

Societas Scientiarum Fennica

A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND
PSYCHOLOGY IN FINLAND,
1809-1917

by

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PREFACE

The first plans for this book were made by Academician Georg Henrik von Wright, chairman of the editorial board of the History of Learning and Science in Finland 1828-1918, soon after the announcement of the series in 1963. In his notes he divided the history of philosophy in the Grand Duchy of Finland into three periods: before Hegel, Hegel (including Snellman), and post-Snellman. He also collected bibliographical data about Wilhelm Bolin, Edward Westermarck, and contributions in the journal *Finsk Tidskrift*. However, in 1975 he gave up his own plan and assigned the task to Juha Manninen, who had in the previous year written his Master's thesis on J. V. Snellman's philosophy. Von Wright's decision was no doubt based on his realization that there were only a few scholarly studies in the history of Finnish philosophy during the relevant period. Indeed, it was a prerogative of Juha Manninen, as professor of History of Science and Ideas at the University of Oulu in 1976-2009, to stimulate and organize such studies with his colleagues and students. As the extensive bibliography of this volume shows, quite a lot of important work has been accomplished in this sector during the last forty years.

The project was restarted in 2013 with a new team of four authors. Ilkka Niiniluoto, who as professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki had studied Eino Kaila's thinking, had worked together with Juha Manninen in several bibliographical and documentary projects. Juhani Ihanus and Marja Jalava had written their doctoral theses at the University of Helsinki on central figures in the history of philosophy in Finland: Ihanus on Edward Westermarck in the discipline of Psychology, Jalava on Rolf Lagerborg in the discipline of Finnish and Scandinavian History. The list of contents was composed together, and psychology (which was still included in theoretical philosophy in the 19th century) was added to the title. We have included surveys of the background of philosophy and academic life in Finland before 1828, and some of the directions of philosophy and psychology after 1918, but otherwise concentrated on the key persons in the relevant period in their

historical context. Juha Manninen is responsible for chapter 2.3 (Tengström), chapters 2.5 and 2.6 (Snellman), and Chapter 2.8 (Bolin, written jointly with late Georg Gimpl). Juhani Ihanus has written chapter 3.1 (early psychology), part of chapter 3.2 (Rein's psychology), chapter 3.3 (Neiglick's and Grotenfelt's psychology), chapter 3.5 (Westermarck), and chapter 3.10 (new trends in psychology). Marja Jalava has written chapter 2.2 (romanticism in Turku), main part of chapter 2.7 (Snellman), chapter 3.4 (philosophy of history and Grotenfelt), chapter 3.6 (Lagerborg), and chapter 3.9 (debates on Mach). The rest of the work is due to Ilkka Niiniluoto, including editing the texts and the bibliography. We are also grateful to Ph.D. Alisa Manninen for her skillful translation of chapters 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8.

This volume is the last in the series, so that the history of learning and science in the autonomous Finland is now complete. We thank our colleagues for their co-operation during many years, the Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters for its support, and professor Kalevi Rikkinen (the new chairperson of the editorial board of the series) for his patience.

Helsinki, June 2021

Juha Manninen, Juhani Ihanus, Marja Jalava, Ilkka Niiniluoto

PART ONE

AN OUTLINE OF FINNISH PHILOSOPHY BEFORE 1809

Philosophy is originally a product of Greek higher culture which has been practiced in Finland mainly as an academic discipline. The first Finnish university was founded in Turku in 1640, when Finland was a part of the Swedish kingdom. In the Royal Academy of Turku, philosophy was accorded an important status with the establishment of two chairs: Theoretical Philosophy, comprising logic and metaphysics, and Practical Philosophy, comprising ethics and politics. Philosophy has ever since played a significant part in the education and cultural life of Finland, even though for a long time the Finnish philosophers were mainly receptive of the existing international fashions and traditions without strong original contributions of their own.

In 1809 Russia took over Finland from Sweden, and the Turku period ended when the University moved to Helsinki in 1828. Soon thereafter Finnish philosophers were able to make some important contributions to international discussions. Philosophy reached a high peak in the nationalist movement of the mid-nineteenth century and again after 1917 within the esteemed academic life of the independent republic of Finland.¹

¹ For surveys of Finnish philosophy from its prehistory to the present time, see Niiniluoto (2000, 2003, 2006). See also Ketonen (1961), Hintikka (1968), Knuuttila, Manninen, and Niiniluoto (1979), Pitkäranta (2004), and Häntsch (2006). For surveys of Scandinavian philosophy, see Føllesdal (1997, 1998).

