pan-nationalism with the cult of Stalin and the Soviet Union. As Jan Behrends argues, pan-Slavism was now ill-fit with integration of non-Slavic nations such as Germans, Hungarians, and Romanians and thus a more universal “Struggle for Peace,” “Friendship of Peoples,” and the Soviet-/Stalin-cult came forward to consolidate the communist power in the eastern and central European countries. Furthermore, pan-Slavism was even more dangerous for Moscow and the unity of the Socialist bloc because of Tito’s regional ambition to form a Balkan Federation with Bulgaria, annex Albania, and continue to meddle in the Greece Civil War, and irredentist demands for neighboring regions populated by Slavic peoples in Trieste and Istria (Italy) and Carinthia (Austria). In addition to his fury at the “disloyal” behavior of Tito, Stalin feared that the demands of Belgrade would cause a serious conflict with the West and evoke a sympathy from other satellite countries, which led to Moscow’s attack against Belgrade in spring 1948.  

Władysław Gomułka, faithful to a Polish road to socialism, tried to mediate Stalin and Tito but was forced to retreat from public activity by Moscow and pro-Moscow Polish communists.\textsuperscript{146}

Celebrating national symbols functioned as a tool to reify the socialist and Soviet ideology of friendships and at the same time consolidate a hierarchy among the nations and nationalities. The 150th anniversary of the birth of the Polish national poet Adam Mickiewicz was celebrated on December 24, 1948, both in Poland and the Soviet Union as a symbol of Soviet-Polish friendship. Born to a Polish noble family in the Grodno region of today’s Belorussia, Mickiewicz studied in Vilnius and moved to St. Petersburg, Moscow, then Odessa and Crimea. This trajectory and his patriotic works were useful for a symbol of the Soviet-Polish and Russian-Polish friendship and hierarchy, as Pravda featured Pushkin’s and the Decembrists’ progressive influence on Mickiewicz. At the same time, the celebration in Kiev indicates that Mickiewicz functioned also as a Polish-Ukrainian friendship when Pravda mentioned the progressive influence of Mickiewicz on Shevchenko and Ivan Franko as Ukrainian national poets.\textsuperscript{147} This also covered bloody conflicts among them given wartime and post-war bloody partisan war among Polish and Ukrainian nationalist organizations and the Red Army and population exchanges among Poland, Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania and following “nationalizations” in each country.\textsuperscript{148}

This drive for consolidation of Soviet influence and communist power in the socialist bloc went hand in hand with further vigilance against “local and bourgeois nationalism” in the borderlands. Among others, the Russian nationalism often associated with Leningrad regionalism became a more troubling problem. Confident of post-war Russo-centrism and the rise of their political status, Leningrad leaders started to support the idea of establishing a VKP(b) Central Committee bureau for RSFSR affairs, which Rodionov proposed to Stalin in his letter in September 1947, and rumors of the formation of a Russian Communist party with headquarters in Leningrad was around, which according to David Brandenberger played an important role in the so-called Leningrad Affair in 1949-50, targeting those former Leningrad leaders.\textsuperscript{149} Commemoration of the blockade, one of the important sources of Leningrad regionalism, was to be seen as a special status of Leningrad rather than as a part of a coherent Soviet myth of the war. As early as in early 1948, the narrative of the blockade began to stress more Stalin’s role in the myth of the blockade rather than the heroism of the Leningraders, which was also reflected in the exhibits of the Museum of the Defense of Leningrad.\textsuperscript{150}

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\textsuperscript{146} Naimark, \textit{Stalin and the Fate of Europe}, 210–18.
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Pravda}, December 24, 1948.
\textsuperscript{148} Snyder, \textit{Bloodlands}, 326–29.
\textsuperscript{150} Steven Maddox, \textit{Saving Stalin’s Imperial City: Historic Preservation in Leningrad, 1930–1950} (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2015), 181–86; Lisa A. Kirschenbaum,
Finland fell in an unclear and unstable situation “in-between” the East-West confrontation in Europe. Despite its strong wish for participation, the Finnish government was forced to give up joining in the Marshall Plan in July 1947 under the pressure of the Soviet Union since the Allied Control Commission continued to stay in Helsinki. Finland was economically dependent on the Soviet Union for its food imports to feed the population in addition to the reparation. However, the US, UK, and France well understood the reason why Finland had to decline the program and the US Export-Import Bank did not suspend the 32 million-dollar credits granted to Finland in January 1947. This economic aid from the US was further eased by the victory of non-SKDL forces in the 1948 parliamentary election and exclusion of the SKDL from the government. As far as the payment of reparation and barter trade went smoothly, the Soviet Union did not have reason to take a risk to make “the Finnish domestic situation more leftist”\(^\text{151}\) and include the Finnish Communist Party into the Cominform, though the Finnish communists asked Moscow permission to form a united workers’ party and join the Cominform.\(^\text{152}\)

The most challenging for Finland was the negotiations for the Soviet-Finnish Treaty (the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance) signed on April 6, 1948. As Kimmo Rentola summarizes, the Finns successfully convinced Stalin and Molotov of its agreement draft and concluded a treaty which was different from the ones with Eastern European countries in that Finland was obliged to fight (if Finland requires with the Soviet Union) against Germany or her ally only when they attack the Soviet Union through Finnish territory and Finland does not have to consult the Soviet Union about her foreign policy in advance.\(^\text{153}\) This satisfied Stalin’s security concern given the situation that the coup in Czechoslovakia alerted the West, which signed the Treaty of Brussels on March 17, and Sweden worried that Finland would completely fall into the Soviet bloc with the coming treaty. Furthermore, in Finland, the Soviet-Finnish Treaty awaited the parliament’s ratification, because Paasikivi tactically brought parliament politics into the Soviet-Finnish negotiations, and it seemed unsure for Moscow if Paasikivi and the Finnish government could persuade the parliament. As a result, the Soviet-Finnish Treaty put Finland out of the way of great power confrontation, “somewhere between a full-scale military alliance and benevolent neutrality.”\(^\text{154}\)

This approach to the Kremlin forced the SKP and the SKDL into a more difficult position.


\(^{153}\) Rentola, Stalin ja Suomen kohtalo, 167–73.

The right wing of SDP belonged to a supra-party network of “Union of Brother-in-Arms [Aseveliliitto]” and was determined to defeat the communists and the SKDL together with its fellow brothers-in-arms in the bourgeois parties in the coming parliamentary elections in early July 1948. Furthermore, the SDP had improved its relationships with Scandinavian (above all Swedish) social democrats and gained moral and financial supports for its campaign and elections for “Nordic [Pohjolan] democracy and individual freedom.”

The communists saw a chance in the negotiations of the treaty to mobilize workers to support the treaty, they put pressure on the parliament through demonstrations and threat of strike, and attacked those anti-Soviet forces who opposed the treaty, which, however, further damaged the popular image of the communists and the SKDL. To turn the tables, what the communists hoped for was only the Soviet support for a communist rebellion or Czechoslovakia-like coup, something Stalin and Zhdanov never allowed.

The Soviet Union launched a massive propaganda campaign against the newly formed Karl-August Fagerholm social democratic government, which ousted the SKDL from the government. The social democrat government reorganized the communist controlled State Police into the Security Intelligence Service [Suojelupoliisi] in December and finally put down a strike at the Arabia factory in Helsinki in October. This was a clear victory for the employers and accordingly another blow for the SKP, which could not mobilize enough workers to support the Arabia strike nor put pressure on the government.

Immediately after Paasikivi appointed Fagerholm Literaturnaia Gazeta condemned him as an agent of the American-British imperialism spoiling the Soviet-Finnish treaty and, later, dragging Finland and Sweden into NATO, which was followed by attacks from other Soviet newspapers and journals for months. In fact, Moscow was dissatisfied with the fact that the SKDL was ousted from the government and instructed the Finnish communists to put pressure on the government not to make anti-Soviet foreign policy. At the same time Moscow continued to seek a possible channel through Maalaisliitto (Kekkonen), now an opposition party, and even RKP to influence Paasikivi and the Finnish government, bypassing the SKP and the SKDL.

Seen from Soviet Karelia, however, the Soviet-Finnish Treaty looked very different and challenged a raison d’être of the Karelo-Finnish Republic. Though Leninskoe Znamia reported the Treaty without any comments but the speeches of Molotov and Pekkala, Totuus was so shocked that


157 Rentola, Niin kylmää, 70–75; Holmila and Mikkonen, Suomi sodan jälkeen, 204–210.

it did not immediately report the treaty until it published a letter from a Soviet correspondent in Helsinki (on May 22) about the impact of the treaty on Finnish politics and society. Furthermore, Stalin’s speech at the reception of the Finnish delegation after the signing of the Treaty had tremendous importance on Karelo-Finnish national culture, especially the Kalevala jubilee. In the Soviet media Stalin’s speech was received as a sign of Soviet/Russian-Finnish friendship and Soviet respect for Finland as a small country, a clear contrast to the American “imperialism,” ignoring the sovereignty of a small country. Stalin said:

“Many people do not believe that the relation between a big nation and small nation is equal. We the Soviet people, however, think that such a relation is possible and must be realized. The Soviet people considers that each nation – whether big or small equally – owns its own qualitative specificities and own peculiarities which belong to one nation alone. These specificities are the contribution that each nation brings to the common treasury of world culture, with which each nation supplements and enriches it [the common treasury]. In this spirit, all nations – big or small – are in a similar situation and all nations are equal to every other nation. Thus, the Soviet people believe that Finland, although small, appears an equal state to the Soviet Union in this treaty.”

At the same time, however, Stalin stressed that the Finns were now a friend not only of the Soviets but also of the Russians, saying that “the Treaty broke down [slomal] the distrust” which had existed between Russia and Finland, between the Russians and the Finns for 150 years and with which the Finns approached the Russians and vice versa. Though Russia and Finland entered a new period of “mutual trust,” Stalin added that it was wrong to think that the distrust between the two peoples disappeared immediately and they had to “work and struggle hard” to dispel the distrust. The editorial Bol'shevik praised the treaty and Stalin’s speech not only as a Soviet respect for a small nation/country but also as the extension of the Soviet nationalities policy and ideology, which had fought for equal relations among the peoples and against both the Great Russian chauvinism and the non-Russian chauvinisms that appeared in each Soviet republic and national raion against national minorities. Accordingly, the Karelo-Finnish Republic came to be seen as a point where the Soviet friendly treatment of Finland and the Finnish nation, and the equal relations among the Russians, Karelians, and Finns intersected.

No other than Otto Kuusinen better understood this position of the Karelo-Finnish Republic in the Soviet-Finnish relations and within the Soviet imperial rule of its borderlands. Like Dimitrov

159 “Rech’ tovarishcha I.V. Stalina,” Bol’shevik, no. 7 (1948), 2.
161 “Sovetskaia politika ravnopraviia natsii,” Bol’shevik, no. 9 (1948), 1–2.
and Togliatti, Kuusinen hoped to return to Finland as a “victor” after the war. Though the SKP leadership several times begged Stalin to send Kuusinen to Finland, Stalin was afraid of possible disorder Kuusinen and the SKP would bring to Finnish politics and society as far as the Finnish government seriously considered the Soviet security interests and paid the reparation. Stalin used Kuusinen as only a diplomatic card to put pressure on the Helsinki government but never allowed him to play an independent role in Soviet Finnish policy. Kuusinen thus in Moscow concentrated on contributing to newspapers and periodicals as a specialist on international relations, the Soviet-Finnish relations, and ideology. Indeed, he was a member of the council on external propaganda [Sovet po vneshnei propagandy], established in the All-Union Central Committee in August 1946. Accordingly, writings under Kuusinen’s influence such as Novoe vremia tended to focus on the meaning of the treaty for inter-state relations between Finland and the Soviet Union.

At the same time, Otto Kuusinen was not indifferent to the Soviet national ideology and its extent to the neighboring countries. In 1945 Novoe vremia published an article titled “On patriotism” by N. Baltiiskii (a pseudonym of Otto Kuusinen’s). In this article, he already showed the Manichaean understanding of the post-war world, that is, Anglo-American imperialist and capitalist forces versus Soviet socialist and democratic forces. His view was militant, given that Moscow had then hoped officially for cooperation with the US and Britain in the post-war world. He reminded readers that true patriotism outside the Soviet Union came true only thorough solidarity with the Soviet Union, otherwise patriotism would turn into chauvinism and fascism, and cause another big war. He wrote: “Lenin and Stalin’s genius teaching about national policy has significant meaning for the development of Soviet patriotism and this teaching was successfully and practically realized by the Bolshevik party and the Soviet Government. This realization rapidly developed by all people’s national culture is strongly tied with the mutual friendship for the common brotherly family.” This article suggests that the logic of the Soviet nationality policy would be applied to other would-be socialist states. At the same time, Kuusinen was always careful about the so-called “Great Russian chauvinism” and “Russian centrism” in his writing. Though routinely referring to “the help of the Great Russian people,” Kuusinen was generally loyal to the Lenin-Stalinist nationality principle such as “the friendship of peoples” and “the equal relation of peoples.” As discussed below, Otto Kuusinen entered the negotiations over the Soviet and Finnish Kalevala jubilees from this point of view.

The 25th Anniversary of the Karelian ASSR in July 1948

163 RGASPI f. 77, op. 4, l. 16 in Stalin i kosmopolitizm, 62.
Yet, the dominant discourse of the Republic continued to be the Karelian people and the Karelian-Russian friendship, and the 25th anniversary of the Karelian ASSR on 25 July was the very occasion to celebrate the Soviet “success” of modernizing the Karelian people thanks to the Bolshevik party and the help of the “great” Russian brother. Each union republic and the USSR celebrated its 25th anniversary in the 1940s. For the Karelo-Finnish Republic, this anniversary was a vivid contrast to the “true” anniversary of the Republic, the last day of March.

This anniversary was officially to show the result of the Soviet modernization project in Soviet Karelia and to encourage the people to achieve the five-year plan in four years. Already three months before the day, Leninskoе Znamia announced that the anniversary was to show how “backward national periphery” became a “equal [ravnopravnoi] union republic” thanks to Lenin and Stalin, and all brotherly peoples among others the “great” Russian people. In his interview with Leninskoе Znamia, Yuri Andropov, the second secretary of the Republic party and the chairman of the anniversary committee, stated that the anniversary was for the success of the post-war five-year plan and the working people in the Republic would show their thanks to their brotherly peoples, above all the Russian people and Stalin for their support to the development of the Republic.

The very achievement of this Soviet modernization in Soviet Karelia was the Karelian people, who were pulled up [podniatyi] by the Bolshevik party. In his pamphlet, Kupriianov affirmed that the titular people of the Republic were the Karelians, while the Finns were located, like the Veps, around the Karelians. Leninskoе Znamia featured those “thousands” of Karelians who were born in poor Karelian families but transformed their lives after the Revolution, becoming doctors, teachers, scholars, and engineers. In fact, Leninskoе Znamia reported to the Republic TsK that the newspaper would make it widely known how the socialist competition was successfully going on for the five-year plan and how the Bolshevik party had built socialism in the Republic and raised the people, especially national (non-Russian) cadres, now struggling for the post-war reconstruction and development. The anniversary committee published a series of brochures “Distinguished Peoples of Our Republic [Znatnyе liudi nasheи Respilika],” which featured mainly ethnic Russian and Karelian party elites, workers, war heroes, border guards, scholars, and partisan martyrs.

To make this festival an all-Republic one, the committee tried to mobilize as many citizens as possible and organized mass events. On the festival day in Petrozavodsk, a combined brass band marched from Kirov Square along Karl Marx Prospect to Lenin Square and the people went on an

166 Leninskoе znamia, April 25, 1948.
169 Leninskoе znamia, July 24, 1948
170 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3138, ll. 53–54.
excursion to Kirov and Karl Marx Squares, Karl Marx Prospect, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg Boulevard, and the Park of Culture. Concerts took place at Lenin Square, in which a Kantele ensemble, the Russia Drama Theatre, the Puppet Theatre, and the National Theatre took part and a movie was shown. In a square close to the Russia Drama Theatre, a concert was given by the jazz orchestra “Sampo.” And a bicycle relay started from Louhi in the north heading southward through Kesten’ga, Ukhta, Kem’, Belomorsk, Lekhta, Rugozero, Reboly, Padany, M. Gora, Pudozh, V. Guba, Kondopoga to Petrozavodsk, forming a star shape by connecting those cities. The Republic party organized 150 lectures on July 10 alone, which more than 7,000 people attended. During the festival, the party organized lectures in cultural and enlightenment institutes, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, companies, which 20,153 people attended. Libraries organized more than 1,500 meetings and public readings, featuring such themes as “From the Commune to the Union Republic” and “30 years of Soviet Power,” which gathered 11,450 people. The State Historical-Local Museum organized a photo exhibition “25 Years of the Karelo-Finnish SSR” about the historical past of the Republic and her development in the field of economy, science, and culture, which received 1,867 visitors.¹⁷¹

The researchers were as well mobilized to this 25th anniversary. Evseev and Chistov published an article respectively on the reflection of Russian and Karelian friendship in the Kalevala related poems and on the meaning of the Russian folklore of Karelia in Russian popular creations. Evseev showed some examples of the influence of the Russian heroic epic on the Karelian one: themes about Il’ia Muromets, Dobryna Nikitich, and Diuk Stepanovich appearing in the Karelian folklore in Karelian dialects. Evseev also introduced a case where a bylina about Sviatogor and Il’ia Muromets was contaminated with other related themes in Karelian tales and even in epic poems. Adding to these examples, common Soviet folklore themes between two peoples, Evseev concluded that the Russian and Karelian peoples were historically united with an age-old friendship.¹⁷² Chistov reminded readers of how Russian folklore collected from renown narrators in Karelia before and after the Revolution contributed to the development of Russian national literature, music, and art: works of Nekrasov, Gor’ky, and Tolstoi, and Rimsky-Korsakov’s “Sadko” and Mussorgsky’s song of Varlaam in “Boris Godunov.”¹⁷³

Then, were the Soviet Finns completely removed from the festival? Otto Kuusinen showed a more balanced view including the Finnish factors in his long article “the Results of a Quarter Century” to Lenin'skoe Znamia and indicated that the history of the Republic is the realization of the Lenin-Stalinist national policy, because the Bolshevik Party struggled not only for the awakening of national consciousness of a number of peoples within the Soviet state but also encouraged the growth of their

national culture and the national originality of the working mass. In the process of constructing socialism, “the people of Soviet Karelia” were “forced” to fight against White Finns, the Anglo-French interventionists, and the German-Finnish occupants to defend the motherland. During the last war, though the Finnish chauvinists tried to sow discord between the Karelians and the Russians, the Karelian working people rejected this and defended the Soviet motherland hand in hand with the “great Russian people” and as partisans together with their “Finnish comrades.”

Antikainen and his 1922 raid against the White Finns was one of the lecture themes included in the lecture propaganda program, and in raions and children’s libraries two meetings were organized with the participants of the 1922 raid, which gathered 270 adults and children. Interestingly, in his contribution for *Totuus* the chairman of the Republic Council of Ministers Valdemar Virolainen quoted the “racial and ethnic bonds between the Finns and Karelians” from Zhdanov’s 1940 speech for the first time since 1941.176

In fact, the Soviet-Finnish Treaty carefully prompted the Republic propaganda to selectively feature the Finnish symbolic figures suitable for the Soviets. Both *Totuus* and *Leninskoe Znamia* respectively, published a column by Ivachev and Lehmus on Irmari Rantamala with the 30th anniversary of his death on May 21. They stressed Rantamala’s peasant and eastern Finnish origin, his work experience in Sortavala, and the influence of progressive Russian intellectuals on him during his days in Petersburg.177 Ivachev’s column for *Totuus* spared more space than Lehmus’s to describe much more in detail how Rantamala “developed antibodies against Greater Finland chauvinism with which the Finnish bourgeoisie was infected” through his contacts with the “soul” of the Russian people by reading Russian literature, living in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and his journey to Volga, the Caucasus, and Ukraine. A half a year later, under increasing pressure from the escalating ideological campaign, Rantamala was more tightly tied with Soviet national ideology and Russian superiority. On his 80th birthday, Ivachev quoted Rantamala’s statement that the Finnish questions would be solved only in Russia by the Russian proletariat fighting against tsarism, and the Finnish people were proud to join the peoples of foreign tribes [*inoplemenyikh narodov*] gathering under the banner of Russia as a member of the family.178

Bubrikh’s article for the 25th anniversary in fact stressed the common historical past shared by the Russian and Karelian peoples but his consideration of Finnish-Karelian kinship was becoming more explicit. Making it clear that the “Karelo-Finnish question has exclusively diplomatic acuteness,” Bubrikh declared that Soviet Finno-Ugric studies “exploded” the “monopoly” of the Finnish studies in this field, which had a political, territorial “conclusion.” To confront this, Bubrikh wrote as a “political conclusion” that the Korela tribe spent their “entire state history” with the Russian people

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175 NARK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3139, l. 117, 126.
within Russia, not by force but by their own will, and it was difficult to find the “best friend” of the Russian people other than the Karelian people and vice versa. Bubrikh thus concluded: “If the Finns consider their kinship with the Karelians important, they have to be a good neighbor of the Soviet Union. We need no war, but peace.”

Though Kuusinen, Antikainen, and Rantamala were undisputable symbols of Soviet Finnishness, the Kalevala was a far more controversial symbol to be included among Soviet national symbols. For the Kalevala jubilee to be successfully carried out, those who involved in the jubilee had to face two problems: an escalating ideological campaign and competition with Finland.

**Escalation of Stalinist Ideological Campaign in Leningrad and Petrozavodsk**

The potentially harshest attack on the Kalevala jubilee was a campaign against philologists, among others, against Aleksandr Veselovsky and his pupils in Leningrad. Soon after the 1947 Kalevala jubilee preliminary meeting, the general secretary of the Soviet Writers’ Union Aleksandr Fadeev launched an ideological offensive against Aleksandr Veselovsky at the 11th plenum of the Soviet Writers’ Union board [pravlenie]. Targeting Moscow philologist I. M. Nusinov’s 1941 study, “Pushkin and the world literature,” Fadeev criticized him of ignoring “national foundation” (that is, Russian) in Pushkin and his works and of treating him only as a “European,” “worldwide without nationality [beznatsional'no-vsemirnym]” figure, which was foreign to the “Russian revolutionary-democratic” tradition and Marxism. Fadeev condemned Veselovsky as the “founder [rodonachal’nik]” of this “school” and his philologist-followers, “parrots of Veselovsky,” in universities and institutes such as Leningrad professors Shishmarev and M. Alekseev. According to the memoir by Konstantin Simonov, secretary of the Writers’ Union board, Stalin invited Fadeev, Simonov, and Gorbatov to a meeting at his Kremlin office on May 13, 1947, and told them to give the priority to Soviet patriotism as an important topic for Soviet writers, because a sense of Soviet patriotism was not “nurtured” enough among “scholarly intelligentsia, professors, doctors” who were inclined to “unacceptable kowtowing [neopravdannoe preklonenie] to foreign culture.” Furthermore, Stalin encouraged the Writers’ Union and its organ *Literaturnaiia Gazeta* to be an unofficial channel to propagate questions which “we cannot or do not want to officially raise.”

This sudden attack against Veselovsky, however, puzzled many scholars engaged in philology, since Veselovsky’s works had been firmly (and critically) incorporated into Soviet linguistics, folkloristics, and literature studies. In August Shishmarev sent a letter to Andrei Zhdanov in defence of Veselovsky, who for the first time introduced “rich and diverse” legacy of medieval

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180 *Literaturnaiia gazeta*, June 29, 1947.

literatures and poetry of the Russian, Slavic people and the peoples of the East and criticized “narrow Eurocentrism” dominant in literature studies of Western Europe. Shishmarev thus concluded that Fadeev discredited a “great Russian scholar,” whom “Russian and Soviet science was and is proud of.” Likewise, four philologist-academicians (V. Alekseev, Meshchaninov, Zh. Tolstov, and I. Kralkovskii) sent a letter to ask Zhdanov to defend the “cultural achievement of the Soviet people from vicious consequences of impatient and groundless criticism.”

Actually, until early 1948 a series of open discussion on Veselovsky continued in the literature journal Oktiabr’, where Shishmarev continued to defend Veselovsky by explaining his method to clarify the historical process of how the “foreign” was transformed into the “Russian own,” how Russian national culture, literature, and language appeared from international cultural interactions.

Indeed, the attack against Veselovsky was, especially for Leningrad philologists, one against not only Russian national pride but also the Soviet ideology of inter-national friendship. Lev Plotkin, professor of Soviet literature at Leningrad University, tried to defend Veselovsky as a progressive Russian scholar who well studied Herzen and rightly described Pushkin and his works, while pointing out that his comparative methodology was kowtowing to western Europe. In late November 1947 Fadeev gave a presentation at a meeting of Leningrad writers to reiterate his attack against Veselovsky. Being critical of Fadeev, V. A. Manuilov, specialist on Pushkin and Lermontov and pupil of Eikhenbaum, stressed the authority of Veselovsky, “a very great Russian scholar, whom our Russian culture has the right to be proud of,” not only in Russia but also in “brotherly Slavic peoples friendly to us” and worried that such remarks by “the boss [vozhd’] of our literature” would lead to such a situation that some hastily hide Veselovsky’s works in university libraries as has already happened in Minsk and other cities, and this would give rise to great “grief [ogorchenie]” among brother Slavic countries which have found priceless value in eastern and western Slavic folklore thanks to Veselovsky, as great a non-Marxist Soviet/Russian scholar as “Pavlov and Mendeleev.” Thus, Manuilov closed his remark, “[W]hen Russian literature scholars start to trample these names without reasonable cause, which we today heard from Aleksandr Aleksandrovich [Fadeev], then it is a bit worrying and even so worrying that it is very difficult to be silent! (Applauses)”

Against the background of these “reactions” from scholars and “worsening” international relations, this anti-Veselovsky campaign gradually spread to universities and institutes. In the end of 1947, the campaign was joined by the rector of Moscow State University Il’ia Galkin and the Minster of Higher Education USSR Sergei Kaftanov. In late November, the rector of Leningrad State

182 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 567, ll. 34–39 (Shishmarev’s letter), 40.
185 TsGALI SPb, f. 371, op. 1, d. 31, ll. 2–15. See also, Druzhinin, Ideologiia i filologiia, T. 1, 539–41.
186 TsGALI SPb, f. 371, op. 1, d. 31, ll. 24–31.

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University Aleksandr Voznesensky signed an order that instructed all faculties and courses to fight against kowtowing and blind obedience to the bourgeois culture and sciences and critically review research programs, methodology, textbooks, publishing plans, themes of doctoral dissertations and of student discussion clubs, and the role of Russian and Soviet scholars. In early 1948 *Oktiabrʹ* finally concluded a series of discussions on Veselovsky with Kirpotin’s article that Veselovsky’s comparatism and borrowing theory was kowtowing to the West, downgrading Russian literature such as “The Tale of Igor’s Campaign.” This was followed by a piece “Against bourgeois liberalism in literature studies,” which appeared in *Kulʹtura i Zhiznʹ*, that not only repeated criticism against Veselovsky and those scholars who defended him, now associated with Nazi Germany and Anglo-American quasi-democracy-liberalism, but also criticized *Oktiabrʹ* and *Literaturnaia Gazeta* of publishing nothing but “evil [vreda].”

This campaign severely hit the Leningrad philologists involved in preparation for the Kalevala jubilee. Immediately after the Fadeev speech in June, *Literaturnaia gazeta* criticized Azadovsky of suspecting Russian popular character of Pushkin’s folk tales such as “The Tale of the Fisherman and the Fish” by pointing out Western literature influence from the Brothers Grimm, Herder, and Washington Irving. Soon after this the same newspaper attacked Propp of his doctoral work and “formalist” approach to folklore, which ignored the role of the real life of the people and history in the development of folklore. Propp, especially, was a target of harsh attacks in periodicals, which criticized him of his ethnographic method borrowing from British ethnography, of his abstract approach to the form of folklore, ignoring historical and social conditions. In February 1948, the folklore section of the Institute of Ethnography and the scholar council also “critically” reviewed Propp’s works in a series of meetings, where, for example, Moscow folklorist Boris Chicherov pointed out that Propp’s view was irreconcilable with Gorky’s view on folklore as the “creation of a broad working mass,” and Sergei Tolstov, the director of the Institute of Ethnography, portrayed Propp under the influence of the Finnish school of folkloristics in that he pulled up [otryvaet] folktales from the national ground. Anatolii Tarasenkov condemned that Propp followed Veselovsky and imagined a “proto-people” from which myths, legends, and tales were spread to and developed in various groups and countries. Since being a cosmopolitan, Tarasenkov concluded, for Propp “neither class nor nation

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189 *Kulʹtura i Zhiznʹ*, March 11, 1948.
190 *Literaturnaia gazeta*, June 29, 1947.
193 “Diskussii po voprosam folʹkloristiki na zasedaniakh sektora folʹklora instituta etnographii,” and “Obsuzhdenie na zasedaniakh uchenogo soveta instituta etnografii osnovnykh nedostatkov i zadach raboty sovetskikh folʹkloristov,” *Sovetskaiia etnografiia*, no. 3 (1948), especially 140–41, 147.
matter \([\text{net del ani do klassov, ni do natsii}]\) and folklore is an “international phenomenon.”\(^{194}\)

After the publication of the piece in *Kultur' i zhizn'\(^{194}\) in March 1948, the Institute of Literature USSR and the philological faculty of Leningrad University started to discipline Leningrad philologists more tightly. In a closed party meeting of the Institute of Literature on March 24 such philologists having defended Veselovsky were forced to recant their previous statements and self-criticize.\(^{195}\) A week later, the scholars council of the Institute of Literature gathered professors including Zhirmunsky, Shishmarev, Eikhenbaum, and Azadovsky to adopt a resolution which approved the piece in *Kultur' i zhizn',\(^{196}\) and decided to struggle against “any appearance of cosmopolitanism and kowtowing,” and widely develop “Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism.”\(^{196}\) Plotkin, who chaired both meetings, explained that it was now impossible to accept Veselovsky and his “school” when “the Anglo-American reactionaries came forward under the flag of cosmopolitanism” and denied “national sovereignty of each state,”\(^{197}\) and admitted Fadeev’s approach as the one the Party had approved.\(^{198}\) Following Plotkin, the Leningrad professors accepted the criticisms and self-criticized their theoretical method and attitudes toward Veselovsky.\(^{199}\) On April 1 a meeting of the scholars’ council of the philological faculty of Leningrad University also discussed the piece and heard self-criticism of those philologists, of which the university newspaper published the statements of Zhirmunsky, Propp, Tomashevsky, Dolinin, Alekseev, Smirnov, and Eikhenbaum word for word.\(^{200}\)

Azadovsky saw similarities between the on-going discussion and the one in the mid-1930s. In the meeting of scholars’ council of the Institute of Literature on March 31, he stated that the fascist concept of epics and the theory of aristocratic origins of epics were wrong, as the decision about Dem’ian Bedny’s “Bogatyri” and the following discussion in 1936 clearly showed. “Only now, we see that the fascist concept was exposed, now the ideology of bourgeois cosmopolitanism was exposed as well […]. And now I clearly understand my own mistake, […] This is a great mistake of the whole set of scholars, this is a great mistake.”\(^{201}\) As P. Druzhinin discusses in his latest study, Leningrad philologists were getting vulnerable because the rector Aleksandr Voznesensky, sympathetic to Leningrad scholars, moved to Moscow to occupy the post of Minister of Enlightenment of the RSFSR in January 1948, and the new rector Nikita Domnin, chemist, was seen “hostile” to Veselovsky. Furthermore, after the sudden death of the director of the Institute of Literature, Pavel Lebedev-

\(^{194}\) Anatolii Tarasenkov, “Kosmopolity ot literaturovedeniia,” *Novyi mir*, no. 2 (1948), 134–36.

\(^{195}\) TsGAIPD SPb, f. 3034, op. 2, d. 1, ll. 28–29, 33.

\(^{196}\) SPF ARAN, f. 150, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 243–45.

\(^{197}\) TsGAIPD SPb, f. 3034, op. 2, d. 1, l. 29.

\(^{198}\) SPF ARAN, f. 150, op. 1, d. 11, l. 247ob.

\(^{199}\) SPF ARAN, f. 150, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 256-282ob, cited in Druzhinin, *Ideologiia i filologiiia*, T. 2, 81–94.


\(^{201}\) SPF ARAN, f. 150, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 274–75b.
Poliansky in early April the Institute of Literature remained without a director until the end of August.

This campaign in Leningrad never failed to affect academic organizations as well as both Russian and non-Russian scholars in the Karelo-Finnish Republic. In the end of July 1947, the party organization of the Karelo-Finnish branch of the Academy of Sciences discussed the closed letter from the TsK VKP(b) about the Roskin-Kliueva affair, and the participants expressed concerns about the present conditions of political and ideological education in the branch. Stepanikhin, vice-chairman of the branch and secretary of the Republic party, insisted on increasing vigilance against leaks of our “state secret” in the library, the archive, and scholars themselves, because Finland was showing a great interest in scholarly works of the Republic. In addition to this, Mashezersky said that the tendency of blind obedience of some professors, for example Azadovsky, might influence “our scholarly cadres.”

Nevertheless, to ideologically discipline Moscow and Leningrad “professors” was very tough for the local party leadership since the successful completion of the plan heavily depended on their work and instructions to the young local scholars. According to the report about the activity of the branch to the Republic TsK, what the literature section of the Institute had achieved so far in 1947 was a series of Russian folklore studies edited by Azadovsky, Astakhova, and Bazanov, and Evseev and Propp were preparing for a collection of Karelo-Finnish folklore. Indeed, in another meeting of the primary party organizations of the branch (on September 30) Mashezersky complained that they could not completely control activities of those scholars living in Leningrad and sometimes visiting Petrozavodsk. These close ties between Leningrad and Petrozavodsk scholars were mutually beneficial to make a small room of maneuvers amid the ideological campaign. In Petrozavodsk, the anti-“kowtowing to the West” campaign hit Evseev first, who, as Bogdanov criticized in a party meeting, in 1946 “corresponded with researchers abroad, boasting of letters [from Finland] in every possible way and trying to make himself famous in Finland.” Andriainen added that Evseev felt proud of his works being reviewed in the “most reactionary journal in Finland.”

Though the resolution in this meeting did not include criticism against him, Evseev was repeatedly criticized of his “kowtowing” in similar meetings. This naturally led to monitoring the ideological and theoretical “rightness” of Evseev’s works in a scholars’ council meeting of the Institute in late 1947. Gardin complained that the scholars meeting had not raised Evseev’s kowtowing, but Meletinsky replied that Evseev’s approach was “right,” because Evseev demonstrated the originality of the Karelian people in the spirit of the “Russian school” by paying his main attention to singers-narrators, in clear contrast with the Finnish school. Both Bazanov and Bubrikh agreed with Meletinsky, saying that the sector had to support

202 NA RK, f. p-109, op. 3, d. 4, l. 2.

203 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2573, l. 85 (report dated October 15, 1947).

204 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2573, l. 17.

205 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2573, ll. 1–2.
Actually, as far as the Institute set as its assignment to establish the Soviet Kalevala by studying foreign scholarly works and raising national cadres and influence the Finnish scholars, the Institute had to rely on Evseev and a few other young native Karelian scholars and the Leningrad scholars who supervised them.

Of course, this did not mean that the scholars were far enough from the campaign in Leningrad. In March 1948, Meletinsky was removed from the head of the literature section of the Institute, replaced by Kirill Chistov. In his letter to Zhirmunsky, he wrote that Meletinsky was removed from the post “without reason” and he was relieved that this replacement did not cause Meletinsky’s suspicion against him, because Meletinsky already knew him well. Bazanov, who was waiting for his defense in September 1948, also saw harsh criticism in Leningrad but, as a member of the Communist Party, had to be seriously engaged in the ideological campaign in Petrozavodsk. For instances in the meeting of the Soviet Writers Union board (on March 4, 1948) Druzhin (editor-in-chief of the journal Zvezda) attacked Veselovsy and the Leningrad folklorists and presented Bazanov a “controversial question”: why the folklorists ignored Soviet folklore and concerned themselves with pre-revolutionary folklore and narrators, even though the time of illiterate narrator-singers “somewhere in Karelia” had already passed and the people in the countryside were so literate and educated that they read printed bylina. So, these three young scholars as well had to defend their own research and career under attack in Leningrad and Petrozavodsk.

**Planning the Soviet Kalevala Jubilee**

The preparation for the Kalevala jubilee went on with the entanglement between the international and domestic campaign generated by the Cold War and a specific context the Soviet-Finnish relations and the Karelo-Finnish Republic set. Between the 1947 preliminary session and April 1948 the Institute kept contact with potential jubilee session speakers and made some tentative programs. Shitov sent a letter to Mikhail Alekseev (Leningrad University) to ask him to join as a speaker. After the preliminarty session Propp indicated in his telegram to Shitov that Azadovsky would write about the Kalevala in the Russian scholarship if Vozenesesky (probably Aleksandr) and Azadovsky agreed. Likewise, Päss wrote to Bogdanov that the decision adopted in the preliminary session was shared with the Estonian Academy of Sciences and his theme for the jubilee session would be “Singers of the Kalevala [Pevtsy Kalevaly].” A draft program (dated October 28, 1947) included

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206 KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 47, ll. 15–17 (protocol of the scholar meeting of the Institute dated November 28, 1947).
207 SPF ARAN, f. 1001 (V. M. Zhirmunsky), op. 3, d. 912 (Letters from Chistov), l. 1.
208 TsGALI SPb, f. 371, op. 1, d. 45, l. 163ob–164.
209 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 45, l. 74.
210 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 45, l. 103 (received July 2, 1947).
211 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 45, l. 140 (Päss’s letter from Tallinn dated August 22, 1947).
such name as Kilpotin, Pavel Bernov (docent of Leningrad University), and Bazanov in addition to the speakers of the preliminary session. As a principle until early 1948, however, the basic draft program of the jubilee session went unchanged (except for Estonian and Russian topics): 1. Kuusinen, 2. Zhirmunsky “the Kalevala in the world epic creation,” 3. Propp “the place of the Kalevala in the history of epics,” 4. Meletinsky “the Kalevala, myth and tale,” 5. Armas Äikiä, ”the political image of the Kalevala,” 6. Evseev “the Karelian period in the history of Kalevala poems,” 7. Lehmus “Lönnrot’s Kalevala as a literary product,” 8. A. Popov “the Kalevala from an ethnographic point of view,” and 9. Bubrikh and Hämäläinen, "the language of the Kalevala." The anti-Veselovsky campaign, however, was gradually putting pressure on the preparation. By spring in 1948 the main speakers were submitting their first draft to the Republic government jubilee committee. Zhirmusnky in his first draft “the Kalevala in the world epic creation” stressed two points: refute the reactionary bourgeois theory of Kaarle Krohn and the Finnish school (against the theory of borrowing; against the nationalistic theory of purely Finnish origin of the Kalevala; against feudal-aristocratic theory on the origin of the Kalevala) and show the Kalevala as the people’s epic, peasant in its ideological contents, artistic form, and poetic style (heroes’ peaceful work; poetics of the people’s wisdom, realistic description of the peasants of the Karelo-Finnish North). Even though his text of the 1947 preliminary session was not available, his thesis as a principle remained unchanged. Likewise, Evseev’s draft did not change from the 1947 presentation, though the new title “the roads [puti] of the development of the epic songs of the Karelian people” suggested a more linear description of the development of the Karelian people and its poems. The draft tells that his paper would show how specifically Karelian Kalevala poems were crystalized under the specific social-economic conditions and through interactions with ancient Finnic, Baltic, and Slavic tribes. It also tells that later northern and southern Karelian epic traditions were formed and mutually influenced, which finally led to the epic tradition of a unified Karelian people. The clearest change at this phase was Lehmus’s draft about Lönnrot. She changed the title to “Elias Lönnrot as compiler [sostavitel'] of the Kalevala,” which suggested that the authorship of Lönnrot and his presence as a national symbol stayed behind the collective mass of the Karelo-Finnish people and epic singers.

It was Propp that was pessimistic about the jubilee. Propp worried about the attack against his works and method and on February 18 wrote to Sykiäinen: “Yesterday I had a very short meeting with prof. V. M. Zhirmunsky. […] Well before our meeting, he wrote to you that he did not find it possible to work in the government committee for the Kalevala jubilee for several reasons which are described in the letter. […] Concerning me, your proposal is for me very attractive [zamanchivo] and

212 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 57, ll. 56–57.  
213 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 102, ll. 8–9.  
214 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 120, l. 19.  
215 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 120, ll. 20–23.  
216 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 120, ll. 26–27.
joyous [lestno], but everywhere I presuppose some difficulties. I did not have these difficulties when I first agreed to participation in your cabinet. [...] I must reconsider my article and investigate how much it meets today’s requirements, but this will take two-three days.”

On February 29, he sent another letter, which reads: “On February 27, I saw prof. Viktor Maksimovich Zhirmunsky and told him the content of our meeting. He agreed to be included in the government committee of the Kalevala jubilee and promised to inform you about this by way of personal letter. I reviewed my work on the Kalevala and thought that it does not meet the present requirements and directions. As you know, my book on tales was exposed to very fierce criticism in the press. I am not confirmed as an employee of the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences USSR and am facing release from membership of the Institute of Literature. Under these conditions, I feel uncomfortable to be a member of the government committee. I am deeply grateful for your trust in me. I tried to have my article revised, but I found this impossible.”

It is not clear if Propp submitted his first draft to the government committee, other drafts were shared with other jubilee committee members such as Kuusinen, Sykiäinen and Chistov, after which Kuusinen started to intervene in the preparation. In early April, Chistov visited Leningrad (from 3 to 6) to discuss this with Leningrad scholars and after this went to Moscow (April 7) to discuss the preparation with Kuusinen. According to Chistov’s letter to Sykiäinen, Zhirmunsky approved all drafts (not only Evseev and Lehms but also Linevsky, Huttari, and Hämäläinen), and Azadovsky was so ill that he could not comment the drafts, and Astakhova’s theme was not yet ready. On April 7, Chistov visited Kuusinen in Moscow, where Kuusinen more clearly told about the concept of the jubilee: first of all, Kuusinen set the date of the opening day of the jubilee as April 16 1949 (on Saturday) because “[I]n Finland, obviously, it will start on Monday. We must go a little bit ahead of it in order that the democratic press [in Finland] announce the start of our jubilee before the beginning of their jubilee.” Furthermore, Kuusinen continued, “[I]deological meaning of the jubilee: Fierce controversy with the official Finnish science, expose its nationalism, tendency, and narrowness” by setting the basic problem of the Kalevala study from the Marxist point of view.

As to the drafts, Kuusinen especially commented on the ones by Lehms and Evseev: Evseev must be “more boldly and clearly” distinct from the bourgeois-Finnish point of view and must consult Zhirmunsky; Lehms has to argue against those who underestimate the role of the people in the creation of the Kalevala and “must study the doctoral dissertation defended in Helsinki in 1947, which addresses the role of the people.”

Kuusinen’s instructions suggest that in addition to being clearly offensive against the Finns Kuusinen regarded it important to show solidarity with the pro-Soviet forces in Finland by setting the

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217 NA RK, f. r-1394, op. 6, d. 242/1211, ll. 89–91.
218 NA RK, f. r-1394, op. 6, d. 242/1211, ll. 95–96.
219 NA RK, f. r-1394, op. 6, d. 242/1211, l. 93.
220 NA RK, f. r-1394, op. 6, d. 242/1211, ll. 93–93a.
221 NA RK, f. r-1394, op. 6, d. 242/1211, l. 93a.
date of the Soviet jubilee in April (17th April is the day Lönnrot sent the manuscript of the New Kalevala to the publisher), not on February 28. For Kuusinen, the jubilee seemed to have a powerful propaganda potential to influence Finnish society and support the pro-Soviet forces. Actually, *Leninskoe znamia* reported on June 9 1948 that the Kalevala jubilee scholarly session would be held in April 1949, and likewise the organ of the Society of Finland-Soviet Union *SNS-Lehti* reported that the Soviet Kalevala Jubilee would take place in April 1949.222 And Kuusinen brought a “territorial dimension” into the Kalevala jubilee discussion, which is clearly reflected in his comment on Evseev’s draft, when he visited Petrozavodsk to listen to his presentation on April 22. Kuusinen asked Evseev: “How are you trying to refute the reactionary scholarship of the Finnish bourgeois scholars on the origins of the Kalevala poems? […] I am worrying that having a large number of materials you will get buried in them when you try to use them in many ways in your presentation. I think that in the presentation you must concentrate on concrete, on a somewhat concrete theme. […] In this big presentation, you are expected to put forward the idea that the motherland of the Kalevala is the territory of our Soviet Karelia. This you must demonstrate theoretically, and this will be one theme. […] All themes must be theoretically grounded and politically pointed [zaostreny].”223 Given the ongoing anti-foreign, anti-Veselovsky campaign, this stress on “territorial integrity” of Soviet culture was essential to the success of the jubilee, but, as discussed later, this demand from Kuusinen caused conflict with the jubilee speakers.

