COMMENTATIONES SCIENTIARUM SOCIALIUM

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Survivability of Territorial Autonomy: A Study of Contributory Factors that Explain the Preservation and Secession of Autonomous Territories

THE FINNISH SOCIETY OF SCIENCES AND LETTERS

HELSINKI 2025

Editor: Jan Sundberg

Cover design by Oy Nord Print Ab

The series

Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium

is part of the publishing cooperation between

The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters

and the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters

established in 1996.

This book has received a subsidiary granted by the Ministry

of Education and Culture distributed by the Federation

of Finnish Learned Societies.

Distributor:

Bookstore Vetenskapsbokhandeln

Snellmansgatan 13, FIN-0017 Helsinki, Finland

tiedekirja@tsv.fi

www.tiedekirja.fi

ISBN 978-951-653-535-0 (tryckt version)

ISBN 978-951-653-536-7 (nätversion)

ISSN 0355-256x (tryckt version)

ISSN 2737-1751 (nätversion)

https://doi.org/10.54572/ssc.1637 (doi)

Survivability of Territorial Autonomy: A Study of Contributory Factors that Explain the Preservation and Secession of Autonomous Territories

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Förord

Ett mångårigt, arbetsdrygt och mycket lärorikt kapitel har nått sitt slut. Då jag lämnade Åbo Akademi som nybliven politices magister i statskunskap år 2012 fanns det inte på min världskarta att jag några år senare skulle börja doktorera. Som bekant kan livets oförutsägbarhet dock överraska.

Den här avhandlingen hade självklart inte blivit verklighet enbart med min egen insats. Först vill jag tacka min handledare professor Carsten Anckar. Du har alltjämt och tålmodigt väglett mig med din expertis och din tacksamt koncisa tydlighet. Du har gett råd och besvarat frågor – stora som små – samt bidragit med både uppmuntrande och lugnande ord vid komplexa avvägningar. Utan ditt solida stöd hade det här projektet varit avsevärt mer utmanande att genomföra. Jag vill också tacka min andra handledare professor Maria Ackrén vid Grönlands universitet, Ilisimatusarfik. Då djupa huvudbry kopplat sitt grepp om mig har du funnits till hands, bland annat under flertalet av mina sena arbetskvällar utanför ordinarie arbetstid i Åbo tack vare tidsskillnaden mellan Finland och Grönland. Därtill vill jag tacka professor Thomas Denk vid Örebro universitet som var min handledare då jag tog mina första trevande steg in på forskarbanan och vars expertis inom temat statsformation inspirerade mig i mitt val av forskningsområde och som även senare har gett mig tacksamma råd.

Jag vill också rikta ett tack till doktorandkollegor och övriga medarbetare för en trevlig samvaro under mina år i ASA-huset. Tack också för lärdomar av alla deltagare i forskarseminarier och Finlandssvenska forskarskolan. Därtill är jag tacksam över att vid sidan av forskarstudierna haft möjligheten att undervisa vid Åbo Akademi och utveckla min förmåga som lärare. Tack också till alla studerande som gjorde det till en givande erfarenhet.

Jag vill även framföra ett stort tack till professor Joakim Ekman vid Södertörns högskola och docent Pär Olausson vid Mittuniversitet som förhandsgranskat min avhandling och som gett mig positiv och konstruktiv kritik. Jag tackar också Iris Lindahl-Raittila som språkgranskat min avhandling. Utöver tacksamhet för min finansierade doktorandbefattning vid Åbo Akademi som gett mig finansiell trygghet i avhandlingsarbetet vill jag också framföra ett varmt tack för tidigare erhållet finansiellt stöd från Ålands självstyrelses 75-års jubileumsfond och Svensk-Österbottniska Samfundet r.f. samt i avhandlingens slutskede från Stiftelsen för Åbo Akademi.

Avslutningsvis vill jag tacka mina viktiga närstående – ni vet vem ni är. Tack för att ni funnits där och skingrat mina tankar med annat än avhandlingsarbete genom dessa år. Jag vill rikta ett särskilt tack till min mamma, Ann-Kristin, som med sin egen forskarerfarenhet har varit ett tacksamt stöd och bollplank genom processen.

Åbo den 13 november 2025
Richard Eveli

Abstract

Scholars and policymakers often debate whether the creation of territorial autonomy arrangements can appease grievances that a minority group within a parent state might experience or whether such solutions could lead to its eventual secession and acquisition of its own sovereign state. The aim of this dissertation is to identify factors related to ethnicity and identity along with prosperity and viability that have contributed most to autonomy failure by secession for some autonomous territories. A corresponding theoretical model on secessionism and secession based on perspectives on intergroup alienation and grievances is developed.

A mixed-methods approach is applied in the study. First, quantitative analysis with Cox regression analysis is performed using time-series data compiled by the author for 11 independent variables and for 53 autonomous territories that have experienced 68 autonomy periods between the years 1901 and 2020. Then, qualitative case study analysis using event history analysis with process tracing is performed on the key independent variables according to the quantitative analysis. The analysis is conducted on one autonomous territory that was dissolved by secession from its parent state, and on one that endured as such until the year 2020. Research data consists of demographic, geographical, macro and socioeconomic indicators, statements by officials in media and parliamentary sittings, election manifestos and results, opinion polls as well as previous research.

The quantitative analysis indicates that relative economic deprivation in terms of GDP per capita and ethnic distinctiveness in terms of both language and religion contribute to autonomy failure by secession. The qualitative analyses appear to confirm the results regarding relative economic performance from a broader viewpoint. The first case study concerning Malta indicates that the presence of relative economic deprivation contributed to its secession in 1964. The second case study regarding the Cayman Islands indicates that its relative economic prosperity has discouraged secession. However, the qualitative analyses do not seem to confirm the results from the quantitative analysis regarding linguistic and religious distinctiveness. The first case study does not indicate that such distinctiveness in Malta contributed to its secession from its parent state, nor does the second case study indicate that absence of such distinctiveness in the Cayman Islands can explain the absence of secession for the territory.

Thus, the results of this study suggest that relative overall economic deprivation rather than prosperity contributes significantly to the occurrence of autonomy failure by secession, whereas combined linguistic and religious distinctiveness might contribute but to a lesser extent.

Keywords: Territorial autonomy, secessionism, secession, state formation, minority grievances, ethnic identity, relative deprivation, relative prosperity

Abstrakt

Forskare och politiska beslutsfattare dryftar ofta huruvida upprättandet av autonoma territorier kan avhjälpa missnöje som en minoritetsgrupp inom ett moderland kan uppleva eller huruvida sådana lösningar i förlängningen kan leda till dess secession och upprättande av en egen suverän stat. Syftet med denna avhandling är att identifiera faktorer relaterade till etnicitet och identitet samt välfärd och livskraft som har bidragit mest till autonomikollaps genom secession för en del autonoma territorier. En motsvarande teoretisk modell beträffande separatism och secession baserad på perspektiv på alienation och missnöje mellan grupper utformas.

I studien tillämpas en mixed-methods ansats. Kvantitativ analys i form av Cox regressionsanalys genomförs först med tidsseriedata som har sammanställts av författaren för elva oberoende variabler och för 53 autonoma territorier som har upplevt 68 autonomiperioder mellan åren 1901 och 2020. Därefter genomförs kvalitativ fallstudieanalys genom överlevnadsanalys med processpårning för de mest signifikanta oberoende variablerna enligt den kvantitativa analysen. Analysen görs på ett autonomt territorium som upplöstes genom secession från sitt moderland och på ett som bestod som sådant fram till år 2020. Forskningsdata består av demografiska, geografiska, makro- och socioekonomiska indikatorer, uttalanden av makthavare i medier och kammarsammanträden, valprogram och -resultat, opinionsundersökningar, samt tidigare forskning.

Den kvantitativa analysen indikerar att relativ ekonomisk deprivation i form av BNP per capita och etnisk säregenhet i form av både språk och religion bidrar till autonomikollaps genom secession. De kvalitativa analyserna förefaller bekräfta resultaten gällande relativ ekonomisk status ur ett bredare perspektiv. Den första fallstudien beträffande Malta indikerar att förekomsten av relativ ekonomisk deprivation bidrog till dess secession år 1964. Den andra fallstudien avseende Caymanöarna indikerar att dess relativa ekonomiska välstånd har hämmat secession. Däremot förefaller de kvalitativa analyserna inte bekräfta resultaten från den kvantitativa analysen beträffande språklig och religiös säregenhet. Den första fallstudien indikerar inte att sådan säregenhet i Malta bidrog till dess secession från sitt moderland och den andra fallstudien indikerar inte heller att frånvaro av sådan säregenhet i Caymanöarna kan förklara frånvaron av secession för territoriets del.

Resultaten i denna studie antyder således att relativ generell ekonomisk deprivation framom välstånd bidrar väsentligt till uppkomsten av autonomikollaps genom secession medan kombinerad språklig och religiös säregenhet kan bidra men i mindre utsträckning.

Nyckelord: Territoriell autonomi, separatism, secession, statsformation, minoriteter, missnöje, etnisk identitet, relativ deprivation, relativt välstånd

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1 Introduction

Secession and the creation of new sovereign states is a rare phenomenon. However, in the 1990s the number of sovereign states in the world grew quite significantly and some instances of state birth have also occurred since the turn of the millennium. This includes the addition of certain special non-sovereign territories turned sovereign states, such as the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands in 1991, Palau in 1994, Kosovo in 2008 and South Sudan in 2011. Looking further back in time one can also point to the acquisition of sovereign statehood by others of this same type of special non-sovereign territories, such as Suriname in 1975, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1965, Malta in 1964, Irish Free State (now the Republic of Ireland) in 1922 along with South Africa and Australia in 1920 (Correlates of War Project 2017). Obviously, this does not include all additions to the international community of sovereign states during the 20th and 21st centuries. Since the 1990s, and aside from the numerous instances of state birth out of the former Eastern bloc countries in Europe and Asia, other territories that have seceded from a parent state and emerged as sovereign states are Namibia in 1990, Eritrea in 1993, Timor-Leste in 2002 and Montenegro in 2006 (Correlates of War Project 2017).

What do the initially outlined so-called special non-sovereign territories turned sovereign states all have in common? What sets them apart from Namibia, Eritrea, Timor-Leste and Montenegro? One fundamental difference is that their secession and acquisition of sovereign statehood was directly preceded by their possession of some measure of internal non-(con)federal self-governing powers, specifically in the form of territorial autonomy. This is what the present study intends to examine. By applying a mixed-methods approach, it seeks to contribute to previous research on the phenomenon of secession primarily. However, it seeks to explore the phenomenon in the context of pre-existing territorial decentralization through territorial autonomy. Ultimately, this study seeks to illuminate some of the causes behind the fact that just as there are a number of autonomous territories that have not embraced any significant secessionist stance, let alone actually seceded from their parent states – such as Aosta Valley, Cayman Islands, Galicia, Nunavut, Vojvodina, Zanzibar and Åland Islands to mention a few – there are also, as previously established, a number of formerly autonomous territories that have.

It is also notable that there are several cases of currently existing autonomous territories that have not seceded from their parent states but that perhaps are or have not been entirely dismissive of the idea. For instance, autonomous territories such as Bermuda (1995), Scotland (2014), Puerto Rico (2012 and 2017), Catalonia (2014 and 2017), Kurdistan Region of Iraq (2017), Bougainville (2019) and New Caledonia (2018, 2020 and

2021) have in recent years arranged referendums that were either agreed upon or non-agreed upon with their parent states and in which the option of severing ties with the parent state was on the ballot (Sánchez Sánchez et al. 2022a:1878, 2022b). Although so far fruitless, examples such as these and those that did secede give further credence to the argument that secessionism and secession are phenomena that still exist.

The aim of studying the causes of secession with the point of departure being territories that are or, at some point, were in possession of territorial autonomy can be related to previous research on the relationship between territorial decentralization and state formation processes. According to this research, secessionist sentiments and movements might emerge in polities that are in possession of some form of territorial decentralization and, therefore, already in possession of state-like structures and institutions (see e.g. Cornell 2002:246, 275; Brancati 2006:651–653, 681; Pavkovic and Radan 2007:13–14; Erk and Anderson 2009:191–193, 196–197).

However, the very existence of current and former autonomous territories such as the ones highlighted above also makes clear, as has also been confirmed by several scholars (see e.g. Pavkovic and Radan 2007:14, 16–17), that pre-existing territorial decentralization is not in itself a sufficient determinant for a sub-state territory to become secessionist. Although it could be argued that structures and institutions related to territorial autonomy might certainly be useful tools in the event of substantial secessionism emerging, other determinants and processes need to be examined to shed light on why some autonomous territories become secessionist and, in some cases, have seceded from their parent states.

Given the previously outlined different types of sub-state territories that at some point seceded from their parent states, combined with the examples of autonomous territories that in recent times have displayed secessionist tendencies and made concerted efforts to secede, one can conclude that secessionism and secession are phenomena that continue to affect the political stability of territories, sovereign states, wider regions and the international system as well as often also the welfare and security of the peoples therein.

1.1 Key considerations and concepts

In this dissertation, there are certain key considerations and concepts, some of which are touched upon in the aim and research questions outlined in the following, that require brief explanation.

First and for the sake of clarification, this study intends to conduct a focused examination of different factors specifically related to territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability of autonomous territories that might have contributed to some of them having failed as such territories by seceding from their parent states. In short, territory or group

distinctiveness includes identity-enhancing factors related to common markers of ethnic identity, the geography or the political history of the autonomous territory or its population. Territory or group viability, in turn, refers to factors pertaining to the economic and welfare circumstances as well as resources of the autonomous territory or its population. Predominantly, the study does not intend to focus on other factors within or outside the autonomous territories. Thus, this study does not claim nor attempt to contribute with an all-encompassing explanation as to why some autonomous territories have seceded since, naturally, there might have been other factors within the territories that contributed, as well as factors outside of them that also contributed to or even decided the outcomes. The factors, or the independent variables, related to territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability are outlined further in Chapter 2, in Subsections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 as well as in the chapter summary in Section 2.3.

Second, the term secession is for the purpose of this study defined as *the withdrawal of an autonomous territory from its parent state and its acquisition of sufficient recognition to constitute and predominantly be regarded as a sovereign state of its own*. A further elaboration on the term and phenomenon is provided in Chapter 2, Section 2.2. The criteria for determining acquisition of sovereign statehood relate to whether an autonomous territory was recognized as a sovereign state by France and the United Kingdom prior to 1920, or by at least two major powers post-1920 or had attained membership in the League of Nations or the United Nations (Correlates of War Project 2017). A more detailed description of the criteria is offered in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.

Third, in this study an autonomous territory is defined as a currently existing or former equivalent of *a geographically demarcated non-federal first-level administrative subdivision of a sovereign state that possesses a special status and at least administrative powers of some measure*. A detailed elaboration of the concept and system of territorial autonomy is provided in Chapter 2, Subsection 2.1.2. The reference to 'non-federal' means that the definition does not include partially self-governing component units of federal states. However, officially autonomous territories that form part of otherwise federal states as *special* non-federal territories thereof are included in the research sample of this study. A further distinction between territorial autonomy and federalism as well as the application of the concepts in this dissertation is provided in Chapter 2, Subsection 2.1.2 and Chapter 3, Section 3.2, respectively.

Fourth, *Autonomy failure by secession*, denoted in italics with the initial letter in uppercase within the main body of the text, constitutes the dependent variable in this study. However, the phrase is also used in a more general sense, i.e. non-italicized and in lowercase letters, throughout the study. In all instances, this refers specifically to autonomous territories as defined above, i.e. autonomy arrangements with a territorial anchoring, that

have seceded from their parent states. The same referential and typographic approach as used for the dependent variable and its corresponding general application and usage is also applied to all independent variables. The operationalization of the dependent variable and the independent variables is outlined in Chapter 3, Section 3.3 and Section 3.4, respectively. Also, the term 'independent variable' denotes the specific independent variables of this study as outlined and selected in Chapter 2, Section 2.3. The term 'factor' is used somewhat more broadly to include both independent variables and other factors that might have relevance for the outcome of interest although they do not constitute independent variables in this study.

Fifth, for the purpose of the quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4, time series data was collected for the 11 independent variables in this study that are related to territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability. The data was collected and compiled in a dataset, which is presented in the Appendix, for all autonomous territories and for all autonomy periods thereof.

Sixth and finally, the time frame in focus in this study during which the autonomous territories have existed and for which time series data was collected for the independent variables encompasses the period 1901 to 2020. The rationale for this delimitation is provided in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.

1.2 Research aim and research questions

The aim of this dissertation is to identify factors related to ethnicity and identity along with prosperity and viability that have contributed most to autonomy failure by secession for some autonomous territories. Previous research has emphasized the importance of factors related to territory or group distinctiveness as well as territory or group viability (see Chapter 2, Subsections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5). Hence, the purpose is to contribute with an in-depth examination of factors related to these overarching focus areas. The study applies a mixed-methods approach in which the initial quantitative analysis will be complemented with case study analysis. Against the backdrop of the above stated aim, this dissertation seeks to answer the following research questions:

1) What are the specific factors related to territory or group distinctiveness that have contributed most to instances of autonomy failure by secession?

2) What are the specific factors related to territory or group viability that have contributed most to instances of autonomy failure by secession?

In relation to the aim and research questions and based on the review of previous theoretical and empirical research that is conducted in Chapter 2, a set of hypotheses to be tested in the quantitative and qualitative analyses of this study are formulated and presented at the end of that chapter.

1.3 Previous research

Although it could be argued that the subject has perhaps been somewhat understudied, possibly due to the relative rarity of the phenomenon, a fair scope of research on state formation processes, separatism, secessionism and secession does exist (see e.g. Smith 1979; Horowitz 1981; Wood 1981; Hechter 1992; Zarkovic Bookman 1992; Ayres and Saideman 2000; Pavkovic and Radan 2007; Sorens 2012; Denk and Lehtinen 2019; Griffiths 2021). As for previous research on territorial decentralization, various studies have been conducted. However, not seldom have these focused on territorial decentralization in the form of federalism. As for research that focuses primarily on non-federal forms of territorial decentralization, such as territorial autonomy and other similar although differently named arrangements, certain contributions have been made (see e.g. Bernhardt 1981; Lapidoth 1994, 1997; Wolff 2002, 2010; Ghai 2013; Rezvani 2014; Suksi 2022; Sundberg and Sjöblom 2024), and some studies have also applied some form of secession-oriented approach (see e.g. Anckar and Bartmann 2000; Ackrén and Lindström 2012; Clegg 2012; Adler-Nissen 2014; Lecours 2021, 2022).

There have also been some studies with research aims akin to that of this dissertation, i.e. to conduct an analysis of a broad scope of self-governing territories regarding their autonomy stability, as well as political evolution towards sovereign statehood. For instance, Schulte (2020) has conducted a study in which he analyses factors that explain the stability of territorial autonomy arrangements in nineteen autonomous territories around the world. Strang (1990), on the other hand, has conducted a study on the determinants that explain the decolonization of Western dependencies between 1870 and 1987, either by acquisition of sovereign statehood or by incorporation into an existing sovereign state. Roeder (2007) has also analysed the independence capabilities of several autonomous provinces, colonial dependences etc. between 1901 and 2000. Akin to the present study but from an opposite perspective, Ferdinand et al. (2020) have conducted a global comparative study on why several former colonial territories have opted to maintain their non-sovereign status.

Additionally, there have been studies on secession and secessionism that more specifically focus on factors related to distinctiveness and viability, thereby underscoring their relevance in the matter. For instance, Desmet et al. (2024) have in a study that covers 3,153 subnational regions around the world analysed and predicted whether the propensity to secede is more

influenced by ethnolinguistic distinctiveness or income differences. Ferreira (2024), on the other hand, has conducted a study on secessionist party rhetoric based on identity, socioeconomic and political arguments in six Western regions and the different contexts and motivations for using the respective arguments, i.e. getting into office versus remaining in office.

To the author's knowledge, however, the availability of previous mixed-methods studies that have undertaken to explain strives for self-determination in the form of secession and the acquisition of sovereign statehood with a particular focus on territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability in a broad array of non-colonial and non-federal autonomous territories that have existed during the wide temporal scope in focus in this study is limited. The present study seeks to reduce this scarcity. Considering that both autonomist and secessionist demands are likely to persist among various groups and sub-state regions around the world and given that territorial autonomy may function as a solution to temper such demands, additional research into causes that might lead to the failure by secession of territories that are subject to such solutions is warranted.

1.4 Disposition of the dissertation

The dissertation is structured into seven chapters, the first being this introduction. Chapter 2 details the theoretical framework, including relevant concepts. The concepts of political autonomy and primarily territorial autonomy are presented and distinguished from other related concepts. Rationales for and potential pitfalls with adopting autonomy solutions are thereafter outlined as are other relevant concepts for the study, such as sovereign statehood. Building on this, the chapter explores the phenomenon of secession and related concepts. Previous research on a potential relationship between territorial decentralization and secession is also highlighted, as are theories on secession and secessionism. Previous theoretical and empirical research has indicated the significance of factors relating to territory or group distinctiveness as well as territory or group viability. Thus, such research is extensively examined. The chapter concludes with a summary, including a set of independent variables and hypotheses.

In Chapter 3, the research design and methodology are presented, including the overall mixed-methods approach as well as event history analysis with Cox regression analysis used for the quantitative part of the study and process tracing used for the qualitative part. Then follows an outline of the strategy for compiling the research sample, along with a presentation thereof. The case selection procedure for the qualitative analyses is also detailed. Then, the dependent variable of the study, i.e. *Autonomy failure by secession*, is presented and the criteria for determining acquisition of sovereign statehood. Thereafter, the operationalization of the independent variables is elaborated, as are the data sources used for the

variables with respect to the quantitative analysis. Then, the types of data used for the qualitative analyses are also described. The chapter concludes with a summary.

In Chapter 4, the quantitative analysis is conducted. Bivariate Cox regression analysis is conducted first to identify the independent variables with the most explanatory power with respect to *Autonomy failure by secession*, followed by multivariate Cox regression analysis to further test the significance of those variables. The concluding summary outlines the results which indicate significance of *Relative economic performance*, i.e. relative economic deprivation, in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for explaining *Autonomy failure by secession*. The results also indicate the significance of presence of *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of both language and religion. The summary includes a description of the procedure and rationale for selecting two cases that are to be subjected to case study analysis, i.e. Malta and the Cayman Islands, based on the results obtained in the quantitative analysis.

In Chapters 5 and 6, the qualitative analyses are then conducted for Malta and the Cayman Islands, respectively. As for Malta, the analysis begins with a historic background with emphasis on economic and ethnic conditions. Political and constitutional fluctuations over time are also highlighted. Then, the potential impact of *Relative economic performance* from a broader perspective and *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion on the occurrence of *Autonomy failure by secession* in Malta is analysed. The analysis of the Cayman Islands also begins with a historic overview regarding its economic, social, political and constitutional developments. Then, the analysis focuses on *Relative economic performance* from a broad perspective and *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion (or absence thereof) and other related aspects as potential explanations for absence of *Autonomy failure by secession* in the Cayman Islands. As outlined in the concluding summaries of each chapter, both case studies seem to confirm the significance of *Relative economic performance* for explaining *Autonomy failure by secession*. Relative economic deprivation seems to promote secession, and relative economic prosperity seems to prevent secession. As for *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion, however, the case studies did not confirm its significance for explaining *Autonomy failure by secession.* No evidence was obtained to substantiate that its presence promotes secession, nor was there any evidence to confirm that its complete absence prevents secession.

In Chapter 7, concluding remarks with respect to the results as well as an overarching discussion are provided, along with remarks concerning certain shortcomings in the study. Suggestions for possible further research related to the overall aim of this dissertation are also discussed.

2 Theoretical framework

This chapter provides a review of various concepts and terminology that are relevant for this dissertation. It also highlights previous research relating to theoretical considerations and empirical inferences that have significance for the aim of the study in general and for answering its research questions in particular. The first section of this chapter introduces the notion of political autonomy and its different types. As territorial autonomy is the main type in focus in this study it is prioritized, although non-territorial forms of autonomy are also touched upon. Different reasons why autonomy solutions have been implemented in the past and their potential drawbacks are also explored. The first section ends with a review of other variants of self-government that are conceptually and structurally similar to territorial autonomy, such as federalism and other relevant terms and notions like self-determination, associate statehood and sovereign statehood. The second section focuses on the main task of this chapter which is to develop a framework of independent variables that potentially explain *Autonomy failure by secession*, which is the dependent variable in this study. The aim is to elaborate briefly on the terminological meaning of the dependent variable with a particular focus on the concept of secession, and define the process that foregoes it, i.e. secessionism. A brief overview of other related terms, movements and phenomena is also provided. This is followed by a review of previous research on the relationship between territorial decentralization and the occurrence of secession and secessionism. The formulation of a framework of independent variables, which then follows, is conducted by reviewing existing theoretical and empirical explanations regarding the occurrence of secession, state formation processes and intrastate conflicts including secessionism, which usually, although not always (see Subsection 2.2.1), only refers to movements that advocate for the creation of new sovereign states. The chapter concludes with a summary, including a compilation of the independent variables along with a set of related hypotheses. The hypotheses will be tested in the analyses conducted in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

The review of previous theoretical insights regarding secession and secessionism is, to a certain extent, intertwined with research that focuses on claims for lesser forms of territorial self-government that fall within the scope of what can be described as autonomism. These are movements that merely aim to achieve some form and degree of limited self-government for a territory within its parent state (see e.g. Lluch 2012:135). Smith (1979:21–22) has argued that a too rigid differentiation between autonomist and secessionist (or separatist as he calls them) movements is not useful since both types of movements are usually founded based on similar rhetoric and justifications. In addition to examining literature on secessionism and autonomism, the review also elaborates on separatism whose definition also

differs to some extent depending on different scholars' interpretation (see Subsection 2.2.1). Apart from reviewing established theoretical insights regarding the occurrence of secession and secessionism, but also to some extent autonomism and ethnic conflicts from a broader perspective, previous empirical findings related to these processes and outcomes are also highlighted.

As previously clarified, the review of determinants of secession and secessionism does not include the full spectrum of determinants that, according to previous research, can be regarded as potentially having a bearing on the occurrence of such events and movements. The purpose is to solely focus on determinants related to territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability that according to previous research have the most explanatory power. Research has shown that factors concerning ethnic distinctiveness and group identity and relative economic characteristics, prosperity and viability have frequently influenced these processes and outcomes. While applying different focal points in their arguments, many scholars have also highlighted the combinatory effect of these factors (see e.g. Smith 1979:22–23, 28–32, 34–35; Horowitz 1981:167–168, 170–171; Hechter 1992:269–271; Wallerstein 2005:88; Sorens 2012:85; Álvarez Pereira et al. 2018:197, 199, 203–209).

Territory or group distinctiveness refers to factors that relate to the dominant group or groups of the autonomous territory that have certain distinct identity markers that differentiate them from the dominant group or groups in the parent state. Other factors that might add to a sense of separate identity and distinctiveness include the autonomous territory being characterised by certain geographical features that differentiate it from its parent state, or the territory and its dominant group or groups having had a distinct political status in the past. Territory or group viability, in turn, refers to factors that relate to the economic, commodity and human resources of the autonomous territory and its dominant group or groups and the relative position vis-à-vis the parent state regarding these factors. Some of the determinants examined in Subsections 2.2.5 and 2.2.6 might, to some extent, straddle both categories according to previous research. These determinants are, however, categorized according to the category they most commonly are associated with.

Often, however, there are several other determinants that can be identified on the territorial, state and international level that ultimately decide whether secessionism or secessions occur. Horowitz (1981:167), for one, notes that the emergence of secessionist movements is usually decided by domestic factors, whereas a successful outcome is largely dependent on international politics. Therefore, and as previously established, the purpose of this study is to focus specifically and merely on characteristics and structural circumstances related to territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability within the autonomous territories and their

populations that, aside from determinants on the wider parent state level or international system level, may contribute to the rise of secessionism and the occurrence of secession or, indeed, inhibit such movements and outcomes. Hence, this study does not claim nor aspire to offer a comprehensive answer as a contribution to the question why some autonomous territories have seceded from their parent states and why others have not.

The definition for the purpose of this study of the term and system of territorial autonomy is outlined at the end of Subsection 2.1.2. Likewise, the terms secession and secessionism are explained and defined in Section 2.2. Furthermore, in this study the term territorial decentralization is used as an overarching term for territorial autonomy, federalism and other forms of territorial self-rule short of sovereign statehood. The term sub-state territory is used to denote a wider scope of territories, encompassing those that are or could become subject to territorial decentralization and territories that due to certain characteristics potentially could make them prone to secession and secessionism. The population of sub-state territories for whom territorial decentralization has been or potentially could be implemented, or for whom the occurrence of secession and secessionism is a possibility, is in this study referred to as group, recipient group or target group. The sovereign state that has suzerainty over the sub-state territories and their populations is referred to as parent state.

2.1 Political autonomy

The overarching term political autonomy is in this dissertation applied analogously to Michael Hechter's (2000:114) description according to which he broadly depicts political autonomy as 'a state of affairs falling short of sovereignty'. More specifically, in this study the term is applied as a clarification of but also synonymously with the basic and oft-used term autonomy when that term is used in its more general political sense to denote the accommodation of minority rights in the context of multilevel governance.

However, the term political autonomy often comes across as rather ambiguous in the academic field. This has to do with mere definitional differences between scholars but also with the fact that it might not always be clear at first glance whether the author is referring to non-territorial or territorial autonomy. Most of the theoretical literature and empirical studies on decentralization that explicitly refer to an arrangement as an autonomy solution do, however, tend to focus on territorial forms of autonomy. Therefore, one could argue that the general term autonomy is frequently applied when the author is, in fact, referring to territorial autonomy in some form or another.

Lexically and etymologically the term autonomy derives from the Greek words 'auto' and 'nomos' which respectively mean 'self' and 'law' or

'rule' (Dinstein 1981:291; Lapidoth 1997:29). The concept of autonomy has a broad applicability both in national public law and international law, but it essentially entails the ability of an individual or an entity to independently without outside interference conduct its own affairs. It could relate to matters such as the autonomy of universities, churches or cities vis-à-vis the state, but it could also relate to issues concerning self-determination and protection of minorities. Regarding the latter, autonomy can be seen as an aspect of human rights since implementing autonomy means the legal recognition of minorities and minority rights (Bernhardt 1981:27). Again, autonomy solutions usually have a territorial anchoring although there are other autonomy types that can be applied in situations in which the group for whom the solution is aimed is geographically dispersed over a larger territory (Bernhardt 1981:27; Ghai 2013:6).

However, and as already stated, regarding a more detailed characterization of political autonomy there seems to be a lack of consensus. Weller (2010:2), for one, recognizes that there is no universally accepted precise definition of the notion of autonomy. Similarly, Hannum and Lillich (1981:249) conclude that autonomy is a relative term that does not define a particular threshold for when a territory can be regarded as autonomous but rather entails a broad scope of differing degrees and levels of independence. Rezvani and Sundberg (2024:18, 22) similarly emphasize the broad and ambiguous meaning of the concept of autonomy in which they include a wide scope of polities such as sovereign states, constituent units of federal states, certain colonies, etc. There are also scholars whose interpretations and definitions of the concept have been slightly more constricted. Lapidoth (1994:289) agrees with the existing ambiguity regarding scope of powers included in autonomy solutions. According to Lapidoth, however, autonomy may, on the one hand, include merely a few competences while, on the other, the powers awarded to a recipient group can stop just short of independence in the form of sovereign statehood. Another ambiguity with the broad concept of autonomy, as noted by Rezvani and Sundberg (2024:3, 11), is that it is not always clear whether it entails powers that have been merely delegated to the recipient group and that can be easily revoked by the parent state, or powers that are more difficult to abrogate since they have been transferred altogether and afforded constitutional entrenchment. Sohn (1981:5), for his part, notes that the term autonomy as well as other synonymous terms, such as self-government or self-rule, need to be distinguished from terms like independence or complete self-determination of peoples. He notes that while the latter notions are often understood to mean the right to complete separation from another political entity, the former do not. Instead, autonomy is usually implemented due to political or economic circumstances for the purpose of enabling the recipient group to exercise control over certain matters of interest to its members within a defined territory that is under the overall sovereignty of another political

entity. Wolff (2010:20), in turn, has summarized the scope and nature of autonomy based on multiple previously given definitions and concluded that one common trait is the transfer from the central government to the autonomous polity of certain and varying degrees of legislative, executive and judicial powers.

Further to the rather broad applicability of the overall concept of political autonomy presented above, certain distinctions have been offered in the literature on the subject. The following sections will elaborate on some of these distinctions although, as previously noted, primary focus will be on territorial forms of autonomy. Hence, the intent is to provide more clarity on the substance but also on the effects and possible ramifications associated with political autonomy.

2.1.1 Different types of autonomy solutions

Autonomous systems can be divided into two main categories, namely *territorial autonomies* and *non-territorial autonomies*. As mentioned in the previous section, autonomy as a general term can be perceived as rather ambiguous in the literature because it is sometimes unclear whether the author has territorial or non-territorial forms of autonomy in mind. Although non-territorial forms of autonomy are not of primary concern in this study, a brief overview of this variant and its characteristics vis-vis territorial autonomy is presented in the following.

The main difference between territorial and non-territorial forms of autonomy can be explained, as the term suggests, by the existence or absence of a clear territorial anchoring to the autonomy solution. Territorial autonomy can be further differentiated from non-territorial autonomy arrangements in that it normally includes powers not only over cultural matters but also over a wide scope of economic and social issues (Lapidoth 1997:39–40). The lack of a territorial basis distinguishes non-territorial autonomy from territorial autonomy in that the former normally applies to all members belonging to a distinct ethnic group irrespective of their geographical dispersion throughout the parent state. Hence, the application of non-territorial autonomy is not merely restricted to a demarcated territory as in the case of territorial autonomy. Non-territorial forms of autonomy have often been applied to safeguard the cultural, linguistic, religious and educational needs of a particular ethnic minority group (Wolff 2002:210–211).

The concept of non-territorial autonomy can also be sub-divided into personal autonomy and cultural or functional autonomy. Personal autonomy exists as a protection of the individual's right to choose one's cultural or religious convictions and practices regardless of the affiliations of the majority population. For instance, this type of autonomy has been applied in cases where the establishment of territorial autonomy for a locally

concentrated national minority group has resulted in new minority groups emerging within that autonomy system. These minority groups can then benefit from personal autonomy within the wider system of territorial autonomy to safeguard their distinct ethnic traits and rights. Functional and cultural autonomy, in contrast, focuses more on the recognition of minority groups as a whole and the preservation and development of their distinct identities and cultural traits. This autonomy type often encompasses the establishment of representative bodies aimed at promoting minority interests within fields such as education, language and culture (Weller 2010:2–4).

2.1.2 Territorial autonomy

Although the variant has already been touched upon above, this subsection presents a closer insight into the concept and system of territorial autonomy, which is the type of autonomy solution relevant for the specific aim of this study and that characterises its research population and sample. As will be further elaborated below, there are different definitions of what encompasses territorial autonomy. Moreover, there are numerous other terms and systems of power-sharing between a central and a sub-state territorial level for which the exact definition and substantial meaning may vary somewhat depending on the source, but that overall can be considered close to synonymous with or closely related to territorial autonomy. Such terms and systems are, for instance, territorial decentralization, self-government, self-rule, home rule, devolution, federacy, dependency or dependent territory, overseas territory, overseas collectivity, partially independent territory, segment state, unincorporated territory, special administrative region, etc. In this study, the term territorial autonomy is primarily used although occasionally the term self-government is used synonymously and interchangeably. The term territorial autonomy is applied with a rather broad substantial meaning, and the following review does not elaborate on the definitions and differing interpretations offered in the literature of the other closely related terms and systems. The definition of territorial autonomy as applied in this dissertation is presented at the end of this subsection.

Unitary states have often been regarded as the archetype of the sovereign state. However, at least in the European context states with some type of territorial decentralization, be it by means of territorial autonomy or federalism, constitute a majority. Furthermore, there are also federal states which consist of special autonomous territories in addition to the overall federal state structure (Légaré and Suksi 2008:147–148). Moreover, there is a wide variety of autonomous territories as regards characteristics and level of autonomous powers. When establishing an autonomous territory, the division of powers between it and its parent state is naturally a predominant

matter and usually the powers awarded to the autonomous territory relate to areas such as culture, economics, social issues (Lapidoth 1997:33), health, education, environmental matters (Suksi 2022:21) religion, language and history (Ghai 2013:2). Regardless of scope and level of powers granted, however, the autonomous territory is generally responsible for legislation, administration and adjudication pertaining to the transferred areas of competence although in some cases the latter aspect remains the responsibility of the parent state authorities. As has already been pointed out above, territorial autonomy fundamentally refers to self-governing powers and political status for a recipient group that also has a clearly circumscribed territorial anchoring within the wider parent state (Lapidoth 1997:35, 39–40). Moreover, territorial autonomy applies to all residents within the autonomous territory irrespective of ethnic group membership (Wolff 2002:209). Apart from the special status and rights that the autonomy arrangement provides, the inhabitants living in autonomous territories are usually recognized as equal compatriots of their parent states. They take part in state elections and enjoy the same nationality, rights and duties as other members of the parent state to which they ultimately belong (Bernhardt 1981:27). There are, however, variations between different autonomous territories around the world regarding citizenship rights and electoral participation in parent state elections that are dependent on the particular constitutional arrangement and relationship between the territory in question and its parent state (see e.g. Chapter 6, Subsection 6.2.3). Ultimately, and as Suksi (2022:17) has stated, territorial autonomy can be described as an arrangement according to which the external sovereignty of the overall state is preserved while simultaneously allowing for its internal sovereignty, such as legislative powers, to be shared between the central and the substate legislatures.

Further to the above broad description, and as with the general concept of political autonomy, the narrowed-down term territorial autonomy also presents its share of ambiguities. For this variant there is also no precise checklist of what characteristics it should possess and what competences the recipient group should have been awarded for the system to be identified explicitly as a territorial autonomy arrangement. However, several scholars have made attempts to provide a relatively detailed definition. Wolff and Weller (2005:11) have provided a somewhat broad definition that appears to straddle territorial forms of autonomy but also other types as they define autonomy as 'the legally entrenched power of ethnic or territorial communities to exercise public policy functions (legislative, executive and adjudicative) independently of other sources of authority in the state, but subject to the overall legal order of the state'. Légaré and Suksi (2008:144), in turn, describe territorial autonomy as a form of autonomy that entails some exclusive law-making powers within the boundaries of a geographically circumscribed territory. Lapidoth (1994:277) describes the

aim of territorial political autonomy as 'granting a certain degree of self-determination to a group, that differs from the majority of the population in the State, and yet constitutes a majority in a specific region'. Nordquist (1998:63–64), for his part, defines an autonomous region as 'an intra-state territory, which has a constitutionally based self-government that is wider than any comparable region in the state'. Rothchild and Hartzell (2000:259) define territorial autonomy as 'an institutional arrangement that delimits a regionally-based, self-administering entity or entities within a state as having explicit policy-making responsibilities in one or more political, economic or cultural spheres'. Wolff (2002:209–210) describes territorial autonomy as encompassing a differing scope of degrees and levels of autonomous powers ranging from administrative autonomy to full self-government. Administrative autonomy normally does not entail any legislative or judicial powers. Rather, the autonomous powers are merely executive in the sense that the autonomous territory acts upon central state legislation. Full self-government, in contrast, includes an independently elected legislature and executive and administrative authority over the functions that have been transferred to the autonomous territory.

As for the content of territorial autonomy in more detail, Weller (2010:4–5) for one has attempted to summarize and outline a more comprehensive set of necessary elements to denote territorial forms of autonomy. According to him, what first and foremost usually distinguishes territorial autonomy from other forms of local or regional self-government is that territorial autonomy usually reflects *demographic distinctiveness* of the dominant group within the territory, such as language, religion, culture and ethnicity. *Devolution, not decentralization* is another trait that is highlighted which means that the autonomous polity has authority to exercise public power on its own instead of merely doing so on behalf of the central state authorities, which would imply a decentralized system. Another characteristic component is the *legal entrenchment* of the autonomy arrangement in ordinary legislation, the state constitution or in an international agreement or peace settlement. Some scholars suggest that for an autonomous system to be fully implemented the autonomous status should not be amendable without the approval of the autonomous polity. *Legal supremacy,* in turn, specifies that the autonomous territory is ultimately under the sovereignty of the parent state and, therefore, has no right to secede unless the autonomy agreement stipulates such a right. Moreover, the autonomous polities are often granted *statute-making powers* with the right to establish their own basic law or statute so long as the powers do not extend beyond the framework of the stipulated autonomous competences. *Significant competences* is another feature of territorial autonomy that commonly includes legislative and executive competences. The areas of competence are usually stipulated in the autonomy law. *Parallell action* means that both the territorial and state authorities exercise direct powers as regards individuals

in the autonomous territory but within their separate fields of competence and responsibility. Furthermore, in some cases the autonomous polities enjoy *limited external relations powers* that enables them to enter into agreements with foreign states, for instance, in relation to commercial or cultural matters so long as this is conducted within the scope of the stipulated autonomous competences. Also, territorial autonomy usually entails *institutions*, such as a legislative assembly, government, courts, police force, etc. To facilitate integration of the autonomous polity into the overall state, *integrative mechanisms* may be implemented for settling disputes, transferring resources between state and territory and ensuring autonomous representation at the state level.

The review of territorial autonomy in this section has demonstrated that this form of territorial decentralization has been characterised with somewhat different yet fundamentally similar traits. The basic features that can be discerned are a) the handing over of a certain breadth and level of powers from the central government to a recipient group; b) the existence of a territorial anchoring to the arrangement. Some scholars also emphasize the recipient group's distinctiveness, ethnically or otherwise, from the rest of the parent state population. Considering that the research sample of this study consists of a set of globally dispersed autonomous territories with a varying scope of environments, characters and powers that have existed or exist within a wide time span defined by tremendous political and social changes of all sorts, a rather broad definition of what constitutes an autonomous territory is necessary for this study. Therefore, an autonomous territory is in this study defined as a currently existing or former equivalent of *a geographically demarcated non-federal first-level administrative subdivision of a sovereign state that possesses a special status and at least administrative powers of some measure*.

In the next chapter, a more detailed operationalization of the concept and system of territorial autonomy for the purpose of this study is provided as well as criteria for inclusion in the research sample. The terms territorial autonomy and autonomous territory are essentially used interchangeably according to the above definition, with the former denoting the system of political self-government and the latter denoting a territory that has been awarded self-governing powers as part of such a system.

Federalism

Before elaborating on the usability of and motivations for implementing territorial autonomy arrangements, another term that is sometimes used nearly synonymously with territorial autonomy and, therefore, does warrant attention and differentiation from it is *federalism*. Often sub-state territories in federal states have been awarded similar powers and competences that some scholars ascribe to what they explicitly label as autonomous territories

under territorial autonomy arrangements. However, in comparison with many other terms and systems that are indeed closely related to or rather indistinguishable from territorial autonomy, arguments that there are in fact distinct differences between autonomous and federal systems have been presented (see e.g. Bernhardt 1981:23; Ghai 2013:16–17, 19). This study also distinguishes between territorial autonomy and federalism, and constituent units of federal states are excluded from its research sample. However, and as previously established, autonomous territories that form part of officially federal states as *special* non-federal territories are included in this study. Moreover, in the forthcoming review of research on the occurrence of secession as well as secessionism, cases of territorial autonomy and federalism are both considered as these systems are still similar and, therefore, relevant for examining the causes behind the phenomena.

First, a federal system of government is usually anchored in the state constitution, and the system applies to the entire state which is divided into federal constituent units. Territorial autonomy, in contrast, is usually established only in certain regions of the state and can be created by means of constitutional entrenchment, treaty, statute or a combination of these (Lapidoth 1994:283–284). Another notable difference between federal systems and territorial autonomy arrangements can be identified in the extent of political influence that is exerted on the central state level. Constituent units of federal states normally take an active part in the central legislature which usually consists of two chambers, one for equal representation of the constituent units and the other for proportional representation based on the population size of each unit (Légaré and Suksi 2008: 148). Autonomous territories, in turn, normally exert little influence over the decision-making process outside their own territory and they are generally not involved in central state governing processes in a similar manner as federal constituent units usually are (Lapidoth 1994:283–284). Instead, other solutions for securing a level of representation can be arranged such as providing a fixed number of seats in the central legislature to be filled by representatives of the autonomous territory. Third, the legislative powers granted to an autonomous territory are often enumerated rather than residual, meaning that the autonomous territory has responsibility only for specifically listed areas of competence, whereas all other areas are the responsibility of the parent state. Conversely, in a federal system the central authorities usually control only the powers specifically reserved for them, while all remaining areas of competence are the responsibility of the federal constituent units. Furthermore, whereas federal units would need to give their consent to amendments to the federal constitution, autonomous territories would normally have very little say in such instances, at least so long as the changes do not have a direct impact on the autonomy arrangement as such (Légaré and Suksi 2008:148–149). In fact, federal arrangements are often perceived as systems in which it is the

constituent units that have handed over certain parts of *their* original sovereign powers to the federal level (Suksi 2022:18).

In other words, federal systems can be described as more fundamental arrangements in the sense that they normally encompass the entire state, and the power that the central authorities is in possession of emanates from the will and consent of the constituent units. In territorial autonomy arrangements, however, it is the central authorities that have decided to hand down certain self-governing powers as an ad hoc solution to one or a few territorial sub-divisions that exist within the overall and often unitary framework of the state.

2.1.3 Why implement autonomy solutions?

As the granting of a substantial degree of political autonomy to a sub-state territory inevitably entails the forsaking of at least some measure of sovereignty over some part of the territory that a parent state possesses, the question then arises why parent states would be willing to agree to such solutions in the first place. Previous research has elaborated on the various reasons that, throughout the times, have motivated political actors and decision-makers to advocate for and implement territorial autonomy solutions.

The very ambiguity and flexibility of the notion due to the absence of a precise clarification on what an autonomous system should and should not entail has proved it a politically useful and popular solution to resolve conflicts (Wiberg 1998:56–57). Territorial autonomy solutions have existed for at least the last couple of centuries and early examples of regional self-government that were to some extent equivalent to modern perceptions of territorial autonomy could be found in the Ottoman, Habsburg, German and Russian empires. The early autonomous systems that formed part of larger empires were in part created to manage and avoid dissent from different minority communities that were subjugated to the rule of the dominant nation or ethnic group. The rise of nationalism brought about an increased awareness of the need to take claims for self-determination more seriously to prevent violence and the break-up of multiethnic states. Generally, however, autonomy solutions gained prominence as a conflict preventing and resolving mechanism and a way to deal with self-determination disputes only in the 20th century and even more so since the end of the Cold War (Wolff 2010:17–18).

More specifically, and in addition to the overall aim of easing ethnic tensions, autonomy arrangements have been formed with the purpose of accommodating diversity by recognising the ethnic and national consciousness and rights of minorities, indigenous populations and peoples that aspire for self-determination. In addition to this, autonomy

arrangements have also been implemented to address other issues such as intrastate economic disparities (Lapidoth 1997:3–5, 23).

Another reason why autonomy or partial independence arrangements are implemented is that such solutions are considered a compromise between, on the one hand, a minority group's right to a certain degree of self-determination and the unity and territorial integrity of the overall state on the other (Cornell 1999:186; Rezvani and Sundberg 2024:16–17). The creation of autonomous territories can be considered a compromise on the territory's original demands for full independence as it gains a measure of internal self-government along with state-like paraphernalia, such as a flag, postal stamps, anthems, etc. Simultaneously, the territory would not have to assume the burden of all responsibilities that sovereign statehood would entail, and it would not have to sacrifice the benefits that association with a larger polity provide (Ghai 2013:11).

Other reasons for establishing autonomy arrangements and for which there are past examples is the hope to settle ownership conflicts between states over particular territories. For instance, Germany's disputes with Lithuania and Poland regarding sovereignty over Memel and the Free City of Danzig respectively in the first half of the 20th century is one, as are the cases concerning Finland's and Sweden's claim to the Åland Islands and Italy's and Austria's claim to South Tyrol. More recent examples in which autonomy solutions have been fundamental in international negotiations of this type are the sovereignty transfers of Hong Kong and Macau to China from the United Kingdom and Portugal respectively, and the negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia on the settling of Timor Leste's status (Ghai 2013:9, 29).

Moreover, Ghai (2013:29) notes that some autonomous systems have been established following wars, as was the case with South Tyrol, whereas others have been created due to internal secessionist conflicts such as Bougainville's status vis-à-vis Papua New Guinea. The Åland Islands also gained autonomy in conjunction with the parent state's own acquisition of full independence and the decolonization process led to the establishment of Puerto Rico's autonomous status. For Zanzibar, it was the merger with another polity, Tanganyika, that resulted in its autonomy arrangement, as it was for Scotland although in this case autonomy was not implemented until centuries after its merger with England.

Finally, it is noteworthy that although the establishment of autonomous territories is often regarded as permanent solutions, in some instances autonomous systems have been created with the aim of being merely transitional arrangements where the end goal could be either eventual full integration with the parent state, as with Hong Kong and Macau (Ghai 2013: 9–10), or an eventual option for full independence, as was the case with New Caledonia (Maclellan 1999:245).

2.1.4 Potential drawbacks and failure of autonomy solutions

Despite the relative prevalence of autonomy solutions in modern times, there are also drawbacks and often states are very reluctant to the idea of granting autonomy to minority groups within their territories. One obstacle is that territorial forms of autonomy are only possible where the group for whom the solution is aimed is geographically concentrated in the territory for which autonomy is considered and in which the group constitutes a significant majority of the overall population. Second, the very demands for and possible rejections of autonomy may themselves lead to conflicts between the parties involved (Ghai 2013:11–13).

It can also be noted that the acquisition of territorial autonomy has not always had the desired effect if minority language preservation or promotion was the intended goal with the arrangement. As Safran (2000:24) points out, territorial self-government for Croats and Serbs within Yugoslavia did not enhance the modest differences that existed between their respective vernaculars, nor did the Yiddish language flourish under territorial self-government for the Jewish population in the Soviet Union.

Moreover, and often contrary to the original aim, when autonomy solutions are implemented, they may in fact foster even greater intra-state division and there is also a risk that the autonomy solution, with all the new powers granted to the recipient territory, could potentially be used in a harmful fashion by the dominant group against certain other groups under its control. Moreover, the granting of autonomy to one group might trigger a proliferation of autonomy demands within the parent state. Another fear of granting autonomy is the possibility that the autonomous territory will then try to break away. This risk is often seen as higher if there is a neighbouring state that has kinship with the dominant group in the autonomous territory and whose territory is contiguous with it (Ghai 2013:11–12, 14).

This particular aspect then is related to irredentism (see Subsection 2.2.1), but there are also obvious parallels with perhaps the most often mentioned and by central governments perhaps most feared possible negative consequence of granting territorial autonomy to a sub-state territory, i.e. that such a solution might lead to the territory demanding full independence and eventually seceding (see e.g. Lapidoth 1997:203; Cornell 2001:27; Ghai 2013:14). The relationship between territorial decentralization and secession is examined further in Subsection 2.2.3 below.

2.1.5 Related terms

Before proceeding to the second section of this chapter, which elaborates on secession as well as secessionism as part of the dependent variable of the study, certain other concepts that relate to the dependent variable, such as *self-determination* and *sovereign statehood* need to be acknowledged. The

polity option that perhaps could be described as somewhat analogous but secondary to sovereign statehood, *associate statehood*, is also examined briefly as some of the territories included in the overall research sample of this study are associated states.

Within the fields of international law and international relations the concept of *self-determination* is fundamentally intertwined with the notion of self-rule of peoples, whether in the form of non-territorial autonomy, territorial autonomy, sovereign statehood or indeed associate statehood. Pavkovic and Radan (2007:20–21), among others, note that it was at the end of the Second World War that the right of self-determination of peoples was recognized as a universal principle in the United Nations Charter. However, it was only in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the United Nations General Assembly in 1960 that this principle was enshrined as a legal right under international law. The declaration basically stated that all peoples have the right to self-determination and to freely determine their political status either by establishing for themselves a fully independent sovereign state, entering into an agreement of free association with an existing sovereign state or by integration with an existing sovereign state. Despite self-determination being expressed as a universal right, the United Nations has recognized it as a right only for peoples subject to European overseas colonialism.

The *sovereign state* is another fundamental concept in this study that has been referenced several times thus far. Since secession, as the term is usually defined in the academic literature and in the present study (see Section 2.2), results in the creation of a sovereign state the concept needs elaboration. Many scholars have made contributions to the vast scope of definitions on what characteristics constitute the sovereign state. According to a classical definition advanced by the German sociologist and political economist Max Weber, the state can be defined as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (Weber 1919/2009:78). British-Czech philosopher and social anthropologist Ernest Gellner builds on this definition and describes the state by dividing it into order-enforcing agencies on the one hand, and the rest of society on the other. Order-enforcing agencies, which according to Gellner constitute the actual state, are institutions whose primary responsibility is to maintain general order, such as police forces and courts (Gellner 1983:3–4). Another frequently cited definition has been offered by the American sociologist, political scientist and historian Charles Tilly who describes states as 'coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories' (Tilly 1992:1). An additional modern-day criteria-based definition of what constitutes statehood according to international law was established in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933. Article 1 of the

convention stipulates the following four criteria that need to be met for a state to be recognized as such: a permanent population, a defined territory, government and capacity to enter relations with other states (Grant 2010:41).

Elaborating on these criteria, Grant (2010:41–42) notes that although the Montevideo Convention stipulates that a state must have a permanent population and a defined territory there are no requirements as to the size of the population and territory nor that the borders need to be settled. There are states that have come into existence and been accepted as such despite being very small in terms of population and territory or having had disputed borders. Another note regarding the criteria for statehood is the necessity for 'government', not 'a government', which could be interpreted as some type of orderly political structure and effective governance over a territory and its inhabitants regardless of what form that governance takes.

However, the latter criterion on the capacity to enter relations with other states renders the overall question concerning diplomatic recognition of statehood by other states a crucial one. As noted by Grant (2010:42), the reason for this is that if existing states do not recognize a territory as a state and are unwilling to interact with it, then that territory is unable to enter relations with other states and has, thus, failed to function as a state according to the latter criterion of the Montevideo Convention.

Another type of arrangement that warrants examination in the context of territories that have attained very far-reaching self-government is *associate statehood*, which perhaps could be described as a hybrid alternative between territorial autonomy and sovereign statehood. Lapidoth (1994:286–287), for one, describes associate statehood as 'autonomy with very broad powers' and as an arrangement that both parties, the associate and the principal, agree to. The associated state possesses full internal self-government with the powers usually enshrined in the territory's own constitution. Reasons for establishing these types of arrangements might, for instance, be desires on the part of the associated state to enhance its economic viability and security. However, despite having full internal self-government it is notable that certain responsibilities such as defence and, to varying degrees, foreign affairs have often been delegated to the larger principal state to handle. Elazar (1987:7, 55) further adds to the description of associate statehood by noting that such territories exercise little influence in the governance of the principal state and arrangements of this type can be unilaterally dissolved by either party according to predefined terms.

Lapidoth (1994:286) also points to the fact that some associated states, such as the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, are in possession of United Nations membership. As United Nations membership often is seen as the highest form of recognition of a territory's status as a sovereign state (see e.g. Pavkovic and Radan 2007:36), it could be argued that the specific meaning of associate statehood and the category of political

independence within which this type of self-rule falls can become somewhat unclear. However, associate statehood generally cannot be regarded as an arrangement akin to sovereign statehood and, as noted by Lapidoth (1994:287), such arrangements are instead sometimes applied as a compromise solution when full independence is not a feasible alternative for a particular territory. In this study associated states are not regarded as territories that have achieved full independence in the form of sovereign statehood unless they comply with the criteria elaborated in Chapter 3, Section 3.2. From an opposite perspective regarding United Nations membership as recognition of sovereign statehood it is also worth pointing out that this is not necessarily an absolute criterion for recognition in practise, as the case of Switzerland shows given that it only gained full membership in 2002 although its status as a sovereign state prior to this is indisputable (Griffiths 2021:11).

2.2 The dependent variable: Autonomy failure by secession

This section elaborates primarily on the term and phenomenon of secession, which is the key concept of the dependent variable in this study, i.e. *Autonomy failure by secession*. This section also elaborates on the associated process of secessionism. It also highlights other related terms and movements and the relationship between territorial decentralization and secession. It then proceeds to examine theoretical and empirical inferences and explanations for the occurrence of secession and secessionism, with a particular focus on factors concerning territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability.

The verb form of the term *secession*, i.e. secede, derives from the Latin words 'se' and 'cedere' which respectively mean 'apart' and 'to go' (Pavkovic and Radan 2007:5–8). As regards providing a more detailed characterization of secession, the academic community specialized in the field is not completely in agreement as there are varying definitions available. Wood (1981:111), for one, describes secession as 'an instance of political disintegration, wherein political actors in one or more sub-systems withdraw their loyalties, expectations, and political activities from a jurisdictional centre and focus them on a centre of their own.' Quite similarly, Pavkovic and Radan (2007:5) define secession as 'the creation of a new state by the withdrawal of a territory and its population where that territory was previously part of an existing state. Likewise, according to Bartkus (1999:3), secession involves 'the formal withdrawal from an established, internationally recognized state by a constituent unit to create a new sovereign state'. Crawford (2006:375), in turn, offers a definition with a

somewhat different focus as he describes secession as 'the creation of a State by the use or threat of force without the consent of the former sovereign'.

The definitions above indicate that secession entails, at least occasionally, a non-consensual separation of a piece of territory from an existing sovereign state for the purpose of establishing a new sovereign state of that territory. However, as previously noted and as will be further elaborated in the next chapter, given that recognition is an important aspect for distinguishing de jure sovereign statehood in general and also for the purpose of the present study and given that practices of diplomatic recognition has differed over the time period under study, in this dissertation secession denotes *the withdrawal of an autonomous territory from its parent state and its acquisition of sufficient recognition to constitute and predominantly be regarded as a sovereign state of its own*.

The activities and measures that aim at achieving secession are referred to as *secessionism*. However, definitions of the term seem to differ to a certain degree. According to Wood (1981:110), secessionism can be described as 'a demand for formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status'. Sorens (2012:5, 8–9) and Horowitz (1981:165), instead, offer a somewhat broader interpretation of the term. Sorens defines secessionism as including all movements that seek a considerable level of internal territorial autonomy and that do not rule out the eventuality of acquiring full independent statehood. Likewise, Horowitz states that all movements aiming to establish a separate territorial identity, whether it be quests for independence or mere autonomy from a larger political unit, can be regarded as secessionist. Furthermore, secessionism is also a term that is sometimes regarded as interchangeable with the term *separatism*. Horowitz (1981:169) seems to regard secessionism and separatism as synonymous terms that – again – encompass the full spectrum of self-government ambitions, ranging from limited internal autonomy to full independence. Wood (1981:110), however, does not seem to agree with this interpretation. According to him, separatism can be regarded as an overarching term for more limited self-governance demands, such as for decision-making powers within certain areas on the local, provincial or regional level. Hechter (1992:267) seems to agree with Wood's distinction between secessionism and separatism and he also explicitly separates cases of decolonization from secessionist movements as such territories cannot, according to him, be regarded as sub-units of host states. Smith (1979:21–22, 31), in turn, appears to regard separatism as movements that explicitly aim to achieve full independence for a territory, as opposed to autonomist movements that strive for some lesser form of internal self-rule. However, and as previously noted, he emphasizes that the rhetoric and justifications that underlie both types of movements are fundamentally similar.