1.1. Prehistory

According to a once popular theory, now discarded by more recent research, the Finns started their journey from the Volga river and moved from the south-east to the present area of Finland around the time of Christ's birth, bringing with them their own peculiar language. The first written mention of people living in this Northern territory, allegedly in a miserable condition, is by the Roman historian Tacitus in 98 CE.

Today it is known that, immediately after the Ice Age started to come to the end about 8.000 BCE, there were small groups of hunters and fishers following the receding ice-rim. It is possible that they already spoke the proto-Finno-Ugric language (which belongs to the Uralic language family, not to the Indo-European family). Several invasions from the south and the south-east were followed in the next millenniums – most of the genes of the present population are known to be European.

The Iron Age and agriculture reached Finland in approximately 500 BCE, but it took a long time to establish stable land-cultivation in Western Finland starting from its south-west corner, originally called Suomi in the native tongue. The Finnish epic folklore originates from this period. It continued to exist as an oral tradition, carried on by seers and run-singers especially in Karelia, until it was collected, edited, and published by Elias Lönnrot in the *Kalevala* in 1835 and 1849.

The ancient animistic religion of the Finns included various kinds of nature spirits, patron divinities, trolls, and brownies. The Sámi population, which adopted a Finno-Ugric language but retreated northward to Lapland, had a strong tradition of shamanism, incorporating such elements as witch drums and the like. The old Finnish poems give a rich mythological account of the origin of the world, stars, forests, fire, and agriculture – indicating also a place, Tuonela, as the realm of the dead.

Väinämöinen, the great hero of the *Kalevala*, is a shamanistic figure, but without mystical or transcendent elements. The old man's lack of success with women is told with irony, but otherwise he is presented as a wise man or *tietäjä*. This word literally means "one who knows". It is derived from *tieto* ("knowledge"), which in turn is derived from *tie* ("way"). Thus, the early Finns had a pragmatic notion of knowledge as something which brings you where you want to go – resembling the Greek notion of method (*meta hodou* = along the way).

On the other hand, Väinämöinen is a sage whose "knowledge" is magical in the sense that it is based upon the power of words, songs, and spells: a person "knows" something if he or she can make it appear or disappear

by reciting a charm. A more practical and material kind of know-how or skill is represented by another hero of the *Kalevala*: the blacksmith Seppo Ilmarinen hammers for himself a wife out of bronze. He also constructs a wonderful mill, Sampo, which is able to produce money and wealth. Thus, Ilmarinen and his work can be seen as an expression of the new potential implicit in the emerging crafts and technologies of the Iron Age.

1.2. Christianity Arrives

The people living in the area of southern Finland were subordinated by the Swedish kings and the Roman Church in the mid-twelfth century. At the same time, Karelia in the east was influenced by the Orthodox faith. The eastern border of Finland was not only a battle-field between the Germanic Sweden and the Slavonic Russia, but also a northern cultural meeting point of the western and eastern Christian traditions.

The first Cathedral School was founded in Turku (or Åbo, as it is called in Swedish, or Aboe in Latin) in 1289, and probably its teaching included some elements of scholastic philosophy. The Finns made direct contacts with the Western tradition of philosophy in the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries, when the first students from the ultimate North went to study at the University of Paris.² The earliest documents are from the year 1313. Olavus Magni served as the Rector of the University of Paris in 1435-36. Later the medieval universities of Prague, Leipzig, Rostock, Erfurt, and Greifswald were important schools for Finnish students.³ The first university in Sweden was established in Uppsala in 1477.

When Finland, as a part of the Swedish kingdom, was converted to Lutheranism in 1527 during the reign of King Gustavus I Vasa, the new Protestant University of Wittenberg in Germany became the most significant academic center. Marcus Henrici Helsingius defended there his dissertation *De rationali hominis anima: metaphysicae propositiones* in 1593.

Mikael Agricola (c. 1510-57) studied in Wittenberg in 1536-39 under the supervision of Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon, and later became the Bishop of Turku at a time when the population of Finland was only about 300 000. Agricola was the first to publish literature in Finnish with his *Abc-kiria* (The Alphabet Book, 1543) and a translation of the

² See Nuorteva (1997, 2006).

³ For medieval sources of philosophy in Finland, see Lehtinen (1979).

New Testament (1548).