Another point Kuusinen pushed is the scale of the jubilee. Kuusinen told Chistov and the writer Samuil Marshak, representing the Soviet Writers’ Union, that he hoped to have an “all-Union committee” for the jubilee, like the ones established in the past for the jubilees of “Firdousi, Rustabel’, Shevchenko, and others.” Kuusinen asked the Soviet Writers’ Union to support the jubilee, and Marshak (and later also Marietta Shaginian, a Soviet Armenian writer) to help translate parts of the Kalevala poems into Russian. And Kuusinen “approved inviting A. M. Astakhova and other guest speakers, notifying beforehand that, of course, one must not be keen on the number of the papers if it turns out to sacrificing the quality.”224 This means that Kuusinen prioritized the Finnish-Karelian relations but saw little problem in including Russian and Estonian related papers to the session as long as they did not violate the Soviet ideology of internationalism. Whether or not Kuusinen was conscious of it, pan-Finnic brotherhood as well were quietly included in the plan of the Kalevala jubilee.

Then, how was the discussion on the Kalevala jubilee going in Finland? The doctoral dissertation Kuusinen mentioned might be the work by Yrjö Penttinen because he addressed the people’s (either Slavic or Finnic) role in spreading and creating the poems and variants by using Soviet

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223 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 73, l. 59. The underline is original.
224 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 73, l. 94–94b.
materials. In Finland, the controversy over the Kalevala continued after Kaukonen’s 1946 lecture but some gradually began to accept Kaukonen’s thesis on the Kalevala as Lönnrot’s creation. On Kalevala Day 1948, non-leftist local newspapers including the major evening paper *Ilta-Sanomat* began to talk about his authorship, though not mentioning that he “created” the Kalevala.225 Those who were opposed to the leftist interpretation of the Kalevala were also finding a new direction and shifted the focus from the Kalevala itself to the original poems which Lönnrot and other Finnish scholars had collected for a century and the poet-singers who had inherited the poems. Martti Haavio published the second edition of his war-time work *Viimeiset Runonlaulajat* by removing some “politically incorrect” words and phrases in 1948 and his work on *Väinämöinen* stressed the gratitude to “our” ancestors for preserving the poems from generation to generation.226

A clash of these two directions happened in the weekly journal *Kansan Kuvalehti*, where Matti Kuusi and Kaukonen criticized each other over the Kalevala as a Finnish national symbol. On Kalevala Day 1948, Kuusi (pseudonym *Savinnyrkki*) described the Kalevala as “the prison house of the ancient poems,” saying that Lönnrot did a great job to save the poems from oblivion and contributed to Finnish national music, painting, and language by delivering the Kalevala, but “his Kalevala” was just a page of Finnish history, though “at this moment hardly so any longer.” Kuusi maintained that since Lönnrot spoiled the original, beautiful poems in the making of the Kalevala, it is time to “decide what parts of the Kalevala one should read in school and put the rest in the National Museum.”227 Valle Ojaniemi, a teacher from Helsinki, in puzzlement reacted to Kuusi saying that denying the Kalevala and Lönnrot, “the letter of proxy to the family nations,” was “like throwing cold water on the back of someone’s neck [niin kuin kylmää vettä niskaan].” At the same time, he asked, if the whole Kalevala is the imagination of Lönnrot, are the Kalevala heroes such as *Väinämöinen*, *Ilmarinen*, *Louhi*, *Lemminkäinen* not born from “our ancient poets” but from the brain of Lönnrot? He could accept neither of them, because “both [the Kalevala and Lönnrot] have the symbolic meaning and value that, especially right now, should not lose any of its credibility.”228 By refuting Kuusi, Kaukonen emphasized that the Kalevala was the earliest national literature and Lönnrot was a great national writer to rival Shakespeare and Cervantes. He especially attacked Kuusi’s orientation toward the antiquity of the poems and wrote that even if the Kalevala was broken “into pieces,” it was impossible to return it to antiquity, because many more “frosted windows [himmetä ikkunoita]” appeared and prevented us from seeing. Kaukonen thus concluded that antiquity could not replace the


Kalevala, which was great Finnish literature and a national symbol.229

This conflict was indeed over the Kalevala as a national symbol but also reflected disciplinary and political conflicts. Kaukonen as a literature researcher had been dissatisfied with the fact that folklorists dominated the Kalevala and the related poem studies. Kaukonen competed with Haavio for the post of professor of folkloristics at the University of Helsinki after the death of Salminen in 1947. Following the references from Uno Harva and two other professors, the history and linguistic department finally chose Haavio in October 1948. In his reference, Harva judged that Kaukonen’s works were “almost negligible miltei olematon” in terms of folklore studies since Kaukonen did not understand the difference between Lönnrot’s Kalevala and Arhippa Perttunen’s poems.230 While preparing for his doctoral dissertation on the Sampo cycle, Kuusi belonged to a former AKS network of anti-Soviet and -communism and was engaged in the 1948 election campaign, and recalled that Kaukonen once in early 1945 told: “We will live in Soviet Finland before spring.”231 Though Kaukonen was not actively engaged in “political activities” of the SKDL and SKP, the SKP organ supported him, seeing Lönnrot not only as the compiler of the poems but also as a poet.232 Kuusi wrote to Kaukonen: “The right and duty of the period of upheaval is to study the grounds of inherited beliefs, throw off decayed myths, and raise new truths which last longer in the new space. […] Only a certain modest question might be allowed before exploding the centenary national epic-temple. What becomes of the space?”233

The official Finnish Kalevala jubilee took a middle position between Kuusi and Kaukonen but decided to treat Lönnrot as the main symbol of the jubilee. On 27 February 1948, the preparation meeting for the official Helsinki jubilee saw the gathering of the Minister of Education Eino Kilpi and representatives of academic and cultural organizations to discuss the centenary jubilee. Armas Väisänen, the chairman of the Kalevala society, proposed focusing the main attention on the lifework of Lönnrot because the new Kalevala was more “Lönnrot’s creation” than the old Kalevala, whose centenary jubilee “everybody still remembered well.”234

The Soviet jubilee, therefore, had to confront the Finnish official jubilee by showing that the Kalevala poems were the creation of the Soviet people and Soviet Karelia, not the creation of the ancestors of the Finnish nation nor of Lönnrot. To establish a “Soviet Lönnrot,” the Institute intensively discussed Lehmus’s draft, which aimed to stress Lönnrot’s interaction with the Karelians. Other scholars agreed to this as Bubrikh advised her to “clearly demonstrate a friendship between

230 SKS Kirjallisuuden arkisto, Kaukonen archive, file 21 (Harva’s reference about Kaukonen).
233 SKS Kirjallisuuden arkisto, Kaukonen archive, Kuusi’s letter to Kaukonen (not dated).
234 Kalevalaseuran arkisto, pöytäkirja (February 27, 1948).
Lönnrot and the Karelians.”

Evseev more frankly mentioned the need to focus the Karelian singers by pointing out the rivalry with Finland, especially Kaukonen: “In Finland nowadays, it is very trendy to think that Lönnrot collected the epic from the Karelians, included his own worldview into it, and presented it in such way that the Karelians borrowed it from someone. Being silent about the role of the narrators leads to this argument.”

Furthermore, Bubrikh and other participants underlined the importance of making clear the general background of the activities of Lönnrot; the economic-social conditions in Finland after the “liberation” from feudal Sweden and his relationship with Snellman. As Propp advised Lehmus in Leningrad, the “progressive” character of the Finnish national movement reacting against Russian tsarism was necessary to show Lönnrot as one of the progressive intellectuals of the time.

Chistov thus proposed to mention Lönnrot’s travel with Grot in Finland and Pletnyov as progressive Russian intellectuals. In fact, the Soviet scholars, too, had conflicting views about to what extent the Kalevala reflected Lönnrot’s worldview and those of the singers.

Nonetheless, Soviet Lönnrot was being articulated through negotiations as a progressive national intellectual of the Russian Empire, thanks to which he had a chance to “receive” the poems from the people’s singers in present Soviet Karelia and contributed to “healthy” Finnish nationalism against tsarism by publishing the Kalevala.

This in turn further highlighted the importance of the “people” who created the poems, shared them with Lönnrot, and was still creating new poems in Soviet Karelia. But, who were they? Karelians or Finns or the Karelo-Finnish people?

**Attack on the Finno-Ugric Kinship and Russian Folkloristics**

This “people” is primarily the Soviet Karelian people who were still not only preserving the Kalevala related poems but creating new Soviet poems in the Republic. Since the Finnish “bourgeois” scholars claimed that the Kalevala singers had already gone, the Soviet scholars had to demonstrate that the Finns were “lying.” For this aim, the Institute organized an expedition for collecting both “old” Kaleva related poems and “new” poems (called *noviny*) about the Soviet achievement, the last war, the Soviet life and people, and Stalin.

In addition to his jubilee session paper, Evseev was preparing a brochure of newly collected Karelian folklore and an anthology of Karelian folklore for the jubilee.

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235 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 86, ll. 15–17 (protocol of meeting of the literature section of the Institute on March 25, 1948).
236 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 86, l. 52 (protocol of meeting of the literature section of the Institute on November 6, 1948).
237 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 86, ll. 50–51. Propp was not present at the meetings in Petrozavodsk, but Lehmus consulted him after the September meeting of the literature section.
238 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 86, l. 18 (Chistov’s comment) and 51 (Hämäläinen’s comment).
In the introduction to the brochure, Evseev explained how Soviet folklorists approached the narrators and described Lönnrot as a predecessor of Soviet folklorists: “What is the role of the Soviet folklorists in front of them [the narrators]? It is not to be a bystander absorbing the creative life of the narrators, but to conduct political and educational activity among them and help them to look for new forms of creation which completely reflect the life of our motherland. The Soviet folklorists such as Bogdanov, who wrote down poems and songs in north Karelia in 1926 and Evseev, who wrote down poems and songs by Maria Lemus in 1934, are all heirs of Lönnrot, who wrote down songs by Arhippa Perttunen.”

In as far as the titular people of the Republic was the Karelo-Finnish people, however, celebrating only the Karelian people was not enough and it was even politically incorrect. The jubilee thus had to clarify the relations between the Karelians and the Finns and further so between them and the Russian people during the ideological attack against Finno-Ugric language kinship and pre-revolutionary Russian folklore studies. An important event in this respect was the session of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the Soviet Union [VASKhNIL] in the summer of 1948, where Trofim Lysenko, agronomist and biologist, finally won Stalin’s support and declared the victory of his “Michurinist” theory over the bourgeois “Mendelist-Morganist” genetics, that is, Lysenko denied heredity and genetics by insisting the main role of environment in affecting evolution. For many, the similarities between biology and linguistics were obvious: as Ethan Pollock has explained, “primordial and unchanging hereditary material” appeared in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s understanding of language, the concept of language family, and of proto language. One of the main targets in linguistics became those who were labelled as students of Indo-European linguistics including Bubrikh and Finno-Ugric studies. A meeting of the scholars’ council of the Karelo-Finnish branch of Academy of Sciences discussed the result of Lysenko’s victory on September 25, and A. V. Ivanov (head of the economics section) said that the researchers of humanities “sooner or later” had to address the problems of “direction” of folkloristics and Finno-Ugric studies of the Institute, though the decision of the meeting mentioned only the reconstruction of biology.

At the same meeting, Gardin also understood that Lysenko’s speech and the decision of the VASKhNIL session would influence the whole of Soviet science including the humanities. Gardin criticized those folklorists who were not willing to study Soviet folklore, believing that folklore was perishing in Soviet time, and clung to old folklore, showing the “idealization of reactionary remnants.” He thus said that it was time to return to the “present day [segodniashnemu dniu]” for those scholars

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241 Pollock, Stalin and the Soviet, 108; Smith, Language and Power in the Creation of the USSR, 165. On Lycenko and his controversy, see also chapter 3 in Pollock’s study.
242 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3107, l. 32 (protocol of the meeting of the scholars’ council of the Base on September 25, 1948).
who “lives in the past [vcherashnim dnem].” Gardin continued that Finno-Ugric linguists as well lived “in the past,” as Cheboksarov’s review “rightly” demonstrated, and did not follow the teaching of Nikolai Marr.243 In his critical review of 1947 Finno-Ugric conference in Leningrad, the Moscow anthropologist Nikolai Cheboksarov criticized the very concept of the conference of treating the Finno-Ugric language people as a single ethnic and cultural entity, concentrating the mutual interactions within the group and ignoring their historical interactions with neighboring non-Finno-Ugric groups, among others the Slavic peoples and languages. Cheboksarov pointed out that Soviet Finno-Ugric studies had not yet produced any studies from the Marrist point of view.244 Petrozavodsk linguists including Alatyrev, who was regarded a Marrist, opposed his “blame on us” without his knowing about linguistics.245 Cheboksarov himself wrote to Bubrikh that he understood opinions of Soviet Finno-Ugric scholars and agreed to give a paper on a Finno-Ugric theme from an anthropologic standpoint at the second all-union conference of Finno-Ugric studies Bubrikh was preparing for.246

It was a warning, nonetheless, for both the Kalevala jubilee and Bubrikh because the Kalevala was associated with Karelian-Finnish language kinship, and Bubrikh was expected to make clear his position on this, especially the Finnish-Karelian kinship and the Karelian character of the Kalevala, which Bubrikh once rejected in the 1930s. The government committee and Kuusinen divided the joint draft paper of Bubrikh and Hämäläinen to have Bubrikh clarify to whom the Kalevala poems belong. In his draft “On the ethnic background [prinadlezhnosti] of the Kalevala poems” submitted to the government committee in spring 1948, however, Bubrikh criticized the discussion on the origins of the Kalevala poems and insisted that it had no relation to the ethnic background of the poems. One finds, of course, Karelian and Finnish words and names in the poems but also even ones of Swedish and Russian origin. Admitting that the Kalevala poems came exclusively from the Karelian people (since Lönnrot took dictations from the narrators), he wrote that the connection between Korela and Em’ was close, especially in the north, and their factors were mixed into the poems. Bubrikh thus wrote, “we have a possibility to clarify the ethnic background of the Kalevala poems with enough accuracy: these are the creation of the Karelo-Finnish people.”247 Besides, he stated that we could connect the origins of the poems with either place, because neither Karelian ancestors nor Finnish ones lived where the Karelians and Finns live today. He concluded that one could not associate the Kalevala related

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243 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3107, ll. 52–54.
245 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 103, ll. 2–12 (the protocol of the meeting of the Institute on September 21, 1948).
246 SPF ARAN, f. 1112, op. 1, d. 117, l. 1 (Cheboksarov’s letter to Bubrikh dated October 30, 1948).
247 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 120, ll. 5–6, 9.
poems with either Karelia or Finland, because the demographical fluidity was high at that time.248

This scholarly “sincere” statement obviously contradicted Kuusinen’s demand on territoriosity of the Kalevala poems. According to Chistov’s account, Kuusinen directly requested Bubrikh to rewrite the draft and withdraw his previous argument in the 1930s.249 In fact, for those who were not familiar with the discussion on the Kalevala it was unclear what the “official” line about the Kalevala was. Shaginian wrote to her friend Vladimir Gordlevsky, now academician at the age of 71 in 1948, to get him involved in the Kalevala jubilee but she stressed the need to “update” his idea and reached unexpectedly the same conclusion on the role of Lönnrot as Kaarle Krohn wrote in 1902: “And you contradict yourself. It [the essay by Gordlevsky in 1903] was written 45 years earlier. I gave many promising ideas to it. One is that Lönnrot was saved by his little personal genius [odaren nost’] which helped him deliver us the popular essence [nachalo] in a pure shape and take a risk to take on the epic. If he had more talent, he could not have done it. You consider this. I would give a right concept to it: the Kalevala – the popular epic in such sense as we call the Iliad and the Odyssey epic, the Kalevala was mainly written down in Karelia: the Kalevala did not receive so much influence from the Edda, […] But our Soviet scholar Bubrikh in 1932 (sic!) in a Soviet publication deigned to state that the Kalevala – as a whole under the influence of the Edda, great influence in it. […] The Kalevala – the epic of the time of the Vikings, a feudal monument. […] the Finnish language was totally Germanized. Come on, who is close to the truth and which year is more relevant to the Soviet era, my splash [pleskanie] of 1903 or Bubrikh’s 1932 (sic!)?”250 To publicly refute his past argument, Bubrikh initially prepared his apology in the end of his jubilee session paper to withdraw his 1933 thesis, but in the end he was to publish a separate piece for this in the Petrozavodsk journal Na rubezhe.

It is true that the popular, Karelian (geographically) and Karelo-Finnish character of the Kalevala was politically important for the success of the jubilee, but again the competition with Finland was another significant factor for the Soviet jubilee to highlight the Karelian-Finnish kinship and even include the Estonians. Before the time of the first All-Union Finno-Ugric conference in Leningrad, Soviet Finno-Ugric scholars began to have access to Finnish academic journals from Finland and learn of Finnish academic works from the postwar period. In October 1947, Ariste from Tartu wrote to Bubrikh: “I am very grateful to You and Your wife for Your hospitality. As in last winter, now my impression of the Leningrad people is at its very best. You are not only kind [laskovye] to me but Sie haben auch den Geist – Und so es den Geist gibt, da lass Ich leben, as Goethe said. […] Yesterday, two issues of Virittäjä (1947, no. 1 and 2) came to Tartu. They have many interesting pieces. Among others J. J. Mikkola passed away. So did Mansikka and the linguist Uotila. In Virittäjä one

248 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 120, ll. 9–11.
250 ARAN, f. 688 (Gordlevsky), op. 4, d. 354, l. 7 (Shaginian’s letter to Gordlevsky dated August 28, 1948).
sees Turunen’s article on the Ludians above all. According to him, the Ludians are Veps immigrants who became Karelianized. It seems that he has not read the results of the Soviet studies on the Veps.”  

After returning from occupied Karelia, Aimo Turunen indeed continued his linguistic research on the Veps language and the Ludian dialect, especially the consonants, which he argued following previous Finnish linguistics obtained their main character from the Veps language but also gained influence from the Olonets Karelian dialect in its development. This was a similar conclusion Bubrikh had reiterated since 1945 and the Soviet Kalevala jubilee thus needed to propagate the “achievement” of Soviet scholarship to Finland.

Furthermore, there was a more active reason to include the Estonians. Many leading Estonian humanities scholars such as Felix Oinas and Julius Mägiste had fled to Britain, Sweden, or the US during the final phase of the last war. One of them was Gustav Ränk, who continued his research in Sweden and published a piece about the result of his wartime expedition to the Votic villages in Finland. Despite his materials collected there – unavailable due to his evacuation, Ränk could introduce his latest ethnographic knowledge on Votic culture and life in the Leningrad region to Finnish readers. According to Ariste’s diary, the University of Tartu and the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR (especially the vice chairman Nigol Andresen) supported further expedition to Votic villages in the Leningrad region, and in July 1947 Ariste and two Tartu students carried out an expedition there, where Ariste wrote down some Votic poems. Using these materials, Ariste wrote a session paper “On the Votic popular poems [Vatjalaisten kansarunoisto/O vodskikh narodykh pesniakh],” which maintained that though the Votic language was related to the Estonian language and influenced by the neighboring Ingrian and Finnish languages, the Votics had developed their own language and poetic tradition. Furthermore, Ariste introduced a variant of the Kalevala poem collected on his last expedition and emphasized that along with the Ingrian tradition the Votic epic tradition formed an “essential link [oleellisena renkaana/sushchestvennym zvenom]” between the Estonian and Karelo-Finnish Kalevala tradition.

In short, the competition with Finland encouraged the Soviet jubilee and participants to seek a Soviet Finnic kinship despite the ideological offensive against it. Arguably more vulnerable than the Finnic scholars were the Russian folklorists who had a direct connection with the Leningrad academic world. The VASKhNIL session and the death of Andrei Zhdanov (announced on September 1) was followed by Nikolai Leont’ev’s piece, which attacked not only Azadovsky but also Astakhova and Bazanov in September, and meetings of the scholars’ council.

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251 SPF ARAN, f. 1112, op. 1, d. 105, ll. 4–5 (Ariste’s letter to Bubrikh dated October 26, 1947).
255 Eesti Kultuurilooline Arhiv (EKLA), f. 330, m. 179:1, ll. 77–99 (draft in Finnish), 101–19 (draft in Russian). This draft was received by the Institute in November 1948 (Bodanov’s letter to Ariste dated November 27, 1948. EKLA, f. 330, m. 35:3, l. 1).
and the party organization of the Institute of Literature in October. At the same time, Georgii Berdenikov was appointed as the dean of the Faculty of Philology of Leningrad University on September 20 and Aleksei Bushmin, student of Fadeev, started to work at the Institute of Literature, both of them played a central role in the 1949 purge. The ideological campaign strengthened its attack toward those folklorists who were labelled as “comparativist” and allegedly ignored Soviet folklore. At the two-day (October 23–24) meeting of the scholars’ council of the Institute of Literature, Bushmin criticized Plotkin, now the director, of “inadequate” performance of the Institute and Shiriaeva criticized the folklore section of the Institute led by Azadovsky of ignoring the views of the Russian revolutionary-democrats (Belinsky, Dobroliubov, Chernyshevsky) on folklore and not studying Soviet folklore, the “living, creative process happening at present.” The resolution of the meeting mentioned this “shortcoming” in the works of Azadovsky, Astakhova, and Bazanov.256 Already in March Bazanov self-criticized his past studies based on Veselovsky, pre-revolutionary Russian folklorists Rybnikov and Alexander Gil’ferding, ignoring Dobroliubov. At the October meeting of the Institute of Literature, Bazanov agreed with Shiriaeva, who expressed suspicion against Meletinsky as a pupil of Zhirmunsky, both “formalist-apologists” of Veselovsky, and proposed to strengthen vigilance against the Karelo-Finnish branch of the Academy of Sciences, where Azadovsky had sent “his own pupil” Chistov.257

In fact, as early as June, an inspection team [brigade] of the TsK VKPb studied the plan of the literature section of the Institute for 1949 and instructed the section to put more emphasis on the Soviet, especially national (non-Russian) folklore and literature, after which Gardin and Chistov reported to the Republic TsK that the section lectured the Karelian narrators about the heroes of the last war, 25th anniversary of the Republic, and international situation to encourage them to produce Soviet folklore.258 Though not mentioning the Karelo-Finnish branch, Kul’tura i zhizn’ criticized the Academy of Sciences of the USSR of lacking leadership over ideological control in its branches in the “peripheries” such as Kirgiz and Dagestan.259 The same organ later reported the meeting at the Agitprop department of the TsK VKPb, which discussed literature organizations of the Karelo-Finnish Republic and pointed out “serious shortcomings” in literature and linguistics of the Institute, concentrating on only pre-revolutionary and Russian folklore studies.260 In response to this criticism, the literature section of the Institute held an open meeting to critically review its activity on October 256

257 TsGAIPD SPb, f. 3034, op. 2, d. 1, l. 32 (Bazanov’s remark at closed party meeting of the Institute of Literature on March 24, 1948), ll. 96ob–70 (Shiriaeva and Bazanov’s remarks at the meeting of the scholars’ council of the Institute on October 22, 1948).
258 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3106, ll.118–19.

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13 and Chistov acknowledged the criticisms against previous activities of the section including works by Bazanov, “the former head of the section,” who believed in the theory of “extinction [otmiraniia] of folklore in Soviet time” and regarded it essential to reconstruct the section by increasing Soviet, “especially national,” folklore studies and the number of researchers engaged in national folklore and Finno-Ugric studies.261

This troubled the potential jubilee session speakers who were expected to present the Russian bylina tradition in Karelia and Russian-Karelian folklore interactions: Astakhova, Bazanov, and Propp. In her doctoral work Astakhova addressed a classical question of Russian folkloristics on why the bylina of Kievan Rus’ survived and continued to develop in Russian Karelia, periphery of Greater Novgorod by studying bylina singers of Olonets and White Sea Karelia. Furthermore, succeeding Rybnikov and Gil’ferding, Astakhova published anthologies of distinguished bylina singers of Karelia such as Ivan Riabinin-Andreev of Kizhi, collections of Russian historical songs rich in Olonets Karelia, and selected bylinas collected in Karelia, which told of optimism and struggles against foreign invaders from East and West for the freedom, unity, and independence of the Russian people and heroes.262 Chistov’s letters to Astakhova suggest that Astakhova agreed to participate in the jubilee session as a speaker and sent her draft to the jubilee committee in the summer.263 In the report about the activities of the Karelo-Finnish branch (from January to 14th of July) to the Republic TsK the director Gorskii wrote that Astakhova’s draft “the role of the Kalevala in the history of Russian folklore studies” was sent back to the author for “rewriting [dorabotki prospekty].”264 In another report to the Republic TsK in the end of the year, however, Gardin did not mention her name as a speaker at the jubilee.265 It is not clear whether Astakhova gave up or Kuusinen declined her draft but, given the criticism against her and the ongoing campaign, it seemed unacceptable to discuss the influence of the Kalevala on Russian folklore studies.

The fate of Propp’s draft is known to researchers of Soviet/Russian folklore studies: Kuusinen rejected his paper because Propp wrote that it was meaningless to claim there was a single national background of the Kalevala poems and it was impossible to identify the Kalevala, an “artificial dome [iskusstvennyi svod],” with the popular poems.266 True, Propp wrote that the “old

261 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 86, ll. 42–43 (the decision of the meeting of the literature section on October 13, 1948).
262 For example, Anna Astakhova, ed., Severnye istoricheskie pesni (Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo Karelo-Finskoi SSR, 1947).
263 SPF ARAN, f. 724, op. 1, n. 385, l. 1 (Chistov’s letter dated March 4, 1948), l. 7 (Chistov’s letter dated June 9, 1948).
264 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3106, l. 108.
265 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3106, l. 158.
science” in Finland and Russia had made (and was making) an effort to explain to what extent Lönnrot changed and retained the original poems. Recognizing this as one direction for further research, Propp wrote that Soviet science had to focus on the poems of the people to include the Kalevala poems in larger comparative studies of epics. As Propp wrote to Sykiäinen in February 1948, his paper is part of his ongoing research on the Russian heroic epic, which sought the origin of the Russian bylina in the time of the pre-Kievan Rus’ state, and saw the Kalevala poems equivalent to the earliest, pre-state form of the Russian bylina and folklores of Siberian peoples such as the Yakuts/Sakhas, Nivkhs, and Chukchis. Propp thus believed that one could see the past in those folklores, historical reflection of the social system the people lived in and, especially by comparing the Russian bylina, gain insight into the past of the Finno-Ugric tribes [narodonostei]. Propp closed his paper by quoting a song written down by the Finnish folklorist Borenius in 1872, which describes a scene where Joukahainen and his son defended the motherland Karelia in Russia with the Russians, as an example of the historical struggle of the Karelian-Finnish people, which is, as other peoples in the Soviet Union, “national in form.” As a long-time critique of Krohn’s theory, Propp developed his criticism against not only Finnish folkloristics but also Kaukonen’s literature approach to the Kalevala while adapting himself to the Soviet national ideology such as “the friendship of peoples” and “national in form and socialist in content.”

Like Astakhova’s draft, the report by Gardin to the Republic TsK said that Propp’s draft was finally “rejected” before the jubilee. Needless to say, Evseev and Chistov encouraged Propp to engage himself in preparation for the jubilee. In June Evseev wrote to Propp that he wanted Propp’s advice on his jubilee paper and “we” were waiting for Propp’s jubilee presentation on the Kalevala. In August, Chistov also wrote to Propp to ask him to meet Lehmus in Leningrad and give advice on her jubilee paper in mid-September. Propp actually made some minor “corrections” to take Kuusinen’s demands into account: remove two sentences “The word Russia is nowhere to be found in the Kalevala” and the Karelo-Finnish epic, “which mentioned not only Louhi, but also Swedes, Danes, Russians, and other peoples,” and ease his distinction between the Kalevala and the popular poems by adding the word “some [nekotoruiu]” boundary between them. These corrections apparently did not satisfy Kuusinen.

As a result, it was Bazanov who took charge of the contributions of Russia and the Russians to this symbol of Karelo-Finnishness. Bazanov replaced Chistov as head of the literature section of

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267 NA RK, f. r-1394, op. 6, d. 242/1211, l. 96. On his work on the Russian heroic epic, see chapter 5 of Warner, Vladimir Iakovlevich Propp.
269 RO IRL RAN, f. 721, op. 1, d. 354, ll. 1–2 (Evseev’s letter to Propp dated June 25, 1948).
270 RO IRL RAN, f. 721, op. 1, d. 450, l. 1 (Chistov’s letter to Propp dated August 26, 1948).
271 RO IRL RAN, f. 721, op. 1, d. 4, l. 24.
272 RO IRL RAN, f. 721, op. 1, d. 4, l. 18.
the Institute in 1948 after severe criticism against Chistov on his handling of the situation the literature section had fallen into. Though not clear when approved, Bazanov took the role of Astakhova to show the Russian-Finnish interactions around the Kalevala in his paper “For the history of familiarizing the Kalevala in Russia [K istorii znakomstva c Kalevaloi v Rossii],” which discussed rather the leading role of “progressive” Russian intellectuals such as Glinka and Pletnyov, and above all if indirectly Pushkin, and Russian culture and their influence and “friendship” with Lönnrot before and after the publication of the old and new Kalevalas.

As a communist and a scholar of the Decembrists-intellectuals, Bazanov had to be careful on how to treat individual Decembrists, who, as Ludmilla Trigos discusses, were collectively included in the Stalinist cultural mythology as a model patriotic, Russian group speaking to the people and loyal to the state, while these facts as to their aristocratic origin, influence from the West, and revolt were suppressed.\(^{273}\) When Bazanov defended his dissertation on Decembrists Glinka and Raevskii on September 22, the Leningrad philologist Piksanov criticized Bazanov of overestimating Glinka’s “progressiveness” and ignoring his “reactionary” and “religious, mythical” aspects.\(^{274}\) Gukovsky as an opponent argued against Piksanov, who “did not read the dissertation,” that Bazanov did not “revolutionarize” Glinka and made it clear that it was “Russian academician” Sjögren that made the first note of the Kalevala poem and Feodor Glinka made the first translation of some poems into a European language (but for Finnish and Karelian), while it had been believed “for 100 years that it was Lönnrot that made the first note.” Gukovsky understood that Piksanov found in the sentence an excess of Russian centrism especially if “we have read that it is not the Wright brothers but a Russian engineer who invented the first airplane” in Soviet newspapers.\(^{275}\) This shows that Bazanov was also under the pressure of Soviet superiority, Russo-centrism, and scholarly demands.

This party pressure on pre-revolutionary Russian issues influenced not only the discussion in the Soviet Union but also the ones with Finland. The periodical of the Finland-Soviet Union Society, *SNS-lehti*, sometimes featured research publications from the Institute and living Karelian narrators such as Maria Remsu with a picture of an old Karelian narrator surrounded by children eager to listen to oral performances under the pine tree where Lönnrot was said to have written down the poems. The November *SNS-lehti* featured Leningrad philologist Natalia Kolpakova’s book on Russian folklore. The book was also used as a school text in Soviet schools and the periodical translated some parts of it, which mainly introduced the history of the development of Russian bylina, legends, tales, and customs from the 11\(^{th}\) to the 19\(^{th}\) century.\(^{276}\) Many readers were so impressed with this history of Russian folklore that they asked for further information and the periodical published another story...

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\(^{274}\) SPF ARAN, f. 150, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 118, 120–121ob.

\(^{275}\) SPF ARAN, f. 150, op. 1, d. 11, l. 122.

\(^{276}\) *SNS-lehti*, no. 46, November 10, 1948.
about Kolpakova's folklore expedition to Vologda, where she learned some charms inherited from “our ancestors” from a local Russian elderly, which showed “living folklore” in Russia. Not knowing what was going on in the Soviet Union, those sympathetic to the Soviets wanted to make use of the Kalevala centenary as an occasion to strengthen academic and cultural ties with the Soviet Union. The humanities section of Finland-Soviet Union Society asked the VOKS if it would send Soviet scholars to the Finnish Kalevala Jubilee in February 1949 and to hold a scholarly meeting with them on the Kalevala to make known to the Finns the latest research on the Kalevala in the Soviet Union. In October, the Society again asked the VOKS to send Soviet scholars of Finno-Ugric studies, folkloristics, and archaeologists to the Finnish Jubilee in addition to Soviet artists, above all the Kantele ensemble group of the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Of course, this attack on the pre-revolutionary Russian past and local, non-Russian national cultures was All-Union-wide, but what is specific of the Karelo-Finnish Republic? The Agitation and Propaganda Department of the TsK VKP(b) at the special meeting mentioned above criticized the Institute of concentrating its attention solely on the study of pre-revolutionary Russian folklore and of dismissing Soviet folklore and national (non-Russian) folklore and literature. Specifically, the Agitprop ordered the Institute to concentrate its attention to the study of national folklore and literature. To show Soviet superiority over the Finnish nationalists, the national culture had to be further enhanced. The Agitprop ordered the Institute:

“The sector’s one-sidedness toward Russian folklore and underrating the assignment to study the national culture of the Karelian-Finnish people cannot be allowed, because it has harmful political consequences. This benefits our enemies, Finnish nationalists, who slander us for the decline of Karelian culture in the USSR, Russification, and so on. […]

Expanded study of national folklore and literature in our republic will be a heavy blow to Finnish reactionary forces and its false propaganda because it will demonstrate the blossoming of the national culture of the Karelian-Finnish people by the Soviet power and her loyalty to the Soviet system and the Communist Party. Studying Finnish literature is also an important part of our ideological struggle. Profound study of classical and contemporary Finnish literature must show the progressive influence of great Russian culture on the Finnish people, especially, on the progressive Finnish writers, and it must scrutinize the democratic, progressive tendency of contemporary Finnish literature.”

278 Kansallisarkisto, Suomi-Neuvostoliitto Seura, copy of the letter to the humanities section of the VOKS, dated February 10, 1948.
279 Kansallisarkisto, Suomi-Neuvostoliitto Seura, letter to the VOKS, dated October 8, 1948.
280 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3106, ll. 151–52.
It is true that national intellectuals too were the target of criticism from Moscow. The Agitprop accused Evseev of using Kalevala poems which were collected by the Finns before the Revolution and published in Finland and of failing to accuse Jalmari Jaakkola of “falsifications” in his writings.\textsuperscript{281} Furthermore, in his report to the Republic TsK, Gerd showed his concern over the ideological weakness of Evseev and Chistov, because they were so busy.\textsuperscript{282} What worried the Agitprop most, however, was the accusation of “Russification” from the Finnish nationalists, and Moscow understood the significance of the Soviet Kalevala jubilee in reifying Soviet “respect” for a small Finnish state as Stalin remarked to the Finns in April. With this support from Moscow, Gerd could appeal to the Republic Party organization to understand the Institute’s and its researchers’ situation before the Kalevala jubilee. Replying to the Republic leadership’s demand to reconsider the activity of the Institute, Gerd wrote:

“The evaluation of the folklore section’s reconstruction would be incomplete without consideration of the most important parts of this year’s activity: the preparation for the centennial jubilee of the greatest Karelian-Finnish epic, “the Kalevala.” This jubilee grants the community [\textit{obshchestvnnost’}] of our republic and state great meaning. This will become not only a great event in the social life of our republic, not only a gift of Soviet socialist culture but also the ideological struggle in which we have to soon destroy the nationalistic and chauvinistic concept of Finnish bourgeois science.”\textsuperscript{283}

Though those who were in charge of ideology understood the need to openly wage a campaign in the Institute, as Chistov recalled, Kuusinen did not allow the local newspapers and journals to attack the researchers engaged in the preparation of the jubilee.\textsuperscript{284} A closed meeting of the party organization of the Institute discussed this criticism against the literature section from the TsK VKPb to review the plan for 1949, but it was impossible to make a new plan without party members such as Bazanov and Gardin at the meeting. Furthermore, many worried about the jubilee preparation because “not even one presentation is ready yet in complete form.”\textsuperscript{285} Since only Kuusinen and the jubilee committee were responsible for the session, the party organization of the Institute could do nothing but express concerns about the state of the preparation in its decision and wait for the jubilee.\textsuperscript{286}

The Republic party leadership indeed had to rely on Kuusinen and the scholars in this issue.

\textsuperscript{281} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3106, l. 154.
\textsuperscript{282} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3106, l. 159.
\textsuperscript{283} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3106, ll. 157–58.
\textsuperscript{284} Chistov, “Zabyty epizod nauchnoi biografii V. M. Zhirmunskogo,” 38.
\textsuperscript{285} NA RK, f. p-109, op. 3, d. 8, l. 16.
\textsuperscript{286} NA RK, f. p-109, op. 3, d. 8, l. 19.
but Kupriianov in particular had his own political interest regarding this jubilee. Though small in number, the national population of the Republic, in particular those who lived in White Sea Karelia and experienced the Finnish occupation, continued to be a serious problem for the Republic leadership. Lack of such party lecturers and propagandists fluent in Finnish made it difficult to reach such a population that did not understand Russian. In addition, they also lacked materials to be used in meetings and lectures especially when they lectured on the latest scientific issues and national culture. Propagandists and lecturers were thus dissatisfied with the fact that they did not receive any instruction on the Kalevala from the leadership. At a meeting of party lecturers in late September 1948, Shokhemskii, a lecturer of Kondopoga raion, complained to Kupriianov that they had received no materials on the Kalevala, saying, “It is shameful, comrades, to admit that we are completely weak on this problem [the Kalevala].” Likewise, at this meeting, representatives of the national raions (Kesten’ga, Kalevala, Loukhi) all appealed that the party propaganda and lecture for the Finnish and Karelian population went bad, due to lack of materials and speakers who could use Finnish or Karelian. Kupriianov could reply that we had to wage a serious struggle against the low cultural level and religious prejudice but said nothing about the Kalevala.

At the same time, a slow recovery of the Republic population was a negative factor for the post-war five-year plan of the Republic. Though the return of evacuees and demobilization (more than 16,000 by early 1947) completed in early 1948, other regions and republics were reluctant to allow the return of former residents of Soviet Karelia to secure their own workforces. The Republic suffered shortages in the labor force especially in the forestry industry, for which in 1946 only 4,300 full-time workers (13,100 in 1940) and 4,800 seasonal workers (7,000 in 1940) were working. In addition to Kolkhoz workers the Republic was compelled to use “special immigrants [spetsperedelentsy]” in the forestry industry, such as former kulaks, Vlasovites, and evicted collective farmers from Ukraine and other areas, who in total amounted to 8,647 people between 1946–1948. POWs (on February 1, 1947, 19,711 Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and others) in the Republic were also important sources for the forestry, construction, and paper industry for the first post-war years, but they started to leave

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287 According to a document of the Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, the number of Finns in the Republic was 4,999 in 1947, of whom 1,958 lived in Petrozavodsk. Alexey Golubev and Irina Takala, The Search for a Socialist El Dorado: Finnish Immigration to Soviet Karelia from the United States and Canada in the 1930s (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2014), 164.
288 NA RK, f. r-2152, op. 1, d. 15/138, l. 69 (stenographic record of a meeting of lectures at the Republic Committee of Cultural-Enlightenment institutions of the Council of Ministers of the KFSSR on September 29–30, 1948).
289 NA RK, f. r-2152, op. 1, d. 15/138, ll. 29–56.
290 NA RK, f. r-2152, op. 1, d. 15/138, ll. 87–88.
291 Korabiev, Istoriia Karelii, 685.
the Republic beginning in 1948. Furthermore, according to Pavel Polian’s study, the Karelo-Finnish Republic seemed most opposing to MVD’s plan to make it possible to deport the repatriates again who had already served their term, fearing loss of their quality workforce. Despite a great demand for its timber and paper productions for the reconstruction of the whole USSR, the Republic struggled to maintain a sufficient workforce.

To get two birds with one stone, Kupriianov paid attention to the Ingrian Finns repatriated from Finland and resettled outside their homeland Ingria. According to unpublished memoirs by Kupriianov from as early as in August 1944 he tried to receive the Ingrian Finns to be deported from the Leningrad oblast' to increase the number of Finnic population and workforce in the Republic but Kuusinen refused to support this idea. Soon after this, the State Committee of Defense decided to resettle the repatriated Ingrian Finns from Finland (12,000 families, around 50,000 people) in various regions of the RSFSR but not the Leningrad oblast'. Since many Ingrian Finns returned to their homeland or moved to Estonia, the Council of Ministers of the USSR ordered the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR to send those Ingrian Finns back to their resettled regions, and the Leningrad oblast' committee decided to prohibit them from living in Leningrad city and region in May 1947.

In spite of protest and objection from the Republic Minister of Internal Affairs Serebriakov, Kupriianov finally gained a “principal approvement [printsi pal’noe soglasie]” from Stalin to resettle the Ingrian Finns in the Karelo-Finnish Republic in October 1948 and in the end of January 1949 the Council of Ministers USSR made a decision for this resettlement. For Kupriianov, political and economic interests were intertwined with the Kalevala jubilee.

Chapter 7: The New Kalevala Centenary Jubilees in the Soviet Union and Finland

Finland celebrated the new Kalevala centenary on February 28, 1949, amid the Soviet

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295 Pavel Polian, Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR, transl. by Anna Yastrzhembska (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), 164–66.
296 NA RK, f. r-3435, op. 3, d. 5, l. 195, 197, 198.
299 NA RK, f. r-3435, op. 3, d. 5, ll. 200–2. At the same time, Moscow decided to “Russianize” the placenames in the former Finnish territory in the Karelian Isthmus ceded to the Leningrad oblast’ (such as Viipuri/Vyborg and Terijoki/Zelenogorsk) in January 1949. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1073, l. 72 (decision of the Politburo).
propaganda offensive against the Fagerholm government. In his speech at the jubilee ceremony, President Paasikivi tried to integrate the nation, including the leftists, by defining the Kalevala as “our ancestors’ spiritual immortal record” and as “an outcome which Lönnrot designed as a work of literature (kirjateoksena).” The identification of Lönnrot with the Finnish nation was, however, obvious, when Paasikivi called on the citizens to thank and follow Lönnrot, who was not satisfied with the folklore composition but created the new Kalevala. Paasikivi described how Lönnrot endured many hardships alone as now the Finnish nation was enduring the post-war hardships alone in the divided world and building a friendly relation with its eastern neighbor: “There is a well-known metaphor: Elias Lönnrot is like the Finnish nation, the Finnish nation is like Elias Lönnrot. Indeed, the best virtues of our nation were personified within the nature of Lönnrot. […] In the Kalevala, the force inwardly uniting our nation is still hidden. Around it, as is happening today, interests of groups and parties of various national spheres are evaporating. Let us use this metaphor, ‘the Finnish nation is like Elias Lönnrot,’ in our everyday life, not only on this jubilee today.”

Another main speaker Aarne Anttila also highlighted the centrality of Lönnrot, saying that his lifework was possible thanks to his “humanity, purity, harmony, complaisance, and integrity” without mentioning such words denoting his “childish, primitive” personality.

Although Finnish society was accepting this official jubilee, the representation of the Kalevala and Lönnrot were diverse even within non-communist and -SKDL media. On the one hand, for the newspaper of SDP, Suomen sosialidemokraatti, Penttinen wrote that the new Kalevala was mainly Lönnrot’s epic, while for Helsingin Sanomat Aimo Turunen wrote that it was yet difficult to say if the Kalevala was completely the creation of Lönnrot since many questions were yet to be addressed to clarify to what extent he “created” poems. In addition, Haavio stressed in the Suomalainen Suomi the need to let the school children become familiar with the “proper, original Finnish old poems” sung by “forgotten” poets, saying that teachers should not force children to read the Kalevala as the “canonized” national symbol. Nonetheless, even Haavio could not dismiss Lönnrot when he edited the collection of pieces about the Kalevala written by distinguished Finnish scholars. The collection included rather nationalistic pieces by Jaakkola, Harva, and Haavio himself published in the inter-war years but Haavio put Kaarle Krohn’s 1902 article “Elias Lönnrot and the Kalevala” first in order, suggesting a parallel between the years of oppression and the postwar years. Ironically enough, the representation of Elias Lönnrot Krohn described in 1902 seemed closer than any pro-Soviet writings in Finland to the one the Soviet Jubilee described in 1949: “Lönnrot was never a creative poem master. […] Nor was Lönnrot a proper scholar, […] as a child of the people he was close to the singers of the people, he thus really could set himself at their side and continue their work.

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It was on January 9, 1949, that the Politburo approved the proposal of the Kalevala jubilee held in Moscow and Petrozavodsk proposed by the TsK KP (b) KFSSR, the presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and the Writers’ Union of the USSR. In addition to Kupriianov, Virolainen, and Kuusinen, Fadeev also sent a letter to Malenkov for his support of the jubilee and the contents of the Kalevala were treated in the Secretariat and Politburo. Two days after this decision Pravda attacked Zhirmunsky of his co-work with the Uzbek folklorist Khadi Zarifov “The Uzbek popular heroic epic [Uzbekskii narodnyi geroicheskii epos],” which allegedly ignored the historical reality of the Uzbek people reflected in their folklore and stressing the “Muslim” and “Arabic-Persian literary sources” of the Uzbek epic and the parallelism among the Uzbek epic, West-European and Near-Eastern literatures. Pravda further blamed them for ignoring the mutual interactions of the Uzbek and Russian peoples.

Though already in mid-November 1948 the Institute of Ethnography in Moscow discussed and criticized this study, this attack by Pravda against Zhirmunsky highlighted a growing anti-Semitic character of the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign, which saw a coordinated attack against the “anti-patriotic group of theater critics” which included many Jewish names from the end of January 1949. In Leningrad, the party organization of the Institute of Literature was preparing for another attack against Leningrad philologists who had Jewish background including Plotkin, Azadovsky, Zhirmunsky, and Bazanov (his wife was Jewish) and the communists of the Institute of Literature wrote a letter to Malenkov about the “anti-patriotic group” in the Institute, which the Secretariat TsK discussed on February 18, when Malenkov was preparing for the so-called “Leningrad Affair.”