2.2.1 Related terms

There are also other terms that, in many instances, can be perceived as associated with secessionism and separatism as well as the previously mentioned concept of autonomism. Of course, in these contexts one such term is the frequently referenced overall concept of *nationalism*, as well as different variants and subcategories thereof. However, there is a relative scholarly consensus that nationalism fundamentally refers to political actions that aim to align the boundaries of nations and states (Hechter 2000:7). Another related concept is *irredentism*. The term stems from the Italian word *irredenta*, which means 'unredeemed' and refers to territorial claims made on an ethnic, national or historical basis by one state on a part of another state's territory. However, irredentism differs from secession in that irredentism encompasses the merging of the break-away territory of one state with the retrieving state's territory (Ambrosio 2011:1346). Hence, irredentism does not encompass the establishment of a new sovereign state. *Regionalism* is another term and political movement that entails measures taken by its proponents to alter the existing distribution of rights and resources between the people and representatives of a sub-state territory and the central authorities of the overall state without demanding sovereign statehood (Hechter 2000:9).

As the focus in this dissertation lies specifically on secession as well as secessionism and given that many related concepts are rather ambiguous but also too vast in the terminological and substantial sense to properly elaborate in a limited study such as this, the above and other related terms and political phenomena are not further elaborated in this study.

2.2.2 Territorial decentralization and secession

Aside from theories and empirical inferences concerning determinants related to the occurrence of secession and secessionism, one cardinal issue that is frequently highlighted and debated among scholars but also by affected policymakers is the relationship between substantial territorial decentralization, whether it be territorial autonomy, federalism, etc., and the risk of secession. More specifically, the issue relates to whether territorial decentralization itself provides sub-state territories with state-like institutions, resources and capacities that could be used to challenge the parent state to concede more powers to the self-governing territory and potentially enable it to break away from the parent state altogether. Despite territorial decentralization often being hailed as a useful solution to alleviate intrastate ethnopolitical tensions and conflicts, there are several previous studies that have explored whether such fears are valid or whether territorial decentralization has indeed managed to temper secessionist aspirations among recipient groups in divided states.

Pavkovic and Radan (2007:14, 16–17), for their part, have concluded that having some form of devolved powers is not reason enough for a territory to become secessionist. Instead, they argue, the population of the territory must also be distinct from other groups living in the otherwise multinational state for favourable conditions for secession to emerge. Pavkovic and Radan note that, apart from having a sense of affinity with their territory, secessionist groups are usually characterised by a sense of solidarity and a set of group-specific common markers springing from cultural indicators, such as language and customs. Rezvani (2024:32), for his part, emphasises that power maximization is not always the end goal for distinct groups in possession of partial autonomy. Instead, the very system of power-sharing might be seen as most beneficial, for instance, for economic reasons as it allows them to focus their resources on efforts to improve specialization and competitiveness. In a study on why decentralization has effectively curbed ethnic conflict and secessionist sentiments in some democratic countries while failing to do so in others, Brancati (2006:651–653, 681) has similarly concluded that in general decentralization has indeed had a dampening effect on such tensions. However, Brancati has also concluded that the presence of regional parties may pose an issue as decentralization might have the secondary negative effect of encouraging the growth of strong regional parties that, in turn, could fuel ethnic conflict and secessionism. Also, based on a comparative study on secessionism in Scotland and Catalonia on the one hand, and Flanders and South Tyrol on the other, Lecours (2022:730–731, 741–742) has concluded that the flexibility of autonomy arrangements is more important than degree of autonomy in dealing with the problem of secessionism. He argues that static and unchangeable autonomy solutions, as in the former cases during certain periods, might increase the risk of secessionism given that such solutions offer the minority community only the alternatives of status quo or secession. Dynamic, adjustable and expandable autonomy solutions that have been present in the latter cases, on the other hand, might instead offer more satisfactory alternatives than secession.

On the other side of the argument, Cornell (2002:246, 275) has analysed the causal relationship between territorial autonomy and the likelihood of ethnic minority rebellion against the central government during and after the breakup of the Soviet Union. He has concluded that territorial autonomy is likely to increase the risk of secessionism and points to the republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in which it was autonomous minorities instead of non-autonomous minorities that embarked on the separatist path. Jenne, Saideman and Lowe (2007:539, 552–553) have conducted a study on minority claims concerning different levels of autonomy and group protection on the one hand, and minority rebellion on the other during the period 1985 to 2000. Their study shows that groups that had experience of autonomy were 24 percent more likely to advance claims for secession or unification with a kin state in the 1990s, whereas no such effect could be

discerned in the 1980s. However, the findings in their study also suggest that having autonomy did not have a decisive effect on the likelihood of groups engaging in violent rebellion. Erk and Anderson (2009:191–193, 196–197) have reached similar conclusions in their summary of factors that might contribute to or prevent secessionism within federal arrangements. They note that although territorial recognition of minorities through federalism is often seen as a solution to ethno-linguistic differences that may exist within countries, such solutions may in fact lead to disintegration of the state in the long run. If the system of territorial self-rule has proved beneficial for a constituent unit of the federal state, the will to proceed towards complete secession may increase. Also, the group recognition and institutionalization that accompanies federalization could have the effect of reinforcing regional identities and differences that the system was meant to bridge, and of providing incentives to secede and the practical tools to carry it out. However, Erk and Anderson also deduce that the more constituent units that make up a federal state the more stable the system tends to be. This is because in a federal state with fewer units the risk of polarization between the units is greater, whereas in a system with multiple constituent units a fluid system of cooperation and alliances is more likely to occur that, in turn, reduces the risk of polarization and secessionism. On a similar note, Pavkovic and Radan (2007:13–14) emphasize that many of the successful and attempted secessions in the 20th century occurred among constituent units that formed part of federal states. The reason for this was that the federal constituent units already had existing borders and state-like infrastructure, such as legislative, executive and judicial institutions in place. This enabled them to relatively easily transform internal borders into state borders and assume the additional responsibilities that sovereign statehood required. Also, akin to Erk and Anderson's inference that territorial self-rule that has been judged to be beneficial to the recipient group might in fact increase its willingness to opt for complete secession, Ackrén and Jakobsen (2024:167, 171–172) have offered a similar assessment regarding the case of Greenland. They conclude that existing support for eventual independence from Denmark should be seen as a testament to the success of the current system of self-government in the territory.

The following sections will examine more closely the specific factors and individual determinants of secession, again with a particular emphasis on determinants that can be identified on the territorial level.

2.2.3 Secession and secessionism: General theoretical considerations

Within the academic field concerning secession and secessionism it has been noted that theorical perspectives have been scarce. There are, however, some well-established theories that are frequently applied to form the basis of

studies related to this field. As already mentioned, the primary focus in this study lies on determinants concerning territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability. This section provides an introduction to some of these theories and their stance regarding territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability as well as other determinants.

In the early 1980s, John R. Wood addressed the issue concerning the absence of a theory on secession by outlining one of his own in his work *Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework*. Wood's theory outlines secessionism and secession as a process characterised by preconditions of secession, the rise of secessionist movements, the response of central governments, direct precipitants of secession and resolution of secessionist crises by armed conflict. In relation to territory-level preconditions of secession, Wood has highlighted the so-called social and economic preconditions of secession, which will be outlined in more detail below. However, he also calls attention to other types of determinants that could potentially have relevance for secessionism and secession, such as geographical, political and psychological preconditions. *Geographical preconditions* include the existence of a separable territory that is predominantly inhabited by the potentially secessionist group. Without a strong territorial base where the alienated and potentially secessionist population is in majority, successful secession is unlikely. By separability, Wood means that the secessionist territory must be detachable from its parent state without this causing unacceptable damage to the military or economic stability of either. Another geographical condition is the presence of provincial boundaries and their potentially inhibiting effect on the natural flow of people, goods and ideas due to the creation of separate movement networks. Kevin R. Cox, according to Wood, defines movement networks as 'groups of locations between members of which movement is relatively intense but for which movement between groups is relatively weak'. Even in situations in which ethnicity is not a factor, Wood notes that such partitions could further reinforce group alienation and secessionism within a delimited territory. As for the *political preconditions* of secession, these are fundamentally related to whether the secessionists recognize the legitimacy of the parent state and its leadership as their group's ultimate authority. Wood refers to John H. Hertz's conclusions by listing failures to promote a common identity, to provide welfare and to protect the citizens from global demographic, economic and social problems as examples of causes that could lead to the decline of legitimacy. Another element part of the political preconditions mentioned by Wood is the existence or absence of integrative political institutions for intergroup participation and bargaining, such as state-wide political parties. Wood notes that there is a higher risk of secessionist potential if a state-wide party system is non-existent or flawed. In systems where regional parties rather than state-wide parties take primacy, a decrease in interest in common state matters and an increased

risk of regionalism and secessionism is likely to occur. *Psychological preconditions,* in turn, denote the emotional aspects in favour of secession among group members. According to Wood, one of the fundamental factors that motivate group members that favour secession is the need for security or self-preservation. The secessionist ambition can then be characterised as either anticipatory or reactionary, that is aiming to prevent a perceived threat from materializing or reacting to one that appears imminent. The perceived threats can relate to fears over the group's ever decreasing total or relative population size or cultural assimilation but also fears of losing a privileged position (Wood 1981:107–109, 112–121).

Another frequently featured theory on secessionism has been proposed by Donald L. Horowitz in his study *Patterns of Ethnic Separatism*. Compared to Wood, Horowitz has a rather more focused perspective as he sees ethnic distinctiveness as a fundamental component and precondition for groups to embark on the secessionist path. In addition to this, he also argues that it is the positioning of the distinct group within the overall state in terms of educational and non-agricultural career opportunities and the relative economic strength of its core region compared to other regions that are the key determinants for the emergence of secessionism. Horowitz concludes that if the prosperity and security of a group is diminished by remaining part of a larger multiethnic state secessionist sentiments are likely to increase. Severe injustice towards national minorities by the central state can lead to stronger support for secession, as in the case of Basque demands for independence from Spain that arose because of the harsh repressions by the Franco regime. Horowitz does, however, highlight a factor that has proved to discourage otherwise pro-secessionist groups. Regions that would be tempted to secede might be less inclined to strive for that outcome if secession might risk not resulting in independence but in incorporation into another state with which association is regarded even less desirable than maintaining status quo (Horowitz 1981: 167–168, 170–171).

Anthony Smith is another oft-cited theorist with his work *Towards a Theory of Ethnic Separatism*. Like Horowitz, he also introduces a rather more concise perspective that relies on the combinatory effect of cultural difference and cultural discrimination as a potent explanation for the emergence of ethnic separatism. As for the first step in this process, the development of an ethnic identity and sense of group solidarity, or 'ethnic revival' as Smith calls it (see Subsection 2.2.4), is brought about due to the abandonment of traditional and religious institutions as the pillars of society in favour of a science-oriented, critical and secular education, intelligentsia and bureaucracy. This reordered society then leads to the strata of professionals to aspire for inclusion in the emerging new elite that is required for a modernized bureaucracy. The supply of aspirants eventually ends up outnumbering the actual demand and the new social order along with its new demands of legitimacy leads to ethnic minorities being among the first to

suffer discrimination and rejection. However, the new order and rationalist outlook also lead to the minority group intelligentsia to start questioning their subordinate position in society and, consequently, to turn inwards to their own communities in search of fair recognition and career opportunities – a process that also comprises and requires the formation of greater group awareness, identity and solidarity. Aside from these fundamental prerequisites that bring about the development of ethnic consciousness and group identity, what might spur an ethnic community to then resort to political action further builds on the discrimination aspect. Smith notes that as states experience increased economic challenges, regulation and international competition, governmental neglect against minorities and their elites continues due to the state's increased capacity limitations. The actual outcome of the subsequent political actions on behalf of the aggrieved ethnic community hinges in large parts upon the parent state's response, whether it be continued neglect and discrimination or conciliatory efforts (Smith 1979:22, 28–32, 34–35).

As for other perspectives on incentives for secession and secessionism, Matthew J. Webb (2015:6) notes that for a group to mobilize in support of secession a deep-rooted grievance directed towards the parent state is a necessary pre-requisite. Simultaneously, the dissatisfied group also needs to be supportive of the alternative path that secession entails. The first pre-requisite, deep-rooted grievances, does not always result in secession but rather some form of internal rebellion or civil disobedience. The latter pre-requisite is fulfilled only when the discontented group decides that the grievances are better remedied by secession and the creation of a new sovereign state of one's own rather than maintaining status quo.

Stephane Dion (1996:271) has offered a similar perspective by emphasizing the perceptions of fear and confidence among potentially secessionist groups. By fear he means the perception that the cultural, political or economic circumstances of a group would worsen in a continued association with the parent state. Confidence, in contrast, relates to the perception that secession is feasible and that the group would fare better in relation to these aspects in an independent state of its own. The reason why successful secessions have been rare and are unlikely to occur in well-established democracies is, according to Dion, the fact that both fear and confidence regarding the mentioned aspects have generally not been perceived as high in these political systems.

To sum up, Pavkovic and Radan (2007:61–62) note that secessionist movements tend to emphasize grievances and injustices that are being inflicted on their group and one such grievance that has proved effective in mobilizing secessionist sentiments is the sense of 'statelessness', i.e. when a national group feels that it is not in possession of a sovereign state of its own. Secessionists often justify their claims to a state of their own based on the argument that their status as a separate nation should warrant them this.

Considering the general theoretical perspectives outlined above, the likelihood of secession and secessionism occurring can broadly and at this initial stage of outlining the phenomena be expressed in the words of Michael Hechter (1992:268) who states that 'whenever the bulk of its population shares a common interest, a territory is at risk of becoming secessionist'. The following subsections will examine such common interests more closely with particular emphasis on factors related to territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability that could potentially be identified within autonomous territories and that might contribute to the occurrence of secessionist sentiments and, in some cases, autonomy failure by secession.

2.2.4 Explanations related to territory or group distinctiveness

In addition to general theoretical inferences, previous research has highlighted the impact that ethnic and cultural differences and identification between groups in sub-state territories and the dominant groups in the overall parent states may have on the development of nationalist, regionalist, autonomist and secessionist sentiments in the former. Hroch (1996:79, 84) defines a nation as 'a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness'. According to Hroch, one of the fundamental ingredients in igniting the modern nation-building process and the eventual development of a national identity was gathering awareness of an ethnic group's history, customs and language.

In relation to minority group distinctiveness, language and religion are generally considered perhaps some of the most tangible markers of ethnic identity. Moreover, one of the preconditions for secessionism mentioned by Wood (1981:114–116) are the so-called social preconditions. As for these, Wood concludes that group solidarity, which is often based on distinct ethnic traits such as language, religion but also race, has frequently proved an important element in the growth of secessionist alienation. Likewise, Smith (1979:22, 26–27) notes that 'ethnic revival' through the formation of an ethnic group identity and solidarity is a fundamental precondition for the emergence of ethnic political separatism. This revival is realized through a process of historicism that involves the acquisition of a greater awareness of the origin and historical development of the ethnic community in question. This has often been done by obtaining greater acquaintance of a literary language particular to the ethnic group and of cultural attributes pertaining to its religion. For autonomist and separatist supporters, the objective has then been to restore their cultural identity.

As regards language, the literature is quite unambiguous in its assertion that linguistic cleavages between the parent state and the sub-state territory have often been a significant factor in stirring up secessionist sentiments (see

e.g. Zarkovic Bookman 1992:12). As Hannum (1996:458) points out, language can be regarded as the most distinctive feature of a culture, and language was more often than other elements the driving force behind the self-determination strives in Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Hannum further adds that language functions both as a means for promoting solidarity within a cultural community but also as a symbolic means to distinguish one group from another.

As for religion more specifically then, Fox (2004:728) has concluded that having a different religion is a contributing but not fundamental factor in the occurrence of ethnic nationalism and conflict. However, there are some scholars that seem to place a somewhat greater importance on religion. Gurr (2015:103–104), for one, emphasizes religion as an important aspect in forging strong ethnocultural identities which, in turn, is an important component for the potential occurrence of minority rebellion against the state. Dent (2004:201) has also concluded that for the creation of separate national identities religious distinctiveness has proved to be of prime importance. This holds, according to Dent, also true for populations among whom religion generally plays a more moderate role in daily life. Zarkovic Bookman (1992:12) has also highlighted the effect of religion on secessionist movements. Religious conflicts in which members of one religious group perceive themselves as being oppressed by another have been the catalyst for many secessionist movements, for instance in Northern Ireland, South Sudan and former Yugoslavia.

In Sorens' (2012:97, 110) study on secessionist mobilization in advanced democracies he takes several factors into consideration and concludes that territories with their own languages have shown an increased support for secessionism. In a study on secessionist conflicts between fifteen regional minority groups and their parent state governments, Dent (2004:201) has noted that, although exceptions do exist, having a separate language is an important factor for fostering a dissident group identity even if the language is spoken only by a part of the minority population. One reason for this is that having a separate and distinct literary tradition has played a crucial role in fostering a sense of national consciousness among minorities. Hale (2000:49–50) has reached a similar conclusion in his study on the likelihood of regional separatism in the Soviet Union at the time of its demise. According to his findings, ethnic distinctiveness in terms of linguistic differentiation was a crucial factor since the results showed that the less linguistically assimilated into neighbouring cultures a native regional group was, the more eager the region was to secede. In another study on whether linguistic or religious cleavages are more likely to result in ethnic civil war, Bormann et al. (2017:746, 764) have concluded that since the Second World War the former has been a significantly more propelling factor for these types of conflicts. Bormann et al. do acknowledge the impact of religion, but they ascribe it significantly less explanatory power for the occurrence of ethnic

civil war compared to the linguistic aspect. Álvarez Pereira et al. (2018:197, 199, 203–209) have conducted a study on the effect that cultural distinctiveness, expressed as linguistic differentiation but also geographical distance from the parent state and relative affluence, have on electoral support for autonomist and secessionist parties in territorial sub-units in ten Western European democracies. They have concluded that in culturally distinct territories that are also wealthier relative to their parent state a higher support for such parties tends to be expressed. On the other hand, Desmet et al. (2024:1261–1265, 1278–1285, 1294–1296) have in an extensive study analysed and predicted the propensity to secede among 3,153 subnational regions in 177 countries and inferred that linguistic distinctiveness is an important factor for inducing secessionism, more so than subnational interregional differences in income per capita, although they do acknowledge the influence of this factor as well.

Another important determinant according to previous research for secessionist movements to occur, which is closely intertwined with group distinctiveness and identity, is when a territory that in the past used to be in possession of some form and level of self-rule lost this status. Hroch (1996:84), for one, notes that a previous history of independence or statehood, even far back in history, can have an impact on the development of group solidarity and national awakening. Webb (2015:9–11) has also touched upon the subject. He notes that if a group has a history of having been in possession of institutions of political authority that predate the current state, this may lead to increased levels of secessionist support. This is especially true if the parent state has failed to adequately respect and incorporate the group and its remnants of pre-state institutions into the political and institutional setup of the state. By pre-state institutions, Webb refers to governance structures stemming from the group having had previous independence or self-governance before coming under the sovereignty of the current parent state. Gurr (2015:107) also notes that loss of political autonomy is a major incentive for members of ethnocultural identity groups to mobilize against the state of which they form part. Lost autonomy often results in grievances, myths and hopes for reclamation that can be exploited by political entrepreneurs whose goal it is to restore autonomy. Furthermore, Gurr asserts that the greater the political loss and the more recently it occurred, the more likely the group is to respond favourably to such endeavours.

Germann and Sambanis (2021:178, 180, 189, 200) have examined the impact of lost autonomy on the emergence of non-violent separatist claims as well as on the escalation of non-violent separatist claims into violent separatist claims. In their study, the notion of lost autonomy entails loss of independent statehood, loss of significant internal autonomy and border adjustments leaving a group stranded outside its original parent state. They have inferred that both recent and historical loss of autonomy may spur

ethnic groups to engage in non-violent separatist claims, and if the loss of autonomy occurred recently there is also a risk of the separatist claims escalating into violence. In his study on secessionism among ethnopolitical groups around the world, Sorens (2012:59, 70, 88–89, 110) has also inferred that lost autonomy, which he quite broadly defines as groups having had a history of some traditional form of autonomy or independence or colonial status with the right to self-determination according to international law that was disregarded by the parent state, has been a particularly strong contributory determinant of secessionism. Likewise, regarding determinants of secessionist party vote share in provinces in advanced democracies, Sorens has confirmed that provinces with a history of independence often experience more secessionist voting. In this context, he defines lost independence as a province that at some point since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 declared itself an independent country or constituted the capital province of an independent state other than the one it currently forms part of. Similarly, in a study on separatist behaviour among 324 groups in more than 100 countries between 1960 and 2000, Siroky and Cuffe (2015:3, 6, 17–26) note that groups that have had their autonomous status revoked by the parent state are twice as likely to pursue secession compared to groups that are in possession of autonomy and groups that have never had autonomy. Ayres and Saideman (2000:105–106) have also found evidence that groups that have a history of lost autonomy have shown a greater likelihood of engaging in secessionist activities. However, there are also studies that have produced results that are not quite as unambiguous when it comes to the positive association between lost autonomy and the occurrence of secessionism. For instance, Hale's (2000:32) study on the likelihood of regional separatism during the breakup of the Soviet Union somewhat discourages the above arguments, as history of national independence did not seem to be of crucial significance according to his study.

An additional factor that has been highlighted in the literature regarding the occurrence of secessionist sentiments and that is related to group distinctiveness and identity is geographical distance between the sub-state territory and its parent state. First, Horowitz (1981:173) for his part notes that long distance between parent states and sub-state territories could make secession attempts easier to carry out and hamper the ability of a parent state to quell such events. However, Horowitz also indicates that distance may reduce friction, as it minimizes intrusion by the parent state in the local affairs of a distant sub-state territory. As for the emergence of secessionist movements, Horowitz, in contrast, seems to attach less but still some secondary importance to the impact that distance may have. However, Heraclides (1991:14) has noted that a territory's distance from the parent state and the centre of decision-making can lead to the formation of a previously non-existent group identity. In relation to the establishment of autonomy arrangements, Suksi (2011:28) also emphasizes that geographical

distance rather than ethnic distinctiveness has in some cases been the primary determinant. Nordquist (1998:64), likewise, agrees that mere practical reasons such as distance or other geographical barriers might give rise to autonomy solutions, which he refers to as 'expedient autonomies'.

There are also empirical findings that have shown that geographical distance between parent states and sub-state territories may explain the occurrence of secessionism. In his analysis of determinants of secessionism among ethnopolitical groups around the world, Sorens (2012:16, 35, 70, 110, 156) has concluded that geographical separation from the core territory of the parent state does give rise to greater levels of secessionism. Sorens has also reached the same conclusion in a separate study of provinces in advanced democracies only and secessionist party vote share. Sorens suggests that geographical distance makes a territory more prone to secessionism as distance may contribute to the emergence of a distinct local culture. Furthermore, he adds that distance might make a territory better protected from potential military incursions by the parent state and it could also make a territory less dependent on trade with it and, thus, make the territory less economically vulnerable in case of secession.

The development of group identities is sometimes also interconnected with other factors than the typical ones mentioned thus far. One such is the economic characteristics of the group or territory in question. This element will be examined more prominently in the next subsection, but Hechter (1992:269–271) has highlighted its interconnectedness with group identity in his theory on why certain territorially concentrated peoples develop a distinct national identity, whereas others do not. According to him, it is a question of common interests related to production and consumption. From a production standpoint, he claims that common group interests are particularly strong when regional production is highly specialized and dependent on the production of certain goods or services. Such specialization often leads to common interests concerning measures and regulations aimed at protecting and promoting regional production. Moreover, Hechter claims that regional production interests could also to some extent generate certain consumption interests although these are usually decided based on the population's cultural, linguistic and religious traits. Hechter emphasizes that common group interests from an economic specialization standpoint and regional cultural distinctiveness are both factors that are positively associated with secessionism and when they coincide there is an even greater likelihood of secessionist movements developing.

2.2.5 Explanations related to territory or group viability

The previous section examined determinants related to territory or group distinctiveness. However, as already noted, another important element according to previous research for the occurrence of secessionist sentiments

and secession relates to the prosperity and viability of sub-state territories and the groups living therein, and their relative position vis-à-vis their parent states and the dominant group therein. Wood (1981:116–118), for one, notes the importance that changes in the social relationships between groups may have. For instance, he notes the modernization process and the divergent impact it has sometimes had on ethnic groups regarding social mobility and access to modern technology and communications etc. Such disparities have often but not always exacerbated ethnic cleavages and led to secessionist sentiments due to injustices perceived as being fundamentally ethnic. Furthermore, Wood notes that disparities between groups in terms of access to the benefits of modernization is closely related to the economic preconditions of secession which, in turn, can be associated with theories on relative deprivation. Wood does, however, highlight the fact that there are cases where groups that are economically disadvantaged in relation to their parent states do not wish to secede as well as cases where relatively advantaged groups do. This contradiction suggests, according to Wood, that relative deprivation as such is not reason enough for secessionism to occur. A more plausible explanation for the onset of secessionism is significant group frustration resulting from initial economic growth followed by subsequent economic decline. Ultimately, however, Wood concludes that economic disadvantages are often connected to ethnic differences, and this leads the disadvantaged group to favour the secessionist path since they believe that they are being denied their rightful share of material benefits. Similarly, Zarkovic Bookman (1992:8) emphasizes the importance of ethnicity in secessionist processes, while also noting instances where ethnicity did not seem to have a bearing on secessionist demands. For instance, the attempted secession of the Confederate States of America that led to the American Civil War was not driven by ethnic differences. Neither was Panama's independence from Colombia in 1903 nor the secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic in 1961. In these cases, it was rather economic motivations that spurred the secessionist events.

Zarkovic Bookman (1992:39, 44, 94–95, 115, 161) has examined economic factors that contribute to the will of territories to secede from their parent states. Again, she argues that although non-economic factors such as ethnicity, language and religion are important for motivating secessionist movements, economic considerations are indeed of great importance as well. In a study on 37 secessionist movements during the latter part of the 20th century, she concludes that in most movements economic factors did play a motivating role, as they were either of primary or secondary concern. She notes that relative economic status is a significant factor since states with a wide range of regional disparities are more likely to experience perceptions of injustice between territories and develop regional movements. Moreover, she argues that both relatively wealthy and relatively poor territories are prone to perceptions of economic injustice. People in territories that are

economically disadvantaged in terms of relative income might feel that they are being exploited or insufficiently assisted by the parent state. However, a reversed sense of injustice could be perceived in economically advantaged territories as their populations might feel that they are subsidizing the less prosperous parts of the state. Zarkovic Bookman does, however, argue that it is the economically better-off territories that are more likely to become secessionist due to their stronger conviction of post-independence prosperity.

In another study on why secessionist support may differ between ethnic territories within the same state, Hale (2000:31–34, 43–48, 55) has analysed forty-five regions in the late Soviet Union. He concluded that, along with a few other determinants, high levels of wealth was an important factor that characterised the regions that were most eager to secede. The reason for this, Hale argues, may have been that these regions stood the most to lose in case of potential exploitation by another dominant group in the state. In their summary on factors that may contribute to or prevent secessionism in federal systems, Erk and Anderson (2009:196, 198) also touch upon economic aspects. They, on the other hand, assert that the will to secede might arise if there are economic disparities across federal units since the hope is that the disadvantaged group will have better economic prospects in a state of their own. Erk and Anderson note that the risk of secessionism may increase if economic disparities overlap with ethno-cultural boundaries. Another example of the combinatory impact of ethnicity and economic factors has been highlighted by Giuliano (2015:518–520). Regarding the factors that gave rise to political alienation and increased popular support for separatism in the Donbass region in Eastern Ukraine in the wake of the Maidan protests of 2014, she argues that ethnic and linguistic distinctiveness in this region was not the sole explanation. Instead, Giuliano emphasizes that in the case of Eastern Ukraine one of the main reasons for the separatist surge was that the Maidan events resulted in fears that the political consequences would lead to regional industries losing access to the Russian market.

As has already been touched upon in the examples above, a notable aspect is that the literature on secessionism is somewhat ambiguous on whether it is economic prosperity or deprivation for a group or sub-state territory in relation to the rest of the parent state that best explains why secessionist sentiments and movements emerge. Horowitz (1981:170–171, 173–188) emphasizes that although secession is a phenomenon which occurs in both rich and poor regions it is the latter that tend to represent the most eager secessionists. One reason, according to Horowitz, for poor regions to opt for secession despite profiting from association with a more prosperous region is the hopes of laying sole claim to resources located in or near the region. To further elaborate on the positioning of ethnic groups within their parent states and its relationship with ethnic separatism, Horowitz refers to backward or advanced groups in backward or advanced regions. Backward

or advanced groups refer to groups that are either disadvantaged or advantaged compared to other groups in the parent state in terms of education and non-agricultural employment opportunities. Backward or advanced regions, in contrast, refer to either disadvantaged or advantaged regions in terms of relative economic strength measured in regional per capita income excluding remittances from other regions. The first type of potential seceders, according to Horowitz, are *backward groups in backward regions*. These groups often aspire to secede at an early stage after the independence of their parent state or early after having had claims rejected by the parent state. Generally, these groups often lack competitive advantages vis-à-vis other groups in the parent state regarding relative group size, education level, political representation at the central level and economic development. Despite the economic burden of secession, hopes of increased competitiveness and representation in a state of their own tend to outweigh the drawbacks. The other group, *advanced groups in backward regions*, are generally reluctant and late seceders. One explanation for this is that these groups are often highly dependent on free movement for education or employment opportunities in other more economically lucrative parts of the state from which they can send remittances to their less developed home regions. Also, the fact that this diaspora would find themselves outside their homeland in case of secession often generates fears of being subjected to discrimination and violence. However, if they suddenly were to be subjected to such treatment outside their home region anyway, these groups might reconsider their anti-secessionist stance if they feel that all previous economic benefits associated with membership in the state evaporate. *Advanced groups in advanced regions* are also unlikely to opt for secession since their wealth often depend on interregional economic relations and market access. Breaking this relationship by seceding is usually not beneficial for these groups and, therefore, they rarely opt for secession. They might, however, turn secessionist if they feel that their regionally generated wealth is unjustly used to subsidize other poorer regions and if the costs associated with secession are deemed surmountable. As regards *backward groups in advanced regions*, Horowitz notes that these groups often feel a certain level of anxiety due to the subordinate position they occupy within their region as well as a desire to rectify the economic disadvantages they experience. As a result of this, these groups are often pro-secession, but due to their numerical or political inferiority they often lack the capacity to realize such aspirations.

Thus, Horowitz presents a rather more detailed argument pertaining to socioeconomic and macroeconomic factors as reasons why, according to him, secessionists can be found primarily but not always only among disadvantaged groups. However, contrary to this claim and as already mentioned, there is also research suggesting that it is the comparatively wealthier groups and territories that sometimes wish to secede from their

parent states. Rezvani (2014:69–70), for one, argues that for autonomous territories, or partially independent territories as he calls them, the sharing of sovereign powers between themselves and their parent states is reasonable so long as the parent state is more capable of providing public goods to the autonomous territory than it is itself. However, if this disparity in capabilities begins to dissipate and the autonomous territory finds itself equally capable of providing for itself, then the sharing of sovereign powers might also become more difficult to accept, and secession might become an appealing alternative. In a study conducted by Sorens (2012:16, 71, 97, 110, 156) he has found no conclusive evidence that more affluent ethnic groups are more likely to be secessionist, at least not in a wider global comparison. However, when limiting the research scope to advanced democracies only Sorens obtained robust results confirming that relatively affluent territories show a higher vote share for secessionist political parties. Sambanis and Milanovic (2014:1848), in turn, have found that the more affluent but also the more populous the territories are compared to the national average the more autonomy demands they advance and the higher policy autonomy they possess. The reason for this, according to Sambanis and Milanovic, is that richer and more populous territories are more self-sufficient and, therefore, also more able to advance credible separatist threats.

The fact that some sub-state territories are or presume that they could become relatively prosperous in relation to the overall parent state can often be ascribed to the existence of valuable natural resources in the territory in question. This, in turn, might also have a bearing on both autonomist and secessionist desires therein but also on the response from the parent state. Hannum (1996:465) notes that many states that have agreed to territorial autonomy arrangements within their borders have found it more difficult to concede that the ownership of natural resources should be fully awarded to these territories only. Instead, they often regard such resources as belonging to the state as a whole and, consequently, the resources should benefit the whole state. In a study on the causal link between natural resources and civil war, Ross (2004:46, 49–52, 61–63) has in his analysis based on thirteen cases of civil war that occurred between 1990 and 2000 concluded that the existence of natural resources has had an impact on the onset of civil war, including separatist civil wars. Lei and Michaels (2014:140, 145, 154) have also shed light on the relationship between discovery of giant oilfields and an increased risk of internal armed conflict taking place. In a study on the discovery of oil fields around the world between 1946 and 2008, they have also concluded that such findings may indeed lead to internal armed conflicts. However, the likelihood of this occurring is greater in countries that are already prone to political violence, such as having experienced coups or armed conflicts in the decade prior to the discovery. Gehring and Schneider (2020:2, 16–17) have analysed how oil discoveries in the North Sea affected secessionist voting patterns in Scotland. They have concluded that the initial

discovery in 1970 and subsequent major discoveries resulted in a higher share of votes for the pro-secessionist Scottish National Party (SNP). Furthermore, they have concluded that not just extraction and production, but mere discovery is enough to generate a higher share of secessionist votes. In another study concerning mineral resource wealth for ethnic groups, Sorens (2012:71) has also found indicative but inconclusive evidence that this could induce secessionist activities.

Another factor related to the viability and economic circumstances of sub-state territories is the territory's size. Sorens (2012:71, 97) has inferred that ethnic groups around the world that are more populous also seem to be more supportive of secessionist movements although the results are inconclusive. As regards secessionist party vote share in territories in advanced democracies, however, Sorens has inferred that greater population size is strongly associated with stronger support for secessionism. According to Sorens, this is presumably due to assumptions that greater population size equals greater territorial viability. Likewise, according to Aldrich and Connell (1998:113), size in terms of population but also area was in the early stage of the decolonization process often regarded as a crucial determinant for whether some small colonies were viable for full independence. The reason for this is that size in the colonial context was regarded as interconnected with economic viability and, consequently, small colonies were frequently regarded as economically too vulnerable to become fully independent. Ferdinand et al. (2020:46, 50, 60) also argue that smallness in terms of both population and area, and thereby vulnerability, are factors that explain popular apprehension within non-sovereign jurisdictions towards the sovereignty option. Similarly, in a study on the determinants that explain decolonization of Western dependencies during the period 1870–1987, Strang (1990:846, 852, 854) has inferred that the population size of the dependencies did have a considerable impact. Regarding acquisition of sovereign statehood, Strang also highlights the economic viability aspect as interlinked with population size, but in addition to this he emphasizes the potential pressure that can be directed towards the parent state by the dependency due to its size as well as its general military viability as a sovereign state. Another aspect related to the population size of autonomous territories that might temper enthusiasm for secession has to do with administrative capacity. As Sundberg and Sjöblom (2024:286–288, 298–299, 301, 307) point out, smaller territories often face greater administrative challenges than larger ones due to a shortage of human and material resources. For instance, larger territories have a larger pool of resources and often have universities that in the territory's native language can produce a variety of skilled staff members needed for quality administration. Smaller territories, on the other hand, might at least in part have to rely on the parent state's established procedures, expertise and resources to fulfil such needs. Moreover, in the event of transition to full sovereign statehood, the

administrative capacity requirements would become considerably greater still. From an alternative perspective as regards relative population size, however, Horowitz (1981:178) also highlights the potential for delayed secession due to a sub-state territory having a comparatively large population. He exemplifies this by pointing to the fact that the East Bengalis waited a long time until they finally seceded from the unified state of Pakistan due to their numerical advantage of composing more than half of its total population and hopes that this would eventually give them a fair level of political influence in the unified state.

2.3 Summary and hypotheses

The first section of this chapter introduced the concept of political autonomy and more specifically territorial autonomy, which characterises the research sample of this study, and shone a light on the persistent terminological and substantial ambiguity of these concepts. However, territorial autonomy fundamentally entails a certain level of self-rule awarded to a demarcated territory and all its residents where the powers awarded may vary in terms of legislative, administrative and adjudicative scope and usually concern areas such as language, religion, culture, economic and social matters. In this dissertation, an autonomous territory is defined quite broadly as a currently existing or former equivalent of *a geographically demarcated non-federal first-level administrative subdivision of a sovereign state that possesses a special status and at least administrative powers of some measure*.

Throughout their existence, autonomy solutions have primarily been implemented to appease rebellious minorities in multiethnic states. However, in more recent times the impetus has increasingly been the mere recognition of minority rights and the right to self-determination. Occasionally, territorial autonomy has also been implemented as a compromise solution between a sub-state territory's demand for sovereign statehood and the parent state's insistence on its territorial integrity, but also to solve international disputes over certain territories. Still, autonomy solutions have not always succeeded as intended in promoting ethnic identities or group co-existence within recipient territories nor have they always led to better co-existence with parent states. Occasionally, the granting of autonomy has also led to a proliferation of autonomy demands from other groups in the parent state and of secessionist demands by recipient groups.

The second section of the chapter examined this aspect in more detail. Secession, which forms part of the dependent variable of the study, as well as secessionism and separatism are also defined somewhat differently in the literature. Some scholars agree that secession and secessionism denote the acquisition of and striving for sovereign statehood, whereas others argue that the terms also include gains of and claims for territorial decentralization.

As for separatism, disagreements concern whether it entails claims for merely limited or all types of self-rule or only claims for sovereign statehood. For the specific purpose of this study, secession entails *the withdrawal of an autonomous territory from its parent state and its acquisition of sufficient recognition to constitute and predominantly be regarded as a sovereign state of its own*.

A plethora of research exists on whether systems of territorial decentralization in themselves prevent or promote the occurrence of secession and secessionism. Previous research is inconclusive, with some scholars suggesting that territorial decentralization does not necessarily encourage such events, and others stating that it might although often in conjunction with other factors such as group distinctiveness, regional institutions, general success or decline due to decentralization and the overall government structure of the parent state. Previous research has, however, emphasized the importance of factors concerning ethnic distinctiveness and group identity as well as factors concerning relative prosperity and viability of sub-state territories and their populations for the occurrence of secession as well as secessionism. Many scholars have also underlined the combinatory impact of these factors.

As for determinants related to territory or group distinctiveness, previous research emphasizes that having a language or religion different from the parent state or the majority group therein are considered important factors, as this might generate a particularly strong sense of identity and solidarity among groups. There seems to be greater unanimity on the importance of language in previous research, as it was one of the main driving forces in past nationalist movements and has often been seen as an important factor for distinguishing groups from each other. As for the importance of religion, previous research is slightly less unanimous although there are also strong arguments for and examples of its significance for secession and secessionism occurring.

It has also been argued that geographical distance to their parent states might contribute to a sense of group distinctiveness emerging in sub-state territories, in addition to potentially reducing friction with and financial dependency on the former but also reducing their ability to quell potential secessionist agitation in the latter. An additional element of geographical distance to consider is whether a sub-state territory is geographically contiguous or non-contiguous with its parent state.

For the most part, previous research has also acknowledged that groups are more likely to become secessionist if they used to be in possession of self-rule at some point in the past and then lost it, whether it be territorial autonomy, sovereign statehood or having been left stranded outside their historical homeland due to border adjustments. Loss of self-rule might contribute to the forging of group identities and a sense of solidarity and might cause grievances and hopes of restoring the previously held status.

Arguments have also been made that the more recently the loss occurred the greater the likelihood of secessionism occurring.

These considerations give rise to the following independent variables related to territory or group distinctiveness: *Ethnic distinctiveness; Geographical distance; Geographical contiguousness* and *Previously autonomous, sovereign or stranded*. The following hypotheses are, thus, formulated:

Hypothesis 1a: *Autonomous territories that have either a dominant language or religion that is distinct from the dominant language or religion in the rest of their parent states are more likely to secede than those that have not.*

Hypothesis 1b: *Autonomous territories that have both a dominant language and religion that are distinct from the dominant language and religion in the rest of their parent states are more likely to secede than those that have not.*

Hypothesis 2: *Autonomous territories that are geographically more distant from their parent states are more likely to secede than those that are less distant.*

Hypothesis 3: *Autonomous territories that are non-contiguous with their parent states are more likely to secede than those that are contiguous with their parent states.*

Hypothesis 4: *Autonomous territories that were autonomous territories or sovereign states in the past and then lost this status, or were left stranded outside their historical parent states, are more likely to secede than those that have not experienced these events.*

Factors pertaining to territory or group viability might also, according to previous research, be highly motivating factors for the occurrence of secessionism in and secession of sub-state territories. However, several scholars have emphasized that this necessitates the presence of ethnic distinctiveness as well, whereas some have pointed to instances in which the ethnic component has been completely absent. Moreover, there is a lack of unanimity in previous research as to whether it is the more or the less prosperous groups or sub-state territories compared to the remainder of the parent state that tend to be more secessionist. Proponents of the former argument suggest that the more prosperous groups or sub-state territories might want to rectify a perceived sense of unfairness of having to subsidize less prosperous groups or parts of the parent state. Due to their prosperity, these groups or sub-state territories might also have more confidence in their ability to break away from their parent states and in their post-independence

viability. Proponents of the latter argument, instead, argue that the less prosperous groups or sub-state territories see themselves as worse off precisely because of their membership in the current state and that independence would bring greater prosperity, also perhaps due to hopes of laying claim to certain natural resources. However, arguments have also been made that the more prosperous groups or sub-state territories do not wish to secede precisely because this might jeopardize their privileged position, as well as arguments that the less prosperous groups or sub-state territories do not wish to secede either because they might be doubtful about their prospects for self-sufficiency as a sovereign state. In addition to relative levels of prosperity and viability, previous research has also suggested that the existence of natural resources, such as oil, has proved important motivators in secessionist struggles.

Furthermore, some research has inferred that factors concerning size with respect to population but also in terms of land area of a potentially secessionist group or sub-state territory could increase the likelihood of secessionism as well as secession occurring. Some scholars have suggested that this is due to the conception that greater size equals greater economic viability. Conversely, however, some previous research has suggested that large groups relative to other groups or the dominant group in the parent state are not very readily secessionist due to their hope of eventually gaining greater influence or dominance in the parent state.

Based on these arguments, the following independent variables are outlined in relation to territory or group viability: *Relative economic performance*, *Fuel mineral resources*, *Non-fuel mineral resources*, *Population size*, *Relative population size*, *Land area* and *Relative land area*. These variables give rise to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5a: *Autonomous territories that are relatively more prosperous in relation to the rest of their parent states are more likely to secede than those that are relatively less prosperous.*

Hypothesis 5b: *Autonomous territories that are relatively more prosperous in relation to the rest of their parent states are less likely to secede than those that are relatively less prosperous.*

Hypothesis 6: *Autonomous territories that possess fuel mineral resources are more likely to secede than those that do not possess such resources.*

Hypothesis 7: *Autonomous territories that possess non-fuel mineral resources are more likely to secede than those that do not possess such resources.*

Hypothesis 8a: *Autonomous territories that have larger populations are more likely to secede than those that have smaller populations.*

Hypothesis 8b: *Autonomous territories that have relatively larger populations in relation to the population of the rest of their parent states are more likely to secede than those that have relatively smaller populations.*

Hypothesis 8c: *Autonomous territories that have relatively larger populations in relation to the population of the rest of their parent states are less likely to secede than those that have relatively smaller populations.*

Hypothesis 9a: *Autonomous territories that have larger land areas are more likely to secede than those that have smaller land areas.*

Hypothesis 9b: *Autonomous territories that have relatively larger land areas in relation to the land area of the rest of their parent states are more likely to secede than those that have relatively smaller land areas.*

These hypotheses will be subjected to quantitative analysis in Chapter 4. The hypotheses that are validated in the quantitative analysis will be subjected to further analysis by means of qualitative case study analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. The purpose is to infer which of the hypotheses and associated independent variables might have a bearing on the dependent variable, i.e. *Autonomy failure by secession*, in autonomous territories. The next chapter will elaborate on the overall research design and methods applied in this study, along with a more detailed operationalization of territorial autonomy, secession and the independent variables.

3 Research design

The purpose of this chapter is to present the research design of the study, including the methodological approach used to explain autonomy failure by secession among autonomous territories. First, the overall mixed-methods approach and the specific quantitative and qualitative methods adopted are outlined. Then the research sample and the criteria applied for its compilation are introduced, followed by an overview of the case selection strategy for the qualitative case study analyses. The dependent variable is thereafter operationalized, with the data and criteria used for determining what constitutes acquisition of sovereign statehood being presented. The independent variables highlighted in the previous chapter are then operationalized, primarily for the purpose of the quantitative analysis, and the data sources used in the data collection process are outlined. An overview is also provided of the data sources that are used in the qualitative case study analyses. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main highlights.

3.1 A mixed-methods approach

Mixed-methods design entails the combination of two or more techniques, such as quantitative and qualitative approaches, in a single study for gathering and analysing data (Tashakkori and Creswell 2007:4; Seawright 2016:2) to provide more comprehensive and valid conclusions than can be obtained by mere single-method designs (Harbers and Ingram 2020:1117). In quantitative analysis, the researcher often has a more limited knowledge of the individual cases and focus primarily lies on measuring and drawing inferences based on a wider cross-case comparison. In qualitative analysis, however, there is a more focused intent to disentangle and identify processes that lead to a particular outcome within a limited number of cases (Goertz and Mahoney 2012:87–88).

The mixed-methods approach can be sub-divided into designs in which two or more techniques are applied in a parallel or an integrated manner. A mixed-methods study with a parallel or triangulation design is one in which the quantitative and qualitative analyses are conducted completely independently of each other with the intent of determining whether the respective findings corroborate each other or not. In an integrated design, sometimes also called the nested or embedded design, the quantitative and qualitative methods collaborate and make use of each other, and often the method first applied guides the course of action to be taken in the application of the subsequent method. Within the field of political science, the integrated design often begins with quantitative analysis of a large sample to produce an inference. It then proceeds with qualitative in-depth analysis of one or several cases from the large sample with the intention to test or refine the

quantitative findings (Lieberman 2005; 435–440; Seawright 2016:8; Harbers and Ingram 2020:1123–1124).

To gain a more robust understanding of the underlying causes that may contribute to explaining the outcome of interest, an integrated mixed-methods design has been applied in this study. In the initial quantitative step of the study, event history analysis, or more specifically Cox regression analysis, is performed to ascertain whether the previously hypothesized causal relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable can be corroborated. In the subsequent qualitative step, the independent variables that appear to have the most significance according to the quantitative analysis are tested by means of process tracing with the intent of either further corroborating their explanatory power or rejecting them and adding more nuances to the results. The primary reason behind this approach is that the study consists of a comparatively small research sample of autonomous territories (see Section 3.2, Table 1) in which the outcome of interest shows limited occurrence. Below follows an overview of the quantitative and qualitative methods applied in the respective analyses of this dissertation.

3.1.1 Quantitative analysis: Event history analysis with Cox regression analysis

The quantitative method applied in this study is what political scientists often refer to as event history analysis. The method is also common within other fields such as health sciences, engineering and economics in which it is often referred to as survival analysis, reliability analysis and duration models. Event history analysis is an umbrella term for different statistical methods that are used in studies in which the author is interested in the timing and duration until an event of interest occurs. The event of interest can be described as a significant qualitative change in circumstances at a certain point in time, denoting a clear difference between what preceded and what succeeded the event. This could be events such as death, onset of a medical condition, marriage, etc. For political scientists the event of interest could be the end of a peacekeeping mission, changes of government, riots, revolutions, etc. Thus, in event history analysis focus lies on both the event itself and the time leading up to this event. Since the time aspect is relevant for studying causes of events, longitudinal event history data will need to be collected to conduct this type of analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:1; Mills 2011:2–3; Allison 2014:2).

One particularly useful model within event history analysis is the Cox proportional-hazards regression model, which was introduced by the British statistician Sir David Cox in 1972. One of the differences between event history analysis in general and Cox regression analysis in particular, and ordinary regression models such as OLS and logistic regression is that the

former enables the researcher to include time-varying independent variables. Another trait that sets event history analysis and the Cox regression model apart from many other methods is its usefulness in dealing with censored cases. Uncensored cases are cases for which the researcher knows the exact starting time from which the unit of analysis is 'at risk' of experiencing the event of interest until the point in time when the event occurs. The most common type of censoring is right censoring which entails cases that do not experience the event before the final observation point. Although the event of interest does not occur in these cases, the researcher still has information about the time of exposure to the risk up until the last point of observation (Mills 2011:5–6, 10; Allison 2014:2). Since this study consists of a number of autonomous territories that have both endured and failed as such as well as some time-varying independent variables, event history analysis in the form of Cox regression analysis is deemed an appropriate choice of method for the quantitative part of the analysis.

3.1.2 Qualitative analysis: Case study analysis with process tracing

The qualitative part of the analysis is conducted using a comparative case study approach by means of process tracing. Case studies are frequently used in political science and can be defined as 'an intensive study of a single case or a small number of cases which draws on observational data and promises to shed light on a larger population of cases'. Thus, for a case study to qualify as such there must be aspects of the study that can be generalized to shed light on a wider population rather than merely the case itself (Gerring 2016:28, 30). Moreover, case studies can be conducted as single case studies but also as multiple case studies, with the latter alternative often referred to as the comparative case method within the field of political science and public administration (Yin 2009:19). The case study approach entails a considerable amount of in-depth familiarization by the researcher with the case or cases in focus, as the aim is to provide important evidence for a stated argument or hypothesis (Gerring 2016:28). The researcher will conduct over-time analysis, considering several observations from different points in time to identify processes and key junctures, which may or may not be sequentially interconnected and which may have contributed to a particular outcome (Goertz and Mahoney 2012:89).

Due to the particular emphasis in qualitative research on processes and events occurring within individual cases, process tracing is considered a central methodological approach for within-case analysis. Process tracing entails observing the intervening causal mechanisms between variables X and Y. In qualitative research, the identification of intervening causal mechanisms is often regarded as crucial to causal inference since their existence can be regarded as additional confirmation of the assumption that

X does indeed affect Y. This is particularly applicable when using process tracing in mixed-methods designs, as focus usually lies on further analysing a main independent variable of interest that displayed a significant effect on an outcome in a previously conducted regression analysis (Goertz and Mahoney 2012:87–93, 101–102, 110). Again, given the relatively small research sample included in this study, case study analysis with process tracing is deemed a useful complement to the quantitative analysis.

3.2 Research population and sample

As the intent with this study is to include a multitude of territories from different time periods, geographical locations and political cultures, the definition of an autonomous territory needs to be rather broad. Further to the definition already provided in the previous chapter, clear criteria and boundaries for the territories that will and will not be included in the research sample are needed. To achieve this, the autonomous territories included in this study are first and foremost fundamentally based on the set of internally self-governing territories outlined by David Rezvani which he refers to as partially independent territories (PITs). He defines partially independent territories as 'nationalistically distinct and constitutionally differentiated territories that share and divide sovereign powers with a core state' (Rezvani 2014:5).

Moreover, Rezvani has outlined the following five characteristics to describe partially independent territories: *Legally allocated final decision-making powers*, *Presence of entrenched powers, Constitutionally unincorporated within a core state*, *Some authority and control over foreign affairs* and *Nationalistically distinct*. The first characteristic, *Legally allocated final decision-making powers*, means that the powers are provided to partially independent territories by means of statute, constitutional provision, judicial decision or executive order. The second characteristic, *Presence of entrenched powers,* ties into the first characteristic and entails that the powers awarded are guaranteed by certain mechanisms that prevent the status and powers from being unilaterally changed or revoked by the core states or even by the partially independent territories themselves. The third characteristic, *Constitutionally unincorporated within a core state*, essentially means that the powers, rights and status of partially independent territories are different from those that apply to the overall core states. Furthermore, this characteristic denotes the non-federal character of partially independent territories, as component units in federal arrangements are fully incorporated into the constitutional framework of their state in which they enjoy equal rights, status and powers throughout. However, component units in federal states are also distinct from partially independent territories in the sense that they generally do not possess powers to conduct foreign relations on their own. Rezvani's fourth characteristic, *Some authority and control over*

foreign affairs, states that partially independent territories possess some foreign policy powers, such as international treaty-making rights and the authority to seek membership in international organizations. Diplomatic relations are, however, normally reserved for the core states to handle, as are defence responsibilities. The fifth and final characteristic, *Nationalistically distinct*, essentially means that partially independent territories consist of distinct populations that advocate that representatives from their own group and no other should have the governing power within their territory (Rezvani 2014:82–84, 89, 94–97, 100).

Based on the definition provided and these criteria, Rezvani (2014:311–313) has compiled an extensive list of partially independent territories that have existed during a period spanning from 1744 to 2014, which denotes the final year observed in his study.

As was established in Chapter 2, this field of research is somewhat saturated with different terms for and definitions of non-sovereign territories with some measure of internal self-governance. However, one can argue that Rezvani's definition is semantically quite clear on the type and substantial meaning of the territories it denotes. The characteristics further add to the general understanding of the scope, robustness and rather high level of internal self-government that the territories in question are likely to possess. Therefore, Rezvani's partially independent territories can be seen as a functional point of departure for the cases that are included in this study.

However, when it comes to Rezvani's criteria for what constitutes partially independent territories a few alterations have been made for the purpose of this study, along with the addition of some complementary criteria. As a result of these alterations the more commonly used term autonomous territory rather than partially independent territory is applied in this study.

First, regarding the scope of cases based on Rezvani's partially independent territories that are included in this study, the time span has been adjusted to only include territories that emerged as such territories and, in some cases, became fully sovereign states or were dissolved by territorial assimilation within the time span 1901 to 2020. This has resulted in several of Rezvani's partially independent territories that came into existence prior to this starting point being omitted from the set of cases included in this study. These are Canada, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Monaco, New Zealand, Newfoundland and San Marino. The main reason for narrowing the scope is to include and capture the full lifespan and development of the selected territories and the effect over time on the outcome of the independent variables that are analysed. A time span with a starting point far back in time increases the difficulty of obtaining accurate and comprehensive historical data on the sub-state territorial level and, therefore, a starting point within an accessible historic time frame is necessary. One could also argue that more modern forms of territorial

autonomy began to appear during the 20th century and for the sake of *relative* comparability between the cases included and regarding the international system-level context within which they have existed the time span 1901 to 2020 can be regarded reasonable. Moreover, due to the currently existing differences regarding the de jure and de facto international status of Crimea, which is also defined as a partially independent territory by Rezvani, this territory has been omitted. As for Hong Kong as a partially independent territory, the period of British sovereignty prior to the 1997 handover to China has also been omitted. The reason for this is the aim of focusing on autonomous territories' sovereignty relationship with the most recent parent state only, unless a previous sovereignty relationship with another parent state at some point during the time period in focus resulted in full independence for that territory. However, no such cases are included in this study. With a similar purpose of also focusing on the most recent structural constellations of autonomous territories and all autonomy periods thereof under the same parent state, Trentino-South Tyrol as a joint territorial autonomy arrangement has also been omitted. Although still in existence, this territorial autonomy arrangement was significantly disassembled in 1972 with many of the autonomous powers transferred to the autonomous constituent territories of Trentino and South Tyrol (Hooghe et al. 2010:84–85). Thus, these territories are instead included separately in this study.

Second, Rezvani's criteria for what constitutes a partially independent territory have been somewhat altered and for the most part relaxed in this study to enable a broader scope of territorial autonomy arrangements to be included. For instance, some of Rezvani's territories have in fact possessed some directly preceding form of lesser territorial autonomy under the same parent state before they qualified as partially independent territories according to his definition and criteria. In this study, these directly preceding periods of territorial autonomy have been taken into consideration and added onto the total life span of some of the autonomous territories. The reasoning behind this is that by including directly preceding periods of lesser territorial autonomy the entire period during which a political-territorial identity may have been fostered in the territories is taken into consideration. Furthermore, cases such as Catalonia, Basque Country and Malta have also had earlier periods of some lesser form of territorial autonomy that were dissolved at some point, and which have not been included in Rezvani's set of cases. These periods of autonomy are also included in the research sample. Thus, due to the relaxation of most of Rezvani's criteria the autonomous territories included in this study do not necessarily have or have not necessarily throughout their entire existence as such territories had the same level and extent of legally allocated final decision-making powers, entrenched powers nor authority and control over foreign affairs as do partially independent territories according to Rezvani's criteria. As for one criterion, however, this study applies a stricter approach which for some

autonomous territories have resulted in a shorter total autonomy period compared to Rezvani's partially independent territories. According to Rezvani, the date of their establishment is set as the year in which the self-governing status was proclaimed in the national constitution or equivalent. In some cases, this occurred several years prior to when the arrangement de facto went into effect. In this study, however, the year in which the territorial autonomy arrangement commenced in practise is considered the starting point. Again, the reasoning for this is the assumption that the possible formation of a political-territorial identity in the autonomous territories, but also of popular assessments of the parent state relationship under the territorial autonomy arrangement, are more likely to take shape once the arrangement commences and its effects become tangible. Moreover, the autonomy period for Rezvani's set of partially independent territories only extends until 2014. By consulting several different sources, the autonomous status of the territories included in this study was confirmed up until year 2020.

Third, Rezvani also characterises some territories as partially independent territories throughout, although according to international law they have at different points in time been recognized as sovereign states by attaining United Nations membership. These are Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau. Rezvani's reasoning for not classifying territories such as these as sovereign states is that they do not meet conventional definitions of sovereign statehood and that they have surrendered some of their sovereignty to other states to handle, such as certain parts of their diplomatic relations and all their external defence responsibilities (Rezvani 2014:90). Again, the former three are excluded entirely from the research sample of this study due to their year of establishment as partially independent territories falling outside the time period in focus. The latter three are included although, as opposed to Rezvani's characterization, as former autonomous territories that have attained sovereign statehood. Compared to Rezvani, this study applies a wider interpretation of what constitutes sovereign statehood, which is elaborated in greater detail in Section 3.3.