In a country where Swedish and Latin were the official languages of administration and education, Agricola's project in creating the written Finnish language followed the protestant ideology that all citizens should be able to read the Bible in their own language. The Church was also strongly committed to the fight against primitive manners and what it considered pagan superstition. The educational system was controlled by the Church until the nineteenth century, but progress was slow, especially in the countryside. This is witnessed vividly by the first Finnish novel, *Seitsemän veljestä* (Seven Brothers, 1870), where Aleksis Kivi (1834-72) describes the painful and comical steps of seven brothers of a peasant family in gaining literacy and adapting to civilized society.

The first well-known philosophical scholar of Finnish origin is Sigfridus Aronius Forsius (c. 1560-1624) who had a prolific career as a royal astronomer, astrologist, poet, and priest. His writings are well-informed about the Renaissance doctrines of natural philosophy: his Swedish textbook *Physica* (finished in 1611, published in 1952) combined Aristotelian, Paracelsistic, Stoic, Hermetic, and Platonic ideas. He used largely *Physiologia peripatetica* of Johannes Magirus as his source but modified it with influences from Paracelsus.⁴ Forsius had contacts with the University of Uppsala and the King's court in Stockholm, but in his time there was not yet any organized academic life in Finland.

1.3. The Academy of Turku

In the early seventeenth century, the King Gustavus II Adolphus participated in the long European war against the Catholics. The Swedish Empire was expanding and flourishing, thereby strengthening the need to give higher education to priests and civil servants. A new Swedish university was established in Tartu (Dorpat) in Estonia in 1632.

The first university in Finland was established eight years later in Turku in 1640, when the young Queen Christina ruled in Sweden and count Per Brahe was Governor General of Finland. The founding was effected by transforming the Gymnasium, established only ten years earlier in Turku, into a University. Isaac Rothovius, the Bishop of Turku and *ex officio* vice-chancellor of the new Academy, declared that this was the

4 See Forsius (1952), Pursiainen (1997).

most remarkable event to happen in Finland since the creation of the world.⁵

The Royal Academy of Turku initially had eleven professors, a library, and since 1642 a printing press. Following the models of Paris and Uppsala, the Academy had three “higher” professional faculties, Theology, Law, and Medicine, while the Faculty of Arts provided propaedeutic teaching in mathematics, physics, philosophy, Greek, Latin, and Hebrew. Latin was the province of the professor of Eloquence. The Faculty of Arts had two chairs in Philosophy: Theoretical and Practical. The former, devoted to logic and metaphysics, was concerned with the proper use of human reason and language in thinking, writing, arguing, and even composing poems. The latter, teaching ethics, politics, and history, discussed the moral conduct and virtues of citizens and the best ways of organizing their social and political life.⁶

The first professor of Theoretical Philosophy, Nicolaus Nycopensis (died 1664), taught “logic and poetry” mainly in the Ramistic mold. His successors, who in 1665 became professors of “logic and metaphysics”, combined ideas from the *Dialectica* of Petrus Ramus with neo-Aristotelian influences from Wittenberg (Johannes Scharfius) and Hessen (Conradus Theodoricus, Christophorus Scheibler). The most notable of them, Andreas Thuronius (1632–65), wrote an important 862-page compendium *Institutiones logicae* (1660). An even larger compilation is *Collegium logicum* (1678) by Jakob Flacsenius (1633–94).⁷ Thuronius wrote also a *Compendium metaphysicae* in 1664.

The first professor of Practical Philosophy, Mikael Wexionius, later Gyldenstolpe (1608–70), played a visible role in the founding of the Academy.⁸ In addition to his work in politics and jurisprudence, his most central studies were devoted to eudaimonistic ethics (*Collegium ethicum*, 1649) and virtues (*De Prudentia, De Temperantia, De Fortitudine*).⁹

5 For the history of the Academy of Turku, and its continuation as the University of Helsinki up to the present time, see Heikel (1940), Kaila (1940), Klinge and Leikola (1988), Klinge (1992a, 2010).

6 For a pioneering study of the development of philosophy in the Academy of Turku from 1640 to 1828, see Rein (1908). See also Oittinen (2004).

7 For the study of logic in the early Academy of Turku, see Lounela (1978, 1979).

8 See Klinge (2010).

9 See Kajanto (1990).

The Academy of Turku was for a long time dominated by a mixture of Lutheran and neoscholastic orthodoxy. New ideas were not encouraged, and the main role of philosophy was to support the study of theology. Philosophical topics were discussed in encyclopedic works by theologians like the Bishop Johannes Gezelius, the elder (1615-90).