In fact, well before Pravda’s attack, the jubilee committee was not sure if Zhirmunsky would be included in the program. The program the bureaus of the Republic party and the Karelo-Finnish Council of Ministers approved (on January 6 and February 9, respectively) did not include Zhirmunsky’s paper, but it approved nine speakers (Bubrikh, Evseev, Bazanov, Lehmus, Jaakkola,

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304 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 280, ll. 74–75. (protocol of the Secretariat on the jubilee and the copy of the decision of the Politburo from Stalin); RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1073, l. 72 (protocol of the Politburo on the jubilee). The jubilee committee invited Azadovsky, Propp, and Astakhova as well to the Petrozavodsk jubilee. Azadovsky wrote to V. Krupianskaia on February 17 that he probably would not attend the jubilee, though Bazanov “earnestly” requested his attendance. A. A. Gorelov, ed., Iz istorii russkoi sovetskoi folʹkloristiki (Leningrad: Nauka, 1981), 249.
305 Pravda, January 11, 1949 (L. Klimovich, “Protiv kosmopolitizma v literaturovedenii”).
Linevskii, Hämäläinen, Laugaste, and Ariste). The printed program also excluded Zhirmunsky’s name but changed the order of presentations (February 26, Bubrikh, Evseev, Bazanov, Shaginian, and Laugaste; February 27, Jaakkola, Hämäläinen, Lehmus, Linevskii, and Ariste). In the end, however, Zhirmunsky was allowed to give a presentation at the jubilee session and send a message to the youth in the Republic Komsomol newspaper Molodoi Bol’shevik on the Kalevala, “the Karelian popular creation,” which was “close to us and native [blizkimi i rodnymi]” and he “has loved since his school years.” Judging from the jubilee paper “The Kalevala and the Finnish bourgeois folkloristics [‘Kalevaly’ i finskaia burzhuznaia fol’kloristika],” Zhirmunsky concentrated on the attack against the methodology and ideology of the Finnish “bourgeois” folkloristics including Veselovsky. Zhirmunsky did not, however, change the essential part of his presentation despite the ideological and political pressure, which was indicated by the revised paper (the Kalevala and the Finnish school of folkloristics) in 1962, which removed ideologically offensive words but kept the main argument untouched by adding further proposals and some examples to compare the Kalevala heroes and poems with the epics of Central Asian, Altaic (Turkic-Mongolic), and Siberian peoples which have typological analogies in themes with the Kalevala.

In fact, Zhirmunsky’s paper pointed out the “limitations” of the Finnish study of the Kalevala and set an ideological ground for the Karelo-Finnish scholars to build a Karelian nationality and a national scholarship of the Kalevala within the Soviet community. Picking up the Sampo cycle (The theft of the Sampo), Zhirmunsky got to the point that Krohn’s theory aimed to transform the Finnish nation from a passive object of the Scandinavian military expansion to an active subject of it equal to Scandinavian Vikings, which resulted in “Greater Finnish” expansion. Accordingly, the Finnish Kalevala studies denied an active role of the Karelian people in the making of the Kalevala poems and in the social-economic world reflected in the poems by its theory of the southwestern Finnish origins of the Kalevala poems influenced from the northern and western culture and religion. With the recent attack against his work on the Central Asian epic tradition in mind, Zhirmunsky had no choice but to mention only the “centuries-long cultural interactions between the Russian and Karelian peoples,” which the Finnish scholars had “intentionally” ignored, as an example of the eastern interactions of the Kalevala poems. Zhirmunsky concluded, this was the key to answer the question set by Kaarle Krohn in 1910 “does there exist some special Karelian tradition equivalent to richly preserved Estonian or western Finnish poetic tradition?” and the Karelo-Finnish scholars would address this

308 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3454, l. 202 (attachments to the meeting of the bureau of the Republic party on January 6, 1949). The program the bureau approved did not include Jaakkola, but the one the Republic Council of Ministers approved included him. NA RK, f. r-1394, op. 6, d. 227/1139, l. 133–134.
309 RO IRLI RAN, f. 825, op. 1, n. 26, ll. 1–2 (A printed program of the jubilee).
question with the Soviet folkloristics which deepened “the tradition of progressive Russian folkloristics of the pre-revolutionary time.”

This paper of Zhirmunsky’s, of course, took into consideration Kuusinen’s main interpretation of the Kalevala, an anti-religious, peaceful, territorialized, but “de-nationalized” one. Criticizing Krohn’s theory, Kuusinen asserted that it was Russian/Soviet Karelia where the pre-feudal and stateless social-economic conditions existed and Lönnrot wrote down “almost all” poems from the Karelian singers. As Sallamaa has pointed out, Kuusinen’s interpretation of the Kalevala owed much to Sirola, who saw a pre-feudal, classless peasant tribal community in the Kalevala poems in the 1930s. True, Kuusinen praised hundreds of the Karelian singers and Lönnrot as the editor of the Kalevala and savior of the poems in the very beginning of his opening presentation, and even admitted that the ancient Karelians utilized such materials as the thematic motifs and linguistic elements borrowed from “not only western, but also southern and eastern (Slavic influence)” areas. But he carefully avoided ethnic/national issues, that is, indicating whom the poems originally belonged to.

Leaving the ethnic/national issues aside, unlike Sirola’s rather militaristic understanding, Kuusinen saw peaceful work and struggle of the people for better material life in the Kalevala, not the class struggle: Louhi and the people in the dark Pohjola do not respect working and felt contempt for the heroes and people in Kalevala land who respected “working, diligence, and mastery.” The struggle of the Kalevala heroes against Louhi and Pohjola is for the happiness of the Kalevala people, which is represented by the Sampo, an “incredible productive mechanism” and future technical progress which the ancient Karelian people dreamed of but the Kalevala heroes lost, but “thanks to the Revolution and Soviet power” the Karelo-Finnish people gained a new Sampo, which the living Karelo-Finnish poets now narrate and glorify. In this way, Kuusinen identified the Karelo-Finnish people with the heroes and people of Kalevala.

Who, then, is Louhi and the people in Pohjola, against whom the heroes and the people in Kalevala are fighting? Kuusinen hinted at the present Finnish “reactionaries” in his opening remark, stating that “abroad, especially in Finland” the ideological struggle between the “supporters of the reactionaries and our friends – conscious supporters of democracy and progress” and “for this struggle we cannot take either an indifferent or non-party [bezpartiinogo] position. Our friends abroad, understandably, are trying to make use of the poetry of the Kalevala as a weapon of the ideological

struggle against the reactionaries.” It is true that Kuusinen declared that the jubilee was not only for the Karelo-Finnish people but also for all of the peoples of the Soviet Union. Kuusinen was nonetheless reluctant to present a simplified white-and-black picture between Finland and the Soviet Union or Finns and Soviets/Russians but rather carefully kept ambiguous about who the Karelo-Finnish people really is in his presentation, hinting his support for the “friends” in Finland.

It was thus others, especially Evseev, Chistov, Lehmus, and Sykiäinen who somewhat more clearly articulated the whole picture of the jubilee, the Kalevala, and the Karelo-Finnish people for a broader population in and outside the Republic. A massive propaganda campaign started from February 1 with Sykiäinen’s long piece in Totuus and Leninskoe znamia, which summarized the main points of the Soviet Kalevala and was later recited in the Estonian newspapers, too. Being loyal to Kuusinen’s thesis, Sykiäinen flatly denied the Kalevala as Lönnrot’s literature and then asserted that it was the ancestor of the Karelo-Finnish people, among whom the Kalevala poems came into being [zarodilis’], the poems had been passed from “by word of mouth, from generation to generation” to the present Karelo-Finnish living narrators in today’s Kalevala raion, the “best and richest motherland of the poems.” These poems were collected by those Finnish “collectors” from Sakari Toperius and Lönnrot to Europeus, Ahlqvist, and Reinholm, who collected the poems in western Karelia, the Karelian Isthmus, Ingria, and Estonia, all now the territory of the Soviet Union. These names, together with the Russian translator Bel’skii, saved and brought the poems to the Soviet people. They made a clear contrast with the Finnish bourgeois scholar, Sykiäinen who described peace and work loving heroes of the Kalevala: Väinämöinen as peasant, hunter, fisherman, mastery poet, the wise, and kantele performer, who heals disease and peacefully brings to bay the enemy in Pohjola with his music and singing; Ilmarinen a blacksmith, who makes tools for working, weapons, and the Sampo, a miracle item which makes life and work in a severe northern condition easier and happier; Lemminkäinen a representation of bravery and fearlessness.

So, does one find historical facts and figures in the Kalevala and the Kalevala-related poems as Krohn believed and Jaakkola insisted? While the Soviet jubilee stressed continuity from the ancient world of the Kalevala to the present, all Soviet writings did not describe the Kalevala heroes and events as something once historically lived but as the representation and dream of the ancestors of the Karelo-Finnish people. In his jubilee reading for broader public, Chistov included Propp’s voice in the text that the Kalevala does not tell precisely what happened in the past but tells a poetically precise description on the way of life [byti] and rituals of not only the distant past but also the near past such as Karelian peasants in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At the same time, arguing back

317 Leninskoe znamia and Totuus, February 1, 1949. See also Chistov’s piece for Molodoi bol’shevik, February 20, 1949.
against the Finnish leftists, Chistov, again Propp’s criticism in mind, underlined that one could find the past of the Karelo-Finnish people and what Lön­nrot collected and “edited” was just a part of it: “They [bourgeois nationalist researchers] are trying to make readers believe that the Kalevala was created by Lön­nrot himself and the fact about the usage of people’s songs in it is meaningless. Recognizing the great achievement of Lön­nrot as an editor and collector of people’s poems, Soviet science regards the Kalevala as the creation of the Karelian-Finnish people. Lön­nrot’s collection is just one of the episodes of the life of people’s epic, which was born long before it [the Kalevala] and is still living today.” So, as the Finnish nationalists did, the Soviet jubilee located the Kalevala and the Karelo-Finnish people in the line of history.

The Soviet jubilee, therefore, presented Lön­nrot as a “modest, tenacious, and simple” editor and collector of the poems, born in and raised among the people, but it was inconsistent considering his relations with Finnish nationalism. As Lehmus wrote, Lön­nrot could approach the popular Karelian narrators thanks to his manner, dress, and popular roots, he visited various places in Russian Karelia to collect the poems, and won their love and trust. In addition, she also wrote that Lön­nrot studied Swedish, “a foreign language” for him, to enter the university and there studied Russian and folklore in addition to medicine, which made it possible to collect the poems and edit the Kalevala but was silent about his relations with Finnish nationalism, as if Lön­nrot were alone in his room to work on the Kalevala in Helsinki. Lehmus’s paper in the jubilee session was no exception in this point.

Shaginian, however, was leaning more on Gordlevsky’s description of Lön­nrot. In her public lecture in Moscow, she then more boldly portrayed Lön­nrot representing “nationally conscious, progressive part of the Finnish society,” who resisted the Swedish language and thus got interested in the language which “the people, the Karelo-Finnish peasants, had spoken since ancient times” and finally “open both the native people and the language” to progressive Finnish contemporaries and the people in Finland by editing the Kalevala and completing the modern Finnish literary language. Quoting Gordlevsky’s 1903 essay on Lön­nrot, Shaginian wrote that the Kalevala was a “popular product giving shape to the democratic spirit” edited and restored by Lön­nrot, neither an artificial amalgam of the fragments pasted together by Lön­nrot nor the product of the Germanic-Scandinavian feudal lords. The Republic Finnish-language media was so careful not to touch this “nationalist”

320 Molodoi bol’shevik, February 17, 1949; Totuus, February 26, 1949. Though not featuring a biography of Lön­nrot like Totuus, Leninskoe znamia marked his birthday as the first date in the list of “important dates [znamenateli nye daty]” of the Kalevala with a portrait of him. Leninskoe znamia, February 25, 1949.
321 Helmi Lehmus, “Elias Lön­nrot – sostavitel’ Kalevaly,” in Bazanov, Trudy iubilieinoi, 166–76. This paper was published after, probably, being “corrected” because of the criticism against the original paper from the publisher (this will be discussed in chapter 4). This suggests that the original jubilee paper might have touched Lön­nrot’s relations with the Finnish national movement as her colleagues pointed out before the jubilee.
322 RGALI, f. 1200, op. 2, d. 8 (Stenographic record of the public lecture at the Central Reading
aspect of Lönnrot but Shaginian’s lecture spread through the Russian-language media.

The Soviet Russian contributions to the Kalevala was of course loudly propagated but, unlike the 25th anniversary of the Republic, the Russian left behind the Sovietness and Karelo-Finnish character of the jubilee. True, many repeatedly pointed out that Feodor Glinka already translated some songs about Väinämöinen into Russian years before Lönnrot. “Progressive” Russian intellectuals like Grot and Belinsky were interested in his works and thanks to the translation by Bel’skii the Kalevala “fully came into Russian culture.” Bubrikh refuted Jalmari Jaakkola’s thesis of the Iam’ or Em’/Jäämi or Hämä origin of the Korela/Karjala tribe by his argument that the Karelian people consisted mainly of the Korela tribe and parts of the Ves’ tribe (Livvi and Ludian dialect speakers) and Chud’, a group of ancient Finnic tribes, all “belonging to the Russian state from the very beginning,” also contributed to the formation of the Karelian people. Bubrikh thus concluded that Karelian people developed within the Russian/Novgorod state system from its ethnic formation and the Kalevala was a creation of the Korela tribe historically belonging to the East rather than the West. Like Propp and Zhirmunsky, Bubrikh further proposed to study the “mutual relationship” between the Russian bylina and the Kalevala poems, which had been neglected in Finland.

It was difficult to stress explicitly, however, the Russian centrality in this jubilee. First, due to the “rejection” of the papers by Propp and Astakhova, Bazanov’s jubilee session paper on Russia and the Kalevala was hastily prepared. And his paper tried to demonstrate that the intellectual of the Russian Empire such as Sjögren, a “Russian scholar [russkii uchenyi],” Glinka, and V. I. Braikevich of Kharkiv University showed interests in the Karelo-Finnish poems as early as Lönnrot. Lacking such materials supporting the Slavic/Russian influences on the Kalevala poems and the Kalevala studies, Bazanov’s paper was forced to focus on the “progressive” Russian intellectuals’ influence on Lönnrot himself and his work. Among others, the paper highlighted Yakov Grot’s lifelong friendship with Lönnrot and after the jubilee 16 unpublished letters from him to Grot were published. While stressing “mutual influence” between them, for example, as Grot’s letter to Pletnyov about his travels with Lönnrot in Finland in 1846 “[…] we taught each other in Russian and in Finnish, […]” Bazanov dragged this Finnish national/popular symbol closer to the “progressive, democratic” Russian, when he quoted Grot’s letter to Pletnyov that Lönnrot studied Russian hard and followed the journal

room of Society in Moscow in 1949), l. 3ob, 6 (Shaginian’s lecture on the Kalevala). This lecture was published in Leninskoe znamia, February 19, 1949, and in Novyi mir (Marietta Shaginian, “Kalevala,” Novyi mir, no. 1 (1949), 202–17).


324 Dmitry V. Bubrikh, “K voprosy ob etnicheskoi prinadolezhnosti run Kalevaly,” in Bazanov, Trudy jubileinoi, 142–51. At the same time, he left a warning message to this question: “The studies on the Russian relations with the Kalevala poems must not be harmful extremes [vrednykh krainostei]. (…) The relations between the two epics [Novgorod epic and ancient Karelian epic] is not the relations of the origin but mutual influence.”
Sovremennik, “who was founded by Pushkin,” and Grot asked Pletnyov to send a copy of the journal to Lönnrot to thank him for “playing the kantele” for Grot.\(^{325}\) In sum, Bazanov’s paper reflects sensitive mixture of Russian-Finnish friendship and Russian/Soviet superiority.

No less sensitive an issue was the Karelian-Finnish kinship caught between Russian-Karelian historical friendship and the Soviet/Russian-Finnish, rather political friendship. The 1949 Soviet jubilee attack against the Krohn school (and silence about Finnic kinship the Finns claimed before the war) made a clear contrast with the 1935 Soviet jubilee, which did not care about Krohn but had rather attacked Salminen and Albert Hämäläinen, who saw the Baltic-Finnic proto-language community in the historical trajectory of the Kalevala poems. To recant his introduction to the 1933 Russian translation of the Kalevala, Bubrikh published a short apology in the journal Na rubezhe. Indeed, what Bubrikh admitted as “my grave error” was the fact that he once accepted Krohn’s theory to deny the relations between the Kalevala and the Karelian people, defending himself that the Soviet linguistics was at that time fighting against the “kinship [rodstvo]” between people and language and had to rely on Krohn’s theory because of the lack of studies on the ancient past of the Karelian people and of the need to deny Salminen’s argument.\(^{326}\) However, what Kuusinen and Bubrikh finally agreed to include in this apology is the kinship between the Finns and Karelians: “As a result of the consideration of the materials gathered we found the origins of the Karelians and the basic lines of their ancient history. It has become clear that the Karelians are closely related to the Finns, but from the beginning of their formation they had come to live a historical life in close union and friendship with the great Russian people, a different life from that of the Finns. […] The poems that formed the basis of the Kalevala must be acknowledged as the creation of the most important part of the components of the Karelian people – of the ancient tribe Korela. Since two collateral lines of the Korela – Privyborg and Prisaiminsk [sic!] – joined the Finnish people, the Finnish people as well had their part in the Kalevala poems. It is therefore completely right to say something about the Kalevala as the Karelo-Finnish epic, not forgetting that its source [istochnik] is Korela.”\(^{327}\)

This tacit collusion about the kinship between the Soviets and Finns appeared in Shaginian’s treatment of Gordlevsky’s piece on the Kalevala in 1903. In her lecture, Shaginian did not mention the “division” between the eastern and western “Lutheran” Finns and the “Orthodox” Karelians, which Gordlevsky stressed in his 1903 piece as proof of the Finns’ effort to put themselves on a higher cultural level than the Karelians. This religious difference could highlight the historical closeness between the Russians and Karelians, but the Orthodoxy and denying the Finnish-Karelian closeness did not fit in with the Soviet Kalevala jubilee. As discussed below, Gordlevsky’s speech as well was

\(^{325}\) Vasilii G. Bazanov, “K istorii znakomstva s Kalevaloi v Rossii,” in Bazanov, Trudy jubileinoi, 181–83. Lönnrot’s letters to Grot were published in Bazanov, Trudy jubileinoi, 198–212.


\(^{327}\) Bubrikh, “Ob odnoi moei gruboi oshibke,” 122. The original apology in his draft did not touch this kinship. SPF ARAN, f. 1112, op. 1, d. 16, l. 22.
silent on this difference between the Finns and Karelians.

Together with this implicit affirmation of Karelian-Finnish kinship, Bubrikh’s counter article against Cheboksarov was published in the journal *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, which also defended the stronger and longer past linguistic “contacts” if not “kinship” within the Finno-Ugric people than with neighboring non-Finno-Ugric linguistic groups. Bubrikh, of course, stressed that these specifically Finno-Ugric interactions were only linguistic ones and the interactions between the Russian people and the Finno-Ugric peoples were “not merely of scientific significance [imeet ne tol’ko nauchnoe znachenie].” He then pointed out that “our enemies” in Finland had taken advantage of the “miserable state” in Soviet Finno-Ugric studies, because Soviet historians and other humanities scholars had little knowledge on the past of the Baltic-Finnic peoples and only Soviet Finno-Ugric linguists could contest the Finnish scholars in the “Karelian question” and the “Baltic-Finnic questions.” So, for Bubrikh, to politically admit the Karelian-Finnish kinship was associated with his defense of Soviet Finno-Ugric studies.

This issue of the Baltic-Finnic “kinship” was also highlighted by Estonians attending the jubilee. In the Estonian SSR as well, jubilee preparations were going side by side with Moscow’s preparation to carry out collectivization and mass deportations, and the harsh attack against leading political and academic figures who represented “pre-Soviet” Estonia. Anticipating coming changes, four Estonian scholars sent their jubilee session drafts to Petrozavodsk and two papers (Ariste and Laugaste) were approved by the jubilee committee. It is not clear why the papers of Erna Normann and Päss were rejected, but it is possible to speculate the reasons. Päss’s paper “Narrators of the Kalevala [skaziteli Kalevaly]” is very loyal to Kuusinen’s concept since it denied the aristocratic origin of the poems and depicted Lönnrot as a “collector” of the poems. His paper probably conflicted with the line of the jubilee in that its detailed description of the Kalevala poem narrators in Russian/Soviet Karelia overlapped Evseev’s publications on the same topic and its introduction to the variants of the Kalevala poems collected in Estonia might disturb the Karelian territoriality of the Kalevala poems and narrators.

Normann’s paper “the Kalevala epic song ‘Big Bull’ in the Estonian popular tradition [Kalevala eepiline laulu “Suur härg” eesti rahvatraditsioonis]” challenged Kaarle Krohn’s discussion on the western Finnish origin of a Kalevala poem with her study, which argued the poem spread from the people in Vatja, Ingria, and Estonia to Finland. Her paper, perhaps, concentrated on the Finnish-

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329 In December 1948, Chistov wrote to Pal’gi, the director of the Institute of Language and Literature of the Estonian Academy of Sciences, that he confirmed receiving three drafts (Ariste, Laugaste, and Päss), which were to be reviewed by the government committee. Rahvusarhiiv, f. r-2345, n. 1, s. 45, l. 44. Chistov confirmed receiving the draft of Normann on January 13, 1949, which suggests that she was asked to submit a completed paper to Petrozavodsk, but it was rejected in the end. EKLA, f. 274, m 3:44, l. 1.

330 Rahvusarhiiv, f. r-2345, n. 3, s. 21, ll. 1–30.
Estonian folklore interaction, which was in contradiction with the jubilee’s focus on Soviet Karelia.  
This careful approach to Estonian-Finnish interactions was also reflected in Laugaste’s paper, “The Estonian popular epic Kalevipoeg and the role of the Kalevala in its history [Eesti rahvaeepos Kalevipoeg ja Kalevala osa selle saamisloos].” Laugaste flatly denied kinship interactions between Finnish and Estonian folklore materials, themes, and motives, and carefully stressed the differences rather than similarities between the two epics. This is because the popular legends and tales used in the Kalevipoeg reflect the Estonian people’s struggle against “foreign” Baltic-Germans and patriotism under the Baltic-German rule, and Kreutzwald created the epic with the help of “progressive” Estophile Baltic-German, Estonian, and Russian intellectuals of his time. In addition, Laugaste maintained, Kreutzwald wanted to show that the hero Kalevipoeg waged a war against the invaders from West but kept a peaceful relation with the Russian people in the East.

Nonetheless, if implicit, the Baltic-Finnic interactions were sensible for those who were familiar with this topic. Despite his carefulness, Laugaste concluded that the publication of the old Kalevala and Lönnrot’s visit to Faehlmann and Kreutzwald in 1844 were “unquestionable and productive [kindlad ja viljakad]” for the creation of the Kalevipoeg. Furthermore, at the jubilee session, asked by the audience about the similarity of the names of the two epics, Laugaste admitted, “This is the result of mutual influence. The Estonian names appeared under the influence of the Karelo-Finnish names. These words have the same origin. Kaleva is the hero. Kalevipoeg is the son of the hero and of the Kalevala.” In his greetings at the jubilee session, Anton Vaarandi, deputy chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers, included the voice of the Finnish-Estonian brotherhood in the Soviet family of peoples through the Kalevala: “The Estonian people is particularly indebted to the Kalevala. This is because we have the Kalevipoeg, which is close to your epic in origin and content. This is because the Kalevala, published in Estonia more than 50 years ago, became one of the most popular books among our people. People, animals, birds, fish, and the whole of nature, even the sun and the moon were completely enchanted by Väinämöinen playing the kantele. Vanemuine, in the Estonian people’s creation, was such a master of music, the father of song.” In Estonian, while the Russian-language media said little about the jubilee, the Estonian-language newspapers and journals actively propagated and followed not only the jubilee in Petrozavodsk but also the preliminary event in Moscow to celebrate “our brother republic [meie vennasvabariigi].”

331 EKLA, f. 274, m 5:3, ll. 1-20. Though their papers were rejected, Normann and Päss were invited to the Petrozavodsk jubilee, together with Ariste, Laugaste, Kroot (the rector of the University of Tartu), and Kruus (the president of the Estonian Academy of Sciences).
332 Rahvusarhiiv, f. r-2345, n. 3, s. 3, ll. 1–14.
333 Rahvusarhiiv, f. r-2345, n. 3, s. 3, ll. 13–14.
334 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 115, l. 71.
335 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 115, l. 104.
his article detailed the history of acceptance of the Kalevala in Estonia.337

As a result, the specifically national/ethnic character of the Karelians became entangled in Karelo-Finnishness, Russo-centrism, Finnic interaction, and Soviet superiority. Evseev as an ethnic Karelian depicted the Kalevala as the “Karelian popular epic” whenever he could in his writings related to the jubilee, which also influenced similar writings of Chistov, who together with Evseev prepared local propaganda materials and instructions during the jubilee period. Chistov reiterated that the Kalevala poems were created by the Karelian people and its basic idea, manners, and language reflected a “specifically Karelian character.”338 It was obvious that the leading actors in the jubilee were the Karelian popular narrators in the past and present: Petrozavodsk newspapers and journals both in Russian and Finnish published the poems written down from ethnic Karelian narrators during Soviet times, especially in the years after the Second World War, some of which were related to the Kalevala heroes such as the poem “Väinämöinen plays the kantele” by 62-year-old Aleksandra Kareľ'skaia from Iushkozero, and others were contemporary Soviet topic of industrialization and praises for Stalin such as the poem about how “our Soviet people” prepares for a new Sampo thanks to Moscow and “our teacher, great leader, dear father” Stalin by 66-years-old Jouki/Evgeniiia Hämäläinen from Ukhta.339

Karelian writers and journalists featured distinguished Karelian narrators such as Maria Remsu, Tatiana Perttunen, Ivan Konevalov, and Maria Miheeva. They were invited to the jubilee in Moscow and Petrozavodsk to perform their poems, and newspapers and journals disseminated imagery of the narrators performing the poems about the people working, singing, and dancing as before in Karelian villages, schools, towns, and workplaces modernized in the Soviet period and reconstructed after the last war.340 Based on his expeditions to the Karelian narrators, Evseev found some new variants of the Kalevala poem and two Karelian heroes by setting old Väinämöinen as the hero of north Karelia and blacksmith Il'moilline as the one of south Karelian, who represented various groups of the Karelo-Finnish ancestors in northern and southern Karelia and supported and competed with each other.341 Emphasizing new discoveries of the epic poems from southern Soviet Karelia, which Finnish folklorists had failed to collect, Evseev tried to show a picture of a single Karelian national culture which covered different historical trajectories and dialects among the Karelian people.

Needless to say, as we have seen, the Karelian people and its national culture already had to stress friendship with Russian culture, the oldest brother in the Soviet Union. True, to underline the

337 Nigol Andresen, “Kalevala’ mälestuspäevade puhul,” Looming, no. 3 (1949), 354.
338 Kirill Chistov, “Kalevala – epos karelo-finskogo naroda,” Molodoi bol'shevik, February 10, 1949; Chistov, Kalevala – velikii epos, 22. Matvei Hämäläinen as well wrote that it was the Karelian people who created the poems. Molodoi bol'shevik, February 25, 1949.
340 Totuus, February 13, 22, and 23, 1949
341 Leninskoе znamia, February 13, 1949. For example, a new variant of “The robbery of the Sampo” written down from Anastasiia Bogdanova in 1947, Na rubezhe, no. 2 (1949), 4–44.
Karelian character of the Kalevala poems for the jubilee, the Soviet Academy of Sciences and its Karelo-Finnish branch published two collections of Karelian folklore edited by Propp and Evseev. In the collection of the Karelian poems translated into Russian, Evseev described the “bilingual” character of the Karelian folklore, which was “close” to the Russian folklore, on the one hand, and had “interaction [sviaz’]” with Finnish popular poetry, on the other. Since the Karelian people shared historical “achievements” with the Russian people, one would find the Russian epic heroes in the Karelian folkloristic representation, while Väinämöinen appeared in the works of the Russian narrators in Karelia.\footnote{342} One poem written down from Melan’ia Kalaukkoeva of Priazh raion in 1945 describes how Il’moilline helped Peter the Great in his war against the Swedes in Vyborg.\footnote{343} This closeness between the two peoples strengthened in their common struggle against Russian feudalism and common experiences during Soviet times, which were reflected in the Karelian variants of Pushkin’s tales, the “Russian influence on the Karelo-Finnish oral literature.”\footnote{344}

At the same time, the jubilee showed if implicitly that, as before, the Karelian people as the younger brother were inseparably bound to the Finnish. Evseev strongly resisted the new Finnish claim of the Kalevala as Lönnrot’s literature creation, because, for him, the Finns again seemed to claim the Kalevala, “Karelian epic”, as the Finnish national symbol. When discussing instruction of school teachers on the Kalevala for the jubilee at a meeting of the Institute, Evseev insisted on showing “there is no Chinese wall [mezhdu nimi net kitaiskoi steny]” between the Kalevala and the Kalevala poems even though “difference in quality” exists.\footnote{345} In another piece, Evseev more directly criticized Kaukonen of detaching the Kalevala from the Karelian oral epic traditions which were mutually influenced after the appearance of Lönnrot and the Kalevala, succeeded by the present Karelian oral creations about the Soviet heroic war, industrialization, and Stalin.\footnote{346} Still, side by side with the Karelian narrators, pictures and photos of the legendary pine tree near Lake Kuitto/Kuitti were used everywhere as an unchangeable symbol of Karelo-Finnishness, which had seen Soviet modernization and the Soviet soldiers and partisans who defended the pine tree from the White Finnish invaders during the Civil War and the last war.

Though the Finnish-Karelian relation was of course always behind the Russian-Karelian friendship and the Finns were never described as an older brother of the Karelians, the Finnish literary language as an official language of the Republic and Lönnrot as a Finnish scholar marked superiority

\begin{footnotes}
\item[343] Kalaukkoeva’s poem, Na rubezhe, no. 1 (1949), 102.
\item[345] NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 86, l. 55 (protocol of the meeting of the literature sector of the Institute on December 13, 1948).
\end{footnotes}
A letter from Feodor Ivachev, a Karelian editor of *Totuus*, to the Republic party secretary Tsvetkov a month before the Kalevala jubilee made a petition to rehabilitate Jalmari Virtanen, who was a leading Soviet Red Finnish writer and died after his arrest in 1938. In his letter Ivachev skillfully depicted the Finnish-Karelian brotherhood, Russian centrality, and Soviet superiority: Virtanen had been stalked by the Finnish bourgeoisie and the agents of the enemies of the people for more than 10 years and only gained practical and moral supports for his talent from Gor’ky; Virtanen understood well that the literature of Soviet Karelia would develop only in “close friendship with and with instruction from the great Soviet Russian literature;” and Ivachev continued:

“Jalmari Virtanen boundlessly believed in the creative forces of the Karelo-Finnish people, who for centuries preserved a wonderful poetic treasure of world significance – the Kalevala – in the popular memory. He believed that this people, who did not have their own literary language in the time of the tsar, would produce a series of talented writers and poets from among themselves and create the Soviet literature of the Karelo-Finnish people under Soviet development. The Soviet literature of the Karelo-Finnish Republic is still young, and a group of writers coming from this people is small in quantity, but without exaggeration one can say that all of these comrades who are now doing great things with their works (Huttari, Jaakkola, Timonen, and others), they all are grateful to the poet Virtanen, who with fatherly love gathered these young buds around himself and helped in their creative growth.”

These multiple voices keeping cacophony inside were gathered into a harmonious Soviet national ideology, the friendship of peoples at the jubilee, under the Party and Stalin. The Soviet Kalevala jubilee was officially announced to be the festival of peace and democracy for all peoples and workers in the Soviet Union. In union-wide newspapers Kuusinen and other Republic high-rank officials stressed that the jubilee would be dedicated to not only the Karelo-Finnish people but also all the “brotherly family of the Soviet peoples.” In Moscow at the Tchaikovsky Concert Hall a jubilee meeting for the Kalevala took place on February 21, where Kuusinen, Tikhonov, and Shaginian delivered a speech and Marshak performed the Russian translation of a song from the Kalevala, which

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347 The party organization of the Institute criticized the Institute literature researchers such as Bazanov and Bogdanov of not studying the Finnish language. NA RK, f. p-109, op. 3, d. 8, l. 23–25 (the protocol of the party meeting in the Base, February 11, 1949).

348 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6020, l. 10–12, 18. This letter was picked up by the Republic party leadership in July 1954 when they started to consider the rehabilitation of Soviet Finns who had become victims of Stalinist terror. Ivachev later in July 1952 even wrote to Stalin to ask him to consider the rehabilitation of Virtanen, “Karelo-Finnish poet.” RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 903, l. 8–10 cited in G. V. Gorskaia et al., eds., *Poslednie pis’ma Stalinu. 1952–1953 gg.* (M.: ROSSPEN, 2015), doc. no. 59, 190–93.

was followed by performances by Karelian narrators and the kantele ensemble and dance group. At the jubilee in Petrozavodsk, many guest speakers depicted the Kalevala, the Karelo-Finnish people, and the Republic as a member of the Soviet family of peoples. Leonid Leonov, representing the Soviet Writers’ Union, reminded the audience of the jubilees of Pushkin, Shevchenko, Rustaveli, and David of Sassoun, praised the “patriotic deeds” of Lönnrot, and ensured that Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen with the “passport,” the Kalevala, entered the “pantheon of world culture” in the motherland of “The night in the Panther’s Skin,” “The Manas,” “The Epic of Koroghlu,” and the heroes of Sassouns and the Russian epic heroes. The Turkmen writer Berdy Kerbabaev greeted, saying “My republic – the most southern one in the Soviet Union. Your republic – the most northern one. But we have one climate – the Soviet climate.”

The Armenian writer Amayak Siras said:

“We, the descendants of David of Sassoun, took six days and nights to arrive at the shores of Lake Onega, and are here to congratulate the descendants of Väinämöinen. [Applause] Created in a country located thousands of kilometers away from Armenia and under completely different geographic conditions, the Kalevala in many respects of social-ideological contents is consonant with the great epic of the Armenian people – The David of Sassouns. […] One can make clear the common moments between the Karelo-Finnish and Armenian people. This commonness is the result of kinship [rodstva] between the historical destinies of the peoples who are geographically located so far from each other. […] Our cultural, all-people’s anniversaries show that working people in the East and the West are living with a common interest. The Kalevala enters the treasury of world culture. Väinämöinen is as close to the hearts of the Armenian people as the beloved David of Sassoun.”

One of the main guests of the Petrozavodsk jubilee, Gordlevsky, put the multiple voices including the one he himself made in 1903 around the Kalevala and the Karelo-Finnish people into his greeting speech. Given that he stressed the religious and historical differences between the Finns and Karelians and praised Lönnrot as a scholar-intellectual 46 years before, the fact that he put stress on the Karelian singers and closed his speech in Finnish was symbolic:

“For hundreds of years, Karelians have enjoyed singing poems, and glorifying the heroes of the land of the Kalevala, who achieved happiness for their own people with persistent work in the struggle against harsh nature. The evil beldam-ruler, however, an incarnation of the exploiters who lives on someone else’s account, was indifferent to this. […]

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351 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 115, l. 59, 62.
352 “Празднование столетия Kalevaly,” Na rubezhe, no. 3 (1949), 92.
353 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 115, ll. 82–84.
Then a wanderer appeared from Finland appeared traveling around Karelia in search of the poems. In the distance away under an old pine tree that collapsed in the summer, the tree nearly lived to our days, a remarkable meeting of the poem singer Arhippa Perttunen and the scholar-enthusiast Lönnrot took place.

He took these poems away to Finland, but the distinguished generation of the singers of the poem continued to sing songs for the peasants during the time of work and for entertainment from family to family.

These poems lived, developed, and changed its forms, but they were heard only by the peasants. So, the whole generation came to secretive silence, painstaking indifference, perhaps, the glorification of this wise popular poetry, and only after the October the Karelians woke up from their age-long sleep. They created what they were robbed of, they declared their own legal claim to their share. They said that the Kalevala – this is the popular epic, no longer the Finnish epic but the Karelo-Finnish epic.

And so, looking back, the grateful descendants want to erect a monument to these famous poems, the keepers of national culture. Glory to the epic, which revived Karelia (speaks in Finnish – *Long live the Karelian land, long live Stalin*).354

Finally, why was the Karelo-Finnish jubilee “allowed” to be held, it was potentially dangerous given that it was associated with Greater Finland and pan-Finnism? Comparing it with the fate of another Soviet national epic, the Geser, the Buryat-Mongolian epic, offers the reasons to this question.355 The Buryat-Mongolian ASSR party leadership and intellectuals were also preparing for the 600th anniversary of the Geser, which was postponed due to the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. Nevertheless, the first secretary of the Buyat-Mongolian party A. Kudriavtsev proposed that Zhdanov cancel this jubilee of the Geser on May 22, 1948, after the discussion in Ulan-Ude, and the jubilee did not take place in the end. While Kuusinen dictated the basic interpretation of the Kalevala and, in particular, the enemy in the Kalevala jubilee, the Geser jubilee lacked a powerful patron and was caught up in a power and ideological struggle within the Buryat-Mongolian leadership.

Furthermore, both the Kalevala and the Geser touched pan-nationalism, but the pan-Finnism is far more compact and less dangerous than the other from a geopolitical, historical, and religious point of view. Though Stalin manipulated the pan-Mongolism when needed, it was not obvious and predictable what repercussions the Geser jubilee would have on Mongolia and China. As toying with a Finnish card for Kuusinen, Stalin played a Mongolian card for Choibalsan and Mao Zedong, who wanted to include MPR in communist China, and informally asked Choibalsan on September 29, 1949, about a possible united Mongolia as an autonomous region within communist China. When

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354 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 115, ll. 64–66.
Choibalsan naturally resisted this plan, Stalin withdrew this but told him to be patient, allegedly saying “Lenin had allowed Finland and Poland to become independent, but Mao Zedong was no Lenin.”

Though not explicitly mentioning the pan-Mongolism, the participants in the Geser controversy would understand this background, because the variants of the Geser folklore were broadly spread in the Chinese Mongolian region and Tibet and its content was associated with Genghis Khan, a taboo in the Soviet Union and even the Politburo of the Mongolian People’s Party adopted a resolution to criticize Genghis Khan as a feudal lord on October 27, 1949. Kudriavtsev furthermore mentioned that it was quite difficult to clarify the specifically Buryat character of the Geser since it had Buryat, Mongolian, and Tibetan variants, and he pointed out that the date of 600th anniversary was also suspicious and the Geser reflected wars and Genghis Khan, which made a clear contrast with the Kalevala, whose 100th anniversary was clearly tied with Lönnrot and, no less importantly, peace, not with any specific historical, anti-Russian events. In addition, the Karelo-Finnish Republic was a union republic which Stalin had made a decision to upgrade soon after the Winter War, which both Moscow and Petrozavodsk could not but justify in all means.

For these reasons, the Geser jubilee was unsuccessful. As one participant in the Geser controversy said: “In a recent meeting with Finnish delegates, Comrade Stalin stated that each nation has its own specialty to contribute to the common treasury of world culture. The Soviet Buryat-Mongolian art as well has taken a great step forward. This is why we came to have the idea to show our people’s heroic epic as well. We can and have to find the heroic epic. Our people have a rich creation of folklore. Our question of publishing the epic is quite convincing. The question is, is it possible?”

This statement makes a clear contrast with Chistov’s Kalevala jubilee pamphlet:

“Stalin said: ‘the Soviet people deems that each nation – whether big or small, equally – owns its own qualitative specialty and own peculiarity which belong to one nation alone. This specialty is the contribution that each nation brings to the common treasury of world culture, with which each nation supplements and enriches it.’ […] The Kalevala is the contribution of the small people for the world culture like Uzbek Alisher Navoi and Armenian Abovian.”

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358 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 80, ll. 40–44 (stenographic record of the meeting of the Buryat-Mongolian oblast’ party committee, May 20, 1948).
359 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 80, l. 70.
It is true that the Soviet Kalevala jubilee was strongly propaganda-oriented but its “Karelo-Finnish” character surely found no small repercussions in the discourse of the intellectuals. When the Soviet Union commemorated the 150th anniversary of Pushkin’s death in June 1949, Antti Timonen hosted a guest from Finland, a leftist writer, Elvi Sinervo, in Moscow. His speech at the reception for her articulated his Soviet Karelo-Finnish identity, which blurred boundaries between Finn and Soviet Karelo-Finn thanks to the Kalevala. Although a Karelian, Timonen could “teach” Pushkin to a Finn (superior to Karelian!), because he was a Soviet thanks to the Kalevala and the friendship with the Russian people:

“I am here as a representative of the Karelo-Finnish people. We live next to Finland. We have a common people’s epic, the Kalevala. Despite this, we have confronted the Finns three times with weapons in hand during the years of Soviet power. Our people were saved from the attacks of the enemy by the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the friendship with the Russian people in particular. Today, we met with Elvi Sinervo as friends. She represents new democratic Finland which hopes for friendship with us. I make a toast to further friendship between our peoples, to further contacts in creative circumstances.”

In this way, the Soviet Kalevala and the Karelo-Finnish Republic, while manipulating the pan-Finnic hierarchy to fix the Finnish superiority over the Karelians, offered room for the Karelians to turn this hierarchy for a moment by being Soviet with its friendship in the Russian people.

Part 3 has scrutinized discussions about the Kalevala, Karelian-Finnish kinship, and pan-Finnism in the Karelo-Finnish Republic but also in Moscow and Leningrad under international and domestic political and ideological pressure. As a union republic which has experienced Finnish occupation, it was difficult to put Finnishness/Karelian-Finnishess forward immediately after the occupation and the most important assignment was to emphasize Russian-Karelian friendship. Though starting preparation for the Kalevala jubilee and reconstruction of Finno-Ugric studies, discussion on the Kalevala and Karelian-Finnish kinship remained behind the scenes.

Negotiations over the Soviet Kalevala and Karelian-Finnish kinship advanced amid deepening Cold War confrontations and the intensification of vigilance against leading intellectuals and local nationalisms. Both Petrozavodsk and Leningrad actors had to adapt their discussion to changing international and ideological contexts, while keeping their scholarly views as much as possible. Since Finland became a non-socialist but “friendly” neighbor of the Soviet Union, Finnishness in the Republic came to have different meanings: claim Soviet Finnishness and Karelo-Finnishness and perform the Soviet-Finnish friendship, while competing with “reactionary” Finns in Finland.

361 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3735, ll. 43–44 (Timonen’s report to Kupriianov).
In fact, the Soviets followed postwar discussions on the Kalevala and Finnic kinship in Finland and tried to challenge the past and current achievements of the Finns in these fields. The Soviet observers were furious about the fact that Finnish scholars had taken advantage of wartime opportunities to study Soviet Karelia and had advanced their studies after the war. The Soviets were also irritated by the Finns who did not understand how the Soviets treated the Kalevala and the Karelians as the Karelo-Finnish and thus concentrated on the Finnish-Russian relationships and adhered to the Kalevala as a Finnish epic. At the same time, the Soviets had to compete fiercely with the Finnish nationalist understanding of the Kalevala and the Finnic kinship, because they noticed similarities between the Soviets and Finns in this respect. These negotiations with the Finns shaped the Soviet Kalevala, Finnish-Karelian kinship, and pan-Finnism.

The Soviet Kalevala jubilee was an occasion to reify Soviet ideology of “friendship of the peoples” by locating the Kalevala, the Karelian-Finnish kinship, and pan-Finnism within the Soviet multinational community. Accepting the cult of Stalin and superiority of the Communist Party, the Republic celebrated the Kalevala and Finnic kinship as their own. The Soviet Karelians were allowed to claim their poems and singers, but their past and present were closely bound to Russia and the Russian brother and, if not openly, their language and culture were inseparably linked with the Finnish brother. In this sense, the Soviets grated the pan-Finnic hierarchy and ideology onto the Soviet national ideology and imperial order.

Nonetheless, how far could this Karelo-Finnishness sustain its argument and how much their ideology was resilient and able to cope with changing reality? Part 4 will discuss this resilience and limitations of this Karelo-Finnishness.
Part 4

Surviving the Last Stalinist Years and De-Stalinization: Fate of the Karelo-Finnish and the End of the Republic, 1949–1956

As the previous part has demonstrated, the Republic leadership and intellectuals manifested the Kalevala as the symbol of the Karelo-Finnish people and of the Karelian-Finnish and even Finnic kinship under mounting pressure from Moscow, Leningrad, and Petrozavodsk but with the implicit approval of Moscow. Once symbols of Greater Finland, the Kalevala, Lönnerot, and the pan-Finnic kinship were grafted onto Soviet ideology of the friendship of peoples, which reifies a hierarchy managing the Soviet multinational empire: the cult of Stalin, the superiority of the Party and Soviet government, and Russian centrality. The negotiations within the Soviet Union and with Finland during 1944–1949 resulted in that pan-Finnic hierarchy was included in the Soviet hierarchy without expansionist, militaristic, anti-Russian/Soviet elements. This inclusiveness contributed to the Soviet rule of the population of the Republic but at the same time left room for Finnic actors to resist two hierarchies: pan-Finnic and Soviet ones.

This part sees how this achievement survived both the last years of Stalinist rule and de-Stalinization and what hindered the Soviet Kalevala and pan-Finnic project. The Republic had to survive the last Stalinist years because political and ideological attacks hit each borderland republic and nationalism including the Russian one equally. The Republic had to survive de-Stalinization because it was Stalin who created and kept the Republic, which was vulnerable to criticism against the Stalinist past and its artificial character. Though finally abolished as a union republic, the Pan-Finnic hierarchy was so pervasive in the Soviet hierarchy of peoples that the Finnic kinship and the Kalevala outlived the Republic, functioning as a tool to rule the Finnic population in Soviet Karelia and to influence Finland but as a potential alternative to the Soviet ideology, values, and worldview.