Amending Rezvani's criteria to produce less stringent benchmarks for what constitutes an autonomous territory should provide a more comprehensive study into why some autonomous territories have emerged as sovereign states. Based on the above considerations and as outlined in the previous chapter, an autonomous territory is in this study defined as *a geographically demarcated non-federal first-level administrative subdivision of a sovereign state that possesses a special status and at least administrative powers of some measure*. In Table 1 below the research sample included in this study is presented.

Autonomous territory	Autonomy period	Status at end of autonomy period or in year 2020	Autonomy period as PIT (Rezvani)
Aosta Valley	1948–2020	Autonomous	1948–2014
Aruba	1986–2020	Autonomous	1985–2014
Australia	1901–1920	Sovereign statehood	1900–1931
Azores	1976–2020	Autonomous	1974–2014
Basque Country	1936–1937	Dissolved	-
Basque Country	1979–2020	Autonomous	1978–2014
Bermuda	1968–2020	Autonomous	1967–2014
Bougainville	2004–2020	Autonomous	2004–2014
British Virgin Islands	1967–2020	Autonomous	2005–2014
Catalonia	1932–1934	Dissolved	-
Catalonia	1936–1939	Dissolved	-
Catalonia	1979–2017	Dissolved	1978–2014
Catalonia	2018–2020	Autonomous	-
Cayman Islands	1962–2020	Autonomous	1967–2014
Cook Islands	1965–2020	Autonomous	1965–2014
Curacao	2010–2020	Autonomous	2010–2014
Eritrea	1952–1962	Dissolved	1952–1955
Faroe Islands	1948–2020	Autonomous	1948–2014
French Polynesia	1977–2020	Autonomous	1977–2014
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1963–2020	Autonomous	1948–2014
Gagauzia	1995–2020	Autonomous	1994–2014
Galicia	1981–2020	Autonomous	1978–2014
Gibraltar	1964–2020	Autonomous	2006–2014
Greenland	1979–2020	Autonomous	1979–2014
Hong Kong	1997–2020	Autonomous	1997–2014
Irish Free State	1921–1922	Sovereign statehood	1921–1931
Kosovo	1974–1989	Dissolved	1974–1989
Kosovo	2001–2008	Sovereign statehood	-
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2006–2020	Autonomous	2004–2014
Madeira	1976–2020	Autonomous	1974–2014
Malta	1921–1930	Dissolved	1919–1931
Malta	1932–1933	Dissolved	-
Malta	1947–1958	Dissolved	-
Malta	1961–1964	Sovereign statehood	-
Marshall Islands	1979–1991	Sovereign statehood	1994–2014
Memel-Klaipeda	1924–1939	Dissolved	1924–1939
Micronesia, F.S.	1979–1991	Sovereign statehood	1986–2014
Bangsamoro A.R.	1990–2020	Autonomous	1990–2014
Netherlands Antilles	1954–2010	Dissolved	1954–2010
New Caledonia	1998–2020	Autonomous	1988–2014
Niue	1974–2020	Autonomous	1974–2014
Northern Ireland	1921–1972	Dissolved	1921–1972
Northern Ireland	1999–2002	Dissolved	1998–2014
Northern Ireland	2007–2020	Autonomous	-
Northern Mariana Islands	1978–2020	Autonomous	1978–2014
Nunavut	1999–2020	Autonomous	1999–2014
Palau	1981–1994	Sovereign statehood	1994–2014
Puerto Rico	1952–2020	Autonomous	1952–2014

Sardinia	1948–2020	Autonomous	1948–2014
Scotland	1999–2020	Autonomous	1998–2014
Sicily	1946–2020	Autonomous	1948–2014
Sint Maarten	2010–2020	Autonomous	2010–2014
South Africa	1910–1920	Sovereign statehood	1910–1931
South Sudan	1972–1983	Dissolved	1972–1983
South Sudan	2005–2011	Sovereign statehood	2005–2011
South Tyrol	1972–2020	Autonomous	-
Southern Rhodesia	1923–1953	Dissolved	1923–1931
Southern Rhodesia	1964–1965	Sovereign statehood	-
Suriname	1954–1975	Sovereign statehood	1954–1975
Trentino	1972–2020	Autonomous	-
Turks and Caicos Islands	1976–1986	Dissolved	-
Turks and Caicos Islands	1988–2009	Dissolved	2006–2009
Turks and Caicos Islands	2012–2020	Autonomous	2012–2014
Vojvodina	1974–1990	Dissolved	1974–1990
Vojvodina	2009–2020	Autonomous	2009–2014
Wales	1999–2020	Autonomous	2006–2014
Zanzibar	1979–2020	Autonomous	1977–2014
Åland Islands	1920–2020	Autonomous	1922–2014

Table 1. List of autonomous territories 1901–2020. Autonomy period denotes the year the territorial autonomy arrangement de facto went into effect until the year it ended, or until year 2020. Status at end of autonomy period or in year 2020 denotes whether the autonomous territory in the final year of the autonomy period acquired sovereign statehood, was autonomous or dissolved by territorial assimilation. Autonomy period as PIT (Rezvani) denotes the autonomous territories' period of existence as partially independent territories (PITs) according to David Rezvani's (2014) definition and criteria. Autonomous territories in italics have been added to the research sample of this study, complementary to Rezvani's set of partially independent territories.

Accordingly, the research sample consists of 53 individual autonomous territories that each have experienced one or multiple autonomy periods, 68 in total, during the time span 1901–2020. At the end of their only or last autonomy period, 11 autonomous territories had experienced autonomy failure by secession. However, 39 autonomous territories had endured as such since the establishment of their only or last autonomy period until year 2020. Also, nine autonomous territories had experienced autonomy failure by temporary dissolution and territorial assimilation at the end of one or multiple of their autonomy periods. Also, three autonomous territories had experienced autonomy failure by permanent dissolution and territorial assimilation at the end of their, in these cases, only autonomy period. One of these autonomous territories, Eritrea, did eventually become a sovereign state although this occurred much later in 1993 and without any form of preceding territorial autonomy. Consequently, Eritrea does not count as a case of autonomy failure by secession although it does count as an autonomous territory that did experience autonomy failure by permanent dissolution and territorial assimilation.

In the quantitative analysis, the autonomy periods are the units of analysis that are subjected to Cox regression analysis to discern the independent variables that initially appear have the most bearing on the outcome of interest. Autonomy periods with *Sovereign statehood* as the status in the final year are the uncensored cases of the research sample and autonomy periods with *Autonomous* or *Dissolved* as the status are considered censored cases. For the qualitative analysis, naturally the units of analysis are instead the individual autonomous territories that have been selected and that are holistically analysed by means of process tracing with the purpose of determining the causes for their respective outcome status.

3.2.1 Case selection for qualitative case study analysis

As this dissertation applies a mixed-methods approach for determining the independent variables that have the most explanatory power in relation to the occurrence of autonomy failure by secession in autonomous territories, a smaller sample of cases from the larger research sample needs to be selected for the comparative case study analysis that builds on the results obtained in quantitative analysis.

Within the literature regarding case selection approaches based on regression results for multi-method research designs, methodological scholars have highlighted both random and deliberate selection as the most common alternatives (Rohlfing and Starke 2013:493). Random case selection is sometimes hailed as a useful strategy, as it is argued that it decreases the risk of bias and cherry-picking cases that conform to a researcher's preconceived expectations (see e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2008:758, 764–765, 773). However, Lieberman (2005:447) notes that often there might be practical considerations that discourage this approach. For instance, random case selection may bind the researcher to analysing specific cases for which he or she might lack the necessary skills to carry out the task and, therefore, end up having to rely on possibly heavily biased secondary sources. Seawright and Gerring (2008:295) also advise against random case selection in comparative case study research due to the risk that a small sample of cases selected will not be representative enough for the larger population for which the goal is to generalize the findings.

Instead, some form of deliberate strategy for selecting cases is advisable. Different scholars have highlighted numerous case study types that exist in the literature that are related to the purposive case selection strategy, such as the typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, most similar and most different, contrast and pathway types (Seawright and Gerring 2008:296–306; Rohlfing and Starke 2013:492–509; Seawright 2016: 75–106). A typical-case approach to case selection might be useful for probing a causal relationship between some hypothesis and a particular phenomenon or outcome of interest, and the idea is to then select a case that is representative

or typical of that causal relationship. In addition to its usefulness for exploring causal mechanisms relating to some specific variable and hypothesis, a typical case is also effective for identifying potential endogeneity issues, omitted variables, etc. (Gerring 2007:91–93).

A typical-case selection approach ought to be useful in this study as well since, as the results obtained in the quantitative analysis will show, further probing will be required into some of the hypotheses formulated in the previous chapter. In relation and complementary to the above highlighted aspects, the summary section of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 provides a further elaboration on the reasoning and procedure for selecting the cases that will be analysed by means of process tracing in Chapters 5 and 6.

3.3 Operationalization of the dependent variable and data

The dependent variable and the outcome of interest in this dissertation is *Autonomy failure by secession*. As for the result of secessions, i.e. the acquisition of sovereign statehood, the previous chapter elaborated on some of the established definitions of the sovereign state along with some of the more detailed criteria that are often considered necessary for a territory to qualify as a sovereign state. However, as was also described in the previous chapter, the term secession in this study is defined as *the withdrawal of an autonomous territory from its parent state and its acquisition of sufficient recognition to constitute and predominantly be regarded as a sovereign state of its own.*

This definition of secession is formulated based on the criteria for inclusion in the international community of sovereign states as defined by the Correlates of War Project (2017) in the *State System Membership List, v2016*, *States2016* which covers the period 1816 to 2016. According to this, inclusion in the international state system is based on two criteria. First, prior to 1920 inclusion is defined based on whether a territory had a population that was greater than 500.000 and had diplomatic missions with the United Kingdom and France that functioned at least at the level of a chargé d'affaires. Second, from 1920 onwards inclusion in the international state system is ascertained based on whether the territory was or is a member of the League of Nations or the United Nations, or whether the territory has a population that is greater than 500.000 and receives diplomatic missions from two major powers.

Given that most autonomous territories in this study are small in population, it could be argued that using the criteria from the Correlates of War Project (2017) for denoting acquisition of sovereign statehood might ostensibly appear to pose an issue for the pre-1920 period due to the

requirement that the territories considered need to have had a population of at least 500.000. One could argue that potential cases of acquisition of sovereign statehood for smaller autonomous territories during this period would not be considered in the Correlates of War Project (2017) data, whereas alternative sources using different criteria might. However, given that Australia and South Africa are the only autonomous territories included in this study that were established prior to 1920 and considering that both are included in the data from the Correlates of War Project (2017) and had sufficiently sized populations from the very beginning (see Appendix), the population size criterion does not pose an issue for any of the cases included.

The above operationalization of the dependent variable is applicable for both the quantitative and qualitative analyses in the following chapters. However, for the purpose of the quantitative analysis the dependent variable is coded '0' for all the years in which the territorial autonomy arrangement was maintained, i.e. the autonomous territory had not seceded from its parent state and become a sovereign state of its own, and '1' for the year when the arrangement was dissolved, i.e. the autonomous territory seceded and became a sovereign state. The dependent variable and the coding are presented in the Appendix under the abbreviation 'AFS' (*Autonomy failure by secession*).

3.4 Operationalization of the independent variables and data

The formulation of a framework of independent variables that may contribute to explaining autonomy failure by secession for autonomous territories, which was conducted in the previous chapter, was based on a review of previous theoretical and empirical research concerning secessionism but also other related movements and phenomena, such as autonomism, separatism, ethnic conflict, state formation, etc. Although perhaps different regarding ultimate objectives depending on specific case and context, movements such as these are often triggered by similar circumstances and determinants. Consequently, a research design that rests on a framework of independent variables that can be detected in a variety of similar movements is useful and appropriate for the purpose of answering the research questions of this study.

The framework consists of 11 independent variables. These variables can broadly be described as relating to either territory or group distinctiveness, or territory or group viability. In the following, further presentations of these variables and how they have been operationalized is provided. The presentations primarily describe the operationalization process, but they also offer a brief and general overview of the data sources used in the data collection process for the construction of the dataset presented in the

Appendix, which was used for the quantitative analysis. However, this section concludes with a brief presentation also of the data types and sources used for the qualitative analyses. The independent variables are recapitulated in Table 2 below.

Independent variable	Type of variable
Ethnic distinctiveness	Territory or group distinctiveness
Geographical distance	
Geographical contiguousness	
Previously autonomous, sovereign or stranded	
Relative economic performance	Territory or group viability
Fuel mineral resources	
Non-fuel mineral resources	
Population size	
Relative population size	
Land area	
Relative land area	

Table 2. List of the independent variables. Type of variable denotes whether the independent variable is related to Territory or group distinctiveness or Territory or group viability as designated in Chapter 2, Subsections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5.

Ethnic distinctiveness

As established in previous research, linguistic and religious distinctiveness have proved significant for the occurrence of secessionism and secession (see e.g. Smith 1979:22, 26–27; Wood 1981:114–116; Hannum 1996:458; Gurr 2015:103–104; Bormann et al. 2017:746, 764). Thus, the independent variable *Ethnic distinctiveness* was created to denote the level of difference between the autonomous territories and their respective parent states in terms of dominant language and religion therein. The variable was operationalized by constructing an aggregated categorical independent variable. A dominant language or religion in an autonomous territory or its parent state means that the language or religion is spoken or adhered to by a plurality of the population. For instance, an autonomous territory is considered linguistically distinct if its dominant language is different from the dominant language in the parent state. The plurality language or religion refers to the numerically largest linguistic or religious group, regardless of whether the group constitutes a majority or minority of the total population. Territory-specific characteristics, although such might contribute to the formation of group identities, are not considered unless they characterise the dominant share of the population in the autonomous territories. Territory-specific characteristics refer to instances in which an autonomous territory has, for instance, a language that has a symbolic or historical importance or

is otherwise unique to the territory and that is different from the dominant language in the parent state in which it might not be spoken at all or only by a negligible share of the population. The reasoning behind the approach of strictly and merely focusing on the dominant language and religion of the populations is the assumption that characteristics that apply to the dominant share of the populations have the greatest probability of potentially influencing significant political sentiments and movements to emerge in autonomous territories. Accordingly, no difference whatsoever between an autonomous territory and its parent state regarding language and religion is denoted with '0'. If an autonomous territory differs or differed from its parent state regarding one of these ethnic aspects only, this is coded with '1' (Level of Distinctiveness 1). If an autonomous territory differs or differed more significantly from its parent state in terms of both language and religion, this is coded with '2' (Level of Distinctiveness 2). The independent variable as well as the coding is presented in the dataset in the Appendix under the abbreviation 'ED' (*Ethnic distinctiveness*).

As for the language data collected and used in this study, a wide although rather even variety of sources have been consulted to determine the dominant languages in the autonomous territories as well as their parent states. The data sources primarily include official census reports and national and territorial statistics offices data but also a wide range of encyclopaedias and statistical yearbooks, topic-related research, etc. Different sources have applied different terminology over space and time. Some have stated the language composition by using terminology such as mother tongue, primary language, first language etc., whereas other sources have applied terminology such as usual spoken language, language most spoken in the household, ability to speak, read and write a particular language, etc. In addition to this, some sources have also included data on multilingualism for which the respondents have had the opportunity to state their proficiency in more than one language. In handling the different response options to determine the dominant languages over time in the autonomous territories, the data figures have been boiled down to consider all *potential* speakers of a particular language. This means that the percentage figures of respondents that have listed a particular language as their mother tongue or equivalent have been combined with the figures of those who claim to be able to speak that language as an additional language. For the parent states, the process of ascertaining the dominant languages has unquestionably been more straightforward. The number of potential speakers of the dominant language in the parent states is usually large enough to exclude any doubts as to whether it is the same or different from that of their respective autonomous territories. The autonomous territories have then been coded with '1' if there is or was a linguistic distinction between themselves and their parent states, and they have been coded with '0' if there is or was none.

As for the historical development of religious adherence in the autonomous territories and their respective parent states, data has primarily been collected from the *Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project - Demographics v. 2.0 (RCS-Dem 2.0), COUNTRIES ONLY* by Brown and James (2019). The dataset covers many autonomous territories and parent states included in this study. However, some autonomous territories are not included and to fill these data gaps a range of different sources such as national and territorial statistics offices' databases, census data, encyclopaedias and other topic-related research have been consulted. The religious adherence in the autonomous territories as well as in their parent states has then been determined according to eight sub-categories of the major world religions that are applicable for the cases included in this study, and which are listed in the taxonomy of religions by Brown and James (2019). These are *Catholic* (including Roman Catholic and other Catholic), *Protestant Extended* (including Protestant such as Lutheran, Baptist and Wesleyan and Quasi-Protestant such as Anglican and Pentecostal), *Orthodox* (including Orthodox Unspecified, Oriental Orthodox and Eastern Orthodox), *Sunni Muslim* (including Sunni Unspecified, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali), *Shia Muslim* (including Shia unspecified, Twelver, Ismaili, Zaydi and Other Shia), *East Asian Complex* (including Shintoism, Confucianism, Taoism and Chinese Folk Religion combined), *Hindu* (including all Hindu denominations and sects combined) and *Indigenous Religionists* (including Indigenous Unspecified, Animist, Shamanist and Other Indigenous). On the basis of this taxonomy, the autonomous territories have been coded with '1' if there is or was a religious distinction between themselves and their parent states, and they have been coded with '0' if there is or was none.

Geographical distance

Geographical distance and detachment (as in relation to geographical contiguousness below) between a sub-state territory and its parent state is another factor that might have significance for whether territorial decentralization, secessionism and secession occur, as confirmed in previous research (see e.g. Horowitz 1981:173; Suksi 2011:28; Sorens 2012:16, 35, 70, 110, 156). The independent variable *Geographical distance* was operationalized to denote the shortest direct geographical distance in kilometres between the autonomous territories and their respective parent states. This measurement process resulted in the construction of a continuous independent variable. For the quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4, log transformation was subsequently performed on the variable to reduce skewness. More specifically, this independent variable measures the direct distance 'as the crow flies' between the location of the legislative assemblies as seats of power in the autonomous territories and their parent states respectively, which in most cases are situated in the official capitals.

For all cases included in this study the variable remains or remained constant over time since the seats of power have not or did not change location in either the autonomous territories or their parent states during the observation periods. The independent variable is presented in the dataset in the Appendix under the abbreviation 'GD' (*Geographical distance*).

The geographical distance between the seats of power in the autonomous territories and their respective parent states was measured and ascertained using the online measurement calculator available in Google Maps (2021). It could be argued that certain other data sources or more sophisticated measurement software would have been better suited to determine the distances. However, as this measurement tool has been used for the entire research sample, it could be argued that a consistent and, therefore, comparable level of measurement quality is still maintained throughout.

Geographical contiguousness

The independent variable *Geographical contiguousness* was constructed to denote whether the autonomous territories are or were geographically contiguous or non-contiguous with their respective parent states. This process resulted in the construction of a dichotomous independent variable indicating, more specifically, whether an autonomous territory is geographically attached to the landmass of its parent state or whether it is completely separated from it by a body of water larger than a river or equivalent waterway. Other types of significant separation by geographical features such as mountain ranges etc. are not taken into consideration primarily due to non-applicability for any of the cases included in this study.

Accordingly, if an autonomous territory is or was geographically contiguous with its parent state, this is coded with '0'. If an autonomous territory is or was geographically non-contiguous with its parent state, this is coded with '1'. The independent variable and the coding are presented in the dataset in the Appendix under the abbreviation 'GC' (*Geographical contiguousness*). Determining this status has, by consulting cartographic sources such as Google Maps (2021), also been a straightforward process for every autonomous territory included in the research sample.

Previously autonomous, sovereign or stranded

According to previous research, groups that in the past were in possession of autonomous status or sovereign statehood and subsequently lost this status, or were left stranded outside their historical homeland due to border adjustments, might be more prone to secessionism (see e.g. Hroch 1996:84; Webb 2015:9–11; Germann and Sambanis 2021:178, 180, 189, 200). The independent variable *Previously autonomous, sovereign or stranded* was,

thus, constructed to denote these different scenarios as regards self-rule that the autonomous territories or their dominant ethnic groups might have experienced in the past. It was operationalized as a dichotomous independent variable taking the different scenarios into consideration. The first scenario denotes whether an autonomous territory or its dominant ethnic group has had a previous history of territorial decentralization that was dissolved at some point since the year 1800, regardless of whether that arrangement was equivalent in scope of powers to the current or most recent territorial autonomy arrangement or whether it consisted of some other variant of territorial decentralization. The other scenario relates to whether an autonomous territory or its dominant ethnic group used to be in possession of internationally recognized sovereign statehood or was otherwise largely free from outside influence, and that this status was subsequently lost at some point since the year 1800. Finally, the variable also considers autonomous territories or rather dominant ethnic groups therein that at some point since the year 1800 were left stranded, i.e. their association with the current or most recent parent state is or was the result of past border adjustments that rendered them situated outside the borders of another sovereign state that may be regarded as their cultural motherland. These scenarios and the coding below are akin to the same approach that has been applied by Germann and Sambanis (2020; see below).

Thus, if an autonomous territory or the dominant ethnic group therein does not or did not have an experience of loss of territorial decentralization or sovereignty or having been stranded since the year 1800 and prior to the current or most recent territorial autonomy arrangement, this is coded with '0'. Conversely, if an autonomous territory or its dominant ethnic group does have or did have prior experience of loss of territorial decentralization or sovereignty or having been stranded, this is coded with '1'. The independent variable and the coding is presented in the dataset in the Appendix under the abbreviation 'PASS' (*Previously autonomous, sovereign or stranded*).

Data sources and criteria used for ascertaining the existence of any of these political statuses or events in the past primarily include the *Replication Data for: Political Exclusion, Lost Autonomy, and Escalating Conflict over Self-Determination* dataset by Germann and Sambanis (2020). This source lists ethnic groups rather than autonomous territories within currently existing sovereign states. However, identifying and linking ethnic groups with their respective autonomous territories that are included in this study has essentially been a straightforward task. In the few cases where the autonomous territory is home to multiple considerably sized ethnic groups, the historical experiences and status of the group that was dominant at the beginning of the current or latest territorial autonomy arrangement has been examined. In addition to the above-mentioned source, various encyclopaedias and other topic-related research and sources have also been

consulted to determine the previous political statuses of the autonomous territories included in the research sample of this study.

Relative economic performance

With respect to economic disparities between groups within sovereign states, previous research has also shown that such circumstances might determine whether secessionist sentiments and actions occur (see e.g. Horowitz 1981:170–171, 173–188; Wood 1981:116–118; Zarkovic Bookman 1992:39, 44, 94–95, 115, 161; Sorens 2012:16, 71, 97, 110, 156; Rezvani 2014:69–70). The independent variable *Relative economic performance* was created to outline differences in level of economic performance and prosperity between the autonomous territories and their parent states. From a broader perspective, this includes a wide scope of socio and macroeconomic indicators. From a narrower perspective it includes only GDP per capita. This narrower focus is applied especially for the quantitative part of the analysis which will be elaborated in the following. The continuous independent variable has been operationalized based on data on GDP per capita. In the first step of the data collection process, the aim has been to gather official or estimate data on this indicator of economic performance, which has been available for most cases. However, the exact type of GDP per capita data has varied over time and space. For instance, different benchmark currencies or years have been used for different autonomous territories and parent states. Also, in some cases different types of data have been used for the same autonomous territories and parent states for different measurement periods. In the complete absence of GDP per capita data other available economic performance indicators have been utilized in a few cases, such as gross social product per capita which was used in certain communist states. However, for the purpose of strict comparability, corresponding types of data for both the autonomous territories and their respective parent states for each year have consistently been used. For a few autonomous territories no economic performance data was obtained and these were coded as missing data. In instances where confirmed data values have been available only for certain years, the intervening years have been estimated by the author using data interpolation. In the absence of a second data value to conduct data interpolation based on a confirmed value, the undetermined values have been set to correspond with the confirmed data value that is nearest in time.

To harmonize the different types of data and to make them comparable between all autonomous territories and parent states as well as over time, in the second step of the data collection process all values were transformed into relative percentage values. More specifically, for each year the relative economic performance level of an autonomous territory is expressed as a percentage value of the performance level of its parent state (=100%). For

the quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4, log transformation was subsequently performed on this variable to reduce skewness. The independent variable is presented in the dataset in the Appendix under the abbreviation 'REP' (*Relative economic performance*).

Economic performance data has primarily been obtained from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division (2024) and from various national and territorial statistics offices' databases but also from other topic-related databases and research, central bank reports, statistical yearbooks, etc.

Fuel mineral resources

The presence or absence of natural resources, such as fuel mineral resources and non-fuel mineral resources (as applicable below), has in previous research been shown to influence the occurrence of secessionism and secession (see e.g. Ross 2004:46, 49–52, 61–63; Sorens 2012:71; Gehring and Schneider 2020:2, 16–17). Thus, the independent variable *Fuel mineral resources* was operationalized to denote whether the autonomous territories are or have been in possession of coal, oil or natural gas. This resulted in the creation of a dichotomous independent variable that takes into consideration both known deposits only as well as possible extraction of coal, oil or natural gas. Thus, this variable only focuses on the most traditional and common non-renewable primary energy sources in the world throughout the time period under study. In multiple cases, the presence or absence of fuel mineral resources has been confirmed only for certain years. The preceding, intervening or subsequent years without confirmed status have been estimated by the author as having the same status as the confirmed year nearest in time. For some autonomous territories, particularly those that are geographically contiguous with their parent states and, therefore, often not listed separately in the data sources, it has been somewhat difficult to unambiguously determine the presence or absence of fuel mineral resources. However, if a parent state does not possess such resources according to the data sources, the same status has naturally been applied to any geographically contiguous autonomous territory. If a parent state does possess fuel mineral resources, data on the exact location has generally been available and determining the status of any contiguous autonomous territory has generally not posed an issue. For other territories in which presence or absence of fuel mineral resources was undetermined but for which there is no indication of such resources existing, at least as far as the author has been able to deduce, the status has been determined as non-possession of fuel mineral resources.

Thus, if an autonomous territory does not or did not have known deposits of any of these types of fuel mineral resources and is or was therefore not conducting extraction either, this is coded with '0'. However, if an

autonomous territory has or had at least known deposits of any of these resources and is or was possibly also conducting extraction, this is coded with '1'. The independent variable and the coding are presented in the dataset in the Appendix under the abbreviation 'FMR' (*Fuel mineral resources*).

To ascertain the presence or absence of fuel mineral resources in the autonomous territories, the *Petroleum Dataset (PETRODATA)* by Lujala, Ketil Rød and Thieme (2007) and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2022) were the primary sources consulted but also other sources such as various statistical yearbooks and encyclopaedias, national and territorial statistics offices' databases and other topic-related research and data were used.

Non-fuel mineral resources

The independent variable *Non-fuel mineral resources* was constructed to denote whether the autonomous territories are or have been in possession of significant natural resources other than fuel mineral resources, such as precious metals, base metals, industrial minerals, gemstones, etc. The dichotomous independent variable that was created considers instances of at least known deposits but possibly also extraction of non-fuel minerals in the autonomous territories. For inclusion in this variable, significant deposits of any type of non-fuel mineral are required. More specifically, the presence of 'significant deposits' is determined if one or multiple non-fuel minerals are listed as natural resources in the autonomous territories according to the data sources consulted. If a resource is listed, it is considered as having significant commercial or other value. As was done with the foregoing independent variable, undetermined presence or absence of non-fuel mineral resources in an autonomous territory has been considered equal to non-possession. Likewise, years without confirmation regarding presence or absence were determined to have the same status as the confirmed year nearest in time.

Thus, if an autonomous territory does not or did not have known deposits of non-fuel mineral resources and is or was therefore not conducting extraction, this is coded with '0'. However, if an autonomous territory has or had at least known deposits of non-fuel mineral resources and extraction is or was possibly also conducted, this is coded with '1'. The independent variable and the coding are presented in the dataset in the Appendix under the abbreviation 'NFMR' (*Non-fuel mineral resources*).

The data sources consulted to determine the presence or absence of non-fuel mineral resources in the autonomous territories consisted of a various range of statistical yearbooks and encyclopaedias as well as national and territorial statistics offices' databases and other topic-related research and sources.

Population size

Size in terms of population but also land area (as applicable further below) have in previous research been confirmed to have a bearing on the viability of sub-state groups and territories (see e.g. Aldrich and Connell 1998:113; Sorens 2012:71, 97; Ferdinand et al. 2020:46, 50, 60) and might also constitute determinants for the occurrence of secessionism and secession. The independent variable *Population size* was constructed to denote the total population size in absolute numbers of the autonomous territories. This resulted in the creation of a continuous independent variable. For the quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4, log transformation was then performed on the variable to reduce skewness. For some of the autonomous territories included in this study confirmed population data has been available only for certain years. In these cases, the author has conducted data interpolation to estimate the total population for the intervening years with missing population data values. In instances where a second data value required to conduct data interpolation based on a confirmed value has been missing, the undetermined data values have been given the same value as the confirmed population data value that is nearest in time. The independent variable is presented in the dataset in the Appendix under the abbreviation 'PS' (*Population size*).

As for the data used to determine the total population of the autonomous territories included in this study, data has primarily been obtained from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2022) but also regional, national and territorial statistics offices' databases as well as various statistical yearbooks, encyclopaedias, census data and other topic-related research.

Relative population size

The independent variable *Relative population size* outlines the difference in the total population of the autonomous territories relative to the total population of their parent states. This resulted in the construction of a continuous independent variable for which log transformation was subsequently performed to reduce skewness for the sake of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4. The variable was created by calculating the percentage share that the total population of the autonomous territories constitutes in relation to the total population of their respective parent states. Population data for the parent states was collected and handled in the same manner as described above concerning population size of the autonomous territories. In some cases, parent states include in their total population the populations of geographically contiguous as well as non-contiguous autonomous territories. In others, the populations of autonomous territories that might not be considered fully integral, often geographically non-contiguous autonomous

territories located far from their parent states, are excluded. Thus, the relative population size of all autonomous territories in this study needs to be operationalized in a comparable manner.

As for autonomous territories whose populations are confirmed as not enumerated with the total population of their parent states, their relative population size has been calculated against the total population of their parent states. The total population of a parent state includes the populations of its metropolitan territory and of all its potential autonomous territories that are confirmed or strongly presumed to be enumerated with its total population. However, it excludes the populations of all potential autonomous territories that are confirmed as not enumerated therein. For instance, the relative population size of Bermuda has been calculated against the total population of the United Kingdom, including England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland but excluding the population of Gibraltar. As for autonomous territories whose populations are confirmed or strongly presumed to be enumerated with the total population of their parent states, their relative population size has been calculated against the total population of the *remainder* of their parent states. The total population of the remainder of a parent state includes and excludes the populations of the same type of territories outlined in the previous scenario. However, it also excludes the population of the autonomous territory whose relative population size is being calculated. For instance, the relative population size of Scotland has been calculated against the total population of England, Wales and Northern Ireland but excluding the population of Gibraltar.

The relative population size of the autonomous territories was calculated based on the population data for the territories that was outlined above and on comparable data for their respective parent states, which was largely obtained from the same sources. The independent variable is presented in the dataset in the Appendix under the abbreviation 'RPS' (*Relative population size*).

Land area

The independent variable *Land area* was created to denote the total area in square kilometres of the autonomous territories, which resulted in the construction of a continuous independent variable. For the sake of the quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4, log transformation was subsequently performed on the variable to reduce skewness. Naturally, for most of the autonomous territories included in this study their land area has remained constant over time. In cases where border adjustment may have altered the land area of certain autonomous territories during their autonomy periods, the values have been modified at the relevant point in time. For currently existing autonomous territories modern-day data has been used for ascertaining their land area as these data are assumed to be

most accurate compared to older assessments. For formerly existing autonomous territories, however, data sources stemming from the end of their autonomy periods have been used rather than modern-day estimates. The main reason for using older estimates for these autonomous territories is to capture their territorial size, or at least the conventional knowledge thereof, at the time of their dissolution to eliminate the risk of applying modern-day assessments that might include potential subsequent territorial adjustments unknown to the author. The independent variable is presented in the dataset in the Appendix under the abbreviation 'LA' (*Land area*).

The primary data source used to determine the total land area of the autonomous territories in this study is *The Statesman's Yearbook 2015: The Politics, Cultures and Economies of the World* by Turner (2014) but to some extent also various statistical yearbooks and other topic-related research.

Relative land area

The independent variable *Relative land area* was constructed to denote the difference in the total land area of the autonomous territories vis-à-vis the total land area of their respective parent states. This also resulted in the creation of a continuous independent variable. Log transformation was subsequently performed on the variable to reduce skewness for the quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4. As with the corresponding independent variable concerning relative population size, this variable was created by calculating the percentage share that the total land area of the autonomous territories constitutes in comparison to the total land area of their respective parent states. This required collecting data on the land area of parent states as well. As noted regarding the foregoing independent variable, both modern-day and older data sources were consulted depending on the period of existence of the autonomous territories. Corresponding sources have consistently been used for the respective parent states. Due to this, the land area data for some parent states may differ slightly in the Appendix depending on which of their autonomous territories are displayed and when they existed. To adjust for potential changes in the parent states' total land area, the same approach that was used for the autonomous territories was applied. As with the corresponding population-related independent variable, there are differences regarding whether the land area of geographically contiguous and non-contiguous autonomous territories is included in the total land area of their parent states depending on whether they are considered integral with their parent states or not. Therefore, all autonomous territories require a comparable approach for the operationalization of their relative land area.

Autonomous territories whose land areas are confirmed as not included in the total land area of their parent states are calculated against the total land area of their parent states. The total land area of a parent state includes

the land areas of its metropolitan territory and of all its potential autonomous territories that are confirmed or strongly presumed to be included in its total land area. However, it excludes the land areas of all potential autonomous territories that are confirmed not to be included therein. Again, this can be exemplified with Bermuda's relative land area that has been calculated vis-à-vis the total land area of the United Kingdom, including England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland but excluding the land area of, for instance, Gibraltar. Conversely, autonomous territories whose land areas are confirmed or strongly presumed to be included in the total land area of their parent states are calculated against the total land area of the *remainder* of their parent states. This includes and excludes the same type of territories as previously exemplified, but it also excludes the land area of the autonomous territory that is being calculated. Again, the example of Scotland is applicable in this instance, as its relative land area has been calculated against the combined land area of England, Wales and Northern Ireland but excluding the land area of Gibraltar.

The relative land area was calculated based on the data that was collected for the autonomous territories for the foregoing independent variable as well as on corresponding land area data for their respective parent states. Thus, the data sources that have been consulted to ascertain the land area of the parent states primarily were the same as those used for the foregoing variable. The independent variable is presented in the dataset in the Appendix under the abbreviation 'RLA' (*Relative land area*).

3.4.1 Qualitative data

As the qualitative case study analyses conducted in Chapters 5 and 6 examine the independent variables that show the most explanatory power with respect to the dependent variable, i.e. *Autonomy failure by secession*, according to the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4, the primary focus naturally lies on qualitative data related to these variables.

Previous research by case experts has been used for the case-specific introductions and background information. As for the processes concerning structural political conditions and political developments in the autonomous territories, as well as the rhetoric and viewpoints from leaders regarding matters pertaining to self-determination in general and the key independent variables in particular, numerous data sources have been consulted. Examples of such sources are constitution orders, records of parliamentary debates and statements, political party manifestos, newspaper articles referencing statements made by politicians and officials, election results, etc. Other data sources used for determining the status of the key independent variables in the autonomous territories over time include, for instance, a various array of statistical yearbooks, intergovernmental organizations, national and territorial statistics offices, government agencies and

departments, censuses and other relevant data and case-related research. The examination of the cases has also been complemented with research conducted by other scholars for the purpose of providing additional context to the processes that explain the different outcomes regarding autonomy failure by secession in the respective cases.

3.5 Summary

This chapter elaborated on the research design and methodological approach in this dissertation. First, the application and benefits of a mixed-methods approach and the different types thereof was described, followed by confirmation that this study applies an integrated mixed-methods approach in which the qualitative analysis builds on the results from the preceding quantitative analysis. Then, a description of event history analysis with Cox regression analysis used for the quantitative analysis and of process tracing used for the subsequent qualitative case study analyses was provided.

Thereafter, the research sample used in this study in general and in the initial quantitative analysis was described and further defined. The cases are fundamentally based on David Rezvani's (2014) set of so-called partially independent territories (PITs). However, due to the specific criteria applied for determining case inclusion in this study the total life span of some of the territories was extended, whereas the total life span of others was reduced. For the same reason, some of Rezvani's territories were also excluded altogether and some additional observations were included. Due to these modifications, the cases are referred to as autonomous territories in this study. Moreover, this study applies certain criteria for determining the acquisition of sovereign statehood. This resulted in some of the territories that Rezvani defined as partially independent throughout their existence instead being regarded as having attained sovereign statehood at some point. A list of autonomous territories included in this study and in the quantitative analysis was then presented. This totals 53 autonomous territories. A total of 11 autonomous territories have experienced the outcome of interest, i.e. autonomy failure by secession. The section concluded with a description of the case selection strategy applied for the qualitative analyses, confirming that a typical-case approach is utilized.

The operationalization of the outcome of interest, i.e. the dependent variable, was elaborated thereafter, as was the data and criteria used for determining acquisition of sovereign statehood. The criteria relate to whether an autonomous territory was recognized as a sovereign state by France and the United Kingdom prior to 1920 or whether it was recognized by at least two major powers post-1920 or had attained membership in the League of Nations or the United Nations.

The following section of this chapter described, primarily for the purpose of the quantitative analysis, the operationalization of the 11 independent

variables outlined in Chapter 2 as well as the data sources used during the data collection process. For the quantitative analysis, there is one categorical variable and four dichotomous variables and six continuous variables for which log transformation was performed to reduce skewness. The section concluded with a presentation of the qualitative data types and sources that are examined for the purpose of the case study analyses.

In the next chapter, the initial quantitative analysis is performed as the first step in addressing the overall aim and research questions of this study.

4 Quantitative analysis

In this chapter, the initial quantitative part of the overall analysis of the study is conducted. The purpose is to discern which of the independent variables selected in Chapter 2 and operationalized in Chapter 3 that appear to have the strongest bearing on the dependent variable, i.e. *Autonomy failure by secession*. The following are the 11 independent variables related to territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability that were selected: *Ethnic distinctiveness – Level of distinctiveness 1 (LoD 1)* or *Level of distinctiveness 2 (LoD 2); Geographical distance (ln); Geographical contiguousness; Previously autonomous, sovereign or stranded; Relative economic performance (ln); Fuel mineral resources; Non-fuel mineral resources; Population size (ln); Relative population size (ln); Land area (ln)* and *Relative land area (ln)*.

As outlined in the previous chapter, for the purpose of the quantitative analysis the independent variable *Relative economic performance (ln)* focuses explicitly on GDP per capita levels in the autonomous territories vis-à-vis their parent states.

The chapter seeks to quantitatively identify the independent variables related to territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability within the autonomous territories themselves that may have contributed most to why some of them since the early 20th century have failed by secession and become fully sovereign states. To that end, event history analysis by means of Cox regression analysis is conducted.

In the first section, bivariate Cox regression analysis is run for each of the independent variables against the dependent variable to ascertain which of the independent variables that individually display the most explanatory power in terms of statistical significance and association with *Autonomy failure by secession*. The independent variables that display the highest level of statistical significance are then included in the second section in which multivariate Cox regression analysis is performed. In this section, the independent variables are first all pitted against each other and analysed. Then, they are subjected to different combinations of multivariate regression analysis in a pairwise manner. Conducting pairwise multivariate regression analysis with at most two independent variables is reasonable due to the low number of events per predictor variable (EVP) that can be identified in the research sample of this study.

The chapter concludes with a summary in which the overall explanatory power of the independent variables based on the results in the bivariate and multivariate regression analyses is recapitulated. This section also elaborates on the case selection procedure for the qualitative case study analysis that is conducted in Chapters 5 and 6.

4.1 Bivariate regression analysis

The results from the bivariate regression analysis as regards the explanatory power of each independent variable on the dependent variable, i.e. *Autonomy failure by secession*, is presented in Table 3 below. The results from the analysis are elaborated in the following subsection.

Independent variable		SE	Sig.	HR
Ethnic distinctiveness				
	Level of distinctiveness 1 (LoD 1)	1.118	.180	4.475
	Level of distinctiveness 2 (LoD 2)	1.082	.004	22.001
Geographical distance (ln)		.255	.011	1.912
Geographical contiguousness		.678	.962	1.033
Previously autonomous, sovereign or stranded		.606	.373	1.715
Relative economic performance (ln)		.326	<.001	.198
Fuel mineral resources		.606	.029	3.771
Non-fuel mineral resources		.606	.710	.799
Population size (ln)		.165	.067	1.353
Relative population size (ln)		.181	.290	1.210
Land area (ln)		.103	.004	1.340
Relative land area (ln)		.095	.083	1.180

Table 3. Bivariate regression analysis of the independent variables against the dependent variable. Prior to analysis, log transformation (ln) was performed on *Geographical distance*, *Relative economic performance*, *Population size*, *Relative population size*, *Land area* and *Relative land area*.

4.1.1 Results

The effect of the level of ethnic distinctiveness in terms of language and religion in autonomous territories was analysed using a categorical independent variable. *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 1)* denotes whether an autonomous territory is distinct from its parent state in terms of either language or religion. The analysis indicated that for such territories there is a notable positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=4.475) compared to autonomous territories that are not distinct from their parent states at all in terms of these aspects. The independent variable was, however, not statistically significant (p=0.180). *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)*, in turn, denotes whether an autonomous territory is distinct from its parent state in terms of both language and religion. The analysis suggested a strong positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=22.001) compared to autonomous territories that are not distinct from their parent states. This independent variable was also highly statistically significant (p=0.004).

Geographical distance (ln) denotes the distance in kilometres between the locality of the seats of power of an autonomous territory and its parent state. The analysis indicated a moderate positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=1.912) the greater the distance between the autonomous territories and their parent states. Moreover, this independent variable reached a fairly high level of statistical significance (p=0.011).

Geographical contiguousness denotes whether an autonomous territory is physically attached to the land mass of its parent state or separated by a body of water. The analysis implied the existence of a modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=1.033) for autonomous territories that are separated from their parent states compared to those that are not, although the independent variable was not statistically significant (p=0.962).

Previously autonomous, sovereign or stranded denotes whether an autonomous territory or its dominant ethnic group has since the year 1800 experienced any of these types of losses or changes to its status prior to its current or latest autonomy arrangement. The analysis suggested a moderate positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=1.715) for autonomous territories that have had such experiences compared to those that have not, but the independent variable was not statistically significant (p=0.373).

Relative economic performance (ln) denotes the economic performance of an autonomous territory in terms of GDP per capita in percentage relative to its parent state. The analysis indicated a strong negative association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=0.198) the more prosperous the autonomous territories are, and the independent variable also reached a very high level of statistical significance (p=<0.001).

The effect of autonomous territories having natural resources was analysed using two separate independent variables. *Fuel mineral resources* denotes whether an autonomous territory possesses this type of resources or not. The analysis suggested a notable positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=3.771) for autonomous territories that possess fuel mineral resources compared to those that do not. The independent variable reached a level of statistical significance (p=0.029).

Non-fuel mineral resources, in turn, similarly denotes whether an autonomous territory possesses such resources or not. The analysis indicated a modest negative association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=0.799) for autonomous territories that possess non-fuel mineral resources compared to those with none. This independent variable was, however, not statistically significant (p=0.710).

The effect of the population size of autonomous territories was also analysed using two separate independent variables. *Population size (ln)* denotes the total population size in absolute numbers of an autonomous territory. The analysis implied a modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=1.353) the greater the population size of the autonomous territories, although the independent variable was not statistically significant (p=0.067).

Relative population size (ln), in turn, denotes the population size of an autonomous territory in percentage relative to its parent state. This analysis also suggested a modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=1.210) the greater the relative population size of the autonomous territories. However, this independent variable was not statistically significant either (p=0.290).

As with the population-related independent variables, two independent variables relating to the land area of the autonomous territories were analysed. *Land area (ln)* denotes the total land area in square kilometres of an autonomous territory. The analysis indicated a modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=1.340) the larger the land area of the autonomous territories, and this independent variable was highly statistically significant (p=0.004).

Relative land area (ln) instead denotes the land area of an autonomous territory in percentage relative to its parent state. This analysis also indicated a modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=1.180) the larger the relative land area of the autonomous territories, although this independent variable was not statistically significant (p=0.083).

In conclusion, the bivariate regression analysis indicated that the following five independent variables reached a level of statistical significance, enumerated in descending order according to their level of significance: *Relative economic performance (ln)*, (p=<0.001); *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)*, (p=0.004); *Land area (ln)*, (p=0.004); *Geographical distance (ln)*, (p=0.011) and *Fuel mineral resources*, (p=0.029). Based on the

results thus far, it could be assumed that these independent variables might contribute to explaining why some autonomous territories have experienced *Autonomy failure by secession*. To reach a more solid statistical result, the independent variables were subjected to multivariate regression analysis.

4.2 Multivariate regression analysis

In this section, the results from the multivariate regression analyses of the five statistically significant independent variables according to the bivariate regression analysis are presented. Table 4 displays Model 1 with the results from the analysis in which all independent variables were pitted against each other. Tables 5 and 6 display Models 2–11 with the results from the pairwise analysis with the independent variables analysed in different combinations. First, the variables that theoretically are more closely related to each other (Models 2 and 3) are analysed. Then, all variables are analysed in random combinations to discern potential interesting patterns (Models 4–11). The results are elaborated in the subsequent subsection. For the sake of comparison therein, the results from the bivariate regression analysis are also displayed within square brackets.

Model 1

Independent variable	SE	Sig.	HR
Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)	1.385	.455	2.816
Geographical distance (ln)	.332	.509	1.245
Relative economic performance (ln)	.518	.022	.305
Fuel mineral resources	1.422	.907	1.180
Land area (ln)	.227	.429	1.197

Table 4. Multivariate regression analysis (Model 1) of the independent variables that reached a level of statistical significance against the dependent variable in the bivariate regression analysis (see Table 3).

	Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5			Model 6		
Independent variable	**SE**	**Sig.**	**HR**	**SE**	**Sig.**	**HR**	**SE**	**Sig.**	**HR**	**SE**	**Sig.**	**HR**	**SE**	**Sig.**	**HR**
Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)	1.092	.013	14.901				1.191	.187	4.815	1.085	.003	24.732	1.097	.012	15.798
Geographical distance (ln)	.269	.059	1.663												
Relative economic performance (ln)				.324	<.001	.210	.379	<.001	.262						
Fuel mineral resources				.611	.069	3.034				.616	.017	4.361			
Land area (ln)													.107	.042	1.245

Table 5. Pairwise multivariate regression analysis (Models 2–6) of the independent variables that reached a level of statistical significance against the dependent variable in the bivariate regression analysis (see Table 3).

	Model 7			Model 8			Model 9			Model 10			Model 11		
Independent variable	**SE**	**Sig.**	**HR**	**SE**	**Sig.**	**HR**	**SE**	**Sig.**	**HR**	**SE**	**Sig.**	**HR**	**SE**	**Sig.**	**HR**
Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)															
Geographical distance (ln)	.311	.365	1.325	.237	.003	2.022	.244	.010	1.880						
Relative economic performance (ln)	.371	<.001	.237							.328	<.001	.214			
Fuel mineral resources				.611	.006	5.307							.872	.720	1.367
Land area (ln)							.084	.005	1.265	.101	.025	1.254	.149	.088	1.290

Table 6. Pairwise multivariate regression analysis (Models 7–11) of the independent variables that reached a level of statistical significance against the dependent variable in the bivariate regression analysis (see Table 3).

4.2.1 Results

In Model 1, all statistically significant independent variables from the bivariate regression analysis were analysed. The analysis indicated that for *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)* the strong positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* that was inferred in the bivariate analysis was greatly reduced (HR=2.816 [22.001]), and its high level of statistical significance was lost (p=0.455 [0.004]). As for *Geographical distance (ln)*, the moderate positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* was somewhat reduced (HR=1.245 [1.912]), and its fairly high level of statistical significance was also lost (p=0.509 [0.011]). For *Relative economic performance (ln)*, in contrast, the strong negative association with *Autonomy failure by secession* was retained (HR=0.305 [0.198]), although the very high level of statistical significance was considerably reduced (p=0.022 [<0.001]). As regards *Fuel mineral resources*, its notable positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* was greatly reduced (HR=1.180 [3.771]), and its statistical significance was lost (p=0.907 [0.029]). Finally, with respect to *Land area (ln)* the modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* was retained (HR=1.197 [1.340]), although its high level of statistical significance that was deduced in the bivariate analysis was lost (p=0.429 [0.004]).

In Model 2, *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)* and *Geographical distance (ln)* were analysed. The analysis suggested that for the former independent variable the strong positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* deduced in the bivariate analysis was somewhat reduced but still strong (HR=14.901 [22.001]), and its high level of statistical significance was also somewhat reduced (p=0.013 [0.004]). For the latter variable, the moderate positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* was also somewhat reduced (HR=1.663 [1.912]), and its fairly high level of statistical significance was lost (p=0.059 [0.011]).

In Model 3, *Relative economic performance (ln)* and *Fuel mineral resources* were analysed. The analysis indicated that for the former independent variable, the strong negative association with *Autonomy failure by secession* that was inferred in the bivariate analysis was retained (HR=0.210 [0.198]), as was the very high level of statistical significance (p=<0.001 [=<0.001]). As for the latter variable, the notable positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* was somewhat reduced (HR=3.034 [3.771]), and the statistical significance was lost (p=0.069 [0.029]).

Model 4 analysed *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)* and *Relative economic performance (ln)*. For the former independent variable, the analysis indicated that the strong positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* obtained in the bivariate analysis was greatly reduced (HR=4.815 [22.001]), and its high level of statistical significance was lost (p=0.187 [0.004]). For the latter variable, the strong negative association with *Autonomy failure by*

secession was retained (HR=0.262 [0.198]), and it also retained a very high level of statistical significance (p=<0.001 [<0.001]).

In Model 5, *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)* and *Fuel mineral resources* were analysed. The analysis suggested that the former independent variable retained and somewhat increased the strong positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* that was inferred the bivariate analysis (HR=24.732 [22.001]), and it also retained and slightly increased its high level of statistical significance (p=0.003 [0.004]). As regards the latter variable, it also retained and somewhat increased its notable positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=4.361 [3.771]) as well as its level of statistical significance (p=0.017 [0.029]).

Model 6 analysed *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)* and *Land area (ln)*. The analysis indicated that for the former independent variable the strong positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* deduced in the bivariate analysis was somewhat reduced although still strong (HR=15.798 [22.001]), and its high level of statistical significance was also somewhat reduced (p=0.012 [0.004]). For the latter variable, the modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* was retained (HR=1.245 [1.340]), although its high level of statistical significance was considerably reduced (p=0.042 [0.004]).

Model 7 analysed *Geographical distance (ln)* and *Relative economic performance (ln)*. The analysis suggested that for the former independent variable the moderate positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* obtained in the bivariate analysis was somewhat reduced (HR=1.325 [1.912]), and it lost its fairly high level of statistical significance (p=0.365 [0.011]). The latter variable retained a strong negative association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=0.237 [0.198]), and it retained a very high level of statistical significance (p=<0.001 [=<0.001]).

In Model 8, *Geographical distance (ln)* and *Fuel mineral resources* were analysed. Regarding the former independent variable, the analysis implied that the moderate positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* obtained in the bivariate analysis was retained and slightly increased (HR=2.022 [1.912]), and it also somewhat increased its fairly high level of statistical significance (p=0.003 [0.011]). As for the latter variable, it also retained and somewhat increased its notable positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* (HR=5.307 [3.771]), while it considerably increased its level of statistical significance (p=0.006 [0.029]).

Model 9 analysed *Geographical distance (ln)* and *Land area (ln)*. The analysis indicated that for the former independent variable the moderate positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* that was inferred in the bivariate analysis was retained (HR=1.880 [1.912]), as was its fairly high level of statistical significance (p=0.010 [0.011]). The latter variable also retained both a modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by*

secession (HR=1.265 [1.340]) and a high level of statistical significance (p=0.005 [0.004]).

In Model 10, *Relative economic performance (ln)* and *Land area (ln)* were analysed. The analysis suggested that the former independent variable retained the strong negative association with *Autonomy failure by secession* that it obtained in the bivariate analysis (HR=0.214 [0.198]), while it also retained a very high level of statistical significance (p=<0.001 [<0.001]). For the latter variable, the modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* was retained (HR=1.254 [1.340]), although its high level of statistical significance was considerably reduced (p=0.025 [0.004]).

Finally, Model 11 analysed *Fuel mineral resources* and *Land area (ln)*. The analysis implied that for the former independent variable, the notable positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* inferred in the bivariate analysis was greatly reduced (HR=1.367 [3.771]), and its statistical significance was lost (p=0.720 [0.029]). For the latter variable, the modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* was retained (HR=1.290 [1.340]), but its high level of statistical significance was also lost (p=0.088 [0.004]).

4.3 Summary and case selection for qualitative analysis

According to the bivariate regression analysis the following independent variables did not reach a level of statistical significance and were hence excluded from further analysis: *Geographical contiguousness* (p=0.962), thus contradicting *Hypothesis 3*; *Non-fuel mineral resources* (p=0.710), thus contradicting *Hypothesis 7*; *Previously autonomous, sovereign or stranded* (p=0.373), thus contradicting *Hypothesis 4*; *Relative population size (ln)* (p=0.290), thus contradicting *Hypotheses 8b and 8c*; *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 1)* (p=0.180), thus contradicting *Hypothesis 1a*; *Relative land area (ln)* (p=0.083), thus contradicting *Hypothesis 9b* and *Population size (ln)* (p=0.067), thus contradicting *Hypothesis 8a*.

However, the bivariate analysis produced five statistically significant independent variables: *Relative economic performance (ln)* (p=<0.001); *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)* (p=0.004); *Land area (ln)* (p=0.004); *Geographical distance (ln)* (p=0.011) and *Fuel mineral resources* (p=0.029). These variables were then analysed in different multivariate models, altogether and pairwise, to further ascertain their explanatory power. The variables are presented below in descending order according to their overall performance in these models.

Relative economic performance (ln) reached a level of statistical significance while also indicating a notable negative association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with all other independent variables (p=0.022 and HR=0.305). In the pairwise multivariate models it also reached a very high level of statistical significance and indicated a strong

negative association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with *Fuel mineral resources* (p=<0.001 and HR=0.210), *Land area (ln)* (p=<0.001 and HR=0.214), *Geographical distance (ln)* (p=<0.001 and HR=0.237) and *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)* (p=<0.001 and HR=0.262). In none of these multivariate models was the variable's statistical significance or negative association with *Autonomy failure by secession* strengthened compared to its individual performance in the bivariate analysis (p=<0.001 and HR=0.198). Given these results and the fact that statistical significance was reached in all five multivariate models, *Hypothesis 5b* is confirmed, whereas *Hypothesis 5a* is contradicted.

Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2) lost its statistical significance and indicated a moderate positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with all other independent variables (p=0.455 and HR=2.816). However, in the pairwise multivariate models it reached a high or fairly high level of statistical significance and indicated a strong positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with *Fuel mineral resources* (p=0.003 and HR=24.732), *Land area (ln)* (p=0.012 and HR=15.798) and *Geographical distance (ln)* (p=0.013 and HR=14.901). Interestingly, the variable's statistical significance and positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* were both slightly strengthened when analysed with *Fuel mineral resources*, compared to its individual performance in the bivariate analysis (p=0.004 and HR=22.001). However, its statistical significance was lost although it suggested a notable positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with *Relative economic performance (ln)* (p=0.187 and HR=4.815). Given these results and that statistical significance was reached in in three out of five multivariate models, *Hypothesis 1b* is tentatively confirmed.

Land area (ln) lost its statistical significance and indicated a mere modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with all other independent variables (p=0.429 and HR=1.197). However, in the pairwise multivariate models it reached a level of statistical significance, and in one instance a high level, and indicated a modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with *Geographical distance (ln)* (p=0.005 and HR=1.265), *Relative economic performance (ln)* (p=0.025 and HR=1.254) and *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)* (p=0.042 and HR=1.245). In none of these multivariate models was the variable's statistical significance or positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* strengthened compared to its individual performance in the bivariate analysis (p=0.004 and HR=1.340). Moreover, its statistical significance was lost, and it suggested a mere modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with *Fuel mineral resources* (p=0.088 and HR=1.290). In light of these results and that statistical significance was reached in three out of five multivariate models, *Hypothesis 9a* is tentatively confirmed.

Fuel mineral resources lost its statistical significance while also indicating a modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with all other independent variables (p=0.907 and HR=1.180). In the pairwise multivariate models, however, it reached a high or fairly high level of statistical significance and indicated a notable positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with *Geographical distance (ln)* (p=0.006 and HR=5.307) and *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)* (p=0.017 and HR=4.361). The variable's statistical significance and positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* were in fact both considerably strengthened when pairwise analysed with both *Geographical distance (ln)* and *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)*, compared to its individual performance in the bivariate analysis (p=0.029 and HR=3.771). However, its statistical significance was lost, and it indicated a notable or modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with *Relative economic performance (ln)* (p=0.069 and HR=3.034) and *Land area (ln)* (p=0.720 and HR=1.367). Considering these results and that statistical significance was reached in two out of five multivariate models only, *Hypothesis 6* is contradicted.

Geographical distance (ln) lost its statistical significance and indicated a mere modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with all other independent variables (p=0.509 and HR=1.245). In the pairwise multivariate models, however, it reached a high level of statistical significance and indicated a moderate positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with *Fuel mineral resources* (p=0.003 and HR=2.022) and *Land area (ln)* (p=0.010 and HR=1.880). This variable's statistical significance and positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* were also somewhat strengthened when analysed primarily with *Fuel mineral resources*, compared to its individual performance in the bivariate analysis (p=0.011 and HR=1.912). However, its statistical significance was lost although it implied a moderate or modest positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* when analysed with *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)* (p=0.059 and HR=1.663) and *Relative economic performance (ln)* (p=0.365 and HR=1.325). Given these results and that statistical significance was reached in only two out of five multivariate models, *Hypothesis 2* is contradicted.

In sum, the quantitative analysis has indicated that in terms of statistical significance and strength of association with *Autonomy failure by secession*, primarily *Relative economic performance (ln)* but also *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)* provided the most convincing results. *Land area (ln)* also performed well although not as convincingly so. As for *Relative economic performance (ln)*, the negative association with *Autonomy failure by secession* implies, in other words, that an autonomous territory that is more prosperous than its parent state in terms of GDP per capita is less likely to secede. Conversely, the results can also be interpreted as indicating that an autonomous territory

that is less prosperous than its parent state is more likely to secede. As for *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)*, the positive association with *Autonomy failure by secession* implies that an autonomous territory that is linguistically *and* religiously distinct vis-à-vis its parent state is more likely to secede compared to one that is not distinct at all. The results can also be interpreted as indicating that an autonomous territory that is not distinct at all is less likely to secede compared to one that is.