The French philosopher René Descartes died in Stockholm in 1650, when he was invited by the Queen Christina to teach her philosophy, and the “Cartesian controversies” in Uppsala in the 1660s were followed in Turku as well. In 1689 the King Charles XI issued the freedom of philosophy – as long as the Bible and Christian faith were not criticized. New philosophical influences from Descartes and Francis Bacon made their appearance in Turku only in the last years of the seventeenth century.¹⁰ An active role was played by Petter Hahn (1650-1719), professor of Physics, whose dissertations defended a Cartesian view of sense physiology in 1690 and a Baconian view of idols as hindrances of knowledge in 1697.¹¹ Also Gabriel Juslenius (1666-1724), who was appointed professor of Theoretical Philosophy in 1702, supervised dissertations on the search of new knowledge with references to Jacopo Zabarella and Bacon.

After the Great Northern War, the spirit of “useful” Baconian and Newtonian science, combined with natural theology, gained a standing foothold in Turku in the 1720s.¹² During this “age of utility” the professorship of Poetry was changed to Economics.¹³ The first and most important professor of Economics was the botanist Pehr Kalm (1716-79), a student of the Swede Carl von Linné. Kalm was famous for his expeditions to North America. Some internationally recognized work was done also in the fields of astronomy and chemistry.

In Theoretical Philosophy, especially with Johan Welin (1705-44) and Carl Mesterton (1715-73), the new way of combining rationalism with some empiricist elements was tied with Christian Wolff’s attempt to develop the ideas of G. W. Leibniz into a metaphysical system. Welin studied in Marburg with Wolff, and wrote a dissertation on the connection of logic and mathematics in 1735. Later he became a member of the Royal Society in London. While Welin was mainly absent from Turku, Mester-

¹⁰ See Knuuttila and Niiniluoto (1986).

¹¹ See Kallinen (1995).

¹² In Rein’s (1908a) history of the Academy of Turku, the period of neoscholasticism spans from 1640 to 1722, the period of Enlightenment from 1722 to 1809, and the period of Idealism from 1809 to 1828.

¹³ See Manninen and Patoluoto (1986).

ton supervised Wolffian studies in logic and ontology for twenty years. John Locke's empiricism was later supported by two influential professors of Eloquence, Henrik Hassel (1700-76)¹⁴ and Henrik Gabriel Porthan (1739-1804), and two professors of physics, Johan Browallius (1707-55) and Karl Mennander (1712-86).

In Practical Philosophy, both Algot Scarin (1684-1771) and his successor Johan Bilmark (1728-1801) held the chair for forty years. Both were conservative thinkers, but had influences from the social philosophy of Samuel Pufendorf, a German theorist of natural rights, who was active in the Swedish University of Lund.

The most interesting work in political philosophy was made outside the Academy by Petter Forsskål (1732-63), Linné's student in Uppsala and Wolff's sharp critic in Göttingen in his dissertation *Dubia de principiis philosophiae recentoris* (1756). Forsskål defended "bourgeois liberty" in his radical pamphlet *Tankar om borgerliga friheten* (1759). In the spirit of Enlightenment, he defended freedom of speech and religious tolerance.¹⁵ The fate of Forsskål was to die in an Oriental expedition in Yemen.

Another important Enlightenment thinker was Anders Chydenius (1729-1803), vicar of Kokkola and statesman in Stockholm, who formulated the world's first Freedom of Information Act in 1776.¹⁶ This new legislation abolished political censorship in Sweden and gave the public access to government documents. His essay *Den nationale Winsten* (1765) defended the basic ideas of economic liberalism – anticipating the famous formulation in Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776.¹⁷

Together with the learned jurist Matthias Calonius (1737-1817), H. G. Porthan became a central figure of neohumanist Enlightenment in Turku, which later developed into a national awakening in Finland. He founded the Aurora Society in 1770 and edited its journal, served as the librarian of the Academy, and collected old Finnish myths and epic.¹⁸ As professor of Eloquence, Porthan lectured in Latin about logic, psychology, practical philosophy, natural theology, and pedagogic. He criticized both mysticism and radical materialism. In philosophy he defended empiricism and Pufendorf, but opposed the fading school of Wolff and the rising influence of Kant.

¹⁴ See Lindberg (1990).

¹⁵ See Forsskål (1989, 2006), Steinby (1971), Oittinen (2006).

¹⁶ See Manninen (2006b).

¹⁷ See Chydenius (2012), Patoluoto and Sarje (1979),

¹⁸ See Manninen (2000).