Chapter 8: “Halt” of the Karelo-Finnish Project? 1949–1953

The years 1949–50 saw a peak of early Cold War confrontations: the Soviet success of the first atomic bomb in the end of August 1949, the establishment of West and East Germanies, the declaration of the People’s Republic of China, and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Stalin was on the offensive in East Asia and Southeast Asia but in Europe nervous about imperialist “spies” and Titoists allegedly infiltrated in the socialist countries and the fate of Germany. Party and government elite-targeted purges were launched in those countries, though the Soviet grip on the socialist countries in Europe seemed consolidated as late as in the end of 1948. Fearing for possible
future military conflicts in Europe, Stalin ordered the socialist countries in Europe to increase military expenditures and the Soviet Army expanded to 5.6 million in March 1953 from 2.9 million in 1948. At the same time, Moscow was as before actively engaged in a peace campaign toward non-socialist countries.¹ In the European socialist countries, the last Stalinist purge and Sovietization subsided, but, as Stefano Bottoni has recently demonstrated in his studies on the Hungarian Autonomous Region in Romanian Transylvania, Moscow made use of nationalities questions in the socialist countries to discipline local leadership and keep order and conformity within the Socialist bloc.²

The Soviet pressure on the Finnish government and Finnish leftists as well heightened but the Soviets saw Finland as either “ours/friends” or “theirs/enemy” in the last years of Stalinist rule.³ As a friend, Stalin treated Finland as a part of the Soviet military and economic preparation for a possible military conflict. With the 1950 presidential election approaching, Paasikivi also became a target of a Soviet propaganda offensive. During the period of the Fagerholm government, the Soviet-Finnish trade negotiations were suspended, which made difficult for Finland to import grains and oil. Expecting North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, however, Stalin as a pragmatist received the new prime minister Kekkonen after the president election in June and concluded a five-year (1951–55) trade agreement in addition to a one-year trade agreement (1950–51). The United States generally trusted in the ability of Paasikivi and the Finnish government to control Finnish communists and gave moral and careful economic support to keep Finland, especially its economic system, from completely falling into the Soviet sphere of influences as far as it did not provoke the Soviets.⁴ As Jussi Hanhimäki has aptly described, the US acknowledged a special status of Finland in the divided world and “contained coexistence.”

As before, the Finnish leftists and communists were forced to be in a difficult position: Paasikivi and other non-communist parties were vigilant and Kekkonen was trying to establish direct interactions with the Soviets, bypassing the Finnish communists, while Moscow was inconsistent in its support for the SKP. The strike in the northwestern borderland city of Kemi in August 1949 was easily suppressed despite the SKP’s effort to support the workers, as a result of which the communists were further marginalized in the Finnish workers’ movement and Finnish society.⁵ Hella Wuolijoki was removed from the post of the National Radio in summer 1949, because the new law approved in October 1948 made it possible to transfer the power to select the board members to the Parliament

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³ Rentola, Stalin ja Suomen kohtalo, 193–215.
⁴ Hanhimäki, Rinnakkaiseloa patoamassa, 69–121; Kuisma, Venäjä ja Suomen talous, 229–41.
What illustrated the difficulty the Finnish communists faced was “their” Kalevala jubilee in Helsinki on April 18, 1949. Both the Finnish official jubilee and the leftists wanted to invite guests from the Soviet Union, which declined to send Bubrikh to the official jubilee because he was “busy” in his preparation for the Soviet Kalevala jubilee. In fact, the Soviets were ambiguous about how to approach the Finnish Kalevala jubilee and how to propagate the Soviet Kalevala to Finland. In June 1948 the VOKS invited Finnish journalists from all major newspapers to the Soviet Union to introduce the postwar reconstruction there. Shaginian wrote to Gordlevsky that she had a breakfast and conversation about the Kalevala jubilee with Finnish journalists. According to the report of the Soviet embassy in Finland to the VOKS, however, the Finnish newspapers did not report this meeting.

Even though Hertta Kuusinen had pledged to her father that the Soviet Union send a delegate to the leftist jubilee, what the Finnish communists received was Kuusinen’s jubilee presentation and the so-called “Kuusinen’s” Kalevala “Kalevalan runoutta,” an anthology of the Kalevala poems Kuusinen picked up to show the “essence” of the beauty of the Kalevala. Those materials which reflected the discussions and ideology in the Soviet Union bewildered the Finnish leftists including Raoul Palmgren and Hertta Kuusinen, who, forwarding Palmgren’s comment on Otto Kuusinen’s presentation, wrote to her father that it was “too uncompromising” to stress the exclusively Soviet Karelian origin and peaceful character of the poems. This is because Hertta and Palmgren believed that Louhi and the people of Pohjola obviously had property and elements of the class society, and the poems might move because the people moved. Still the leftist jubilee, the “jubilee of the people [Kansanjuhla],” followed the Soviet Kalevala jubilee by its attack against the Krohn school, the official Finnish Kalevala jubilee, and the government.

Leftist intellectuals, however, tried to negotiate with the Soviet jubilee to claim their own Kalevala and Lönnrot, and to “translate” the Soviet Kalevala into the Finnish context. One of them was Raoul Palmgren, who published his influential work the “Great Line [Suuri lina]” in 1948, which fundamentally reconsidered modern Finnish history by reminding the readers of the “great century” of Finland under Pax Russica, when leading national intellectuals from Arvidsson through Snellman and Koskinen to Sirola established Finnish national culture, connecting it to western culture, thanks

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7 ARAN, f. 688, op. 4, d. 354, l. 7. (Shaginian’s letter dated June 17, 1948).
8 GARF, f. r-5283, op. 20, d. 188, ll. 40–105.
9 Hertta wrote to her father that the success of “our own Kalevala jubilee” decisively depends on whether guests from the Soviet Union come or not. Kansan arkisto, Hertta Kuusinen archive, kansio 5, Hertta’s letter to Otto Kuusinen, dated April 8, 1949.
11 Työkansan Sanomat, February 26, March 8, April 17, and April 20, 1949; Vapaa Sana, April 17 and 19, 1949
to their friendship with Russia and the Russian people. Since the intellectuals of the inter-war years betrayed the Finnish people, Palmgren called out to the readers asking them to go back to the “line of the great century.”

Palmgren, however, wrote a piece to mediate the conflict between Stalin and Tito in July 1948, which caused suspicion and criticism from the SKP and the Soviet Union. At the leftist jubilee Palmgren praised Kuusinen and the Soviet jubilee but also Kaukonen’s scholarly achievement on Lönnrot’s creative role, writing that “the Kalevala is decisively Lönnrot’s epic, artistic genius, but admissible as a historical document provided that Lönnrot’s contribution to it is clarified.”

Within the Soviet Union, another wave of purges and arrests of high party and soviet officials began with the Leningrad Affair, which went parallel with the forced deportations from western borderlands such as the Baltic countries, Moldavia, western Ukraine, and western Belorussia, often with collectivization. Accordingly, national symbols became targets of criticism from Moscow and this was visible in Central Asia and Azerbaijan, and conflicts over the “origins” of Turkic epics between Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan further fueled Moscow’s fear of pan-Turkism connected with Turkey, now a member of NATO, and the Turkic epics from the Azerbaijan epic Korkut-ada too were labelled “anti-people” and “anti-Russian.” And finally, the Kirgiz epic Manas became a target of the campaign, which was concerned about its “anti-Chinese” elements.

From the 1949 spring Leningrad philologists saw a climax of political and ideological attacks. With the support from the Leningrad city party committee and the TsK VKP(b), the party organization of the Institute of Literature prepared for another attack against “cosmopolitanist” Leningrad philologists from the end of February. The director of the Institute Plotkin was replaced by Nikolai Bel’chikov, professor at Moscow Institute of Philosophy, Literature, and History. Not only the party organization of the Institute of Literature, but also the party organization of the faculty of philology at Leningrad University held a two-day closed meeting in the end of March (both meetings on March 29–30) and denounced Azadovsky, Gukovsky, Zhirmunsky, and Eikhenbaum. In the closed meeting of the faculty of philology, Azadovsky was criticized of his past “contacts” with foreigners in Prague and Helsinki, where he published articles for the “organ of the Finnish school F[olklore]F[ellows]C[ommunications]” in the 1920s and early 1930s. In the meeting of party organization of the Institute of Literature Bazanov was pressed for a self-criticism about his past “liberal” attitude toward his mentor Azadovsky and a criticism against him, who “set up a den to which

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he infiltrates his own not-so-talented pupils in Karelia.”

Finally, on April 4–5 the open meeting of scholars’ council of the faculty of philology discussed these four Leningrad philologists, of whom Azadovsky and Eikhenbaum were absent. Zhirmunsky self-criticized of his “interactions” with Veselovsky and his work on the Uzbek heroic epic but stressed his contribution to the Kalevala jubilee, which, however, did not help him: “I was engaged in the theme which the government of the Karelo-Finnish Republic assigned. Com. Kuusinen asked me to address the theme “On the reactionary bourgeois Finnish folkloristics.” I have completed this assignment and would like you, comrades, to be familiar with this, that is, to let yourself read it through.” In the end, the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR decided to remove Gukovsky and Azadovsky from the university and Zhirmusnky from the head of the course of Western European Literature from 5 May, and Zhirmunsky was finally removed from the university in early December. In the same vein, Eikhenbaum, Gukovsky, and Azadovsky were removed from the Institute of Literature in May. Gukovsky was arrested in July and died in April 1950.

This wave of criticism and terror in major republics and regions came to the Republic as well, which further crystallized the fundamental contradiction: promote indigenous, Karelo-Finnish culture although the number of Finns was disproportionally small and their loyalty was under suspicion.

**Late Stalinist Purge in the Karelo-Finnish Republic and the Kalevala**

After the Kalevala jubilee, the Karelo-Finnish party leadership started discussion of the second congress of KP(b) of the Karelo-Finnish SSR from April 24, which could not avoid addressing ideological issues in the university and the Institute. The Republic party burau discussed the activities of the Institute together with another topic about non-Russian schools on March 24, which was quite important to understand how the Republic leadership understood nationalities issues of the Republic.

As for non-Russian schools, after the report from the minister of Enlightenment, Beliaev, all the participants understood the necessity to improve the quality of teachers and teaching to raise and supply native non-Russian cadres. How to achieve this goal was at issue: some insisted stressing Russian language education while others supported the idea of further accelerating Finnish language education. Zheltonosova reported the “miserable” situation in the non-Russian schools: teachers working in the national schools were scarcely able to teach in Russian or in Finnish; of 222 teachers capable of non-Russian language only 65 teachers were working in the national schools while others were teaching in the Russian schools. As a result, those pupils who completed 7-year school lacked a

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18 TsGAIPD SPb, f. 984, op. 3, d. 126, l. 29.
sufficient command of the Finnish or Russian language. The second Secretary, Andropov, thus insisted that the non-Russian schools had to start with the improvement of Russian language education, which would enable the children studying in Finnish to have access to “Great” Russian culture and to a better career. For Andropov, “it is more realistic” to teach the Russian language sufficiently to those unqualified teachers who were teaching in Russian in spite of their Finnish abilities. Dil’denkin agreed with Andropov on the idea that the national schools should start Russian language education from the first year but insisted on keeping the current study hours of the Finnish language. Justifying his plan, however, Kupriianov stressed the necessity to enlarge the network of non-Russian schools and establish a national middle-school in Petrozavodsk taught in Finnish for the Finnic population and Ingrian Finns arriving in the Republic, which was supported by Tsvetkov and Virolainen. To persuade the bureau members to agree with his own idea, Kupriianov reminded them of how well things had gone before the last war:

“And if it were not for the war, we could have done in eight years what we did in ten years. One must pay attention to the fact that during the war the number of the population fell, and some children studied in Russian for five years because one could not establish Finnish school. […] The thing is not how to complete this academic year but how we go forward. We should not cause a controversy over the question that teaching until the fourth class has to be in Finnish. I think we have to teach in Finnish in the fifth, sixth, and seventh classes too, because we have all the textbooks for this, we have cadres. […] It would be wrong to say that after the seventh-year teaching has to be in Russian.”

Going between Kupriianov and Andropov, Dil’denkin pointed out the importance of national culture in the Republic.

“If we do a good job of teaching the Russian and Finnish languages to the children, we will preserve national culture, the significance of the language, and raise culture and cadres and, in addition, lead our youth to socialist Russian culture.”

The bureau accordingly took the decision to support Kupriianov and assigned the Ministry of Enlightenment to take measures to increase the number of Karelians and Finns in non-Russian schools and enlarge the network of the non-Russian schools to receive the Ingrian Finns, and proposed the rector of the university receive at least 25 Karelians and Finns in the first course of Finno-Ugric Studies and, together with the Teachers Institute, to prepare qualified teachers capable of teaching the

20 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3673, ll. 13–16 (stenographic record of the meeting of the Republic bureau, March 24, 1949).
21 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3673, ll. 17–18.
22 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3673, l. 16.
Finnish language and instructing in Finnish. At the same time, the bureau demanded “fundamental improvement” of Russian language teaching in the national schools.\textsuperscript{23}

For the bureau members, however, especially those who supported Kupriianov, national culture in the Republic meant the Soviet national culture, not the pre-revolutionary national culture. Many of them were dissatisfied with researchers’ exploration of the national and non-national (Russian) pre-revolutionary past. They accused Bazanov, who reported on the activities of the Institute, above all, of the folklore and literature sections. Kupriianov criticized the researchers who thought that the people today could not create collective creations like in the past and such folklore creation was created only in the countryside but not in the city. He said: “For example, chastushka, which reflects our ways of life, our culture, is already a creation. This creation is being done not only in the countryside, but also in the city, distinguished ideas of our present-today and future-tomorrow are being created.” Likewise, Malegin stressed that to deny people’s creation in the Soviet condition was “a serious error” and denied Bazanov’s claim that the folklore sector had been seriously engaged in the struggle against the formalism and kowtowing to the West. For example, Malegin pointed out, Evseev in his 1946 publication translated “all the poems” which reflected the interests of the Finnish bourgeois scholars and wrote more favourably about the variants of the poems created outside the Republic than the Kalevala poems literally processed by Lönnrot. Malegin concluded that Evseev in this way had slandered the “popular creation of the Karelo-Finnish people.”\textsuperscript{24}

These accusations were mainly directed against Azadovsky and Astakhova but also their young pupils, who underestimated the ability of the people today and idealized the people of the past. Stefanikhin, the deputy director of the Institute, pointed out that the group of Azadovsky and Astakhova had found an asylum in the Institute and influenced the growing cadres in the Republic such as Chistov, “a pupil of Azadovsky,” and Evseev. Tsvetokov, secretary in charge of propaganda, even demanded that they officially accuse Bazanov, Chistov and Evseev in the resolution, as ones who had downgraded the creation of the people today.\textsuperscript{25} Finally, Kupriianov stressed the need to support the Republic writers such as Timonen, Huttari, and Chekhov, who tried to express Soviet reality and achievement and establish the Karelo-Finnish literature, and admonished Bazanov to concentrate on the study of Soviet folklore:

> “[T]he positions of the journal *Na rubezhe* and the sector of language and literature are not right. This is because that they separate themselves from the people. The same thing happened to Azadovsky and others who flattered themselves as scholars and thought that they were smarter than the people. This feeling exists in comrade Bazanov as well. Do not think that you now have nothing to learn, used up

\textsuperscript{23} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3456, ll. 155–59 (decision of the bureau TsK KP(b), March 31, 1949).
\textsuperscript{24} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3673, ll. 19–20.
\textsuperscript{25} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3673, l. 21.
all, and there is no material which you can add to your research. To me, you seem to have such a feeling. If you continue to have such a point of view, you will not protect yourself from a very serious error. I guarantee that you and 5-6 other doctoral researchers like you will find a workplace in Karelia.”

Though the leadership showed their dissatisfaction behind the scenes, they restrained their criticism at least against Evseev in public. The bureau decision criticized Azadovsky, Astakhova, Bazanov, and Chistov of idealizing the pre-revolutionary past in folkloristics. Azadovsky and Astakhova, in particular, shifted their activity from Leningrad to the Republic, guided the young scholars in the “wrong” direction, following “Rybnikov and Gil’ferding.” At the second Republic Party Congress, Kupriianov stressed the need to improve the network and quality of non-national schools, boasting the Soviet achievement of how Soviet power had raised national cadres in schools, the university, and the Karelo-Finnish branch of the Academy of Sciences. Following Kupriianov, Sykiäinen underlined the importance of improving the instructions both in Russian and in Finnish in national schools. It was Tsvetkov who criticized Azadovsky, Astakhova, and Bazanov for their belief in the “extinction [omiranie]” of folklore in the Soviet condition and of the vicious influence on Republic scholarship. The journal Na rubezhe published a critical article which criticized the works by Azadovsky, Astakhova, and Bazanov in detail, and the activity of the literature sector of the Institute led by Chistov. According to this article, these cosmopolitanists “completely ignored national folklore and folklore on the Soviet theme.” These public accusations went mainly to such folklorists who had close connections with the Soviet Russian folkloristics in Leningrad but avoided local Karelo-Finnish folklorists.

It was Meletinsky that became the main target of the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign in the Republic. He recalled that in Leningrad Azadovsky warned him that his teachers would be driven out of their posts within a few days and he also might lose his post in the Karelo-Finnish University. Even before the Second Republic Party Congress Leninskoe znamia criticized Meletinsky and his colleagues (Pavlov, Ginzburg, and Morozov) in the university for their “formalist, rootless cosmopolitanist” lectures and supervision. The two-day meeting of scholars, writers, and artists of the Republic in the end of March had 20 speakers, and they criticized the Leningrad folklorists and Meletinsky and his colleagues. According to Meletinsky’s memoirs, he tried to fight back against Bazanov, whom he supposed as a man manipulating in this meeting but was criticized of lacking self-

26 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3673, l. 23.
27 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3456, ll. 160–161.
28 Leninskoe znamia, April 26, 1949.
29 Leninskoe znamia, April 30, 1949.
30 “Vytravit’ sledy vliianiia kospopolitizma,” Na rubezhe, no. 4 (1949), 86.
31 Meletinskii, Izbrannye stat’i, vospominaniia, 518.
criticism and masking his errors. This “counterattack” against Bazanov sparked a series of criticism within the Karelo-Finnish University, whose party organization held a closed meeting on April 5, which discussed the “struggle against cosmopolitanism.” The closed meeting accused those communists working in the course of literature of lacking criticism and self-criticism, for not giving diplomas to the Karelo-Finnish themes, and not contributing to the Kalevala jubilee. Likewise, Meletinsky, Murav’eva (the wife of Meletinsky), and Morozov were criticized for having celebrated Veselovsky in 1946 and, after Fadeev’s attack on him, tried to demonstrate, “Fadeev is simply not familiar with Veselovsky, he mistakes Aleksandr Veselovsky for Aleksei Veselovsky.” The closed party meeting proposed the rector Yakovlev remove Meletinsky as head of the literature course, and the bureau of the party organization punished him with a strict reprimand. Meletinsky was finally arrested in May. Chistov as well received no less harsh criticism since he allegedly “ignored” the national folklore and Soviet themes and “scorned” the development of “our” Republic.

Given the previous discussions in Leningrad and Petrozavodsk Bazanov protected young Karelian and Finnish scholars in the Republic at the sacrifice of Meletinsky and Chistov but Bubrikh and Propp, who yet somehow avoided the assault, also tried to protect younger scholars, stressing the “special” status of the Republic. The open party meeting of the Karelo-Finnish branch of the Academy of Sciences on April 7 discussed the “struggle against cosmopolitanism and formalism,” and Bazanov attacked Chistov’s previous works and the theme of his doctoral dissertation on the Russian popular narrator Irina Fedosova. Stefanikhin accused both Bazanov and Chistov of having done nothing to improve the sector even after criticism from Moscow in 1948. Not directly criticizing Chistov, Elina Timonen, an Ingrian Finnish folklorist, argued that the sector should pay more attention to the national folklore, both pre-revolutionary and Soviet. This was supported by Bubrikh, who said to Bazanov to continue publishing studies on Karelian folklore. Though Chistov wrote in his memoirs that Propp came to this meeting to defend him, Propp supervised both Evseev’s doctoral dissertation and other Finnic doctoral candidates to secure folkloristics both national and non-national for the Republic, separating it from what was going on in Leningrad. He said:

“The folklore section of the Leningrad Institute of Literature of AN SSSR has not published even one work for 12 years and the one completed – was of bad quality. […] A positive aspect in the work of

33 Meletinskii, Izbrannye stat’i, vospominaniia, 519; Leninskoe znamia, April 5, 1949.
34 NA RK, f. p-394, op. 3, d. 9, ll. 90–92 (protocol of the closed party meeting, April 5, 1949).
35 NA RK, f. p-394, op. 3, d. 9, l. 105. Aleksei Veselovsky is a younger brother of Aleksandr Veselovsky and specialist in Western European literature and culture. Aleksei Veselovsky was as well a target of the anti-Western campaign of the 1940s.
36 NA RK, f. p-394, op. 3, d. 10, l. 26 (protocol of the party bureau meeting on April 15, 1949).
38 NA RK, f. p-109, op. 3, d. 12, ll. 190–92, 195.
your Institute is that the Institute has prepared a series of works on folkloristics. The leading scholars in folkloristics, exposed to the harshest criticism, they must completely reconstruct their own views, and system. You thus need to display more initiative, independence, and not wait for prepared answers from somewhere. You need to raise your own cadres, and help them everyday to enrich their own knowledge.

The theme of the dissertation of com. Chistov may arouse suspicion, but this problem must be resolved right now, do not leave the person ignorant. My personal opinion is that the dissertation can go to the defence.\textsuperscript{39}

Otto Kuusinen as well left an implicit message in his reply to Kupriianov’s speech at the Second Republic Party Congress to remind the local communists of the importance of national culture for Soviet-Finnish relations. Kuusinen told the audience, the Republic propagandists above all, to understand and explain the international situation “correctly.” At his opening speech at the jubilee, Kuusinen stressed the “friends” of the Soviet Union in the capitalist and imperialist states. He pointed out that the struggle between workers and bourgeois reactionaries was reduced into a few main issues such as peace and democracy and contributed to the establishment of unification of working class and the supporters of socialism, democracy, and peace. Kuusinen stated:

“There are no states where one cannot find the true friends of our great Soviet Union. There are no states where people would not be against the war. Even in the United States and Britain almost all of people are supporters of peace.”\textsuperscript{40}

One of the sympathizers of national culture and scholarship was, as before, the first secretary Kupriianov, because it was his initiative that the Republic receive the first group of Ingrian Finns from Estonia on March 16. \textit{Totuus} (but not \textit{Leninskoe znamia}) reported with a picture that 6 Ingrian Finnish families (15 peoples) were “warmly” welcomed at the reception point near the Petrozavodsk station.\textsuperscript{41} According to the plan the Soviet Council of Ministers approved in January, about 25,000 Ingrian Finns were moved to the Republic from 1949 to 1951, and Kupriianov wrote in his memoirs that 60,000 were expected to come to the Republic between April and October 1949, about 140,000 in 1950, and about 50,000 in 1951.\textsuperscript{42} To encourage immigration of the Ingrian Finns from outside of the Republic, Kupriianov pledged to Shepilov, the head of the Agitprop department of the VKP(b), that he would

\textsuperscript{39} NA RK, f. p-109, op. 3, d. 12, ll. 197–98; Chistov, \textit{Zabyvat’i stydit’sia nechego}, 141–42; Propp did not have Jewish background and avoided the fate of the leading Leningrad philologists in 1949. Druzhinin, \textit{Filologiiia i ideologiiia}. T. 2, 387–88.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Leninskoe znamia}, April 30, 1949.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Totuus}, March 19, 1949.

\textsuperscript{42} Flink, \textit{Kottiin karkotettavaksi}, 239–40.
have *Totuus* distributed to the autonomous republics and oblast’s where the Ingrain Finns were resettled to propagate the achievements and working conditions of the Republic forestry and agriculture. He also asked Malenkov to send those Soviet Finns who were working outside the Republic Finnish translations of the important literatures of Marx-Leninism to meet the demand from the Republic and the “democratic circle of Finland.”

As for the national school, Virolainen asked Voroshilov, the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, for financial support in realizing enlargement of the network of middle schools to encourage the national children and the parents in the country side to continue their 8-10 classes for free during the years between 1949 and 1951.

This plan of Kupriianov’s was halted by the purge targeted at the Republic. The purge is said to target those party and soviet leaders who had close associations with Zhdanov and the Leningrad party organization and was initiated by Malenkov and Beria to decrease their influences. Kupriianov himself understood that Andropov, backed by Malenkov and Beria, played a decisive role in the fall of Kupriianov in this purge. In addition to this power struggle, the purge in the Republic was related to the plan of Ingrian Finns. Not directly mentioning the Ingrian Finns, the Orgburo pointed out the main reasons for the removal of Kupriianov were his mismanagement of the Republic party organizations and economic problems, especially in the forestry and paper industry and the economic and cultural conditions of the borderland areas of the Republic, where the Ingrian Finns were primarily resettled. Needless to say, the immigration of the Ingrian Finns to the Republic halted, and the Republic TsK decided to remove those Ingrian Finnish families who worked in the forestry and wood processing industries in the borderland areas.

Kupriianov wrote to Beria from the prison in November 1952 that “thanks to your personal help” the Republic could gather workforces for the forestry from outside the Republic between 1945 and 1950 and reminded him what he had told Kupriianov, “Com. Kupriianov, now we need pitprops, drive everything to pitprops, mobilize everything that the Republic has for preparation and loading pitprops,” and stressed “And I mobilized everything that I could…”

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43 NA RK, f. P-8, op. 1, d. 3488, l. 14, 17, 23–25. Dil’denkin asked the VKP(b) for permission to hire one more Finnish translator for *Totuus*, whose editorial had only two translators and could not guarantee the quality of translation due to the large number of materials in Russian. NA RK, f. P-8, op. 1, d. 3488, ll. 37–39.

44 RGASPI, f. 7, op. 132, d. 199, ll. 18–19.


46 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 116, d. 480, ll. 2–6 (decision of the Orgburo about the TsK KP(b) KFSSR on January 16, 1950), cited in *TsK VKP(b) i regional’nye partiinye komitety 1945–1953*, eds. V. V. Denisov et al. (M.: ROSSPEN, 2004), doc. no. 117, 236–40.


At the third plenum of the Republic TsK in January 1950, Andropov criticized Kupriianov for his deciding the questions of immigration alone, especially Ingrian Finns, without agreeing with other bureau members and secretaries, for acting alone in handling this question of “not only economic but also political” moment gathering “thousands of Ingrian Finnish families,” many of whom “had been in Finland for long time […] and had been influenced by a nationalistic atmosphere.” Since no speakers at the plenum mentioned the Ingrian Finnish question, Andropov was solely assigned to speak about this and, though he exposed himself to fierce criticism at the plenum, he secured his position and later moved to the All-Union party organization with Kuusinen, who was selected as a member of the enlarged Presidium in 1952.

The so-called “bourgeois nationalism” was, however, not a major point in the Republic in the purge. Such union republics as the Moldovan SSR and the Estonian SSR saw collectivization and mass deportation during the purge and Moscow did not fail to criticize the appearance of “bourgeois nationalism” there. In his report to Malenkov in June 1949, N. Koval’’, secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party, reported that the Republic party released the first secretary Radul and the head of the art department of the Republic Council of Ministers Istru due to their ideological activities and bourgeois-nationalistic errors. After their inspection, two inspectors from the VKP(b) reported to Malenkov that they had found “kulak-nationalist elements” and “Moldovan-Romanian nationalists” coming from Moldavia, kowtowing to the bourgeois West, and “Romanization of language, literature, and art, lowering the progressive role of the Russian culture,” which the Moldovan party and soviet leadership ignored. Likewise, the Politburo criticized the Estonian party leadership, especially the first secretary Karotamm, of not engaging in the struggle against the bourgeois nationalism and of promoting “bourgeois-nationalistic elements” to leading positions. Nonetheless, the Orgburo criticized the Karelo-Finnish Republic party mainly for Kupriianov’s mismanagement of the economy and organizations, lack of self-criticism, and arrogance, not to mention nationalities issues, as had happened in oblast’ party organizations in the RSFSR such as in Cheliabinsk and Kursk.

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49 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3940, l. 100 (stenographic record of the third plenum of the TsK KP(b) KFSSR on January 25, 1950). Andropov reported to the All-Union Party Control Commission in March that it was the serious errors of Kupriianov and Virolainen that gathered those Ingrian Finns, some of whom “openly say that they came to the Republic with the aim of being close to Finland to cross the border if occasion offered.” RGASPI, f. 589, op. 3, d. 6265, t. 1, l. 146–151, cited in “Bor’ba politicheskih elit,” doc. no. 3, 19.

50 The Party Control Commission inspected also Andropov’s activities in the Republic but concluded that the accusations against him were not well grounded. “Bor’ba politicheskih elit,” doc. no. 4, 5, and 6, 19–21.

51 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 102, l. 17–21.

52 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 102, 98–99 (the report to Malenkov in late 1949).

53 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1080, l. 37, 146–50 (decision of the Politburo about the activity of the TsK KP(b) of the Estonian SSR on March 7, 1950), cited in TsK VKP(b) i regional’nye partiinye komitety, eds. Denisov et al., doc. no. 122, 248–51.

54 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 116, d. 480, l. 2-6, cited in Denisov, TsK VKP(b) i regional’nye partiinyt komitety, doc. 117. On the Cheliabinsk oblast’ committee, doc. no. 118, 240–244, the Kursk oblast’
The Karelo-Finnish party and Kupriianov were further criticized of unsuccessful results in their efforts to raise the indigenous cadres and support national scholarship and culture. In his report to Suslov after his inspection, Sarkisov criticized the Republic leadership for not raising the Finnic cadres for propaganda and lecture for the indigenous population and relying on the small number of Finns including those coming from North America and who had themselves or whose relatives had been removed from the party or arrested in the 1930s. Furthermore, Sarkisov wrote, the Republic party did not control the academic organizations which ignored Soviet and national folklores and concentrated on pre-revolutionary folklore done by Azadovsky, Astakhova, Bazanov, and Chistov. Kupriianov published a brochure “the Karelo-Finnish SSR” in 1948, which allegedly depicted the Karelian front and the Republic as being in a separate war against Finland, independent from the rest of the Soviet Union, and Kupriianov made his assistant Zhukov write a positive review on this brochure published in Na rubezhe under the alias of N. Sidorov. Sarkisov also reported that Kupriianov tried to popularize himself, overemphasizing his role in the post-war five-year plan of the Republic, which appeared in a Karelian epic poem included in “the Karelian folklore” edited by Evseev.55 Kupriianov explained himself to Malenkov, Suslov, and Ponomarenko that he did not read Evseev’s book nor know the author and criticized Sarkisov of extracting some parts suitable for him without considering the context.56 The final report to Malenkov by inspector G. Kuznetsov also pointed out that the Republic party failed to raise the cadres among “Karelians, Finns, and Veps” and made “serious ideological errors especially in the field of folkloristics.”57 Kupriianov was forced to self-criticize of this “arrogance” at the 1950 January party plenum, after which he was removed from his post.

Amid this purge, the Institute prepared the publication of collected papers of the Kalevala jubilee session. The editor of the Karelo-Finnish State Publisher Faina Eliashberg, who studied under Propp at Leningrad University, complained to the Institute that Zhirmunsky’s paper resulted in “intentional or unintentional propaganda on behalf of the bourgeois Finnish folkloristics” for the Soviet academic community, since readers would find a “most complete knowledge” on it in the paper. She also suspected that Lehmus’s paper idealized the national movement by attributing the “deepest, most fundamental democratism” of Lönnrot to the problems of the Finnish national movement led by the Finnish bourgeoisie. She further criticized Lehmus of “canonizing” the activity and personality of Lönnrot despite the fact that the Soviet scholarship could have shown “historical limitations of Lönnrot

56 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3473, ll. 35–41.
57 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 693, l. 144 (the report from Kuznetsov to Malenkov, December 20, 1949).
as a scholar and poet. While those two papers were finally included in the collected papers, two papers by the Estonians were rejected. Eliashberg wrote that Laugaste’s paper lacked the “party principle [partiinoi printsipial’nosti]” and saw the period at issue from the “bourgeois-nationalist” point of view as Lehmus’s paper did. It seems that Ariste’s paper did not even go to the state publisher, though the jubilee scholarly session announced that Ariste’s paper would be included in the collected paper. The decision not to include the Estonian papers was understandable given that Estonia as well was witnessing an ideological campaign against the “old bourgeois” scholars. Yet, without the Estonians’ paper, the collected papers of the jubilee session were published and exported to Finland.

The purge and fall of Kupriianov was directly connected with Karelo-Finnish national culture and scholarship, but Karelo-Finnish intellectuals naturally underwent difficult times. In February 1952, the Republic party bureau decided to remove Aleksis Kivi’s “Kullervo” and “The Seven Brothers” from the repertory of the Finnish Drama Theatre. In the last summer, the Republic party leadership had already been nervous about Kivi’s works and had decided to remove the Kullervo, a tragedy of one of the Kalevala heroes, from the program of the week of the Karelo-Finnish music and dance performance in Moscow. Timonen, together with Uljas Vikström, prepared a letter to the editorial of Pravda to defend Kivi and the Kullervo, criticizing the Republic party leadership of an “erroneous attitude” toward the Kalevala and Finnish classic literature when the Kalevala was attacked by the reactionaries in Finland. Indeed, the year 1952 marked the 150th anniversary of the birthday of Lonnrot but the Republic media both in Finnish and in Russian kept silent about this anniversary. After considering this letter, the Republic party bureau criticized two Karelo-Finnish writers for considering the development of Karelo-Finnish national culture and literature based on the Finnish language and literature, and in December 1952 they decided to remove Timonen from the post of chairman of the Karelo-Finnish branch of the Soviet Writers’ Union. At this phase, even Kuusinen was reluctant to defend the Kalevala and Finnish classic literature in the Republic.

Like Timonen, Evseev also continued his doctoral work on the Kalevala under the supervision of Propp and his “dialogue” with Finland under ideological and political pressure. Propp wrote in his report on Evseev’s dissertation that the title of the dissertation would be “the historical foundations of the Karelo-Finnish epic [Istoricheskie osnovy karelo-finskogo eposa],” which

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58 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 4250, ll. 42–43.
59 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 4250, l. 42.
60 NA KarNTs RAN f. 1, op. 4, d. 115, l. 110.
63 NA RK, f. 1075, op. 2, d. 173, l. 139, cited in Diuzhev, Antti Timonen, 225.
64 Diuzhev, Antti Timonen, 226–30.
obviously took inspiration from the post-war works of Propp, and the dissertation would present a “well-discussed picture of the interactions between the Karelo-Finnish epic and historical reality.”

In spring 1950, Evseev published a review article on postwar Finnish Kalevala-related studies, which he claimed remained “bourgeois-nationalistic” even after the war and became cosmopolitanistic. Evseev bitterly criticized the wartime and postwar works of Haavio, Jaakkola, and Harva, who still clung to the Scandinavian and western Finnish origin of the poems, thanking their own “ancestors” and ignoring the Karelian and the Karelo-Finnish peoples, and pointing out that “cosmopolitanist and reactionary” Finnish philologists as before saw the Kalevala poems as the “common Finnic legacy.” Evseev further criticized those intellectuals as cosmopolitanist who belonged to pro-Soviet circle such as Iivar Kemppinen and Kaukonen because of their methodology, especially the latter had “wrongly” argued that the Kalevala was the “epic of Lönnrot.” In spite of this criticism, Evseev was sympathetic to Kaukonen, who represented some changes in Finnish society and lost the competition for the post of the professorship of folkloristics at the University of Helsinki.

In Finland as well, Finnish leftists continued their efforts to negotiate the Kalevala and Lönnrot with the Soviets. The Finland-Soviet Union Association organized an event for the 150th anniversary of Lönnrot on April 9, 1952, and received the Soviet writer Anatolii Sofronov as a guest. In his speech Sofronov depicted Lönnrot as a collector and scholar and hailed the popular singers but saw Lönnrot also as a “poet” and the “father of the Kalevala,” he had gained such an impression when he visited the National Museum of Finland before the event. Of course, following the Soviet interpretation of the Kalevala, Sofronov stated that the Kalevala heroes were the working people and were fighting against evil and “millions of Väinämöinen’s” were fighting against the “Pohjola and Louhi” of today, who tried to steal the “sun” from the peoples of the world and bring the “darkness.”

Sylvi Kylikki-Kilpi, a member of the SKDL, stated in her speech, approaching the Soviet point of views, that Lönnrot was a great man of the “peoples of Finland and Karelia” and she was sure “our” ancestors, ancestors of the Finnish people and the Karelo-Finnish peoples, sang the folksongs a thousand years ago. Nevertheless, she was determined not to give up Kaukonen’s argument that the Kalevala was the “achievement [aikaansaannos]” of Elias Lönnrot, an “ingenious individual [nerokkaan yksilön].”

This is no clearer than in the writings and activities of Kaukonen, who became the director of the Soviet Union Institute [Neuvostoliittoinstituutti] in Finland in 1951. Kaukonen introduced the

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65 RO IRLI, f. 721, op. 1, n. 147, l. 1–2 (Propp’s comment about Evseev’s dissertation, dated February 15, 1952).
67 Kansan arkisto, Sylvi Kylikki-Kilpi archive, kansio 5, the summary of the speech of Sofronov, April 9, 1952.
68 Kansan arkisto, Sylvi Kylikki-Kilpi archive, kansio 5, material for the speech on the day of the Kalevala, April 9, 1952.
collected papers of the Soviet Kalevala jubilee session and the collection of Lönnrot’s letters to Grot, which the Soviet Union Institute had received from the VOKS. Utilizing the latest Soviet studies on the Kalevala, Karelo-Finnish folklore, and Bubrikh’s works, Kaukonen showed that Soviet scholarship had demonstrated various new approaches to Karelo-Finnish folklore and the Karelian people and urged continuation in Soviet-Finnish research collaborations. Nevertheless, Kaukonen did not mention Soviet criticism against his argument on the Kalevala and tirelessly explained his argument to the VOKS, which was well reflected in his letter to Kustaa Vilkuna:

“The appearance of Haavio and Kuusi as the indicators of the ancient Finnish poets has placed me in an uncomfortable position as the director of the Institute. [...] It is crystal clear [päivän selvää] that the Soviet Union regarded Haavio’s and Kuusi’s presentations as really rough oppositionist and anti-Soviet propaganda. [...] It seems to me that my concept on ‘the Kalevala’ as Lönnrot’s creation has won the support of Soviet scholars after all [...] The situation is now very different from what it was in November 1946, when I presented my thesis almost alone, and in spring 1949, when the confrontation during the jubilees was very harsh. As a scholar on Elias Lönnrot’s great works, the assignment of the director of the Institute is never to restrict the freedom of the scholar. [...] It is obvious that among the circles of the Finland-Soviet Union Association, as a scholar of the Kalevala and the Kanteletar I presented my argument as earlier, but when it comes to their basis, authentic folklore, the matter changes. According to its assignment, the Association of course spreads the concept of Soviet scholars, and as far as I am concerned, I act as a referee [referaattorina], not as a scholar. [...] For my part, it is now, give or take a confirmed public and unanimous concept that the Kalevala and the Kanteletar are Lönnrot’s works – the victory of science [tieteen] over propaganda.”

Another letter of Kaukonen’s to Elsa Heporauta in the early 1950s illustrates how Kaukonen articulated the Kalevala through the negotiations with the Soviet Union and Finnish society: “During restless years immediately after the wars I again raised the Finnish flag to the pole with the thesis: the Kalevala, the epic of Lönnrot, as the cornerstone of Finnish literature, against the general, anonymous opinion. [...] Soviet scholars seem to accept my concept as far as it regards “Karelo-Finnish folk poems” as the foundation of the Kalevala and of course the Kanteletar. [...] But now Martti Haavio and Matti Kuusi try to raise a new flag on the pole. Their thesis is: the ancient Finnish great poets and their authentic ancient poems, [...] I fight against this with all my might.”

70 SKS KIA, Kaukonen’s letter to Kustaa Vilkuna, March 14, 1952. Kaukonen reported to the VOKS about his “struggle” against Haavio and Kuusi in early 1952. See SKS KIA, Kaukonen archive.
Finnic Language Kinship under Attack

Another campaign hit the Soviet linguists, and in particular the Finno-Ugric linguists. Many studies have already addressed this ideological campaign in linguistics, which was relatively short but harsh and ended with a series of publications by Stalin in the summer of 1950, which denounced the Marrists and blessed the comparative-historical linguistics. The Marrists attacked the supporters of “fascist” proto-language and language kinship, but Stalin and the party ideologues came to put priority on a practical need rather than ideological discipline, because the comparative-historical method was essential to the development of cybernetics and computer science and offered an effective way to teach the Russian language, in particular the grammar, to non-Russian native speakers in schools. Worried

71 SKS KIA, Kaukonen archive, Kaukonen’s letter to Elsa Heporauta.
72 Väinö Kaukonen, “Elias Lönnrot, velikii ucheny Karelo-Finskogo naroda,” Izvestia Akademii Nauk SSSR, otdelenie literatury i iazyka XI, no. 5 (1952), 457, 460. I would like to thank Susan Ikonen for sharing this piece with me.
73 SKS KIA Kaukonen archive, the draft was sent to the VOKS on February 28, 1952.
about the performances of Russian language education, the party ideologues and education authorities felt it difficult to support Marrists who emphasized the semantics not the grammar and spelling in education and local leaders and teachers in non-Russian republics complained about the confusion caused by the Marrists. This declaration of Stalin shocked those who believed in the future that Soviet society would see a single proletarian language but brought a compromise and stability to the linguistics and decisively associated language with nation/nationality. Yet, Soviet Finno-Ugric linguistics and Bubrikh became a target of this campaign in Leningrad and Petrozavodsk. After Lysenko’s victory in 1948 Literaturnaia gazeta led the campaign against the “Indo-Europeanists” and “formalists.” Meshchaninov initially criticized the “bourgeois” theories and methods, not individual linguists, but other leading Marrists such as Filin and Serdiuchenko were by far more offensive. Kul’tura i zhizn’ published an article in May 1949, which attacked the “bourgeois” Soviet linguists including Bubrikh, who was criticized for masking the “proto-language” by his theory of language contacts in Finno-Ugric linguistics. In the end of July, the Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences reported to Malenkov that the Presidium had discussed Soviet linguistics and sent the report of Meshchaninov, which named the leading “bourgeois” linguists such as the Georgian linguist Chikobava, Freiman, and Zhirmunsky. Bubrikh was criticized of trying to “rehabilitate” the formalist-comparative method and the “reactionary” theory of the proto-language. And in the end of March 1950, the Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences decided to change structures of leading research institutes, as a result of which the sector of Finno-Ugric languages at the Institute of the Language and Thought was merged with the sector of Iranian languages into a more neutral, “sector of languages of the peoples of the USSR.”

In Leningrad, Bubrikh was exposed to a series of harsh criticism in party meetings, scholars’ meetings, and lecture rooms but there was a subtle difference in degrees of enthusiasm even among those who criticized him because of his unalterable status as the founder of Soviet Finno-Ugric studies. True, Bubrikh endlessly suffered criticism and finally in the end of November died of a heart attack after he collapsed during his lecture at Leningrad University, where some “participants” obstructed his lecture. In the mid-April 1949 the Institute of Language and Thought held a party meeting including

76 Smith, Language and Power, 164–71; Pollock, Stalin and the Soviet, 106-34; Alpatov, Istoriia odnogo mifa, chapters 5 and 6.
77 Literaturnaia gazeta, October 13 and November 17, 1948.
78 Alpatov, Istoriia odnogo mifa, 146–50.
80 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 164, ll. 16–19 (report to Malenkov from the Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, July 30, 1949); ARAN, f. 2, op. 1–48g., d. 362, ll. 20–23 (the decision of the Presidium, July 21, 1949).
81 ARAN, f. 2, op. 1–50, d. 12, ll. 1–2 (the decision of the Presidium, March 29, 1950). The sector of comparative grammar of the Indo-European languages at the Institute of Languages and Thought was renamed to the sector of general linguistics, while the sector of Romance-German and Classic languages was renamed to the sector of foreign languages.
82 Alpatov, Istoriia adnogo mifa, 158–59.
the local district party bureau leaders and Serdiuchenko and S. P. Tolstov from Moscow. At this meeting, the member of the party bureau of the Institute V. Avrorin criticized Zhirmunsky, Vinogradov, and others but spoke sympathetically about Bubrikh, who had “carefully and painstakingly” prepared cadres and built the interactions between the research institutes engaged in Finno-Ugric studies. Avrorin thus asked the participants to “help” Bubrikh to “overcome the remnants of the proto-language concept.”