Moreover, and interestingly, the analyses indicated that the presence of both *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)* and *Fuel mineral resources* might particularly contribute to an autonomous territory seceding, as the former independent variable performed slightly better in this combination than it did individually in the bivariate analysis and the latter performed considerably better. Similarly, the presence of both *Fuel mineral resources* and *Geographical distance (ln)* resulted in the former performing considerably better and the latter somewhat better in this combination than they did individually. Particularly *Fuel mineral resources* seems to gain influence when existing as part of these specific contexts.

Given the overall superior performance of *Relative economic performance (ln)* and *Ethnic distinctiveness (LoD 2)*, these independent variables constitute the point of departure in the selection of cases for qualitative case study analysis.

4.3.1 Case selection for qualitative analysis

To further ascertain whether the most robust independent variables according to the quantitative analysis in this chapter might indeed be associated with and contribute to the occurrence of autonomy failure by secession, the following hypotheses will be further tested by means of qualitative case study analysis:

Hypothesis 1b: *Autonomous territories that have both a dominant language and religion that are distinct from the dominant language and religion in the rest of their parent states are more likely to secede than those that have not.*

Hypothesis 5b: *Autonomous territories that are relatively more prosperous in relation to the rest of their parent states are less likely to secede than those that are relatively less prosperous.*

Process tracing will be used in two typical cases that reflect the results obtained thus far. The first case is selected with the aim of explaining the direct trajectory that leads to autonomy failure by secession. The interpretation of the results that inversely and directly align with that outcome is applied. Hence, a relatively less prosperous and linguistically and religiously distinct autonomous territory that that did secede from its parent

state is selected. However, to more comprehensively analyse the contributory causes behind autonomy failure by secession, an inverse approach is applied by selecting an autonomous territory that lacks these features and this outcome. Hence, based on the corresponding direct and inverse interpretation of the results, a relatively more prosperous but not linguistically and religiously distinct autonomous territory that has not seceded from its parent state is selected. The purpose is to ascertain whether the absence of the statistically significant independent variables might also explain the absence of autonomy failure by secession.

Both cases are selected based on all autonomous territories' mean values on the two independent variables that displayed the most explanatory power according to the quantitative analysis, i.e. *Relative economic performance* in terms of GDP per capita and *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion, throughout their period(s) of territorial autonomy until acquisition of sovereign statehood (Table 7) or until year 2020 for those territories that until then remained autonomous (Table 8). The autonomous territories are sorted in descending order according to their values on the most robust independent variable, i.e. *Relative economic performance*. The values are based on the data that was used for the quantitative analysis (see Appendix).

In the selection of cases, one must consider that the research sample of this study consists of a relatively small number of autonomous territories, and considerably fewer still of such that have experienced autonomy failure by secession. Moreover, case study analysis might present challenges with data availability, especially when analysing historical developments in sub-state territories for which data might be scarce, unavailable or lacking altogether. This, together with the above-mentioned case selection approach, has resulted in the selection of Malta and the Cayman Islands for analysis.

Experience of Autonomy failure by secession 1901–2020	**Autonomy period(s) 1901–2020** (final year denotes occurrence of Autonomy failure by secession)	**Rel. econ. per. %**	**Ethn. dist.**
Australia	1901–1920	98	0
Irish Free State	1921–1922	57	1
South Sudan	1972–1983, 2005–2011	46	2
Kosovo	1974–1989, 2001–2008	40	2
South Africa	1910–1920	38	1.6
Palau	1981–1994	31	2
Suriname	1954–1975	27	0.8
Malta	1921–1930, 1932–1933, 1947–1958, 1961–1964	18	2
Southern Rhodesia	1923–1953, 1964–1965	11	2
Marshall Isl.	1979–1991	7	1
Micronesia, (F.S.)	1979–1991	7	2

Table 7. Mean values of *Relative economic performance* (GDP per capita of the autonomous territory as % of that of the parent state) and *Ethnic distinctiveness* (language and religion) for autonomy period(s) of each autonomous territory that experienced *Autonomy failure by secession*.

No experience of Autonomy failure by secession 1901–2020	Autonomy period(s) 1901–2020 (year/final year denotes commencement of most recent autonomy period prior to year 2020)	Rel. econ. per. %	Ethn. dist.
Hong Kong	1997–	809	1
Bermuda	1968–	284	0
Cayman Isl.	1962–	206	0
Aosta Valley	1948–	147	0
South Tyrol	1972–	135	1
Trentino	1972–	133	0
Catalonia	1932–1934, 1936–1939, 1979–2017, 2018–	125	0.1
Basque Country	1936–1937, 1979–	122	0
Vojvodina	1974–1990, 2009–	116	0
Nunavut	1999–	111	2
Åland Isl.	1920–	108	1
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1963–	102	0.4
Scotland	1999–	91	0
Zanzibar	1979–	90	0.5
Madeira	1976–	89	0
Galicia	1981–	84	1
Gibraltar	1964–	84	1
Azores	1976–	83	0
New Caledonia	1998–	79	0
British Virgin Isl.	1967–	78	0
Faroe Isl.	1948–	76	1
Greenland	1979–	76	1
Aruba	1986–	75	1
Sardinia	1948–	74	0
Wales	1999–	72	0
Sint Maarten	2010–	68	2
Sicily	1946–	66	0.8
Northern Ireland	1921–1972, 1999–2002, 2007–	63	0.2
French Polynesia	1977–	61	0.9
Gagauzia	1995–	58	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1976–1986, 1988–2009, 2012–	54	0
Puerto Rico	1952–	46	2
Cook Isl.	1965–	38	0
Curacao	2010–	38	1
Northern Mariana Isl.	1978–	38	2
Bangsamoro A.R.	1990–	33	2
Niue	1974–	15	1
Bougainville	2004–	*ND*	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2006–	*ND*	2

Table 8. Mean values of *Relative economic performance* (GDP per capita of the autonomous territory as % of that of the parent state) and *Ethnic distinctiveness* (language and religion) for autonomy period(s) of each autonomous territory that did not experience *Autonomy failure by secession*.

Malta (see Table 7) is a case that did experience autonomy failure by secession and that reflects the results of the quantitative analysis. Again, with respect to *Relative economic performance* the result indicated that relative prosperity of an autonomous territory vis-à-vis its parent state equals a lesser likelihood of *Autonomy failure by secession*. However, the inverse interpretation of the result is that relative economic deprivation equals a greater likelihood of such an outcome occurring. As the latter trajectory is of interest in the first case to be analysed, Malta is a suitable selection. Malta

was an autonomous territory that, compared to its parent state and throughout its periods of territorial autonomy, was considerably less prosperous since its mean GDP per capita level only constituted about 18 percent of that of the United Kingdom. However, Malta was not the most typical, i.e. comparatively least prosperous autonomous territory, of all those that did transition into sovereign statehood. Thus, Malta cannot be considered an extreme outlier among the typical cases. As for *Ethnic distinctiveness*, the result of the quantitative analysis, again, indicated that maximal ethnic distinctiveness in terms of language and religion in an autonomous territory vis-à-vis its parent state equals a greater likelihood of *Autonomy failure by secession*. With respect to this, Malta is also a suitable case since it directly aligns with this result as it, in relation to its parent state, was a maximally ethnically distinct autonomous territory with a total mean score of 2 on this independent variable.

In line with the purpose of the second case to be analysed, the Cayman Islands (see Table 8) is an autonomous territory that did not experience autonomy failure by secession and that also reflects the results of the quantitative analysis although, again, from an inverse perspective. As for *Relative economic performance*, the Cayman Islands directly aligns with the result of this independent variable since during its existence as an autonomous territory it has been considerably more prosperous than its parent state with a mean GDP per capita level of about 206 percent of that of the United Kingdom. However, and as with Malta, the Cayman Islands is not the most typical, i.e. comparatively most prosperous, case either of those autonomous territories that have not become sovereign states and, likewise, the Cayman Islands cannot be considered an extreme outlier. With respect to *Ethnic distinctiveness*, the inverse interpretation of the result of the quantitative analysis suggests that no ethnic distinctiveness at all in terms of language and religion equals a lesser likelihood of *Autonomy failure by secession*. As this trajectory is of interest in the second case that is to be analysed, the Cayman Islands is a suitable selection since, compared to its parent state, it is not a distinct autonomous territory at all regarding these ethnic aspects as its total mean score was 0 on this independent variable.

In the following two chapters, the quantitative findings of this chapter will be examined in these cases by means of process tracing with the purpose of further determining whether they appear to hold true or whether there might be other aspects or factors that contribute to explaining autonomy failure by secession in autonomous territories, and indeed the absence thereof. Given that *Relative economic performance* in terms of GDP per capita is a rather narrow aspect of territory or group viability, the impact of other related aspects and factors will also be examined in the case studies. Due to the absence of linguistic and religious distinctiveness in the Cayman Islands, a wider examination of ethnic distinctiveness beyond these aspects is also warranted in this particular case.

5 Qualitative analysis: Malta

In this chapter, case study analysis is conducted to infer whether the results from the quantitative analysis in the previous chapter can be further corroborated and whether *Relative economic performance*, i.e. relative economic deprivation, and *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion appear to have been important determinants that contributed to *Autonomy failure by secession* in Malta in 1964.

The first section of this chapter introduces Malta's early history, starting when the islands came under British rule and the subsequent developments leading, on the one hand, to its acquisition of territorial autonomy and, on the other, to Malta becoming a sovereign state. The second section of the chapter analyses Malta's position and development with respect to *Relative economic performance* and *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion during its period of territorial autonomy to ascertain these independent variables' possible influence on Malta's decision to secede. However, as previously stated, the former independent variable will be examined from a broader perspective than in the quantitative analysis with other aspects thereof also considered. First, the section provides an overview of Malta's performance with respect to certain economic and welfare indicators over time and in comparison to its parent state, followed by an examination of the concurrent and related political and societal developments. Second, it proceeds to present and examine Malta's ethnic distinctiveness in terms of language and religion, with an emphasis on the general influence thereof in Maltese politics and society. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.

5.1 History and constitutional developments

This section begins with a brief introductory subsection to Malta's history prior to the acquisition of territorial autonomy in 1921. It focuses primarily on the economic and welfare situation and shifts in Malta as well as the ethnic, social and political changes from the beginning of British rule in the early 19th century. The following subsection focuses specifically on the political and constitutional developments and regressions after the granting of territorial autonomy up until the acquisition of sovereign statehood in 1964.

5.1.1 The early years of British rule

Throughout its history and largely due to its strategic geographical location, Malta has been controlled or heavily influenced by numerous foreign rulers, such as the Phoenicians, Charthaginians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Normans, Sicilians and the Order of Knights of the Hospital of St. John of

Jerusalem (Austin 1971:3–5). In 1798, French forces took control of Malta, a change of rule that quickly became very unpopular among the residents. In response to this, Maltese leaders requested that the United Kingdom intervene and protect the islands from the French invaders. The subsequent conflict between the United Kingdom and France ended in 1800 and there were proposals that Malta be returned to rule under the Order of Knights (Dobie 1967:3–4). However, the Maltese strongly objected and, in the end, the return never materialised. British administration of the islands was finally formalised in the Treaty of Paris in 1814, making Malta a British colony (Rudolf 2018:10).

Throughout the entire period of British administration, calls for greater internal self-government were frequently voiced by the Maltese people. One of the early arguments presented in support of this was that already in 1282, the Maltese had been granted by the Kings of Aragon effective self-government through an elective legislative assembly, the *Consiglio Popolare*. The British, however, argued that this assembly had been discontinued during the rule of the Order of Knights and that when it did exist it had convened only rarely and for specific purposes and could not be likened with a representative or legislative institution (Dobie 1967:10–11). Moreover, according to Colonial Office Records 158/19, in an investigative commission the British had concluded that the Maltese were not equipped for representative government and instead concluded that crown colony government was preferable. This resulted in many Maltese feeling aggrieved at receiving the same status as other conquered territories of the British Empire, despite the fact that the Maltese had willingly joined the United Kingdom (cited in Dobie 1967:11).

After the British takeover, the Maltese experienced periods of both prosperity and hardship. In the early years of British rule, Malta became a commercial hub for large numbers of merchants and, as an important Mediterranean entrepôt, its affluence peaked. However, Malta's economy suffered a serious blow in 1812 when the plague originating from Constantinople struck and practically wiped out its foreign trade and prosperity. A couple of years later, the economy recovered somewhat, but during the following decades the overall conditions were dismal with widespread poverty, starvation and unhealthy living conditions. Towards the end of the 1830s, trade had rebounded to some extent, but it was the start of the Crimean War in 1854 that again brought prosperity to Malta. This was largely due to Malta's strategic location as a headquarter for the military operations which brought huge numbers of troops and sailors to the islands and the heavy traffic of warships in need of docking, but also repair, required significant expansions of the Admiralty Dockyard facilities located in Malta. In the 1860s, the economy suffered somewhat due to a cholera outbreak and trade competition from Italy but bounced back with the opening of the Suez Canal and the American Civil War, which temporarily gave Maltese cotton

production a competitive advantage. Towards the end of the century, the economy again deteriorated with cholera striking once more in 1887, resulting in reduced trade and increased unemployment. At the same time, the Dockyard authorities had also announced that the workforce would be reduced. Harbour commerce also decreased, as ships at this time had become more powerful and could travel farther without having to replenish at Malta. Ultimately, this development led to Malta's economy becoming increasingly dependent on one predominant source of revenue, namely British naval and military interests in the islands in connection to their strategic value (Busuttil 1965:45–63).

As regards ethnic aspects and especially language, the Maltese language was the vernacular of the masses, but it existed only as a spoken language in the early years of British rule (Rudolf 2018:165) and it was not until 1931 that a standard orthography was developed (Cassar 2001:270). Maltese is a Semitic language with certain similarities with Arabic and it was historically often associated with Islam (Cassar 2001:269), although throughout history it has also been significantly influenced by the Sicilian, Italian and English languages (Paggio and Gatt 2018:1). However, during the 19th century English and Italian were the preeminent languages in Malta and, as a consequence, were frequently at odds with each other. For the sake of enlightening people and promoting loyalty to the United Kingdom, according to Laferla, the British strived to increase the importance of the English language over that of Italian in the early years of administration. Knowledge in and usage of English was made preferable and even mandatory in judicial and governmental matters and positions (cited in Dobie 1967:13). The British efforts to promote the usage of English, and to a lesser extent Maltese, resulted in fierce protests from pro-Italianists, which largely consisted of the Maltese intelligentsia and the Roman Catholic clergy (Frendo 1981:24–25, 29). For the latter group, the Italian language was regarded as a safeguard to their faith (Dobie 1967:34) and many members of the bourgeoisie regarded Italy as their cultural homeland with Italian being their preferred language instead of English and Maltese (Austin 1971:7). Towards the end of the 19th century, the British also started to promote the Maltese language, though mostly for the purpose of weakening the standing of Italian (Rudolf 2018:165).

Religion has also been a very important component in Maltese society throughout its history. In fact, it could be said that prior to the arrival of the French and the British, Malta was for almost three centuries practically governed by religion through the Order of Knights, which itself was a Roman Catholic religious institution (Frendo 2009:92). Throughout the centuries, religion dominated every sphere of political and social life with the Roman Catholic Church and priests having largely unchallenged authority (Austin 1971:6) and almost no serious confrontation occurred between the Church and the British authorities, especially in the early years of British

administration (Frendo 2009:95). Despite this, however, a certain level of suspiciousness against all things English and a perception that Protestantism was being imposed upon them persisted among some Maltese (Dobie 1967:20, 29).

Despite assertions by the British during the early years of administration that the Maltese were not equipped to partake in political power, they eventually yielded. In 1835, a Council of Government was created which consisted of eight members and was headed by the governor, who was authorised to act without the consent of the council although he was to consult with it (Rudolf 2018:46). In 1849, however, a partially elected council consisting of eight elected and ten official members was introduced. Given that five of the official members would always be Maltese, the new system gave the Maltese significant influence in the governing of their islands although certain measures, such as the Governor's veto powers, safeguarded matters of imperial interest (Dobie 1967:18). Further developments occurred in the early 1880s when first an executive council was created and tasked with advising and assisting the governor, but soon thereafter the powers of the Council of Government was reverted to those under the 1835 constitution. In 1887, a new constitution was proclaimed which again advanced the influence of the Maltese in the governing process, but the system proved unsuccessful and in 1903 it was amended to reflect the one created under the 1849 constitution (Rudolf 2018:47).

5.1.2 Acquisition of territorial autonomy and subsequent political developments

At the end of the First World War, Maltese demands for political change became increasingly pronounced, and the aspirations for constitutional reform led to representatives of every organized group in Malta to come together to form the so-called National Assembly, whose purpose was to draft a proposal for a new constitution for Malta. Both the safeguarding of the standing of the Roman Catholic faith in Maltese society and the language question were of great focus and characterised by some discontent in the subsequent negotiations with the British government (Dobie 1967:74, 76–78). However, the endeavour bore fruit, and the Malta Constitution of 1921 was the first one that referred to Malta as a nation and that gave the Maltese a real degree of self-government (Rudolf 2018:11, 239). It provided responsible government under a diarchic system. The legislature consisted of the Legislative Assembly with 32 members and the Senate with 17 members. An Executive Council or responsible ministry of seven members at most oversaw the administration (Dobie 1967:78–79). The legislature was responsible for internal matters while the colonial side of the diarchy was headed by a governor and, according to the constitution, the British would be

responsible for reserved matters such as foreign affairs and defence (Rudolf 2018:11).

Although the Maltese did regard themselves as a separate people with their own characteristics, in the early years of self-government they recognised that sovereign statehood was not an option for their islands. Thus, the Maltese people were content with their newly acquired autonomous powers (Frendo 1995:49). However, the years that followed proved chaotic in Maltese politics, with territorial autonomy being revoked and reinstalled several times over. The constitution was suspended for the first time in 1930 and restored again in 1932, only to be revoked once more in 1933 and, finally, in 1936 a new constitution came into force that placed all powers in the hands of the governor (Rudolf 2018:11, 47). In 1939, however, an interim constitution that once more provided for something akin to self-government for the Maltese was proclaimed which installed a Council of Government consisting of ten elected, two nominated unofficial members and eight official members (Dobie 1967:111).

In the wake of the Second World War, as had occurred after the First World War, a sense of being entitled to some form of compensation for what had been endured for the sake of the Empire and democracy emerged among the people of Malta. Different ideas were proposed, ranging from reinstatement of self-government to greater political integration with the United Kingdom (Frendo 1989:207). Due to the war, the British authorities also became more positive towards restoring some form of self-government for Malta (Rudolf 2018:47) and a National Assembly was once again convened to work out a draft for a new constitution, which was eventually approved and proclaimed by Letters Patent in 1947 (Dobie 1967:117, 122–123).

Just as with the constitution of 1921, the aim of the new constitution was two-fold: accommodating legitimate Maltese claims to self-determination as well as safeguarding the imperial interests of the United Kingdom (Smith 2007:54). The new constitution restored Maltese self-government once again through a diarchic system but henceforth with a unicameral legislature consisting of a legislative assembly with forty elected representatives and a cabinet consisting of eight ministers (Dobie 1967:123) and the leader of the governing party was from this point onward referred to as prime minister (Frendo 1989:209). The upper house of the legislature that was established under the 1921 constitution, the Senate, was thus abolished. The governor, who represented the imperial authorities in the diarchy, retained powers within certain areas such as defence, nationality, immigration, currency and civil aviation (Dobie 1967:123). Furthermore, the constitution of 1947 for the first time granted universal suffrage for everyone over the age of 21 in Malta (Frendo 1989:208).

However, an increased level of concern started to emerge regarding the reserved rights that the British authorities possessed. More specifically, the

concerns related to how the British at different times throughout the period of responsible government had encroached upon the local rights of the Maltese. Moreover, the full meaning of the right to self-determination, which was generally supported and promoted by the United Kingdom after the war for its dependencies, did not extend to Malta due to the islands' continuous military-strategic importance to the United Kingdom (Dobie 1967:142–143).

Still, none of the political parties in Malta at this time argued for any radical break with the United Kingdom. For instance, the Malta Labour Party did not support independence for Malta (Frendo 1989:210) and, instead, integration with the United Kingdom became the favoured option mostly due to the anticipated economic and social improvements that it would entail (Dobie 1967:156, 160). The idea of integration was not new, as it had been raised by certain individuals in the early 1940s and then by the Malta Labour Party in the early 1950s. One of the reasons why the idea was initially perceived as feasible was the deepened relationship that had developed as a result of both heroism in the war and the generosity in terms of financial aid from the United Kingdom to Malta (Austin 1971:26–29, 118).

In opposition to the Malta Labour Party's integrationist agenda the Nationalist Party, in contrast, was in favour of moving gradually towards independence as part of the Commonwealth (Frendo 1989:219). In fact, the Nationalist Party had already in 1932 requested that the United Kingdom grant Malta dominion status (Rudolf 2018:190–191). The United Kingdom, for its part, was initially in favour of integration partly due to a sense of pride at Malta's request for closer ties but also because it was perceived as a possible solution to the instability that had persisted in Malta after the post-war restoration of self-government (Smith 2007:50). Moreover, independence was seen as practically unattainable for Malta due to its strong dependence on the United Kingdom (Smith 2007:50) and since Malta was strategically very important both as a Commonwealth and NATO base in the Mediterranean (Austin 1971:28). During the 1950s, however, it was the Malta Labour Party that grew ever more influential. In the 1955 general election, the party emerged victorious (University of Malta 2023a) and embarked on its previously made pledge regarding integration with the United Kingdom.

To consider the integration proposals, a round table conference between Maltese and British representatives was held in June and July of 1955. The subsequent recommendations were that responsibility for defence and foreign affairs would remain in British hands. The United Kingdom would also commit to efforts at raising the standard of living in Malta and once economic parity between the two had been reached, the British government would also oversee direct taxation. Three seats in the British House of Commons would be given to Maltese representatives while the Maltese parliament would retain certain powers of its own. Otherwise, communication between London and Valletta would be improved and

conducted in a consultative and cooperative spirit. Finally, the standing and rights of the Roman Catholic Church would be preserved (Austin 1971:31–33).

The proposal was put to a referendum but, in the end, integration did not materialise. For one, the result indicated that there was a questionable level of overall support for integration. Superficially, it gave that of all valid votes 77.0 percent voted for the proposal and 23.0 percent voted against it. Out of all votes cast, there was a 2.8 percent share of invalid votes. However, the low turnout of 59.1 percent showed that in actuality only 44.3 percent of the entire electorate were in favour and 13.2 percent were against integration (University of Malta 2023b). Religious considerations were significant for the low turnout in the referendum (see Subsection 5.2.2), but more decisive for the failure of integration were financial disagreements with the United Kingdom (see Subsection 5.2.1). This eventually prompted the Malta Labour Party to change course entirely away from integration and instead agitate for Maltese independence (Dobie 1967:180–181, 184). The so-called 'Break with Britain' resolution, which was proposed by Prime Minister Dom Mintoff in December 1957, was met with unusual political unanimity as it was also supported by the Nationalist Party opposition leader Giorgio Borg Olivier as well as the Maltese parliament (Frendo 1989:225, 2000:32). What followed was Mintoff's resignation which, in turn, was followed by riots in April 1958 driven by his supporters. In response to this, the British government declared a state of emergency and the constitution was revoked, resulting in Malta once again being placed under direct British rule (Rudolf 2018:47, 193).

In the following few years, the British government and Maltese political leaders struggled to reach agreement on how to reinstate some form of territorial autonomy in Malta. To find a way forward, the British government created the so-called 'Blood Commission' headed by Sir Hilary Blood (Rudolf 2018:42). In July 1960, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Iain Macleod, announced in the House of Commons that the intention with the commission was to formulate proposals for a new constitution under which elections could be held with the aim of restoring the widest measure of self-government to Malta (House of Commons of the United Kingdom 1960). The following year, in March 1961, the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced to the House of Commons that the British government would accept the recommendations made by the Blood Commission for a new Maltese constitution. The commission had recommended that the previous system of diarchy be abolished, and that the Maltese be given responsibility for domestic matters. With respect to foreign affairs and defence, the recommendations were that the Maltese and the British would share responsibilities, with the latter having final say in the event of conflict. It was also announced that, for the time being, the Governor would have sole authority over the Maltese police force (House of Commons of the United

Kingdom 1961). The subsequent so-called 'Blood Constitution' was proclaimed in October 1961 (Rudolf 2018:42).

In the general election that followed in 1962, the Nationalist Party became the biggest party with 25 seats out of now 50 in the legislature (University of Malta 2023a). After the election, the Nationalist Party headed by Borg Olivier embarked on the task to realize Malta's independence within the Commonwealth. In a statement at a press conference following the election, he said that 'The result is a vindication of the policy of the Nationalist Party which, as everyone knows is independence within the Commonwealth' (Times of Malta 1962). The first step in the process was to amend the existing constitution. At the press conference, he further added that 'I shall see to it that the United Kingdom Government agree to immediate improvements in the Constitution which my Party has never accepted' (Times of Malta 1962). After Borg Olivier had been sworn in as prime minister, he left for London for talks with the British government on the matter and the talks concluded with the British agreeing to most of the proposed amendments. There were also subsequent negotiations concerning the dire economic conditions in Malta that ultimately disappointed the Maltese side, prompting Borg Olivier to repeat his demands for independence (Dobie 1967:223, 225, 227–228, 230–231). At a press conference after the talks had broken down, Borg Olivier in a prepared statement, which was republished in the *Times of Malta* on 22 August 1962, expressed regret at the outcome and consequently requested independence as an urgent matter while adding that:

> The unfortunate outcome of these talks has served to convince me even more that we shall be in a better position to face the great problems besetting our country if we have full freedom of action in the shaping of Malta's future as an independent member of the Commonwealth, which is after all the platform on which I won the recent election. (Borg Olivier 1962)

The British government agreed with the Maltese government to convene a conference in London with representatives from all parties in the Maltese Parliament to discuss an independence constitution for Malta (House of Commons of the United Kingdom 1963a, 1963b). However, most other parties were dissatisfied with the move, as they believed that independence was neither feasible nor adequately desired in Malta. The Malta Labour Party supported immediate independence but wanted it under different terms than the Nationalist Party (Dobie 1967:231–232, 235, 237–238). Hence, on 1 August 1963, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies announced to the House of Commons that the Maltese parties had failed to agree on a constitution. They had also failed to agree on a British proposal to hold a referendum solely on the issue of independence, which was put forth since the smaller parties lacked

confidence that the electorate really wanted it. Consequently, the Secretary announced that independence, as had been requested by the Maltese government, would be granted to Malta on 31 May 1964 at the latest. The Secretary also announced that the British government had made further efforts to get the Maltese parties to agree on a constitution but, in the event of failure, it might take upon itself to decide on the matter (House of Commons of the United Kingdom 1963c).

The additional efforts failed and, consequently, the prime minister of Malta asked the British government to decide on the constitution. Again, this led to tensions and the prime minister asked that the British government allow the Maltese government to prepare and present a draft constitution to the Maltese parliament which, if approved, would be put to a referendum. The draft was fiercely debated but ultimately approved in the legislature. All parties except the Nationalist Party mobilized to have it defeated in the upcoming referendum (Dobie 1967:242–243, 245–247).

In the end, the constitution passed by a modest majority of 54.5 percent of the valid votes, whereas 45.5 percent voted against it. Of all votes cast, 7.0 percent were invalid and of the entire electorate 20.3 percent abstained from voting. Thus, of the entire electorate 40.4 percent supported the constitution and 33.8 percent voted against it (University of Malta 2023b). The British government gave its consent, although after making a couple of amendments (Dobie 1967:252–255), and Malta proclaimed independence on 21 September 1964 (Austin 1971:102).

5.2 Malta: Explaining its experience of autonomy failure by secession

The aim of this section is to examine Malta's viability and distinctiveness during its period of territorial autonomy. The first subsection begins with a data overview to highlight Malta's position regarding welfare and prosperity vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. It then proceeds to analyse the associated political, societal and electoral developments. The second subsection also offers a data overview of Malta's linguistic and religious distinctiveness vis-à-vis the United Kingdom, followed by a closer examination of the overall impact in society of these ethnic aspects.

5.2.1 Territory or group viability

As for relative viability, data displayed in the figures below on a variety of economic performance indicators confirm that throughout its entire period of territorial autonomy Malta was considerably less developed and prosperous in comparison to its parent state.

As displayed in Figure 1 below, during the first half of the period of territorial autonomy GDP per capita in Malta was about 20 percent of the levels in the United Kingdom at the time. Moreover, during the post-war years the relative levels of GDP per capita in Malta decreased even further to only about 15 percent of those experienced in the United Kingdom, lending further evidence of Malta's economically disadvantaged position prior to independence.

Moreover, as Figure 2 confirms, Malta was in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis its parent state with respect to other economic performance indicators as well. For instance, Malta had a comparatively low level of life expectancy at birth but also a high rate of infant mortality throughout most of its period of territorial autonomy. Especially the infant mortality rate was for a long period several times higher in Malta than in the United Kingdom. However, the data also shows that both indicators improved over time in Malta with the most notable developments occurring in the post-war years. Both indicators had roughly reached parity with the United Kingdom by the time of Malta's independence in 1964. However, regarding comparative levels of unemployment the situation was the reverse. Malta's unemployment rates increased sharply in the final decade prior to independence after having been roughly on the same level as in the United Kingdom in the early post-war years. As for the adult literacy rate, data shows that significant improvements occurred in Malta between 1948 and 1963, although at this point right before independence it stood at only 66 percent. Thus, this was a tremendous difference compared to the United Kingdom whose population by the mid-century was virtually fully literate (UNESCO 1957:44).



Figure 1. Relative levels of GDP per capita in Malta and the United Kingdom, 1921–1964. Note: no comparative data has been obtained for the period 1939–1949. Sources: Maddison (2006); Apostolides (2010); Bolt and van Zanden (2020).



Figure 2. Relative levels of life expectancy at birth, infant mortality and unemployment in Malta and the United Kingdom as well as adult literacy rate in Malta during its period of territorial autonomy. Sources: League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service (1931); United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1953, 1954, 1958, 1962, 1966, 1967, 1969); Fenech et al. (1977); Barrett (1982).

Despite experiencing relative prosperity during the First World War, conditions changed significantly for the worse in its aftermath (Rudolf 2018:11, 241), thus making the beginning of territorial autonomy an economically difficult period for Malta. However, in the years that followed revocation of self-government and return to direct rule under the United Kingdom in the early 1930s the Maltese economy thrived. The levels of unemployment plummeted and by 1939, Malta's standard of living had reached unprecedented levels. One reason for this was the uncertain times with increased military tensions that characterised this period, and due to Malta's position as a 'fortress colony' the Maltese prospered as the United Kingdom increased its military expenditure on the islands. Another reason for the improved standards was the efficient administration that direct rule brought with it and efforts were made to improve local infrastructure, public services, agriculture, etc. (Austin 1971:16).

During the years of the Second World War, the Admiralty dockyards were significantly expanded and in subsequent years Malta's economy depended greatly on the dockyards (Holland 1985:260–261). Still, the war had a hugely destructive impact on Malta, but it also had a significant effect on Maltese society with social and political change and class distinctions removed in the wake of the hardships that had been mutually endured (Frendo 1989:205, 208–209).

Compared to previous times, political affinity with the Malta Labour Party also grew much stronger in the post-war years and in the general election of 1947 the party succeeded in earning 24 out of 40 seats in the legislature

(University of Malta 2023a), with the bulk of the party's support found in the Admiralty dockyards (Holland 1985:260). Furthermore, later in the 1950s the party presented a rather unusual solution in response to Malta's post-war economic woes. In the party's electoral program prior to the general election of 1955, which was published in *The Torch* on 13 January 1955, it advocated for a new constitution with the aim of further political and economic integration into the United Kingdom. The party's objectives with integration included attaining better economic conditions in Malta regarding aspects such as employment and wage levels and obtaining social services and direct taxation levels on par with those existing in the United Kingdom (Malta Labour Party 1955). Integration was also seen as a means to safeguard Malta from any adverse effects stemming from potential future changes to the British military presence in the Mediterranean region (Smith 2007:50). This was especially important since the Maltese economy at this time was highly dependent on British military expenditure in the islands. Whereas the share of the Maltese labour force employed by the British defence and administrative apparatus in 1931 was 18 percent, by 1957 this figure had risen to over 27 percent (Austin 1971:27–28).

However, not everyone in Malta supported the integrationist idea. In the run up to the 1955 general election, the Nationalist Party in its electoral program, which was published in its English version in the *Times of Malta* on 18 February 1955, had denounced the integration scheme of its political adversaries as 'anti-national'. Instead, the Nationalist Party pledged to continue its work for Malta to 'take the place it deserves in the Commonwealth' and specified 'full autonomy' as the party's ideal, although it did concede that this would take some years to realize. It did not explicitly cite economic reasons for the delay, although implicitly it did by stating that it would continue to insist on, aside from, for instance, certain improvements in its existing autonomous powers, 'substantial financial aid' to alleviate certain urgent needs while also citing the use of existing British grants for different purposes. Moreover, it stated that the constitutional position of Malta needed to be clarified to deal with the economic question (Nationalist Party 1955).

In the Progressive Constitutional Party's electoral program, which was published in the *Times of Malta* on 18 January 1955, the party did not advocate for any form of full autonomy along the lines of the Nationalist Party nor political integration with the United Kingdom to the extent proposed by the Malta Labour Party. Instead, it pledged 'wholehearted loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen' and favoured the maintenance of Malta's autonomy as part of the United Kingdom with 'quasi Dominion status', although it did also allude to the potentiality of a concurrent and somewhat more integral political relationship with the United Kingdom. It did not explicitly ascribe its political aims to any economic realities although it did state that long-term financial assistance was required for Malta while also specifying certain

development projects in need of external funding (Progressive Constitutional Party 1955).

In the end, it was the Malta Labour Party that won the 1955 general election, earning 23 out of 40 seats. The Nationalist Party came second with 17 seats, whereas the Progressive Constitutional Party lost out on representation altogether due to low support (University of Malta 2023a). The result paved the way for the Malta Labour Party to pursue its goal of realizing integration with the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom was, again, initially in favour of the integration proposal and one reason for this, according to Smith (2007:50), was the perception that Malta was too economically dependent on the United Kingdom to be able to shoulder the responsibility of sovereign statehood. Thus, the integration referendum was held and, as previously stated, the result showed that 77.0 percent of voters supported integration, although only 44.3 percent of the entire electorate (University of Malta 2023b). One reason for the low turnout was that the referendum had been boycotted by the Nationalist Party altogether (Rudolf 2018:229, 233). Afterwards, the leader of that party Giorgio Borg Olivier declared that, based on the outcome, integration should not move forward. The leader of the Progressive Constitutional Party Mabel Strickland motivated a similar conclusion with the argument that the outcome showed insufficient support for the proposal (Times of Malta 1956c). However, Prime Minister Mintoff, in a statement, depicted the outcome as a victory (Mintoff 1956) and the integration process did initially proceed.

Financial aid to Malta was one of the main issues in the subsequent negotiations, and Maltese and British representatives exchanged proposals back and forth as to how much assistance was needed and over what period it would be paid out. The Maltese representatives, spearheaded by Prime Minister Mintoff, demanded equivalence with the United Kingdom in terms of productivity and living standards (Dobie 1967:173–177).

The United Kingdom had previously announced significant changes to its military structure and in 1957 more details were laid out which made clear that Malta would be hugely affected by reductions. The Maltese economy was heavily dependent on the presence of the British armed services, and the proposed cuts would have resulted in a sharp rise in unemployment due to the massive reduction of military personnel and vessels stationed in Malta since this also meant a reduction of work opportunities at the Maltese dockyards. Mintoff made frequent demands that no reduction of the Maltese workforce should be carried out before alternative employment could be secured for those affected (Dobie 1967:178–180). Moreover, the Maltese argued that if these changes were to be made, Malta would be entitled to even more financial aid. The British, who themselves were experiencing economic hardship at home, were unwilling to concede to such demands (Frendo 1989:223).

The crisis ultimately led to Prime Minister Mintoff declaring that Malta would no longer be bound by any agreements or obligations to the United Kingdom unless the British government guaranteed that no reductions would be made before alternative employment could be secured. A motion that was put before the Maltese parliament on the matter was also supported by the opposition. Some additional negotiations between the Maltese and the British did take place that, ultimately, proved fruitless. In response to all of this, Mintoff's government resigned with the intention of bringing the issue of independence to the forefront in the subsequent general election, and the resignation was followed by violent public disturbance (Dobie 1967:181–184, 186). Moreover, the Nationalist Party in opposition refused to form a government, and the violence resulted in the United Kingdom once again imposing direct rule in 1958 (Rudolf 2018:47, 193).

However, in October 1961 self-government was reinstated based on the Blood Constitution (Rudolf 2018:42), which the British Secretary of State for the Colonies Iain Macleod had stated would allow for elections to be held in Malta (House of Commons of the United Kingdom 1960).

The Nationalist Party emerged victorious in the subsequent 1962 general election in which it earned 25 out of 50 seats in total (University of Malta 2023a). In its electoral program the party had declared that in response to the changes in British defence policy Malta needed diversification of its economy and aid, which the United Kingdom was unwilling to give so long as Malta remained a colony. The program stated that full and independent membership in the Commonwealth with dominion status would remedy Malta's problems and enable it to seek financial aid from elsewhere. Thus, the party would strive to obtain a constitution that would give Malta full self-government (Nationalist Party 1962).

The Malta Labour Party came second in the election, earning 16 seats out of 50 in the legislature (University of Malta 2023a). The party had declared in its electoral program that immediate independence with full authority for the Maltese to formulate their own constitution was needed to negotiate and forge the most fair and effective solution to Malta's economic problems. As for membership in the Commonwealth, the party stated that this should be decided in a referendum after independence (Malta Labour Party 1962). Thus, the Malta Labour Party had completely reversed the position it held in the previous general election in 1955 and during the referendum campaign in 1956 in which the party advocated for Malta's integration into the United Kingdom. This also meant that, for the first time, the two largest political parties were both in favour of Malta's independence.

Of the remaining smaller parties that managed to gain representation in the Maltese parliament, the Christian Workers Party had declared in its program that building a stable economy was the party's primary goal. Although sympathetic to such desires, the party also stated that independence at this point would be 'sheer madness and catastrophic'. Still,

the party made clear that immediate amendments to the current constitution were needed but also that the Maltese themselves should have the full right to formulate their own constitution going forward (Christian Workers Party 1962). In the election, the party gained four seats out of fifty in the legislature and so did the Democratic Nationalist Party (University of Malta 2023a).

The Democratic Nationalist Party had insisted in its electoral program that the United Kingdom recognize both Malta's right to full self-government within the Commonwealth with dominion status and its right to sovereignty. The party emphasized its wish for a mutually beneficial partnership but also its demands that the United Kingdom upholds its pledges to contribute to the development of Malta. The party did not state its position on immediate independence as explicitly as the other parties had but emphasized the interconnectedness of constitutional advancement with economic development (Democratic Nationalist Party 1962).

The Progressive Constitutional Party had declared in its electoral program, which was published in the *Times of Malta* on 28 December 1961, that the current constitution needed amendment and that it was 'a step towards Malta becoming an internal self-governing state'. However, the party also declared its loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen and, contrary to the other parties, sought closer ties with the United Kingdom by gaining representation in the British parliament where matters such as foreign affairs and defence would be handled. The Progressive Constitutional Party also stressed the importance of a sound economic basis for Malta and, in similar terms as the Democratic Nationalist Party, stated that 'economic viability is inextricably interwoven with constitutional progress' (Progressive Constitutional Party 1961). In the end, the party managed to earn only one seat in the legislature (University of Malta 2023a).

After the 1962 general election, and aside from the subsequent negotiations regarding certain immediate amendments to the existing constitution, the Maltese government had to deal with the ever-present economic hardships and the threat of unemployment due to the reduction of British military presence in Malta. Because of this, Prime Minister Borg Olivier approached the British government concerning financial aid but was ultimately disappointed at the meagreness of the offers. This, combined with the refusal by the British to change their plans regarding the layoffs, prompted Borg Olivier to reiterate his commitment to swift independence for Malta (Dobie 1967:223, 225–228, 230–231; see Subsection 5.1.2).

The other political parties in Malta protested the decision, again to a large part with reference to their view that Malta was not yet ready for independence due to its economic difficulties. The Malta Labour Party was, again, in favour of independence but wanted it under different terms (Dobie 1967:231–232, 235, 237–238). The subsequent negotiations on an independence constitution with the Maltese parties at a conference in London failed (House of Commons of the United Kingdom 1963c), as did the

additional efforts undertaken thereafter (Dobie 1967:242–243). In the end, however, a much-contested draft constitution was produced by the Nationalist Party alone and approved in the Maltese parliament and put to a referendum (Dobie 1967:245–247).

The other parties represented in parliament continued their protests during the referendum campaign and, as in the 1962 general election campaign, several of them cited economic reasons. The Malta Labour Party leader Dom Mintoff stated at a campaign meeting that voting yes in the referendum would lead to poorer living conditions as well as unemployment and emigration levels doubling (Times of Malta 1964a). The Progressive Constitutional Party leader Mabel Strickland stated that independence was not feasible due to Malta's economic vulnerability and called for a boycott of the referendum (Times of Malta 1964b). Herbert Ganado, the leader of the Democratic Nationalist Party, also at a press conference expressed disapproval, not of independence per se but of immediate independence due to economic reasons and called for a boycott of the referendum (Times of Malta 1964d). The leader of the Christian Workers Party, Toni Pellegrini, urged people to boycott the referendum while alluding to the impossibility of immediate independence due to Malta's economic challenges by saying that voting in the referendum was akin to ensuring that Maltese emigrants would never be able to return home (Times of Malta 1964c).

Again, the constitution passed by a limited majority (University of Malta 2023b) and soon after the referendum was over representatives of the Maltese government left for London to ask the British government's approval of the new constitution and to negotiate defence and financial agreements (Dobie 1967:251).

Although overall somewhat more amenable than previously, the outcome of the negotiations did not please the Maltese opposition entirely. The Malta Labour Party, on its part, criticised the defence and financial agreements with the United Kingdom as insufficient and party leader Dom Mintoff stated that a decent government would have demanded more financial compensation from the United Kingdom for its use of Malta. He also made it clear that the Malta Labour Party's aim was to have the new constitution repealed (Times of Malta 1964f).

The smaller Maltese parties were also more or less disapproving. The Christian Workers Party voiced criticism that was largely similar in content and harshness to that expressed by the Malta Labour Party. In a statement published in the *Times of Malta* on 31 July 1964 the party lamented at the fact that the Maltese people had been denied the right to formulate their own constitution while also denouncing the financial agreement as insufficient and insulting. It also denounced the defence agreement as depriving Malta of its sovereignty and stated that it 'extends privileges and powers to the U.K. Government as to ridicule the term Independence and humiliate the Maltese Nation in the international field' (Christian Workers Party 1964).

The Progressive Constitutional Party and the Democratic Nationalist Party also expressed apprehension about independence but were more conciliatory. After the passing of the Malta Independence Bill by the British Parliament, Mable Strickland, the leader of the former party, again expressed doubts during a Maltese legislative assembly session and called independence a gamble but concluded that since it was an accomplished fact the party would cooperate. As opposed to the representatives of the aforementioned parties, the leader commended the financial and defence agreements reached between Malta and the United Kingdom (Times of Malta 1964g). The Democratic Nationalist Party, in a statement published in *The Sunday Times of Malta* on 26 July 1964, also reiterated the party's previous qualms about immediate independence and its economic and security implications. However, the party stated that the agreements reached did alleviate the situation to some extent and that it would 'do all that is necessary to make independence a success in the interest of these islands' (Democratic Nationalist Party 1964).

Another aspect to do with Malta's economic prospects in the final years prior to independence was the possibility of hydrocarbon discoveries on its territory. Following the discovery of oil in southeast Sicily, exploration also began in Malta in the 1950s. An exploration licence was granted in 1954 and the first and only pre-independence drilling took place in 1959, although that exploratory well turned out to be dry (Continental Shelf Department 2022). Still, the matter also became political during this time with most of the parties that were electorally successful, to varying degrees, pledging to survey Malta's possible oil reserves. In its electoral programs for the general elections of 1955 and 1962, the Nationalist Party made pledges to conduct oil exploration, and in 1955 it made references to the work it had already commenced when previously in government (Nationalist Party 1955, 1962). The Malta Labour Party, in contrast, did not make any references whatsoever to oil exploration in its electoral programs of 1955 and 1962 (Malta Labour Party 1955, 1962). Of the smaller parties, the Christian Workers Party and the Democratic Nationalist Party also promoted oil exploration in their 1962 programs (Christian Workers Party 1962; Democratic Nationalist Party 1962). The Progressive Constitutional Party in its electoral program of 1955 did not explicitly mention oil exploration but declared that it would strive to enact legislation to facilitate a review of 'the potential economic resources of these Islands and the sources of national income'. However, in its program for the 1962 general election it did not make any such commitments (Progressive Constitutional Party 1955, 1961).

Despite these political initiatives during a period of immense economic restructuring and challenges, no hydrocarbons were discovered until 1972 and then only in commercially unviable quantities (Continental Shelf Department 2022).

5.2.2 Territory or group distinctiveness

In this subsection, the second independent variable, *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion, is examined. Figures 3 and 4 below demonstrate that Malta differed significantly from the United Kingdom regarding these ethnic aspects during its period of territorial autonomy.

Census data from 1921 and 1931 shown in Figure 3 demonstrate that 77 and 71 percent respectively of the population of Malta spoke Maltese only, thus showing a notable decrease in the latter census. Simultaneously, the share of English-speakers only had increased from 9 to 13 percent at the time of the 1931 census. As for the Italian language, only a small share of about 3 percent spoke this language only in 1921, and the share decreased somewhat in the latter census. The share of people who reported as speaking both English and Italian increased slightly from barely 11 percent in 1921 to around 13 percent in 1931. Subsequent censuses conducted in 1948 and onwards did not query about language usage and, therefore, no reliable data on this has been obtained for the final years prior to independence in 1964.

Moreover, Figure 4 below demonstrates that a high level of religious distinctiveness existed during the whole period of territorial autonomy with Roman Catholicism clearly dominating, in contrast to the overwhelmingly Protestant United Kingdom. According to the data, more than 90 percent of the population of Malta adhered to Roman Catholicism and this share increased slightly but constantly throughout the whole period.



Figure 3. Languages spoken in Malta in 1921 and 1931 among population five years and over. Note: the number of respondents answering 'other' was miniscule in both censuses and this share is therefore not displayed in the pie charts. Source: Census Office (1931).



Figure 4. Roman Catholicism in Malta vis-à-vis other Christian denominations, religions and non-believers, 1921–1964. Source: Brown and James (2019).

During the process of for the first time establishing a system of real territorial autonomy for Malta in 1921 the question regarding language and religion was, as it had been in previous times, of paramount importance in Maltese society and politics. Before deciding on the new constitution, the British authorities took into consideration the draft constitution that the Maltese National Assembly had earlier formulated, as well as additional wishes that had been expressed by the Maltese. Requests had been made both regarding the status that the English, Italian and Maltese languages would have in relation to each other under the new constitution and regarding the status of the Roman Catholic faith. The archbishop and other representatives of the Maltese clergy and members of the legal profession and large parts of the public demanded that precedence be given to the Roman Catholic faith over other religious denominations. However, in the final draft for the constitution the British colonial authorities ultimately decided against the demands regarding religion, as they regarded such provisions out of place in a constitution and better suited for normal legislative proceedings. As regards language, they also decided that English would be the official language of Malta. At the same time, equal status of the Italian language in educational, judicial and cultural matters would be guaranteed. The status and usage of the Maltese language was also guaranteed in the constitution, albeit at a subordinate level to English and Italian. To some extent, the language provisions went against the wishes that especially the clergy and members of the legal profession had expressed prior. Ever since the 1880s, they had strived for precedence of the Italian language to safeguard the primacy of the Roman Catholic Church and faith (Dobie 1967:76–78).

After the establishment of the new constitution, religion and language continued to have a decisive and even detrimental impact in Maltese society

and politics in the early years of territorial autonomy. In 1930, tensions rose between the Church and the government headed by then Maltese Prime Minister Lord Strickland. The Church took exception to Lord Strickland because of his interference in church matters and promotion of the English language and culture in Malta. In the run up to the 1930 general election, a pastoral letter that labelled voting for Lord Strickland and his candidates as sinful was issued in Malta. This sort of action did not go down well with the British government who, unsuccessfully, protested to the Vatican. As a result of this, the British government decided that the upcoming elections would be cancelled and that the constitution be suspended (Rudolf 2018:60).

In 1932, however, self-government was restored (Rudolf 2018:47). With the new system, the status of the Maltese language was somewhat enhanced in the sphere of education to the detriment of the Italian language. Likewise, the usage of Maltese was enhanced in the judicial sphere, although the status that Italian had previously held remained unchanged (Dobie 1967:104–105). In the general election of 1932, the Nationalist Party came to power (University of Malta 2023a) and embarked on an effort to restore the status of the Italian language in the judiciary and education, a pursuit that was a violation of the new constitution (Austin 1971:13). Hence, the constitution was once again suspended in 1933 due to British fears of the level of influence in Maltese political life coming from fascist Italy. By 1934, the status of Italian had been diminished even further, as it was replaced by Maltese and English as the official languages of the judiciary. With the enactment of the 1936 constitution, which placed all powers in the hands of the governor, Maltese and English were recognized as the official languages of Malta (Rudolf 2018:47, 64, 165).

The British had purposefully embarked on an effort to develop Maltese nationalism by promoting the Maltese language in favour of Italian and blend this nationalism with a sense of patriotism towards the empire. This was an effort to counteract pro-Italian sentiments represented primarily by the Nationalist Party and to lay the groundwork for a future return to self-government under the United Kingdom (Austin 1971:17–18; Hancock, cited in Austin 1971:17). Although real self-government was not restored until after the Second World War in 1947 (Dobie 1967:123), some tentative steps in this direction were taken right before the war. In February 1939, a new interim constitution was proclaimed, which created a Council of Government. Given previous tensions, however, the governor retained all powers that concerned language matters (Dobie 1967:111).

One of the consequences of the Second World War was that the strong affinity in Malta with the Italian language and culture came to an end, with Italians being regarded as enemies and the British as friends (Frendo 1989:205–206). One practical outcome of having fought side by side with the British was that usage of the English language had become more prevalent among the Maltese (Vassallo 1979:41). Significant to the anti-Italian

sentiments that emerged was the fact that thousands of Maltese had died because of the bombings of Malta by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, and because of this and allied propaganda pro-Britishness and anti-Italianism were high (Frendo 1981:31).

Even the pro-Italian Nationalist Party abandoned its stance. This was due to both the effects of the war and the deliberate policies by the British that began prior to the war (Austin 1971:26). Also, the death in 1950 of the party's leader and then Prime Minister Enrico Mizzi removed much of the pro-Italian elements in the party (Frendo 1981:31). Instead, the Nationalist Party reoriented itself towards promoting Maltese distinctiveness and began to advocate for the Maltese language and history as main components of Maltese nationalism (Austin 1971:26).

However, the Nationalist Party's pro-Italian sympathies did not completely disappear after the war. For instance, in its electoral programs for the last two pre-independence general elections in 1955 and 1962, the party defended its commitment to the Latin culture and the maintenance of the usage and teaching of the Italian language in Malta, albeit without prejudice to the English and Maltese languages (Nationalist Party 1955, 1962). Still, after the war there were other matters of a more practical nature that pre-occupied Maltese political leaders, as improvements in social and economic conditions was seen as a more pressing issue than the old language question (Vassallo 1979:41).

As already established above, the Malta Labour Party won the general election of 1955 ahead of the Nationalist Party, and by this time the party had come to favour integration with the United Kingdom. In its electoral program the Malta Labour Party had pledged its adherence to the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, and it made clear that the integration plan included full protection of the standing of the Church (Malta Labour Party 1955). In spite of this pro-Catholic pledge and in addition to the anticipated welfare prospects (see Subsection 5.2.1), Holland (1985:261) states that the Malta Labour Party favoured integration also because of hopes that deeper ties with the Protestant motherland would diminish the social influence of the Roman Catholic Church, which the party saw as one of its main adversaries.

The Nationalist Party in its electoral program for the general election of 1955, as previously noted, denounced the integration proposal of its political adversaries as 'anti-national' and that it would lead to the dismantling of the national character of Malta, and pledged to combat anything that ran counter to the Catholic traits and traditions of the Maltese (Nationalist Party 1955). The Progressive Constitutional Party was, again, the third party to partake in the 1955 general election, although it failed to gain representation in the legislature (University of Malta 2023a). Again, it largely favoured political status quo with internal autonomy for Malta, although potentially and simultaneously with somewhat closer political ties with the United Kingdom. Aside from beginning its electoral program with declaring that the party

'steadfastly adheres to the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church', it did not cite religion as a factor for its political positioning (Progressive Constitutional Party 1955).

As previously noted, the referendum did proceed and the integration proposal did pass, although by a dubious majority due to a low turnout (University of Malta 2023b). Moreover, as in many previous and indeed subsequent instances of national significance to the Maltese, religion played an essential part in the process and election result. The Roman Catholic Church of Malta had been doubtful at the proposal, and prior to the integration referendum it conveyed its misgivings in a Pastoral Letter, which was read out in all churches in Malta and published in English in the *Times of Malta* on 23 January 1956. In the letter, the Metropolitan Archbishop of Malta and the Bishop of Gozo voiced their apprehension since the British had not given enough guarantees that after integration the Maltese Parliament would be exclusively responsible, without British interference, for legislation in internal matters pertaining to the Church, education and family life including marriage laws. While also reminding the Maltese of the great religious differences between the United Kingdom and Malta, the Church did not explicitly urge people to vote against integration. It did, however, remind the voters of the great responsibility they carried and directed them to 'fervent prayer to Almighty God in order that He may enlighten your minds and touch your hearts, to fulfil your duty as true Catholics' (Archiepiscopal Curia 1956).

Also, during the referendum campaign, the Nationalist Party's leader Giorgio Borg Olivier called on voters to boycott the referendum and cited different reasons for the party's opposition. However, he mostly avoided citing religion as one reason, although he tacitly did by referring the religious aspects of integration to the ecclesiastical leadership of Malta to comment on (Times of Malta 1956b). Again, in its Pastoral Letter, the Church had a couple of weeks earlier already expressed apprehension based on religious considerations towards the proposal.

The Progressive Constitutional Party, on its part, urged voters to vote no in the referendum, partly but explicitly with reference to concerns regarding the position of the Roman Catholic faith and Church in Malta after integration (Times of Malta 1956a). Thus, during the referendum campaign the Progressive Constitutional Party came out more strongly against integration than it had done in its electoral program the previous year and with explicit reference to religious concerns.

According to Austin (1971:37, 46), the opposition by the Church prior to the referendum had a significant effect in influencing many voters to either vote against the proposal or abstain from voting altogether. However, despite religious and other misgivings towards the endeavour, integration ultimately failed primarily because of disagreements between Malta and the United Kingdom on financial matters (see Subsection 5.2.1).

The Maltese government's subsequent combative change in direction towards achieving full independence (Dobie 1967:180–181, 184) soon led to political and public chaos, resulting in self-government being suspended in 1958 but ultimately reinstated again in late 1961 (Rudolf 2018:42, 47, 193). The Nationalist Party won the 1962 general election (University of Malta 2023a), and Prime Minister Borg Olivier subsequently initiated discussions on constitutional amendments aimed at achieving independence (Times of Malta 1962).

The process of agreeing on a draft independence constitution was arduous and fraught with tensions between the pro-independence and anti-independence fractions in Malta with economic considerations being one of the major reasons (see Subsections 5.1.2 and 5.2.1). However, the independence debate was undoubtedly and once again also defined by religious concerns. The Malta Labour Party was in favour of swift independence like the Nationalist Party was, which had prepared its own draft constitution for independence (Dobie 1967:231–232, 237–239). However, the Malta Labour Party wanted amendments to the Nationalist Party's draft with the aim of reducing the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in Maltese society and politics. Although the party did agree to Roman Catholicism being the state religion of Malta, the amendments called for allowing freedom of religion and religious partaking as well as civil marriages. Moreover, they wanted the Church's involvement in politics and ability to inflict spiritual injury to influence the electorate eliminated, along with the archbishop's immunity against criminal liability (Austin 1971:97). The other parties opposed such measures and the hasty rush towards independence (Dobie 1967:239).

The situation continued to be chaotic, with the parties unable to agree on a constitution, which led to proposals that the British government instead would have to decide on the constitution. This was also followed by significant dissatisfaction, as many feared that it would result in a constitution that would reduce the previously held status and position of the Roman Catholic Church. The situation was not helped by the fact that the prime minister himself made dubious statements by not clearly dismissing the possibility of a compromise on the future status of the Church. However, instead of the British government imposing a constitution upon Malta, the Nationalist Party made another attempt at proposing one, which was subsequently presented to the legislature. With the proposal, the position of the Roman Catholic Church in Maltese society would, according to Borg Olivier, be secured, but to solidify this the prime minister stressed the importance that the draft be approved in the legislature and subsequent referendum. After fierce debates and protests, the draft constitution was approved in the legislature (Dobie 1967:242–246).

During the independence referendum campaign that followed religious considerations continued to be at the forefront of the debate and resistance.

The Nationalist Party and the prime minister argued that a convincing affirmative vote for their proposed constitution was required to prevent the Malta Labour Party from getting its anti-Church amendments included in the final post-referendum constitution. This was seen as important since the British government, although striving to abide by the public will and referendum outcome, was empowered to adjust the final constitution if deemed necessary. The other parties fought to have the draft constitution defeated, partly because of this very reason. Aside from most of them being against Malta's independence so soon, the same parties believed the draft constitution and the prime minister did not provide enough protection for the Church when the British government was still empowered to make final amendments (Dobie 1967:239, 245–248).

The Malta Labour Party was, again, in favour of immediate independence (Dobie 1967:239) but against the draft constitution due to its enshrining of the status of the Church and the party's strive towards greater secularisation of Maltese society (Austin 1971:97). For instance, at a Malta Labour Party meeting held prior to the referendum party leader Dom Mintoff accused the Nationalist Party of pushing a constitution that would allow the Church to keep its privileges and make sure that Malta would go back to living in medieval times (Times of Malta 1964a). At another mass meeting, Mintoff also accused some priests of pressuring their congregations to vote 'yes' in the referendum and Mintoff himself urged all workers to vote 'no' (Times of Malta 1964e).

The framing of the referendum question also drew criticism (Dobie 1967:247) since the electorate was asked whether it approved of the government-proposed independence constitution, which encompassed both protection for the Church and independence for Malta (Frendo 1989:243). According to Frendo (1989:243–244), this formulation led to some anti-independence sympathisers feeling compelled to vote in favour of the proposal, if only to protect the standing of the Church.

In the end, the referendum gave that only a small majority of voters had voted in favour of the proposed constitution (University of Malta 2023b). Still, the Maltese and British governments proceeded on the path towards realizing Malta's independence. However, uneasiness in Malta concerning the final formulation of the constitution continued after the referendum and during the Maltese government's visit to London where it had gone to request the British government's approval of the new constitution and to negotiate future defence and financial arrangements. In the end, the British government made two amendments to the constitution. The first amendment strengthened the overall protection against discrimination, and the second amendment removed clauses from the draft constitution that would have placed the Roman Catholic Church above the law (Dobie 1967:251–253). Despite this, the Malta Labour Party was dissatisfied. Apart from criticising the defence and financial agreements made with the United Kingdom,

representatives of the party lamented that the Roman Catholic Church would still wield too much power in Malta under the new constitution and that their party would strive to repeal it (Times of Malta 1964f).

Still, Malta's full independence was declared on 21 September 1964 (Austin 1971:102). Upon independence, Malta became a member of the Commonwealth of Nations with the British monarch as its head of state. The Malta Labour Party was returned to power in the general election of 1971 and, following this, the defence agreement with the United Kingdom was renegotiated, resulting in the British forces leaving Malta in 1979. Moreover, in 1974 Malta opted to become a republic while remaining a member of the Commonwealth (Rudolf 2018:14–15, 113, 152, 207).

5.3 Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a deeper insight into the causes behind Malta's trajectory from an autonomous territory under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom to becoming a fully sovereign state of its own. The qualitative case study analysis has been guided by the results in the quantitative analysis, which indicated that *Relative economic performance*, i.e. relative economic deprivation, in terms of GDP per capita and maximal *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion might contribute to *Autonomy failure by secession*. However, in this chapter the former independent variable was analysed from a broader perspective by also considering other related aspects than merely GDP per capita.

As for *Relative economic performance*, the analysis showed that during the entire era of British rule the Maltese were used to periods of economic hardship that, on occasion, were interspersed by periods of prosperity. This fluctuation was also evident during the period of territorial autonomy. Malta experienced economic difficulties in the years following the First World War that coincided with the granting of territorial autonomy in 1921, and in the post-Second World War years leading up to independence in 1964. In contrast, the period following the revocations of Malta's constitution and imposition of direct British rule in the 1930s was defined by relative affluence. Overall and throughout the period of territorial autonomy, however, Malta's welfare and prosperity levels remained exceedingly below those in the United Kingdom.

Even though the Maltese had always demanded more internal self-government from the United Kingdom, in the post-war years only the Nationalist Party had voiced aspirations for some form of independence because of the economic woes that Malta experienced, albeit as a long-term goal. In fact, for a short period during the 1950s, the Maltese leadership spearheaded by the Malta Labour Party instead contemplated further integration with the United Kingdom as a remedy to the dire economic situation. The primary reason for the lack of a wider support for full

independence was the great economic dependence on the United Kingdom. However, it was also due to military and security aspects because of Malta's defence vulnerabilities and its military strategic value to the United Kingdom that also ruled out any British concessions towards independence.

Eventually, however, economic hardships did come to play a crucial role in the emergence of a wider pro-independence stance. The decisive turn came when the other large party, the Malta Labour Party, joined the Nationalist Party as proponents of independence in the late 1950s, although both parties had entirely different formulas for achieving it. This, and the fact that the other smaller parties were against independence altogether, made the independence process politically chaotic. Regardless, the wider pro-independence shift occurred when the Maltese faced the threat of perceived economic devastation, although this was also the argument against independence among those who represented this view. The economic anguish resulted from of an announcement in the late 1950s of a large reduction of British military presence, which was a huge source of employment and revenue in Malta. Independence was seen by its proponents as a means to gain a better bargaining position and aid package in exchange for the United Kingdom's future military presence in Malta, which it still wished to maintain to some degree. Also, independence was seen as an opportunity for Malta to turn elsewhere than to the British for financial aid. The reduction in military expenditure had come about due to the British viewpoint that Malta's strategic significance had diminished following changes in international relations and security structures. Thus, the long-held conviction that Malta was an indispensable so-called 'fortress colony' had lost some traction.

As for the other independent variable that proved essential in the quantitative analysis, *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion, the qualitative analysis provided some interesting insights. Most of the islanders spoke Maltese, whereas Italian had originally been the predominant intellectual and professional language among the upper classes although Maltese was frequently spoken informally as well. Thus, despite the introduction of English in the early years of British rule and its popularity among some people belonging to the educated classes, from the very beginning the Maltese people at large had a linguistic identity that was distinct from that of the United Kingdom.

Whereas Maltese was for a long time considered the subordinate language, not least among the Maltese elite, the constantly present and periodically intense battles between pro-English and pro-Italian fractions lasted until the 1930s. After this, affinity towards the Italian language dissipated due to anti-Italian policies implemented by the British and Italy's atrocities against Malta during the Second World War. At the same time, the Maltese language had also gained greater status due to direct British efforts in the interwar years. Moreover, the usage of English also became more

widespread due to intensified exchanges between the Maltese and the British during the war. Thus, despite some initial dissatisfaction by the elite at the demotion of the Italian language in minority, no linguistic suppression took place by the parent state against Maltese as the popular language, and after the Second World War the historically contentious language question had mostly ceased to be a significant issue in Malta.

Malta also had a clear religious distinctiveness vis-à-vis the protestant United Kingdom, as virtually all Maltese adhered to the Roman Catholic faith. Moreover, religion has played an even larger role than language in Maltese society throughout history and the clergy has been very influential both socially and politically. However, since the beginning of colonial rule the British were keen to respect both the Roman Catholic faith and the authority of its figureheads and made no efforts to spread Protestantism. Still, some people, especially within the clergy, were suspicious of the British intentions. Historically, the Italian language has been closely intertwined with Roman Catholicism in Malta, and Italian used to be considered its carrier. For this reason, British efforts to advance the English language and curtail Italian were seen by some Maltese as a covert attempt at elevating Protestantism at the expense of Roman Catholicism.

The power and influence of the Church in Maltese society and politics during the years of territorial autonomy had manifested itself several times with consequential effects when self-government was revoked in the 1930s and when, as assessed by some, the integration proposal failed to gain enough support in the 1956 referendum. Religion as such also played a vital role in the negotiations on the establishment of territorial autonomy in 1921, as well as in the political rhetoric in conjunction with both the integration proposal and the independence process. Thus, during the entire period of territorial autonomy religious schisms were ever-present in Malta. However, despite some Maltese apprehension concerning the United Kingdom's intentions with respect to protecting the Roman Catholic Church and faith during the process of formulating the final independence constitution, for the most part there had not been any religious tensions between Malta and the United Kingdom during the period of territorial autonomy but rather between internal fractions.

In conclusion, relative economic deprivation had persisted throughout the years of British rule and had periodically caused severe suffering in Malta. As opposed to the overall ethno-cultural tensions, however, the economic woes did not abate but rather intensified in the years prior to independence and became a decisive element in the fractured but still relatively popular support for full independence. Thus, the presence of relative economic deprivation appears, according to the inferences drawn in this chapter, to have been an important contributory factor in Malta's autonomy failure by secession. Therefore, *Hypothesis 5b* according to the inverse interpretation thereof is confirmed.

As for the aspects related to ethnic distinctiveness, while most of British rule had been marred by significant linguistic animosities and religious friction in Malta, none of these aspects were contentious matters between the Maltese and the British in the final decades prior to independence. Thus, linguistic and religious distinctiveness does not appear to have been an important contributory factor for Malta's autonomy failure by secession according to the analysis conducted in this chapter and, therefore, *Hypothesis 1b* is contradicted.

In Chapter 7, the findings in this chapter with respect to Malta's experience of autonomy failure by secession will be reflected upon in greater detail. In the next chapter, however, the possible influence of *Relative economic performance* and *Ethnic distinctiveness* on *Autonomy failure by secession* will be analysed from an inverse perspective in an autonomous territory that has not experienced this outcome.

6 Qualitative analysis: The Cayman Islands

In this chapter, case study analysis is conducted to ascertain whether the results from the quantitative analysis hold true if one interprets them from an inverse perspective. In other words, the analysis seeks to determine whether the Cayman Islands' *Relative economic performance*, i.e. relative economic prosperity, and absence of *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion have contributed to its absence of *Autonomy failure by secession*.

The chapter begins with an introductory section to the history of the Cayman Islands, including the developments during the early years of British rule and the political developments since it acquired territorial autonomy. The second section of the chapter focuses more specifically on the Cayman Islands' circumstances regarding *Relative economic performance* and *Ethnic distinctiveness* throughout its period of territorial autonomy and how these independent variables might have influenced the absence of secession for the territory. Again, the former independent variable will be more broadly analysed than in the quantitative analysis. Likewise, due to the absence of significant linguistic and religious distinctiveness in the Cayman Islands, an openness to other aspects related to ethnic distinctiveness will also be displayed for the purpose of ascertaining other potential factors that might have influenced the outcome status of the territory. The second section begins by offering a data overview of the economic and welfare-related indicators and developments in the Cayman Islands in comparison to its parent state, as well as a more in-depth examination of the overall and relative economic structure and prosperity of the territory. Then, it examines aspects related to ethnicity, ethnic composition and other demographic indicators as well as national identity and overall societal values, and the various effects of many of these aspects. The section also provides an examination of local attitudes and statements made pertaining to the issue of sovereign statehood for the Cayman Islands. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.

6.1 History and constitutional developments

This section begins with an introductory subsection to the early history of the Cayman Islands since its discovery and settlement, with a particular focus on the era of British rule and the concurrent economic, social and political development of the territory. The following subsection details the constitutional development and stepwise acquisition of more autonomous powers, beginning with the formal start of the Cayman Islands' territorial autonomy in 1959 and ending with the most recent constitution that came into force in 2009.

6.1.1 The early years of British rule

The Cayman Islands has been known by the Europeans at least since 1503 when Christopher Columbus was the first European to sight the territory, although he did not set foot on the islands. After the discovery the Cayman Islands was not initially settled as the islands were mostly used as a navigational waypoint, alternatively as a location for meeting or hiding or for turtle catching. The islands lacked fresh water sources and were rather treacherous due to being surrounded by reefs and inhabited by crocodiles (Craton 2003:11). The islands are believed to have been uninhabited prior to the arrival of the first Europeans, as there are no records from these times indicating the existence of indigenous inhabitants. Neither have modern-day archaeological field surveys on all three main islands discovered any evidence of prior human activity and, although this does not exclude the possibility of prehistoric human settlements, the existence of any significantly sized settlement has been presumed unlikely (Drewett, Scudder and Quitmyer 2000:6–7).

As for the beginning of British rule, it was not until the English claimed Jamaica in 1655 that they also claimed the Cayman Islands (Craton 2003:11) and the formal handover of the Cayman Islands, as well as Jamaica, from Spain to England occurred with the Treaty of Madrid in 1670 (MacDonald 2021:355). After the Cayman Islands officially came under English rule, the islands were frequented by temporary male visitors and settlers of varying occupations, sometimes collectively branded as pirates. Records of permanent settlements with women and families as well as records of land grants exist from the first half of the 18th century, suggesting that it was only at around this time that the islands started to receive permanent inhabitants (Craton 2003:27–28, 33, 36).

As for livelihood, the Cayman Islands did not, in comparison to the rest of the Caribbean, experience any significant socio-economic development following the establishment of British rule (Bodden 2018:139). Due to the lack of agricultural potential, the economy was initially dependent on maritime resources and activities such as turtle fishing, boatbuilding as well as shark catching and skinning (Davies 1995:35). The residents also found revenue from, for instance, exporting mahogany and, towards the end of the 1700s, cotton production. The cotton industry provided the islands with a temporary economic boost due to increased prices and the fact that cotton trade with the United States at the time had been banned by the British. However, the Caymanian cotton boom was rather brief, mostly due to increased cotton production in the southern United States whose cotton had come into demand in the expanding British textile industry. The large-scale supply of American cotton resulted in a significant drop in prices, which ultimately rendered Caymanian and all West Indian cotton production uncompetitive (Craton 2003:49, 66, 69). Another rather important source of

income for the people of the Cayman Islands during this time was wrecking (Craton 2003:56), which, as described by Hirst, was a practice that consisted of plundering ships by luring them to founder on the nearby reefs (cited in Bodden 2007:41–42). Due to improved means of navigation, however, this practice began to abate towards the end of the 19th century and had practically ended a few years into the 20th century (Craton 2003:215, 217).

As the population increased during the first decades of the 19th century, combined with the political, social and economic turmoil that followed the emancipation of slaves in 1834, an increased need of orderly government in the Cayman Islands emerged (Craton 2003:89). Thus, in 1831, the inhabitants of the territory established their own legislative assembly, the Assembly of Justices and Vestry, which was the first in the history of the Cayman Islands and which was tasked with making laws in accordance with local needs (Constitutional Commission 2023). However, in the years that followed the Cayman Islands suffered from a certain degree of administrative deficiency and the islanders had expressed discontent to the colonial authorities about the fact that they lacked basic civil resources such as teachers and clergymen. For instance, to be married many islanders had to travel to nearby Jamaica (Fergus 2004:5). Moreover, general poverty and hardship in the mid-19th century led many Caymanians to favour closer association with Jamaica. The Caymanians hoped that dependency status under Jamaica would free Caymanian vessels from having to pay tonnage dues when entering Jamaican ports, as well as provide the islands with investments and improved health and public services. Dependency status was also seen as a solution to the islands' administrative, legal and constitutional issues, while also keeping a certain level of self-government for the islands intact. The Jamaicans, in turn, were willing to accept incorporation of the Cayman Islands as a dependency so long as it did not add to their financial burden (Craton 2003:148, 150). Thus, in 1863, the Cayman Islands was formally placed under the administration of Jamaica (Fergus 2004:5). According to the 1863 Act of Parliament, the Cayman Islands was granted its own assembly (Bodden 2007:64), thereby formalizing the territory's previously unrecognized legislative powers created in 1831 (Davies 1995:31). However, the incorporation made the Cayman Islands politically subordinate to the Jamaican Governor and legislature (Davies 1995:31) as the Jamaican assembly had overriding powers to amend or veto any legislation passed by the Caymanian assembly (Bodden 2007:64). Despite this, the Cayman Islands was largely left to its own devices and even neglected throughout much of the administrative relationship with Jamaica. This, in turn, entrenched a sense of separateness and distinctiveness among the people of the Cayman Islands towards the rest of the Caribbean (Bodden 2007:37–38).

Apart from continued emigration as well as a large overall population increase during the remainder of the 19th century, the Cayman Islands did not

really experience any significant development, economic or otherwise. Improved sea communications and other fundamental changes that characterised the world of the early 20th century brought with it new prospects for the people of the Cayman Islands to travel abroad to live and work. Rather than going to Jamaica the bulk of migrants set their sights on other nearby destinations in search for a better life, primarily the United States but also Cuba and Central America. However, this did not diminish the strong affection and loyalty that the people of the Cayman Islands maintained towards both their islands and the British Empire (Craton 2003:145, 254, 259–260).

During the First World War, the Cayman Islands suffered a significant economic downturn. Exports fell sharply due to, for instance, the loss of the European market for export of tortoise shells as well as difficulties in upholding trade with live turtles. Additionally, the territory was hit by two serious hurricanes in 1915 and 1917, which further exacerbated the hardships (Craton 2003:260–261). In the early and mid-20th century, the Cayman Islands became known for providing American shipping companies that operated under 'flags of convenience' with English-speaking crews that were highly regarded for their reliability and skills (Bodden 2018:139), as well as for their willingness to work as non-affiliated with trade unions and for low wages (Bodden 2007:60–61). The Great Depression of the late 1920s and 1930s dealt a severe blow, as the number of jobs on American ships and other foreign employment opportunities declined. Caymanians were no longer able to seek employment in the United States and many of those already settled there were forced to return (Craton 2003:270). Moreover, in 1932 the islands were struck by a severe hurricane that caused unprecedented devastation in terms of lives and property lost (Bodden 2007:57).

When the Second World War broke out, the turtle and rope-making industries experienced an increase in demand and prices, although the shipbuilding industry declined sharply due to a shortage of materials. Many Caymanians found employment by enlisting into the British Merchant Navy, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve or the Army or as workers in the Canal Zone for contractors to the United States Army and Navy. Remittances sent home from these employments, combined with the influx of American dollars due to the United States military presence on the islands from 1942, contributed positively to the Caymanian economy during the war years (Colonial Office 1948:3–4). After the war, the economic situation in the Cayman Islands had reached a level of relative prosperity and welfare compared to many other Caribbean territories and the remittances during and after the war were a significant factor in laying the foundation for post-war economic development (Craton 2003:301).

As for the relationship between the Cayman Islands and Jamaica, the political differences became increasingly pronounced after the war. The

constitution, universal suffrage, ministerial system of government and political parties associated with trade unions that functioned in Jamaica were all non-existent in the Cayman Islands (Craton 2003:306, 310). Since the Cayman Islands had been a lower tier dependency under the colony of Jamaica, its constitutional development over the years had been rather limited (Clegg 2018:15). Despite some emigration to Jamaica during the first half of the 20th century for economic or educational benefits primarily, most Caymanians never developed any sense of affinity towards its larger neighbour (Bodden 2018:139–140).

After the war, it also became increasingly obvious that many British colonies would move towards independence. In preparation of this, it was decided that several British territories and islands in the Caribbean that had previously been administered as separate units would merge into a federation (Constitutional Commission 2023). The intention with the federation was to strengthen the autonomy of these Caribbean territories and to prepare them for eventual independence (Clegg 2018:14; Constitutional Commission 2023). The Cayman Islands, being a dependency of Jamaica, agreed to enter into the federation provided it would be given its own direct representation. However, this was rejected and instead it was suggested that the Governor-General of the proposed federation would directly administer the Cayman Islands. The Caymanians had wanted to ensure their own right to control their borders, have a say in the taxes that were to be imposed on them as well as retain their rights to foreign trade and employment opportunities. Still, on 3 January 1958, the Federation of the West Indies was created. The position of the Cayman Islands within the federation remained unresolved as the Caymanians were not content with their status, and different proposals were presented in subsequent years to resolve the situation. However, one significant change that did occur simultaneous to the creation of the federation was that the Cayman Islands received its first written constitution that, for the time being, clarified its status (Constitutional Commission 2023).

6.1.2 Constitutional development and current level of autonomy

The Cayman Islands received its first written constitution on 4th July 1959. This entailed the introduction of universal adult suffrage in the territory and the removal the authority of the Jamaican legislature and placing the Cayman Islands provisionally under the direct authority of the Governor of Jamaica (Constitutional Commission 2023).

In the running of most day-to-day affairs, the Governor was represented by a Cayman Islands-based Administrator of the Islands. In exercising their powers, the Governor and the Administrator were generally but not in every instance obliged to consult with the Executive Council. The Governor and the Administrator were also empowered to act against the advice received if they

found it justifiable to do so. Moreover, the Governor was empowered to carry motions and pass bills without consent from the Legislative Assembly and return bills received for assent back to the Assembly with amendment proposals. The Executive Council consisted of the Administrator, two official and one nominated member appointed by the Governor. In addition to this, it also consisted of two elected members, both elected by the nominated and elected members of the Assembly. The newly established Legislative Assembly had a term of three years and consisted of the Administrator, two or three official members appointed by the Governor, two or three nominated members also appointed by the Governor and twelve elected members (Cayman Islands (Constitution) Order in Council 1959).

Soon after receiving the constitution, the Cayman Islands had to decide on its future political path. Overall tensions between the different territories within the West Indies Federation had increased due to various differences, which eventually led to the collapse of the federation and full independence for Jamaica in 1962. The Cayman Islands rejected continued association with Jamaica and independence of its own and instead opted to retain political links with the United Kingdom. Thus, a new constitution for the Cayman Islands came into effect in 1962, although it did not differ much from the original constitution from 1959. Further discussions on constitutional change continued throughout the 1960s, resulting in a new constitution that came into force on 22 August 1972 (Constitutional Commission 2023).

The new constitution brought some changes. As for the powers reserved for the Governor, these largely remained similar to those prescribed in the constitutions of 1959 and 1962, although the 1972 constitution provided some specification regarding some powers. For instance, it stated that the Governor would be responsible for matters concerning defence, external affairs, internal security and police as well as powers to appoint, discipline and terminate the employment of public officers. In addition to the requirement that the Governor should consult with the Executive Council when exercising power within areas other than the aforementioned, the new constitution also specified that the Governor should act in accordance with the advice received. As previously, however, provisions to disregard such advice if deemed inexpedient and the option to refrain from consulting the Executive Council altogether in certain situations remained. Moreover, the Governor also retained the power to pass motions and legislation without the consent of the Assembly, and return bills received for assent back to the Assembly with amendment proposals. As per the 1972 constitution, the Executive Council consisted of three official members appointed by the Governor and four elected members, elected by the elected members of the Assembly. Thus, the previously existing nominated members of the Executive Council were removed. Provisions were also made so that the Governor could assign governmental responsibility for departments to members of the Executive Council. According to the constitution, the Legislative Assembly

would consist of the Governor or a Speaker, three official members appointed by the Governor and twelve elected members. The nominated members were also removed from the Legislative Assembly. Instead of the Governor automatically assuming the role of Speaker as in previous times, the Governor could, according to the constitution, appoint a separate Speaker (Cayman Islands (Constitution) Order 1972).

The current constitution of the Cayman Islands came into effect on 6 November 2009, and a few amendments have been made afterwards (Constitutional Commission 2023). The constitution includes many new provisions such as the Bill of Rights, which cites the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, and multiple new administrative and advisory bodies. As for the Governor's powers, the new constitution specifies and circumscribes these to some extent compared to the provisions made in the 1972 constitution. Except with respect to certain situations, the Governor is generally obliged to consult with Cabinet when exercising functions, unless consultations are deemed unpractical or unnecessary, and the advice received should generally be acted on. As opposed to earlier versions, the 2009 constitution obliges the Governor to consult with Cabinet also with respect to defence, external affairs and internal security including the police. It does not apply to the Governor's powers to appoint, discipline and terminate the employment of public officers. Still, the Governor is not obliged to act on the advice received and the Governor also retains the right to refrain from consulting the Cabinet if such consultations are deemed not in the public interest, unnecessary or impeding a need for urgent action. The Governor may also delegate responsibilities for any of these matters to a member of the Cabinet and in the case of some specified areas within external affairs and provided certain conditions, is obliged to do so to the Premier or some other minister. With the 2009 creation of the National Security Council, which aside from the Governor also consists of members of the Cabinet and Parliament and others, responsibility for internal security has also been dispersed. As for other matters, the Governor retains the right to return bills received for assent back to Parliament together with amendment proposals and, as in previous times, the Governor is empowered to pass legislation against the will of the Government and Parliament. However, the 2009 constitution expressly restricts this right to matters concerning the Governor's reserved responsibilities only. The executive power is vested in the Government consisting of the Governor and the Cabinet. The Premier is appointed by the Governor based primarily on selection by the majority-holding party in the Parliament. In addition to this, the number of ministers in Cabinet today stands at seven, and ministers are also appointed and charged with governmental responsibilities by the Governor upon recommendation by the Premier. The constitution explicitly states that one of these ministers shall be awarded responsibility for finance. Moreover, the Deputy Governor and the Attorney-General also form part of the Cabinet as

ex officio members without voting power. Today, the constitution also clarifies that the Cabinet possesses autonomous and exclusive powers within internal affairs, except for areas in which the Governor possesses special responsibilities or functions. The Parliament consists of a Speaker and eighteen elected members. The Speaker is elected by the members of Parliament rather than appointed by the Governor. Also, the Parliament consists of the Deputy Governor and the Attorney-General as ex officio members without voting power. With the new constitution, the United Kingdom is obliged to notify the Premier of the Cayman Islands of any proposed Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament or Orders in Council thereof that would directly affect the Cayman Islands (Cayman Islands Constitution Order 2009).

Hence, the Cayman Islands has experienced a gradual increase of its autonomous powers over the years. From having very little influence in the running of its own affairs in the early 1960s, the 1972 constitution provided what could be described as the beginning of some level of real autonomy, and the 2009 constitution again increased the scope of self-government significantly. There are of course limitations to the powers that the Cayman Islands possesses. First, the United Kingdom, through the Governor, retains certain powers within matters of defence, most of external affairs and internal security (Cayman Islands Constitution Order 2009). Outside of these responsibilities, the Governor also has the authority to reject certain local legislation if it encroaches on, for instance, the constitution, the Governor's responsibilities, the United Kingdom's international obligations or the integrity of the court system or the public services (Loft 2022:22–23).

6.2 The Cayman Islands: Explaining its absence of autonomy failure by secession

This section examines viability of and distinctiveness in the Cayman Islands during its period of territorial autonomy. The first subsection highlights its position vis-à-vis the United Kingdom for common economic performance indicators. It also examines the territory's broader economic and socioeconomic structure. Additionally, the analysis is broadened by examining its relative viability vis-à-vis other comparable territories. The second subsection offers an overview of the Cayman Islands' ethnic distinctiveness in terms of language and religion in relation to the United Kingdom. As stated, other aspects of distinctiveness beyond language and religion are also analysed. Moreover, this subsection also includes comparisons with other territories. Aspects regarding national identity and social conservatism are also examined. The third subsection provides a brief overview of conditions along with positions taken regarding sovereign statehood, expressed both in the Cayman Islands and in the United Kingdom.

6.2.1 Territory or group viability

As for relative viability, Figure 5 shows that in terms of GDP per capita the Cayman Islands has been more prosperous than the United Kingdom throughout much of its period of territorial autonomy. It also shows that its relative prosperity has increased since the mid-1980s, with the greatest difference noted in the decade prior to 2020. Moreover, Figure 6 shows that the strongest relative GDP growth occurred earlier on in the observation period, i.e. from the mid-1980s until the early 1990s. After this, growth slowed and was periodically lower than in the United Kingdom. As for unemployment levels shown in Figure 7, no great differences have existed, nor has unemployment ever been very high in the Cayman Islands.



Figure 5. Relative levels of GDP per capita in the Cayman Islands and the United Kingdom, 1985–2020. Sources: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1992, 1995, 2004a, 2004b, 2012, 2016a, 2020, 2022, author's computations).



Figure 6. Average real rates of growth of GDP in the Cayman Islands and the United Kingdom, 1984–2015. Sources: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1992, 1994, 2004a, 2004b, 2008, 2011, 2016a, 2016b, 2017, author's computations).



Figure 7. Unemployment rates in the Cayman Islands and the United Kingdom, 1970–2020. Sources: University of the West Indies – Census Research Program, cited in Zuvekas (1978); Economics and Statistics Office (2022a); World Bank Group (2025).

Apart from typical macroeconomic indicators related to GDP and labour force status, there are also other measurements of economic and social performance of states and territories, for instance the Human Development Index. The Cayman Islands' score for the period 2010 to 2020 for which data is available was 0.882 in 2010 and 0.884 in 2020, which equals a very high Human Development Index (Economics and Statistics Office 2023:2). As for the United Kingdom, its equivalent scores were 0.912 in 2010 and 0.924 in 2020 (United Nations Development Programme 2022:277). For the Cayman Islands, no human development score has been composed prior to 2010. However, by looking more closely and partly further back in time at some of the components of the Human Development Index for which comparable data is available, for instance life expectancy at birth, one can infer that in 1960, 1990 and 2020 this stood at 58.5, 72.0 and 75.1 years in the Cayman Islands. The corresponding figures for the United Kingdom, in contrast, were 71.0, 75.7 and 80.4 years (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2022). Another component is adult literacy rate, which stood at 93 percent in the Cayman Islands in 1960 (Barrett 1982:219) and which was not far off from the virtually full literacy levels that existed in the United Kingdom at the time (UNESCO 1957:44). Average number of years of schooling is another component of the Human Development Index. In 1970, this number stood at 6.47 years in the Cayman Islands, and in 1971 it stood at 11.37 years in the United Kingdom for the population over the age of 25. However, this disparity has been erased over time. In 2014, which is the last year prior to 2020 for which data is available for both the Cayman Islands and the United Kingdom, the number stood at 13.44 and 12.89 years, respectively (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2025).

It is notable that the Cayman Islands has throughout its period of territorial autonomy done well also in other comparisons. For instance,

already at the turn of the 1970s the territory had one of the highest living standards and per capita incomes in the Caribbean (Buck 1971:43). In 2020, the Cayman Islands was also ranked in the top tier in terms of GDP per capita among twenty-two sovereign and non-sovereign territories in the Caribbean for which data is available (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division 2024). As for Human Development Index, in 2020 the Cayman Islands performed better than Trinidad and Tobago (0.818) and the Bahamas (0.815), which then were the sovereign states in the Caribbean with the highest scores (United Nations Development Programme 2022:277). According to data reported primarily by the University of the West Indies – Census Research Program from the 1970 Population Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean but also Antigua census data, in that year the unemployment rate in the Cayman Islands stood at 1.5 percent, which also was the lowest among several small English-speaking states and territories in the Caribbean (cited in Zuvekas 1978:29) and very low compared to the 17.6 percent rate registered in its larger neighbour Jamaica in 1969 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 1980:92). Also, since the 1990s, the unemployment levels in the Cayman Islands have been very low in comparison to several other Caribbean states and territories (Economics and Statistics Office 2021:58; Pan American Health Organization 2023). As for poverty levels in several Caribbean sovereign and non-sovereign territories between the years 2002 and 2016, the Cayman Islands had by far the smallest share of inhabitants living in poverty with 2 percent reported as moderately poor and none as extremely poor in 2007. For instance, in nearby and much larger Jamaica the equivalent figures in 2015 were 17 and 11 percent, respectively (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 2023:9–10). Moreover, with respect to average number of years of schooling for the population over the age of 25 among thirteen sovereign and non-sovereign territories in the Caribbean for which data is available between the years 2010 and 2020, the Cayman Islands was ranked first (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2025). One area in which the Cayman Islands has not outperformed its peers in the Caribbean region, however, is life expectancy at birth. When comparing twenty-eight sovereign and non-sovereign territories in the region the Cayman Islands in 2020 and 1990 ranked fifteenth and sixteenth respectively, and in 1960 it ranked twenty-first (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2022). Apart from the comparison with other territories and states in the near region, it is also notable that in comparison to all remaining British Overseas Territories, both in the Caribbean and elsewhere, the Cayman Islands today counts as the second wealthiest (Loft 2023:9).

What seems rather indisputable is that the people of the Cayman Islands have enjoyed significant prosperity since the earliest days of territorial autonomy. For instance, in the beginning of the 1960s, the Cayman Islands experienced a rapid development with expanded social services, a high

standard of living with virtually no poverty (Commonwealth Office 1967:3) and, as previously stated, had a high adult literacy rate (Barrett 1982:219). Already in the early days of self-government, the Cayman Islands government generally did not require any grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom to fund and uphold local functions. With personal taxation largely non-existent, the main sources of revenue for the government came from import duties and from the sale of postage stamps. As for revenue sources for the islanders in general, in the early days the economy still depended largely on remittances by Caymanian seamen employed on American ships. As for external trade, locally manufactured ropes stood for the largest share of export revenues in 1965 (Commonwealth Office 1967:3, 5, 13, 16). Until 1970, the fishing industry also contributed greatly to the economy (Cichon 1989:572).

However, in subsequent decades a couple of other sectors have come to dominate the Caymanian economy. After a modest start already in the 1930s (Bodden 2007:342), by the early 1960s tourism had emerged as an important industry in the territory's economy (Commonwealth Office 1967:3). The industry continued to grow immensely as, between 1973 and 1984, there was a more than 300 percent increase in tourist arrivals to the islands (Europa Year Book 1988:2857). By 1991, the tourism industry stood for 22.9 percent of contribution to GDP (Europa World Year Book 1996:3347) and in 2019, it similarly accounted for 20.0 percent thereof (World Travel and Tourism Council 2023).

Despite the importance of tourism, the financial and insurance services industry dominates the economy of the Cayman Islands. Already in the 1960s the territory began its transition from a, primarily, maritime economy into one of the world's largest financial services centres (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2012:33). Already by the end of the 1970s, there were around 10.000 companies and at least 250 offshore banks and trust companies registered in the Cayman Islands (Banks et al. 1981:474). In 2020, the territory counted as the 16th largest banking centre in international assets and 14th in international liabilities with about 85 percent of all hedge funds in the world domiciled in the territory (Cayman Islands Monetary Authority 2023:2). The dominance of the financial and insurance services sector in modern times is notable considering that during the period 2006–2020 its contribution to Caymanian GDP stood at a high of 37.3 percent in 2007 and 32.6 percent in 2020 (Economics and Statistics Office 2022b:85).

The transition of the Cayman Islands into an international financial centre occurred due to several reasons. Globalisation and the lack of exchange controls on foreign currency in the early days was one. In addition to being geographically located in North America, the islands also had the benefits of having good flight connections and good telecommunication infrastructure in place (Bodden 2007:223–224). Moreover, the adoption of the *Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Law of 1966* opened the Cayman Islands to

companies that would conduct business operations on the islands, and to those far more numerous and, through licence fees, very lucrative ones that were mostly offshore based. Additionally, the Cayman Islands adopted its own currency, the Cayman Islands dollar, which eventually was pegged to the United States dollar. This further added to the perceived stability of the Caymanian financial system. Apart from these factors, another reason for the Cayman Islands' financial attractiveness was its political association with the United Kingdom, which added to the impression of the territory as stable and secure, while also distant enough from its parent state and the United States to maintain a level of financial discretion (Craton 2003:331, 353, 358). Initially, however, the Cayman Islands lacked professionals especially within corporate law to develop as a financial centre. This changed when many British with these skills that resided in the Bahamas left after a new nationalist government came to power there in 1972. Some of them relocated to the Cayman Islands and brought with them, among other things, expertise and connections that helped to further develop the financial services sector in the territory (Bodden 2007:219).

The development of certain overseas territories into financial centres was also encouraged by the British government (Connell and Aldrich 2020:256). The support rested on arguments concerning the development of the overseas territories' economic self-sufficiency and the United Kingdom granted them broader autonomous powers to enable this. The fact that the territories were still British also meant that assets would remain within the 'Sterling Area' (Freyer and Morriss 2013:1302).

As in the early days of self-government, today there is no direct taxation in the Cayman Islands in the form of income tax, company or corporation tax, inheritance tax, property tax or capital gains or gift tax (Cayman Islands Government 2023). According to the Cayman Islands Treasury Department, government revenues primarily stem from taxes on goods and services including financial services licences, work permit and residency fees, etc. and from taxes on international trade and transactions (cited in Economics and Statistics Office 2021:42–45). The Cayman Islands is self-sufficient in the sense that it does not require any direct financial assistance from the United Kingdom (Foreign Affairs Committee 2019:18).

However, despite the comparatively prosperous standing that the territory has long enjoyed there are limitations to its overall economic robustness and self-sufficiency. For one, the Cayman Islands does not possess any significant supply of commodities of its own. The territory has no known deposits, nor is there any extraction of non-fuel minerals such as precious metals, iron ores, gemstones, etc. (Turner 2014:1320–1321). Moreover, the Cayman Islands has not produced any fuel mineral resources such as coal, oil and natural gas (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2022). In this regard it is notable that in 2021 oil accounted for 99 percent of total energy supply in the territory. The share of renewable energy, and likewise the share

of the Cayman Island's energy self-sufficiency, amounted to just one percent (International Renewable Energy Agency 2024).

With respect to food self-sufficiency, it can be noted that the agriculture and fishing industry contributed 0.3–0.4 percent to GDP in 2006–2020 (Economics and Statistics Office 2022b:85) and the Cayman Islands only has an estimated 0.8 percent of arable land (Central Intelligence Agency 2023). Crop production has been limited throughout the years due to infertile soil and other factors, although some crop and livestock have been produced (Buck 1971:43; Europa Year Book 1988:2857; Europa World Year Book 2009:4771). As a result of this, almost all food consumed in the islands has been imported since the early years of self-government to the present time (Buck 1971:43; Europa Year Book 1988:2857; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2018).

Finally, it is noteworthy that in addition to certain limitations regarding self-sufficiency, the Cayman Islands has also experienced some direct challenges over the years, which have further highlighted certain financial vulnerabilities. In modern times, the financial crisis that began in 2008 had a significant impact on the economy, forcing the government in 2009 to turn to the United Kingdom for loans to cover public expenses (Higman 2021:426). Consequent to this, the United Kingdom forced the Cayman Islands to commit to budgetary cuts, borrowing limits and to a more responsible and transparent approach to fiscal and debt management (Clegg 2013:58). In addition to this, natural disasters have also posed serious threats and occasionally caused huge financial strains in the territory, particularly hurricanes. In 2008, Hurricane Paloma struck the Cayman Islands with the smaller so-called Sister Islands, i.e. Little Cayman and Cayman Brac, hit by far the hardest. Total damage was estimated at 7.4 percent of the Cayman Islands' GDP. Still, this was a relatively low figure since Grand Cayman, which is the main island that hosts the bulk of the Cayman Islands' economy, was largely spared from the disaster. However, only a few years earlier the situation was the opposite. In 2004, Hurricane Ivan devastated Grand Cayman but left the Sister Islands mostly spared. This time, total damage was estimated at 183 percent of Caymanian GDP (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 2009:1, 32, 43, 45). The vast devastation caused by Hurricane Ivan left the Cayman Islands in need of British and international relief assistance (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 2004:18–19, Bush 2004).

6.2.2 Territory or group distinctiveness

As for distinctiveness in terms of language and religion in the Cayman Islands, Figure 8 below displays census data from 1999, 2010 and 2021. The data confirms the dominance of English as the main language spoken at home, with Spanish being the largest minority language. Thus, the Cayman

Islands does not fundamentally differ from its parent state in terms of language. As for religion, Figure 9 confirms that throughout the period of territorial autonomy Christian Protestantism (Extended), which includes all branches of Protestantism, has dominated. However, a steady decrease of adherers has occurred over time. Thus, the Cayman Islands has not differed from its parent state in terms of religion, given that historically and traditionally the Christian Anglican denomination of Protestantism has dominated in the United Kingdom.



Figure 8. Language most spoken at home in the Cayman Islands in 1999, 2010 and 2021. Sources: Economics and Statistics Office (2008, 2011, 2022c, author's computations).



Figure 9. Protestantism (Extended) in the Cayman Islands vis-à-vis other Christian denominations, religions and non-believers, 1962–2015. Source: Brown and James (2019).

However, the Cayman Islands does differ in some respects. First, one can infer that religion has a comparatively large influence in Caymanian society. This is evident, for instance, in the current constitution from 2009, which refers to the Cayman Islands as 'a God-fearing country based on traditional Christian values…' (Cayman Islands Constitution Order 2009). On a societal level, census data from 2021 also show that approximately 82 percent of the population of the Cayman Islands are affiliated with a religious denomination, whereas the share of respondents stating 'No religion' stood at 16.7 percent. Corresponding figures from the 2010 census showed that 90.0 percent of respondents were affiliated with a religion with 9.3 percent stating 'No religion' (Economics and Statistics Office 2011:26, 2022c:22). Similar figures in England and Wales in 2021 showed that 56.9 percent of the population adhere to a religion, with 37.2 percent stating 'No religion' (Office for National Statistics 2022a, author's computations).

Second, the Cayman Islands also differs somewhat from the United Kingdom in that it displays a rather more multifaceted Protestant tradition due to the popularity of many other branches of Protestantism than the Anglican. Census data from 2021, 2010 and 1999 show that more than half of the respondents were affiliated with one of the Protestant denominations. Of these, Church of God was the most common with a share of 19.5, 22.6 and 26.0 percent respectively, whereas the Anglican Church had a followership of 2.8, 4.1 and 5.7 percent. Others include Seventh-day Adventist, Non-denominational, Baptist, Pentecostal, Presbyterian/United Church, Wesleyan Holiness, Methodist and Rastafarian branches, all of which have numerous followers. Roman Catholicism also has a notable number of followers with a percentage share of 13.6, 14.1 and 11.0 percent according to 2021, 2010 and 1999 census data (Economics and Statistics Office 2008:30, 2011:26, 2022c:22, author's computations).

Still, given that there are no substantial differences between the Cayman Islands and the United Kingdom in terms of language and religion, an examination of ethnic distinctiveness from a broader perspective is advisable. This shows that the population of the Cayman Islands is comparatively diverse in several ways. In 1960, the territory had a total population of 8,511 inhabitants of which 18.4 percent of the population were of European origin, 17.2 percent were of African origin and 64.5 percent were of mixed origin (Commonwealth Office 1967:8, author's computations). According to present-day figures, around 20.0 percent are white, 20.0 percent are of African descent and 40.0 percent are mixed. Moreover, there are 20.0 percent expatriates of various ethnicities (Central Intelligence Agency 2023). In this regard, the Cayman Islands differs in comparison to modern-day United Kingdom in which, depending on constituent country, about 81–97 percent of the population is white (Office for National Statistics 2022b; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency 2023; National Records of Scotland 2024, author's computations).

When comparing the Cayman Islands with other territories in the Caribbean region in terms of ethnic composition there is, however, also a clear difference. According to household survey data stemming from between the years 2002 and 2016 in a report by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2023:2–3) on ethnic-racial self-identification in nine Caribbean sovereign and non-sovereign territories, the Cayman Islands differs substantially from its peer territories in the region. Data show that between 76 and 92 percent of respondents in the other territories identified as 'Afro-descendent', whereas the same figure in the Cayman Islands stood at 42 percent. Instead, 57 percent of Caymanian respondents identified as 'Neither Indigenous nor Afro-descendant', while no one identified as 'Indigenous'.

The Cayman Islands has also experienced rapid population growth over the years. According to official census data, the total population of the territory in 1970 was 10,068 residents, whereas in 2021 it stood at 71,105 residents (Economics and Statistics Office 2022c:3), which corresponds to a population increase of 606 percent in fifty-one years (author's computations). However, the level of growth has gradually slowed in recent decades with a 29.2 percent population growth occurring between 2010 and 2021. This is considerably lower than in preceding times since 1970 when population growth ranged between 41.0 and 65.6 percent per decade (Economics and Statistics Office 2022c:3–4).

Due to this growth, Caymanian society is also characterised by a wide scope of people of different nationalities. In 2021, there were residents from 162 different countries or territories and only 35.4 percent of residents were born in the islands (Economics and Statistics Office 2022c:18–19). As a result of this demographic structure, a broader sense of Caymanian nationalism used to have difficulties emerging in the territory (Connell and Aldrich 2020:298). However, there might be other reasons for this as well. One might be the fact that the people of the Cayman Islands in general have felt a strong connection with and loyalty towards the United Kingdom and the monarchy, with such sentiments being the strongest among the older segments of the population (Bodden 2007:127–128). Moreover, the perceived economic benefits and prosperity that has followed due to association with the United Kingdom has stifled the development of separateness and a separate identity in the same way as has been the case in some other British Overseas Territories in the Caribbean (Connell and Aldrich 2020:137).

Another result of the high levels of immigration in recent decades has been the emergence of an official distinction between Caymanians and non-Caymanians. Due to general discontent at the influx of immigrants, immigration laws were amended to more clearly define who is Caymanian and who is not (Bodden 2018:140). A resident is considered Caymanian either by birth or by status. Non-Caymanians, in turn, are for instance residents with work permits or government contracts along with their

spouses and children. Also, residents with student visas and permanent residents with or without the right to work as well as holders or applicants of asylum are considered non-Caymanians. According to census data from 1979, 19.2 percent of the Cayman Islands' residents were non-Caymanians, whereas 80.7 percent were Caymanians. According to the census data from 2021, the share of non-Caymanians had reached 46.5 percent of the total population, although Caymanians still represented a slight majority with a share of 53.5 percent. The greatest increase of non-Caymanians occurred from 1979–1989 and 1989–1999 with an increase of 161.3 and 120.0 percent respectively, far outnumbering the increase of Caymanians. However, the increase of non-Caymanians slowed markedly in the periods 1999–2010 and 2010–2021with growth rates of 30.4 and 37.4 percent respectively, which was much nearer to the increase in the share of Caymanians (Economics and Statistics Office 2022c:6, 74).

One of the consequences of the immigration laws has been that many Caymanians have blamed non-Caymanians for their failures to find work since many have erroneously believed that being Caymanian would give them precedence over non-Caymanians on the labour market (Bodden 2018:142). A stricter attitude towards immigration is also reflected in the 2009 constitution, which states that the Cayman Islands is 'A country with an immigration system that protects Caymanians, gives security to long-term residents and welcomes legitimate visitors and workers' (Cayman Islands Constitution Order 2009). Prior to the new constitution, there had been constitutional amendments also concerning requirements that persons seeking election to Parliament or registering as electors needed to have certain connections to the Cayman Islands. For instance, according to amendments made in 1984, such persons were for the first time required to possess Caymanian status. There were also additional criteria with respect to citizenship status, birthplace and length of residence in the Cayman Islands and requirements concerning these were reinforced in further constitutional amendments in 1987 (Cayman Islands (Constitution) (Amendment) Order 1984; Cayman Islands (Constitution) (Amendment) Order 1987).

A clear divide in terms of ethnicity and class has arisen over the years among the immigrant population as about half has consisted of white wealthy people or higher-paid professionals from developed countries, whereas the other half has been made up of non-whites from developing countries with mostly low-wage jobs (Craton 2003:363–364). Still, the immigrant segment of the population has contributed with significant investments and earning power, and the financial and the legal sectors are almost entirely dominated by non-Caymanians. Thus, non-Caymanians have held extensive influence in Caymanian society, and this has caused certain friction and increased demands for greater parity for Caymanians (Bodden 2018:144–145).

Despite some marginal friction in Cayman Islands society, the Caymanians have in recent decades become more aware of their own identity. This has

manifested itself through the creation of several new organisations and institutions with the prefix 'National', such as the National Trust, the National Archive, the National Museum, etc. Another factor that has promoted a sense of national identity is the participation of the Cayman Islands in regional and international sports competitions such as the CARIFTA Games, the Commonwealth Games and the Olympic Games (Craton 2003:410, 413). The Cayman Islands is one of only a few British Overseas Territories eligible to take part in the Olympics as a 'country' with its own representation (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2012:76). In addition to this, there have also been increased efforts to promote Caymanian arts, music, literature and drama (Craton 2003:410–416).

Finally, by looking beyond matters explicitly concerning ethnicity, demographics and self-identification, one can deduce that there are other related aspects where the Cayman Islands is distinct from the United Kingdom. Aside from being a comparatively religious society, as previously demonstrated, a significant level of conservatism has also prevailed, for instance, with respect to issues such as capital punishment and homosexuality. In fact, the United Kingdom has in the past imposed legislation to circumvent the will of the people of the Cayman Islands in these matters (Bodden 2007:184). In 1991, an Order in Council was issued to abolish capital punishment for murder and in 2000, another was issued to put an end to the ban against homosexual acts between consenting adults (Caribbean Territories (Abolition of Death Penalty for Murder) Order 1991; Caribbean Territories (Criminal Law) Order 2000). The issue of homosexuality has, however, continued to remain contentious. For instance, the most recent constitution from 2009 states that the 'Government shall respect the right of every unmarried man and woman of marriageable age (as determined by law) freely to marry a person of the opposite sex and found a family' (Cayman Islands Constitution Order 2009). Moreover, prior to the enactment of the constitution, its draft was described as 'deplorable' by the British Foreign Affairs Committee since it was seen as deliberately omitting protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation. The committee also concluded that it was due to public opinion in the Cayman Islands that the constitution was formulated in this way (Foreign Affairs Committee 2009:14, 103–104). The draft constitution in its entirety had also been put to a referendum and approved by 62.7 percent of the voters (Elections Office Cayman Islands 2009). More recently, in April 2019, then Premier Alden McLaughlin noted before Parliament that, although sympathetic to the feelings of all sides in the matter, his conviction was that most Caymanians at that time were against same-sex marriage (Cayman Islands Legislative Assembly 2019).

6.2.3 Other explanations and attitudes towards sovereign statehood

Throughout most of its modern history until present times, the Cayman Islands has been dismissive of the question of independence (Drower 1992:203; Davies 1995:37; Connell and Aldrich 2020:69). There are different reasons for this. The current system of governance is perceived as the most beneficial to the Cayman Islands' residents due to the legal, political, democratic and economic safeguarding that association with the United Kingdom entails (Clegg 2018:22). Throughout the years, the people of the Cayman Islands have witnessed significant economic and political hardship and violence in nearby places such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada along with some sense of wariness towards Cuba. This has given rise to the feeling that the current system of political association with the United Kingdom provides the most benefits and security vis-à-vis the option of independence (Davies 1995:36–37).

Political association with the United Kingdom also relieves the Cayman Islands from the costly responsibility of maintaining their own foreign policy machinery as well as diplomatic representation abroad (Craton 2003:409). Through its international influence and vast diplomatic resources, the United Kingdom manages the external relations of the Cayman Islands and promotes its interests in the world. Political association with the United Kingdom also adds to the international standing of the islands and provides economic and technical assistance as well as security and defence guarantees. For instance, within the area of safety and security the United Kingdom has committed itself to assisting and protecting its Overseas Territories from different kinds of threats, such as international terrorism, organized crime, military incursions and natural disasters. Moreover, the United Kingdom provides certain technical support to the territories as well as advice, training and support within a vast array of areas where local resources or expertise is limited. In terms of economic benefits, political association enables British trade and investments in the territories, and the United Kingdom also provides support in terms of economic development and planning but also in terms of financial assistance if needed (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2012:8, 14, 22, 54). The relationship with the United Kingdom is often credited as the reason for the Cayman Islands' favourable performance with respect to crime and poverty levels in comparison to many of the other sovereign states in the region (Connell and Aldrich 2020:138).

In general, it has been the potential consequences on the local economy that has been the cardinal issue whenever constitutional status has been discussed in the Cayman Islands (Fergus 2004:6). Already in the days when independence of the West Indies Federation was on the agenda, the people of the Cayman Islands feared that independence as part of that federation would deprive them of the visa privileges they held which allowed them to

work on American ships. This was one reason why they instead opted for dependency status directly under the United Kingdom (Drower 1992:202, 222). More recently, a perception has existed among Caymanians that the islands' economic prosperity is tied to its political association with the United Kingdom and that political and social advancement on the one hand, and economic prosperity on the other cannot be simultaneously achieved. Thus, economic development has generally been a far more prioritised issue than constitutional advancement and independence (Bodden 2007:142–143). Rather than regarding their prosperity as a stepping stone towards eventual independence, the people of the Cayman Islands have ascribed their fortune to the current political association with the United Kingdom (Fergus 2004:8).

The right to British citizenship is another reason why the people of the Cayman Islands find the current system most beneficial (Clegg 2018:22). In 1999, it was decided that the possibility to acquire full British citizenship with the right of abode in the United Kingdom would be extended to the citizens of the British Overseas Territories with some exceptions (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1999:6, 17–18) and this right came into effect in 2002 (British Overseas Territories Act 2002).

In the 1980s, Tony Thorndike conducted a series of interviews concerning attitudes towards independence in the British Overseas Territories of the Cayman Islands, Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat and Turks and Caicos Islands. The aggregated results for all territories showed that, according to the respondents, the most significant impediment to independence was the small size of their territories. Regardless of the prosperity level, it was felt that independence was too expensive and that serious recessions posed too great a risk to cope with alone without the United Kingdom as an economic guarantor. Other fears concerned the risk of irresponsible politicians, increased public expenses and taxation together with greater administrative inflexibility. General pro-British sentiments were, to a lesser extent, offered as a reason against independence, although more frequently in connection with the perception that political association with the United Kingdom added to outside financial confidence in the territories (Thorndike 1989:123). About a decade later in the late 1990s, the British government commissioned a white paper titled *Partnership for Progress and Prosperity – Britain and the Overseas Territories* and, according to its findings, there was no wish in the Overseas Territories for any great overhaul or severing of the constitutional relationship with the United Kingdom. However, some desire was expressed concerning modification and modernization of the constitutions of the Territories. The United Kingdom did make commitments to review the requests but also to push for further development within areas such as democracy, human rights and rule of law (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1999:9, 11, 13).

Caymanian politicians have also mostly dismissed the idea of full independence in recent decades based on economic arguments. As reported

in *The New Caymanian* on 14 May 1993, in response to statements made by the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation, then Leader of Government Business Thomas Jefferson dismissed the idea of independence on grounds that it would jeopardise the islands' prosperity (cited in Connell 2001:121). In 2003, then Premier McKeeva Bush did, however, demand a revised constitution granting further sovereign decision-making powers to the Cayman Islands within financial and other spheres (Connell and Aldrich 2020:70). Throughout his premiership, Bush had frequently been quite critical of both the Governor and the United Kingdom government, accusing them of overstepping their authority and of bureaucratic harassment (Clegg 2013:57). In 2014, then Premier Alden McLaughlin also rejected talks of independence by referring to a renewed relationship with the United Kingdom (Cayman News Service 2014). In 2016, he denounced independence more bluntly by stating that the Cayman Islands is too small for independence in terms of population and that such an endeavour would be madness. Instead, he argued, the Cayman Islands should aspire for greater economic independence and internal autonomy (Cayman News Service 2016). However, in a reaction to calls for independence by a Caymanian MEP in 2020, Premier McLaughlin responded that he regarded independence unwanted but inevitable (Cayman News Service 2020a). Later that same year he largely reiterated this stance and added that internal autonomy, preferably expanded, would serve the Cayman Islands better in the near term (Cayman News Service 2020b). Apart from the previously mentioned studies, no in-depth surveys on the Caymanian public's view regarding sovereign statehood for the Cayman Islands have been conducted to the author's knowledge. However, an online poll that touched upon the subject was conducted in 2011 by the Cayman Compass, which is one of the local news outlets. To the question 'When, if ever, do you think the Cayman Islands will become independent?', 60.9 percent of the 733 respondents replied 'Never', whereas 15.9 percent said it would happen in ten to twenty-five years. The remaining share believed independence would be achieved either sooner or later than this (Markoff 2011).

As for the United Kingdom's position on sovereign statehood for its Overseas Territories, it has since several decades back been amenable to such requests. For instance, towards the end of the 1980s and 1990s and again in 2012, the respective British governments have stated that independence is a matter for the Overseas Territories to decide and that the British government would be supportive where this is an option and the clearly expressed will of the people. Likewise, the United Kingdom have also committed to supporting those territories that wish to remain part of the United Kingdom (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1999:4, 9, 12; 2012:5, 11, 15).

6.3 Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to apply an inverse approach altogether and analyse an autonomous territory in which autonomy failure by secession has not occurred. Again, the partly inverse interpretation of the results in the quantitative analysis, on which this case study analysis was based, suggested that *Relative economic performance*, i.e. relative economic prosperity, in terms of GDP per capita and absence of *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion might contribute to the absence of *Autonomy failure by secession*. The Cayman Islands was selected as a suitable case for this analysis. *Relative economic performance* was analysed from a broad perspective to include a multitude of indicators and aspects. Likewise, given the absence of linguistic and religious distinctiveness in the Cayman Islands, focus on *Ethnic distinctiveness* also required an openness to other potential explanatory factors than language and religion. The selection of the Cayman Islands for case study analysis was guided by the intent to determine whether the opposite or complete absence of these qualities might then contribute to the absence of autonomy failure by secession in that autonomous territory.

Beginning with the independent variable with the most solid explanatory power according to the quantitative analysis, i.e. *Relative economic performance,* the qualitative analysis shows that throughout history when changes to the Cayman Islands' status have been on the agenda, economic benefits and implications have often been at the forefront of considerations. This was the case when the territory wished to merge with Jamaica in 1863 and when its position within the West Indies Federation was debated beginning in the late 1950s. Moreover, since the beginning of territorial autonomy, political association with the United Kingdom has been seen as providing reputational benefits and stability to the Cayman Islands' highly important financial services sector. The study also shows that economic considerations have been the basis for most arguments against sovereign statehood for the Cayman Islands, as expressed by both politicians and the people over the years.

As for data on the Cayman Islands' overall relative economic status over time, some conclusions can be drawn. Concerning GDP per capita, the Cayman Islands has consistently performed better than the United Kingdom since at least the mid-1980s and especially in the final decade prior to year 2020. Moreover, other studies have established that the territory had reached a rather high level of general prosperity already in the 1960s, although the state of this prosperity in more detail relative to the United Kingdom has been somewhat difficult to determine. When it comes to GDP growth, unemployment levels, literacy levels and Human Development Index the territory has generally not excelled to the same extent as with GDP per capita levels, although it has not underperformed in any marked sense either. However, in terms of life expectancy and average years of schooling, there

were substantial differences to the disadvantage of the Cayman Islands in the early years of territorial autonomy. Still, significant improvements have been made with life expectancy having neared the same levels as in the United Kingdom by 1990 and the number of years of schooling is today on an equal level. All in all, one can deduce that based on the mentioned indicators, the Cayman Islands has since the beginning of territorial autonomy to some extent outperformed, but mostly by and large reflected, the levels of economic and social development in its parent state. However, in relation to its Caribbean peers the Cayman Islands has mostly, and in many cases by a clear margin, outperformed these states and territories regarding the mentioned social and economic indicators. The Cayman Islands is today also one of the wealthiest of all British Overseas Territories.

As for the territory's economic structure and self-sufficiency, due to its overall wealth it has generally not depended on subsidies from the United Kingdom to uphold its functions, except in the aftermath of some devastating natural disasters in recent times. There are, however, certain limitations to the Cayman Islands' capacity and self-sufficiency, as it does not possess any primary commodities to generate significant export revenues or to provide for local consumption needs. There are no fuel or non-fuel mineral resources, and the agricultural industry is negligible. Instead, the economy has been highly dependent on the financial services industry and tourism during most of the Cayman Islands' period of territorial autonomy.

With respect to the other independent variable that proved significant according to the quantitative analysis, *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion, the case study analysis confirms the largely non-distinctiveness of the Cayman Islands in terms of these aspects. Linguistically, there is no difference between the Cayman Islands and the United Kingdom. There is no overall difference in terms of religion either, although the Cayman Islands is both a significantly more religious and a more multifaceted society regarding the Christian Protestant faith. A comparatively large share of the population of the Cayman Islands describes themselves as religious and religion has considerable overall influence as it, for instance and as demonstrated, represents the foundation for comparatively pronounced conservative values both in law and society. As for the character of the Protestant faith in the territory, data shows that throughout the years a multitude of different branches of Protestantism have existed and been popular, with the Anglican branch having had a comparatively minor position. However, despite the comparatively high levels of religiosity it can be noted, as demonstrated in Figure 9 and by census data, that the number of both Protestant and religious adherers overall has steadily decreased over the years, presumably due to increased levels of multiculturalism and secularism in Caymanian society.