At Leningrad University, teachers, students, and other “visitors” gathered to discuss Bubrikh and his works. In defense of himself and Finno-Ugric studies, Bubrikh and those who supported him took the status of the Karelo-Finnish Republic and rivalry with Finnish linguistics into consideration. At the meeting of the Finno-Ugric course in May 1949, which saw 36 participants, Bubrikh explained that his methodology did not justify the proto-language but the “the contact relationships which created the similarity [skhodstvo] that existed, without doubt, before [kogda-to].” Bubrikh also mentioned that to speak against the Finnish language in Karelia at present would be “stupid [nelepo],” when a senior teacher I. Norants said that it was understandable that Bubrikh spoke against the Finnish language in Karelia in the 1930s, when “Finnish nationalists were sitting everywhere.” Agreeing this, one docent N. Tereshenko said that Bubrikh, the “greatest Finno-Ugric scholar,” was responsible for criticizing the Finnish bourgeois scholars, who “steamrolled the idea of Greater Finland” and had “interests in Karelia,” and Soviet linguistics should “help” him for this “politically important assignment.”

In fact, Meshchaninov himself was reluctant to bring Bubrikh and Soviet Finno-Ugric studies to bay. The meeting of the sector of general linguistics of the Institute of Language and Thought in the mid-May 1949 discussed Bubrikh and Finno-Ugric studies. Bubrikh concentrated on attacking the Finnish “bourgeois” scholarship, especially works on the Karelian people and language by Tallgrenn, Jaakkola, and Kettunen to avoid the criticism against him. To close the meeting, Meshchaninov told an episode of when Marr invited Bubrikh to his Institute because Finno-Ugric studies in the Soviet Union was “not satisfactory” and Bubrikh agreed but maintained a distance from his theory. Meshchaninov further mentioned, “I would not say that Dmitrii Vladimirovich [Bubrikh] is an admirer of the proto language. At least he is a very sincere person and clearly speaks against this proto language,” though his theory of language contact had errors and he must clarify the entire outline of the Finno-Ugric language group and more specific relations between one Finno-Ugric language and another. And Meshchaninov reminded the participants of the fact that Bubrikh raised two doctors and eleven candidates in this field, though there was only one doctor, Bubrikh himself, ten years ago, and

83 TsGAIPD SPb, f. 3035, op. 2, d. 6, l. 81–83 (party meeting of the Institute of Language and Thought on April 18 and 19, 1949), cited in Druzhinin, Ideologii i filologiia. T. 2, 403.
84 SPF ARAN, f. 1112, op. 1, d. 90, ll. 24–26 (protocol of the meeting of the Finno-Ugric course at Leningrad University, May 5, 1949).
85 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3757, ll. 12–14 (stenographic record of the meeting of the sector of general linguistics, May 17, 1949).
expanded the network of Finno-Ugric scholars and research institutes which was spread across the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{86}

In the Karelo-Finnish Republic, those contemporaries who saw this campaign criticized the Udmurt linguist Alatyrev for his attack against Bubrikh and other linguists, but the Karelo-Finnish party leadership was not active in joining this campaign since Karelian-Finnish kinship was if not explicitly a pillar of the Republic. The second all-union congress of Finno-Ugric studies in Petrozavodsk Bubrikh planned in 1949 did not take place. And Bubrikh had to give up his posts as head of the language section at the Institute and head of the Finno-Ugric course at the Karelo-Finnish University, replaced by Alatyrev. Unlike in Moscow and Leningrad, however, Alatyrev was rather alone and Bubrikh took multiple positions to defend himself and the discipline as Russian nationalist, Soviet patriot who defended Karelian-Finnish kinship and Soviet Finno-Ugric studies against Finnish “bourgeois” scholarship, and defender of Russian-Karelian friendship.

An enlarged meeting of Petrozavodsk scholars on June 27, discussing Finno-Ugric linguistics in the Republic, highlighted the multiple positions Bubrikh and his fellow linguists utilized to defend themselves. Alatyrev, together with the historian Gardin, criticized Bubikh of exaggerating the Viking influence on the Russian state and the Russian and Finnic languages, and further condemned his textbook on the Finnish grammar as uncritically relying on and recommending the methodology of the Finnish bourgeois linguists and the journal \textit{Virittäjä}. Alatyrev reminded the participants that Finno-Ugric studies is not a “science of Bubrikh nor of Alatyrev but of the Soviet people.”\textsuperscript{87} Criticizing the idea of a proto-Finno-Ugric language and proto-motherland \textit{prarodina} of the Finno-Ugric peoples, however, Alatyrev was silent about what united the Karelians and Finns, which provided the foundation of the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Bubrikh therefore refuted Alatyrev’s criticism with the fact that his works justified and contributed to what Soviet power and the Karelo-Finnish Republic had practiced: Russian-Karelian friendship and Karelian-Finnish kinship. Not mentioning the difference between the northern and southern dialects, Bubrikh stressed that the “Karelian people” had been interconnected \textit{sviazan} with the Russian people ever since the establishment of the Russian-Swedish border which separated the Karelian language from the Finnish language and made the Karelian language closer to the Russian. But, after the Russian Empire annexed Finland, “the eastern elements permeated \textit{propityvat'sia} the Finnish literary language, and its dialectical base moved eastward. Progressive Finnish activists of the last century, for example Elias Lönnrot, with purpose orientated the Finnish literary language to the eastern Finnish dialects.” The Kalevala influenced this trend so strongly that the Finnish literary language had been “useful in Karelia, too,” under Soviet power, even though it had been separated

\textsuperscript{86} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3758, ll. 97–100 (stenographic record of the meeting in Leningrad).

\textsuperscript{87} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3760, l. 49 (stenographic record of the meeting of the Institute and other intellectuals of the Republic, June 27, 1949).
from the western Finnish dialects for long. Explaining his discussion on the “origins” of the Karelian people, Bubrikh said:

“According to the Soviet point of view, the Karelian people consisted of relatively eastern ethnic elements. In the process of his work [Bubrikh’s work on the origins of the Karelian people] the relations between the Finnish-Suomi and the Karelian peoples also became clear. These peoples were close to each other as com. A. A. Zhdanov stated. Nevertheless, the basics of this closeness were, of course, in no way the same as what the Finnish scholars presented. It is important that they were close to each other because of those ethnic elements which were the basis of both of the peoples. […] When through the Kalevala and Karelo-Finnish poetry the influence of the Karelian language came into Finland, the eastern color of the Finnish literary language became strong.”

In addition, Bubikh also stressed a practical aspect of utilizing the “bourgeois legacy,” though not mentioning it directly, to support Finnish language education in schools with the grammar book by him, asking, “[I]f bourgeois scholars confirm that the earth revolved round the sun, do we have to go back to Ptolemy and confirm the opposite? Or, if bourgeois scholars say that the reflex angle is equal to the incidence angle, do we have to say anything else? We must scrutinize in detail everything coming from bourgeois scholarship. But if scrutinizing gives a positive result, we do not need to be afraid of agreeing with bourgeois scholars. No, in this case we must not be afraid of agreeing. Otherwise, we run a risk of falling into the Ptolemian cosmology or pre-Archimedean physics.”

In fact, the Republic had no alternative for Bubrikh and his pupils, and Alatyrev, who had no knowledge of Baltic-Finnic languages, could not replace them. The resolution of the meeting declared that the Institute would strengthen its struggle against Finnish bourgeois linguistics and prepare for meetings to discuss “errors” in the methodology of Bubrikh. After the meeting, Alatyrev reported to Tsvetkov and the president of the Karelo-Finnish branch Gorsky that Bubrikh and his fellow linguists totally ignored Marrist linguistics and lacked the class consciousness. Both at the University and the Institute, Alatyrev replaced Bubrikh. But in late December Alatyrev asked the University rector Yakovlev to release him from the head of the course of Finno-Ugric linguistics, because he “has no (physical) possibility to spare enough time for the course” since he had to give two new lectures on Marrist linguistics and the introduction to Finno-Ugric linguistics. Yakovlev told Tsvetkov that Alatyrev was “sabotaging” and the course of Finno-Ugric studies at the University was

88 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3760, ll. 115–16.
89 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3760, ll. 109–11.
90 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3760, l. 6.
91 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 127, ll. 1–9.
92 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3748, ll. 51–52 (two letters from Alatyrev to Yakovlev, dated December 19, 1949).
“on the brink of collapse [nad rani razvala].”

Even for Bubrikh’s pupils, Alatyrev seemed to be driven into a corner. Koliadenkov, a Mordvin linguist, wrote to Bubrikh that he learned from Alatyrev’s writings that he “had lost all sense as if possessed” and searched for “adoration” in bourgeois scholarship “not in the text but in the footnote. […] What is he doing?” And Koliadenkov warned: “It seems to me, for some reason, that Alatyrev is not alone. He is supported by some hidden hand and, probably, not one. This hand (or hands) of Moscow, but probably also of Leningrad. Take this into consideration. Alatyrev himself is not dangerous.”

This campaign and confusion caused protest not only voiced by researchers but also students at the Karelo-Finnish University. As the head of the Russian language course, Ardentov suffered a series of criticism due to his methodology on Old Church Slavic and his defense of Bubrikh at the meeting of linguists in Leningrad. In addition, according to the report of the dean of the faculty of history and philosophy of the university, Ivan Käiväräinen, Ardentov spoke against the article on linguistics published in *Kultur i zhizn’* and did not explain his own errors to his students. The university party bureau thus decided to organize a meeting for linguistics to have the students and scholars informed about the party policy. Ardentov and Alatyrev clashed so bitterly that Käiväräinen proposed to unite two courses (the Russian language and Finno-Ugric) and assign Alatyrev the lectures and launched a committee led by Alatyrev to inspect the activities of the course of the Russian language. To protest this “attack” against Ardentov, 44 students including 41 Komsomol members submitted a collective letter to the rector in defense of Ardentov on October 29. The university party bureau and the scholars’ council criticized this act of students, many of whom recognized their “error” after a meeting of Komsomol. The party bureau also assigned Alatyrev to accelerate the inspection of the Finno-Ugric linguistics course since the letter mentioned “a series of errors in teaching of com. Alatyrev.” As Morozov ironically commented at another party meeting, however, “if a man himself does not know the Finnish language, he cannot guarantee the teaching of the Finnish language.”

Amid this confusion, the Republic quietly celebrated its 10th anniversary on March 31, 1950, which was in contradiction with the ongoing ideological campaign. Both *Leninskoe znamia* and *Totuus* reminded readers of Karelian-Finnish kinship by quoting Zhdanov’s speech “the tribal, racial, and
national glues binding the Karelian and Finnish peoples” for the first time after the 25th anniversary of the Republic in 1948. Kuusinen published a piece for this anniversary, which was, as usual, careful enough to avoid mentioning such “tribal, racial, and national glues” and reminded readers of how the “Karelo-Finnish population hand in hand with the Russian population” had defended the motherland in the army and as partisans, and the “Karelian working people” under White Finnish occupation had rejected Finnish nationalist propaganda with the spirit of “friendship of peoples.”

His radio speech for the anniversary, however, treated the Soviet-Finnish and Karelian-Finnish relations more sensitively. Kuusinen spoke about the Soviet-Finnish treaty, which the “people of Soviet Karelia welcomed with joy,” because the people knew that the “people of Finland” were not enemy for them. Furthermore, Kuusinen removed two sentences from the speech manuscript so as not to focus on wartime Finnish-Karelian antagonisms: “What irritated the Finnish chauvinists, in particular, was that they could not force the Karelian population in any way to change their especially friendly relations with the Russians. They [the Finnish chauvinists] every now and then resented: ‘What a foreign people they are [kakoi eto chuzhoi narod], they speak Finnish but never agree to hate Russians.’”

The Karelo-Finnish Republic thus easily received “Stalin’s linguistics” in the summer of 1950, even though Stalin never accepted the “proto language” nor “proto-language-family.” Cheboksarov as well criticized himself of wrongly criticizing Bubrikh and admitted the existence of the Finno-Ugric language group and the linguistic-historical approach to the group, though he again stressed that the linguistic approach to this question was far from enough.

In the Republic, the linguists accused Alatyrev of denying Finno-Ugric studies as a science and objected to the plan to assign him the introductory course, though Alatyrev said that he would use various materials of both “ours” including Bubrikh’s works and “the Finnish” and admitted to the existence of a “commonality [obshchnost]” of the Finno-Ugric languages. Recognizing the need to “reconstruct” the Finno-Ugric course, Bazanov tried to find the middle ground whereby Alatyrev could be assigned only the introductory course but offered the rest to other linguists and doctoral students because of the “shortage of teaching staff.” Alatyrev, however, suddenly left the university and never came back.

Though critical of Bubrikh, the Veps linguist Bogdanov said to the fellow linguists, “[I]t is clear to us that all these languages: not only Finnish, Karelian, Veps, but also Estonian, Votic, Livonian, and Ingrian basically originate in the ancient Baltic-Finnish commonality [obshchnost],” that is, they depend on a historically formed one-language base they emerged and developed from, thus history shows that they

100 Leninskoe znamia, March 31, 1950.
101 RGASPI, f. 522, op. 2, d. 22, ll. 18–20.
103 NA RK, f. r-1178, op. 2, d. 278, l. 1–1ob (protocol of the meeting of the Finno-Ugric course, September 2, 1950).
are tightly intertwined in the ancient layer.\textsuperscript{104}

Though Karelian-Finnish kinship survived the Marrist campaign, the relations between Finns and Karelians remained controversial because of Bubrikh’s last works. In November the Institute discussed Gardin’s paper on the origins of the Karelian people, which revisited Bubrikh’s latest works after Stalin’s intervention in linguistics. Gardin evaluated that Bubrikh “exploded the anti-scientific pan-Finnicist composition created by Finnish bourgeois scholarship” which “totally and completely reflects the ideology of Greater Finnish chauvinism and serves the occupation plans of the Finnish reactionary, time and again trying to enslave the Karelian people and going to great lengths to cut her centuries-long ties, going through great trials, of friendship with the great Russian people under the mask of ‘help for the younger brother-tribes.’”\textsuperscript{105} As a historian, however, Gardin pointed out that Bubrikh did not answer the question why the Karelians and Finns were “brotherly peoples, who now constituted a single socialist nation in our Republic, despite the separate ways of their ethnic and political development and when and how tribes [narodonestei] of Karelia” were formed, on the base of which “the new Karelo-Finnish socialist nation was formed, happily existing and developing in the brotherly family of peoples of the great Soviet Union as a result of the victory of the Soviet system in our country.” Gardin maintained that there was no “Karelian nation,” and the name of the Republic was the “Karelo-Finnish SSR,” whose state language was Finnish, which meant that “political and cultural development of the Karelian language goes faster with the Finnish language” and “we cannot leave the Finnish population out of the process of the formation of the socialist nation.”\textsuperscript{106} In other words, Gardin referred directly to the hierarchy of Soviet pan-Finnism, in which the Finns/Finnish language occupy first place.

This aroused various reactions, which articulated how non-Finnish Finnic linguists reacted to this hierarchy. Pointing out that it was a “problem of the political people,” Hämäläinen opposed Gardin’s excessively “official” statement, saying, “here we sit, Aleksandr Antonovich [Beliakov, Karelian], Me, and Nikolai Aleksandrovich (sic!) [Bogdanov, Veps], - what nationalities are we?”\textsuperscript{107} For Bogdanov, Bubrikh’s discussion was the very beginning of his research on the Veps and the relations between the Ves’ and Korela, the Karelians and the Veps were essential to his national identity.\textsuperscript{108} The Veps, in particular, were, in a sense, “loser,” while the Karelian/Karelian language appeared as the winner when the Korela and part of the Ves’ approached each other and the Ludian

\textsuperscript{104} NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 222, l. 7 (protocol of the meeting of the language section of the Institute, March 16, 1951).
\textsuperscript{105} NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 194, ll. 9–10 (stenographic record of the scholarly discussion, November 15, 1950).
\textsuperscript{106} NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 194, ll. 22–29.
\textsuperscript{107} NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 194, l. 29.
and Livvi were included in the Karelian language as Bubrikh showed and Stalin explained that when
two languages became “hybridized [skreshchivanie]” one of them would appear as “the victorious
language,” keeping the grammar and even enriching the vocabulary. Bogdanov thus expressed
suspicion about the treatment of the Veps inferior to the Karelians and asked whether it is possible to
regard the “language” of the Livvi and Ludian as “dialects” of the Karelian language or as “remnants
[ostatki]” of the “Karelianized [karelizirovannogo]” tribal language of the Ves’.\textsuperscript{109}

Admitting that there was no single Karelian language and that the Karelian people consisted
of Karelians and Veps, Hämäläinen maintained that the Livvi dialect belonged to the Karelian language
like some German dialects belonged to the German language though they were closer to the Dutch
language. He also added that it was “Russians” who called Karelians Karelians but did not call Veps
Karelians but “Chudʹ or Chukahri,” which were the “objective conclusions.”\textsuperscript{110} Stressing that it was
the “Livvi and Ludian, […] not Karelians” that were the descendants of the Ves’, Bogdanov opposed
to the hierarchy, saying, “Com. Stalin said nothing on the Veps,”:

“Who gave Ludian and Livvi the name Karelians? Who named [them] the Karelians? Who named the
Veps Chud’, Chukhar’, Kaivan…., as they were called before the revolution. I did not know that I was
Veps, my father wrote Chud’, but according to the document, demonstrated by history, I am Veps. The
Ludians and Livvis were called Karelians. But they called themselves and even now use the name the
Livvi and Ludian, but we, scholars, say – they were called Karelians, so let them be Karelians.
(Hämäläinen: Named the great Russian people.)

Well, but, nevertheless, we have to make use of historical documents which preserved the fact that
they call themselves the Livvi and Ludian, and since the great Russian people called them the
Karelians, they obviously had some reason. But what reason? I do not know. This is clearly explained
by history. I do not want to deny that at present the very Karelian people exist, who have the language
and dialects within it. After all, I repeat, we are speaking about the origins of the Karelian people! […]
What language are the Livvi close to? To the Veps or the Karelian? You deny one historical moment,
the moment of the dissolution of the Veps ethnic group [narodonosti]. The dissolution took place –
each individual dialect developed along its own inner law. We must clarify the historical essence of
the formation of the Karelian people.

Here they speak – the Karelian language the victor. How can you prove it? What does it mean to say,
a culture was superior [vyshe]? How do you prove that a culture is superior? Or the Karelians proper
made use of special rights in the condition of tsarist autocracy? But why do we have various isoglosses
on the linguistic maps, too? This is because all languages of the tribes, Karelian, Ludian, and Livvi,
developed along with their own inner laws and none of them could not become a winner. There were

\textsuperscript{109} NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 194, ll. 43–46.
\textsuperscript{110} NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 194, ll. 70–72.
no conditions for this. This is why these tribes have not forgotten their own ethnic name even to this day.

I really want to say that the Karelians are a single people, but its formation was somewhat different.¹¹¹

This discussion illustrates that the Soviet pan-Finnic hierarchy was consolidated by Stalin, the Republic, and its scholarship and cemented by the “great” Russian people but resisted by the Veps ranked lower than the Karelians in the hierarchy. It was ironical, however, that the same Soviet and Finnish scholarship supported the Veps to claim their origins and present. Beliakov somehow tried to harmonize opinions by reminding the participants that in addition to the common vocabulary and grammar the Finnic tribe had a “common, at least close spiritual and material culture” and all tribes from which the Finnic ethnic groups appeared had “very close, tight direct interactions and mutual relationships.” Beliakov also reminded that Bubrikh was engaged in a “harsh political struggle against the Finnish bourgeois linguists and historians” and thus stressed, “this struggle must be continued by linguists, historians, archaeologists, ethnographers, and toponymists” to solve the questions of the “history of the formation of the Karelian ethnic group, history of Karelia.”¹¹²

Writing the Origins of the Karelian People for the “History of Karelia”

This discussion on the origins of the Karelian people among linguists was not isolated. It was parts of the project of the three-volume “History of Karelia,” whose first volume gathered not only historians but also linguists, folklorists, archaeologists, and literary scholars. By mid-1945 the journal Bol’shevik published a review on the “History of the Kazakh SSR,” which was critical of the work overestimating the “national-liberation movement” of the Kazakhs and wrongly evaluating the mutual relations with the Russian people and of Kazakhstan “joining [prisoedinenie]” to Russia.¹¹³ In Ukraine, Moscow and Kiev were busy fighting against pre-war Polish and bourgeois Ukrainian cultural influence and historical studies in western Ukraine but also against the propaganda of Ukrainian nationalist partisans which criticized Soviet historical writings for treating the Russians as the old brother. In July and August 1946, Kul’tura i zhizn’ and the first secretary of the Ukrainian SSR Khrushchev respectively criticized the first volume of “History of the Ukrainian SSR” for nationalistic deviations.¹¹⁴

Soviet Karelia had not yet produced an “official” history, an emergent assignment for

¹¹¹ NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 194, ll. 76–78.
¹¹² NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 194, ll. 35–37.
¹¹³ Tillett, The Great Friendship, 79–95.
Republic scholars under mounting ideological pressure. In the November of 1946 meeting in Leningrad, Shitov urged the participants to have the project completed in 1950 not only for Soviet readers but also for refuting the bourgeois Finnish history writing, saying that Soviet historians had to write of “brotherly help” from the “great” Russian people to the Karelian people, the progressive meaning of Karelia’s joining [prisoedinenie] the Moscow state, the progressive influence of Russian economy and culture, and the centuries-long struggle “hand in hand with the great Russian people” against foreign occupants. The general editor of this project (and the editor-in-chief of the first volume from the ancient time to the 19th century) was a specialist of the time of Peter the Great, Aleksandr Andreev, who, however, faced many problems from the very beginning of this project. The project lacked native Finnic historians and had difficulty in fully utilizing Finnish language materials, as Shitov reported to the Republic TsK in early February 1947 that the Karelo-Finnish University had no doctoral students of Finnic nationality researching Soviet history and the history of Karelia and Finland in 1946, and, even in 1948, the sector of history of the Institute had only one scholar with a working knowledge of a Finnish language. When asked how the project understood the relationship among the Karelo-Finnish tribes, Andreev stated that the project would deal with such Finnic peoples as appeared in the territory of Karelia and not even Leningrad Finns. Dissatisfied with this reply, Nikolai Volkov, a researcher of the Institute of Ethnography, said: “The Karelo-Finnish tribes must be included in the history of Karelia. Who will write it if this Republic does not. Finland has made such a monopoly of writing, but the K-F Republic does not regard it possible to speak about the western Finns.”

In addition to this lack of native cadres, the ideological campaign in historical studies hit this project soon after this 1946 November meeting. After the Kliueva-Roskin affair, Andreev came under harsh criticism in Moscow for his works on Peter the Great, which was “kowtowing to the West” by overemphasizing the influence of England on Peter the Great, and his background as a pupil of “pre-revolutionary bourgeois historian” Lappo-Danilevskii. The victory of Lysenko also signaled further pressure on “bourgeois objectivism” in history, and Andreev and his colleagues and pupils who participated in his project on Peter the Great were forced to self-criticize. Furthermore, important to the history discussion in Soviet Karelia, the Moscow historian and correspondent member of the Academy of Sciences Mikhail Tihomirov was criticized for the textbook of history of the USSR he edited for pedagogical organizations which allegedly “double-heartedly [dvukhsmyslenno]” raised the

115 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 14, ll. 9–10 (stenographic record of the scholars’ council of the Karelo-Finnish Branch, November 20–23, 1946).
116 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2088, l. 120; Ibid., d. 3109, l. 3 (the report of Bubrikh on the activities of the Institute for 1948 to the Republic TsK).
117 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 14, ll. 106–8.
“unscientific” Norman theory of the origins of the Slavic state.  

In addition, an ambitious plan for the project increased the difficulty of having the project completed on time. Although originally optimistic about completing as planned (in the end of 1947), the Institute reported to the Republic TsK in late 1947 that the first volume would be ready “no earlier than the middle of 1948.” Yet, at the meeting of the primary party organizations of the Karelo-Finnish branch on 15 June 1948, Andriainen admitted that the entire project would not be ready within the period of the current five-year-plan since “we overestimated our forces and our possibilities” and the authors were “very overloaded [ochen' peregruzheny],” even though the first volume was approaching the goal. And, critically, the project could not organize a good quality of translation of the Finnish literatures concerning this project. Andriainen and Hämäläinen suggested publishing those chapters which had been already completed because the “History of Karelia” had a significance “not only for our Republic. Finnish histories very cunningly describe the history of Karelia by falsifying it.”

Worried about the progress, the Institute called a meeting to discuss the project by inviting the authors, including Andreev, Raisa Miuller (in charge of the 16th and 17th centuries), and the Moscow archaeologist Briusov, and Tsvetkov and Gorskii on 29 July. Andreev pointed out that the first volume had not yet fully integrated the related disciplines such as ethnography and Finno-Ugric studies nor Bubrikh’s contribution, which had not yet been rendered “consistent [uviazyvaetsia]” with the other disciplines. Furthermore, Andreev proposed to include the young Leningrad historian Igor Shaskol’skii, who had just defended his candidate dissertation “The Struggle of Novgorod against Sweden and Norway until the 1260s” and could utilize the Swedish materials which concerned with the Swedish intervention in Karelia in the 17th century. Although not mentioned at the meeting, Andreev himself could not concentrate on his contribution partly because of the lack of archival materials but also due to the ideological campaign against him in Moscow, as Bubrikh reported to the Republic TsK in late 1948 that Andreev’s chapter for the first volume was “not yet complete.”

Andreev’s concern about Bubrikh’s argument was understandable given the ongoing

119 Tikhonov, Ideologicheskie kampanii, 133–41, 147–68, 171–83; Sonin, Bor’ba s kosmopolitizmom, 534–35., 539–41.
120 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 2568, l. 125.
121 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3106, l. 52.
122 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3106, l. 54. In February 1947 Shitov wrote to Andreev that two staff members of the Institute were engaged in the translation of Finnish and Swedish literatures, but, in his opinion, “we cannot carry it out very carefully but quickly.” NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, ed. khr. 45, l. 51 (Shitov’s letter to Andreev on February 22, 1947). Likewise Miuller wrote to Andreev after her return from Petrozavodsk in November 1947 that she could not receive the translation of the Finnish materials needed for her chapter in time and could not utilize those materials. SPF ARAN, f. 934, op. 5, d. 25, ll. 40–40ob (Miuller’s letter to Andreev, November 30, 1947).
123 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3106, ll. 52–53.
124 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3106, ll. 66–67.
125 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 3109, l. 9.
campaign against the Norman theory in history. Already in spring 1948, the sector of history of the Institute discussed Bubrikh’s work on the origins of the Karelian people. A. Ivanov, the head of the sector of economy, pointed out that Bubrikh’s work sounded as if they were justifying the theory of the proto-language and the Norman theory and underestimated archival materials available. Although denying the criticism of the proto-language, Bubrikh admitted that he “overestimated” the Norman influence on the origins of the Russian state. At the same time, the Republic leadership gave such a high evaluation of Bubrikh’s work that Kupriianov included it in his brochure “the Karelo-Finnish SSR” published in 1948 to explain the origins of the Karelian people. So, as we see below, there was explicitly or implicitly political and scholarly “pressure” to include Bubrikh’s achievement in the first volume of the “History of Karelia.”

In this respect, one of the supporters of Bubrikh was Igor’ Shaskol’skii. Shaskol’skii was born in Petrograd, 1918, having Jewish backgrounds from the former territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. He went to the famed German-language school, “Petrischule,” and started his study in 1936 at Leningrad University, where he studied history and archeology of the Rus’ state and her relations with Scandinavia. From the 1940s, he started to publish works on the expansion of Rus’ on the Baltic and her relations with indigenous tribes including Ladoga and Karelian tribes, as he listened to Bubrikh’s lecture in Leningrad after the blockade. He officially became a senior researcher of the Institute in August 1949 but had joined in the project of the “History of Karelia” earlier. Chistov wrote to Andreev in June 1948 that he had listened to Shaskol’skii’s presentation on Karelian history, which was “very good.” By adding two scholars, Bubrikh and Shaskol’skii, who could make use of Finnish literature, the project strengthened its rivalry with the “bourgeois” Finnish historical studies amid the escalation of the political and ideological campaign.

Being suspicious of Andreev’s leadership, the Institute called a meeting to discuss the first volume. Miuller and Andreev learned in advance from Mashezerskii that Gardin would give “harsh objections [rezkie vozrazhenia]” against all papers except for the ones by Briusov and Shaskol’skii. Miuller’s letter to Andreev does not suggest in detail what Gardin’s criticism was but she wrote that his indications were “in many respects, in my opinion, rational [del'nye].” While complaining of the long absence of Andreev in Petrozavodsk, Gardin criticized the first volume of failing to give Marxist criticism against the “chauvinistic” Finnish historians and even to learn major Finnish studies through the translation the Institute had already prepared, about 30 literatures in Finnish.

126 NA RK, f. r-3627 (Fond of Gardin), op. 1, d. 34, l. 8, 10 (protocol of the meeting of the section of history, April 28, 1948).
128 SPF ARAN, f. 934, op. 5, d. 373, ll. 1–2 (Chistov’s letter to Andreev, June 13, 1948).
129 SPF ARAN, f. 934, op. 5, d. 25, l. 65 (Miuller’s letter to Andreev, November 5, 1948).
130 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 103, ll. 48–53 (the stenographic record of the meeting on the
his argument, Bubrikh criticized that there was “no Karelian people” in the first volume, saying, “we see – some obscure population on the territory called Karelia.” His criticism especially went to the chapter written by the late Gaziatskii and Gaziatskaia, which completely ignored the Karelian and Baltic-Finnic problems and Soviet archaeological and linguistic studies on those problems and thus could not compete with Finnish scholarship. He said: “If such a chapter reaches Finland, it will be scandalous. Such a chapter must not be published. I informed professor Andreev beforehand that nonetheless we have to treat the question of ancient Karelia more carefully, this question has political acuteness.”

Chistov joined in this criticism and stated that Gaziatskii and Gaziatskaia uncritically treated the Kalevala as a historical source as did bourgeois Finnish scholarship, but the Kalevala, which “Lönnrot wrote down from the peasants in the 19th century,” reflected the representation of the ideal of the Karelian people.

It was Shaskolʹskii that most frankly and powerfully demanded to strengthen the rivalry with Finland and utilize the special position of the Republic to make the first volume a more competent work. Shaskolʹskii stated that the important but difficult assignment was to find the “right combination” of the “general Russian [obshche-russkogo]” and “Karelian” elements in the history of Karelia as a part of Russia, since it was impossible to describe it as a process of “self-development [samorazvitiia], resulting from activities of one Karelian people.” In other words, one had to clarify how history and development of the entire country influenced the history of Karelia and, at the same time, scrutinize the Karelian people, her development, and her role, taking what Russian and Finnish scholars produced into consideration during the imperial and Soviet periods. Reminding the “chauvinistic” publications on Karelia in Finland during the last war, Shaskolʹskii, however, had to admit that Soviet scholars had only a little knowledge of Finnish studies: “We cannot fight against them without knowing them.”

This is why the first volume had to make the best use of Bubrikh’s work and the discovery of Soviet archaeology:

“It is completely clear that the historical work, which reflects the official opinion of Soviet scholarship, will be published, the work will be sent to Finland, let us assume that a special meeting of the University [of Helsinki] will be called, which will discuss it, and then we, Soviet historians, can submit to the fact that our work there would be evaluated as outdated? […] If it concerns the history of Tatar, Chuvash, Bashkir, the situation is simpler, but we have to take into account the borderland situation the K-F Republic is put in. We have to consider the neighbors. We have to consider a political struggle which took place on the ideological front. The struggle includes the historical studies, too, and thus

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131 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 103, ll. 60–62.
132 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 103, ll. 104–5.
133 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 103, ll. 65, 71–72.
we must present a thorough knowledge of all historical problems in this book.\footnote{NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 103, ll. 69–70.}

The Republic party leadership and party-minded historians, too, agreed to this criticism. Andriainen expressed frustration with the fact that the authors did not use the Finnish literatures and Bubrikh’s studies. He complained that the Institute had done “what the Institute could do” for the translations of the Finnish literatures but only Miuller submitted requests for translation and the translations the Institute did were not used in the first volume. In addition, as a historian in charge of the third volume (Karelia in the Soviet period), Andriainen even proposed to address the “interaction between the ancient Karelian tribes and neighboring Finnic tribes, between the Karelian and Finnish peoples,” not only the Russian-Karelian friendship.\footnote{NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 103, ll. 91–93.} And the meeting’s decision said that the first volume failed to consider the latest Soviet historical, linguistic, archaeological, and anthropological achievements and it especially ignored the Karelian people and her origins, and recommended using the translations of the Finnish literatures for the criticism of bourgeois Finnish scholarship.\footnote{NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 103, ll. 121–23.}

As a result, the project was forced to restart with a new editor after the criticism from the Republic party leadership. After the November meeting, Andreev told the Institute that he resigned the position of general editor of the project and editor of the first volume. Shaskol’skii wrote to Andreev that he had recently noticed an “atmosphere” against Andreev in Petrozavodsk but asked him to continue as the editor because he believed “no one but you at present can be the editor of the first volume and the Karelian Institute made a mistake, when its ‘top echelons [nachal’stvo]’ wished to refuse your leadership of the first volume. Only the ‘poor’ first volume suffers from this.”\footnote{SPF ARAN, f. 934, op. 5, d. 25, l. 68 (Miuller’s letter to Andreev, dated December 15, 1948).} Learning this from Shaskol’skii, Miuller also wrote to Andreev that he had a good reason to give up the assignment but she was sorry at this news and the “unfortunate publication [neschastnym izdaniiam].”\footnote{SPF ARAN, f. 934, op. 5, d. 380, ll. 1–1ob (Shaskol’skii’s letter to Andreev, dated December 3, 1948).} At the second congress of the Republic party in his keynote speech, Kupriianov criticized the first volume of “apolitically, objectively” addressing history of the Karelian people and of not giving “Bol’shevik criticism” against the “reactionary and chauvinistic theory of the bourgeois Finnish nationalists” on the origins of the Finns and Karelians.\footnote{Leninskoe znamia, April 26, 1949.} Following Kupriianov, Stefanikhin mentioned that the first volume wrongly approached history of the Karelian people and Tsvetkov as well maintained that it did not expose the “falsification of history of the Karelian people by reactionary Finnish historiography.”\footnote{Leninskoe znamia, April 27 and 30, 1949.}

In fact, in Moscow and Leningrad, Andreev and Miuller went through more antisemitic,
anti-cosmopolitanism campaigning from early 1949. From the end of February, Moscow University and the Institute of History historians who had Jewish backgrounds became the target of the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign. At the Institute of History-Archive in Moscow, Andreev was released from his post in the end of April.141 At the Leningrad branch of the Institute of History, where Miuller was officially affiliated, the newly appointed director M. Ivanov called a meeting in mid-April and criticized Leningrad historian A. Predtechenskii (the editor of the second volume of the History of Karelia) for “lowering the role of Radishchev and overestimating Karamzin” in his study.142 Though the campaign in Leningrad was “milder” than in Moscow, Miuller suffered in the end. Miuller had studied history and archeology in Leningrad under Andreev in the 1920s. From 1937 Miuller and Andreev began to study Karelian history with the Karelian scholarly-research institute of culture, and Miuller became a staff member of the Leningrad Branch of the Institute of History in 1945. Since her husband was of German nationality and arrested in 1941, Miuller was removed from the Leningrad Branch of the Institute of History in July 1951.143

In Petrozavodsk, Bubrikh wrote to defend his studies on the Karelians not only for linguists but also for historians. One month before his death, Bubrikh prepared a short article “Is the Em’ theory not enough? [Ne dostatochno li emskaia teoriia?]” to refute the work of the geographer N. Shishkin on the Komi-Permyak. Based on the Marrist linguistics, Shishkin criticized Sjögren and the Finnish bourgeois scholars and the “comparative method” of linguistics that they regarded the Komi-Permyaks as Finns and both the territory of the Komi-Permyaks and Komi-Zyrians as one area of Greater Finland.144 Bubrikh came against this and maintained that Shishkin ignored the latest Soviet linguistics and archaeology and, as Sjögren wrongly did and the bourgeois Finnish scholars utilized for Greater Finland, supposed that the Em’ tribe spread so far eastward that it could participate in the formation of the Komi-Zyrian.145 According to Chistov, Alatyrev and another historian were opposed to publishing this piece posthumously, but Chistov, Shaskol’skii, and Linevskii demanded it be published. They finally agreed on publishing it with a supplement comment by Shaskol’skii after Stalin’s intervention in linguistics.146 Shaskol’skii wrote that even though the Soviets could regard Sjögren as a Russian [russkim] scholar and be proud of him, he shared anti-Russian feeling of the time dominant among the ruling circle of Finland, which reflected in his work on Em’, whom Sjögren did not want to describe as once being under the political and cultural influence of ancient Rus’ from 11th

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141 Tikhonov, Ideologicheskie kampanii, 201–35, 250–54.
142 Tikhonov, Ideologicheskie kampanii, 238–44.
145 Dmitrii V. Bubrikh, “Ne dostatochno li emsikh teori?” Izvestiiia Karelo-Finskogo filiala Akademii Nauk SSSR, no. 1 (1950), 80–92. The draft of this piece is dated October 30, and Bubrikh tried to organize a meeting on this topic by asking the Institute of History and inviting Shaskol’skii, the archaeologist Ravdonikas, and Hämäläinen. SPF ARAN, f. 1112, op. 1, d. 21, l. 1, 5.
146 Chistov, “Vospominania o moem pervom direktore,” in Kert, D. V. Bubrikh, 94.
to the mid-13th centuries, before the Swedish conquest. Seen from this historical standpoint, Shaskol'skii accused, Shishkin clung to the 19th-century scholarship of Sjögren’s and the bourgeois Finnish historians’.147

In fact, Shaskol'skii’s historical studies were highly evaluated by the Institute because his studies showed not only the historical subjectivity of the Karelians within the Russian state and friendship with the Russians but also partly reversed the pan-Finnic hierarchy by shedding light on the leading role of the Karelians. Though the project of the first volume was forced to restart, Shaskol'skii’s chapter gained him permission to separately published it as a monograph in 1950 and he published articles on the Novgorod State and the Russians and Karelians in the struggle against Sweden in the 12th century. Shaskol'skii demonstrated that it was the Karelians who played the central role in the Pillage of Sigtuna in 1187, which marked the debut of the Karelian people in European history as a part of the Russian [Russkogo] state and hand in hand with the Russians to “defend the Finnish tribes from Swedish conquest and subordination.”148

Shaskol'skii’s Russo-centric writing and Bubrikh’s argument on the Karelians, however, were finally irreconcilable with the project of the first volume and the Republic party leadership. The new draft of the first volume was ready in early 1951 and submitted to the Institute of History for preview. The Institute of History held a meeting to discuss the new draft on 2 June. Briusov delivered an opening presentation, which said that the draft had excluded the chapter which treated the origins of the Karelians and instead added a summary of Bubrikh’s discussion on the origins of the Karelian “ethnic group [narodnosti].” since the origins of the Korela tribe remained “yet ambiguous and unclear.”149 At the meeting, however, the Leningrad historian Viktor Bernadskii wished to add Bubrikh’s article to the first volume, otherwise it would be insufficient to address the “penetration [proniknovenii] of Russian influence and Russian culture into Karelian territory and their role in the development of the Karelian people.”150 Likewise, some voiced that the draft paid too much attention to wars and lacked class struggle, but Shaskol'skii replied that Karelia was located on the borderland and could not avoid wars and there was no fact of class struggle discussed during the period.151 Nevertheless, the meeting evaluated the new draft as “positive, readable.” The Institute of History, its section of the history of peoples of the Soviet Union also gave a positive review on the specimen of the first volume in May 1952. Skeptical about linguistic data on the Karelian question compared with archeological data, Briusov again explained the reason why the first volume did not include Bubrikh’s

148 Igor’ Shashkol’skii, “‘Bor’ba Novrogoda i karel protive shvedskoi ekspansii v XII v.,” Izvestiia Karelo-Finskogo filiala Akademii Nauk SSSR, no. 2 (1951), 3–23.
149 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 207, ll. 34–35 (protocol of the meeting of the scholars’ council of the Institute, June 2, 1951).
150 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 207, l. 21.
151 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 207, ll. 22–23.
contribution: the late Bubrikh could no longer reconsider his discussion which had to take Stalin’s linguistics into consideration.152

These positive reviews were nevertheless overturned by the party leadership of the Institute in early July 1952. They criticized Shaskol’skii of overemphasizing the role of the Karelians in the defense of Novgorod and of forgetting the positive influence of the Russian state on the Karelians and Karelia since it was “fortunate” not for Novgorod but for the Karelians when they entered the Novgorod state, thanks to which the Karelians could avoid the “more difficult” fate of the other “related peoples.”153 Osipov, the head of the department of science and higher education of the Republic TsK, said that the Republic propaganda must not allow any appearance of nationalism because during the last war the “Finnish-Fascist occupants carried out the policy of explosion [podryva] of the friendship of peoples of the Republic by portraying the Russian people in opposition to the population of Karelian, Veps, and Finnish nationalities.”154 The party leadership was not monolithic as the deputy minister of enlightenment Strelkov welcomed the first volume as proof of creative development of the Republic historians and hoped to use the work for history education in the schools as soon as possible.155 But Osipov proposed the first secretary Egorov to “fundamentally” reconsider the project, reporting that the first volume promoted “local nationalism” by exaggerating the role of the Karelians, ignored class struggle, and falsified the diplomatic history of the Russian state by writing about multiple Russian and Karelian military expeditions to Norway, Sweden, and Finland.156

Although the party leadership problematized the “local nationalism” of the Karelians, another error of the first volume in this phase was the failure to rightly treat the “mutual relationship between the Karelian and Finnish peoples and their ethnic and historical commonness,” the question the Republic linguists and folklorists had addressed. Hämäläinen was not yet convinced with why Briusov removed Bubrikh’s contribution since Briusov “quite often” cited the Kalevala and mentioned the Karelians on north-western Ladoga and “two groups of Karelians” between Lake Onega and Ladoga, but the latter Karelians no longer appeared in the specimen.157 One step forward, Andriainen asked the authors why the specimen “bypassed” the question about the mutual relationships in the historical development of the Karelian and Finnish people. For historians of the Soviet period of Karelia like Andriainen, this question was unavoidable. That is why he asked:

152 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5423, l. 6, 91, 104 (stenographic record of the meeting of the section of history of peoples of the Soviet Union, the Institute of History, May 22, 1952).
154 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5424, l. 49.
155 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5424, ll. 30–31.
156 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5424, ll. 134–41.
157 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5424, ll. 81–82.
“All participants here are familiar with the words of com. Zhdanov, stated at the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the SSSR, when he called the Karelian and Finnish peoples the kindred peoples tied with blood racial-national glues. The specimen correctly demonstrates the friendship of the Karelian and Russian peoples. The historical development of the Karelian people took place on the territory, in the system, and under the protection of the Russian state, in the friendship and under the leadership of the Russian people. […] But it seems to me, we must not set a Chinese wall between the historical developments of the Karelian and of Finnish peoples. If we pay attention to history, we find that already in an earlier period in the development of the Karelian and Finnish tribes there was a territorial commonness, racial closeness and they utilized the languages which were very close to each other. […] Here the authors were accused of having paid too much attention to the Russian and Karelian expeditions to Sweden, but they had not brought even one fact showing the joint struggle of the Karelian and Finnish peoples against the despotic tyranny of Sweden. It seems that the division of history of the development of the Karelian and Finnish peoples by the Chinese wall is not only not beneficial but, on the contrary, obstructs the effort of the Karelian and Finnish peoples to be united in a single nation on the base of socialism.”  

Nonetheless, the history project was geographically and historically more clearly defined than similar projects in the Kalevala studies and linguistics and lack of sources, and scholarly strictness did not allow the projection of the Karelo-Finnish “nation” onto the past. Agreeing with Andriainen, Shaskol’skii replied that he tried to demonstrate the struggle against Sweden as the struggle against the subordination of Finland and believed that the Karelians participated in the struggle for the fate of Finland. However, he said that one must not draw such picture for the period between the 12th and 15th centuries because the sources did not allow it.

It is difficult to say to what extent Soviet historians followed the historical studies in Finland after the war. As many studies have argued, Finnish historians went through changes which reflected the post-war paradigm shift in Finnish historical studies and “realistic” diplomacy of Paasikivi and Finland’s position in the world. When the publisher WSOY launched a new project of Finnish history “Handbook of History of Finland [Suomen historian käsikirja]” for university students and appointed the historian Arvi Korhonen as the general editor, he did not include Jaakkola among the contributors. The chapter for medieval Finland no longer used the Kalevala and its heroes and paid

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158 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5424, ll. 74–75.  
159 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5424, l. 95, 100.  
little attention to Karelia. Paavo Ravila, who was in charge of the chapter “the Lineage of Finland and the people of Finland [Suomen suku ja Suomen kansa],” was careful enough not to take the Finno-Ugric language family seriously and, like Briusov, to write that the origins of the Karelian people was far from clear, although he was critical of Lauri Kettunen’s argument on the western Finnish origins of the Karelians, since the Karelian people included many Veps and Votic elements.\textsuperscript{161}

Jaakkola kept his post as professor of Finnish history at the University of Helsinki and the editor-in-chief of the journal Historiallinen Aikakauskirja until his retirement. His wartime publications were removed from libraries under the Allied Control Commission. For the 1949 Kalevala jubilee, Jaakkola also followed the trend and focused on Lönnrot, “the great editor and last poem singer,” in his opening essay for the jubilee in the Historiallinen Aikakauskirja but persistently called historians to pay respect to and take advantage of what Finnish folkloristics had achieved and “our ancient poems” and believed that the “heroic poems of the Kalevala were fundamentally realistic and historical and western-Finnish in their origins,” which Evseev condemned as “propaganda of cosmopolitanism” and “bourgeois nationalism.”\textsuperscript{162}

Arguably, given the situation in Finland, there might also be room, if small, for historians as there was for folklorists, literature researchers, and linguists over the Kalevala and the Karelian people between Finland and the Karelo-Finnish Republic during the late Stalinist years. For the Soviet side, however, lack of academic resources (local professors and scholars, translators, archival sources) and political needs (Kuusinen not interested in history), and political and ideological pressure after 1949 (not only rivalry but also pressure for peace) made it even more difficult to complete a project for historians than folklorists and linguists, and historians had to wait a little longer to make their “dialogues” more visible.