Aside from language and religion, which are the primary aspects of ethnic distinctiveness applied in this study, the population of the Cayman Islands

does also differ from that of its parent state in terms of ethnic origin since the territory has historically been composed of a rather equal division of people of white, black and mixed ethnicity. Also, the immense population growth in recent decades has added to the demographic diversity of the Cayman Islands, with only about one third of the modern-day population born in the territory. Many of the immigrants have been more competitive on the labour market, which has resulted in some resentment among the local population. The population growth eventually resulted in the implementation of a legal distinction between Caymanians and non-Caymanians and there have also been certain nation-formation efforts to raise group awareness. Today, a slight majority of the population consists of Caymanians, which includes people born in the islands as well as people who are born elsewhere but have Caymanian ancestry. However, according to census data, the comparatively large increase of non-Caymanians of past times has slowed in recent decades. Also, as demonstrated, there are some differences and, consequently, has been some friction between the Cayman Islands and the United Kingdom concerning social values and the means according to which the United Kingdom has attempted to form Caymanian society in ways that have contradicted the will of the people. Still, this has not been sufficient reason to stir up serious demands to radically change the constitutional status of the Cayman Islands.

In conclusion, throughout its years of territorial autonomy, the Cayman Islands has been a comparatively prosperous, and in certain respects considerably more prosperous, territory than its parent state. Still, there have been instances when the islands' economic vulnerabilities have become evident, and statements made by officials on the issue concerning sovereign statehood seem to have reflected that awareness as well as a general awareness of the potential risks to the current prosperity that sovereign statehood might entail. Therefore, the presence of relative economic prosperity in the Cayman Islands appears to have been a contributory factor to the absence of *Autonomy failure by secession* and, thus, *Hypothesis 5b* is confirmed.

Moreover, although a certain distinctiveness exists in the Cayman Islands vis-à-vis its parent state in relation to other aspects, ethnic distinctiveness in terms of language and religion, according to the definition and criteria applied in this study, does not exist in the territory. However, the analysis conducted in this chapter has not identified any evidence or mechanisms indicating that this situation has been a contributory factor to the non-sovereign status of the Cayman Islands nor to attitudes towards the matter. Therefore, the status of *Hypothesis 1b* according to the inverse interpretation thereof is deemed undetermined based on the results of this study.

In the following Chapter 7, the qualitative findings in this chapter are reflected upon in greater detail along with an overarching discussion regarding all findings in this study.

7 Conclusions and discussion

Previous research has established that factors pertaining to territory or group distinctiveness and territory or group viability can influence the occurrence of secessionist sentiments and actions. The focus of this study has been on the phenomenon of secession in the context of decentralized territories with a particular focus on non-(con)federal autonomous territories. Thus, the aim of this dissertation has been to identify factors related to ethnicity and identity along with prosperity and viability that have contributed most to autonomy failure by secession for some autonomous territories.

As for the research sample, this study has taken a broad approach both geographically, since it includes autonomous territories from around the world, as well as temporally, given that it covers autonomous territories that have existed at some point between the years 1901 and 2020. To ascertain the influence of the selected independent variables on the occurrence of autonomy failure by secession, a mixed-methods approach consisting of event history analysis with Cox regression analysis for the quantitative part of the study and case study analysis with process tracing for the qualitative part of the study was applied. A total of 53 autonomous territories that have experienced 68 autonomy periods were analysed in the quantitative analysis. For case study analysis, one formerly autonomous territory that eventually seceded from its parent state and one autonomous territory that still existed as such in 2020 were analysed.

In this final chapter, the intent in the first section is to highlight and reflect on the main results arrived at in this dissertation. The second section reflects on the limitations of the study. The third and concluding section offers some finishing remarks and suggestions for future research.

7.1 Main findings

The first independent variable that proved significant for the occurrence of *Autonomy failure by secession* according to this study is *Relative economic performance*. In the quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4 the variable was analysed based on one of the most common indicators of economic performance, i.e. GDP per capita. The result indicated that autonomous territories that are more prosperous than the rest of their parent states in terms of GDP per capita are less likely to secede. The inverse interpretation of the result would indicate that autonomous territories that are less prosperous in relation to their parent states are more likely to secede. However, given that GDP per capita is a very specific and rather narrow indicator of economic performance, the subsequent case studies with respect to Malta and the Cayman Islands that were conducted in Chapters 5 and 6 required a more holistic approach. This included an extended analysis of a

range of macro and socioeconomic indicators such as GDP, GDP per capita, employment status, life expectancy at birth, average number of years of schooling, Human Development Index, etc., to assess the autonomous territories' economic circumstances, the effects thereof on secession and the potential effects thereon of secession. The case studies seemed to lend further weight to the quantitative findings.

With respect to Malta, the evidence was rather convincing. As was demonstrated in the analysis in Chapter 5, Malta's clear economic deprivation vis-à-vis its parent state was omnipresent throughout its periods of territorial autonomy and the final years were characterised by a sharp deterioration in conditions and prospects. Many Maltese were apprehensive about proposals for full independence from the United Kingdom, but it was the threat of huge reductions in its largest employment sector, i.e. the British armed services and the Maltese dockyards, that increased the number of independentist supporters enough to bring about Malta's secession in 1964. Still, significant doubts about the venture persisted among many Maltese up until that point. These inferences by and large reflect findings in previous research which suggest that the existence of relative economic deprivation does induce secessionism (see e.g. Horowitz 1981:170–171; Wood 1981:116–118; Erk and Anderson 2009:196, 198). To some extent, Malta's circumstances might be interpreted to align with Wood's viewpoints that relative economic deprivation as such is not always sufficient for secessionism to emerge, considering that little secessionist sentiments existed in Malta for a long time despite its consistent relative economic deprivation vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. However, as Wood notes, if economic deprivation coincides with ethnic differences the disadvantaged group might still turn secessionist if it feels that it is being deprived of its rightful material benefits.

Although this study did not establish a causal relationship, there might be other factors related to territory or group viability that might have had some contributory influence on Malta's trajectory to sovereign statehood. For instance, previous research has highlighted that the existence of natural resources might influence the occurrence of political upheaval, including secessionism and secession (see e.g. Ross 2004: 49–52, 61–63; Sorens 2012:71; Lei and Michaels 2014:140, 145, 154; Gehring and Schneider 2020:2, 16–17). In the case of Malta, in cannot be excluded that the possibility of oil reserves that became known in the 1950s (see Chapter 5, Subsection 5.2.1) might have contributed to some extent to Malta's pro-secessionist shift. Despite the case study analysis confirming that it was the dire situation in the largest employment sector that precipitated the shift, it is notable that it occurred at about the same times as the height of the oil prospecting period in Malta and most political parties in their election manifestos at the time vowed to conduct oil explorations. A deeper examination of the effect of possible oil reserves on Malta's pro-secession shift might have been

warranted as this could have provided a broader insight into the influence of viability-related factors in this particular case. Previous research has also highlighted the importance of size in terms of population but also land area, as such characteristics are often indicative of a territory's viability (see e.g. Aldrich and Connell 1998:113; Sorens 2012:71, 97; Sambanis and Milanovic 2014:1848; Ferdinand et al. 2020:46, 50, 60). Malta's total population when it acquired sovereign statehood in 1964 was 329,757 inhabitants (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2022) and its total land area was 316 square kilometres (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 1966:38). Although this places Malta in the category of microstates, it is arguably sizeable enough for viability as a sovereign state. Thus, a certain contributory influence of these aspects cannot be completely ruled out.

As for the Cayman Islands and the relationship between its relative economic prosperity vis-à-vis its parent state and the absence of autonomy failure by secession, some indicative evidence could be discerned in the case study analysis in Chapter 6. Firstly, the Cayman Islands has been more prosperous than its parent state in terms of GDP per capita. Its relative socio-economic performance has not been quite as remarkable although it has not underperformed either in recent decades. Secondly, however, the Cayman Islands has on multiple occasions during its period of territorial autonomy been hit by severe crises, such as hurricanes and the financial crisis of 2008, after which its economic vulnerability and dependence was evident. Thirdly, and perhaps the clearest indication that sovereign statehood has not been attained at least in part due to economic considerations, is that political leaders in the Cayman Islands have cited stability and preservation of the important and profitable financial and insurance services sector as a strong argument against sovereign statehood. There is also some evidence that the public does not believe that sovereign statehood will become a reality for the Cayman Islands. The inferences drawn in this analysis seem to align with previous research that emphasize that it is the economically worse-off groups or territories that are more likely to secede (see above in relation to Malta). Often this is due to a perception that sovereign statehood might provide more remedial opportunities (see e.g. Erk and Anderson 2009:196). As was inferred in this analysis, such viewpoints do not exist in the Cayman Islands, and the United Kingdom has by and large throughout the years been respectful and accommodating of its financial and insurance services sector (see e.g. Clegg 2013:59; Connell and Aldrich 2020:256). Therefore, some parallels might be drawn to elements from Horowitz's (1981:179–188) theory pertaining to the lack of readiness among so-called advanced groups to embark on the secessionist path due fears of losing the economic benefits that political association provides. Also, Hechter's (1992:269–271) theory regarding group interests in protecting the local economy as a factor that might stir up secessionism, especially if it coincides with regional cultural

distinctiveness, might be applicable although from on opposite perspective. Given that the Cayman Islands finds political association with the United Kingdom highly beneficial to the local economy and that it lacks significant ethnic distinctiveness, at least according to the criteria applied in this study, these determinants for secessionism are absent in the territory.

There are also other viability-related factors that were not confirmed to have significance according to this study but that might warrant some discussion in a further attempt to explain the Cayman Islands' political status and the potential reasons behind it, which are somewhat less obvious than in the case of Malta. Population and land area size are factors that might have had some contributory relevance. In this respect, the Cayman Islands is a very small territory and if it was to become a sovereign state it would count as one of the smallest in the world as its total land area is 259 square kilometres (Turner 2014:1320) and its total population in 2020 was 67,311 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2022). Malta, in comparison, had a similar land area size but it was almost five times larger in terms of population size when it acquired sovereign statehood. The quantitative analysis did not confirm the importance of either of the independent variables *Relative population size* or *Population size* (total) although the latter was not far off from reaching statistical significance in the bivariate analysis (see Table 3). The independent variable *Land area* did reach statistical significance in the bivariate analysis and in several multivariate models (see Tables 3, 5 and 6), suggesting that having a larger land area contributes to autonomous territories seceding from their parent states. Although the case study analysis did not find explicit evidence that the Cayman Islands' small size has influenced the negative stance towards acquiring sovereign statehood, implicitly one might argue that perhaps it did. Firstly, the wish to maintain political ties with the United Kingdom due to its facilitating effect on the Cayman Islands' highly important financial and insurance services industry might be one indication of this. The dependence on this source of revenue, which constitutes about one third of Caymanian GDP (Economics and Statistics Office 2022b:85), and the reliance on the reputational benefits that political ties with the parent state adds to the industry could be regarded as a vulnerability that a larger population and thereby possibly a larger, more self-sufficient and more diversified economy might alleviate. Secondly, and perhaps more speculative although one might argue not unreasonable, the Cayman Islands' dependence thus far on parent state aid during severe crises and, therefore, likely future dependence is also indicative of a smallness and vulnerability that might have contributed to discouraging secessionism and secession. Finally, the case study analysis also demonstrated that the Cayman Islands does not have any significant natural resources or commodities of its own and, therefore, this driver of some instances of secessionist sentiments and actions is absent in the territory. Moreover, the analysis also showed that in comparison to many other

sovereign states in the Caribbean region, the Cayman Islands has performed exceptionally well economically and socioeconomically. Although it was not explicitly established in this study, it is possible that both factors have, to some extent, contributed to impeding any desires to change the existing system and status that the Cayman Islands enjoys.

Ultimately, in light of the confirmed results of this study and to answer the second research question: '*What are the specific factors related to territory or group viability that have contributed most to instances of autonomy failure by secession?*', the findings indicate that *Relative economic performance*, specifically relative economic deprivation, has contributed most to instances of *Autonomy failure by secession*. Macroeconomic indicators such as GDP and GDP per capita seem to have been particularly influential, as confirmed in the quantitative analysis and, one might argue, indirectly in the case studies particularly for the Cayman Islands given its strong economic reliance on the financial and insurance services industry and given explicit arguments against sovereign statehood based on protecting this industry. Employment status also seemed to be an important indicator, particularly in Malta according to the case study analysis but also, one might argue, indirectly in the Cayman Islands, again due to the heavy reliance of its economy on the financial and insurance services industry. The results add to previous but divergent research and discussions as to whether relative economic deprivation, as indicated in this study, or prosperity has a greater influence on the occurrence of secessionism and secession. Other factors related to territory or group viability that were analysed in this study – i.e. *Fuel mineral resources*, *Non-fuel mineral resources*, *Population size*, *Relative population size*, *Land area* and *Relative land area* – have no or limited contribution to *Autonomy failure by secession* according to the confirmed results.

The other independent variable that proved significant for the occurrence of *Autonomy failure by secession* according to this study is *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion. The quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4 indicated that autonomous territories that are both linguistically and religiously distinct vis-à-vis their parent states are more likely to secede. Inversely, this result would also imply that autonomous territories that are not distinct in this regard in relation to their parent states are less likely to secede. The impact of these aspects was further analysed in the case study pertaining to Malta. A wider scope of aspects in addition to language and religion was included for consideration and analysis with respect to the Cayman Islands due to a greater ambiguity in assessing its political trajectory. This included aspects related to birthplace and citizenship, ethnic origin and self-identification, national identity, social values, etc. However, the case studies conducted in Chapters 5 and 6 did not produce enough evidence to substantiate the causal relationship inferred in the quantitative analysis.

As was highlighted in the case study analysis in Chapter 5, Malta was linguistically and religiously distinct in relation to its parent state during its period of territorial autonomy. Maltese was the dominant native language in the territory with English and to a certain extent Italian occupying prominent positions. Although a Christian society and, thus, not in that sense religiously dissimilar from the United Kingdom, the Maltese were devoutly Catholic and therefore to a certain extent religiously distinct. However, the linguistic and religious schisms that did exist in Malta were for the most part not with its parent state but between internal groupings. Ultimately, the case study analysis did not infer that language or religion precipitated Malta's pro-secession shift and secession, thus deviating from viewpoints in previous research that have been rather unanimous regarding their significance, and especially that of language, for the occurrence of secessionism and secession (see e.g. Smith 1979: 26–27; Wood 1981:115; Zarkovic Bookman 1992:12; Hannum 1996:458; Dent 2004:201; Sorens 2012:97, 110; Gurr 2015:103–104). Also, despite some previous research indicating that both ethnic distinctiveness and economic disparity could be a potent combination for secessionism to emerge (see e.g. Erk and Anderson 2009:198), this study inferred that the anticipated economic deprivation was the decisive factor for the secessionist shift in Malta.

Although the case study analysis did not infer that other factors pertaining to territory or group distinctiveness had a significant impact on Malta's trajectory to sovereign statehood, certain aspects might still require further discussion. For instance, Malta is both geographically detached and distant from the United Kingdom. Given the emphasis in previous research that this might contribute to the emergence of distinct group identities (see e.g. Heraclides 1991:14) and secessionist sentiments (see e.g. Sorens 2012:16, 35, 70, 110, 156), a certain contributory influence of these independent variables cannot be ruled out. Moreover, previous research has highlighted the significance of lost autonomy or sovereign statehood (see e.g. Webb 2015:9–11; Germann and Sambanis 2021:178, 180, 189, 200). Although Malta had no prior history of sovereign statehood it did experience multiple revocations of its autonomous status in the 1930s and after the Second World War (see Chapter 5, Subsection 5.1.2). Thus, it also cannot be excluded that some grievances pertaining to this might have existed in Maltese politics and society and, to some extent, might have contributed to the pro-secessionist shift, even though it was not substantiated in this study.

As for the Cayman Islands, the case study analysis conducted in Chapter 6 firstly asserted that the territory is not ethnically distinct vis-à-vis its parent state in terms of either language or religion. English is the dominant language, and Protestant Christianity is the dominant religion although minor differences do exist. For instance, there is a great diversity of Protestant denominations in Caymanian society in which the Anglican holds a rather modest position. However, the analysis cast light on the fact that the

Cayman Islands is a society that is rather religious, socially conservative and diverse in terms of the population's ethnic origin. The case study analysis indicated that social conservatism has throughout the years generated some but not secessionist tensions between the Cayman Islands and the United Kingdom. Ultimately, however, the analysis could not identify a causal relationship between the absence of linguistic and religious distinctiveness and the absence of a transition to sovereign statehood for the territory. As will be further elaborated below, one could argue that mechanisms behind such a causal relationship would be somewhat difficult to identify. Viewpoints and inferences in previous research have emphasized the importance of ethnic distinctiveness (see above). Again, the combination of distinctiveness and economic interests has also been highlighted in previous research as important for the emergence of secessionism (see e.g. Hechter 1992:271). Although this study did not identify a causal relationship, it cannot be excluded that the absence of both ethnic distinctiveness and, as previously highlighted, economic incentives might have contributed to the absence of secessionism and secession in the Cayman Islands.

There could also be other factors related to territory or group distinctiveness that might have had some contributory relevance in explaining the absence of secessionism and secession in the Cayman Islands, even though it was not established in this study. Population diversity in terms of status and origin might be one, given that of the present-day population almost half consists of non-Caymanians and only about one-third are born in the territory (Economics and Statistics Office 2022c:6, 19). These demographic realities might contribute to an absence of sufficient national cohesiveness, as also inferred by Connell and Aldrich (2020:298), which would be one necessary condition for significant pro-secessionist sentiments to emerge. The Cayman Islands' geographical detachment and distance from its parent state could also have contributed, if one considers Horowitz's (1981:173) argument from an alternative perspective according to which distance might reduce unnecessary friction with and interference by the parent state. Again, despite some friction regarding some matters, the United Kingdom has been quite accommodating of the Cayman Islands especially pertaining to its highly important status as an international financial centre (see e.g. Freyer and Morriss 2013:1302; Connell and Aldrich 2020:256). Finally, given that the Cayman Islands has no history of lost sovereign statehood, nor has it ever had its autonomous status revoked since its inception but rather experienced a continuous increase in self-governing powers over the years (see Chapter 6, Subsection 6.1.2), this might also have contributed to the absence of secessionist grievances in the territory.

With respect to the confirmed results of this study, however, and for the purpose of answering the first research question: '*What are the specific factors related to territory or group distinctiveness that have contributed most to instances of autonomy failure by secession?*', the findings indicate that

Ethnic distinctiveness in terms of both language and religion combined has contributed most to instances of *Autonomy failure by secession*. However, its influence seems to be somewhat limited given that these findings were only substantiated in the quantitative part of the study. Neither case study with respect to Malta and the Cayman Islands indicated that presence or absence of linguistic and religious distinctiveness has contributed to presence or absence of *Autonomy failure by secession* in the territories. Moreover, the case studies did not find explicit evidence that other aspects of *Ethnic distinctiveness* contributed to the respective outcomes in the respective cases. Still, the results seem to align with previous findings that emphasize the relevance of linguistic and religious aspects for the occurrence of secessionism and secession, yet they also concur with previous research that emphasize their subordinate importance vis-à-vis economic factors. Other factors related to territory or group distinctiveness that were analysed in this study – i.e. *Geographical distance*, *Geographical contiguousness* and *Previously autonomous, sovereign or stranded* – have less or no contribution to *Autonomy failure by secession* according to the confirmed results.

7.2 Limitations of the study

In addition to highlighting the main findings of this dissertation, the way the study was conducted and how the results were arrived at might, however, require some discussion. The first element to consider concerns the fundamental term territorial autonomy as applied in this study. As stated in Chapters 2 and 3, the purpose has been to apply a very broad definition of territorial autonomy. For instance, this includes different autonomous territories with differing ranges of autonomous competences, spanning from very limited autonomous powers, perhaps more akin to administrative autonomy, to significantly broader powers reminiscent of full or nearly full internal self-government. Such variations might be found in different autonomous territories functioning in different political systems. Some autonomous territories have existed as part of former colonial empires such as Australia and Suriname, former and current communist authoritarian states such as Kosovo, Vojvodina and Hong Kong, a recent United Nations administration arrangement such as Kosovo, or contemporary and highly evolved liberal democracies such as New Caledonia and Greenland. Variations in level of autonomous powers might also have occurred within the autonomous territories over time as they have evolved politically. It could be argued that the vastly different character of the autonomous territories and the environments within which they have existed makes comparison between them more complex and significantly adds to the list of potential factors and mechanisms that ultimately might explain the different trajectories they have experienced. This will be touched upon in greater detail below. Moreover, for instance Australia is in this study defined as an

autonomous territory, although since 1901 it was more commonly described as a 'commonwealth' (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900) or a 'dominion' (see e.g. Bouchard 2008:192; Lamb and Robertson-Snape 2017:89). Therefore, in examples such as this the application of the term autonomous territory might be somewhat unconventional although, again, the usage of the term for the purpose of this study has intentionally been broad.

With respect to the purpose of applying a broad definition of territorial autonomy, it could also be argued that even less stringent criteria for outlining such territories might have been advisable. This might have allowed the set of territories included to have been expanded beyond merely the partially independent territories listed by Rezvani (2014) on which the research sample of this study is based. It is also possible that the criteria that were applied might still have allowed this. Obviously, there is a wide scope of more or less autonomous territories that could have been included in an expanded set of cases, such as Gorno-Badakhshan, Guernsey, Jeju Island, Karakalpakstan, Mayotte, Montserrat, Rodrigues, Saint Barthélemy, etc. Although these may be valid arguments, and a larger research sample would likely have offered greater reliability to the results of the quantitative analysis, the restricted amount of time that a project such as this allows prevented a further expansion of its research sample.

Another subject matter that might require discussion concerns the definition of the timing of acquisition of sovereign statehood for some autonomous territories. Again, in this study the timing has been determined based on the criteria applied in the Correlates of War Project (2017) according to which, for instance, Australia gained sovereign statehood in 1920. This was the result of a successful request by Australia and other dominions to be treated as sovereign states when the League of Nations was founded (van Ginneken 2006:41). In actuality, however, Australia progressively acquired more sovereign powers from the United Kingdom from 1901 up until 1986 (see e.g. Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942; Australia Act 1986). A similar situation can be noted in relation to the Federated States of Micronesia which adopted its own constitution in 1979 and regards this as the year in which independence was achieved. In 1986, it entered into a Compact of Free Association with the United States (National Government of the Federated States of Micronesia 2025). Therefore, it could be argued that the Federated States of Micronesia's current level of sovereignty was acquired and territorial autonomy thereby ended earlier than the year 1991 when United Nations membership was obtained. Thus, the dates denoting acquisition of sovereign statehood for some autonomous territories in this study might differ depending on source, but for the sake of consistency the criteria used by the Correlates of War Project (2017) have been applied. However, given that the purpose of this study has been to regard the start of territorial autonomy as occurring in the year in which the

arrangement commenced in practice rather than the year in which it was first enshrined in a constitution, statute, etc., it could be argued that determining the timing of acquisition of sovereign statehood should have been done by applying corresponding benchmarks.

As for the most significant independent variables that emanated from the analyses of this study, there are certain issues that warrant attention. Beginning with *Ethnic distinctiveness*, one could argue that merely emphasizing language and religion as important aspects is a rather narrow approach. Again, language and religion are aspects related to ethnicity whose importance for the occurrence of secessionism and secession has been established in previous research (see previous section) although some studies have ascribed somewhat less importance to religion (see e.g. Bormann et al. 2017:746, 764). However, one could argue that other aspects such as cultural heritage, customs and traditions, ethnic phenotype, etc. might also contribute to the perception of ethnic distinctiveness and thereby possibly lead to a sense of separateness and political alienation for an ethnic group. Despite the notable but not robust results that the analyses of the independent variable *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion produced, the inclusion of a wider spectrum of ethnicity-related aspects would likely have been beneficial to obtain a more in-depth understanding of the potential impact of *Ethnic distinctiveness* on *Autonomy failure by secession*. As for language and religion specifically, it is also important to emphasize that there are differences in distance within these ethnic markers. Some languages are more closely related and somewhat or highly mutually intelligible, whereas others belong to entirely different language families. Also, some religions might belong to different world religion groups, while others belong to the same but are characterised by lesser differences in terms of religious denomination. This study has not made such fine-grained distinctions between different languages and religions although such an approach might have been advisable to obtain more structured and distinguishable results. As for religion specifically, it is undeniable that throughout the times it has had a great influence on culture and customs at large. However, one could also argue that the importance of religion varies across societies and that the inclusion of religion as one of two significant aspects of ethnic distinctiveness could be debated given its limited significance in everyday life and culture for many people in an increasingly secular world.

Another of the independent variables that likely would have required a different operationalization approach, especially with respect to the quantitative analysis, is the one that produced the most robust results, i.e. *Relative economic performance*. The variable was operationalized so that the GDP per capita levels of the autonomous territories were calculated as a percentage share of the GDP per capita levels of their respective parent states. For autonomous territories that are not fully integrated into their

respective parent state's economy, often the geographically non-contiguous and distant ones, and that do not contribute to the parent state's total GDP, this might not be an issue. In those instances, the relative GDP per capita levels of the autonomous territories can presumably be calculated and compared against that of their parent states as was done in this study. However, for autonomous territories whose economies are integrated with that of the overall parent states, usually the geographically contiguous ones, and that contribute to its total GDP, this method of calculating and comparing GDP per capita levels presumably does not offer completely accurate results. This is because the parent state's GDP per capita level is in part the result of the goods and services produced in the autonomous territory. Most autonomous territories included in the research sample of this study are small in terms of population both in absolute and relative numbers compared to the rest of their respective parent states and presumably do not contribute greatly to the parent state's GDP. However, this is not always the case. For instance, in 2019 Catalonia's share of Spain's total GDP was a significant 19 percent and at the start of 2020 its population constituted about 16 percent of the Spanish total (Direcció General de Política Financera, Assegurances i Tresor 2021:8–9). Thus, although the qualitative case study analyses appeared to confirm the results of the quantitative analysis, which indicated the importance of *Relative economic performance* for *Autonomy failure by secession* occurring, the validity of the results of the quantitative analysis could perhaps be called into question to some extent due to how this independent variable was operationalized.

It could also be argued that merely focusing on factors related to ethnicity and identity along with prosperity and viability is likely not sufficient for explaining the occurrence of autonomy failure by secession in many cases. Other factors both internally in the autonomous territories, such as level of autonomous powers as was mentioned in the beginning of this section, and externally in the parent states or the international system could also influence such outcomes. For instance, the wider political environment and era within which the autonomous territories have existed might influence their political trajectories. In relation to the cases subjected to in-depth case study analysis in this dissertation, i.e. Malta and the Cayman Islands, one might point to the fact that the former attained sovereign statehood during an era in which the decolonization process was at its height, whereas the latter continues to be an autonomous territory in a world where this basis for self-determination demands is mostly a thing of the past. Moreover, there might be a wide scope of other factors to be found both internally and externally that could precipitate autonomy failure by secession. To emphasize once more, the intention with this study has not been to offer an all-encompassing explanation as to why autonomous territories embark on the secessionist path and secede. Given that other factors might influence such events and outcomes, the explicit purpose has been to identify potential

contributory factors within the autonomous territories themselves, specifically regarding ethnicity and identity along with prosperity and viability.

Some matters regarding the case study analyses of Malta and the Cayman Islands also require mentioning. The purpose with the second case that was analysed was to explain, based on the results in the quantitative analysis and the two most significant independent variables thereof, why an autonomous territory has not transitioned into sovereign statehood. To ascertain this – relative to the overall aim of the study – inverse outcome, the inverse interpretation of the result of the quantitative analysis for the independent variable *Ethnic distinctiveness* needed to be applied for the case selection, i.e. that no linguistic and religious distinctiveness equals a lesser likelihood of *Autonomy failure by secession* occurring. For the independent variable *Relative economic performance*, the result of the quantitative analysis did not require inverse application for the case selection, as the result indicated a causal relationship between relative prosperity and a lesser likelihood of *Autonomy failure by secession* occurring. Thus, an autonomous territory that, relative to its parent state, is not linguistically and religiously distinct at all but is more prosperous and has not become a sovereign state was required for this analysis. The Cayman Islands was selected as a suitable case for this purpose.

However, this selection approach could be problematic as the absence of identifiable explanatory conditions and/or the absence of an identifiable event or change in circumstances would possibly mean an absence of identifiable interlinking mechanisms. This was especially true with respect to the independent variable *Ethnic distinctiveness*. Thus, to convincingly ascertain by means of process tracing whether the absence of linguistic and religious distinctiveness has contributed to the absence of autonomy failure by secession in the Cayman Islands proved somewhat challenging. This motivated an expansion of the case study analysis to include other potential explanatory aspects of *Ethnic distinctiveness* that might have contributed to this outcome. As for the independent variable *Relative economic performance*, however, the presence of relative economic prosperity in the Cayman Islands is a comparatively identifiable condition that has identifiable effects in society in a similar way as relative economic deprivation would also have but that simply the absence of linguistic and religious distinctiveness in relation to a parent state might not. Therefore, identifying indicative mechanisms and evidence regarding the contributory significance of this independent variable for the absence of autonomy failure by secession in the Cayman Islands was somewhat easier, despite the outcome status not representing an identifiable event or change in circumstances.

For the first case study analysis the purpose, instead, was to explain, based on the results in the quantitative analysis, why an autonomous territory has become a sovereign state. The inverse interpretation of the result for *Relative*

economic performance according to the quantitative analysis, i.e. that relative economic deprivation equals a greater likelihood of *Autonomy failure by secession*, was required for case selection. No such inverse application was required for *Ethnic distinctiveness*, as the quantitative analysis indicated a causal relationship between linguistic and religious distinctiveness and a greater likelihood of *Autonomy failure by secession*. Therefore, an autonomous territory that, relative to its parent state, was both linguistically and religiously distinct but less prosperous and that did become a sovereign state was required. For this purpose, Malta was selected. As a result, identifiable explanatory conditions relating to both independent variables were present in the case of Malta. Moreover, autonomy failure by secession as the identifiable event or change in circumstances did occur. Thus, conducting process tracing to identify related mechanisms that might have contributed to Malta's transition to sovereign statehood was less challenging compared the task relating to the Cayman Islands.

Therefore, and admittedly, given the above-mentioned complexities, the inferences drawn primarily from the case study analysis of the Cayman Islands are somewhat more tentative than those drawn from the case study analysis with respect to Malta. Thus, the strategy of selecting cases that, based on the results of the quantitative analysis, displayed inverse values on at least one of the key independent variables, especially for a variable such as *Ethnic distinctiveness* in terms of language and religion, might not have been an optimal approach and perhaps even less so when the event or outcome of interest is also absent.

Another criticism of the cases used for the case study analyses could be aimed at their overall representativeness. It could be argued that the fact that both are or were autonomous territories of the same parent state, i.e. the United Kingdom, and have therefore functioned as such under similar political cultures and traditions might undermine their level of representativeness for the wider population of autonomous territories. Although these may also be valid arguments, the small number of autonomous territories that experienced the outcome of interest, i.e. *Autonomy failure by secession*, that were also significantly less prosperous than their respective parent state and were ethnically distinct in terms of both language and religion did limit the scope of cases available for analysis (see Table 7). Still, and admittedly, some alternative cases could possibly have been selected for analysis. As for autonomous territories that have not attained sovereign statehood and that are significantly more prosperous than their parent states while not ethnically distinct at all in terms of language and religion, however, the availability of cases for analysis was more limited (see Table 8). Thus, it is less likely that an alternative case could have been successfully used for this analysis.

7.3 Concluding remarks and suggestions for future research

Apart from the specific aim of analysing the contributory internal causes why autonomous territories have seceded from their parent states, with a particular emphasis on factors related to ethnicity and identity along with prosperity and viability, this study has more broadly intended to contribute to the somewhat understudied field of secessionism and secession. Although secessionism might not be, it is undeniable that secessions are rather rare with four instances of state birth by means of secession in the first quarter of the 21st century: Timor-Leste in 2002, Montenegro in 2006, Kosovo in 2008 and South Sudan in 2011 (Correlates of War Project 2017). Still, the phenomenon does exist and the findings in this study regarding the occurrence of secession should hopefully be informative in relation to territorial autonomy but also the wider field of territorial decentralization, as well as for instances of secessionist events and outcomes in which prior substantial territorial decentralization is non-existent. Similarly, the findings might also contribute to further understanding root causes and mechanisms behind related political phenomena, such as autonomism and irredentism.

The fact that secessions are quite rare and that secessions in the context of autonomous territories, as defined in this study, are also very rare makes other avenues for analysing related phenomena in such territories possible and justifiable. As indicated in the introduction of this dissertation, there are multiple autonomous territories that in the past decade alone have experienced significant secessionism to the extent that referenda on secession have been arranged. A quite similar but alternative approach to that of the present study would be to investigate the existing, a modified or an expanded set of autonomous territories to ascertain the independent variables among those selected for this study that, instead of outright secession, have given rise to a critical fervour of secessionism defined, for instance, by the arrangement of secessionist referenda. Such an event would then imply failure of autonomy stability, given the concerted efforts to have the autonomy arrangement terminated in favour of sovereign statehood, rather than failure of autonomy altogether since critical levels of secessionism in whichever form would not necessarily lead to the end of an existing autonomy arrangement. An alternative event of interest marking failure of autonomy stability could be, for instance, election outcomes with a significant vote share in favour of parties or political actors advocating for secession in the short rather than the long term. Approaches such as the aforementioned would allow a greater frequency of the event of interest occurring and, thus, offer more solid results in the initial quantitative analysis than perhaps was obtained in this study.

For this study, time-series data was collected for all autonomous territories included in the research sample and all their autonomy periods

from 1901 to 2020. As elaborated in Chapter 3, the autonomous territories included in the dataset are largely based on David Rezvani's (2014) compilation of internally self-governing territories which he refers to as partially independent territories (PITs). The time-series data pertains to the 11 independent variables analysed in this study, as well as multiple other variables that ultimately were not included. All independent variables were selected based on previous research on determinants of state formation processes, secessionism, secession, etc. Relevant data on the sub-state territorial level that covers the broad array of autonomous territories included in this study for the wide time period in focus has not been readily available for many of the territories and, thus, the data collection process has been time-consuming and occasionally arduous. Still, it has resulted in a rather bountiful dataset. As far as the author has been able to determine, comparable datasets consisting of territory-level data rather than group-level data with a similarly broad geographical and temporal range are scarce. The dataset could hopefully be useful in further research pertaining to autonomous territories, and it could also be expanded to include additional autonomous territories. A reduced version of the dataset displaying the autonomous territories and only data for the 11 independent variables relevant for this study is presented in the Appendix.

Finally, and to reiterate the very first statement of this dissertation: secession and the creation of new sovereign states is a rare phenomenon. To this can be added that secession is especially rare among well-established and robust autonomous territories. However, the ultimate although by no means very overwhelming no-vote in Scotland's 2014 independence referendum (McInnes et al. 2014:3) and in New Caledonia's 2020 independence referendum (Elections-nc.fr 2025), the latest one that was not boycotted by a large share of the electorate, are recent examples of the viability of secessionism and potentiality of secession among present-day autonomous territories. As for current intentions in such territories to realize some form of full independence, Bougainville's have been set for 2027 rather determinedly at least on its part (Autonomous Bougainville Government 2025), whereas Greenland's have been stated although without stipulating a specified time frame for achieving this (Ministry for Statehood and Foreign Affairs 2024:7, 45, 47). Examples such as these, as well as others in which all-out secession might not at present be on the agenda, confirms the need for more in-depth knowledge about the survival and failure by secession of territorial autonomy arrangements. This is needed to better fine-tune such arrangements that, after all, are aimed at maintaining the territorial integrity of existing states while also accommodating sub-state minority demands for self-determination, whether through territorial autonomy or sovereign statehood, which are likely to persist into the future.

Appendix: Data for quantitative analysis[1]

Abbreviation and variable		Coding/ unit
AT	Autonomous territory	
Y	Year	
AFS	Autonomy failure by secession	0, 1
YAH	Years autonomous hitherto	*total*
ED	Ethnic distinctiveness (language and religion)	0, 1, 2
REP	Relative economic performance (GDP per capita)[2]	%
NFMR	Non-fuel mineral resources	0, 1
FMR	Fuel mineral resources	0, 1
RPS	Relative population size	%
PS	Population size	*total*
RLA	Relative land area	%
LA	Land area	km^2
GD	Geographical distance	km
GC	Geographical contiguousness	0, 1
PASS	Previously autonomous, sovereign or stranded	0, 1
	No data	9999

[1] For a detailed description of how the variables have been operationalized and coded, see Chapter 3, Sections 3.3 and 3.4.

[2] For the quantitative analysis, this independent variable has been operationalized with focus explicitly on GDP per capita as an aspect of relative economic performance.

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Aosta Valley	1948	0	1	0	155,00	1	1	0,20	94 330	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1949	0	2	0	156,00	1	1	0,20	94 330	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1950	0	3	0	157,00	1	1	0,20	94 330	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1951	0	4	0	158,00	1	1	0,20	94 330	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1952	0	5	0	159,00	1	1	0,20	94 330	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1953	0	6	0	160,00	1	1	0,20	94 970	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1954	0	7	0	161,00	1	1	0,20	95 680	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1955	0	8	0	162,00	1	1	0,20	96 660	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1956	0	9	0	163,00	1	1	0,20	97 140	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1957	0	10	0	164,00	1	1	0,20	97 550	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1958	0	11	0	165,00	1	1	0,20	97 600	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1959	0	12	0	166,00	1	1	0,20	98 960	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1960	0	13	0	167,00	1	1	0,20	100 410	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1961	0	14	0	168,00	1	1	0,20	100 900	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1962	0	15	0	165,60	1	1	0,20	101 120	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1963	0	16	0	163,20	1	1	0,20	101 770	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1964	0	17	0	160,80	1	1	0,20	102 610	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1965	0	18	0	158,40	1	1	0,20	103 510	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1966	0	19	0	156,00	1	1	0,20	104 550	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1967	0	20	0	153,60	1	1	0,20	105 430	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1968	0	21	0	151,20	1	1	0,20	106 220	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1969	0	22	0	148,80	1	1	0,20	107 080	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1970	0	23	0	146,40	1	1	0,20	107 740	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1971	0	24	0	144,00	1	1	0,20	108 630	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1972	0	25	0	143,60	1	1	0,20	109 215	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1973	0	26	0	143,20	1	1	0,20	109 832	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1974	0	27	0	142,80	1	1	0,20	110 338	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1975	0	28	0	142,40	1	0	0,20	110 910	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1976	0	29	0	142,00	1	0	0,20	111 387	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1977	0	30	0	141,60	1	0	0,20	111 666	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1978	0	31	0	141,20	1	0	0,20	111 874	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1979	0	32	0	140,80	1	0	0,20	112 205	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1980	0	33	0	140,40	1	0	0,20	112 308	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1981	0	34	0	140,00	1	0	0,20	112 349	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1982	0	35	0	140,20	1	0	0,20	112 335	1,09	3 263	595	0	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Aosta Valley	1983	0	36	0	140,40	1	0	0,20	112 437	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1984	0	37	0	140,60	1	0	0,20	112 262	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1985	0	38	0	140,80	1	0	0,20	112 498	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1986	0	39	0	141,00	1	0	0,20	112 560	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1987	0	40	0	141,20	1	0	0,20	112 677	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1988	0	41	0	141,40	1	0	0,20	113 220	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1989	0	42	0	141,60	1	0	0,20	113 789	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1990	0	43	0	141,80	1	0	0,20	114 409	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1991	0	44	0	142,00	1	0	0,20	115 275	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1992	0	45	0	140,20	1	0	0,20	115 897	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1993	0	46	0	138,40	1	0	0,20	116 247	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1994	0	47	0	136,60	1	0	0,21	116 390	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1995	0	48	0	162,09	1	0	0,21	116 654	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1996	0	49	0	157,65	1	0	0,21	117 065	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1997	0	50	0	149,44	1	0	0,21	117 593	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1998	0	51	0	150,50	1	0	0,21	118 081	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	1999	0	52	0	148,53	1	0	0,21	118 628	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2000	0	53	0	142,43	1	0	0,21	118 879	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2001	0	54	0	141,08	1	0	0,21	119 273	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2002	0	55	0	140,32	1	0	0,21	119 353	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2003	0	56	0	145,59	1	0	0,21	120 372	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2004	0	57	0	141,73	1	0	0,21	121 555	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2005	0	58	0	139,66	1	0	0,21	122 927	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2006	0	59	0	138,14	1	0	0,21	123 969	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2007	0	60	0	136,30	1	0	0,21	124 654	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2008	0	61	0	137,76	1	0	0,21	125 550	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2009	0	62	0	137,42	1	0	0,21	126 369	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2010	0	63	0	141,10	1	0	0,21	126 686	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2011	0	64	0	140,10	1	0	0,21	126 761	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2012	0	65	0	143,03	1	0	0,21	126 620	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2013	0	66	0	137,94	1	0	0,21	127 844	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2014	0	67	0	135,48	1	0	0,21	128 591	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2015	0	68	0	133,13	1	0	0,21	128 298	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2016	0	69	0	129,20	1	0	0,21	127 329	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2017	0	70	0	130,39	1	0	0,21	126 883	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2018	0	71	0	130,76	1	0	0,21	126 202	1,09	3 263	595	0	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Aosta Valley	2019	0	72	0	129,98	1	0	0,21	125 653	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aosta Valley	2020	0	73	0	128,91	1	0	0,21	125 034	1,09	3 263	595	0	1
Aruba	1986	0	1	1	60,70	0	0	0,44	64 553	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1987	0	2	1	69,63	0	0	0,44	64 450	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1988	0	3	1	80,49	0	0	0,44	64 332	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1989	0	4	1	86,59	0	0	0,43	64 596	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1990	0	5	1	85,48	0	0	0,44	65 712	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1991	0	6	1	87,82	0	0	0,45	67 864	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1992	0	7	1	89,01	0	0	0,46	70 192	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1993	0	8	1	92,11	0	0	0,47	72 360	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1994	0	9	1	94,36	0	0	0,49	74 710	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1995	0	10	1	91,53	0	0	0,50	77 050	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1996	0	11	1	87,38	0	0	0,51	79 417	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1997	0	12	1	88,12	0	0	0,52	81 858	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1998	0	13	1	87,67	0	0	0,54	84 355	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	1999	0	14	1	82,46	0	0	0,55	86 867	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2000	0	15	1	81,08	0	0	0,56	89 101	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2001	0	16	1	77,00	0	0	0,57	90 691	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2002	0	17	1	76,37	0	0	0,57	91 781	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2003	0	18	1	76,22	0	0	0,57	92 701	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2004	0	19	1	80,03	0	0	0,58	93 540	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2005	0	20	1	78,91	0	0	0,58	94 483	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2006	0	21	1	76,43	0	0	0,59	95 606	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2007	0	22	1	75,48	0	0	0,59	96 787	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2008	0	23	1	72,38	0	0	0,60	97 996	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2009	0	24	1	67,29	0	0	0,60	99 212	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2010	0	25	1	64,10	0	0	0,60	100 341	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2011	0	26	1	63,56	0	0	0,61	101 288	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2012	0	27	1	62,98	0	0	0,61	102 112	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2013	0	28	1	67,12	0	0	0,61	102 880	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2014	0	29	1	65,01	0	0	0,61	103 594	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2015	0	30	1	63,28	0	0	0,61	104 257	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2016	0	31	1	62,93	0	0	0,61	104 874	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2017	0	32	1	65,42	0	0	0,61	105 439	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2018	0	33	1	65,41	0	0	0,61	105 962	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Aruba	2019	0	34	1	62,67	0	0	0,61	106 442	0,46	193	7 844	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Aruba	2020	0	35	1	49,71	0	0	0,61	106 585	0,46	193	7 844	1	0
Australia	1901	0	1	0	86,27	1	1	9,12	3 788 123	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1902	0	2	0	84,49	1	1	9,18	3 845 265	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1903	0	3	0	91,80	1	1	9,21	3 891 519	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1904	0	4	0	97,00	1	1	9,25	3 941 208	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1905	0	5	0	94,73	1	1	9,30	3 999 074	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1906	0	6	0	97,32	1	1	9,36	4 059 083	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1907	0	7	0	98,65	1	1	9,42	4 122 201	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1908	0	8	0	105,48	1	1	9,50	4 190 692	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1909	0	9	0	110,42	1	1	9,60	4 272 439	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1910	0	10	0	112,99	1	1	9,72	4 367 405	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1911	0	11	0	108,39	1	1	10,64	4 489 545	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1912	0	12	0	107,06	1	1	10,98	4 653 721	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1913	0	13	0	104,80	1	1	11,32	4 820 172	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1914	0	14	0	102,03	1	1	11,52	4 948 990	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1915	0	15	0	92,61	1	1	12,05	4 985 569	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1916	0	16	0	90,60	1	1	12,19	4 943 173	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1917	0	17	0	88,38	1	1	12,42	4 940 815	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1918	0	18	0	84,30	1	1	12,71	5 029 403	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1919	0	19	0	96,84	1	1	12,09	5 193 104	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Australia	1920	1	20	0	104,79	1	1	12,28	5 360 462	3170,37	7 704 000	16 904	1	0
Azores	1976	0	1	0	77,64	0	0	2,53	243 410	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1977	0	2	0	77,64	0	0	2,53	243 410	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1978	0	3	0	77,64	0	0	2,53	243 410	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1979	0	4	0	77,64	0	0	2,53	243 410	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1980	0	5	0	77,64	0	0	2,53	243 410	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1981	0	6	0	77,64	0	0	2,53	243 410	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1982	0	7	0	77,64	0	0	2,52	243 067	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1983	0	8	0	77,64	0	0	2,50	242 725	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1984	0	9	0	77,64	0	0	2,49	242 382	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1985	0	10	0	77,64	0	0	2,48	242 040	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1986	0	11	0	77,64	0	0	2,47	241 697	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1987	0	12	0	77,64	0	0	2,47	241 354	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1988	0	13	0	77,64	0	0	2,46	241 012	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1989	0	14	0	77,64	0	0	2,46	240 669	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1990	0	15	0	77,64	0	0	2,46	240 327	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Azores	1991	0	16	0	77,64	0	0	2,46	239 984	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1992	0	17	0	77,64	0	0	2,46	239 918	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1993	0	18	0	77,64	0	0	2,46	239 688	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1994	0	19	0	77,64	0	0	2,45	239 757	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1995	0	20	0	77,64	0	0	2,44	239 786	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1996	0	21	0	77,52	0	0	2,44	239 935	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1997	0	22	0	76,90	0	0	2,43	239 993	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1998	0	23	0	78,15	0	0	2,42	240 289	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	1999	0	24	0	80,47	0	0	2,41	240 759	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2000	0	25	0	79,97	0	0	2,40	241 387	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2001	0	26	0	83,34	0	0	2,39	242 544	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2002	0	27	0	85,62	0	0	2,39	243 303	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2003	0	28	0	86,88	0	0	2,38	243 916	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2004	0	29	0	86,56	0	0	2,38	244 491	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2005	0	30	0	87,58	0	0	2,38	245 118	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2006	0	31	0	87,74	0	0	2,39	245 671	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2007	0	32	0	87,35	0	0	2,39	246 373	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2008	0	33	0	89,32	0	0	2,39	246 670	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2009	0	34	0	90,40	0	0	2,39	246 900	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2010	0	35	0	90,51	0	0	2,39	246 757	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2011	0	36	0	90,36	0	0	2,39	247 095	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2012	0	37	0	90,15	0	0	2,40	246 424	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2013	0	38	0	90,53	0	0	2,40	245 336	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2014	0	39	0	89,73	0	0	2,39	243 271	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2015	0	40	0	89,58	0	0	2,39	241 653	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2016	0	41	0	89,59	0	0	2,38	240 108	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2017	0	42	0	88,35	0	0	2,37	238 964	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2018	0	43	0	88,24	0	0	2,37	237 828	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2019	0	44	0	88,67	0	0	2,36	237 113	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Azores	2020	0	45	0	88,16	0	0	2,36	237 616	2,58	2 322	1 690	1	0
Basque Country	1936	0	1	0	169,13	1	0	3,85	930 142	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1937	0	2	0	168,59	1	0	3,84	936 548	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1979	0	1	0	106,10	1	1	6,02	2 111 970	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1980	0	2	0	102,04	1	1	6,03	2 130 947	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1981	0	3	0	104,01	1	1	6,02	2 144 071	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1982	0	4	0	105,99	1	1	5,99	2 147 649	1,45	7 230	284	0	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Basque Country	1983	0	5	0	107,97	1	1	5,97	2 148 690	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1984	0	6	0	109,96	1	1	5,94	2 147 741	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1985	0	7	0	111,96	1	1	5,91	2 145 710	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1986	0	8	0	112,30	1	1	5,87	2 141 076	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1987	0	9	0	112,60	1	1	5,84	2 136 218	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1988	0	10	0	112,87	1	1	5,81	2 129 410	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1989	0	11	0	113,12	1	1	5,78	2 121 363	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1990	0	12	0	113,35	0	1	5,74	2 111 721	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1991	0	13	0	113,71	0	1	5,70	2 103 777	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1992	0	14	0	114,07	0	1	5,67	2 102 523	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1993	0	15	0	114,41	0	1	5,63	2 101 049	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1994	0	16	0	114,76	0	1	5,59	2 099 068	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1995	0	17	0	119,30	0	1	5,56	2 096 352	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1996	0	18	0	118,70	0	0	5,52	2 093 444	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1997	0	19	0	119,42	0	0	5,49	2 090 649	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1998	0	20	0	121,10	0	0	5,46	2 088 022	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	1999	0	21	0	122,50	0	0	5,42	2 085 234	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2000	0	22	0	122,57	0	0	5,39	2 083 300	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2001	0	23	0	121,74	0	0	5,36	2 082 549	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2002	0	24	0	121,86	0	0	5,30	2 087 427	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2003	0	25	0	121,84	0	0	5,23	2 097 326	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2004	0	26	0	122,38	0	0	5,16	2 107 811	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2005	0	27	0	123,57	0	0	5,10	2 121 008	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2006	0	28	0	124,73	0	0	5,05	2 134 080	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2007	0	29	0	125,69	0	0	4,99	2 151 135	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2008	0	30	0	127,73	0	0	4,95	2 166 798	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2009	0	31	0	127,33	0	0	4,93	2 177 013	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2010	0	32	0	128,72	0	0	4,91	2 181 087	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2011	0	33	0	129,01	0	0	4,90	2 184 016	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2012	0	34	0	130,15	0	0	4,89	2 180 669	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2013	0	35	0	129,69	0	0	4,89	2 174 780	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2014	0	36	0	130,34	0	0	4,90	2 171 669	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2015	0	37	0	129,42	0	0	4,91	2 171 866	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2016	0	38	0	129,20	0	0	4,91	2 176 750	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2017	0	39	0	128,64	0	0	4,91	2 181 972	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2018	0	40	0	128,51	0	0	4,91	2 190 184	1,45	7 230	284	0	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Basque Country	2019	0	41	0	128,40	0	0	4,90	2 203 005	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Basque Country	2020	0	42	0	127,08	0	0	4,90	2 213 940	1,45	7 230	284	0	1
Bermuda	1968	0	1	0	295,74	0	0	0,09	50 148	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1969	0	2	0	295,80	0	0	0,09	51 136	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1970	0	3	0	297,18	0	0	0,09	52 019	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1971	0	4	0	300,41	0	0	0,09	52 539	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1972	0	5	0	296,35	0	0	0,09	52 743	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1973	0	6	0	284,98	0	0	0,09	52 925	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1974	0	7	0	297,20	0	0	0,09	53 102	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1975	0	8	0	315,35	0	0	0,09	53 256	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1976	0	9	0	332,49	0	0	0,09	53 373	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1977	0	10	0	342,25	0	0	0,10	53 434	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1978	0	11	0	331,99	0	0	0,10	53 462	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1979	0	12	0	325,94	0	0	0,10	53 456	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1980	0	13	0	353,84	0	0	0,10	53 565	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1981	0	14	0	362,74	0	0	0,10	53 907	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1982	0	15	0	334,31	0	0	0,10	54 338	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1983	0	16	0	324,51	0	0	0,10	54 765	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1984	0	17	0	316,55	0	0	0,10	55 197	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1985	0	18	0	296,04	0	0	0,10	55 611	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1986	0	19	0	304,25	0	0	0,10	55 995	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1987	0	20	0	297,72	0	0	0,10	56 367	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1988	0	21	0	291,15	0	0	0,10	56 740	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1989	0	22	0	283,44	0	0	0,10	57 111	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1990	0	23	0	279,96	0	0	0,10	57 470	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1991	0	24	0	275,34	0	0	0,10	57 874	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1992	0	25	0	276,82	0	0	0,10	58 322	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1993	0	26	0	277,39	0	0	0,10	58 739	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1994	0	27	0	267,54	0	0	0,10	59 111	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1995	0	28	0	271,19	0	0	0,10	59 465	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1996	0	29	0	270,20	0	0	0,10	59 840	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1997	0	30	0	268,41	0	0	0,10	60 227	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1998	0	31	0	268,48	0	0	0,10	60 603	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	1999	0	32	0	268,70	0	0	0,10	60 981	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2000	0	33	0	280,08	0	0	0,10	61 371	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2001	0	34	0	290,73	1	0	0,10	61 763	0,02	53	5 554	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Bermuda	2002	0	35	0	280,75	1	0	0,10	62 139	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2003	0	36	0	280,94	1	0	0,10	62 468	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2004	0	37	0	280,42	1	0	0,10	62 740	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2005	0	38	0	277,62	1	0	0,10	62 959	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2006	0	39	0	286,64	1	0	0,10	63 081	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2007	0	40	0	289,29	1	0	0,10	63 156	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2008	0	41	0	285,09	1	0	0,10	63 258	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2009	0	42	0	282,63	1	0	0,10	63 353	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2010	0	43	0	273,78	1	0	0,10	63 447	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2011	0	44	0	264,87	1	0	0,10	63 533	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2012	0	45	0	247,91	1	0	0,10	63 560	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2013	0	46	0	243,73	1	0	0,10	63 506	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2014	0	47	0	228,64	1	0	0,10	63 355	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2015	0	48	0	226,86	1	0	0,10	63 144	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2016	0	49	0	225,16	1	0	0,10	63 068	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2017	0	50	0	231,25	1	0	0,10	63 275	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2018	0	51	0	228,28	1	0	0,10	63 571	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2019	0	52	0	226,58	1	0	0,10	63 812	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bermuda	2020	0	53	0	236,41	1	0	0,10	64 031	0,02	53	5 554	1	0
Bougainville	2004	0	1	1	9999	1	0	3,31	201 862	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2005	0	2	1	9999	1	0	3,32	208 565	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2006	0	3	1	9999	1	0	3,32	215 267	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2007	0	4	1	9999	1	0	3,31	221 970	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2008	0	5	1	9999	1	0	3,31	228 672	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2009	0	6	1	9999	1	0	3,30	235 374	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2010	0	7	1	9999	1	0	3,30	242 077	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2011	0	8	1	9999	1	0	3,29	248 779	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2012	0	9	1	9999	1	0	3,72	288 044	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2013	0	10	1	9999	1	0	4,13	327 309	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2014	0	11	1	9999	1	0	4,53	366 575	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2015	0	12	1	9999	1	0	4,90	405 840	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2016	0	13	1	9999	1	0	5,26	445 105	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2017	0	14	1	9999	1	0	5,61	484 370	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2018	0	15	1	9999	1	0	5,95	523 635	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2019	0	16	1	9999	1	0	6,27	562 901	2,05	9 300	940	1	1
Bougainville	2020	0	17	1	9999	1	0	6,58	602 166	2,05	9 300	940	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
British Virgin Isl.	1967	0	1	0	39,54	0	0	0,02	8 337	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1968	0	2	0	39,54	0	0	0,02	8 649	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1969	0	3	0	39,54	0	0	0,02	9 117	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1970	0	4	0	39,54	0	0	0,02	9 581	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1971	0	5	0	33,73	0	0	0,02	9 813	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1972	0	6	0	32,15	0	0	0,02	9 907	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1973	0	7	0	31,56	0	0	0,02	10 018	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1974	0	8	0	35,12	0	0	0,02	10 146	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1975	0	9	0	36,78	0	0	0,02	10 282	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1976	0	10	0	35,12	0	0	0,02	10 428	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1977	0	11	0	34,40	0	0	0,02	10 578	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1978	0	12	0	35,04	0	0	0,02	10 727	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1979	0	13	0	37,21	0	0	0,02	10 876	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1980	0	14	0	42,46	0	0	0,02	11 109	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1981	0	15	0	41,76	0	0	0,02	11 472	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1982	0	16	0	40,44	0	0	0,02	11 889	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1983	0	17	0	39,69	0	0	0,02	12 315	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1984	0	18	0	39,61	0	0	0,02	12 753	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1985	0	19	0	37,29	0	0	0,02	13 202	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1986	0	20	0	36,34	0	0	0,02	13 656	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1987	0	21	0	38,32	0	0	0,02	14 117	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1988	0	22	0	39,10	0	0	0,03	14 593	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1989	0	23	0	40,13	0	0	0,03	15 091	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1990	0	24	0	48,57	0	0	0,03	15 617	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1991	0	25	0	58,73	0	0	0,03	16 090	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1992	0	26	0	71,23	0	0	0,03	16 476	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1993	0	27	0	89,03	0	0	0,03	16 855	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1994	0	28	0	104,69	0	0	0,03	17 255	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1995	0	29	0	125,79	0	0	0,03	17 674	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1996	0	30	0	129,28	0	0	0,03	18 120	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1997	0	31	0	133,11	0	0	0,03	18 591	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1998	0	32	0	138,86	0	0	0,03	19 079	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	1999	0	33	0	144,30	0	0	0,03	19 586	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2000	0	34	0	146,82	0	0	0,03	20 104	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2001	0	35	0	146,32	0	0	0,03	20 657	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2002	0	36	0	135,41	0	0	0,04	21 288	0,06	151	6 660	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
British Virgin Isl.	2003	0	37	0	111,72	0	0	0,04	21 982	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2004	0	38	0	110,13	0	0	0,04	22 715	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2005	0	39	0	119,25	0	0	0,04	23 497	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2006	0	40	0	113,92	0	0	0,04	24 323	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2007	0	41	0	108,89	0	0	0,04	25 191	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2008	0	42	0	106,45	0	0	0,04	26 115	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2009	0	43	0	109,19	0	0	0,04	27 044	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2010	0	44	0	107,77	0	0	0,04	27 556	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2011	0	45	0	102,86	0	0	0,04	27 962	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2012	0	46	0	99,77	0	0	0,04	28 421	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2013	0	47	0	101,39	0	0	0,04	28 657	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2014	0	48	0	99,56	0	0	0,04	28 971	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2015	0	49	0	97,23	0	0	0,05	29 366	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2016	0	50	0	99,69	0	0	0,05	29 739	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2017	0	51	0	96,18	0	0	0,05	30 060	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2018	0	52	0	99,52	0	0	0,05	30 335	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2019	0	53	0	104,46	0	0	0,05	30 610	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
British Virgin Isl.	2020	0	54	0	112,21	0	0	0,05	30 910	0,06	151	6 660	1	1
Catalonia	1932	0	1	1	155,57	1	0	13,18	2 811 228	6,78	32 091	505	0	0
Catalonia	1933	0	2	1	153,59	1	0	13,09	2 821 197	6,78	32 091	505	0	0
Catalonia	1934	0	3	1	151,64	1	0	13,00	2 831 165	6,78	32 091	505	0	0
Catalonia	1936	0	1	1	151,77	1	0	12,83	2 851 101	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1937	0	2	1	153,99	1	0	12,74	2 861 069	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1938	0	3	1	156,39	1	0	12,66	2 871 038	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1939	0	4	1	158,99	1	0	12,58	2 881 006	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1979	0	1	0	114,15	1	1	18,63	5 840 669	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1980	0	2	0	112,55	1	1	18,72	5 911 167	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1981	0	3	0	114,45	1	1	18,76	5 964 918	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1982	0	4	0	116,35	1	1	18,72	5 988 997	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1983	0	5	0	118,26	1	1	18,67	6 005 470	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1984	0	6	0	120,18	1	1	18,63	6 019 649	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1985	0	7	0	122,10	1	1	18,61	6 035 598	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1986	0	8	0	122,16	1	1	18,58	6 046 348	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1987	0	9	0	122,22	1	1	18,56	6 056 162	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1988	0	10	0	122,27	1	1	18,53	6 062 045	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1989	0	11	0	122,31	1	1	18,50	6 063 532	6,78	32 091	505	0	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Catalonia	1990	0	12	0	122,35	1	1	18,47	6 062 271	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1991	0	13	0	122,38	1	1	18,43	6 068 572	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1992	0	14	0	122,41	1	1	18,41	6 095 471	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1993	0	15	0	122,43	1	1	18,39	6 122 944	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1994	0	16	0	122,46	1	1	18,37	6 149 145	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1995	0	17	0	121,52	1	1	18,34	6 171 634	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1996	0	18	0	123,04	1	1	18,33	6 195 649	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1997	0	19	0	122,69	1	1	18,31	6 219 644	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1998	0	20	0	121,50	1	1	18,30	6 244 533	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	1999	0	21	0	122,25	1	1	18,29	6 268 277	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2000	0	22	0	121,70	1	1	18,28	6 297 175	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2001	0	23	0	121,85	1	1	18,28	6 330 927	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2002	0	24	0	120,90	1	1	18,48	6 470 116	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2003	0	25	0	120,01	1	1	18,65	6 639 074	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2004	0	26	0	119,37	1	1	18,75	6 782 263	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2005	0	27	0	118,25	1	1	18,90	6 944 211	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2006	0	28	0	118,03	1	1	18,95	7 076 682	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2007	0	29	0	117,69	1	1	19,03	7 232 348	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2008	0	30	0	116,69	1	1	19,12	7 377 107	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2009	0	31	0	116,53	1	1	19,13	7 447 272	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2010	0	32	0	117,09	1	1	19,13	7 477 257	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2011	0	33	0	116,46	1	1	19,13	7 504 024	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2012	0	34	0	117,04	1	1	19,10	7 499 373	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2013	0	35	0	117,86	1	1	19,05	7 456 300	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2014	0	36	0	118,90	1	1	19,00	7 419 602	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2015	0	37	0	119,01	1	1	19,03	7 424 018	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2016	0	38	0	119,51	1	1	19,10	7 452 824	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2017	0	39	0	119,00	1	1	19,18	7 495 561	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2018	0	1	0	118,31	1	1	19,30	7 571 004	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2019	0	2	0	118,43	1	1	19,45	7 672 980	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Catalonia	2020	0	3	0	116,37	1	1	19,50	7 729 911	6,78	32 091	505	0	1
Cayman Isl.	1962	0	1	0	168,81	0	0	0,02	8 799	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1963	0	2	0	168,81	0	0	0,02	8 985	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1964	0	3	0	168,81	0	0	0,02	9 172	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1965	0	4	0	168,81	0	0	0,02	9 366	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1966	0	5	0	168,81	0	0	0,02	9 566	0,11	259	7 743	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Cayman Isl.	1967	0	6	0	168,81	0	0	0,02	9 771	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1968	0	7	0	168,81	0	0	0,02	9 981	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1969	0	8	0	168,81	0	0	0,02	10 181	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1970	0	9	0	168,81	0	0	0,02	10 533	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1971	0	10	0	160,07	0	0	0,02	11 117	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1972	0	11	0	157,08	0	0	0,02	11 778	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1973	0	12	0	159,92	0	0	0,02	12 443	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1974	0	13	0	171,16	0	0	0,02	13 118	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1975	0	14	0	181,71	0	0	0,02	13 791	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1976	0	15	0	185,11	0	0	0,03	14 456	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1977	0	16	0	189,82	0	0	0,03	15 116	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1978	0	17	0	192,18	0	0	0,03	15 746	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1979	0	18	0	195,80	0	0	0,03	16 378	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1980	0	19	0	210,60	0	0	0,03	17 100	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1981	0	20	0	223,09	0	0	0,03	17 904	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1982	0	21	0	230,01	0	0	0,03	18 729	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1983	0	22	0	239,10	0	0	0,03	19 572	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1984	0	23	0	240,88	0	0	0,04	20 433	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1985	0	24	0	229,72	0	0	0,04	21 313	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1986	0	25	0	230,87	0	0	0,04	22 195	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1987	0	26	0	230,74	0	0	0,04	23 075	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1988	0	27	0	240,58	0	0	0,04	23 956	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1989	0	28	0	246,24	0	0	0,04	24 888	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1990	0	29	0	265,22	0	0	0,05	26 027	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1991	0	30	0	259,41	0	0	0,05	27 340	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1992	0	31	0	254,57	0	0	0,05	28 677	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1993	0	32	0	249,07	0	0	0,05	30 038	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1994	0	33	0	242,06	0	0	0,05	31 418	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1995	0	34	0	241,86	0	0	0,06	32 802	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1996	0	35	0	238,07	0	0	0,06	34 194	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1997	0	36	0	230,73	0	0	0,06	35 579	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1998	0	37	0	280,81	0	0	0,06	36 947	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	1999	0	38	0	272,68	0	0	0,07	38 295	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2000	0	39	0	255,81	0	0	0,07	39 658	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2001	0	40	0	243,24	0	0	0,07	41 054	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2002	0	41	0	236,10	0	0	0,07	42 456	0,11	259	7 743	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Cayman Isl.	2003	0	42	0	227,11	0	0	0,07	43 862	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2004	0	43	0	217,95	0	0	0,08	45 286	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2005	0	44	0	220,36	0	0	0,08	46 727	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2006	0	45	0	219,87	0	0	0,08	48 177	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2007	0	46	0	211,22	0	0	0,08	49 647	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2008	0	47	0	211,23	0	0	0,08	51 123	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2009	0	48	0	201,35	0	0	0,08	52 602	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2010	0	49	0	187,92	0	0	0,09	54 074	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2011	0	50	0	184,70	0	0	0,09	55 492	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2012	0	51	0	181,24	0	0	0,09	56 860	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2013	0	52	0	177,50	0	0	0,09	58 212	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2014	0	53	0	173,84	0	0	0,09	59 559	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2015	0	54	0	172,19	0	0	0,09	60 911	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2016	0	55	0	171,78	0	0	0,09	62 255	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2017	0	56	0	170,12	0	0	0,10	63 581	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2018	0	57	0	172,37	0	0	0,10	64 884	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2019	0	58	0	173,79	0	0	0,10	66 134	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cayman Isl.	2020	0	59	0	181,52	0	0	0,10	67 311	0,11	259	7 743	1	0
Cook Isl.	1965	0	1	0	25,87	0	0	0,71	18 767	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1966	0	2	0	25,87	0	0	0,71	19 003	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1967	0	3	0	25,87	0	0	0,71	19 314	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1968	0	4	0	25,87	0	0	0,71	19 677	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1969	0	5	0	25,87	0	0	0,72	20 066	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1970	0	6	0	25,87	0	0	0,72	20 470	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1971	0	7	0	22,36	0	0	0,73	20 850	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1972	0	8	0	19,18	0	0	0,71	20 759	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1973	0	9	0	19,43	0	0	0,68	20 177	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1974	0	10	0	19,52	0	0	0,64	19 535	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1975	0	11	0	20,65	0	0	0,61	18 863	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1976	0	12	0	19,85	0	0	0,58	18 216	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1977	0	13	0	25,22	0	0	0,57	17 876	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1978	0	14	0	27,48	0	0	0,57	17 809	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1979	0	15	0	28,08	0	0	0,56	17 733	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1980	0	16	0	28,35	0	0	0,56	17 651	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1981	0	17	0	26,17	0	0	0,56	17 559	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1982	0	18	0	27,11	0	0	0,55	17 404	0,09	235	3 266	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Cook Isl.	1983	0	19	0	27,00	0	0	0,53	17 178	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1984	0	20	0	30,42	0	0	0,52	16 925	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1985	0	21	0	33,27	0	0	0,51	16 657	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1986	0	22	0	37,77	0	0	0,50	16 494	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1987	0	23	0	36,65	0	0	0,50	16 557	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1988	0	24	0	36,37	0	0	0,50	16 735	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1989	0	25	0	37,59	0	0	0,51	16 924	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1990	0	26	0	40,60	0	0	0,50	17 123	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1991	0	27	0	44,83	0	0	0,50	17 308	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1992	0	28	0	47,19	0	0	0,49	17 456	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1993	0	29	0	46,27	0	0	0,49	17 564	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1994	0	30	0	46,05	0	0	0,49	17 656	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1995	0	31	0	42,54	0	0	0,48	17 735	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1996	0	32	0	41,51	0	0	0,48	17 798	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1997	0	33	0	40,35	0	0	0,47	17 581	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1998	0	34	0	41,18	0	0	0,45	17 067	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	1999	0	35	0	41,83	0	0	0,43	16 500	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2000	0	36	0	48,62	0	0	0,41	15 897	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2001	0	37	0	51,11	0	0	0,39	15 294	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2002	0	38	0	51,89	0	0	0,38	15 028	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2003	0	39	0	52,53	0	0	0,38	15 077	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2004	0	40	0	52,66	0	0	0,37	15 113	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2005	0	41	0	50,90	0	0	0,37	15 146	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2006	0	42	0	52,55	0	0	0,36	15 199	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2007	0	43	0	51,01	0	0	0,37	15 507	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2008	0	44	0	49,92	0	0	0,38	16 063	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2009	0	45	0	47,61	0	0	0,39	16 634	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2010	0	46	0	43,78	0	0	0,40	17 212	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2011	0	47	0	41,99	0	0	0,41	17 769	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2012	0	48	0	40,96	0	0	0,41	18 000	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2013	0	49	0	40,85	0	0	0,40	17 916	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2014	0	50	0	42,36	0	0	0,39	17 816	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2015	0	51	0	44,02	0	0	0,39	17 695	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2016	0	52	0	45,60	0	0	0,38	17 546	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2017	0	53	0	49,08	0	0	0,37	17 395	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2018	0	54	0	51,29	0	0	0,36	17 253	0,09	235	3 266	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Cook Isl.	2019	0	55	0	54,18	0	0	0,35	17 110	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Cook Isl.	2020	0	56	0	41,46	0	0	0,34	17 029	0,09	235	3 266	1	1
Curacao	2010	0	1	1	43,50	0	0	0,96	159 380	1,07	444	7 806	1	0
Curacao	2011	0	2	1	42,70	0	0	0,97	161 677	1,07	444	7 806	1	0
Curacao	2012	0	3	1	42,61	0	0	0,98	163 948	1,07	444	7 806	1	0
Curacao	2013	0	4	1	42,04	0	0	0,98	166 136	1,07	444	7 806	1	0
Curacao	2014	0	5	1	40,93	0	0	0,99	168 025	1,07	444	7 806	1	0
Curacao	2015	0	6	1	40,17	0	0	1,00	169 572	1,07	444	7 806	1	0
Curacao	2016	0	7	1	38,81	0	0	1,00	170 739	1,07	444	7 806	1	0
Curacao	2017	0	8	1	37,24	0	0	1,00	171 524	1,07	444	7 806	1	0
Curacao	2018	0	9	1	33,22	0	0	1,07	184 722	1,07	444	7 806	1	0
Curacao	2019	0	10	1	30,31	0	0	1,11	193 107	1,07	444	7 806	1	0
Curacao	2020	0	11	1	26,47	0	0	1,09	189 288	1,07	444	7 806	1	0
Eritrea	1952	0	1	2	103,04	1	0	4,59	848 449	11,73	124 320	703	0	1
Eritrea	1953	0	2	2	102,84	1	0	4,57	863 003	11,73	124 320	703	0	1
Eritrea	1954	0	3	2	102,83	1	0	4,55	878 538	11,73	124 320	703	0	1
Eritrea	1955	0	4	2	102,82	1	0	4,54	895 009	11,73	124 320	703	0	1
Eritrea	1956	0	5	2	102,81	1	0	4,53	912 409	11,73	124 320	703	0	1
Eritrea	1957	0	6	2	102,80	1	0	4,54	930 920	11,73	124 320	703	0	1
Eritrea	1958	0	7	2	102,79	1	0	4,57	950 588	11,73	124 320	703	0	1
Eritrea	1959	0	8	2	102,78	1	0	4,58	971 439	11,73	124 320	703	0	1
Eritrea	1960	0	9	2	102,77	1	0	4,57	993 568	11,73	124 320	703	0	1
Eritrea	1961	0	10	2	102,89	1	0	4,56	1 016 932	11,73	124 320	703	0	1
Eritrea	1962	0	11	2	102,79	1	0	4,56	1 041 552	11,73	124 320	703	0	1
Faroe Isl.	1948	0	1	1	60,13	0	0	0,73	30 678	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1949	0	2	1	60,13	0	0	0,74	31 171	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1950	0	3	1	60,13	0	0	0,74	31 655	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1951	0	4	1	61,07	0	0	0,74	31 849	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1952	0	5	1	61,96	0	0	0,74	31 944	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1953	0	6	1	62,80	0	0	0,73	32 014	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1954	0	7	1	63,59	0	0	0,73	32 069	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1955	0	8	1	64,34	0	0	0,73	32 127	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1956	0	9	1	65,05	0	0	0,73	32 338	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1957	0	10	1	65,73	0	0	0,73	32 739	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1958	0	11	1	66,37	0	0	0,73	33 204	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1959	0	12	1	66,99	0	0	0,74	33 685	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Faroe Isl.	1960	0	13	1	67,57	0	0	0,75	34 154	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1961	0	14	1	67,34	0	0	0,75	34 572	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1962	0	15	1	67,12	0	0	0,75	34 963	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1963	0	16	1	66,93	0	0	0,76	35 385	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1964	0	17	1	66,75	0	0	0,76	35 841	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1965	0	18	1	66,59	0	0	0,76	36 346	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1966	0	19	1	66,44	0	0	0,77	36 825	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1967	0	20	1	66,30	0	0	0,77	37 234	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1968	0	21	1	66,17	0	0	0,77	37 630	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1969	0	22	1	66,05	0	0	0,78	38 011	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1970	0	23	1	65,94	0	0	0,78	38 416	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1971	0	24	1	66,39	0	0	0,78	38 861	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1972	0	25	1	65,23	0	0	0,79	39 304	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1973	0	26	1	66,29	0	0	0,79	39 746	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1974	0	27	1	72,31	0	0	0,80	40 189	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1975	0	28	1	69,98	0	0	0,80	40 626	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1976	0	29	1	74,97	0	0	0,81	41 054	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1977	0	30	1	85,70	0	0	0,81	41 481	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1978	0	31	1	80,16	0	0	0,82	41 965	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1979	0	32	1	76,74	0	0	0,83	42 506	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1980	0	33	1	82,48	0	0	0,84	43 054	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1981	0	34	1	86,59	0	0	0,85	43 613	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1982	0	35	1	85,18	0	0	0,86	44 164	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1983	0	36	1	91,87	0	0	0,87	44 669	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1984	0	37	1	81,63	0	0	0,88	45 135	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1985	0	38	1	82,25	0	0	0,89	45 575	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1986	0	39	1	87,05	0	0	0,90	46 011	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1987	0	40	1	89,38	0	0	0,91	46 477	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1988	0	41	1	91,56	0	0	0,92	46 959	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1989	0	42	1	83,83	0	0	0,93	47 490	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1990	0	43	1	75,25	0	0	0,92	47 479	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1991	0	44	1	71,91	0	0	0,91	46 810	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1992	0	45	1	67,09	0	0	0,89	46 005	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1993	0	46	1	61,14	0	0	0,87	45 096	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1994	0	47	1	57,32	0	0	0,85	44 131	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1995	0	48	1	58,21	0	0	0,84	43 805	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Faroe Isl.	1996	0	49	1	62,89	0	0	0,84	44 138	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1997	0	50	1	63,91	0	0	0,84	44 495	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1998	0	51	1	73,79	0	0	0,85	44 865	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	1999	0	52	1	74,60	0	0	0,85	45 203	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2000	0	53	1	76,02	0	0	0,85	45 660	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2001	0	54	1	81,59	0	0	0,86	46 245	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2002	0	55	1	81,97	0	0	0,87	46 813	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2003	0	56	1	78,33	0	0	0,88	47 392	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2004	0	57	1	77,27	0	0	0,89	47 989	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2005	0	58	1	74,67	0	0	0,89	48 291	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2006	0	59	1	80,27	0	0	0,89	48 313	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2007	0	60	1	82,69	0	0	0,88	48 361	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2008	0	61	1	79,96	0	0	0,88	48 411	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2009	0	62	1	81,51	0	0	0,88	48 429	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2010	0	63	1	82,99	0	0	0,87	48 410	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2011	0	64	1	83,86	0	0	0,87	48 386	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2012	0	65	1	85,73	0	0	0,86	48 392	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2013	0	66	1	90,80	0	0	0,86	48 418	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2014	0	67	1	96,13	0	0	0,86	48 465	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2015	0	68	1	99,01	0	0	0,86	48 816	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2016	0	69	1	103,97	0	0	0,87	49 500	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2017	0	70	1	102,98	0	0	0,88	50 230	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2018	0	71	1	101,60	0	0	0,88	50 955	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2019	0	72	1	106,06	0	0	0,89	51 681	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
Faroe Isl.	2020	0	73	1	102,30	0	0	0,90	52 415	3,25	1 399	1 307	1	0
French Polynesia	1977	0	1	1	63,52	0	0	0,28	149 007	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1978	0	2	1	65,38	0	0	0,29	153 745	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1979	0	3	1	63,94	0	0	0,30	158 563	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1980	0	4	1	61,64	0	0	0,30	163 591	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1981	0	5	1	64,47	0	0	0,31	168 892	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1982	0	6	1	67,39	0	0	0,32	174 343	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1983	0	7	1	68,69	0	0	0,33	179 042	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1984	0	8	1	70,08	0	0	0,33	183 146	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1985	0	9	1	71,34	0	0	0,34	187 578	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1986	0	10	1	74,14	0	0	0,35	192 196	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1987	0	11	1	75,99	0	0	0,35	196 856	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
French Polynesia	1988	0	12	1	70,30	0	0	0,36	201 740	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1989	0	13	1	69,00	0	0	0,37	206 571	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1990	0	14	1	67,43	0	0	0,37	211 089	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1991	0	15	1	69,48	0	0	0,38	215 444	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1992	0	16	1	67,67	0	0	0,39	219 621	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1993	0	17	1	67,50	0	0	0,39	223 714	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1994	0	18	1	65,09	0	0	0,40	227 682	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1995	0	19	1	63,26	0	0	0,40	231 446	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1996	0	20	1	62,16	0	0	0,41	235 189	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1997	0	21	1	61,05	0	0	0,41	239 036	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1998	0	22	1	60,30	0	0	0,42	242 882	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	1999	0	23	1	59,84	0	0	0,42	246 821	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2000	0	24	1	59,86	0	0	0,43	250 927	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2001	0	25	1	58,91	0	0	0,43	255 049	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2002	0	26	1	58,91	0	0	0,44	259 137	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2003	0	27	1	59,87	0	0	0,44	263 173	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2004	0	28	1	58,99	0	0	0,44	267 132	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2005	0	29	1	58,37	0	0	0,45	271 060	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2006	0	30	1	57,06	0	0	0,45	274 901	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2007	0	31	1	56,38	0	0	0,45	278 178	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2008	0	32	1	56,13	0	0	0,45	280 558	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2009	0	33	1	55,35	0	0	0,45	282 283	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2010	0	34	1	52,97	0	0	0,45	283 788	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2011	0	35	1	50,31	0	0	0,45	285 265	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2012	0	36	1	49,69	0	0	0,45	286 584	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2013	0	37	1	49,57	0	0	0,45	288 032	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2014	0	38	1	49,28	0	0	0,46	289 873	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2015	0	39	0	49,40	0	0	0,46	291 787	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2016	0	40	0	49,88	0	0	0,46	293 541	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2017	0	41	0	50,70	0	0	0,46	295 450	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2018	0	42	0	50,43	0	0	0,46	297 606	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2019	0	43	0	50,61	0	0	0,47	299 717	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
French Polynesia	2020	0	44	0	50,58	0	0	0,47	301 920	0,65	3 521	15 710	1	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1963	0	1	1	91,80	1	0	2,45	1 206 400	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1964	0	2	1	92,20	1	0	2,44	1 208 000	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1965	0	3	1	92,60	1	0	2,42	1 211 700	2,68	7 855	428	0	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1966	0	4	1	93,00	1	0	2,41	1 214 000	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1967	0	5	1	93,40	1	0	2,39	1 215 300	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1968	0	6	1	93,80	1	0	2,37	1 216 800	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1969	0	7	1	94,20	1	0	2,36	1 215 700	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1970	0	8	1	94,60	1	0	2,34	1 214 700	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1971	0	9	1	95,00	1	0	2,33	1 215 100	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1972	0	10	1	95,20	1	0	2,31	1 214 236	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1973	0	11	1	95,40	1	0	2,30	1 220 220	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1974	0	12	1	95,60	1	0	2,30	1 225 273	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1975	0	13	1	95,80	1	0	2,29	1 230 874	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1976	0	14	1	96,00	1	0	2,28	1 234 029	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1977	0	15	1	96,20	1	0	2,27	1 234 021	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1978	0	16	1	96,40	1	0	2,26	1 234 936	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1979	0	17	1	96,60	1	0	2,26	1 235 601	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1980	0	18	1	96,80	1	0	2,25	1 235 243	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1981	0	19	1	97,00	1	0	2,23	1 234 244	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1982	0	20	1	97,70	1	0	2,23	1 232 692	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1983	0	21	1	98,40	1	0	2,22	1 228 410	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1984	0	22	1	99,10	1	0	2,21	1 223 263	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1985	0	23	0	99,80	1	0	2,20	1 218 691	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1986	0	24	0	100,50	1	0	2,19	1 213 943	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1987	0	25	0	101,20	1	0	2,18	1 209 255	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1988	0	26	0	101,90	1	0	2,17	1 204 946	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1989	0	27	0	102,60	1	0	2,17	1 202 696	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1990	0	28	0	103,30	1	0	2,16	1 200 155	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1991	0	29	0	104,00	1	0	2,16	1 198 178	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1992	0	30	0	104,80	1	0	2,15	1 196 190	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1993	0	31	0	105,60	1	0	2,14	1 191 953	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1994	0	32	0	106,40	1	0	2,13	1 186 725	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1995	0	33	0	107,54	1	0	2,12	1 183 124	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1996	0	34	0	106,50	1	0	2,12	1 180 279	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1997	0	35	0	106,29	1	0	2,11	1 177 856	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1998	0	36	0	105,29	1	0	2,11	1 177 171	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1999	0	37	0	106,39	1	0	2,11	1 177 057	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2000	0	38	0	108,53	1	0	2,11	1 178 281	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2001	0	39	0	108,67	1	0	2,12	1 181 238	2,68	7 855	428	0	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2002	0	40	0	107,25	1	0	2,12	1 183 437	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2003	0	41	0	104,06	1	0	2,12	1 188 528	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2004	0	42	0	103,79	1	0	2,12	1 194 393	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2005	0	43	0	106,12	1	0	2,11	1 199 218	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2006	0	44	0	107,00	1	0	2,10	1 201 522	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2007	0	45	0	107,40	1	0	2,10	1 205 593	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2008	0	46	0	105,54	1	0	2,10	1 214 346	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2009	0	47	0	103,78	1	0	2,10	1 221 392	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2010	0	48	0	105,63	1	0	2,09	1 221 569	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2011	0	49	0	105,61	1	0	2,08	1 220 849	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2012	0	50	0	104,19	1	0	2,07	1 217 780	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2013	0	51	0	106,38	1	0	2,07	1 221 860	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2014	0	52	0	106,24	1	0	2,08	1 229 363	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2015	0	53	0	107,66	1	0	2,08	1 227 122	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2016	0	54	0	106,24	1	0	2,07	1 221 218	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2017	0	55	0	106,43	1	0	2,07	1 217 872	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2018	0	56	0	106,97	1	0	2,07	1 215 538	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2019	0	57	0	107,41	1	0	2,07	1 210 414	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2020	0	58	0	107,98	1	0	2,06	1 206 216	2,68	7 855	428	0	0
Gagauzia	1995	0	1	1	59,52	1	0	3,86	164 600	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	1996	0	2	1	59,52	1	0	3,86	164 600	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	1997	0	3	1	59,52	1	0	3,89	164 600	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	1998	0	4	1	59,52	1	0	3,93	164 800	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	1999	0	5	1	59,52	1	0	3,89	161 100	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2000	0	6	1	59,52	1	0	3,92	160 467	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2001	0	7	1	59,52	1	0	3,96	159 833	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2002	0	8	1	59,52	1	0	3,99	159 200	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2003	0	9	1	59,52	1	0	4,04	158 900	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2004	0	10	1	59,52	1	0	4,08	158 600	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2005	0	11	1	59,52	1	0	4,05	155 700	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2006	0	12	1	59,52	1	0	4,11	155 700	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2007	0	13	1	59,52	1	0	4,18	155 700	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2008	0	14	1	59,52	1	0	4,26	155 600	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2009	0	15	1	59,52	1	0	4,33	155 500	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2010	0	16	1	59,52	1	0	4,42	155 800	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2011	0	17	1	59,52	1	0	4,56	156 700	5,72	1 832	80	0	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Gagauzia	2012	0	18	1	59,52	1	0	4,69	157 200	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2013	0	19	1	59,52	1	0	4,79	156 200	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2014	0	20	1	57,60	1	0	4,92	156 600	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2015	0	21	1	54,88	1	0	4,93	154 000	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2016	0	22	1	53,20	1	0	4,95	152 200	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2017	0	23	1	52,18	1	0	4,98	151 000	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2018	0	24	1	52,18	1	0	5,02	150 200	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2019	0	25	1	50,64	1	0	5,06	149 800	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Gagauzia	2020	0	26	1	49,45	1	0	5,06	149 800	5,72	1 832	80	0	0
Galicia	1981	0	1	1	77,59	0	0	8,05	2 812 775	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1982	0	2	1	78,81	0	0	8,00	2 813 223	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1983	0	3	1	80,03	0	0	7,95	2 810 051	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1984	0	4	1	81,26	0	0	7,90	2 806 318	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1985	0	5	1	82,49	0	0	7,85	2 800 320	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1986	0	6	1	82,82	0	0	7,79	2 790 188	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1987	0	7	1	83,12	0	0	7,75	2 781 544	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1988	0	8	1	83,39	0	0	7,69	2 770 449	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1989	0	9	1	83,63	0	0	7,64	2 757 349	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1990	0	10	1	83,85	1	0	7,59	2 743 027	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1991	0	11	1	83,61	1	0	7,53	2 731 599	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1992	0	12	1	83,37	1	0	7,49	2 730 411	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1993	0	13	1	83,13	1	0	7,44	2 730 448	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1994	0	14	1	82,90	1	0	7,39	2 728 179	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1995	0	15	1	81,62	1	0	7,35	2 724 690	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1996	0	16	1	80,80	1	0	7,29	2 719 127	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1997	0	17	1	80,14	1	0	7,24	2 713 951	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1998	0	18	1	79,34	1	0	7,20	2 709 417	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	1999	0	19	1	78,88	1	0	7,15	2 704 113	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2000	0	20	1	77,62	1	0	7,09	2 698 953	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2001	0	21	1	77,77	1	0	7,04	2 695 999	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2002	0	22	1	78,78	1	0	6,96	2 699 540	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2003	0	23	1	80,02	1	0	6,85	2 707 278	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2004	0	24	1	81,42	1	0	6,74	2 714 068	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2005	0	25	1	83,05	1	0	6,65	2 723 961	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2006	0	26	1	84,18	1	0	6,56	2 733 376	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2007	0	27	1	85,91	1	0	6,46	2 747 084	6,21	29 575	485	0	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Galicia	2008	0	28	1	87,63	1	0	6,39	2 759 988	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2009	0	29	1	88,17	1	0	6,35	2 769 143	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2010	0	30	1	88,90	1	0	6,33	2 771 750	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2011	0	31	1	88,40	1	0	6,31	2 771 651	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2012	0	32	1	88,50	1	0	6,28	2 764 582	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2013	0	33	1	89,48	1	0	6,28	2 752 086	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2014	0	34	1	89,08	1	0	6,26	2 737 551	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2015	0	35	1	89,57	1	0	6,23	2 723 357	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2016	0	36	1	89,53	1	0	6,20	2 712 055	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2017	0	37	1	89,43	1	0	6,16	2 702 734	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2018	0	38	1	89,78	1	0	6,12	2 698 954	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2019	0	39	1	89,99	1	0	6,07	2 698 685	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Galicia	2020	0	40	1	91,97	1	0	6,04	2 698 830	6,21	29 575	485	0	0
Gibraltar	1964	0	1	1	41,69	0	0	0,04	23 347	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1965	0	2	1	42,84	0	0	0,04	23 910	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1966	0	3	1	43,94	0	0	0,04	24 477	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1967	0	4	1	45,00	0	0	0,05	25 047	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1968	0	5	1	46,02	0	0	0,05	25 610	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1969	0	6	1	47,01	0	0	0,05	26 162	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1970	0	7	1	47,95	0	0	0,05	26 685	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1971	0	8	1	48,81	0	0	0,05	27 069	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1972	0	9	1	49,63	0	0	0,05	27 323	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1973	0	10	1	50,42	0	0	0,05	27 558	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1974	0	11	1	51,19	0	0	0,05	27 779	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1975	0	12	1	51,93	0	0	0,05	27 973	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1976	0	13	1	52,65	0	0	0,05	28 162	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1977	0	14	1	53,34	0	0	0,05	28 337	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1978	0	15	1	54,01	0	0	0,05	28 485	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1979	0	16	1	54,66	0	0	0,05	28 618	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1980	0	17	1	55,29	0	0	0,05	28 734	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1981	0	18	1	55,29	0	0	0,05	28 819	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1982	0	19	1	55,28	0	0	0,05	28 863	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1983	0	20	1	55,28	0	0	0,05	28 855	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1984	0	21	1	55,28	0	0	0,05	28 788	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1985	0	22	1	55,28	0	0	0,05	28 674	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1986	0	23	1	55,28	0	0	0,05	28 506	0,00	7	1 760	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Gibraltar	1987	0	24	1	55,28	0	0	0,05	28 272	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1988	0	25	1	55,28	0	0	0,05	28 000	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1989	0	26	1	55,28	0	0	0,05	27 688	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1990	0	27	1	55,28	0	0	0,05	27 317	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1991	0	28	1	61,21	0	0	0,05	26 988	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1992	0	29	1	66,80	0	0	0,05	26 945	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1993	0	30	1	72,09	0	0	0,05	27 118	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1994	0	31	1	77,08	0	0	0,05	27 282	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1995	0	32	1	81,82	0	0	0,05	27 412	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1996	0	33	1	86,31	0	0	0,05	27 491	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1997	0	34	1	90,58	0	0	0,05	27 564	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1998	0	35	1	94,64	0	0	0,05	27 636	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	1999	0	36	1	98,50	0	0	0,05	27 695	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2000	0	37	1	102,19	0	0	0,05	27 741	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2001	0	38	1	105,34	0	0	0,05	27 721	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2002	0	39	1	108,43	0	0	0,05	27 892	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2003	0	40	1	111,45	0	0	0,05	28 301	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2004	0	41	1	114,42	0	0	0,05	28 716	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2005	0	42	1	117,33	0	0	0,05	29 155	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2006	0	43	1	120,19	0	0	0,05	29 587	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2007	0	44	1	122,99	0	0	0,05	29 996	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2008	0	45	1	125,74	0	0	0,05	30 398	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2009	0	46	1	128,44	0	0	0,05	30 819	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2010	0	47	1	131,09	0	0	0,05	31 262	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2011	0	48	1	133,68	0	0	0,05	31 701	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2012	0	49	1	136,26	0	0	0,05	32 160	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2013	0	50	1	136,26	0	0	0,05	32 411	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2014	0	51	1	136,26	0	0	0,05	32 452	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2015	0	52	1	136,26	0	0	0,05	32 520	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2016	0	53	1	136,26	0	0	0,05	32 565	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2017	0	54	1	136,26	0	0	0,05	32 602	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2018	0	55	1	136,26	0	0	0,05	32 648	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2019	0	56	1	136,26	0	0	0,05	32 685	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Gibraltar	2020	0	57	1	136,26	0	0	0,05	32 709	0,00	7	1 760	1	0
Greenland	1979	0	1	1	81,48	1	1	0,97	49 761	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1980	0	2	1	88,47	1	1	0,98	50 106	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Greenland	1981	0	3	1	88,60	1	1	0,99	50 719	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1982	0	4	1	80,68	1	1	1,00	51 341	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1983	0	5	1	80,31	1	1	1,01	51 984	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1984	0	6	1	72,16	1	1	1,03	52 638	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1985	0	7	1	71,10	1	1	1,04	53 220	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1986	0	8	1	71,90	1	1	1,05	53 727	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1987	0	9	1	74,98	1	1	1,06	54 248	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1988	0	10	1	78,50	1	1	1,07	54 778	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1989	0	11	1	82,53	1	1	1,08	55 298	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1990	0	12	1	71,56	1	1	1,08	55 599	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1991	0	13	1	70,61	1	1	1,08	55 657	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1992	0	14	1	65,90	1	1	1,08	55 688	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1993	0	15	1	62,78	1	1	1,07	55 708	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1994	0	16	1	63,38	1	1	1,07	55 700	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1995	0	17	1	63,97	1	1	1,07	55 788	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1996	0	18	1	63,18	1	1	1,06	55 960	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1997	0	19	1	62,21	1	1	1,06	56 072	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1998	0	20	1	65,79	1	1	1,06	56 123	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	1999	0	21	1	65,06	1	1	1,05	56 106	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2000	0	22	1	67,33	1	1	1,05	56 184	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2001	0	23	1	67,64	1	1	1,05	56 386	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2002	0	24	1	66,69	1	1	1,05	56 565	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2003	0	25	1	66,20	1	1	1,05	56 728	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2004	0	26	1	69,01	1	1	1,05	56 866	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2005	0	27	1	71,05	1	1	1,05	56 887	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2006	0	28	1	72,55	1	1	1,04	56 811	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2007	0	29	1	74,02	1	1	1,03	56 708	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2008	0	30	1	79,50	1	1	1,03	56 578	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2009	0	31	1	84,89	1	1	1,02	56 442	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2010	0	32	1	85,29	1	1	1,02	56 351	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2011	0	33	1	84,22	1	1	1,01	56 288	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2012	0	34	1	85,72	1	1	1,00	56 199	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2013	0	35	1	84,36	1	1	1,00	56 089	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2014	0	36	1	87,55	1	1	0,99	55 953	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2015	0	37	1	83,87	1	1	0,98	55 895	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2016	0	38	1	85,44	1	1	0,98	55 916	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Greenland	2017	0	39	1	83,57	1	1	0,97	55 928	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2018	0	40	1	82,86	1	1	0,97	55 931	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2019	0	41	1	84,38	1	1	0,97	55 931	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Greenland	2020	0	42	1	86,94	1	1	0,96	56 026	5 025,95	2 166 086	3 535	1	0
Hong Kong	1997	0	1	1	1510,21	0	0	0,52	6 441 236	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	1998	0	2	1	1306,33	0	0	0,53	6 546 057	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	1999	0	3	1	1234,27	0	0	0,53	6 641 965	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2000	0	4	1	1216,97	0	0	0,53	6 731 195	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2001	0	5	1	1125,59	0	0	0,53	6 801 542	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2002	0	6	1	1047,93	0	0	0,53	6 848 847	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2003	0	7	1	982,14	0	0	0,53	6 886 457	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2004	0	8	1	971,34	0	0	0,53	6 915 998	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2005	0	9	1	939,39	0	0	0,53	6 936 874	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2006	0	10	1	894,53	0	0	0,53	6 960 595	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2007	0	11	1	834,17	0	0	0,53	7 001 456	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2008	0	12	1	776,57	0	0	0,53	7 050 677	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2009	0	13	1	692,75	0	0	0,53	7 094 595	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2010	0	14	1	669,48	0	0	0,53	7 132 438	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2011	0	15	1	640,91	0	0	0,53	7 175 364	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2012	0	16	1	603,57	0	0	0,53	7 234 060	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2013	0	17	1	576,47	0	0	0,53	7 296 827	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2014	0	18	1	550,91	0	0	0,53	7 352 183	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2015	0	19	1	526,79	0	0	0,53	7 399 838	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2016	0	20	1	504,24	0	0	0,53	7 435 927	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2017	0	21	1	490,62	0	0	0,53	7 461 519	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2018	0	22	1	473,69	0	0	0,53	7 481 555	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2019	0	23	1	440,24	0	0	0,53	7 496 122	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Hong Kong	2020	0	24	1	403,03	0	0	0,53	7 500 958	0,01	1 104	1 966	0	0
Irish Free State	1921	0	1	1	57,06	1	1	6,81	3 020 000	28,81	70 000	463	0	1
Irish Free State	1922	1	2	1	56,03	1	0	6,81	3 020 000	28,81	70 000	463	0	1
Kosovo	1974	0	1	2	35,56	1	0	18,48	1 370 857	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1975	0	2	2	34,79	1	0	18,81	1 406 891	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1976	0	3	2	34,02	1	0	19,13	1 443 492	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1977	0	4	2	33,26	1	0	19,46	1 480 318	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1978	0	5	2	32,50	1	0	19,77	1 516 206	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1979	0	6	2	31,74	1	0	20,08	1 551 605	14,05	10 887	242	0	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Kosovo	1980	0	7	2	30,99	1	0	20,44	1 589 395	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1981	0	8	2	30,59	1	0	20,83	1 627 819	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1982	0	9	2	30,18	1	0	21,24	1 665 977	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1983	0	10	2	29,78	1	1	21,69	1 706 004	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1984	0	11	2	29,38	1	1	22,14	1 746 874	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1985	0	12	2	28,98	1	1	22,59	1 787 432	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1986	0	13	2	28,58	1	1	23,04	1 827 149	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1987	0	14	2	28,18	1	1	23,47	1 865 129	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1988	0	15	2	27,79	1	1	23,84	1 898 987	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	1989	0	16	2	27,39	1	1	24,20	1 931 017	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	2001	0	1	2	71,65	0	1	23,24	1 840 256	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	2002	0	2	2	67,78	0	1	23,36	1 846 786	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	2003	0	3	2	61,24	0	1	23,32	1 839 425	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	2004	0	4	2	55,69	0	1	23,30	1 832 239	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	2005	0	5	2	53,53	0	1	23,31	1 825 050	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	2006	0	6	2	51,42	0	1	23,32	1 817 659	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	2007	0	7	2	51,09	0	1	23,33	1 810 222	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kosovo	2008	1	8	2	50,61	0	1	23,35	1 803 370	14,05	10 887	242	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2006	0	1	2	9999	1	1	16,86	4 169 824	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2007	0	2	2	9999	1	1	17,72	4 315 171	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2008	0	3	2	9999	1	1	18,02	4 460 518	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2009	0	4	2	9999	1	1	17,93	4 605 865	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2010	0	5	2	9999	1	1	17,92	4 751 212	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2011	0	6	2	9999	1	1	17,82	4 896 559	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2012	0	7	2	9999	1	1	17,49	5 041 906	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2013	0	8	2	9999	1	1	17,12	5 187 253	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2014	0	9	2	9999	1	1	16,98	5 332 600	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2015	0	10	2	9999	1	1	16,95	5 472 347	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2016	0	11	2	9999	1	1	16,96	5 612 094	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2017	0	12	2	9999	1	1	16,98	5 751 842	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2018	0	13	2	9999	1	1	16,98	5 891 589	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2019	0	14	2	9999	1	1	16,97	6 031 336	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Kurdistan (Iraq)	2020	0	15	2	9999	1	1	16,96	6 171 083	10,33	40 643	321	0	1
Madeira	1976	0	1	0	81,51	0	0	2,63	252 844	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1977	0	2	0	81,51	0	0	2,63	252 844	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1978	0	3	0	81,51	0	0	2,63	252 844	0,88	801	973	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Madeira	1979	0	4	0	81,51	0	0	2,63	252 844	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1980	0	5	0	81,51	0	0	2,63	252 844	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1981	0	6	0	81,51	0	0	2,63	252 844	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1982	0	7	0	81,51	0	0	2,62	252 919	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1983	0	8	0	81,51	0	0	2,61	252 994	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1984	0	9	0	81,51	0	0	2,60	253 069	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1985	0	10	0	81,51	0	0	2,60	253 144	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1986	0	11	0	81,51	0	0	2,60	253 219	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1987	0	12	0	81,51	0	0	2,59	253 293	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1988	0	13	0	81,51	0	0	2,59	253 368	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1989	0	14	0	81,51	0	0	2,59	253 443	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1990	0	15	0	81,51	0	0	2,60	253 518	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1991	0	16	0	81,51	0	0	2,61	253 593	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1992	0	17	0	81,51	0	0	2,59	251 650	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1993	0	18	0	81,51	0	0	2,55	248 570	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1994	0	19	0	81,51	0	0	2,52	246 505	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1995	0	20	0	81,51	0	0	2,49	244 658	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1996	0	21	0	82,01	0	0	2,47	243 212	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1997	0	22	0	82,94	0	0	2,45	242 535	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1998	0	23	0	86,03	0	0	2,44	242 271	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	1999	0	24	0	87,83	0	0	2,43	242 823	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2000	0	25	0	89,58	0	0	2,43	244 150	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2001	0	26	0	87,65	0	0	2,45	248 012	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2002	0	27	0	94,02	0	0	2,47	251 238	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2003	0	28	0	95,62	0	0	2,48	253 925	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2004	0	29	0	98,89	0	0	2,50	256 316	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2005	0	30	0	100,17	0	0	2,52	258 628	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2006	0	31	0	99,99	0	0	2,54	261 079	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2007	0	32	0	98,72	0	0	2,56	263 446	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2008	0	33	0	99,53	0	0	2,57	265 138	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2009	0	34	0	98,45	0	0	2,58	266 715	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2010	0	35	0	97,59	0	0	2,60	267 965	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2011	0	36	0	100,04	0	0	2,60	267 394	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2012	0	37	0	96,27	0	0	2,58	264 650	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2013	0	38	0	96,93	0	0	2,57	261 748	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2014	0	39	0	97,14	0	0	2,54	257 617	0,88	801	973	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Madeira	2015	0	40	0	96,52	0	0	2,52	254 521	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2016	0	41	0	96,97	0	0	2,50	252 313	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2017	0	42	0	98,76	0	0	2,50	251 077	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2018	0	43	0	97,42	0	0	2,49	250 397	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2019	0	44	0	96,80	0	0	2,50	250 713	0,88	801	973	1	0
Madeira	2020	0	45	0	89,93	0	0	2,51	251 900	0,88	801	973	1	0
Malta	1921	0	1	2	20,91	0	0	0,48	212 258	0,13	316	2 089	1	0
Malta	1922	0	2	2	21,39	0	0	0,49	215 194	0,13	316	2 089	1	0
Malta	1923	0	3	2	21,85	0	0	0,49	218 131	0,13	316	2 089	1	0
Malta	1924	0	4	2	22,56	0	0	0,49	221 067	0,13	316	2 089	1	0
Malta	1925	0	5	2	21,79	0	0	0,50	224 003	0,13	316	2 089	1	0
Malta	1926	0	6	2	23,14	0	0	0,50	226 940	0,13	316	2 089	1	0
Malta	1927	0	7	2	21,32	0	0	0,51	229 876	0,13	316	2 089	1	0
Malta	1928	0	8	2	20,10	0	0	0,51	232 812	0,13	316	2 089	1	0
Malta	1929	0	9	2	20,88	0	0	0,52	235 748	0,13	316	2 089	1	0
Malta	1930	0	10	2	20,58	0	0	0,52	238 685	0,13	316	2 089	1	0
Malta	1932	0	1	2	22,30	0	0	0,53	246 000	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1933	0	2	2	22,08	0	0	0,54	250 000	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1947	0	1	2	14,22	0	0	0,61	300 000	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1948	0	2	2	14,22	0	0	0,61	306 000	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1949	0	3	2	14,22	0	0	0,62	311 000	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1950	0	4	2	14,22	0	0	0,58	291 873	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1951	0	5	2	14,46	0	0	0,59	298 188	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1952	0	6	2	15,05	0	0	0,60	304 707	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1953	0	7	2	15,19	0	0	0,61	311 417	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1954	0	8	2	15,18	0	0	0,62	317 760	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1955	0	9	2	15,39	0	0	0,63	323 596	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1956	0	10	2	17,01	0	0	0,64	328 721	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1957	0	11	2	16,78	0	0	0,64	332 598	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1958	0	12	2	17,76	0	0	0,65	335 351	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1961	0	1	2	16,72	0	0	0,64	337 120	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1962	0	2	2	15,99	0	0	0,63	335 452	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1963	0	3	2	15,52	0	0	0,62	332 894	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Malta	1964	1	4	2	15,36	0	0	0,61	329 757	0,13	316	2 089	1	1
Marshall Isl.	1979	0	1	1	7,78	0	0	0,01	30 902	0,00	181	11 333	1	0
Marshall Isl.	1980	0	2	1	7,08	0	0	0,01	31 988	0,00	181	11 333	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Marshall Isl.	1981	0	3	1	7,15	0	0	0,01	33 219	0,00	181	11 333	1	0
Marshall Isl.	1982	0	4	1	7,41	0	0	0,02	34 569	0,00	181	11 333	1	0
Marshall Isl.	1983	0	5	1	7,95	0	0	0,02	35 975	0,00	181	11 333	1	0
Marshall Isl.	1984	0	6	1	7,48	0	0	0,02	37 437	0,00	181	11 333	1	0
Marshall Isl.	1985	0	7	1	6,53	0	0	0,02	38 962	0,00	181	11 333	1	0
Marshall Isl.	1986	0	8	1	7,63	0	0	0,02	40 527	0,00	181	11 333	1	0
Marshall Isl.	1987	0	9	1	7,84	0	0	0,02	42 122	0,00	181	11 333	1	0
Marshall Isl.	1988	0	10	1	7,90	0	0	0,02	43 687	0,00	181	11 333	1	0
Marshall Isl.	1989	0	11	1	7,35	0	0	0,02	44 988	0,00	181	11 333	1	0
Marshall Isl.	1990	0	12	1	7,33	0	0	0,02	46 047	0,00	181	11 333	1	0
Marshall Isl.	1991	1	13	1	7,29	0	0	0,02	47 053	0,00	181	11 333	1	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1924	0	1	1	9999	0	0	6,57	146 000	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1925	0	2	1	9999	0	0	6,57	146 000	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1926	0	3	1	9999	0	0	6,57	146 000	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1927	0	4	1	9999	0	0	6,57	146 000	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1928	0	5	1	9999	0	0	6,57	146 000	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1929	0	6	1	9999	0	0	6,57	146 000	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1930	0	7	1	9999	0	0	6,57	146 000	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1931	0	8	1	9999	0	0	6,57	146 000	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1932	0	9	1	9999	0	0	6,54	147 027	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1933	0	10	1	9999	0	0	6,51	148 053	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1934	0	11	1	9999	0	0	6,48	149 080	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1935	0	12	1	9999	0	0	6,45	150 106	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1936	0	13	1	9999	0	0	6,42	150 893	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1937	0	14	1	9999	0	0	6,40	151 777	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1938	0	15	1	9999	0	0	6,37	152 660	1,71	943	196	0	0
Memel-Klaipeda	1939	0	16	1	9999	0	0	6,37	152 660	1,71	943	196	0	0
Micronesia, F.S.	1979	0	1	2	7,64	0	0	0,03	74 114	0,01	702	12 389	1	0
Micronesia, F.S.	1980	0	2	2	6,99	0	0	0,03	76 299	0,01	702	12 389	1	0
Micronesia, F.S.	1981	0	3	2	7,34	0	0	0,03	78 531	0,01	702	12 389	1	0
Micronesia, F.S.	1982	0	4	2	7,15	0	0	0,04	80 816	0,01	702	12 389	1	0
Micronesia, F.S.	1983	0	5	2	6,84	0	0	0,04	83 153	0,01	702	12 389	1	0
Micronesia, F.S.	1984	0	6	2	6,02	0	0	0,04	85 543	0,01	702	12 389	1	0
Micronesia, F.S.	1985	0	7	2	6,62	0	0	0,04	87 966	0,01	702	12 389	1	0
Micronesia, F.S.	1986	0	8	2	6,79	0	0	0,04	90 397	0,01	702	12 389	1	0
Micronesia, F.S.	1987	0	9	2	6,58	0	0	0,04	92 845	0,01	702	12 389	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Micronesia, F.S.	1988	0	10	2	6,60	0	0	0,04	94 987	0,01	702	12 389	1	0
Micronesia, F.S.	1989	0	11	2	6,37	0	0	0,04	96 796	0,01	702	12 389	1	0
Micronesia, F.S.	1990	0	12	2	6,47	0	0	0,04	98 603	0,01	702	12 389	1	0
Micronesia, F.S.	1991	1	13	2	6,83	0	0	0,04	100 427	0,01	702	12 389	1	0
Mindanao	1990	0	1	2	31,37	0	0	3,55	2 108 061	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	1991	0	2	2	31,37	0	0	3,55	2 158 909	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	1992	0	3	2	31,37	0	0	3,55	2 209 757	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	1993	0	4	2	31,37	0	0	3,54	2 260 604	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	1994	0	5	2	32,34	0	0	3,54	2 311 452	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	1995	0	6	2	33,86	0	0	3,53	2 362 300	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	1996	0	7	2	33,13	0	0	3,58	2 450 449	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	1997	0	8	2	32,30	0	0	3,62	2 538 598	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	1998	0	9	2	33,29	1	0	3,66	2 626 747	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	1999	0	10	2	33,76	0	0	3,69	2 714 896	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2000	0	11	2	35,13	0	0	3,73	2 803 045	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2001	0	12	2	33,06	0	0	3,90	2 991 295	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2002	0	13	2	36,07	0	0	4,07	3 179 545	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2003	0	14	2	36,15	0	0	4,23	3 367 795	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2004	0	15	2	36,76	0	0	4,39	3 556 045	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2005	0	16	2	36,98	0	0	4,54	3 744 295	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2006	0	17	2	37,12	0	0	4,68	3 932 545	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2007	0	18	2	36,54	0	0	4,82	4 120 795	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2008	0	19	2	35,46	0	0	4,38	3 832 577	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2009	0	20	2	35,95	0	0	3,96	3 544 358	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2010	0	21	2	36,27	0	0	3,56	3 256 140	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2011	0	22	2	35,59	0	0	3,62	3 361 189	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2012	0	23	2	33,79	0	0	3,67	3 466 239	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2013	0	24	2	32,71	0	0	3,72	3 571 288	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2014	0	25	2	32,28	0	0	3,76	3 676 338	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2015	0	26	2	30,25	0	0	3,81	3 781 387	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2016	0	27	2	29,09	0	0	3,87	3 905 967	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2017	0	28	2	29,82	0	0	3,92	4 030 547	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Mindanao	2018	0	29	2	30,05	0	0	3,98	4 155 128	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Bangsamoro A.R.	2019	0	30	2	29,79	0	0	4,03	4 279 708	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Bangsamoro A.R.	2020	0	31	2	32,10	0	0	4,09	4 404 288	4,42	12 695	895	0	0
Netherlands Antilles	1954	0	1	2	44,39	1	0	1,14	120 515	2,39	992	7 806	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Netherlands Antilles	1955	0	2	2	44,39	1	0	1,15	122 768	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1956	0	3	2	44,39	1	0	1,16	125 099	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1957	0	4	2	44,39	1	0	1,16	127 501	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1958	0	5	1	44,39	1	0	1,17	129 942	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1959	0	6	1	44,39	1	0	1,18	132 380	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1960	0	7	1	44,39	1	0	1,18	134 776	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1961	0	8	1	44,39	1	0	1,18	137 108	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1962	0	9	1	44,39	1	0	1,19	139 387	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1963	0	10	1	44,39	1	0	1,19	141 665	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1964	0	11	1	44,39	1	0	1,19	144 016	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1965	0	12	1	44,39	1	0	1,20	146 480	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1966	0	13	1	44,39	1	0	1,21	149 093	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1967	0	14	1	44,39	1	0	1,21	151 808	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1968	0	15	1	44,39	1	0	1,22	154 502	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1969	0	16	1	44,39	1	0	1,22	156 998	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1970	0	17	1	44,39	1	0	1,23	159 179	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1971	0	18	1	45,22	1	0	1,23	160 998	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1972	0	19	1	46,16	1	0	1,23	162 504	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1973	0	20	1	45,44	1	0	1,23	163 794	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1974	0	21	1	46,03	1	0	1,22	165 010	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1975	0	22	1	47,22	1	0	1,22	166 261	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1976	0	23	1	47,94	1	0	1,22	167 573	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1977	0	24	1	64,24	1	0	1,22	168 928	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1978	0	25	1	67,04	1	0	1,22	170 335	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1979	0	26	1	68,90	1	0	1,23	171 792	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1980	0	27	1	72,55	1	0	1,23	173 297	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1981	0	28	1	73,97	1	0	1,23	174 837	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1982	0	29	1	73,36	1	0	1,24	176 415	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1983	0	30	1	71,26	1	0	1,24	178 058	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1984	0	31	1	67,67	1	0	1,25	179 800	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1985	0	32	1	64,39	1	0	1,26	181 650	2,39	992	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1986	0	33	1	59,02	1	0	1,26	183 619	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1987	0	34	1	58,44	1	0	1,27	185 649	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1988	0	35	1	57,19	1	0	1,28	187 596	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1989	0	36	1	58,89	1	0	1,28	189 274	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1990	0	37	1	57,24	1	0	1,28	190 539	1,93	800	7 806	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Netherlands Antilles	1991	0	38	1	56,79	1	0	1,28	191 402	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1992	0	39	1	57,75	1	0	1,27	191 888	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1993	0	40	1	60,20	1	0	1,26	191 899	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1994	0	41	1	62,52	1	0	1,25	191 325	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1995	0	42	1	62,54	1	0	1,23	190 124	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1996	0	43	1	62,26	1	0	1,21	188 225	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1997	0	44	1	61,44	1	0	1,19	185 762	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1998	0	45	1	57,91	1	0	1,17	183 172	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	1999	0	46	1	55,14	1	0	1,15	181 033	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	2000	0	47	1	52,76	1	0	1,13	179 769	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	2001	0	48	1	52,83	1	0	1,13	179 516	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	2002	0	49	1	52,89	1	0	1,12	180 170	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	2003	0	50	1	53,32	1	0	1,13	181 607	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	2004	0	51	1	52,44	1	0	1,13	183 603	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	2005	0	52	1	51,44	1	0	1,14	185 967	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	2006	0	53	1	50,30	1	0	1,15	188 700	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	2007	0	54	1	49,75	1	0	1,17	191 788	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	2008	0	55	1	49,13	1	0	1,18	194 999	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	2009	0	56	1	50,40	1	0	1,20	198 037	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
Netherlands Antilles	2010	0	57	1	49,16	1	0	1,21	200 689	1,93	800	7 806	1	0
New Caledonia	1998	0	1	0	76,05	1	0	0,37	212 756	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	1999	0	2	0	75,60	1	0	0,37	217 118	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2000	0	3	0	73,49	1	0	0,38	221 537	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2001	0	4	0	72,49	1	0	0,38	225 987	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2002	0	5	0	72,50	1	0	0,39	230 399	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2003	0	6	0	74,43	1	0	0,39	234 685	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2004	0	7	0	74,42	1	0	0,40	238 649	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2005	0	8	0	75,23	1	0	0,40	242 141	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2006	0	9	0	77,03	1	0	0,40	245 635	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2007	0	10	0	77,76	1	0	0,41	249 367	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2008	0	11	0	77,38	1	1	0,41	253 077	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2009	0	12	0	80,79	1	1	0,41	256 976	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2010	0	13	0	83,77	1	1	0,42	261 426	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2011	0	14	0	84,49	1	1	0,42	266 303	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2012	0	15	0	84,57	1	1	0,43	271 303	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2013	0	16	0	84,46	1	1	0,44	276 394	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
New Caledonia	2014	0	17	0	84,18	1	1	0,44	280 798	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2015	0	18	0	83,57	1	1	0,44	283 032	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2016	0	19	0	82,53	1	1	0,44	283 748	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2017	0	20	0	82,02	1	1	0,44	284 349	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2018	0	21	0	80,88	1	1	0,44	284 880	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2019	0	22	0	78,34	1	1	0,44	285 374	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
New Caledonia	2020	0	23	0	82,52	1	1	0,44	286 403	3,41	18 575	16 741	1	0
Niue	1974	0	1	1	9,12	0	0	0,15	4 499	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1975	0	2	1	9,08	0	0	0,14	4 270	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1976	0	3	1	9,03	0	0	0,13	4 053	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1977	0	4	1	8,99	0	0	0,12	3 914	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1978	0	5	1	8,95	0	0	0,12	3 828	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1979	0	6	1	8,91	0	0	0,12	3 733	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1980	0	7	1	8,87	0	0	0,12	3 637	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1981	0	8	1	8,76	0	0	0,11	3 533	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1982	0	9	1	8,66	0	0	0,11	3 396	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1983	0	10	1	8,55	0	0	0,10	3 224	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1984	0	11	1	8,46	0	0	0,09	3 038	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1985	0	12	1	8,36	0	0	0,09	2 848	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1986	0	13	1	8,27	0	0	0,08	2 680	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1987	0	14	1	8,18	0	0	0,08	2 602	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1988	0	15	1	8,09	0	0	0,08	2 583	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1989	0	16	1	8,00	0	0	0,08	2 560	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1990	0	17	1	7,92	0	0	0,07	2 533	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1991	0	18	1	8,66	0	0	0,07	2 497	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1992	0	19	1	9,38	0	0	0,07	2 458	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1993	0	20	1	10,08	0	0	0,07	2 416	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1994	0	21	1	10,76	0	0	0,07	2 375	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1995	0	22	1	11,41	0	0	0,06	2 339	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1996	0	23	1	12,05	0	0	0,06	2 300	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1997	0	24	1	12,68	0	0	0,06	2 257	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1998	0	25	1	13,28	0	0	0,06	2 207	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	1999	0	26	1	13,87	0	0	0,06	2 142	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2000	0	27	1	14,45	0	0	0,05	2 074	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2001	0	28	1	15,41	0	0	0,05	2 011	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2002	0	29	1	16,35	0	0	0,05	1 965	0,10	261	2 865	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Niue	2003	0	30	1	17,26	0	0	0,05	1 928	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2004	0	31	1	18,14	0	0	0,05	1 891	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2005	0	32	1	19,01	0	0	0,04	1 856	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2006	0	33	1	19,85	0	0	0,04	1 833	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2007	0	34	1	20,67	0	0	0,04	1 822	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2008	0	35	1	21,47	0	0	0,04	1 821	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2009	0	36	1	22,25	0	0	0,04	1 815	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2010	0	37	1	23,01	0	0	0,04	1 812	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2011	0	38	1	22,99	0	0	0,04	1 811	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2012	0	39	1	22,97	0	0	0,04	1 813	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2013	0	40	1	22,97	0	0	0,04	1 825	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2014	0	41	1	22,97	0	0	0,04	1 833	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2015	0	42	1	22,97	0	0	0,04	1 847	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2016	0	43	1	22,97	0	0	0,04	1 861	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2017	0	44	1	22,97	0	0	0,04	1 869	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2018	0	45	1	22,97	0	0	0,04	1 887	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2019	0	46	1	22,97	0	0	0,04	1 921	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Niue	2020	0	47	1	22,97	0	0	0,04	1 942	0,10	261	2 865	1	0
Northern Ireland	1921	0	1	0	55,60	1	0	2,95	1 258 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1922	0	2	0	55,60	1	0	2,95	1 269 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1923	0	3	0	55,60	1	0	2,91	1 259 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1924	0	4	0	55,60	1	0	2,88	1 258 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1925	0	5	0	55,60	1	0	2,87	1 257 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1926	0	6	0	55,60	1	0	2,85	1 254 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1927	0	7	0	55,60	1	0	2,83	1 250 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1928	0	8	0	55,60	1	0	2,81	1 247 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1929	0	9	0	55,60	1	0	2,79	1 240 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1930	0	10	0	55,60	1	0	2,77	1 237 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1931	0	11	0	55,60	1	0	2,77	1 243 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1932	0	12	0	55,60	1	0	2,77	1 251 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1933	0	13	0	55,60	1	0	2,78	1 258 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1934	0	14	0	55,60	1	0	2,79	1 265 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1935	0	15	0	55,60	1	0	2,79	1 271 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1936	0	16	0	55,60	1	0	2,79	1 276 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1937	0	17	0	55,60	1	0	2,78	1 281 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1938	0	18	0	55,60	1	0	2,78	1 286 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Northern Ireland	1939	0	19	0	55,60	1	0	2,80	1 295 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1940	0	20	0	55,60	1	0	2,90	1 299 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1941	0	21	0	55,60	1	1	3,00	1 308 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1942	0	22	0	55,60	1	1	3,09	1 329 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1943	0	23	0	55,60	1	1	2,86	1 341 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1944	0	24	0	55,60	1	1	2,88	1 357 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1945	0	25	0	55,60	1	1	2,87	1 359 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1946	0	26	0	55,60	1	1	2,83	1 350 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1947	0	27	0	55,60	1	1	2,80	1 350 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1948	0	28	0	55,60	1	1	2,80	1 362 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1949	0	29	0	55,60	1	1	2,80	1 371 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1950	0	30	0	55,60	1	1	2,83	1 377 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1951	0	31	0	55,60	1	1	2,81	1 373 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1952	0	32	0	55,60	1	1	2,80	1 375 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1953	0	33	0	55,60	1	1	2,80	1 384 100	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1954	0	34	0	55,60	1	1	2,80	1 387 300	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1955	0	35	0	55,60	1	1	2,80	1 393 800	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1956	0	36	0	55,60	1	1	2,79	1 396 600	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1957	0	37	0	55,60	1	1	2,78	1 398 500	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1958	0	38	0	55,60	0	1	2,77	1 402 300	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1959	0	39	0	55,60	0	1	2,77	1 407 700	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1960	0	40	0	55,60	0	1	2,78	1 419 800	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1961	0	41	0	55,60	0	1	2,78	1 427 400	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1962	0	42	0	55,60	0	1	2,78	1 437 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1963	0	43	0	55,60	0	1	2,78	1 446 700	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1964	0	44	0	55,60	0	1	2,78	1 458 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1965	0	45	0	55,60	0	1	2,78	1 468 200	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1966	0	46	0	63,30	0	1	2,78	1 475 600	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1967	0	47	0	69,40	0	1	2,79	1 488 800	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1968	0	48	0	69,50	0	0	2,80	1 502 600	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1969	0	49	0	70,80	0	0	2,81	1 514 100	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1970	0	50	0	72,20	0	0	2,82	1 527 400	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1971	0	51	0	74,00	0	0	2,84	1 540 413	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1972	0	52	0	70,80	0	0	2,82	1 538 977	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	1999	0	1	0	81,67	1	0	2,95	1 679 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2000	0	2	1	83,33	1	0	2,94	1 682 900	6,14	14 130	517	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Northern Ireland	2001	0	3	1	83,13	1	0	2,94	1 688 800	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2002	0	4	1	82,17	1	0	2,94	1 697 500	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2007	0	1	1	81,64	1	0	2,96	1 761 700	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2008	0	2	1	79,33	1	0	2,97	1 779 200	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2009	0	3	1	78,84	1	0	2,97	1 793 300	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2010	0	4	1	77,67	1	0	2,96	1 804 800	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2011	0	5	1	79,31	1	0	2,95	1 814 300	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2012	0	6	1	79,69	1	0	2,94	1 823 600	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2013	0	7	1	79,13	1	0	2,93	1 829 700	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2014	0	8	1	78,40	1	0	2,92	1 840 500	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2015	0	9	1	77,74	1	0	2,92	1 851 600	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2016	0	10	1	79,22	1	0	2,92	1 862 100	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2017	0	11	1	78,80	1	0	2,91	1 870 800	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2018	0	12	1	78,05	1	0	2,91	1 881 600	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2019	0	13	1	78,76	1	0	2,92	1 893 700	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Ireland	2020	0	14	1	78,84	1	0	2,91	1 896 000	6,14	14 130	517	1	1
Northern Mariana Isl.	1978	0	1	2	51,36	0	0	0,01	16 194	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1979	0	2	2	50,52	0	0	0,01	16 494	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1980	0	3	2	49,71	0	0	0,01	17 613	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1981	0	4	2	48,50	0	0	0,01	19 902	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1982	0	5	2	47,35	0	0	0,01	22 647	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1983	0	6	2	46,25	0	0	0,01	25 594	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1984	0	7	2	45,20	0	0	0,01	28 735	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1985	0	8	2	44,21	0	0	0,01	32 041	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1986	0	9	2	43,26	0	0	0,01	35 459	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1987	0	10	2	42,35	0	0	0,02	38 923	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1988	0	11	2	41,48	0	0	0,02	42 381	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1989	0	12	2	40,65	0	0	0,02	45 859	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1990	0	13	2	39,85	0	0	0,02	48 002	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1991	0	14	2	39,04	0	0	0,02	48 302	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1992	0	15	2	38,27	0	0	0,02	48 128	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1993	0	16	2	37,53	0	0	0,02	47 948	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1994	0	17	2	36,82	0	0	0,02	47 780	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1995	0	18	2	36,15	0	0	0,02	48 717	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1996	0	19	2	35,50	0	0	0,02	53 367	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1997	0	20	2	34,88	0	0	0,02	60 817	0,01	472	12 536	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Northern Mariana Isl.	1998	0	21	2	34,29	0	0	0,02	68 501	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	1999	0	22	2	33,72	0	0	0,03	76 237	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2000	0	23	2	33,17	0	0	0,03	80 338	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2001	0	24	2	32,66	0	0	0,03	79 479	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2002	0	25	2	42,42	0	0	0,03	77 162	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2003	0	26	2	43,19	0	0	0,03	74 623	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2004	0	27	2	42,22	0	0	0,02	71 898	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2005	0	28	2	37,45	0	0	0,02	69 025	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2006	0	29	2	35,79	0	0	0,02	66 060	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2007	0	30	2	34,63	0	0	0,02	63 050	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2008	0	31	2	32,62	0	0	0,02	60 032	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2009	0	32	2	29,30	0	0	0,02	57 056	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2010	0	33	2	30,77	0	0	0,02	54 087	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2011	0	34	2	29,11	0	0	0,02	52 520	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2012	0	35	2	28,99	0	0	0,02	52 359	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2013	0	36	2	29,55	0	0	0,02	52 141	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2014	0	37	2	30,49	0	0	0,02	51 856	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2015	0	38	2	31,12	0	0	0,02	51 514	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2016	0	39	2	40,14	0	0	0,02	51 133	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2017	0	40	2	49,05	0	0	0,02	50 729	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2018	0	41	2	38,99	0	0	0,02	50 304	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2019	0	42	2	34,26	0	0	0,01	49 858	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Northern Mariana Isl.	2020	0	43	2	25,16	0	0	0,01	49 587	0,01	472	12 536	1	0
Nunavut	1999	0	1	2	91,32	1	1	0,09	26 820	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2000	0	2	2	90,13	1	1	0,09	27 498	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2001	0	3	2	89,95	1	1	0,09	28 134	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2002	0	4	2	93,04	1	1	0,09	28 817	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2003	0	5	2	88,39	1	1	0,09	29 301	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2004	0	6	2	89,67	1	1	0,09	29 836	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2005	0	7	2	86,91	1	1	0,09	30 328	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2006	0	8	2	87,69	1	1	0,09	30 818	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2007	0	9	2	87,57	1	1	0,10	31 394	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2008	0	10	2	98,57	1	1	0,10	31 898	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2009	0	11	2	100,96	1	1	0,10	32 604	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2010	0	12	2	117,17	1	1	0,10	33 359	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2011	0	13	2	115,24	1	1	0,10	34 185	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Nunavut	2012	0	14	2	120,54	1	1	0,10	34 658	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2013	0	15	2	119,77	1	1	0,10	35 330	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2014	0	16	2	117,66	1	1	0,10	35 966	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2015	0	17	2	119,02	1	1	0,10	36 490	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2016	0	18	2	124,45	1	1	0,10	36 979	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2017	0	19	2	137,78	1	1	0,10	37 656	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2018	0	20	2	137,54	1	1	0,10	38 322	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2019	0	21	2	145,45	1	1	0,10	38 839	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Nunavut	2020	0	22	2	182,66	1	1	0,10	39 479	26,52	2 093 190	2 085	0	1
Palau	1981	0	1	2	32,88	0	0	0,01	12 386	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1982	0	2	2	32,96	0	0	0,01	12 666	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1983	0	3	2	31,69	0	0	0,01	12 973	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1984	0	4	2	30,47	0	0	0,01	13 299	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1985	0	5	2	30,37	0	0	0,01	13 644	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1986	0	6	2	30,50	0	0	0,01	13 985	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1987	0	7	2	30,68	0	0	0,01	14 309	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1988	0	8	2	30,67	0	0	0,01	14 632	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1989	0	9	2	30,85	0	0	0,01	14 957	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1990	0	10	2	31,62	0	0	0,01	15 293	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1991	0	11	2	32,93	0	0	0,01	15 640	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1992	0	12	2	32,28	0	0	0,01	16 004	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1993	0	13	2	27,30	0	0	0,01	16 380	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Palau	1994	1	14	2	27,87	0	0	0,01	16 770	0,00	459	13 908	1	0
Puerto Rico	1952	0	1	2	22,69	1	0	1,48	2 269 211	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1953	0	2	2	23,28	1	0	1,47	2 284 810	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1954	0	3	2	24,72	1	0	1,45	2 298 008	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1955	0	4	2	24,31	1	0	1,43	2 309 782	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1956	0	5	2	26,02	1	0	1,41	2 320 567	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1957	0	6	2	27,18	1	0	1,40	2 329 614	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1958	0	7	2	28,24	1	0	1,37	2 336 795	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1959	0	8	2	28,84	1	0	1,35	2 343 690	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1960	0	9	2	32,96	1	0	1,34	2 365 072	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1961	0	10	2	34,46	1	0	1,34	2 404 223	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1962	0	11	2	34,99	1	0	1,34	2 446 291	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1963	0	12	2	36,14	1	0	1,35	2 486 863	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1964	0	13	2	36,36	1	0	1,35	2 526 147	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Puerto Rico	1965	0	14	2	37,21	1	0	1,35	2 564 270	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1966	0	15	2	37,55	1	0	1,36	2 601 197	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1967	0	16	2	39,03	1	0	1,36	2 636 741	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1968	0	17	2	39,32	1	0	1,36	2 670 526	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1969	0	18	2	41,78	1	0	1,37	2 701 800	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1970	0	19	2	45,37	1	0	1,37	2 737 619	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1971	0	20	2	46,56	1	0	1,37	2 782 018	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1972	0	21	2	46,98	1	0	1,38	2 829 184	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1973	0	22	2	46,72	1	0	1,39	2 876 681	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1974	0	23	2	47,79	1	0	1,40	2 924 358	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1975	0	24	2	47,17	1	0	1,41	2 972 267	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1976	0	25	2	47,22	1	0	1,42	3 020 456	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1977	0	26	2	47,60	1	0	1,42	3 068 870	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1978	0	27	2	48,11	1	0	1,43	3 117 169	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1979	0	28	2	50,25	1	0	1,44	3 166 208	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1980	0	29	2	52,40	1	0	1,44	3 214 568	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1981	0	30	2	51,61	1	0	1,44	3 259 445	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1982	0	31	2	51,68	1	0	1,45	3 301 071	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1983	0	32	2	48,21	1	0	1,45	3 339 381	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1984	0	33	2	47,56	1	0	1,45	3 374 447	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1985	0	34	2	47,03	1	0	1,45	3 406 279	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1986	0	35	2	47,70	1	0	1,45	3 434 981	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1987	0	36	2	48,74	1	0	1,44	3 461 929	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1988	0	37	2	49,53	1	0	1,44	3 487 970	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1989	0	38	2	49,86	1	0	1,43	3 513 735	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1990	0	39	2	47,66	1	0	1,43	3 543 776	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1991	0	40	2	49,12	1	0	1,42	3 578 450	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1992	0	41	2	49,99	1	0	1,42	3 612 629	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1993	0	42	2	51,15	1	0	1,41	3 645 017	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1994	0	43	2	51,38	1	0	1,40	3 675 749	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1995	0	44	2	52,45	1	0	1,39	3 704 947	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1996	0	45	2	51,74	1	0	1,39	3 732 811	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1997	0	46	2	52,10	1	0	1,38	3 759 518	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1998	0	47	2	52,93	1	0	1,37	3 785 238	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	1999	0	48	2	53,58	1	0	1,36	3 810 115	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2000	0	49	2	53,61	1	0	1,36	3 827 108	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Puerto Rico	2001	0	50	2	56,89	1	0	1,34	3 832 131	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2002	0	51	2	56,91	1	0	1,33	3 830 773	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2003	0	52	2	55,84	1	0	1,31	3 825 628	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2004	0	53	2	59,00	1	0	1,30	3 817 037	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2005	0	54	2	56,48	1	0	1,28	3 805 559	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2006	0	55	2	54,93	1	0	1,26	3 791 559	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2007	0	56	2	54,05	1	0	1,25	3 775 440	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2008	0	57	2	53,80	1	0	1,23	3 757 619	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2009	0	58	2	54,94	1	0	1,21	3 738 939	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2010	0	59	2	53,98	1	0	1,19	3 717 922	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2011	0	60	2	53,98	1	0	1,18	3 691 614	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2012	0	61	2	53,83	1	0	1,16	3 657 988	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2013	0	62	2	53,67	1	0	1,13	3 615 018	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2014	0	63	2	53,08	1	0	1,11	3 560 010	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2015	0	64	2	52,43	1	0	1,08	3 497 335	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2016	0	65	2	52,30	1	0	1,05	3 432 740	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2017	0	66	2	51,21	1	0	1,02	3 366 408	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2018	0	67	2	49,80	1	0	1,00	3 319 269	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2019	0	68	2	49,72	1	0	0,98	3 292 887	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Puerto Rico	2020	0	69	2	48,14	1	0	0,97	3 271 564	0,10	8 868	2 507	1	1
Southern Rhodesia	1923	0	1	2	12,92	1	1	2,09	932 800	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1924	0	2	2	12,70	1	1	2,11	948 400	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1925	0	3	2	12,48	1	1	2,14	964 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1926	0	4	2	12,28	1	1	2,19	991 200	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1927	0	5	2	12,08	1	1	2,24	1 018 400	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1928	0	6	2	11,89	1	1	2,29	1 045 600	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1929	0	7	2	11,71	1	1	2,35	1 072 800	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1930	0	8	2	11,58	1	1	2,40	1 100 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1931	0	9	2	11,45	1	1	2,44	1 122 500	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1932	0	10	2	11,33	1	1	2,47	1 145 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1933	0	11	2	11,21	1	1	2,52	1 174 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1934	0	12	2	11,09	1	1	2,62	1 222 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1935	0	13	2	10,98	1	1	2,71	1 268 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1936	0	14	2	10,87	1	1	2,77	1 306 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1937	0	15	2	10,76	1	1	2,84	1 341 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1938	0	16	2	10,66	1	1	2,92	1 386 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Southern Rhodesia	1939	0	17	2	10,61	1	1	2,99	1 422 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1940	0	18	2	10,56	1	1	3,17	1 461 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1941	0	19	2	10,51	1	1	3,35	1 501 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1942	0	20	2	10,46	1	1	3,50	1 553 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1943	0	21	2	10,41	1	1	3,33	1 606 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1944	0	22	2	10,37	1	1	3,44	1 666 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1945	0	23	2	10,32	1	1	3,55	1 728 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1946	0	24	2	10,28	1	1	3,63	1 780 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1947	0	25	2	10,23	1	1	3,73	1 850 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1948	0	26	2	10,19	1	1	3,82	1 910 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1949	0	27	2	10,15	1	1	3,95	1 990 000	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1950	0	28	2	10,10	1	1	5,58	2 791 326	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1951	0	29	2	10,14	1	1	5,73	2 881 713	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1952	0	30	2	10,21	1	1	5,89	2 973 713	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1953	0	31	2	10,34	1	1	6,05	3 067 899	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	0
Southern Rhodesia	1964	0	1	2	9,96	1	1	8,00	4 310 332	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	1
Southern Rhodesia	1965	1	2	2	10,09	1	1	8,20	4 447 149	159,55	389 361	8 283	1	1
Sardinia	1948	0	1	0	67,00	1	1	2,80	1 277 600	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1949	0	2	0	66,00	1	1	2,80	1 277 600	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1950	0	3	0	64,00	1	1	2,80	1 277 600	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1951	0	4	0	63,00	1	1	2,80	1 277 600	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1952	0	5	0	64,20	1	1	2,80	1 277 600	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1953	0	6	0	65,40	1	1	2,82	1 295 100	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1954	0	7	0	66,60	1	1	2,84	1 316 000	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1955	0	8	0	67,80	1	1	2,86	1 333 000	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1956	0	9	0	69,00	1	1	2,87	1 347 300	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1957	0	10	0	70,20	1	1	2,89	1 360 900	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1958	0	11	0	71,40	1	1	2,90	1 376 200	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1959	0	12	0	72,60	1	1	2,91	1 389 000	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1960	0	13	0	73,80	1	1	2,93	1 404 100	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1961	0	14	0	75,00	1	1	2,93	1 412 100	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1962	0	15	0	76,00	1	1	2,93	1 421 500	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1963	0	16	0	77,00	1	1	2,92	1 429 000	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1964	0	17	0	78,00	1	1	2,91	1 436 600	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1965	0	18	0	79,00	1	1	2,90	1 446 200	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1966	0	19	0	80,00	1	1	2,90	1 454 100	8,69	24 090	413	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Sardinia	1967	0	20	0	81,00	1	1	2,89	1 461 600	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1968	0	21	0	82,00	1	1	2,88	1 467 300	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1969	0	22	0	83,00	1	1	2,86	1 471 400	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1970	0	23	0	84,00	1	1	2,85	1 475 100	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1971	0	24	0	85,00	1	1	2,84	1 476 800	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1972	0	25	0	84,00	1	1	2,82	1 476 255	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1973	0	26	0	83,00	1	1	2,83	1 491 560	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1974	0	27	0	82,00	1	1	2,84	1 507 780	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1975	0	28	0	81,00	1	1	2,85	1 523 592	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1976	0	29	0	80,00	1	1	2,86	1 537 441	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1977	0	30	0	79,00	1	1	2,87	1 550 498	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1978	0	31	0	78,00	1	1	2,88	1 562 149	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1979	0	32	0	77,00	1	1	2,89	1 572 549	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1980	0	33	0	76,00	1	1	2,90	1 581 274	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1981	0	34	0	75,00	1	1	2,89	1 588 960	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1982	0	35	0	75,20	1	1	2,90	1 594 445	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1983	0	36	0	75,40	1	1	2,91	1 602 055	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1984	0	37	0	75,60	1	1	2,92	1 607 388	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1985	0	38	0	75,80	1	1	2,94	1 614 771	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1986	0	39	0	76,00	1	1	2,95	1 620 692	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1987	0	40	0	76,20	1	1	2,95	1 625 328	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1988	0	41	0	76,40	1	1	2,96	1 630 187	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1989	0	42	0	76,60	1	1	2,97	1 634 759	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1990	0	43	0	76,80	1	1	2,97	1 637 940	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1991	0	44	0	77,00	1	1	2,98	1 644 286	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1992	0	45	0	77,00	1	1	2,99	1 647 998	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1993	0	46	0	77,00	1	1	2,99	1 649 490	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1994	0	47	0	77,00	1	1	2,99	1 650 700	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1995	0	48	0	71,78	1	1	2,99	1 651 101	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1996	0	49	0	70,73	1	1	2,99	1 650 388	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1997	0	50	0	71,98	1	1	2,98	1 649 041	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1998	0	51	0	72,11	1	1	2,98	1 646 354	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	1999	0	52	0	72,05	1	1	2,97	1 641 918	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2000	0	53	0	71,48	1	1	2,96	1 638 422	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2001	0	54	0	71,83	1	1	2,95	1 634 795	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2002	0	55	0	71,36	1	1	2,94	1 629 889	8,69	24 090	413	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Sardinia	2003	0	56	0	72,72	1	1	2,93	1 630 280	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2004	0	57	0	73,19	1	1	2,91	1 631 420	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2005	0	58	0	72,53	1	1	2,89	1 632 690	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2006	0	59	0	71,79	1	1	2,88	1 634 026	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2007	0	60	0	71,64	1	1	2,87	1 635 648	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2008	0	61	0	72,93	1	1	2,86	1 639 766	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2009	0	62	0	74,10	1	1	2,84	1 642 583	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2010	0	63	0	72,80	1	1	2,83	1 641 347	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2011	0	64	0	72,59	1	1	2,82	1 641 681	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2012	0	65	0	74,09	1	1	2,80	1 637 846	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2013	0	66	0	72,97	1	1	2,80	1 640 379	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2014	0	67	0	72,58	1	1	2,84	1 663 859	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2015	0	68	0	73,89	1	1	2,84	1 663 286	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2016	0	69	0	71,49	1	1	2,83	1 658 138	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2017	0	70	0	70,94	1	1	2,83	1 653 135	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2018	0	71	0	70,58	1	1	2,83	1 648 176	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2019	0	72	0	71,37	1	0	2,79	1 622 257	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Sardinia	2020	0	73	0	71,29	1	0	2,78	1 611 621	8,69	24 090	413	1	1
Scotland	1999	0	1	0	87,06	1	1	9,47	5 072 000	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2000	0	2	0	86,79	1	1	9,41	5 062 900	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2001	0	3	0	87,72	1	1	9,37	5 064 200	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2002	0	4	0	87,71	1	1	9,33	5 066 000	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2003	0	5	0	87,88	1	1	9,29	5 068 500	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2004	0	6	0	88,66	1	1	9,26	5 084 300	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2005	0	7	0	89,78	1	1	9,25	5 110 200	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2006	0	8	0	90,69	1	1	9,22	5 133 100	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2007	0	9	0	90,50	1	1	9,22	5 170 000	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2008	0	10	0	91,80	1	1	9,20	5 202 900	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2009	0	11	0	92,24	1	1	9,18	5 231 900	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2010	0	12	0	92,21	1	1	9,15	5 262 200	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2011	0	13	0	93,49	1	1	9,14	5 299 900	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2012	0	14	0	93,69	1	1	9,08	5 313 600	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2013	0	15	0	94,61	1	1	9,03	5 327 700	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2014	0	16	0	94,92	1	1	9,00	5 347 600	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2015	0	17	0	93,99	1	1	8,98	5 373 000	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2016	0	18	0	92,50	1	1	8,97	5 404 700	47,66	78 808	532	0	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Scotland	2017	0	19	0	92,93	1	1	8,95	5 424 800	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2018	0	20	0	92,05	1	1	8,92	5 438 100	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2019	0	21	0	91,70	1	1	8,91	5 463 300	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Scotland	2020	0	22	0	91,25	1	1	8,87	5 466 000	47,66	78 808	532	0	0
Sicily	1946	0	1	1	63,38	1	0	10,59	4 488 800	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1947	0	2	1	62,31	1	0	10,59	4 488 800	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1948	0	3	1	61,23	1	0	10,59	4 488 800	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1949	0	4	1	60,15	1	0	10,59	4 488 800	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1950	0	5	1	59,08	1	0	10,59	4 488 800	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1951	0	6	1	58,00	1	0	10,59	4 488 800	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1952	0	7	1	58,30	1	0	10,59	4 488 800	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1953	0	8	1	58,60	1	0	10,58	4 509 300	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1954	0	9	1	58,90	1	1	10,52	4 538 600	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1955	0	10	1	59,20	1	1	10,54	4 575 600	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1956	0	11	1	59,50	1	1	10,55	4 606 900	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1957	0	12	1	59,80	1	1	10,54	4 626 400	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1958	0	13	1	60,10	1	1	10,52	4 644 200	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1959	0	14	1	60,40	1	1	10,51	4 667 100	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1960	0	15	1	60,70	1	1	10,50	4 692 500	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1961	0	16	1	61,00	1	1	10,48	4 709 000	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1962	0	17	1	61,80	1	1	10,45	4 727 700	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1963	0	18	1	62,60	1	1	10,38	4 735 900	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1964	0	19	1	63,40	1	1	10,30	4 741 400	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1965	0	20	1	64,20	1	1	10,22	4 751 600	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1966	0	21	1	65,00	1	1	10,13	4 753 500	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1967	0	22	1	65,80	1	1	10,04	4 754 000	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1968	0	23	1	66,60	1	1	9,96	4 752 400	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1969	0	24	1	67,40	1	1	9,86	4 742 500	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1970	0	25	1	68,20	1	1	9,77	4 733 400	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1971	0	26	1	69,00	1	1	9,67	4 715 500	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1972	0	27	1	69,30	1	1	9,54	4 685 689	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1973	0	28	1	69,60	1	1	9,54	4 718 654	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1974	0	29	1	69,90	1	1	9,53	4 749 628	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1975	0	30	1	70,20	1	1	9,54	4 783 904	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1976	0	31	1	70,50	1	1	9,54	4 810 799	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1977	0	32	1	70,80	1	1	9,54	4 836 845	9,33	25 708	428	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Sicily	1978	0	33	1	71,10	1	1	9,54	4 858 661	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1979	0	34	1	71,40	1	1	9,54	4 877 903	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1980	0	35	1	71,70	1	1	9,55	4 893 755	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1981	0	36	1	72,00	1	1	9,51	4 905 866	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1982	0	37	1	72,00	1	1	9,49	4 904 503	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1983	0	38	1	72,00	1	1	9,51	4 915 529	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1984	0	39	1	72,00	1	1	9,53	4 927 613	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1985	0	40	1	72,00	1	1	9,56	4 941 107	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1986	0	41	1	72,00	1	1	9,57	4 948 945	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1987	0	42	1	72,00	1	1	9,59	4 956 908	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1988	0	43	1	72,00	1	1	9,60	4 960 896	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1989	0	44	1	72,00	1	1	9,60	4 965 694	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1990	0	45	1	72,00	1	1	9,60	4 969 910	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1991	0	46	1	72,00	1	1	9,59	4 970 805	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1992	0	47	1	71,40	1	1	9,58	4 966 799	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1993	0	48	1	70,80	1	1	9,60	4 980 869	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1994	0	49	1	70,20	1	1	9,63	4 994 581	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1995	0	50	1	66,33	1	1	9,65	5 004 670	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1996	0	51	1	66,32	1	1	9,66	5 008 964	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1997	0	52	1	65,75	1	1	9,65	5 009 770	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1998	0	53	1	65,97	1	1	9,65	5 010 389	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	1999	0	54	1	64,79	1	1	9,63	5 003 447	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2000	0	55	1	64,98	1	1	9,61	4 993 111	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2001	0	56	1	65,40	1	1	9,57	4 978 068	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2002	0	57	1	65,07	1	1	9,54	4 966 723	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2003	0	58	1	65,16	1	1	9,49	4 959 528	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2004	0	59	1	64,81	1	1	9,43	4 965 633	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2005	0	60	1	65,85	1	1	9,36	4 968 623	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2006	0	61	0	65,95	1	1	9,31	4 969 155	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2007	0	62	0	65,04	1	1	9,27	4 967 981	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2008	0	63	0	64,95	1	1	9,22	4 981 526	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2009	0	64	0	65,84	1	1	9,17	4 990 588	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2010	0	65	0	64,62	1	1	9,14	4 997 429	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2011	0	66	0	63,30	1	1	9,11	5 005 657	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2012	0	67	0	63,95	1	1	9,07	4 999 854	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2013	0	68	0	63,73	1	1	9,05	4 999 932	9,33	25 708	428	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Sicily	2014	0	69	0	62,38	1	1	9,22	5 094 937	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2015	0	70	0	62,30	1	1	9,22	5 092 080	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2016	0	71	0	61,79	1	1	9,21	5 074 261	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2017	0	72	0	61,40	1	1	9,19	5 056 641	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2018	0	73	0	60,52	1	1	9,15	5 026 989	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2019	0	74	0	60,45	1	1	8,94	4 908 548	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sicily	2020	0	75	0	61,14	1	1	8,90	4 875 290	9,33	25 708	428	1	1
Sint Maarten	2010	0	1	2	70,12	0	0	0,20	33 034	0,08	34	6 895	1	0
Sint Maarten	2011	0	2	2	69,00	0	0	0,20	33 309	0,08	34	6 895	1	0
Sint Maarten	2012	0	3	2	72,84	0	0	0,21	35 139	0,08	34	6 895	1	0
Sint Maarten	2013	0	4	2	74,84	0	0	0,22	37 697	0,08	34	6 895	1	0
Sint Maarten	2014	0	5	2	78,57	0	0	0,23	39 100	0,08	34	6 895	1	0
Sint Maarten	2015	0	6	2	75,71	0	0	0,24	40 205	0,08	34	6 895	1	0
Sint Maarten	2016	0	7	2	72,63	0	0	0,24	41 346	0,08	34	6 895	1	0
Sint Maarten	2017	0	8	2	65,07	0	0	0,24	41 883	0,08	34	6 895	1	0
Sint Maarten	2018	0	9	2	55,94	0	0	0,24	42 246	0,08	34	6 895	1	0
Sint Maarten	2019	0	10	2	58,95	0	0	0,25	42 980	0,08	34	6 895	1	0
Sint Maarten	2020	0	11	2	50,68	0	0	0,25	43 621	0,08	34	6 895	1	0
South Africa	1910	0	1	2	40,51	1	1	14,16	5 973 394	503,29	1 223 000	9 674	1	1
South Africa	1911	0	2	2	39,55	1	1	14,16	5 973 394	503,29	1 223 000	9 674	1	1
South Africa	1912	0	3	2	39,00	1	1	14,32	6 068 913	503,29	1 223 000	9 674	1	1
South Africa	1913	0	4	2	37,63	1	1	14,48	6 164 431	503,29	1 223 000	9 674	1	1
South Africa	1914	0	5	2	37,87	1	1	14,57	6 259 950	503,29	1 223 000	9 674	1	1
South Africa	1915	0	6	2	35,51	1	1	15,37	6 355 468	503,29	1 223 000	9 674	1	1
South Africa	1916	0	7	2	35,12	1	1	15,91	6 450 987	503,29	1 223 000	9 674	1	1
South Africa	1917	0	8	1	35,14	1	1	16,46	6 546 506	503,29	1 223 000	9 674	1	1
South Africa	1918	0	9	1	35,15	1	1	16,78	6 642 024	503,29	1 223 000	9 674	1	1
South Africa	1919	0	10	1	40,35	1	1	15,69	6 737 543	503,29	1 223 000	9 674	1	1
South Africa	1920	1	11	1	44,22	1	1	15,66	6 833 061	503,29	1 223 000	9 674	1	1
South Sudan	1972	0	1	2	50,91	1	0	28,74	3 464 715	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	1973	0	2	2	50,91	1	0	28,41	3 542 465	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	1974	0	3	2	50,91	1	0	28,03	3 629 608	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	1975	0	4	2	50,91	1	0	27,55	3 718 279	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	1976	0	5	2	50,90	1	0	27,08	3 808 615	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	1977	0	6	2	50,90	1	0	26,60	3 901 044	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	1978	0	7	2	50,90	1	1	26,11	3 995 911	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
South Sudan	1979	0	8	2	50,89	1	1	25,62	4 092 792	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	1980	0	9	2	50,89	1	1	25,14	4 192 012	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	1981	0	10	2	50,89	1	1	24,67	4 293 866	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	1982	0	11	2	50,89	1	1	24,26	4 398 297	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	1983	0	12	2	50,87	1	1	24,03	4 502 541	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	2005	0	1	2	38,77	0	1	25,94	7 662 654	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	2006	0	2	2	38,77	0	1	26,47	8 029 517	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	2007	0	3	2	38,77	0	1	26,99	8 417 823	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	2008	0	4	2	38,79	0	1	27,52	8 823 888	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	2009	0	5	2	38,28	0	1	28,01	9 229 227	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	2010	0	6	2	34,22	0	1	28,79	9 714 419	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
South Sudan	2011	1	7	2	34,57	0	1	29,76	10 243 050	34,61	644 300	1 186	0	1
Suriname	1954	0	1	0	27,13	1	0	2,07	220 148	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1955	0	2	0	27,13	1	0	2,11	227 145	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1956	0	3	0	27,13	1	0	2,15	234 523	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1957	0	4	0	27,13	1	0	2,19	242 316	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1958	0	5	1	27,13	1	0	2,24	250 559	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1959	0	6	1	27,13	1	0	2,29	259 255	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1960	0	7	1	27,14	1	0	2,34	268 396	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1961	0	8	1	27,74	1	0	2,39	277 969	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1962	0	9	1	26,38	1	0	2,44	288 291	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1963	0	10	1	26,25	1	0	2,50	299 332	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1964	0	11	1	25,24	1	0	2,56	310 288	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1965	0	12	1	25,49	1	1	2,62	321 069	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1966	0	13	1	28,97	1	1	2,67	332 142	349,68	142 822	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1967	0	14	1	30,15	1	1	2,73	343 620	399,73	163 265	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1968	0	15	1	29,78	1	1	2,79	355 468	399,73	163 265	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1969	0	16	1	28,60	1	1	2,85	367 618	399,73	163 265	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1970	0	17	1	27,11	1	1	2,91	379 918	399,73	163 265	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1971	0	18	1	26,49	1	1	2,97	392 026	399,73	163 265	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1972	0	19	1	25,33	1	1	2,98	397 529	399,73	163 265	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1973	0	20	1	23,86	1	1	2,95	396 331	399,73	163 265	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1974	0	21	1	23,45	1	1	2,91	394 519	399,73	163 265	7 450	1	0
Suriname	1975	1	22	1	24,47	1	1	2,87	392 137	399,73	163 265	7 450	1	0
South Tyrol	1972	0	1	1	132,90	1	0	0,78	414 546	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1973	0	2	1	132,90	1	0	0,78	417 813	2,52	7 400	519	0	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
South Tyrol	1974	0	3	1	132,90	1	0	0,78	420 554	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1975	0	4	1	132,90	1	0	0,78	423 142	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1976	0	5	1	132,90	1	0	0,78	425 009	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1977	0	6	1	132,90	1	0	0,77	426 366	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1978	0	7	1	132,90	1	0	0,77	427 400	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1979	0	8	1	132,90	1	0	0,77	428 376	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1980	0	9	1	132,90	1	0	0,77	429 050	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1981	0	10	1	132,90	1	0	0,77	429 748	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1982	0	11	1	132,90	1	0	0,77	430 411	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1983	0	12	1	132,90	1	0	0,77	431 216	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1984	0	13	1	131,48	1	0	0,77	431 667	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1985	0	14	1	101,13	1	0	0,77	432 237	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1986	0	15	1	103,75	1	0	0,77	432 880	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1987	0	16	1	101,89	1	0	0,77	433 566	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1988	0	17	1	101,98	1	0	0,77	434 499	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1989	0	18	1	103,66	1	0	0,77	435 885	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1990	0	19	1	104,92	1	0	0,78	437 426	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1991	0	20	1	104,44	1	0	0,78	438 916	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1992	0	21	1	102,04	1	0	0,78	440 638	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1993	0	22	1	109,88	1	0	0,78	442 456	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1994	0	23	1	110,15	1	0	0,79	444 335	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1995	0	24	1	148,23	1	0	0,79	446 202	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1996	0	25	1	149,23	1	0	0,79	448 374	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1997	0	26	1	142,79	1	0	0,80	450 681	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1998	0	27	1	146,68	1	0	0,80	453 548	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	1999	0	28	1	141,90	1	0	0,81	455 856	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2000	0	29	1	142,80	1	0	0,81	458 551	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2001	0	30	1	139,67	1	0	0,82	461 101	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2002	0	31	1	136,08	1	0	0,82	462 827	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2003	0	32	1	136,74	1	0	0,82	466 685	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2004	0	33	1	138,84	1	0	0,82	470 116	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2005	0	34	1	137,02	1	0	0,82	474 568	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2006	0	35	1	138,63	1	0	0,83	479 354	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2007	0	36	1	138,70	1	0	0,83	484 280	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2008	0	37	1	140,03	1	0	0,84	490 035	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2009	0	38	1	145,31	1	0	0,84	494 559	2,52	7 400	519	0	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
South Tyrol	2010	0	39	1	146,59	1	0	0,84	498 315	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2011	0	40	1	148,72	1	0	0,84	501 815	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2012	0	41	1	155,88	1	0	0,85	504 708	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2013	0	42	1	157,72	1	0	0,85	509 626	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2014	0	43	1	157,97	1	0	0,86	515 714	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2015	0	44	1	158,57	1	0	0,87	518 518	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2016	0	45	1	156,79	1	0	0,87	520 891	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2017	0	46	1	155,89	1	0	0,88	524 256	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2018	0	47	1	158,42	1	0	0,89	527 750	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2019	0	48	1	158,76	1	0	0,89	530 313	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
South Tyrol	2020	0	49	1	157,58	1	0	0,90	532 644	2,52	7 400	519	0	1
Trentino	1972	0	1	0	135,04	1	0	0,80	428 172	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1973	0	2	0	135,04	1	0	0,80	430 681	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1974	0	3	0	135,04	1	0	0,80	432 949	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1975	0	4	0	135,04	1	0	0,80	435 370	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1976	0	5	0	135,04	1	0	0,80	437 291	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1977	0	6	0	135,04	1	0	0,80	438 600	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1978	0	7	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	439 720	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1979	0	8	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	440 795	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1980	0	9	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	441 561	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1981	0	10	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	442 296	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1982	0	11	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	442 708	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1983	0	12	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	442 523	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1984	0	13	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	442 672	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1985	0	14	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	442 821	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1986	0	15	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	442 925	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1987	0	16	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	443 362	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1988	0	17	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	443 697	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1989	0	18	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	444 669	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1990	0	19	0	135,04	1	0	0,79	445 997	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1991	0	20	0	135,04	1	0	0,80	448 280	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1992	0	21	0	135,04	1	0	0,80	449 811	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1993	0	22	0	135,04	1	0	0,80	451 606	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1994	0	23	0	135,04	1	0	0,80	453 865	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1995	0	24	0	135,04	1	0	0,81	455 987	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1996	0	25	0	135,91	1	0	0,81	458 161	2,10	6 207	477	0	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Trentino	1997	0	26	0	133,08	1	0	0,82	460 985	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1998	0	27	0	133,59	1	0	0,82	463 900	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	1999	0	28	0	136,27	1	0	0,83	467 029	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2000	0	29	0	135,11	1	0	0,83	470 507	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2001	0	30	0	133,63	1	0	0,84	474 310	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2002	0	31	0	131,25	1	0	0,84	476 792	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2003	0	32	0	130,64	1	0	0,85	481 341	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2004	0	33	0	128,97	1	0	0,85	487 390	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2005	0	34	0	127,98	1	0	0,86	493 907	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2006	0	35	0	126,62	1	0	0,86	498 537	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2007	0	36	0	126,92	1	0	0,87	503 147	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2008	0	37	0	126,06	1	0	0,87	509 109	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2009	0	38	0	128,94	1	0	0,87	514 881	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2010	0	39	0	129,40	1	0	0,88	518 796	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2011	0	40	0	128,89	1	0	0,88	522 486	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2012	0	41	0	131,22	1	0	0,88	524 877	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2013	0	42	0	133,61	1	0	0,89	530 308	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2014	0	43	0	133,54	1	0	0,90	536 237	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2015	0	44	0	130,89	1	0	0,90	537 416	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2016	0	45	0	130,73	1	0	0,90	538 223	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2017	0	46	0	129,68	1	0	0,90	538 604	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2018	0	47	0	131,87	1	0	0,91	539 898	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2019	0	48	0	132,47	1	0	0,92	543 721	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Trentino	2020	0	49	0	134,06	1	0	0,92	545 425	2,10	6 207	477	0	0
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1976	0	1	0	30,73	0	0	0,01	6 668	0,20	500	6 856	1	0
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1977	0	2	0	32,13	0	0	0,01	6 885	0,20	500	6 856	1	0
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1978	0	3	0	33,04	0	0	0,01	7 110	0,20	500	6 856	1	0
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1979	0	4	0	34,19	0	0	0,01	7 332	0,20	500	6 856	1	0
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1980	0	5	0	37,30	0	0	0,01	7 598	0,20	500	6 856	1	0
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1981	0	6	0	39,78	0	0	0,01	7 957	0,20	500	6 856	1	0
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1982	0	7	0	41,13	0	0	0,01	8 355	0,20	500	6 856	1	0
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1983	0	8	0	41,69	0	0	0,02	8 758	0,20	500	6 856	1	0
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1984	0	9	0	43,18	0	0	0,02	9 166	0,20	500	6 856	1	0
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1985	0	10	0	43,97	0	0	0,02	9 577	0,20	500	6 856	1	0
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1986	0	11	0	45,28	0	0	0,02	9 986	0,20	500	6 856	1	0
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1988	0	1	0	46,08	0	0	0,02	10 816	0,20	500	6 856	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1989	0	2	0	48,18	0	0	0,02	11 227	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1990	0	3	0	50,78	0	0	0,02	11 709	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1991	0	4	0	53,93	0	0	0,02	12 329	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1992	0	5	0	56,03	0	0	0,02	13 014	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1993	0	6	0	58,24	0	0	0,02	13 704	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1994	0	7	0	60,46	0	0	0,02	14 402	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1995	0	8	0	61,60	0	0	0,03	15 101	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1996	0	9	0	62,99	0	0	0,03	15 806	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1997	0	10	0	61,92	0	0	0,03	16 515	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1998	0	11	0	63,80	0	0	0,03	17 239	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	1999	0	12	0	64,75	0	0	0,03	17 984	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2000	0	13	0	62,70	0	0	0,03	18 744	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2001	0	14	0	62,90	0	0	0,03	19 578	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2002	0	15	0	59,68	0	0	0,03	20 598	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2003	0	16	0	60,24	0	0	0,04	21 739	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2004	0	17	0	62,64	0	0	0,04	22 869	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2005	0	18	0	66,89	0	0	0,04	23 995	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2006	0	19	0	74,06	0	0	0,04	25 128	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2007	0	20	0	73,48	0	0	0,04	26 268	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2008	0	21	0	76,98	0	0	0,04	27 422	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2009	0	22	0	62,80	0	0	0,05	28 581	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2012	0	1	0	56,18	0	0	0,05	32 081	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2013	0	2	0	53,69	0	0	0,05	33 594	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2014	0	3	0	54,70	0	0	0,05	34 985	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2015	0	4	0	57,44	0	0	0,06	36 538	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2016	0	5	0	58,12	0	0	0,06	38 246	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2017	0	6	0	53,33	0	0	0,06	39 844	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2018	0	7	0	53,64	0	0	0,06	41 487	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2019	0	8	0	53,80	0	0	0,06	43 080	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Turks and Caicos Isl.	2020	0	9	0	42,94	0	0	0,07	44 276	0,20	500	6 856	1	1
Wales	1999	0	1	0	71,39	1	1	5,20	2 900 600	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2000	0	2	0	71,27	1	1	5,20	2 906 900	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2001	0	3	0	71,38	1	1	5,18	2 910 200	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2002	0	4	0	71,17	1	1	5,18	2 922 900	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2003	0	5	0	71,46	1	1	5,18	2 937 700	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2004	0	6	0	71,61	1	1	5,18	2 957 400	9,30	20 780	211	0	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Wales	2005	0	7	0	70,93	1	1	5,17	2 969 300	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2006	0	8	0	71,73	1	1	5,16	2 985 700	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2007	0	9	0	70,64	1	1	5,16	3 006 300	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2008	0	10	0	68,76	1	1	5,15	3 025 900	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2009	0	11	0	69,42	1	1	5,13	3 038 900	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2010	0	12	0	70,38	1	1	5,11	3 050 000	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2011	0	13	0	72,44	1	1	5,09	3 063 800	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2012	0	14	0	72,59	1	1	5,06	3 074 100	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2013	0	15	0	72,81	1	1	5,03	3 082 400	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2014	0	16	0	72,08	1	1	5,01	3 092 000	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2015	0	17	0	72,54	1	1	4,99	3 099 100	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2016	0	18	0	73,18	1	1	4,98	3 113 200	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2017	0	19	0	72,91	1	1	4,97	3 125 200	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2018	0	20	0	73,70	1	1	4,96	3 138 600	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2019	0	21	0	74,10	1	1	4,96	3 152 900	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Wales	2020	0	22	0	73,65	1	1	4,96	3 170 000	9,30	20 780	211	0	0
Vojvodina	1974	0	1	0	128,89	0	1	30,51	1 977 227	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1975	0	2	0	128,32	0	1	30,31	1 985 448	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1976	0	3	0	127,75	0	1	30,10	1 993 673	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1977	0	4	0	127,18	0	1	29,88	2 001 894	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1978	0	5	0	126,62	0	1	29,66	2 010 116	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1979	0	6	0	126,06	0	1	29,46	2 018 338	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1980	0	7	0	125,49	0	1	29,29	2 026 560	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1981	0	8	0	125,95	0	1	29,13	2 034 782	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1982	0	9	0	126,41	0	1	28,81	2 032 693	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1983	0	10	0	126,86	0	1	28,50	2 030 603	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1984	0	11	0	127,31	0	1	28,23	2 028 514	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1985	0	12	0	127,77	0	1	27,97	2 026 424	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1986	0	13	0	128,22	0	1	27,74	2 024 337	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1987	0	14	0	128,67	0	1	27,54	2 022 247	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1988	0	15	0	129,12	0	1	27,32	2 020 157	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1989	0	16	0	129,57	0	1	27,05	2 018 067	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	1990	0	17	0	129,57	0	1	26,69	2 015 978	32,17	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	2009	0	1	0	95,06	0	1	34,41	1 968 356	38,43	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	2010	0	2	0	95,06	0	1	34,37	1 957 585	38,43	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	2011	0	3	0	95,06	0	1	33,98	1 932 945	38,43	21 506	72	0	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Vojvodina	2012	0	4	0	101,81	0	1	33,90	1 922 017	38,43	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	2013	0	5	0	102,03	0	1	33,81	1 912 095	38,43	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	2014	0	6	0	102,74	0	1	33,71	1 901 935	38,43	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	2015	0	7	0	99,67	0	1	33,61	1 891 701	38,43	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	2016	0	8	0	100,16	0	1	33,52	1 881 357	38,43	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	2017	0	9	0	99,56	0	1	33,46	1 871 515	38,43	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	2018	0	10	0	97,11	0	1	33,41	1 861 863	38,43	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	2019	0	11	0	95,77	0	1	33,38	1 852 093	38,43	21 506	72	0	1
Vojvodina	2020	0	12	0	95,86	0	1	33,37	1 840 852	38,43	21 506	72	0	1
Zanzibar	1979	0	1	0	82,67	1	0	2,71	492 568	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1980	0	2	0	82,67	1	0	2,71	509 026	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1981	0	3	0	82,67	1	0	2,71	525 483	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1982	0	4	0	82,67	1	0	2,72	541 941	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1983	0	5	0	82,67	1	0	2,71	558 398	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1984	0	6	0	82,67	1	0	2,70	574 855	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1985	0	7	0	82,67	1	0	2,69	591 313	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1986	0	8	0	82,67	1	0	2,68	607 770	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1987	0	9	0	82,67	1	0	2,66	624 228	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1988	0	10	0	82,67	1	0	2,65	640 685	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1989	0	11	0	82,67	1	0	2,68	665 252	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1990	0	12	0	82,57	1	0	2,70	689 819	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1991	0	13	0	82,22	1	0	2,73	714 386	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1992	0	14	0	84,32	1	0	2,75	738 954	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1993	0	15	0	86,27	1	0	2,76	763 521	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1994	0	16	0	88,41	1	0	2,74	788 088	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1995	0	17	0	88,55	1	0	2,73	812 655	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1996	0	18	0	97,51	1	0	2,76	837 222	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1997	0	19	0	131,32	1	0	2,79	861 789	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1998	0	20	0	96,36	1	0	2,79	886 356	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	1999	0	21	1	98,72	1	0	2,80	910 924	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2000	0	22	1	97,29	1	0	2,79	935 491	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2001	0	23	1	100,02	1	0	2,79	960 058	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2002	0	24	1	99,95	1	0	2,78	984 625	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2003	0	25	1	98,78	1	0	2,80	1 016 519	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2004	0	26	1	97,38	1	0	2,81	1 048 414	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2005	0	27	1	94,85	1	0	2,82	1 080 308	0,26	2 460	383	1	1