The last years of Stalinist rule saw “quiet” progress, not “halt,” in the discussions on the Kalevala, the Karelians, and Karelo-Finnishness in the Republic but limitations and contradictions brought by the Karelo-Finnish were obvious not only in the academic discussion. According to Rudolf Sykiäinen, who worked as interpreter at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stalin suggested to Kuusinen that the role of the Karelo-Finnish might be over. Sykiäinen recalls that when the SKP leaders Ville Pessi and Aimo Aaltonen visited Stalin, Molotov, and Kuusinen on April 27, 1951, to discuss the strategy in Finnish politics, Stalin asked Kuusinen: “Where do you, comrade Kuusinen, govern now?” After Kuusinen answered, “I am the chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Karelo-


“Finnish Republic,” Stalin said: “Yes, they will do well without You there in Karelia. You must move to Moscow and concentrate on helping the Finnish comrades. If you really want to be president of Finland.” Rentola has interpreted this conservation that Stalin suggested the Finnish communists to intensify their struggle against the social democrats for peace and Kuusinen was not allowed to accept the invitation to the 70th anniversary of the SKP in Finland. From the Republic point of view, however, Stalin’s suggestion meant that the Kremlin and Kuusinen were no longer active in supporting the Karelo-Finnishness of the Republic.

Contradiction to the Karelo-Finnish was most obvious in raising national cadres and school education. After the confusion of the Marrist campaign, representatives from the Karelo-Finnish Branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the University, schools, and the Republic government gathered to discuss these topics in the end of 1950. Following the decision of the Republic party bureau in the end of March 1949, the Ministry of Enlightenment took a measure to realize the compulsory seven-year education for non-Russian schools, expand the network of non-Russian schools including seven-year schools and middle schools in the city of Olonets, villages of Ukhta and Vedlozero, and prepare teaching cadres. As a result, in the academic year 1950-51, 164 (6,014 pupils) of the entire 698 schools in the Republic taught in Finnish and 21 elementary schools, 21 seven-year-schools, and 4 middle schools opened. The Ministry prepared 122 new teachers to the non-Russian schools, which brought the total number to 509. The Minister of Enlightenment, however, reported that the non-Russian schools further needed 12 teachers: 3 in biology, 3 in mathematics, 1 in history, and 5 for elementary schools, and the middle schools (8-10 years) totally lacked teaching cadres and textbooks in Finnish, which was a “basic obstacle for the development of the middle-level education for the Karelo-Finnish population.” The Republic leadership was yet aiming to open a non-Russian middle school in Petrozavodsk and schools in each district to make a clear carrier path to the University, Pedagogy Institute, and other higher education institutions, as Tsvetkov mentioned at the meeting.

Once again, however, disagreement about how to achieve this appeared. Bogdanov insisted on fully utilizing the studies on the Karelian dialects to help the Karelian children more easily and efficiently learn the Finnish literary language and then the Russian language, which would in the long run make it possible to achieve the goal. But Borodkin, the head of the Petrovskii raion division of people’s education, appealed that in southern districts the situation was chaotic in “mixed schools [smeshanoi shkoloi]” where the Finnish language and methodology were taught in Finnish, but biology, history, and geography were taught in Russian. Hattunen from the Ministry of Enlightenment frankly

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164 Rentola, Stalin ja Suomen kohtalo, 211–12.
165 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 4306, ll. 1–6 (report from Beliakov to the head of the section of school of the Republic TsK, November 20, 1950).
166 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 4305, ll. 22–23 (stenographic record of the meeting about the non-Russian schools, December 12, 1950).
stated that Finnic children did not want to go to non-Russian school since the parents wanted good education in Russian and good careers for their children and in this respect the authority of the non-Russia schools was low.\textsuperscript{167} Still, at this phase, Yakovlev had a say in this issue. The university rector understood the long-term importance of the Karelian dialects but in the short run could not support the idea of Bogdanov, which was “out of touch with life.” Yakovlev nonetheless reminded the participants of the decision of the TsK VKP(b) in 1940 that assigned the Republic not only to establish national cadres but also to have “all peoples working in the Republic” know the “language of the Republic, where they lived.” And “the state languages are Russian and Finnish” and those who are in leading positions have needed to study the Finnish language since, “I am a Karelian and studied the Finnish language in my years, but my sons know scarcely a word of Karelian.”\textsuperscript{168}

In fact, the Republic leadership desperately sought a young Finnic population in and outside the Republic. Andropov asked Suslov to send those Karelians who competed middle school and was studying in the higher education institutions in the Kalinin oblast\textsuperscript{'} to the Republic since in the Republic only 13 of 26 Karelians and Finns who graduated from middle school entered the University and the Teachers’ Institute, even though both institutes accepted 175 and 306 students, respectively.\textsuperscript{169} To increase the number of Finnic students in the University, the rector Yakovlev had unofficially accepted the Finnic applicants without passing the entrance exam in the foreign language for years since they “badly know the Russian literature. They study the literature but not on the middle school level.” Yakovlev persuaded other Republic ministers at the meeting of the Council of Ministers to give up a “unrealistic” goal for the new Finnic students to the University, saying, “[I]f only 42 people graduate from middle school, I cannot accept 142 peoples into the University.” While some ministers accused Yakovlev of this “wrong” act to give the “discount coupons [skidki]” to the Finnic students, others understood Yakovlev because otherwise there was no increasing the number of the national cadres in higher education.\textsuperscript{170} In fact, the University accepted 12 Karelian, Finnish, and Veps freshmen in September 1948, which brought the total number of Finnish, Karelian, and Veps students to 20, and 61 freshmen of Finnic nationalities in September 1951, which brought the total number to 134. And the Pedagogical Institute accepted 61 Karelians and Finns in September 1951, which brought a total number of 110 Karelian and Finnish students (586 students in total). However, the number of Slavic students jumped up from 95 (89 Russians, 4 Ukrainians, and 3 Belarussians) in 1948-49 to 865 (818

\textsuperscript{167} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 4305, ll. 1–8.
\textsuperscript{168} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 4305, ll. 21–22.
\textsuperscript{169} RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 384, l. 138 (Andropov’s report to Suslov on August 3, 1950). The division of Agitprop reported to Suslov that in the academic year 1949–50 59 Karelians completed the middle school and 13 completed the Teachers’ Vocational School [uchilishche], 15 Karelians were studying at the Pedagogical Institute and 11 studying in two teachers’ institutes in the Kalinin oblast\textsuperscript{’}. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 384, l. 139.
\textsuperscript{170} NA RK, f. r-1394, op. 6, d. 2067, l. 260–69 (stenographic record of the meeting of the bureau of the Council of Ministers, June 24, 1953).
Russians, 29 Ukrainians, and 18 Belarussians) in 1951-52, and the number of Jewish students came to 25 in 1951-52 from 3 in 1948-49. Further studies on this topic were required, however, to achieve the goal set by Moscow in 1940, which was unrealistic as Yakovlev mentioned.

During the last years of Stalin, it became more and more difficult to conspicuously seek Karelo-Finnishness and Karelian-Finnish kinship in the Republic and there were clearly limitations on these politically pressured concepts, but many stakeholders fully took advantage of the existence of the Republic. The Karelo-Finnish intellectuals did not suffer so much criticism as the Russian folkloristics did and, criticizing the “bourgeois,” “cosmopolitanist” Finnish Kalevala studies, they continued their dialogue with their Finnish counterparts, which slightly changed the views of both sides. Though Kupriianov was purged, Moscow was very careful not to shake the Karelo-Finnish architecture, on which the Kalevala and Karelo-Finnish kinship unsteadily stood. The aim of Bubrikh and his pupils was to challenge Finnish superiority by showing the subjectivity of Karelians within the Russian statehood and with the help of the Russian people and by demonstrating the superiority of Soviet Finno-Ugric studies. This effort, however, faced a challenge by the Veps Bogdanov, who objected to this ascent of the Karelians at the expense of the Veps within the pan-Finnic hierarchy. The historians, Shaskol'skii among others, made the same effort by showing the subjectivity of the medieval Karelians and even the Karelian superiority over Finland. Nevertheless, lack of powerful figures, sources, and Karelo-Finnish intellectuals in this field made this effort difficult.

The Karelo-Finnish Republic, indeed, depended on Stalin’s treatment of Finland, which was placed in between the two blocs in Cold War Europe and cleverly met his essential demands, keeping the status-quo. To keep this status-quo, the pan-Finnic hierarchy/order was useful as far as it was modified to fit the Soviet national hierarchy/order. Within these interrelated orders, Finns including Ingrian Finns, Karelians, and Veps in the Republic cooperated and competed with each other, sometimes going back and forth between two hierarchies, sometimes utilizing the interactions with Finland. As we will see in the next chapter, once Stalin was gone, the Karelo-Finnish architecture found itself very fragile, but the interrelated hierarchies were persistent.

Chapter 9: De-Stalinization and the fate of the Karelo-Finnish Republic, 1953–1956

De-Stalinization is usually regarded as an effort to break with Stalinist rule in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc and as a process of “partial liberalization” of Soviet society with the abolition of mass political violence. As Fitzpatrick has recently argued, Stalin’s successors had an

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171 The numbers come from the statistics department of the Republic, NA RK, f. r-1411, op. 4, d. 1116, l. 102ob (the number of the University students in the academic year 1948-49); NA RK, f. r-1411, op. 4, d. 2736, l. 133ob (the number of students in the academic year 1951-1952).
It was Beria that impatiently pushed reforms not only in the Soviet Union but also in other socialist states, which culminated in the Uprising in East Germany on June 17, 1953. After his arrest, the post-Stalin collective leadership carefully and quietly began to correct “excesses” of Stalinist policies. The most decisive break with Stalinist rule is the abolishment of terror and the mass release (more than 4 million people by September 1958) of political criminals from Gulag camps and special settlements. At the same time, these changes caused troubles and confrontations between the Gulag returnees and the local population who did not welcome them, especially in western borderland republics. Khrushchev’s so-called secret speech in February 1956 was the culmination of this process and aimed to win people’s loyalty to the Party and revitalize their commitment to the building of socialism with the Party.

These changes challenged the Karelo-Finnish Republic in many ways. The abolishment of mass violence apparently reassured the Finnic minorities haunted by the memory and fear of terror of high Stalinism. The rehabilitation of selected Red Finns such as Eduard Gylling strengthened this relief and expectations for further changes. Nevertheless, as discussed, it was in the late Stalinist years that the Karelo-Finnish Republic had their national symbols and culture recognized, the kinship between the Karelians and Finns reaffirmed, an interaction with Estonians was reestablished, and the Finnish language “imposed” on Finnic children. Were these policies excesses?

It was Beria’s indigenization policy that destabilized Soviet western borderland republics and inflamed nationalisms. On May 26 the KPSS Presidium passed a resolution [postanovlenie] to criticize the Ukrainian Communist Party of neglecting indigenous cadres and relieved Melʹnikov of his post as the first secretary and appointed the Ukrainian Kyrychenko as his successor. This resolution encouraged local western Ukrainian elites and intellectuals to speak out against “Russification” and the dominance of Russians and eastern Ukrainians, in particular in Lviv, where the influence of pre-war Polish culture still remained among local intellectuals even after uprooting the Polish population and a massive influx of eastern Ukrainians. This action was followed by two

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other resolutions to promote non-Russian, indigenous national elites and languages in Lithuania and Belarussia. In Lithuania, too, this Presidium resolution called for a promotion of local Lithuanian cadres and the indigenous language, of which the Lithuanian leadership made fully use to “Lithuanianize” the party and government cadres and purged Russians. In Belarussia, the Presidium resolution on June 12 demanded the replacement of the first secretary Patolichev with the second secretary Belorussian Zimyanin, who was assigned to proceed the 4th plenum (June 25–27) of Belorussian Communist Party in the Belorussian language, criticize the mismanagement of nationality policy in western Belorussia, and call for using the Belorussian language in the party, government, and education organizations.

This hasty change led by Beria stopped after the Uprising in East Germany on June 17, when workers stood up for the improvement of working conditions and the Socialist Unity Party leadership was helpless under pressure from Moscow to reform itself by changing the leadership. The Uprising prevented the Ulbricht leadership from being replaced because of the need to stabilize their society and spurred other Soviet leaders to arrest Beria and to hold him responsible for all the confusion in Western borderland republics and other socialist states. The fall of Beria helped Patolichev secure his position in Belorussia and removed the Caucasian republic party leaders, because of their close interaction with Beria.

The removal of Beria, however, did not reverse what he had initiated, and the Soviet collective leadership continued to allow the local leaderships to promote national cadres and languages. In Armenia, Armenian communists and intellectuals denounced Artunov for not commanding Armenian and tried to promote national symbols and culture within Soviet patriotism. In Belorussia, though Patolichev remained in power, the Belorussian language became the language officially used in the local party congress and plenum. Especially in Lithuania, thanks to Sniečkus’s ability to preserve a cohort of Lithuanian communists during the late Stalinist era, the republic party was able to advance more Lithuanians to higher party and government posts and repatriated thousands of Russians from Lithuania even after the fall of Beria. At the same time, this relaxation of fear resurrected international/nationality rivalries in union republics. In Azerbaijan, Armenian elites began to demand the reopening of the Armenian drama theater in Baku, which was closed in 1949, and criticized the Azerbaijan leadership’s attitude on Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. In response to this criticism, the new Azerbaijan leadership led by the first secretary Imam Mustafoev denounced those Armenians for forgetting what the Azerbaijanis had done for them. Furthermore, the anger and fear of Russians in

177 Einax, Entstalinisierung auf Weißrussisch, 100–2.
179 Davoliūtė, The Making and Breaking of Soviet Lithuania, 88–89.
non-Russian national republics as well worried both Moscow and local leaderships. This was further complicated by the massive arrivals of Gulag returnees. Thus, post-Stalinist indigenization in the national republics proceeded with high hopes and tension, while Khrushchev was more concerned with the economic development and rehabilitation than a consistent nationality policy.181

“Beria’s New Course” seemed to receive little response in the Karelo-Finnish Republic at least on the surface, but the 6th Republican party plenum taking place soon after the July plenum of TsK KPSS was more revealing of what Beria wanted to do in the Karelo-Finnish Republic. At the plenum, Gusev, Republic Minister of Internal Affairs, reported that the MVD SSSR forced the local MVD to accept and assign the ethnic Karelian chekists to the Finnish-speaking areas, most of whom originally came from Kalinin oblast’, had never lived in Karelia, and did not know the Karelian language, Karelian way of life or culture.182 Many speakers including the first secretary Egorov stressed the need to regain party control over the local MVD, which had been recently “without control.”183

Denouncing Beria’s “interference’ in the local MVD, however, the speakers continued to support the promotion of indigenous nationality to leading cadres as had been done during Stalin’s time. Egorov said, “Could one regard it normal that of all 10,000 pupils of indigenous nationality studying in schools under the Ministry of Education of the K-F Republic only half is studying in Finnish? Or, of 1025 students of K-F University we have today only 126 students from the indigenous nationality. No, this is not normal!”184 Likewise, Petrov, Republic party secretary, raised an example how badly they treated this promotion of the indigenous nationality. According to him, Egorov ordered Stebunov, the head of Statistics Department [upravlenie], to recruit one person from the local nationality cadres into the Statistics Department. Two days later Stebunov came to Petrov to tell that the order did not make sense because “we have a cleaner and typist working” who were of the indigenous nationality. “If we understand the decision of the TsK KPSS on the question of training and education of national cadres in this way,” Petrov warned, “we will not fulfill the decision and commit serious errors in our works.”185 Although calling upon various educational and cultural organizations to improve their activities, both Egorov and Petrov did not mention the role of the Finnish language in the national policy of the Republic. Only Rukolainen, secretary of the Republic

182 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5544, l. 40 (stenographic record of the 6th joint plenum of TsK, Petrozavodsk City Committee).
183 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5544, l. 7 (Egorov’s report) and l. 19 (Smirnov’s report).
184 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5544, l. 9.
185 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5544, l. 60.
Komsomol, paid attention to the poor quality of Finnish language teaching.186

In a similar vein, there were other points the plenum emphasized is the vigilance against capitalist encirclement. Egorov reminded the audience that Finland had an 800-kilometer-long border with the Soviet Union. Petrov more explicitly highlighted the dangerous influence from bourgeois Finland on the nationalist atmosphere within the population and demanded to fight against the uncritical attitude to bourgeois Finnish culture and the emergence of local nationalism.187 Yet the local national writers immediately challenged this call to vigilance. In *Leninskoe Znamia* on July 21 Timonen and Vikström published a piece to refute the editorial of *Totuus* to defend themselves and Aleksis Kivi’s works.188 Iosif Sykiäinen followed this effort to set the direction of Karelo-Finnish literary criticism of Finnish literature by basing their work on the Soviet Kalevala. Acknowledging that Timonen and Vikström were wrongly silent on the reactionary aspects of the literature of Finland, Sykiäinen stressed the importance of the Kalevala’s affirmative influence on the development of Finnish literature and the literary language, and urged people to critically approach how Finnish writers used the themes of the Kalevala and reveal what the Finnish bourgeois critics did not mention.189

The Moscow leadership carefully started to make use of the Soviet-Finnish relationships as a gateway to the West immediately after Stalin’s death.190 Otto Kuusinen was conscious of this “Thaw” in the international arena and paid a rare visit to Petrozavodsk to give a closing remark at the 3rd plenum of the Republic TsK in 1954. It seems strange that Kuusinen was present at the plenum, where they discussed agrarian problems of the Republic. Obviously, Kuusinen came to have the Republic Party members know that recent Soviet diplomatic policy and peace movement had successfully contributed to relaxing international tension and realize peace in Europe and Asia. Not forgetting to stress the vigilance against foreign enemies, Kuusinen’s remark implied that the Soviet-Finnish relationship would continue to ease and the interaction with those who supported peace there would strengthen.191

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186 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5544, l. 50.
187 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5544, l. 9, 59.
188 *Leninskoe znamia*, July 21, 1953, “*Za kriticheskoe otnoshenie k naslediiu proshlogo.*” Both of the writers sent a letter to the Republican Party leadership to request a chance to discuss this issue again at the Party bureau. The leadership rejected this petition but did not exclude them from the Party as once planned in 1952. Diuzhev, *Antti Timonen*, 262–63.
191 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 5942, ll. 116–24 (stenographic record of the third plenum of TsK KP K-F SSR).
Closer to Russia and the Russian Language

The relaxation of political violence and of the cult of Stalin after the arrest of Beria enabled nations and nationalities to emerge within the Soviet Union. Above all, this de-Stalinization process allowed the emergence of Russian nationalism as a significant political and intellectual movement especially in the field of literature on the Russian village.\footnote{Yitzhak M. Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State 1953–1991 (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 30, 46–50.} After officially renouncing the blame on former Leningrad party leaders, Khrushchev explained to the Leningrad regional and city party officials that it was Beria and Abakumov who “fabricated some political grounds” like the attempt to “form the Central Committee of the party of the Republic” to “clear [ubrat’]” Voznesenskii, Kuznetsov, and others. Criticizing the “cult of personality” (but not identifying it with Stalin), Khrushchev called the Leningraders to go back to Lenin and “work and work.”\footnote{RGANI, f. 52, op. 1, d. 398, ll. 237–38, cited in Nikita Sergeevich, Khrushchev: Dva tsveta vremen. T. 1, eds. Andrei Artizov et al. (M.: MFD, 2009), razdel IV, doc. no. 9 (Khrushchev’s speech at the meeting of the Leningrad regional and city party officials on May 8, 1954), 506–7.} Even though this speech was no clear affirmation of Russian nationalism, the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav in June 1954 and the transfer of Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in April reaffirmed the centrality of three East Slavs, especially the “glue [uzyl]” between the oldest and second older brother by kinship, language, history, and origins. Whatever the motivation of this decision, the anniversary underlined a common ancient Russian nationality from which later three brotherly nationalities, Slavic states, and bylina heroes appeared.\footnote{K. Osipov, “Vossoedinenie dvukh bratskikh narodov,” Druzhba narodov, no. 1 (1954), 263–64; Literaturnaia gazeta, June 1, 1954. On the transfer of Crimea, Smith, Red Nations, 193–94.}

This gradual relaxation in the Soviet-Finnish relationship, on the one hand, and in nations/nationalities issues within the Soviet Union, on the other hand, forced the Republic elites to face the long-time question: is it now necessary to raise Finnish-speaking cadres if Finland will no longer be a hostile state? Furthermore, reconsidering the language policy might be encouraged by the new collective leadership, especially Malenkov, who expected a clearer and more efficient economic management and cadre training rather than ideological discipline. From the 1954-55 academic year, all Soviet schools began to emphasize polytechnical teaching and the allocation of more hours to biology, physics, chemistry, mathematics, and handwork. This is for sending more children to work soon after completing middle school, and the parents were thus asked to cooperate with teachers to help the children learn those subjects at home as well.\footnote{Leninskoe znamia, July 1 and 4, 1954.} It is thus more rational than before that both the local leadership and Karelian parents let their children study in Russian. This new policy was crucial for the Karelo-Finnish Republic, where many were dissatisfied with Finnish language education.
The Republic leadership thus called for a meeting to gather the principals and teachers from all national schools to discuss Finnish language education in June 1954. For this meeting, the Republic Ministry of Education dispatched special groups to national schools in each raion to investigate the current situation and discussed their reports on May 27 at the Republic Council of Ministers. Almost all members of the special groups agreed with Mashezerskii, who conducted research in Segezh raion, where 200 out of 421 Karelian and Finnish children studied in Finnish in three non-Russian schools. Summarizing what teachers and parents said to him, Mashezerskii proposed to instruct the pupils in Russian and teach the Finnish language as a subject in national schools. As before, the parents did not want the children to study in Finnish, which obstructed their abilities in the Russian language and their career after a 10-year-education in national schools.

A significant difference from the discussion of the Stalinist era is that Mashezerskii came to point out the difference between the Finnish and the Karelian languages, saying “[T]he Finnish language is related [rodstvennyi] to the Karelian language, but not the mother tongue [rodonoi iazik], Karelians do not speak the Finnish language.”\textsuperscript{196} Ostrovskaaia supported this critical attitude to the Stalinist language policy by reporting the situation in the Petrovskii raion, where all of 12 national schools switched to teaching in Russian before 1954. Stressing that years of Finnish education had changed nothing in the local population’s language, Ostrovskaaia insisted that the ongoing language policy was hindering the preparation of local national cadres because “[It] seemed that we artificially planted [nasazhdaem] Karelo-Finnish schools in this district.”\textsuperscript{197} It is true that the Finnish language helped Ingrian Finnish children, who studied and spoke in Finnish in classrooms, especially in the Rugozerskii and Petrovskii raions, but these Ingrian Finnish children spoke Ingrian Finnish at home, and pedagogical cadres were insufficient.\textsuperscript{198} Faced with these acute criticisms, Prokkonen, who apparently hoped for the continuation of the ongoing “Karelo-Finnish” policy, had no other way to rely on the “kinship [o rodstve]” between the Finnish and Karelian languages to defend his position. “It is wrong,” he underlined, “to consider that the Karelian and Finnish languages are not kindred [rodstvennymi]. Never deepen this error. These two languages are absolutely related languages.”\textsuperscript{199}

The next two meetings attended by the Republic party leaders and government officials as well made it clearer that more elites began to undermine the foundation of the Republic and strengthen the Russian language education in national schools. Accordingly, those who were sympathetic to Finnish language education went further to rely on Karelo-Finnish kinship and the union republic status. Pirhonen, director of RONO (the district department of the Ministry of Education) of the Kalevala raion, mentioned that even in the Kalevala raion, it had been quite difficult to send all the

\textsuperscript{196} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6227 (documents for the resolution of the bureau of the Republic TsK on the language of studying at non-Russian schools), ll. 48–52.  
\textsuperscript{197} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6227, l. 55.  
\textsuperscript{198} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6227, l. 57, 67.  
\textsuperscript{199} NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6227, l. 69.
Karelian and Finnish children to national schools, because the parents demanded that the children learn good Russian. “Every year there has been a fight – the parents demand that the children study in Russian class. For us to have to send our children to Karelo-Finnish classes would seem to be abnormal.” Petrov, secretary of the Republic Party, pointed out that there was no proof that “the Finnish language was closely related [rodnym] to the Karelian language” and proposed to make the Finnish language an optional subject for indigenous children.201

Defending Finnish language teaching, the university rector Yakovlev relied on the borderland and union republic status rather than kinship to defend his position. Again, he reminded the participants of the official line of the Karelo-Finnish Republic since 1940, when the Politburo assigned the Karelians the international obligation [dolg] to the Finnish working class. “We study the Finnish language not because it is the native language of the Karelians,” he said, “We have to study it because our republic is located on the borderland [pogranichnoe polozhenie].”202 To compromise with those who demanded a wholesale transformation to Russian language education, Prokkonen offered a proposal to make the Finnish language a basic subject in national schools and to end the Finnish language study as a subject in purely Russian schools. Resisting the direction of the discussion, Yakovlev said: “There is no union republic, where state languages are not studied. National language is studied in elementary schools, middle schools, and institutes of special education [spetsialnykh uchebnykh zavedeniakh]. Would it be right, if we decide, that they study the Finnish language in one raion but not in another raion?”203 This appeal to the union republic status was, however, denied by Egorov, who said: “Our republic has our own specific character. There is no such union republic where the number of the indigenous populations is so small. We have to take this specificity into consideration,” and regarded it right to study the Russian language in the raions, where Karelians are dominant.204

It is natural that those who supported wholesale Russian education in national schools stressed the historical friendship of Russians and Karelians as a reason for how important the Russian language is for Karelians and how easy it is for them to study. Bogdanov prepared a report on the Finnish language and Karelian dialects for the Republic Party bureau. As before, Bogdanov stressed the closeness of the Baltic-Finnic languages and pointed out the grammatical system and basic vocabulary [osnovnoi slovarnyi fond] of the old Baltic-Finnic linguistic layer as the foundation of Karelo-Finnish linguistic kinship.205 Nonetheless, the meeting participants underlined the differences of both languages. According to Morozov, the head of the department of school at the Republic party,
“linguists” saw that the Karelian and Finnish languages today were strikingly different from each other in terms of lexicon, morphology, and grammatical system in spite of their common origin. Vtorushin, Republic party secretary, even said that it is not necessary to mention the linguistic kinship and their difference in the report on this issue to the Moscow Central Committee. Egorov, too, regarded it unnecessary to deepen “theoretical aspects” of this problem, because “the Russian language had influence” on the Karelians, “not the Finnish language.”

After these meetings Egorov wrote to Malenkov to ask for permission to change language policy in national schools in the Republic. In his petition, Egorov criticized Chikobava’s latest introductory book to linguistics, which describes that the Karelian language is close to the Finnish language, and explained how difficult the situation was in the Republic. For mainly practical reasons mentioned above, Egorov asked Malenkov to allow Karelians to choose themselves what language they wanted to study in schools and not to bring any pressure on their choice. This bold proposal reflected Egorov’s true aim, as he revealed at the meeting mentioned above, to “motivate and ask the TsK KPSS to give the permit” to change the instruction language to Russian and make the Finnish language a subject in non-Russian schools. As Egorov expected, Moscow allowed the Council of Ministers of the K-F SSR to adopt a resolution to make the instruction language in national schools Russian from the beginning of the new academic year, while the Finnish language remained a basic subject, and the Karelian children still had to attend non-Russian school. As Zakharova has summarized, the Republic education authorities and Karelian parents and pupils concluded that the Finnish language had “no future” in the Republic in 1954.

Another effort to cut a Finnish language institution took place in January 1955, when Totuus made a critical spelling error in the editorial. In autumn 1954 the agitprop division [otdel] of the TsK KPSS criticized Totuus for its political error to expose heavy drinking and disorder in kolkhozes in Koskenkylä, which the Finnish radio broadcast to discredit kolkhozes. Soon after, Egorov announced that the agitprop was to pay attention to the newspaper, the editorial reprinted the editorial of Pravda (on January 7, 1955), which stressed the role of newspapers in the coming elections. In its translation in Finnish, Totuus made a spelling error in calling for further “annihilation [kukistamiseen]” of the Soviet industry by omitting “o” from “flourishing [kukoistamiseen].” In his report to the TsK of the Republic Party, Kolmovsky, head of the Agitprop, blamed the correctors, Toini Kälina (sic!)
(American Finn, working since 1943) and Sirkka Öqvist (Finn, working since 1927) and Zakharov, the editor-in-chief for this “grave political error.” In the end of January, Zakharov urged Egorov to assign additional correctors to the editorial department to make the working conditions “more or less normal” and pointed out that the printing office made many mistakes because it had no Finnish-speaking proofreader [podchitchika]. Therefore, Zakharov asked him to obligate the Republic Filial (the Karelo-Finnish branch of the Academy of Sciences) to create a handbook for correctors or an orthographic dictionary, without which “we will have no common terminology and standard spelling.”

In spite of this request, in the end of March, the Republic Party bureau issued the decision to propose the TsK KPSS merge Totuus with Leninskoe Znamia as Leninskaia Pravda/Leniniläinen Totuus. Egorov explained this proposal in terms of efficiency as he had in the discussion on Finnish language education. Almost 90% of the materials used in Totuus came from Leninskoe znamia and they thus used very qualified staff as translators. He further argued that the merger did not matter in everyday life of Finnish-speaking people, because they continued to publish the Finnish-language newspaper, Leniniläinen Totuus, but the content was the same as Leninskaia Pravda.

This “correction” of the Stalinist excess of Finnishness and pursuing economic efficiency was finally discernible in the replacement of the Republic Party leadership in mid-1955. In December 1954 E. Gromov, head of the section of the party organization in charge of the union republics of the TsK KPSS, sent the TsK KPSS a report on the leadership of the Karelo-Finnish Republic, which the Republic Party plenum discussed in October. In this October plenum many speakers criticized the leadership for the failure in forestry and agriculture, especially its cadre policy and leadership style, which led to a lack of qualified specialists, low level of workers’ discipline, and the devastating situation of the party-political activities among workers at timber stations and firms. Monitoring the plenum and the leadership, Sharkov criticized Egorov for his attitude to other members of the bureau, and ignoring their “advice,” and regarded it impossible for Egorov to trust and mobilize the local party members and cadres to assignments. Accepting Sharkov’s report, Gromov proposed to summon the Republican Party bureau members to discuss the activity of the leadership in mid-January 1955.

On June 23, Gromov appealed to the TsK KPSS again, and proposed L. I. Lubennikov, ethnic Russian and the first secretary of the Minsk oblast’ committee in Belorussian SSR, as the candidate.

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213 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6419, ll. 3–7.
214 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6419, ll. 41–42.
215 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6271, l. 144 (protocol of the bureau of the TsK of the KP KFSSR).
216 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 10, ll. 27–29 (Gromov’s report to the TsK KPSS). On the October plenum; Leninskoe znamia, October 29, 1954.
217 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 10, ll. 35–37.
218 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 10, l. 27.
for the next first secretary of the Republic. According to Sharkov’s report to the TsK KPSS, in spite of harsh criticisms, Egorov did not try to improve the situation in the economic life of the Republic even after the February-March plenum of the TsK KPSS, which received “harsh criticism” due to the unsatisfactory leadership of the agricultural economy. Furthermore, the report criticized Egorov for his relationship with two Karelian top officials, Prokkonen (the chairman of the Republican Council of Ministers, Karelian) and Smirnov (the first secretary of Petrozavodsk city committee, a Tver’ Karelian). Ivanov, inspector of the section of party organizations of TsK KPSS in charge of union republics, monitored the meeting of the Republic party bureau on July 30 and reported to Gromov on Egorov’s mismanagement by quoting the remark of Prokkonen, “[W]e did not have practical contacts in the bureau. Com. Egorov sometimes blamed staff using words inappropriate for a leader. For example, he called me ‘baboi.’ We have to change the style of leadership, organize an aktiv around the TsK KP, not avoid it.” Smirnov sent a petition to Khrushchev to allow him to go back to his native city of Kalinin due to the “abnormal situation [nenormal’naia obstanovka]” created by Egorov.

Against this background, the 6th Republic Party plenum on August 15 discussed the criticism of the Secretariat of the TsK KPSS against Egorov. Unlike the January 1950 plenum, which criticized Kupriyanov and his allies, the August plenum did not mention nationalities issues such as national languages and the immigration of Finnic peoples to the Republic. Obviously, the plenum was arranged in advance to attack the mismanagement of Egorov, Vtorushin, and Gulinsky, in charge of party organization, in collective leadership, forestry and agricultural economy, even though Moscow had already criticized Egorov for his error in managing kolkhozes and sovkhozes against the background of the January plenum of the TsK KPSS. Prokkonen had to admit his responsibility for the economic situation as head of the government but remained in his position. After the plenum, Egorov was replaced with Lubennikov, and the TsK KPSS acknowledged the plenum’s election of Smirnov to secretary of the Republic party and, after the 5th Republican Party Congress in January 1956, agreed to appoint Sen’kin secretary, an ethnic Karelian and long-time first secretary of the Karelian oblast’ committee after Lubennikov from 1958.

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219 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 30, l. 9 (Gromov’s proposal to the TsK KPSS).
220 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 30, ll. 65–69 (Sharkov’s report to Gromov on August 5, 1955), cited in Oleg Klevniuk et al., eds., Regional’naia politika N. S. Khrushcheva (M.: ROSSPEN, 2009), doc. no. 16, 76.
221 This term signifies an “ignorant peasant woman.”
222 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 30, l. 12 (Ivanov’s report on the bureau meeting to Gromov). Another report by Sharkov to Gromov as well emphasized Egorov’s “unhealthy relationship” with Prokkonen and Smirnov. RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 30, ll. 65–69.
223 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 30, l. 25 (Smirnov’s petition to Khrushchev dated March 31, 1955).
225 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6259, l. 96 (stenographic record of the 6th plenum of the TsK of the KFSSR on August 15, 1955).
226 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 30, l. 91 (on Smirnov on October 18); RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 59, l. 27
This leadership replacement, however, had another context to bring the Republic closer to Russia. In the midst of the discussion above, on March 17, 1955, Gromov proposed reorganizing the Republic into the Karelian Autonomous oblast’ within the RSFSR to Moscow. Gromov pointed out the fact that the Republic had been formed “artificially [iskustvenno]” without the objective characteristics each union republic had as the reason for this reorganization. Gromov maintained that the objective characteristics the Republic did not meet were a total population (one million at least) and an ethnic component (the titular nationality/nationalities have to form the majority), because, according to the latest data, the total population of the Republic was about 600,000, whose majority were Russians. Furthermore, Gromov wrote, recent years have shown that the Republic has had very limited perspective as a union republic and further development depended on the interaction with the RSFSR, and in particular Leningrad city and oblast’.  

While it is not clear from Gromov’s proposal why it should be an autonomous oblast’, and not an autonomous republic as before 1940, the appointment of Lubennikov suggested Moscow’s intentions. Soon after the plenum, on August 17, the Republic Council of Ministers held a meeting to discuss the forestry and agricultural economy inviting Lubennikov. Prokkonen reiterated the importance of working “practically” and underlined the need to invite 6,000 workers from Belorussia to work in forestry in the Republic. Lubennikov encouraged his new colleagues to make use of the forest “rationally and efficiently” and said: “[E]ven though Egorov was responsible for the unsatisfactory works as late as yesterday, today we do not have to depend on him. Today we meet the demands with all strictness.” At least, at the section of the party organizations in charge of union republics, the dominant idea was to streamline the organizations and institutions of the Republic to raise the economic performance and meet the demand of indigenous peoples, especially the Karelians.  

**Widening Pan-Finnic Interactions in the Soviet-Finnish Relationship**

Nonetheless, to understand this approach to Russia and the Russian language, and efficiency needs further explanation on the fate of Finnishness in the Republic. For this question, it is essential to consider how the Soviet-Finnish relationship changed after the death of Stalin and how post-Stalin leadership used Finnic interactions for this. Khrushchev challenged Molotov to realize the withdrawal of Allied forces by the State Treaty with Austria and to improve relations with Yugoslavia by visiting Tito in May 1955. As Kulaa has discussed, Finland sensed a change in Soviet diplomacy after

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227 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 59, ll. 34–35.
228 NA RK, f. r-1394, op. 6, d. 2563, l. 73, 75, 79, 84 (stenographic record of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the K-F SSR).
Stalin’s death and encouraged the Yugoslav diplomats to consider improvement with Moscow by following Soviet-Finnish relations.\textsuperscript{230} As early as July 1953, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed the report by the former ambassador to Finland Abramov, who depicted Finland as a neutral country rather than a reactionary country as seen during the Stalin years. Accordingly, the Soviet evaluation of Paasikivi became affirmative, and Kekkonen came back as Foreign Minister, which was a positive sign for Moscow. Furthermore, the Soviet embassy started to seek contacts with the SDP and even the \textit{Kokoomus} leadership, who on their part wanted a connection with the Soviets to compete with Kekkonen and the SKP.\textsuperscript{231}

What Moscow hoped from Finland was multifold. First, Moscow wanted to use Finland as a showcase of relaxation of Cold War tensions. Moscow wanted to prevent Finland from entering the Northern Council and include it in the newly planned collective security in Europe, which the Soviets expected to function as a counter against West Germany’s joining NATO. Although dissuading Finland from entering the Northern Council was abandoned, Moscow made efforts to influence the power struggle in Finland, especially for the coming presidential election in early 1956. As Rentola has clarified, the Soviet side was in favor of the first option that Paasikivi continue his presidency. Since Paasikivi’s attitude was ambiguous, Moscow saw Kekkonen as the second option and offered to return Porkkala as a reward to Paasikivi for his contribution to Soviet-Finnish friendship and as a display of Soviet will for further relaxation in the East-West confrontation.\textsuperscript{232} On September 15, Paasikivi and Kekkonen paid a visit to Moscow for negotiation on the extension of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty and Porkkala. The Soviet leaders welcomed them so warmly that Paasikivi gave a speech that he had been in Moscow seven times and “now [I] leave for home with satisfaction.” After the two governments agreed on the extension of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty and the return of Porkkala, they enjoyed Prokofiev’s opera “Cinderella” at the Bol’shoi Theater, where Voroshilov showed the seat of Nicholas II to Paasikivi, who said, “our friend,” and both Khrushchev and Voroshilov laughed.\textsuperscript{233} In listening to Paasikivi’s spontaneous speech in Russian after the negotiation, Vorohilov told Reinhold Svento, “If I were a woman, I am sure I would fall in love with such a man like your president Paasikivi.”\textsuperscript{234}

As a contrary to this friendly atmosphere, the Soviet leadership flatly denied the possibility of returning Karelia, which Kekkonen hoped for in his coming election and was one of the reasons why the Karelo-Finnish Republic was downgraded, given the timing of Gromov’s proposal and of the

\textsuperscript{230} Kullaa, \textit{Non-Alignmen}, chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{231} Rentola, \textit{Niin kylmää että polttaa}, 301–34, 357–58.
\textsuperscript{234} Reinhold Svento, \textit{Ystäväni Juho Kusti Paasikivi} (Helsinki: WSOY, 1960), 58.
appointment of Lubennikov. Since Lebedev in advance informed both Paasikivi and Kekkonen about the impossibility of having Karelia returned and advised them not to raise the Karelian question in the Moscow meeting, Paasikivi was reluctant to raise this issue but let Kekkonen asked Bulganin, who replied that the Soviet-Finnish border question was settled.\(^{235}\) However, the return of Porkkala was a great success for Kekkonen’s election campaign, and he propagated this gain and future possibilities of the returning of ceded Karelia. During the presidential election campaign on January 5, 1956, the *Maalaisliitto* newspaper *Maakansa* published the poem “Song of Finland [Suomen soitto]” with a drawing of a Kekkonen-like Väinämöinen playing the Kantele under a tree. The poem suggested that Kekkonen won back Porkkala and that President Kekkonen might play “beautiful Karelia, too [ehkä kauniin Karjalankin].”\(^{236}\) This was especially appealing for those who were evacuated from ceded Finnish Karelia and the Karelian Isthmus and strongly supported Kekkonen.

Second, more than before, Soviet-Finnish economic cooperation was mutually important after the completion of Finnish repatriation payments. The global fall of the price of paper, wood, and cellulose in the end of 1952 hit the Finnish economy and workers, but the Soviet Union imported those products, which increased the Soviet presence in Finnish export, and, in addition to grain, Finland imported “Red oil” from the Soviet Union, which in the mid-1950s brought Finland to the biggest importer of oil from the socialist bloc in the western countries. In the end of November 1954, Mikoyan visited Finland as the first Presidium member to visit Finland after Zhdanov to take part in the launching ceremony of two icebreakers the Soviet Union had ordered. At the reception Mikoyan toasted the “progressive capitalist” Wahlforss and his shipyard company *Wärtsilä* and hoped he would build more ships for the Soviet Union. Mikoyan’s visit prompted the Soviet Embassy to approach other big companies such as the United Paper Mills and Converta to strengthen Soviet-Finnish economic ties.\(^{237}\) While the US and UK were worried about the rise of Soviet economic influence in Finland and the “pro-Kremlin” politician Kekkonen, the Finnish leadership was willing to deal with Moscow with the confidence of not being totally dependent on the Soviet and socialist economic bloc.\(^{238}\)

This expansion of economic cooperation, however, was accompanied by further cooperation in the field of culture and scholarship. Mikoyan proposed a plan the Presidium had approved to Paasikivi and Kekkonen and suggested further cooperation not only in economics but also in sciences and military.\(^{239}\) In March 1955 the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited Paavo Ravila, Lauri Posti, Kustaa Vilkuna, and Jaakko Rahola to preliminary discussions about the Soviet proposal. Those who were eager to develop academic cooperation with the Soviet Union pushed this plan, and, on

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\(^{237}\) Polvinen, *J. K. Paasikivi 5*, 212; Rentola, *Niin kylmää että polttaa*, 357.


\(^{239}\) Rentola, *Niin kylmää että polttaa*, 353.
April 28, the Finnish Government launched a committee to discuss scientific-technological cooperation with their Soviet counterpart. The committee included Posti, Vilkuna, and Kaukonen, who were all humanities scholars researching Finnic peoples. The Finnish side worried about possible industrial spying from the Soviet side but, as Eero Wuori reported to Helsinki, it was “wonderful [kaunista]” for the Finnish side if they could stress “Väinämöinen line,” that is, cooperation in the field of folklore and linguistics.240 On the contrary, the Soviet side was reluctant to include humanities program to this cooperation program but finally signed the Finnish-Soviet agreement on scientific-technical cooperation on 16 August 1955, for the first time with a non-socialist country.241 This made it possible for Finnish scholars to visit the Soviet Union to conduct research and directly communicate with Soviet scholars.

Vilkuna and Kaukonen had an occasion to visit Soviet Estonia in February-March 1956 after the first joint meeting of the Finnish-Soviet scientific-technical cooperation committee in Moscow. According to Kai Häggman’s analysis, Vilkuna expected that visiting Soviet Estonia would contribute to Kekkonen’s patriotic and pan-Finnic image when the media was speculating a possibility of returning of Karelia after Kekkonen’s victory in the presidential election. In Tartu, Vilkuna and Kaukonen met with Ariste, visited the Eesti Rahvaluule Arhiiv and Eesti Emakeele Selts, and celebrated Friedebert Tuglas’s 70th birthday in Tallinn with 13 Estonians including the Minister of Culture, Ansberg, and professor of archaeology at the University of Tartu, Moora on March 4.242 After returning to Finland, Vilkuna announced to the SKS leadership that the Soviet Union had agreed to permit Finnish scholars to visit Estonian folklore and dialect archives.243 According to Kaukonen’s memo, they listened to a presentation by Martti Kuusinen in Tallinn, a grandson of Otto Kuusinen studied at that time at the University of Tartu, and became familiar with the latest Soviet study on Baltic-Finnic language and culture.244 For Estonian scholars, this was a great step forward to resume interaction with Finland, Soome sild, and strengthen Finnic kinship. Therefore, Ariste did not fail to send a letter to Vilkuna soon after their meeting in March 1956:

> “Once again, I thank you for visiting Tallinn and Tartu. Now we are waiting for prof. P. Ravila to come here. This time, I would like to ask you a big favor. Next year it will have been 100 years since the first part of the Kalevipoeg was published. I have started my assignment to write about all possible

241 For Soviet aims to this kind of cooperation with western countries, see Sari Autio-Sarasmo, “Knowledge through the Iron Curtain: Soviet scientific-technological cooperation with Finland and West Germany,” in Reassessing Cold War Europe, eds. Autio-Sarasmo and Miklóssy, 66–82.
translations of the Kalevipoeg. [...] Therefore, I would like to kindly ask you to collect information for me, is there any Finnish translation or partial translation of the Kalevipoeg published after the war? [...] 
I heard Dr. V. Kaukonen’s presentation on your trip to the Soviet Union. 
Many greetings to you personally and to all acquaintances [tuttaville].”

In this way, the post-Stalin change in the Soviet-Finnish relationship decisively influenced the Finnic kinship in the Soviet Union, first of all in Estonia.

This general change in Soviet-Finnish relationships was reflected in the Kalevala discourse in Finland. For Kalevala day 1955, Vapaa Sana published an interview with Kaukonen, who tried to harmonize his own view on the Kalevala with the Soviet official view (“old poetry-song and valuable forms of many other popular cultures are living in Soviet Karelia as before”) to underline that Lönnrot’s work was the factor which united the Soviet Union and Finland. Furthermore, he came to use the language of Finno-Ugric unity ever increasingly to describe the meaning of the Kalevala. Pointing out recent cooperation with Soviet and Hungarian scholars, Kaukonen declared, “We Finns belongs to the multinational family of Finnish-Ugric peoples.” This is clearer in his speech at the Kalevala jubilee organized by the SKDL. Looking back at the scholarly history of Finnish-Hungarian linguistic kinship, Kaukonen reminded the audience that linguistic kinship unites the Finno-Ugric peoples of Finland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. In addition to linguistic kinship, Kaukonen added the Kalevala as the Finno-Ugric epic to enrich that linguistic kinship. The Hungarian guests István Papp and Béla Kálmán from the Debrecen University confirmed Kaukonen’s speech that the Kalevala bridged Finland and Hungary.

**The Fate of Karelo-Finnishness and Pan-Finnism in the Soviet Union**

Nonetheless, to understand the drive to the Russian and this pan-Finnic interaction between the two states further explanations are needed on the fate of Karelo-Finnishness and pan-Finnism in the Soviet Union. In Leningrad the ousted scholars such as Zhirmunsky and Tomashevsky came back to their former posts, and Meletinsky was released but did not go back to Petrozavodsk. Likewise, Bazanov went back to Leningrad, where he gained a new post as deputy director of the Institute of Literature. It is true that everybody was sensing some change coming because lively discussions about society and the individual began on such journals as Novyi Mir and, unlike the Stalin years, many...
readers were passionate to join in the discussion in the journal. Still, these changes happened quietly and went zigzag partly due to the inconsistent attitude of the Party and, therefore, it was ambiguous if the Party would explicitly withdraw its late Stalinist anti-western and anti-cosmopolitanism campaign such as the decision on *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*, and the harsh criticism against the theory of Veselovsky and his “school.”

To prepare for the second congress of the Soviet Writers’ Union in December 1954, the Karelo-Finnish Writers’ Union convened the second congress, for the first time since 1940, on September 23–25, 1954. Antti Timonen left for Moscow to study at the Higher Literature Course in the Gorky Literature Institute after another conflict with the Republic party leadership in July 1953. Jaakko Rugoev, the new chairman of the Karelo-Finnish Writers’ Union, and other Karelo-Finnish writers, had motivation to find a new direction. At the fourth Congress of TsK KFSSR in February 1954, Rugoev complained that Egorov spared only a few words to literary, scholarly, and cultural organizations in his main speech, and stressed the importance of the contemporary [sovremennost’] and the life otherwise their works could not touch the readers. The second congress of the Soviet Writers’ Union saw criticism from the representatives of the TsK KPSS and leading figures of the Writers’ Union against *Novyi mir* but also implicit but discernible changes from Stalin years, e.g., criticism against a “cult of individual,” which at this phase was not associated with Stalin, in the works of writers.

On the one hand, ethnic Karelian writers were confident about what they had achieved during the time of Stalin. At the second congress of the Karelo-Finnish Writers’ Union, both Rugoev and Vikström proudly declared that the Republic had now established its own national writers and literature and argued back against the recently published “Outline of Literatures in the Karelo-Finnish SSR,” according to which “the Republic has not yet had a true literature.” Rugoev appealed to the audiences for establishing “positive heroes” of our time, while criticizing the recent inclination to historical topics such as Soviet Karelia in the Civil War, Finland in 1917–1919, and stories of the Finnish revolutionaries. While Karelian writers had already started to write something specific on the Karelians or Karelianness since the late 1940s, this sense of change encouraged them to consider their ethnic identity and language separate from the Finnish or the Karelo-Finnish.

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251 *Leninskoe znamia*, February 18, 1954.


On the other hand, the Republic was still the Karelo-Finnish and Moscow leadership and Soviet Finnish intellectuals hoped to retain the interaction between Finland and the Republic through Finnish-language work. In April 1954, Egorov asked the TsK KPSS to give good materials and staff to the Republic for the improvement of Finnish language publication, because a leftist Finnish publisher Kansankulttuuri was hoping for more Finnish language materials on Soviet sports, movies, family, and sciences and a large part of the Finnish language publications in the Republic were exported to Finland. In addition, an important impulse to Finnishness in Soviet Karelia was the rehabilitation of Red Finns repressed during the Great Terror. On July 16, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR revoked the earlier decision on Gylling, according to which Gylling established a counter-revolutionary, nationalist, and terrorist organization to unite Soviet Karelia with Finland and established secret interaction with foreign Finnish agents such as Tunkelo to offer them state secrets. The Military Collegium affirmed that the previous decisions including “the Gylling affair” were groundless, and the arrests of not only Gylling but also other Red Finns such as Rovio, Forsten, Pottoev, Lumivuokko and Mäki were a serious violation of law. Even though the second wave of rehabilitations came after the secret speech by Khrushchev, the important figures of Red Finns were rehabilitated before the secret speech. Between 1954 and 1961, more than 10,000 victims of Stalinist terror were rehabilitated in Soviet Karelia. The rehabilitation of the Red Finns, especially Jalmari Virtanen, encouraged both the Karelo-Finnish researchers and students to (re)start studying Red Finnish literatures.

The Karelians faced this dilemma between their own national identity and Karelo-Finnishness as an institutionalized form crystalized in Timonen’s letter from Moscow to Fedor Trofimov, ethnic Karelian writer and journalist, in October 1955. Timonen had already clarified his uncomfortable feelings in regarding Finnish language and literature as the basis of Karelo-Finnish literature in private occasions or discussions behind the scenes. In his letter, Timonen specifically asked him to keep what he had written between them:

“I am very worried about the question on language. […] Here, in Moscow, I had a possibility to closely study the creations of Pentti Haanpää, a good and talented Finnish writer. What a rich [sochny] language he has, and how popular [narodny] he is. Such language does not occur to writer, such language can only be written when he enriches his own vocabulary everyday from what people are speaking. But I can only be fascinated by his language. I cannot and do not have

256 RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 659, ll. 87–88.
257 Korablev, Istoriia Karelli, 673.
258 At least two students treated Jalmari Virtanen and Hilda Tihlä as the theme of their graduation works in the academic year 1955–56. NA RK, f. r-1178, op. 2, d. 476. ll. 14–15 (protocol of the meeting of the literature course at the Karelo-Finnish University 1955–56.). The Republican KGB announced his rehabilitation to TsK KFSSR, July 19, 1954. NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6020, l. 8.
the right to enrich my own language from the books by Haanpää. This is no language of mine, this is not the language of the people for and about whom I want to write. My people have conversation [razgovarivaet] in other languages, perhaps close to this language, but other ones. If you ponder the histories of the development of the languages, you find interesting phenomena. The very cultured, rich languages of Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian, and others were formed from the old-Slavic language (how many Slavic languages are there abroad!). And they got the literatures! […] The Latin language became the language for doctors and scholars alone, but no artistic creation appeared in this language. […] And here is what is depressing me: the Finnish language became Latin, a dead language, for me. You did not pay attention to an interesting fact among our writers writing in Finnish: Grönlund, Ahveninen, Vikström, and Levänen criticized Timonen, Rugoev, Jaakkola, and Gippiev for writing in poor Finnish. I want to boast, but I have to say on my responsibility, that as for me and Jaakkola this does not fit reality. I, like Jaakkola, know the Finnish no worse than these legislators of the Finnish language, this is serious. […] And here, I again and again reach the conclusion: I am a writer without my own literary language. How I envy the peoples at our course – Kabardians, Yakuts, and Kumiys! Small peoples, but they have such literary languages that they can always enrich among their peoples. Why don’t I have this right?”

Timonen, as other Karelian writers, were very conscious of their ethnic identity, especially after the war, and believed in the richness of their own language. However, he was still sticking (or had to stick) to the hierarchy, where the Finnish language is superior to the Karelian “dialects” and it is Finnish that the Karelo-Finnish Republic has proclaimed official. This dilemma became more acute, when they were encouraged to write for contemporary “people” who spoke “lively and rich” Karelian.

The post-Stalinist discussions on literature did not fail to influence folklor and epics. Soviet folkloristics saw the beginning of the long-time controversy on the authenticity and political use of folklore, which cast a shadow over Karelo-Finnish folklore, especially the Kalevala. As early as May and June 1953 some cast doubts about the solely collective character of Soviet folklore and criticized forcibly putting contemporary contents into the old form of bylina. But it was the literary critics Nikolai Leont’ev who harshly criticized folklorists for producing “quasi-narrators” and political products, not literature. Leont’ev attacked the concept of “Soviet folklore” and those folklorists who “intervened” in the creative process of folklore narrators by asking them to create politically motivated folklores and by propagating “pseudofolklores.” The folklorists accused of the excess of intervention like Chicherov and Astakohva defended the authenticity of Soviet folklore but had to

259 NA RK, f. r-1075, op. 2, d. 185, ll. 1–3 (Timonen’s letter to Trofimov).
admit the political excess and self-criticize.\textsuperscript{262} From Petrozavodsk, it was Chistov who led the discussion to reconsider Soviet folkloristics and attacked Soviet folklore in general including the Soviet Karelian one produced in the late Stalinist years. In June 1955, he expressed his optimism about the idealistic and artistic values of contemporary oral popular creation in Soviet Karelia but did not fail to mention the negative aspects of “low-quality imitation of old bylina and tales.”\textsuperscript{263}

At the same time, however, the Kalevala continued to be firmly associated with the Karelo-Finnish people even after Stalin’s death and was beyond an aftershock of the late Stalinist campaign against national epics. In his keynote speech at the second congress of the Republic Writers’ Union, Rugoev reminded the audience that literature critics had to study Kuusinen’s work on the Kalevala as the Marxist approach to popular creations.\textsuperscript{264} Therefore, any “deviation” from Kuusinen’s Kalevala was strictly monitored. Reviewing Liubaskaia’s rewriting of the Kalevala for children, Lehmus criticized the author for not making it clear that the heroes of the Kalevala represented the Karelo-Finnish people, not mythological figures nor Gods, and, accordingly, for her beginning the story of Väinämöinen with a mythological tale giving the young readers the impression that the hero was a God-like figure.\textsuperscript{265}

This untouchable status of the Kalevala was articulated in comparison with other Soviet national epics. Intellectuals and scholars began to rehabilitate the national epics which suffered denunciations during late Stalinist ideological campaigns. In particular, the Gorky Institute of World Literature in Moscow was active in integrating Soviet national epics. The director Ivan Anisimov, encouraged by the section of Science and Culture of the TsK KPSS in June 1954, held a series of meetings to reactivate the Institute.\textsuperscript{266} In June 1954, the Institute hosted a meeting on the studies of Soviet national epics. As Moscow folklorist E. Bertel’s stated in his opening remark, the participants agreed that the epics should not be evaluated according to the worldview which was “specific to the Soviet people.” Carefully criticizing Veselovsky and Marr, Chicherov urged the participants to study the national epics in a comparative-historical way to understand how the epics of “each people and their families” developed in the territory of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{267} In the Buriyat-Mongolian ASSR, where the second congress of local Writers’ Union convened in the end of August 1954, speakers condemned those scholars who denied the popular character of the Geser before and also at the second

\textsuperscript{264} \textit{Leninskoе znамиа}, September 24, 1954.
\textsuperscript{265} \textit{Leninskoе znамиа}, September 16, 1954.
\textsuperscript{266} Stephen V. Bittner, \textit{The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow’s Arbat} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 181.
congress of the Soviet Writers’ Union Boris Riurikov from the TsK KPSS praised the scholars’ effort to renounce the criticism about the anti-people, feudal-khanate character of the Geser.268

At the same time, renouncing the Stalinist campaign against the epics not only rehabilitated the Geser, the Manas, the Uzbek epics, but also opened disputes between the national epics which shared their origins. For example, N. Kurraev from Turkmenistan praised the Turkmen national epic Ger-ogry and condemned the Azerbaijan national epic Korkut-ata as reactionary and anti-people, while M. G. Takhmasib from Baku maintained that the epic known to Central Asia and peoples in Transcausasia could appear also among Azerbaijanis and stressed a national originality of the Ger-ogry in various peoples of those areas.269 To these possible seeds of conflicts Chicherov stated that the popular character of epic reflected in morale, love for the motherland, heroism, works, and loyalty of the people, and the importance of the epic lay in the struggle against the enemy inside and outside as demonstrated in the Sassoon of David, the Russian bylina, and the Ker-ogly but the criticism against the Dede-kerkut in 1951 was right, because the epic was anti-popular due to its attack against peaceful neighbors.270 Criticizing recent “distortion” of mutual relations and interactions among the peoples, Chicherov emphasized the importance to find friendship and commonness among the various peoples of the Soviet Union.

Contrary to those heated discussions on repressed epics, Evseev’s and Raudsepp’s papers on the Kalevala and the Kalevipoeg were quite moderate, which suggested that those two epics were not objects to be seriously reconsidered.271 Together with the Russian bylina, Ukrainian epic, and the Geser, Chicherov praised the Kalevala as an example of the achievements of Soviet folkloristics during the time of Stalin, while criticizing the situation in epic studies on the Edigei, the Dagestani epic, and epics in Siberia and Far Eastern regions.272 As before, those two Finnic epics were tightly associated with the centrality of the Russian bylina and Eastern Slavic folklore.

Needless to say, the Kalevala was not completely immune from post-Stalinist change. The Institute and Propp continued to instruct Evseev’s dissertation. For the Institute (and the Republic) Evseev’s work would be a great achievement as proof that the Karelo-Finnish people had their “own” past. For Propp, who could finally publish his work on the Russian heroic epic in 1955, Evseev’s work

268 Literaturnaia gazeta, August 31, 1954; E. Dobrenko, “Sovetskaia mnogonatsional’naia literatura na vtorom s’ezae pisatelei: konets nachala,” in V’tiugin and Bogdanov, Vtoroi vsesoiuznyi s’ezd sovetskih pisatelei, 121.
271 Chicerov, “Voprosy izucheniia eposa narodov SSSR,” 180. On the contrary to the Central Asian epics, the rehabilitation of the Edigei could not get support from the local party leadership, though the Gorky Institute and local intellectuals tried to rehabilitate it. Galliamova, Tatarskaia ASSR, 360.
was a good contribution to show that folklorists, too, could reconstruct the history of people by utilizing folklore materials as he did in his latest work, which provocatively argued the birth of the Novgorod state by analyzing Russian folklore. Furthermore, as obvious in his remarks in the manuscript of the dissertation, Evseev’s dissertation would be an important criticism against the Finnish bourgeois scholarship on the Kalevala. That is why Propp became the editor of Evseev’s two-volume work based on the dissertation to be published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Propp asked Viktor Zhirmunsky to be a reviewer and opponent at Evseev’s defense.

After Stalin’s death, Zhirmunsky naturally tried to rehabilitate his works and “correct” what the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign left to Soviet academic world. In meetings at the Gorky Institute of World Cultures in February and June 1955, Zhirmunsky disputed with Samarin on the rehabilitation of Veselovsky and his comparative approach to literatures. Zhirmunsky argued that it was harmful to regard the works of two American writers “adversary” just because they lived in the United States. This is a product of “the slogan of the struggle against cosmopolitanism, but this slogan in 1949-50, combined with a series of factors of political backgrounds, […] and with very personal reasons of various peoples, beard such a harmful character for our science [nauki] […]” That is why “[we] must not direct ourselves to the period of deviation of left-wing opportunism [levatskikh zagibov] in literature studies.”

Zhirmunsky said that Veselovsky also had errors the old comparatism made, but the errors are “not political” and, therefore, “the political qualification of the old comparatism would mean anachronism.” While Samarin insisted that Soviet scholars should stress the fact that so many foreign comparatists were reactionary, Zhirmunsky even cast a doubt on using the term “reactionary [reaktsionnoe]” to describe the old comparatists including Veselovsky. This was supported by Alekseev, who also hoped to rehabilitate Veselovsky to highlight the difference between the comparatistics of Western Europe and “multinational” Russia, whose oriental studies especially opened a new path in the history of Russian literature.

This attitude of Zhirmunsky’s was reflected in his review of Evseev’s dissertation. Adopting Stalinist language of anti-cosmopolitanism, Zhirmunsky highly evaluated the dissertation as a convincing counterargument to “the Finnish school” with reactionary, cosmopolitanist, and bourgeois-nationalist character, which had dominated Kalevala studies since its publication. Criticizing the Finnish school, which stressed the subjects of the Kalevala as borrowings from Scandinavian and

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273 RO IRLI, f. 721, op. 1, n. 147, ll. 3–20 (Propp’s review on Evseev’s dissertation, June 8, 1952).
274 Mashezersky, the vice director of the Institute, asked Propp to be the editor on April 10, 1954. RO IRLI, f. 721, op. 1, n. 390, l. 3. The first volume appeared in 1957 and the second appeared in 1959 after Evseev’s defense in March 1958.
275 ARAN, f. 397, op. 1, d. 350 (stenographic record of the meeting of the group on preparing for questions on mutual interactions and mutual influences of literatures), ll. 9–11.
276 ARAN, f. 397, op. 1, d. 350, l. 73.
278 RO IRLI, f. 721, op. 1, n. 200, l. 1 (A copy of Zhirmunsky’s review).
German sources through western Finnish Vikings, Evseev showed “long-time brotherly relationships, which have united the Karelian people with the Russian people since the time of Novgorod.”

Furthermore, Zhirmunsky continued, Evseev has demonstrated that the poems appeared in Soviet Karelia by connecting each subject, representation, and motive of the epic with the development of social relationships in the concrete historical conditions of Karelia.

At the same time, however, Zhirmunsky encouraged Evseev to ease the Stalinist ideological confinement to his understanding of the Kalevala and advance the Karelo-“Finnish” character of the Kalevala within the family of Soviet peoples to make the epic more universal. For Zhirmunsky, to deny all previous studies and methodologies as the history of “errors [oshibok]” is incompatible with what Lenin and Stalin wrote on the development of sciences. Therefore, Zhirmunsky wrote, Evseev should include great names of Western European and Russian sciences of the past from Jacob Grimm to Veselovsky in the historiography of Kalevala studies. Though not mentioned explicitly, this is in fact a suggestion to accept, at least partially, what Kaarle Krohn and his pupils had achieved, simply because, without them, “the question on the participation of the Finnish people in the creation of ‘the Karelo-Finnish epic’ remained unresolved.” By considering both completely Karelian origin of the epic and “the Baltic-Finnish community [baltiisko-finskoi obshchnosti] of the epic tradition” with mutual interactions and exchanges, the question could have historical importance. Of course, Zhirmunsky did not fail to mention the importance of the Russian and Karelo-Finnish friendship. Nevertheless, Zhirmunsky was skeptical about Evseev’s interpretation of two examples of Russian-Karelian “mutual interactions” and “mutual enrichment [vzaimnoe obogashchenie]”: Russian origins of the name Väinämöinen and mutual interactions between Ilmarinen and Sadko. In this way, Zhirmunsky tried to reformulate the Karelian-Finnish-Russian relationship reflected in the Kalevala poems within the framework of the post-Stalinist friendship of Soviet peoples.

This post-Stalinist influence on the Kalevala in the Soviet Union and Finland reflects Evseev’s writing in Punalippu. Commemorating the 120th anniversary of the old Kalevala, Evseev tried to emphasize his and the Soviet approach to the Kalevala in dialogue with the ongoing change in the Soviet Union and Finland. As in the late Stalinist years, Evseev reminded the readers of how “bourgeois” Finnish scholars wrongly propagated the Kalevala poems as the product of Viking aristocracy and, by quoting Kuusinen, stressed that the Kalevala poems were created by peaceful, work-loving people in Karelia who yearned for a better life and struggled against feudal lords. What changed is that Evseev’s evaluation of Lönnrot’s role in the making of Kalevala became slightly closer
to the one by Kaukonen. Denouncing Haavio and Kuusi, Evseev assured that both the old and new Kalevala he edited remains “Karelian-Finnish epic.” Furthermore, Evseev came to suggest that the Kalevala was a shared legacy of the whole Finno-Ugric peoples. Of course, Evseev wrote that it was fair to say that the Kalevala was first of all the Karelo-Finnish national epic but, at the same time, the legacy of all of the peoples because underlining Finno-Ugric unity was still risky. His quote from Kaukonen’s speech in *Vapaa Sana*, however, shows the meeting point of two pan-Finno-Ugric visions, the Soviet and the post-war Finnish: “[…] V. Kaukonen said in his recent speech that what unites the Finno-Ugric peoples is not only language kinship [kielisukulaisuus] but ‘above all the will of culture which has received bright poetic expression in the Kalevala.’”

The discussions among the Finno-Ugric linguists continued their historical-comparative discussions on antiquity and historical development of the Finno-Ugric languages, while carefully avoiding the discussion on the “proto-Finno-Ugric language.” Though the complete rehabilitation of Bubrikh was not allowed, they rebuilt their network and restarted their exploration toward the origin of the Finno-Ugric languages and linguistic community. It was Estonians, especially Paul Ariste, who played an important role to rebuild and expand Soviet Finno-Ugric studies. Beginning as early as 1951, the Institute had asked Ariste to instruct the doctoral candidates of the Republic to complete their dissertations and the Republic sent young Finno-Ugric linguists who studied under Bubrikh to Tartu such as Martti Kuusinen and a Mari linguist. In March 1954, the Institute of Linguistics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences convened a conference on Finno-Ugric linguistics, where Ariste delivered the keynote speech. Accepting Bubrikh’s latest argument on the origin of the Karelian people, its closeness to ancient Veps tribes, Ariste acknowledged the Korela/Karjala as one of the ancient tribes of the Baltic-Finnic peoples.

Here, again, the discussion in Finland influenced the one in the Soviet Union. Though the Finno-Ugric language kinship was labelled as fascist and associated with Greater Finland after the war, Finnish Finno-Ugric linguists began to reclaim the scholarly importance of the proto-Finno-Ugric language and proto-home of the Finno-Ugric peoples. Commemorating the 100th anniversary of the death of Matthias Castrén in 1951, the linguist-etymologist Yrjö Toivonen delivered a presentation on the proto-home of the Finno-Ugric peoples to argue back against Kustaa Vilkuna, who had criticized the Finno-Ugric linguists for being obsessed with the discussion on the proto-language and original homeland of the Finno-Ugric peoples from ethnographic and archeological points of view. Instead Vilkuna proposed to shift the emphasis to the discussion on the proto-Finnic group around the Gulf of

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285 Ariste wrote in his memoirs that Popov succeeded Bubrikh as the head of the Finno-Ugric course at Leningrad University but performed poorly as an instructor of the Finno-Ugric languages and thus Ariste taught Finno-Ugric linguistics “in Leningrad, Petrozavodsk, Saransk, Joshkar-Olas, and other cities.” Ariste, *Mälestusi*, 295–96.

In the 1954 March conference, Ariste urged the Soviet Finno-Ugric scholars to address the common past of the Finnic people as in the latest discussions by Kustaa Vilkuna and Yrjö Toivonen to develop Soviet Finno-Ugric studies.\footnote{ARAN, f. 679, op. 3, d. 168, l. 34–35, 38–39, 86. (stenographic record of the meeting on Finno-Ugric linguistics, March 9–12, 1954). Ariste declared himself as a supporter of Toivonen’s theory.} In mid-April 1954, the Karelo-Finnish University held a meeting of students, who gave papers on their research. In addition to four students from the Finno-Ugric department, guest students from Leningrad University and the University of Tartu joined in the discussion on Baltic-Finnic linguistics and literatures.\footnote{Leninskoie znamia, April 18, 1954.} Furthermore, the Karelo-Finnish University began to send students from the Finno-Ugric department to the University of Tartu for expeditions, conferences and post-graduate studies in Finno-Ugric studies.\footnote{NARK, f. r-1178, op. 2, d. 481, l. 20 (report of the Finnish language course, June 16, 1956).} In February 1955, Karelo-Finnish Finno-Ugric linguists collectively sent a birthday message to Ariste for his 50th birthday to thank him for his help and support.\footnote{EKLA, f. 330, m 210: 1, 41.}

In fact, Estonia naturally emerged as the only Finnic “nation” in the Soviet Union and Finnish-Estonian brotherhood was manipulated. In late 1953, the Estonian Academy of Sciences published 154 selected letters from Kreutzwald to his colleagues and friends to celebrate his 150th birthday in 1953. As a reviewer pointed out, these letters told how “progressive” Russian scholars at the Imperial Academy of Sciences, especially Anton Schiefner, supported Kreutzwald to publish his works in Petersburg and Tartu, and showed Kreutzwald as a symbol of democracy, the founder of Estonian literature, and editor of the Kalevipoeg, who struggled against tsarist censorship and reactionaries.\footnote{M. I. Fetison’s review, Izvestiia Akademii Nauk. Otdelenie literatury i iazyka XIII, 4 (1954), 382–83.} Stressing Kreutzwald’s relationships with Russian intellectuals, this work includes letters to Sjögren, “Russian scholar,” with whom Kreutzwald discussed the orthography of the Estonian language and the Kalevipoeg.\footnote{F. R. Kreitsval’d, Izbrannye pis’ma (Tallin: Estonskoe gorsudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1953), 41, 45, 47–48.} Furthermore, some letters suggest that Kreutzwald was eager to ask Lönnrot about the themes of Kalev’s adventure to Finland and of Kullervo and sought to publish the Kalevipoeg in Kuopio to avoid censorship in Estonia.\footnote{Kreitsval’d, Izbrannye pis’ma, 68} The Estonian journal \textit{Looming} published the first (and last) letter of Kreutzwald to Lönnrot (dated, February 20, 1851), the editor of “Finnish” people’s epic, which suggests that Kreutzwald asked the questions mentioned above and consulted him about the interpretation of old folk songs which Kreutzwald “luckily” found in 1849 on
his trip to the Pskov Province as Lönnrot found major epic poems in the “East.”

Nonetheless, the role of the Finns is generally lowered in other writing either in Russian or in Estonian. For example, a major biography of Kreutzwald published in 1953 mentions the influence of the old Kalevala on the project of the Kalevipoeg but does not mention the meeting of Lönnrot and Kreutzwald and the publication of the popular version of the Kalevipoeg owes to Schiefner not Ahlqvist. This manipulation of the Finnish-Estonian brotherhood is well illustrated in the postcard drawn by Roman Treuman “Lönnrot and Kreutzwald,” which draws the meeting of the two intellectuals. In the picture, two men are sitting on a sofa in discussion, but Lönnrot slightly looks up at Kreutzwald as if he were asking advice from Kreutzwald.

It is yet arguable if this treatment of Finnic kinship in Estonia was coordinated with the one in the Karelo-Finnish SSR. Leninskoе znamia featured the 150th anniversary of Kreutzwald but did not mention the Kalevala nor Lönnrot unlike the Kalevala jubilee in 1949. Still, the death of Stalin relaxed the vigilance over Finnish culture both in Soviet Karelia and Estonia. Friedebert Tuglas came back to the Estonian Writers’ Union in 1954 and his translation appeared again in bookstores and he wrote in his diary that his Estonian translation of Kivi’s “Seven Brothers (fourth edition)” published (30,000 pieces) and, according to his diary, sold out in one day on October 14, 1955. In June 1955 Punalippu featured Soviet Estonian literature life by publishing some contemporary Estonian poems and a review about the development of Soviet Estonian literature and art by Osvald Kivi, researcher of the Estonian Academy of Sciences. Though these poems are completely “socialist in content,” the fact that these Estonian poems and review appeared at the same timing with the publishing of Elvi Sinervo’s novel, Virtanen’s and Pentti Haanpää’s works marked a further promotion of Baltic-Finnic literary interaction. In 1955, Lyyli Ronkonen, Ingrian Finn from Petrozavodsk, defended her candidate dissertation on the Finnish writer Minna Canth at the University of Tartu with Paul Ariste and Eduard Laugaste as opponents. Ronkonen recalls that Ariste left a great impact on her life and academic career and was very sympathetic to the fate of her family and relatives. For her, Ariste was a “true friend of the fatherland [todellinen isänmaan ystävä],” and she felt “my Finnishness was the trump card which would open Estonians’ hearts and arouse their kinship emotions [sukulaisuustunteita].”

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296 Leninskoе znamia, December 27, 1953.
297 Tuglas, Eluloosi märkmeid II, 70.
298 Punalippu featured Soviet Estonian poets in Punalippu, no. 2 (1955). Jalmari Virtanen’s short pieces appeared in September in Punalippu, no. 3 to announce the coming publication of his collected works.
Khrushchev’s Secret Speech and the End of the Karelo-Finnish Republic

The Khrushchev’s so-called secret speech sparked disturbances in major cities both in Soviet Russia and in the union republics, later reignited by the events in Poland and Hungary. Many studies have addressed the background of and process to the secret speech. In addition to Khrushchev’s political instinct, pressures from the old Bolsheviks released from Gulag pushed him to make use of the secret speech to revitalize the revolutionary spirit and mobilize the society to justify the power of the new leadership. Additionally, the need to modernize the economy and society encouraged not only Khrushchev but also other leaders to reveal the negative legacy of the cult of personality. After the party congress, the text of the speech had been read out to party members, Komsomol members, and activists all over the Soviet Union at closed meetings, where many asked questions and expressed opinions, either affirmative or negative. In the socialist countries, except for East Germany, the secret speech sparked massive opposition movements of workers, intellectuals, and students who had been already influenced by either Stalinization of higher education or changes after Stalin’s death. In Poland, news of the secret speech quickly spread through the broadcasting of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, on the one hand, and the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) itself, which tried to compete with the Western broadcasting by distributing the speech, on the other hand. This culminated in a workers’ uprising in Poznań in the end of June, which left at least 73 people dead and more than 700 seriously wounded by roughly 10,300 army troops and thousands of members of the Internal Security Corps.

In the Soviet Union, many people raised their voice and held demonstrations against/for the Soviet leadership in the regions annexed in 1939-40, where the memory of violence was vivid, and many Gulag returnees were coming back. At the meeting of the party organization of Armenian Writers’ Union after the 20th Party Congress, the Armenian writer Arzumanian Sevan openly demanded the “unification” of Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhichevan, and Dzhavakhtea, “historically and economically parts of Armenia,” to Armenia and deplored Soviet Armenian national consciousness and culture, saying “the Armenians living in Kilikiia, Syria, Bulgaria, and France have preserved their own appearance as Armenian, Armenian language, and Armenian spirit more than the Armenians of Moscow, Baku, Odessa, Leningrad, Tashkent, and so on.”

Contrary to anger against Stalinist terror,

302 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 54 (Gromov’s report to Suslov, June 18, 1956), l. 20.
Georgian peoples, students in particular, became furious with the way the Moscow leadership treated “Georgian” Stalin, and the mass rallying commemorating the third anniversary of Stalin’s death turned into a mass demonstration against the leadership’s treatment of Stalin, demanding rehabilitation of Beria as well, and some even supporting Georgia’s withdrawal from the Soviet Union.303

At the same time, as Dobson has demonstrated, it depended on the first secretaries at oblast’ and city levels to what extent local party members discussed the secret speech and where the first secretary was reluctant to discuss this, the repercussion of the secret speech was relatively mild.304 Having received the reports about those meetings, on April 5 the Presidium of TsK KPSS adapted a resolution to denounce the “harmful” remarks presented at a meeting of the party organization of the Thermology Engineering Laboratory of the Academy of Sciences USSR, where some researchers mentioned a need for popular revolt to change the regime, identification of the Stalinist regime with fascism, and described the Soviet system as not democratic. G. I. Shchedrin, a senior engineer, complained that the Supreme Soviet was not a democratic organ, because it did not ask the people when returning Porkkala to Finland.305 Confident and optimistic as they were, Soviet leaders had to maintain a balance between energetic but explosive mobilization and keeping order.

Major cities in the union republics faced “nationalist,” oppositional voices and movements. In the Georgian SSR, the Republic party leadership conflicted, on the one hand, with Moscow leadership accusing the Georgian leadership of mismanagement of nationality policy, and, on the other hand, with Georgian youth and students protesting against Moscow leadership, and non-Georgian minorities within the GSSR such as Abkhazians, who criticized Georgians for their expansionist nationalism.306 The report to the TsK KPSS by Tovmacian, the first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party, told that at a party meeting of Yerevan State University several communists praised democracy in bourgeois parliaments and proposed to unite with the Nagorno-Karabakh ASSR. Though some communists denounced them, the meeting did not react to their “anti-party fabrications,” and similar remarks concerning Nagorno-Karabakh appeared at other academic and educational institutions.307 In Azerbaijan, the first secretary Mustafayev put all blame of the cult of personality in Azerbaijan on Bagirov in custody waiting for his trial but was very careful to keep the order in the Republic. Nevertheless, dissident voices including those of students’ demanded the release of Bagirov, “Tightly unite with Georgians, kick out the Russians and Armenians,” the reintroduction of the Islamic

303 On the events after the secret speech in Georgia, see Blauvelt and Smith, Georgia after Stalin.
304 Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 87–89.
306 Ira Jänis-Iso kangas, “‘What is the cult of personality and what has it to do with Stalin?’: the role of ideology, youth and the Komsomol in the March 1956 events,” 53–76; Timothy K. Blauvelt, “Resistance, discourse and nationalism in the March 1956 events in Georgia,” 116–28. Both are included in Blauvelt and Smith, Georgia after Stalin.
307 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 52, l. 47 (Tovmacian’s report to CC CPSU).
alphabet, and welcoming Turkey or Iran. In the Caucasian countries, not only antagonisms against Russians and other Caucasian nations but also Turkey was an important destabilizing factor as an object of anger for Armenians as well as sympathy for Azerbaidjanis.

In the Moldavian SSR, the secret speech ignited the re-emergence of the conflict between Bessarabian and Transdniestrian elites over the ratio of the Bessarabian communists in the Moldavian Communist Party and the linguistic reform. Moldovan Gulag returnees included many anti-Soviet intellectuals who hoped to rehabilitate the Moldovan/Romanian political and cultural presence in Moldavia, and some even sought support from Romanian nationalists, who were willing to support them from Romania. Accordingly, Moldavian linguists and writers pushed forward their plan to halt forging a Moldavian language different from Romanian, which made them closer, and achieved the rehabilitation of the Romanian classics and writers, many of whom were born in historical Moldavia. In such an atmosphere further influenced by the Hungarian uprising, Moldavian students found their anti-Soviet, anti-Russian, nationalist expression in the works of Moldavian oral works, Moldavian/Romanian classic literatures, and the history of Moldavia.

In the Baltic countries, both Käbin (the first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party) and Snečkus reported to the TsK KPSS that the secret speech was accepted generally “affirmatively,” but both urged the importance of the national languages. The inspection by a Moscow brigade to Estonia in July as well revealed an insufficient effort to increase the number of national cadres and to educate the youth, students, and intellectuals. Likewise, in Lithuania and Latvia too, local leaders demanded the reconsideration of nationality policy, which worried Moscow elites. These concerns found the realization of a “bourgeois-nationalist” atmosphere after the Polish and Hungarian events. According to the report by Gabrilov in charge of the section of union republics of the CC CPSU, in Estonia and Lithuania in particular, students in Vilnius and Tallinn supported the Hungarians and spoke against the Russian language and Russians. Students in Tallinn and Tartu tried to establish a social organization uniting Estonian students.

In Moscow and Leningrad, students and intellectuals were no less challenging to the authority than non-Russian, national ones in the peripheries. In May MGU students living in the Stromynka university dormitory upset the University party and the Moscow City party leadership by their “boycott,” demanding the improvement of the service of the cafeteria, which gathered support and sympathy from other students. Students began to organize their own student organizations gathering other students, one of which, the “Union of Communists [Soiuz kommunistov],” aimed to withdraw all Soviet armies from foreign countries, increase contacts with the western countries, and

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310 Tamberg, Politika Moskvy v respublikakh Baltii, 158–75.
311 Smith, Moscow 1956, 161–65.
so on. At Moscow University, as in other universities, student reading and studying circles increased its number and became radicalized. Students of the faculty of philology accused university teachers of not explaining the Polish and Hungarian events. As a result, after the party disciplined the control in December, the KGB arrested most radical students for anti-Soviet acts.

It is important, however, to scrutinize in detail what happened in Leningrad during this period, given its closeness to Petrozavodsk. Because the secret speech referred Stalin’s role in the murder of Sergei Kirov, the local party members, writers and students were so interested in what the secret speech meant that the historian Anna Pankratova received more than 800 questions from about 6000 Leningrad party elites and intellectuals after her lectures and reports on the 20th Party Congress. Between March 20 and 23, Pankratova gave nine lectures about the 20th Party Congress and the cult of personality in Soviet history and historical scholarship, especially the role of Stalin in the Russian Revolution, the Civil War, and the Second World War, to the Leningrad audience, which caused both positive and negative responses in addition to many questions.

This wave of criticism reached the Institute of Literature, where Bazanov had been working as vice director since 1953. The party organization of the I LI discussed the secret speech on March 14 for a coming general meeting of the I LI. Having been criticized for his contribution to the cult of personality in folklore studies and publishing, Bazanov tried to divert the criticism to the discussion on the new direction of Russian literature and folklore studies. He stated, “Now we have to frankly say that our literature developed along a false line. In fact, all literature was devoted to one face. […] A clear example of literature studies oriented to this kind of way is the outline of folklore.” At the general meeting, participants pointed out the influence of the Stalin cult on folklore collectors and criticized Soviet media. Calming down these speakers, Bazanov led the discussion to the activities of the Institute and insisted on considering the method and object of folklore to find a way out of the impasse. In the Karelo-Finnish Republic, Lubennikov, only six months at the post of first secretary, was obviously reluctant to discuss the secret speech and Stalinist terror in Soviet Karelia. On March 13, the Karelo-Finnish party gathered party activists to report and discuss the resolution of the 20th Party Congress. Lubennikov spent a long time on problems of Soviet diplomacy, agrarian and forest economy but mentioned only the summary of Khrushchev’s secret speech. While the other five

312 Aksiutin, Khrushchevskaia “ottepel’,” 236.
315 Smith, Moscow, 63–72.
316 TsGAIPD SPb, f. 3034, op. 6, d. 8, l. 31 (protocol of a meeting of the party bureau of the IRLI, March 14, 1956).
317 TsGAIPD SPb, f. 3034, op. 6, d. 7, ll. 40, 42, 44–45.
318 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6508 (protocol of the meeting of party activists on 13 March 1956), ll. 8–38.
speakers did not mention the secret speech, only Kriuchkov (secretary of the Petrozavodsk city committee) and Yakovlev (rector of the K-F University) dared to refer to it. It was Kriuchkov, in particular, who challenged Lubennkov’s attitude to the cult of personality by proposing to ask the TsK KPSS more explanations because the secret speech did not give a clear answer to what the right attitude of the party and the people to Stalin was.\(^{319}\)

This reluctance of Lubennikov to face the past reflected in his reports to Moscow about the discussions on the secret speech in the Republic, which took place in the second half of March. In the report Lubennikov quoted the remarks of Kriuchkov and Yakovlev, and the questions given at the meeting of 2880 party activists from 15 raions of the Republic on March 22. These questions are not specific to the Republic: have comrade Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and other comrades known what Stalin did?; Will the staffs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB be punished?; What will happen to Stalin’s body at the mausoleum and portraits of Stalin? Likewise, the reports from each district committee to the Karelo-Finnish party TsK revealed that the voices from party members and workers did not violate what the Moscow leadership tolerated. For example, at the Rugozerskii raion party meeting, a party member, Chentsov, said why only after Stalin’s death this question arouse, why old Bolsheviks, Politburo members Molotov, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, and others did not talk about this before? On the contrary, at the same meeting, party members Myshin and Gerchin remarked, “is it right that we talk so much about the serious accusations against Stalin? Comrade Stalin did great deeds, did many for the people. The people loved Stalin. Is it true?”\(^{320}\) The report from the Kalevala raion simply said that all the communists and Komsomol members at the meeting unanimously supported the eradication of the remnants of the cult of personality.\(^{321}\) It remains an open question what each raion party meeting in fact discussed and how the district party leaders summarized the meetings. At all events, Lubennikov’s report depicted that the reaction of the people in the Republic was generally not problematic and more moderate than in other union republics.

It is not yet clear why and when the Moscow leadership finally decided to downgrade the Karelo-Finnish Republic, but the decision was made before the 20\(^{th}\) Party Congress. The TsK KPSS set up a commission to discuss the reorganization of the Republic into an autonomous oblast' within the RSFSR on March 1955, but it was on March 26, 1956, that the Secretariat TsK KPSS adopted the resolution to reorganize the Republic into the Karelian Autonomous Republic.\(^{322}\) Judging from the date they adopted the resolution, the Moscow leadership seems to have made the final decision after reading Lubennikov’s report on the Republic’s reaction to the secret speech. From a domestic point of view, to include national area in Soviet Russia might spark a chain reaction from both small nationalities fearing neighboring, expansionist nationalities and those who were sensitive to Leninist

\(^{319}\) NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6508, l. 57.
\(^{320}\) NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6574, l. 69.
\(^{321}\) NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6574, l. 89.
\(^{322}\) RGANI, f. 4, op. 16, d. 18, l. 13 (protocol of the meeting of the Secretariat).
principles of nationalities policy. One participant in a late May Moscow meeting gave a question: Are the rumors right about the coming “reorganization” of the Karelo-Finnish SSR, its “reformulation [preobrazovanie]” into an Autonomous SSR? How does this coincide with the Leninist principle of national policy?” Furthermore, the Karelo-Finnish Republic was associated with not only the Winter War but also general Stalinist policy before the German invasion in 1941. Thus, convincingly, at a Leningrad meeting, some questioned how to “explain the war with Finland in 1940.” Nevertheless, judging from available documents, such voices concerning Finland after the secret speech were little and did not have such an explosive character as to ignite demands of territorial revision in neighboring nations/nationalities within the Soviet Union, unlike Caucasian states.

Obviously, the Karelo-Finnish Republic was an important diplomatic card toward Finland, and the Soviet Union tried to influence Finnish elites and public opinion for the presidential election in early 1956. It seemed that the Soviet leadership never enjoyed the idea of giving “Karelia” back to Finland, but the “Karelian question” was so sensitive that the Soviet leadership could not make any change to the Republic before the Finnish election. The Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law on the reorganization of the Republic on July 16, about one month before Voroshilov’s visit to Helsinki on August 21-26, when the public image of the Soviet Union was “at its best” in Finland and the Soviets were very satisfied with the Finnish reception. For the Soviet leadership, it was the best timing to publish the decision to reorganize the Karelo-Finnish Republic as both a friendly sign and warning to Finland: no more negotiation for border change. Indeed, after the return of Porkkala was completed and Kekkonen became president, the rumor that Karelia would be returned ran around newspapers and diplomatic circles, and the Union of Karelia [Karjalan liitto] lobbied Kekkonen to raise this issue to the Soviets. The Soviet ambassador in Finland, Lebedev, however, warned Kekkonen against raising political issue including the Karelian question to Voroshilov in early July and after this meeting Kekkonen was quick to calm down the speculations.

Perhaps, no less important a factor was Kuusinen’s reaction to the secret speech. After the secret speech, Kuusinen with his rare excitement wrote to Hertta Kuusinen: “You should have come to our party congress!! It was the greatest step forward ever in our life.” According to the report by V. Churaev, in charge of the section of party organizations TsK KPSS of RSFSR, Kuusinen was asked to take his position as the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Karelian ASSR, but he declined this offer, because he was working and living mainly in Moscow and, as a Finn, not relevant to the face of the Karelian ASSR. Although Churaev was worried that leaving Kuusinen

323 Aimermakher, Doklad N. S. Khrushcheva, 540.
324 Aimermakher, Doklad N. S. Khrushcheva, 437.
without the post would be “wrongly interpreted in our country and abroad,” and he asked the TsK KPSS to recommend Kuusinen to the post, Kuusinen was resolute in his decision, and it was Prokkonen who was elected to the post.\textsuperscript{329} Kuusinen no longer felt need to take advantage of the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Then, how was this change after the secret speech experienced on the local level? Between the secret speech and the announcement of the end of the Republic, two scholarly meetings took place, which offered an insight to this question. On the one hand, increasing contacts with Finland articulated the difference between the bourgeois Finnish ideology and Soviet one, especially the Soviet understanding of the relationship between Finns and Karelians, and Soviet Finnishness. On the other hand, being closer to Finland, as before, blurred this difference between the Finnish and Soviet understanding of the Karelia-Finnish kinship. The problem of the Great Terror, which the secret speech triggered, cast a shadow over the discussions. In other words, the discussions crystallized a fundamental dilemma many Soviets faced after the secret speech: they defended what they achieved under Stalin while condemning what they lost due to Stalinist rule.