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Zanzibar	2006	0	28	1	92,54	1	0	2,82	1 112 203	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2007	0	29	1	93,56	1	0	2,82	1 144 097	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2008	0	30	1	92,08	1	0	2,82	1 175 991	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2009	0	31	1	92,53	1	0	2,83	1 207 886	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2010	0	32	1	90,40	1	0	2,83	1 239 780	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2011	0	33	1	90,41	1	0	2,82	1 271 675	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2012	0	34	1	91,41	1	0	2,80	1 303 569	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2013	0	35	1	88,91	1	0	2,84	1 362 189	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2014	0	36	1	88,43	1	0	2,88	1 420 810	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2015	0	37	1	88,50	1	0	2,90	1 479 430	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2016	0	38	1	87,94	1	0	2,91	1 538 051	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2017	0	39	1	88,94	1	0	2,92	1 596 671	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2018	0	40	1	89,30	1	0	2,93	1 655 291	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2019	0	41	1	89,25	1	0	2,95	1 713 912	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Zanzibar	2020	0	42	1	87,12	1	0	2,96	1 772 532	0,26	2 460	383	1	1
Åland Isl.	1920	0	1	1	103,00	0	0	0,81	26 911	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1921	0	2	1	102,50	0	0	0,80	26 957	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1922	0	3	1	102,00	0	0	0,79	27 004	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1923	0	4	1	101,50	0	0	0,79	27 050	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1924	0	5	1	101,00	0	0	0,78	27 097	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1925	0	6	1	100,50	0	0	0,78	27 143	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1926	0	7	1	100,00	0	0	0,77	27 189	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1927	0	8	1	99,50	0	0	0,77	27 236	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1928	0	9	1	99,00	0	0	0,76	27 282	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1929	0	10	1	98,50	0	0	0,76	27 329	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1930	0	11	1	98,00	0	0	0,75	27 375	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1931	0	12	1	100,60	0	0	0,75	27 405	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1932	0	13	1	103,20	0	0	0,74	27 435	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1933	0	14	1	105,80	0	0	0,74	27 465	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1934	0	15	1	108,40	0	0	0,74	27 495	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1935	0	16	1	111,00	0	0	0,73	27 526	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1936	0	17	1	113,60	0	0	0,73	27 556	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1937	0	18	1	116,20	0	0	0,73	27 586	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1938	0	19	1	118,80	0	0	0,72	27 616	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1939	0	20	1	121,40	0	0	0,72	27 646	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1940	0	21	1	124,00	0	0	0,72	27 676	0,42	1 583	277	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Åland Isl.	1941	0	22	1	120,80	0	0	0,70	27 073	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1942	0	23	1	117,60	0	0	0,68	26 471	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1943	0	24	1	114,40	0	0	0,66	25 868	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1944	0	25	1	111,20	0	0	0,64	25 266	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1945	0	26	1	108,00	0	0	0,63	24 663	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1946	0	27	1	104,80	0	0	0,61	24 060	0,42	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1947	0	28	1	101,60	0	0	0,59	23 458	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1948	0	29	1	98,40	0	0	0,57	22 855	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1949	0	30	1	95,20	0	0	0,56	22 253	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1950	0	31	1	92,00	0	0	0,55	21 650	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1951	0	32	1	91,30	0	0	0,54	21 583	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1952	0	33	1	90,60	0	0	0,53	21 516	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1953	0	34	1	89,90	0	0	0,52	21 449	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1954	0	35	1	89,20	0	0	0,52	21 382	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1955	0	36	1	88,50	0	0	0,51	21 316	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1956	0	37	1	87,80	0	0	0,50	21 249	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1957	0	38	1	87,10	0	0	0,49	21 182	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1958	0	39	1	86,40	0	0	0,49	21 115	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1959	0	40	1	85,70	0	0	0,48	21 048	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1960	0	41	1	85,00	0	0	0,48	20 981	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1961	0	42	1	83,20	0	0	0,47	20 950	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1962	0	43	1	81,40	0	0	0,47	20 918	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1963	0	44	1	79,60	0	0	0,47	20 887	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1964	0	45	1	77,80	0	0	0,46	20 855	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1965	0	46	1	76,00	0	0	0,46	20 824	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1966	0	47	1	74,20	0	0	0,46	20 792	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1967	0	48	1	72,40	0	0	0,45	20 761	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1968	0	49	1	70,60	0	0	0,45	20 729	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1969	0	50	1	68,80	0	0	0,45	20 698	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1970	0	51	1	67,00	0	0	0,45	20 666	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1971	0	52	1	74,40	0	0	0,46	20 873	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1972	0	53	1	81,80	0	0	0,46	21 374	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1973	0	54	1	89,20	0	0	0,47	21 867	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1974	0	55	1	96,60	0	0	0,48	22 142	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1975	0	56	1	104,00	0	0	0,48	22 288	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1976	0	57	1	111,40	0	0	0,48	22 413	0,47	1 583	277	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Åland Isl.	1977	0	58	1	118,80	0	0	0,48	22 452	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1978	0	59	1	126,20	0	0	0,48	22 542	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1979	0	60	1	133,60	0	0	0,48	22 608	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1980	0	61	1	141,00	0	0	0,48	22 783	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1981	0	62	1	139,90	0	0	0,48	22 984	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1982	0	63	1	138,80	0	0	0,49	23 251	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1983	0	64	1	137,70	0	0	0,49	23 435	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1984	0	65	1	136,60	0	0	0,49	23 595	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1985	0	66	1	135,50	0	0	0,48	23 591	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1986	0	67	1	134,40	0	0	0,48	23 640	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1987	0	68	1	133,30	0	0	0,48	23 761	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1988	0	69	1	132,20	0	0	0,49	24 045	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1989	0	70	1	131,10	0	0	0,49	24 231	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1990	0	71	1	130,00	0	0	0,50	24 604	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1991	0	72	1	129,40	0	0	0,50	24 847	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1992	0	73	1	128,80	0	0	0,50	24 993	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1993	0	74	1	128,20	0	0	0,50	25 102	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1994	0	75	1	127,60	0	0	0,50	25 158	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1995	0	76	1	126,06	0	0	0,50	25 202	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1996	0	77	1	127,49	0	0	0,50	25 257	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1997	0	78	1	134,04	0	0	0,50	25 392	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1998	0	79	1	128,43	0	0	0,50	25 625	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	1999	0	80	1	126,85	0	0	0,50	25 706	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2000	0	81	1	130,94	0	0	0,50	25 776	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2001	0	82	1	124,35	0	0	0,50	26 008	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2002	0	83	1	125,64	0	0	0,51	26 257	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2003	0	84	1	124,69	0	0	0,51	26 347	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2004	0	85	1	123,92	0	0	0,51	26 530	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2005	0	86	1	126,72	0	0	0,51	26 766	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2006	0	87	1	125,91	0	0	0,51	26 923	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2007	0	88	1	124,08	0	0	0,52	27 153	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2008	0	89	1	107,07	0	0	0,52	27 456	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2009	0	90	1	121,95	0	0	0,52	27 734	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2010	0	91	1	123,05	0	0	0,53	28 007	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2011	0	92	1	114,43	0	0	0,53	28 355	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2012	0	93	1	108,94	0	0	0,53	28 502	0,47	1 583	277	1	0

AT	Y	AFS	YAH	ED	REP	NFMR	FMR	RPS	PS	RLA	LA	GD	GC	PASS
Åland Isl.	2013	0	94	1	113,38	0	0	0,53	28 666	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2014	0	95	1	112,75	0	0	0,53	28 916	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2015	0	96	1	115,46	0	0	0,53	28 983	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2016	0	97	1	112,26	0	0	0,54	29 214	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2017	0	98	1	109,57	0	0	0,54	29 489	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2018	0	99	1	99,40	0	0	0,54	29 789	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2019	0	100	1	101,47	0	0	0,54	29 884	0,47	1 583	277	1	0
Åland Isl.	2020	0	101	1	85,76	0	0	0,55	30 129	0,47	1 583	277	1	0

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