As the first example, local historians gathered to discuss the first volume of History of Karelia. In 1955, Iosif Sykiäinen and Balagurov had a chance to visit Helsinki as members of the delegate of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In a New Year’s greeting 1956, Balagurov recalled the visit with a good memory to consider a peaceful co-existence with the countries having various social and economic systems and cultural cooperation.\textsuperscript{330} In addition to the secret speech, this widening of communication with Finland reflected in the discussion. On 15–16 March 1956, the Institute called for a meeting on the specimen of the first volume by inviting leading scholars from Moscow and Leningrad. Comparing with two previous specimens of 1949 and 1952, Bernatsky summarized that the 1956 specimen was targeting for broader readers. F. Egorov, author of the historical study of Finnish intervention in Soviet Karelia in 1919, reminded the participants that bourgeois Finnish historians, “who took a completely different direction in terms of idea, ideology, and methodology,” had a great interest in this project. Thus, Egorov argued, the specimen should be more polemical with the bourgeois Finnish historiography on Karelia which the contributors of this volume were “ignoring” and take into consideration the materials of the 20th Party Congress.\textsuperscript{331} For Egorov, it was the question of why the Karelian people, unlike other titular nations of union republics, failed to form a bourgeois nation before the October Revolution. While admitting that Karelia developed “along the general way of the general Russian democratic and cultural development [v obshchem rusle obshcherossiiskogo demokraticheskogo i kul’turnogo razvitiia],” Egorov pointed out that the authors should emphasize the

\textsuperscript{329} RGANI, f. 5, op. 32, d. 57, l. 103 (Churaev’s report to the TsK KPSS, August 3, 1956).
\textsuperscript{330} Leninskaia pravda, January 1, 1956.
\textsuperscript{331} NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 370 (stenographic record of the meeting on the first volume of the History of Karelia, March 15–16, 1956), ll. 18–19.
role of cultural and economic centers of pulling power [tiagoteniia] within and outside of Karelia, especially the role of St. Petersburg, to demonstrate the conditions which “interfere and stagnate the transformation of Karelians into a bourgeois nation.” What made Egorov’s standpoint was, in addition to his sympathy for Karelians, both Russia’s centrality and progressiveness, and nervousness about Finnish criticism of “Russification.”

These suggestions by Bernatsky and Egorov seemed similar to the ones raised in the early 1950s, but some participants no longer cared about Karelo-Finnishness of Soviet Karelia. Evseev complained that some contributors named the Kalevala simply as the “Karelian epic,” ignoring the “general Karelo-Finnish and even Baltic-Finnic epic legacy from the epoch of the primitive-communal system.” Being “very satisfied” with the discussion, K. V. Sivkov from the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR called the Republic “the Karelian Republic” and stressed the importance of showing the Karelian people “closely connected” with the history of the Russian people and of the Russian state.

Other participants, especially local scholars, however, urged Bernatsky and other guests and contributors to include what they had achieved in the last 10 years to show the Soviet point of view to the Finns, that is Baltic-Finnic kinship between the Finns and Karelians and the Karelians and the Veps. Bogdanov complained that historians did not clearly understand how and when the tribe Korela/Karjala broke up and spread to the White Sea and the Baltic Sea, which Bubrikh described in his study. It was Ioshif Sykiäinen that most stubbornly demanded to include Bubrikh’s theory of the origins of the Karelian people in the specimen in order to show the rightness of the Soviet understanding of Soviet Karelian-Finnish kinship:

“Concerning the question on the origins of the Karelian ethnic group [narodonosti]. I agree that we have to address the origins of the Karelian ethnic group. We must not avoid this question. I have recently been to Finland and visited local museums. They paid no attention to the questions of interactions among the Karelo-Finnish people, of their origin, rather [they are doing] as they want [po-svoemu]. By the way, in all local museums, I have been to three local museums and the National Museum, you find Khanty, Mansi, Komi, and Volga Finno-Ugric tribes, too. You understand by this that they are trying to find out the basis of their thesis on Greater Finland as they want. I asked, why in a local museum such materials are welcoming [razvodiat rukami], of course, in a city where neither Khanty nor Mansi appear.

That brings me to the opinion that the question on the origin of the Karelian ethnic group is very

332 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 370, ll. 19–20.
333 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 370, l. 57.
334 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 370, l. 65, 67.
335 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 370, l. 35, 38.
important, and to bypass it is impossible [sic].”336

Given that Sykiäinen reiterated the importance of the mutual relationship of the Russian and Karelian peoples, what the Russian state gifted to the Karelian people, and how the Karelian people defended the Russian land, he put his emphasis on the Karelian (more precisely, Livvi and Ludian Karelians)-Veps kinship within the Russian state. Needless to say, as Bubrikh endeavored in 1949, local scholars tried to, if implicitly, include a Finnish factor, too, (in this case White Sea Karelians) to explain the origins and formation of the Karelian people, which failed to be a nation. Thus, Sykiäinen defined and attacked Finnish Greater Finland by underlining its ambition for Eastern Finnic and Ugric peoples, to defend Soviet Baltic-Finnic kinship. Though Vernatsky finally declined this demand to create a separate chapter on this question, local researchers still relied on the form of the Karelo-Finnish Republic.337

The second example, a session on the Karelian language on April 4–6, more clearly demonstrates the impact of the secret speech on the understanding of the relationship between the Karelian and Finnish language. Furthermore, the situation surrounding the session was different from the meeting of historians above, because Moscow had already made the decision to downgrade the Republic, and the local newspapers had not celebrated the 16th anniversary of the Karelo-Finnish Republic on 31 March, which dropped a hint of a possible change for the Republic and, accordingly, the official languages. The session took place to discuss the atlas of Karelian dialects, which Beliakov had just completed. As was well known to all, the atlas showed a great diversity and difference between Karelian dialects. The question is how to interpret this character of the Karelian language. Hämäläinen was cynical to the existence of a Karelian language by pointing out the differences of vocabulary, phonetics, and morphology between three Karelian dialects, especially between the Ludian and Karelian proper dialects.338 It was, however, F. Egorov that openly criticized the introduction of the Finnish language into Soviet Karelia and defended a common Karelian literary language. Like the 1954 discussion on language education, Egorov criticized that the introduction of the Finnish language had aroused discontent and difficulty among the population and offered no advantage to the Karelian youth. Criticizing Beliakov, who said 90% of Karelian words were broken [iskazhennye] Russian words, Egorov suggested to consider what was common in the Karelian dialects to recreate a Karelian literary language: “The population uses the Karelian language and better understands amateur artistic activities [khudozhestvennuu samodeiatel'nost'] in Karelian. It is more understandable for the people.”339

336 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 370, l. 89.
337 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 370, l. 119.
338 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 371 (protocols of the scholarly session of the IIAli, April 4–5, 1956), l. 18.
339 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 371, l. 19.
The other participants defended the status of the Finnish language in the Republic against F. Egorov by directly referring to Stalinist terror. Pehkonen, literature researcher, opposed Egorov’s understanding that “the Finnish language was violently introduced into Karelia” and insisted it was welcomed by the population of Karelia. Therefore, “the position of Com. Egorov about the creation of a Karelian language is wrong. It is absurd.”

Gardin as well disagreed with Egorov because the introduction of the Finnish language was right at that time, though the Finnish language teaching became an obstacle for the development of inter-national [mezhnatsional’nykh] interactions in the postwar years. Furthermore, as a historian, Gardin asked if we could really regard the Karelian dialects as one language, which concerned the question of the origins of the Karelian people and “acute political conclusions” because “The Karelian language exists, but is not finally completed [oformileia]. There is no Karelian literary language, no perspective for the development of the language.”

Adding this scientific reason, Pehkonen appealed to the memory of the Great Terror associated with the Karelian literary language. She said: “the Karelians generally welcomed the introduction of the Finnish language. And, contrarily, the introduction of the Karelian language in 1937-39 as a literary language was wrong. […] At present, the orientation to the creation of a Karelian language is wrong.”

To conclude the discussion, Beliakov said that “Probably, we are in such a situation that the Karelian language has not completed its unification. The Karelian language is not literary, but one belonging to all of the people [obshchenarodnym].” The rumor about the fate of the Karelo-Finnish Republic encouraged some to push for the Karelian literary language, but the majority defended the Finnish language for the reason that the Karelian language lacked good scientific ground and reminded one of the mass terror, which the Soviet leadership and society now began to face.

It was this logic that the local party leaders relied on when justifying the decision of the party members at the second party plenum on April 24. The official explanation in newspapers and speeches reiterated what Gromov proposed in March 1955: the small number of indigenous nationalities, the Russian majority, the historical friendship between the Russian people and the Karelian people, the future economic and cultural development as a part of the RSFSR. Nevertheless, at the April 1956 plenum, borrowing Bubrik’s discussion, secretary Smirnov stressed the ethnic kinship between “Karelians and Veps, which are related to each other,” who had lived as neighbors of the Slavic tribes since ancient times. Although Smirnov spared no word for Finns, this language of primordiality of Finnic nationalities implicitly highlighted the place of Soviet Finns in the newly reorganized KASSR. This is more recognizable in Iosif Sykiäinen’s speech at the Supreme Soviet of

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340 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 371, l. 20.
341 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 371, l. 19, 23.
342 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 371, l. 23.
343 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 371, l. 23–24.
344 NA KarNTs RAN, f. 1, op. 4, d. 371, l. 28.
345 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6504, l. 142 (steno-type record of the second plenum of TsK KFSSR).
the KFSSR. The fact he mentioned the Kalevala in his speech suggested that the Kalevala functioned as an important national symbol to make a little room for Soviet Finns after the end of the Republic. He stated: “If not taking into consideration the oral popular creation of the Karelo-Finnish people, the Kalevala, the literature and art of our republic appeared only from the first years of Soviet power, dependent on Russian literature and Russian art, whose grateful influence on our republic can be found in many examples.”

In this sense, the Karelo-Finnish Republic had completed its historical role. However, its status and name were not only manipulated by political elites but also utilized by various actors both in the Soviet Union and Finland. As a result, the primordial Karelian-Finnish, and Baltic-Finnic kinship, tied by the historical friendship with the “great” Russian people, was rooted deeply in the discourse and mind, and reinforced by scholarly knowledge and various actors.

The Discussions at the Institute and the Karelo-Finnish University

Even after the end of the Republic, the discussion on Karelian-Finnish kinship continued along with the disturbances following the secret speech and the Hungarian uprising both in the Soviet Union and in the socialist countries. The local party leadership, in particular, found some “problematic” remarks concerning the secret speech in a meeting at the Karelo-Finnish University. On the one hand, as an autonomous republic bordering with a non-socialist state, the Republic was nervous about the appearance of anti-Russian and anti-Soviet “bourgeois nationalism” among the non-Russian population, especially intellectuals and students. On the other hand, as Benjamin Tromly had discussed, intellectuals and students understood themselves as “agents” of improving the party and society by reforming Stalinist perversions.

To understand the impact of the secret speech on the Karelo-Finnish University, it is important to scrutinize what happened at Leningrad University, especially its Finno-Ugric course. Leningrad University also saw many conflicts between those who demanded radical changes and those who tried to control them. After the XX Party Congress, the party organizations of each faculty allowed students to organize discussion clubs to meet the demand of students who wanted to deepen the discussion on what the XX Party Congress had raised and have broader perspectives than scholarly meetings and circles under professors’ guidance. The University party committee discussed the meeting of the discussion club of the faculty of history and philology, where some students including Komsomol members, and students coming from the Herzen Pedagogical Institute caused confusion by using “politically harmful, slandering remarks.” Despite such opinions as to demand excluding

346 Leninskaia pravda, July 17, 1956.
348 TsGAIPD SPb, f. 984, op. 10, d. 79 (protocols of meetings of the party committee of the primary
them from Komsomol or breaking up the club, the party organization bureau decided only to denounce [osuditʹ] the remarks and oblige the party bureau and faculties to prepare their meetings “more carefully.” This is because the party committee members considered the club necessary for the forum, through which they hoped they could educate, nurture, and control students after the secret speech.

Discussions at the Finno-Ugric course were moderate in terms of scale and topic. The party bureau of the faculty of philology discussed the situation in the Finno-Ugric course on April 16 because the party bureau, the deans, and the members of the scholars’ council considered it unsatisfactory. According to the main report, the course had had no meeting that year, and students complained lack of instruction from teachers, especially A. Popov, the head of the course. The most problematic topic was Popov’s instruction for the doctoral dissertation of Sokolova, whom Bubrikh originally instructed. Sokolova complained that Popov had not seriously taken care of her dissertation, because he did not have a knowledge of Finnic languages [finskich iazykov], and she had to rely on Paul Ariste in Tartu. Other students lamented the lack of necessary materials, especially new textbooks, in the seminar room, due to which they “needed to order materials from Tartu and others after Bubrikh’s death.” To avoid the Finno-Ugric course being merged into the course of general linguistics, Ariste, “energetic and young” was considered to be the best candidate for the head of the course, and the meeting proposed that the dean relieve Popov from the present position. Although Popov stayed on in his position, the Finno-Ugric studies at Leningrad University had not yet got out of the situation that Bubrikh’s death and the Marrist campaign left.

Given its location on the periphery and relatively small number of students, the consequences of the secret speech in Petrozavodsk were not as distinguished as in other major Soviet cities. On the one hand, the reaction of students, teachers, scholars and party members of Karelo-Finnish University and the Institute represented what happened at other Soviet universities on a smaller scale. On the other hand, the reaction and discussions showed how they viewed the recent development of nationalities policy in Soviet Karelia and what they thought how the nationalities policy, especially the Karelian-Finnish relationship, should be, which was specific to the discussion in Soviet Karelia.

According to the report to Moscow by Lubennikov, the questions and remarks about the secret speech at meetings in Soviet Karelia revealed that only a few people referred to the nationalities issues, that is, Finns, Karelians and Veps. As to the meeting at the university on March 26, Lubennikov

349 TsGAIPD SPb, f. 984, op. 10, d. 79, l. 41.
350 TsGAIPD SPb, f. 984, op. 10, d. 97 (protocols of the bureau and plans of works of the party organizations of the Faculty of Philology), l. 45 (protocol of meeting, April 16, 1956).
351 TsGAIPD SPb, f. 984, op. 10, d. 97, l. 50.
352 TsGAIPD SPb, f. 984, op. 10, d. 97, l. 51.
353 TsGAIPD SPb, f. 984, op. 10, d. 97, l. 52.
reported several remarks which he considered necessary to be mentioned in the report. What Lubennikov considered harmful were two remarks: one is by Shriftein, student of the Karelo-Finnish University and the other is by Särki, university teacher at the course of material dynamics, both of whom criticized Stalin and the Party for “violating nationality policy.” Shriftein, a Jewish student studying Finno-Ugric languages, condemned the Soviet annexation of “Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and several districts of Finland” because this was carried out “by force” and “violation of the principle of Leninist nationality policy.” Furthermore, she also denounced the “hunting [presledovanii]” of Jews, who were rejected studying at higher education institutes in Leningrad, as a violation of Leninist nationalities policy. Likewise, Särki criticized the Party of ignoring Finnish children who “do not know the Russian language and have no possibility to study in their mother tongue.”

So, what made Shriftein, not Finnic but Jewish studying the Finno-Ugric languages, speak in that way? One reason is the so-called cosmopolitanism campaign in the late Stalinist years. As a result of this anti-Semitic campaign, the Karelo-Finnish University attracted such Jewish students that could not continue their studies in Moscow and Leningrad. The number of Jewish students had increased from 1949-50. In September 1949 the university had only 6 Jewish students (128 Russians and 15 Karelians and Finns) but in September 1950 it came to have 24 Jewish students (527 Russians and 66 Karelians and Finns), and in September 1955 – 55 Jewish students (1129 Russians and 252 Karelians and Finns). The anti-cosmopolitanism campaign caused a chaotic situation in the Finno-Ugric course as well. After losing Bubrikh and Alatyrev, the university had only one docent of Finno-Ugric studies, who was not a linguist but a literature researcher. Accordingly, this shortage of teaching staff made the university study more difficult for the indigenous Finnic students. Between 1953-54 and 1955-56 no student chose the Finnish linguistics course. In addition, the Stalinist terror overshadowed those Finnic students who were studying. Lubennikov reported to Moscow, “Such a remark like Schriftein’s is not accidental. There is hardly anyone who does not have repressed relatives at the faculty of Finnish studies.” Indeed, it is probable that the Finnic students at the Finnish department strongly influenced Shriftein because they had lived in the shared rooms assigned for the department students at the university dormitory.

All these factors taken into consideration, university teachers and party organization members discussed the secret speech and how to educate students after the XX party congress. Epstein, teacher of Soviet history, demanded the removal of Shriftein from the university “because she had crossed all lines” and the university had to show that to discuss matters openly with students does not

354 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6572, l. 36 (Lubennikov’s report to the TsK KPSS).
355 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6572, l. 37.
356 The date came from the documents of the Statistics Department of the Council of Ministries of the KFSSR. NA RK, f. r-1411, op. 4, d. 1594, l. 136 (1948–1949); d. 2100, l. 101 (1949–1950); d. 3951, l. 73 (1955–1956).
357 NA RK, f. p-8, op. 1, d. 6572, l. 36
mean to allow students to “propagate” whatever they want. Nonetheless, many of the teachers and party members were sympathetic to students like her. Lubennikov himself reported to Moscow that the university should not remove her but have open dialogues with the students whose relatives suffered in the terror. While some being critical about the Republic leadership’s attitude toward the cult of personality, teachers were in favor of collectively educating students by dialogue not exclusion to overcome the remnants of the cult of personality. Razumova reminded the participants of the fact that Shriftein’s remark “came from the student collective” and thus insisted on increasing the responsibility of members of this collectivity. Gin summarized those opinions:

“Students are now – ‘unrest in mind [volnenia v umakh]’ concerning the speech of Khrushchev about the cult of personality. Many students have such an impression as if ‘everything has collapsed [vse rukhnulo].’ Our assignment is to show students everything done in our country, not associated with one figure, to show that our party is strong. We need a great democratic character [demokratichnost’] and openness in dialogues with students, not to push some suspicion and unclear questions deep. We need not worry to speak in a Leninist way, boldly discuss, paying respect to educating students. This is why I think the proposal by Com. Epstein concerning the removal of student Shrifteilik [sic!] is fundamentally wrong.”

Then, how would this “openness” and “democracy” be practiced in the context of the nationalities problem in Soviet Karelia, that is, in the Russian-Karelian-Finnish relationship? In this regard, it was Särki, whose brother was arrested in 1937, that most boldly raised the topic of repressed Finns. Pointing out the fact that thousands of people had not known where their repressed relatives were, he criticized “the end of Finnish language education in national districts” as a deviation of nationalities policy. Later in another party meeting, the university rector Yakovlev did not fail to correct this remark, because “As is well known to all, the Finnish language is taught in schools of national districts. The bureau of the TsK KP of the Republic took a series of measures to improve the Finnish language education in schools of districts with Karelian populations.” Given that the meeting took place before the publication of the downgrading of the Republic, the party elites were careful not to give a wrong impression on this language issue. And, unlike other republics in western and southern borderlands, claiming the right of non-Russian language was not followed by an open attack against “Russification.”
Even after the Polish and Hungarian events broke out, teachers and party members stubbornly kept supporting the Karelian-Finnish kinship supplemented by Russian. After the secret speech, the university party organization was preparing for the first university newspaper *Petrozavodskii Universitet* as “an important instrument to educate students” and each faculty preparing for the upcoming university festival. Some party members worried that students were talking about what happened in countries of people’s republic and Finland during festival preparation. The university party organization especially paid attention to Finnic students who lived in the same room at the student dormitory. Attending a university party organization meeting, the Republic party secretary Smirnov concerned about the situation in the department of the Finnish language and literature and, as others did, stressed the importance of educational work, without which “our place is replaced by ‘the Voice of America’ and ‘the BBC’.” Thus, he insisted, the educational work had to be carried out at the student dormitory, too, in order to “start a battle against demagogue-students” and to “increase cautiousness.” Agreeing with Smirnov, Barantsev maintained that the students of the Finno-Ugric department needed to live in the same room, separated from other nationalities living in the student dormitory to let them discuss matters in Finnish, because “we do not have textbooks in the Finnish language, there is little time to study the language, and some students of the department have a poor knowledge of the language.”

To gather Finnic students to form a collective was, however, accompanied by the fear of the appearance of nationalism. On December 14, the university party organization discussed the matter again with Finnic students. According to the report by Travianova, “Students of the department of Finnish language and literature were not allowed to drink coffee ‘in Finnish,’ which was regarded as a nationalism (voices from the audience “prohibiting the drinking of coffee – this is a vulgar chauvinism.”). I do not understand this. It is also regarded as nationalism to make Karelian and Finnish students live together.” Travianova further criticized “someone” in the university leadership for not accepting the invitation written in Finnish to the festival. Other participants did not support Travianova and were in favor of, as before, dividing students by their specialty into each room, not by their nationality. The participants, however, denounced the error to prohibit the Finnic students from drinking coffee, “hysteric acts” and criticized each other for who was to be blamed for not accepting the invitation. The resolution of the meeting thus called for fighting against the appearance of “lack of discipline” and “immorality,” not of nationalism. At least even after the end of the Republic until

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364 NA RK, f. p-394, op. 6, d. 3, l. 103, 105 (protocol of closed meeting for report and election of the party bureau, November 18, 1956).
365 NA RK, f. p-394, op. 6, d. 3, l. 108.
366 NA RK, f. p-394, op. 6, d. 3, l. 112.
367 NA RK, f. p-394, op. 6, d. 3, l. 127.
368 Another member Starostina mentioned the rector as “someone” who did not accept the invitation in Finnish. NA RK, f. p-394, op. 6, d. 3, l. 127.
the end of 1956, party elites and intellectuals believed in the Karelian-Finnish kinship, on the one hand, as a tool to control and discipline non-Russian, Finnic students and, on the other hand, as a right category, through which the Soviet national ideology functioned to achieve Soviet democracy, true socialism, and the friendship of peoples.

This notion reflected in the fate of the Karelo-Finnish epic. In August 1956, Anisimov asked the cultural section of the TsK KPSS for permission to launch a new publishing project “epic of the peoples of the USSR [Епос народах СССР] to popularize national epics, which had been unknown to many Soviet readers and had experienced stagnation in recent years labelled as “anti-people.” Accordingly, Anisimov told of a plan to hold a series of meetings in the Caucasus and Central Asia to reconsider the national epics denounced during the late Stalinist years. Though the report said that works on epics in Karelia and Estonia “went successfully,” Anisimov considered that the Kalevala, too, required reconsideration. In December 1956, Anisimov wrote a letter to Kuusinen to propose a meeting gathering researchers from Moscow, Leningrad, and Petrozavodsk to discuss the “national belonging [национальной пренадлежности]” of the Kalevala and to reach “one or another conclusion [к тому или другому выводу]” and asked him to give a paper on this problem. Given that Kuusinen’s Kalevala interpretation remained the dogma until the end of the Soviet Union, Kuusinen very probably declined this proposal. Though not sticking to the Karelo-Finnish Republic and the position of its president, Kuusinen did not permit any change in the Soviet Kalevala as a symbol of Karelo-Finnishness.

Not only Kuusinen’s Kalevala but also Evseev’s doctoral work contributed to this “stability.” On March 20, 1958, Evseev defended his dissertation at the Institute of Russian Literature, chaired by Bazanov, with Zhirmunsky as the official opponent. Zhirmunsky recommended conferring the degree of doctor of philology to Evseev for his “25-years painstaking and fruitful scholarly road.” Propp, for his part, stressed that Evseev’s work showed the historical realities from which the folklore appeared, and his method was applicable to studies of epics of other peoples, especially the Russian epic. Against this proceeding by distinguished scholars, some audiences had an objection against conferring the doctoral degree, not the Кандидат degree, because they believed Evseev’s dissertation did not reach the standard of doctoral degree. One listener ironically said: “From the point of view of

370 ARAN, f. 397 (the Gorky Institute of World Literature), op. 1, d. 382, ll. 33–34.
371 ARAN, f. 397, op. 1, d. 382, ll. 33–34.
372 RGASPI, f. 522, op. 2, d. 91, l. 1. I have not yet found Kuusinen’s reply to this letter.
373 The Petersburg filial of the Russian Academy of Sciences has the stenographic record of the public defense of Evseev, which has not yet been declassified. I use the stenographic record kept in the personal archive of Evseev at the National Archive of the Republic of Karelia, which, however lacked some important remarks such as those of Bazanov and Popov. NA RK, f. r-3717, op. 1, d. 276, ll. 36–45.
374 NA RK, f. r-3717, op. 1, d. 276, l. 39.
375 NA RK, f. r-3717, op. 1, d. 276, l. 42.
a doctoral candidate, this work remarkably increased our possibilities which many of us have." Nonetheless, the scholars’ council of the Institute of Russian Literature unanimously decided to confirm the doctoral degree as planned. The next day, Propp sent a letter to Mashezersky: “I am pleased to congratulate Your Institute on this splendid victory.” Likewise, Bazanov contributed a piece to *Leninskaia Pravda* on March 23, which praised Evseev, “Karelian scholar,” for depicting the historical memory of the Karelian people and the Karelo-Finnish poems.

Kuusinen’s *Kalevala*, however, did not always stop discussing the *Kalevala*. Meletinsky, who was studying the *Kalevala* for his doctoral work on comparative mythology, developed his discussion following the point of view raised by Zhirmunsky and Martti Haavio, that is, to see the *Kalevala* as a mythology and Väinämöinen as a shaman. In his review on the first volume of Evseev’s work, Meletinsky, though praising its achievement, proposed to allow other approaches to the *Kalevala*. Meletinsky was skeptical of Väinämöinen’s representation as a Baltic-Slavic cultural carrier taking his wife from a Karelian clan and reminded that the Väinämöinen poems reflected fishermen culture by quoting Haavio’s study. Therefore, he argued that the representation of Väinämöinen was a cultural hero from a Neolithic ethnic group [*plemiia*] which took part in the origins of the Karelian people.

Furthermore, Meletinsky saw the historiography part as a weak point, because Evseev “unsystematically” selected works by the Finnish school Evseev wanted to criticize, and thus omitted previous works by Finnish scholars who had various directions, different from the Finnish school.

Furthermore, according to his own account in his letters to Bazanov, Evseev was beset with a suspicion that in Petrozavodsk and Moscow, Chistov and Meletinsky were protesting against and trying to obstruct the *VAK*’s approval of the IRLI’s proposal to confer the doctoral degree on Evseev, and Meletinsky’s critical review negatively influenced the *VAK*’s decision. Evseev maintained that he found a report from the Gorky Institute on the Institute of the Karelian filial that his work was “just a commentary on the *Kalevala*,” and the “authors” of this report, “Clearly, […] prepared by Meletinsky and Chistov,” underlined that “one does not confer the *Kandidat* degree, let alone the doctoral degree for a commentary.” Evseev continued that Chistov and Meletinskii were taking a negative attitude to another Karelian scholar at the Institute while keeping a good relation with other scholars including Finnish ones there. These letters are not just a plea for help but also a threat, because if the *VAK* were not to approve the proposal and this scandal were to come to be known in the Finnish reactionary

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376 NA RK, f. r-3717, op. 1, d. 276, l. 42. The remark is by G. F. Turchaninov, Evseev’s “old friend of university time.”
377 NA RK, f. r-3717, op. 1, d. 276, l. 32 (a copy of Propp’s letter to Mashezersky, March 21, 1958).
379 *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 4 (1958), 162.
380 *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 4 (1958), 163.
381 *Vysshiaia Attestatsionnaia Komissiia* (VAK) is the highest organization which has the right to confirm the proposal of conferring the doctoral degree.
382 RO IRLI, f. 825, op. 1, n. 204, l. 7 (Evseev’s letter to Bazanov, November 1, 1958).
383 RO IRLI, f. 825, op. 1, n. 204, l. 5 (Evseev’s letter to Bazanov, May 16, 1958).
bourgeois press and society, “then it would be asked who is to be blamed.”

Thus, the ideology of the friendship of peoples and Karelo-Finnishness informed Evseev’s attitude towards Bazanov but, at the same time, Evseev utilized the ideology to persuade Bazanov to help him. Thanking Bazanov for his “positive” evaluation of Evseev’s defense in *Leninskaia Pravda*, Evseev’s letter below well summarized this interplay between ideology and agency:

“[… ] Vasily Grigor’evich [Bazanov], I sincerely hope that in the future, in a certain circle of appropriate authority I could continue your historical parallel, and congratulate you that if Russian scholar Grot was such a great scholar for Russian scholarship [*nauka*] as his friend, Lönnrot, was for Finnish scholarship, then the Russian Soviet philologist you well know, who began his academic activity in Karelia and continues in Leningrad, would be superior to his Karelian friend and folklorist, of course, in respect of the scale and position in Soviet scholarship. I hope that this idea [their parallel with Grot and Lönnrot] will be polished in time.”

This letter shows that Evseev (Karelian) was identified with Lönnrot (Finn), who was as great a scholar as Grot (Russian). But, in the Soviet era, there was a friendly but unequal relationship between the Soviet/Russian scholar and the Karelo-Finnish scholar. Still, Evseev manipulated this unequal relationship to persuade Bazanov to support him in “their rivalry” with, “their” struggle against the revenge [*revanshizm*] of Chistov and Meletinsky.

For his side, Bazanov acted as a Russian communist, “old brother” of the young Karelian, and tried to use his authority to settle conflicts among Russians and non-Russians.

“Dear Viktor Yakovlevich [Evseev]!

I received your letter. You are a wonderful person and distinguished scholar, but too emotional, impulsive. I was, too, such a person in my youth, with growing, perhaps, slightly became calm [*utikh*], and settled down [*perebecilcia*]. […] Just keep your temper and calm. […] I know that in Petrozavodsk there are extremely cold-blooded [*khladnokrovnye*] people. But they do not decide your destiny in the end. […]

All taken into consideration, the IRLI never leave this to other people and does what they can do to defeat those forces, acting subjectivists. What K. V. Chistov is doing surprises me. Or he sold his soul to such an extent that he writes anonymous denunciations [*paskvili*] and took part in the factionalism [*gruppovshchine*]. The events in 1949 taught them little. […]

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384 RO IRLI, f. 825, op. 1, n. 204, l. 6.
I have not yet read Meletinsky’s review. But it actually does not play any roles. […]"386

Part 4 has discussed how various actors defended and utilized the Karelo-Finnishess and the status of the union republic during the critical years of the last years of Stalin and de-Stalinization. It is true that the late Stalinist ideological campaign fatally hit those Petrozavodsk and Leningrad intellectuals engaged with the Kalevala and Finno-Ugric studies. Nonetheless, local intellectuals in Petrozavodsk effectively parried pressures from Moscow and Leningrad and they were dully supported by the local party elites who were loyal to the original assignment to promote Karelo-Finnish national culture. Though the room of maneuvers had narrowed, Soviet discourse of the Kalevala and Karelian-Finnish kinship was open to dialogue with Finns in Finland who, consciously or not, in fact, discussed them not only within Finland but also with the Soviets.

Indeed, there were limitations on this Soviet discussion on Karelo-Finnishness. To make the Karelian children learn Finnish and in Finnish in schools caused dissatisfaction among the very Karelian family. Among local Finnic intellectuals, there was disagreement and discontent with Soviet “pan-Finnic” hierarchy with the Finnish language on top and the Karelian language in the second place. Furthermore, for archeologists and historians, it was unacceptable to project Karelo-Finnishess onto the pre-historic and pre-modern past of Karelia.

These contradictions came forward after the death of Stalin, the architect of the Karelo-Finnish Republic. Karelo-Finnishness was overwhelmed by the voices for efficiency and practicality which Karelian parents and Republic leaders hoped for the development of Soviet Karelia and Karelians. They thus came to call for Russian-Karelian friendship and Russian language education more openly for Karelian children. This all-union and local trend eased pressure on scholars engaged in Russian national culture in Soviet Karelia which suffered during the late Stalinist years. Though changes in Soviet-Finnish relationships were the primary reason, the Republic was finally downgraded into an autonomous republic because of these domestic pressures.

Still, Karelian-Finnishness remained an important element for Soviet Finnic elites and intellectuals. While Karelo-Finnishenss was associated with Stalin, elimination of Finnishness was as well associated with bloody Stalinist terror. Decades-long negotiations over Karelo-Finnishness were so resilient to post-Stalinist emergence of Karelian nationalism and Russian-Karelian friendship. This persistence of pan-Finnic hierarchy dissatisfied nationally-minded Karelian intellectuals who, however, quite skillfully moved between Soviet and Finnic hierarchies to seek their own interests. As shown in discussions after the secret speech of Khrushchev, this pan-Finnic hierarchy was integrated into the Soviet ideology well and was useful for finding a balance in potentially explosive relationships among the peoples in the Republic.

386 NA RK, f. r-3717, op. 1, d. 213, l. 1 (Bazanov’s letter to Evseev, November 4, 1958).
Conclusion

This dissertation has discussed Soviet repertories of imperial rule in Soviet Karelia during the time of the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic from 1940 to 1956. The dissertation has demonstrated that the Soviets utilized pan-Finnism ideology to win loyalty from the Finnic population in Soviet Karelia and from Finland and made use of a Finnic hierarchy resided in the pan-Finnism ideology to rule the Finnic population in the Republic and keep a Soviet-friendly Finland in the Soviet sphere of influence. The dissertation has articulated that there was “collusion” between the Soviet national ideology and the Finnish one in that both took advantage of the family-like relationship among the Finnic peoples to convince both Finnish and non-Finnish Finnic peoples of Soviet or Finnish justification of rule over the Finnic peoples. To show this, this dissertation has scrutinized the controversy over the Kalevala and Finnic kinship not only among the Soviet political elites and scholars/intellectuals but also between the Soviets and their Finnish counterparts.

What this dissertation argues is that the Karelo-Finnish Republic symbolized the shift of the center in the Finnic world from Finland to the Soviet Union after the Second World War by grafting pan-Finnism into the Soviet multinational ideology. As Part 1 has described at length, the Kalevala and pan-Finnism was borne as a Finnish national project but also as an imperial Russian product beyond the borders of the Grand Duchy of Finland. The Kalevala and Lönnrot became symbols of the emerging Finnish nation loyal to the tsars and opposing Swedish-speaking elite culture. However, these symbols were at the same time an imperial Russian project through pan-Finnism ideology, which was initially favorable for St. Petersburg but later became a separatist threat. The pan-Finnism ideology was not always compatible with the Finnish nation and nation-state project, which saw non-Finnish Finnic peoples outside the Grand Duchy as a burden. With the rise of Russian nationalism, pan-Slavism, and imperial cohesion, the controversy over the Kalevala poems and Lönnrot erupted and the gravity of pan-Finnism leant for the West and South, while the eastern orientation waned but was joined by imperial Russian scholars and ethnic Karelian activists and intellectuals. The birth of the independent Finnish state and Soviet socialist state made Finland and Finns the center and top of the Baltic-Finnic world: the Kalevala and pan-Finnism ideology, together with Red Finns, were brought into Soviet Karelia as more advanced proletariat Finnish culture for socialist modernization in Soviet Karelia, supported by Moscow. Though Greater Finland became unrealistic already in the late 1920s, the pan-Finnism ideology and hierarchy went together with the Finnish nation-state making and socialism building in Soviet Karelia, which was crystallized in the 1935 Kalevala centenary jubilees.

After the physical destruction of Red Finns and Finnish culture in Soviet Karelia, Moscow again played with the idea of pan-Finnism and Greater Finland, as Part 2 has demonstrated. It is true
that the Republic came out as a diplomatic card of Stalin’s toward Finland and a justification of the Winter War toward the Soviet citizens and Finnish workers and peasants in Finland by manipulating the Greater Finland dream. The new Karelo-Finnish party and soviet leaders were in a hurry to resume Finnish education and “Soviet” Finnish cultural and cadre construction including the “Soviet” Kalevala as the Karelo-Finnish epic. This short-lived effort was reversed by another war with Germany and Finland. While Soviet Finns were being marginalized in the Soviet war effort, Russian-Karelian friendship and Karelian nationalism were in full-swing, and Karelian-Finnish kinship and the Kalevala were thus almost removed. It was rather Finland that accidentally got a chance to realize Greater Finland: as the oldest brother, Finns gave a chance to the Karelians and Veps under occupation to be Finns, they gave a brotherly hand to Estonians, and received Ingrian refugees.

It was thus after the war that the Karelo-Finnish Republic could claim the Soviet Kalevala and Soviet pan-Finnism in terms of ideology and moral, in which they were they believed superior to the Finnish ones. The late Stalinist ideological campaign hit this Karelo-Finnish project, but the Republic elites and intellectuals utilized the status as a peaceful neighbor and competitor of Finland. In addition, the Republic intellectuals could make use of networks with Leningrad, Tartu, and Moscow intellectuals to continue their project to negotiate and locate the Karelo-Finnish and pan-Finnism within the Soviet Eurasian multinational space and realm of Soviet ideology. The shift in the Finnic world was promoted by Finland, which after the war ceased to claim the leadership of pan-Finnism and embraced the Kalevala as a purely national symbol of the postwar Finnish nation, which struggled to survive hardship alone like Lönnrot in the making of the Kalevala. Its pro-Soviet leftists tried to negotiate their own Kalevala and pan-Finnism compatible with (rather than obedient to) the Soviet ones. As a result of these negotiations within the Republic, the Soviet Union, and Soviet-Finnish interactions, Soviet Kalevala and pan-Finnism were fit into the Soviet friendly hierarchy of peoples to contribute to a postwar order in Soviet Karelia and in the Baltic-Finnic world.

Soviet Karelians, buffeted by national and imperial projects, were finally historically tied with the Russians and primordially fixed with the Finns. Indeed, early Soviet years and especially the Great Fatherland War brought Soviet Karelian history, heroes, martyrs, symbols, writers, and literatures. Nonetheless, with the Stalinist Soviet Union indigenizing nationalities, Soviet Karelians had to share Soviet Karelia and the Kalevala with the co-titular nationality Soviet Finns, who were, according to pan-Finnic hierarchy, more advanced, but desperately trying to secure their place in Soviet Karelia and Soviet-Finnish interactions. Soviet Karelians were obliged to study Finnish in schools, which might hinder their study of Russian and in the end their promotion to higher education. And even after the demise of the Karelo-Finnish Republic (at least in 1956), the Karelian students studying Finno-Ugric linguistics continued to live with Finnish students in the same student dormitory. Nevertheless, the Soviet pan-Finnic hierarchy within the Soviet hierarchy was not so solid that Soviet Karelians could get the better of Soviet Finns because of their closeness to the older Russian brother.
and they could be a Soviet, superior to Finns in Finland, as examples from Evseev and Timonen have demonstrated.

At the same time, this Karelo-Finnish project and Soviet use of pan-Finnism were fragile, as Part 4 has shown in some examples. Because of this fluid overlapping of pan-Finnic and Soviet ideologies, Soviet Karelians were challenged by Veps, a smaller Finnic group, as Finns were challenged by Karelians. As late Stalinist discussions on the Karelian language demonstrated, the Veps penetrated the Karelians’ tacit effort to put the pan-Finnic hierarchy on them, while resisting the Finnish/Soviet use of the hierarchy on themselves. In addition, the artificial and political character of the Karelo-Finnishness ironically depended on Stalin, even during whose final years (more so after his death) the Karelo-Finnish project faced resistance from the Karelian population and from the scholars who did not give in to the political pressure of the project of the Karelo-Finnish people in the ancient past of Karelia and Karelians. This dependence on Stalin’s geopolitical calculation partly explains the end of the Karelo-Finnish Republic after Stalin’s death.

Making use of pan-Finnic hierarchy, however, did not end with Stalin, since post-Stalinist elites and intellectuals have also found it useful and necessary. While facing demands for efficient, less ideology-oriented modernization and changes relevant to reality inside and outside the Karelo-Finnish Republic, the Soviet elites in Moscow and Petrozavodsk still found it useful to manipulate the pan-Finnic hierarchy to keep order in Soviet Karelia and bring the Finnish elites in Finland over to the Soviet Union through Soviet Estonia and Soviet Karelia. In fact, this seemed to function at the critical moment after Khrushchev’s secret speech: the Karelo-Finnish Republic was quiet, compared with other union republics, and Finland was deepening its relationships in multiple fields with the Soviet Union. Indeed, promoting Finnish culture was associated with Stalin, but at the same time denying Finnish culture and Finnic kinship was also associated with Stalinist terror. Thus, the Karelo-Finnish Republic became the Karelian Autonomous Republic within the RSFSR, but the Kalevala remained the Karelo-Finnish national epic and the Finnish language remained an official language of the Republic.

This dissertation has emphasized that Soviet-Finnish borderland issues, including the Kalevala and pan-Finnism, are to be addressed within an imperial/post-imperial framework. As Max Engmann has summarized Finland’s departure from Sweden as “long goodbyes,” Finland’s departure from the Russian Empire was (and perhaps is) also no less long and even more complicated because of Soviet anti-imperial, socialist empire-building and nation-building in Soviet Karelia. To highlight this nexus of nation-building in Finland and Soviet Karelia and Soviet empire-building, this dissertation has also utilized a transnational approach to the controversy over the Kalevala and pan-Finnism to scrutinize the flow and interplay of ideas and knowledge between Finland and Soviet Karelia (and even Soviet Estonia). Going back to the origins of this controversy in the Grand Duchy of Finland in the Russian Empire, this study has demonstrated fluctuating identification, negotiated in
the same discursive space in the Finnish-Russian/Soviet imperial/post-imperial borderland. In this way, though the accent was on the post-World War II years, this research has described a great shift in leadership of the Finnic world from Finland within the Russian Empire through the Finnish nation-state and Red Finnish Karelia to the Soviet multiethnic empire after the Second World War.

How does this study contribute to Soviet/Russian and Finnish historical studies? Decades before in his influential article, Yuri Slezkine used a metaphor “communal apartment” to describe Soviet management of multiethnic population. Each nation and nationality (however small) was “entitled to a room of its own” and rooms were “lavishly decorated with hometown memorabilia, grandfather clocks and lovingly preserved family portraits.”¹ In the case of Soviet Karelia, however, many of those decorations were contested between Karelians and Finns. The Finns once lived in the same grounds and established their own decorations in their own house by using the common Finnic cultural legacy before other Finnic relatives. In the room of Soviet Karelians, Russians occupied large spaces and where smaller numbers of Finns and Veps awkwardly resided. Their room in the Soviet communal apartment, however, was located higher than the neighboring Finnish house. Though access to the room and the house was strictly controlled, Finnish and Soviet Finnic architects and designers raced and studied each other to show their own appearances and decorations to be more attractive, while the owner of the Soviet communal apartment utilized the Finnish leitmotif to keep the Soviet Karelian room in order. This is a repertoire of Soviet imperial power to manipulate hierarchical differences between the Finnic peoples, who adapted themselves to this manipulation but also took advantage of it. This is what this dissertation aims to demonstrate for the comparison with other Soviet borderlands.

Since the Russian Empire and Soviet Union had long borders and many neighbors, this Soviet-Finnish entanglement in Soviet Karelia and the Baltic-Finnic world is one example of many international and transnational entanglements on the borderlands. As shown in Part 3, this study has touched on comparison between the Kalevala controversy and pan-Finnism and the Geser controversy and pan-Mongolism to highlight the Karelo-Finnish case and Soviet management of diverse population and borderlands. Similar comparison is possible with pan-Turkic, pan-Slavic, pan-Persian networks, and their cultural symbols, and with other irredenta movements such as Bessarabian and Armenian cases. The whole picture of Soviet rule of Eurasia will be articulated through those comparisons among Soviet borderlands and with neighboring countries, which is essential to the understanding of current post-Soviet imperial space in Eurasia.

To Finnish historical studies, this dissertation has tried to show that pan-Finnism and Greater Finland did not die out in 1944. True, it was the Soviet Union that forced Finland to give up and forget pan-Finnism and Greater Finland, which was also relevant to and convenient for building a postwar Finnish welfare, nation-state. However, Soviet selective use of pan-Finnism and the Kalevala made

¹ Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment,” 434, 446.
dialogues and negotiations with Finland possible even after the Second World War. Even if the Finns did not wish for and were not conscious of these dialogues and negotiations, they were caught in the logic of the Soviet multinational imperial ideology (or Soviet internationalism) and played a role in the Soviet management of domestic multinational hierarchy and of her own sphere of influence. This is the point which the “national” history of the Finnish nation, nation-state, and Soviet-Finnish relations have failed to point out. Only recently have Finnish scholars started to address “colonial/imperial” aspects of the rule of the Finnish nation-state over the Karelian-speaking population and the Saami people on the peripheries. This dissertation has argued that this Finnish “colonial” gaze and ideology had similarities with Soviet ones, and they intersected with each other in the Baltic-Finnic world.
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**Doctoral Dissertation**

Krohn, Julius. “Suomenkielinen runollisuus ruotsinvallan aikana.” PhD diss., Imperial Aleksander University (The University of Helsinki), 1862.

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To whom do the Kalevala and its epic poems belong? Where are the origins of the epic poems? How do we understand the relationship between Finns and Karelians? Is the Finnish language closely related to the Karelian language? These questions were intensively discussed not only in Finland but also in the Soviet Union, and between Finland and the Soviet Union, in the 1940s and 1950s.

This dissertation addresses repertories of Soviet imperial rule in Soviet Karelia, where the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic existed from 1940 to 1956, by scrutinizing the controversy over the Kalevala and pan-Finnik kinship among Soviet intellectuals in Soviet Karelia, Leningrad, and Moscow and between Soviet and Finnish intellectuals.

The dissertation is based on varieties of archival materials from Russia, Finland, and Estonia to understand how the Soviet Union grafted pan-Finnic ideology/heimoaate onto the Soviet national ideology to justify its rule in Soviet Karelia and influence Finland to challenge Finland and the Finns to claim the central place of the Baltic-Finnic world after the Second World War.

This doctoral dissertation argues that the Soviet Union “tamed” Greater Finland by picking up useful elements—in particular the pan-Finnism ideology and hierarchy—from it to justify its rule in the Soviet-Finnish borderlands, as the Finns did before and during the Second World War. The dissertation also demonstrates how Soviet Finns, Karelians, and Veps held multiple positions to resist and challenge the pan-Finnism ideology and hierarchy, which the “collusion” between the Soviet Union and Finland imposed on them.
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