In the last years of the Swedish rule, Gabriel Israel Hartman (1776-1809), whose promising career was interrupted by untimely death, wrote an original study in critical epistemology, *Kunskapsläran* I-II (Theory of Knowledge, 1807-08). Kant's philosophy was supported by Porthan's student, the poet Franz Mikael Franzén. During 1801-11 he was the last professor of "history and morality" in Turku, as in 1811 history was separated from practical philosophy as an independent discipline. Kant influenced also Anders Johan Lagus, who was professor of theoretical philosophy in 1805-12.¹⁹

Later German idealists (Fichte, Schelling),²⁰ and more decisively Hegel,²¹ had a strong impact on the next generation of philosophers in Finland. They belong already to the new period, as in a war against Sweden in 1808-09 Russia was able to conquer the mainland of Finland. As a result, Finland was made an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire. The Academy of Turku was reorganized in 1811 by the Russian Emperor Alexander I who in the next year decided to make Helsinki the capital of Finland. After a great fire in Turku in 1827, his successor Emperor Nicholas I moved the University from Turku to Helsinki in 1828.²²

¹⁹ See Ch. 2.1.

²⁰ See Ch. 2.2.

²¹ See Ch. 2.3.

²² Digitized versions of 1778 dissertations defended at the Academy of Turku between 1640 and 1828 can be found in www.doris.fi > Kansalliskirjasto > Turun Akatemian väitöskirjat.

PART TWO

FROM IDEALISM TO NATIONALISTIC
AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
THE STATE

As a Grand Duchy of Russia, Finland was under the rule of the Russian Emperor, represented locally by a Governor General, but it also had a lot of administrative and cultural autonomy, including its own legislation from the Swedish period, senate, a four-estate Diet, Lutheran church, and several new national institutions.

The University was also under direct control of the Emperor who in practice made the important academic decisions from St. Petersburg bypassing the senate in Helsinki. He was assisted there by the Chancellor, who usually was the young crown prince and future Emperor, and the Acting Chancellor, while locally the University was governed by Pro-Chancellor and Rector. When the Academy was moved from Turku to Helsinki in 1828, and renamed the Imperial Alexander University of Finland, it had 21 professors and 337 students.²³

The new capital Helsinki (or Helsingfors, as it is called in Swedish) itself was a small city, guarded from the sea by the Viapori Fortress (Suomenlinna), but a huge construction process was started in 1816 with the German architect Carl Ludwig Engel (1718-1840) to create a monumental neo-classical center. Along with the Cathedral and the Senate building, the main building of the University was finished in 1832, and the beautiful building of the University Library in 1840. In this symbolic fashion, the University was granted an extremely significant position, which was greeted with loyal gratitude in the 1840 celebrations of its

²³ The new statutes made Doctor's degrees possible in the Faculty of Philosophy. 82 doctoral theses in the discipline of philosophy are listed in https://filosofia.fi/suomalainen_filosofia/bibliografia, but the same authors may have several dissertations. All doctoral dissertations in all fields in 1828-1917 can be found in a digitized form in <https://digi.kansalliskirjasto.fi/collections? id = 561>.

bicentennial anniversary.

The development of Finland as a modern nation-state continued during the liberal reign of the Emperor Alexander II (ruled in 1855-81). The Diet started to meet regularly, Finnish stamps were printed in 1856, the Finnish language gained an official status equal to Swedish in 1863, a law concerning primary schools was accepted in 1866, the first railway track was opened in 1862, industrialization developed rapidly, freedom of trade was accepted in 1879, and the Finnish national army was established in 1878. Many of these reforms were planned and supported by the Hegelian philosopher J. V. Snellman who served in 1863-68 as a senator in a position corresponding to the minister of finance.

The Emperor Nicholas II (ruled in 1894-1917) tried to reduce the autonomy of the Finnish administration. This period of oppression resulted in a polarization between the “Fennoman” and “Swecoman” political groups and between the loyalist (conservative, constitutional, the Old Finns) and anti-loyalist (liberal, the Young Finns) wings of the Finnish movement.

In 1906, the four-estate Diet was replaced by a unicameral parliament with universal suffrage. Finland was thus the first country in the world which allowed women both to vote for members of the parliament and to be eligible as such members. Social reforms were demanded by the Socialist workers’ party, which had a large representation in the new parliament.

Besides the idealist Fennoman Snellman and his successor Thiodolf Rein, also other philosophers participated in debates about the construction of the state. Liberal democracy was defended by the materialist Wilhelm Bolin. These philosophical discussions were vital for the emergence of the social sciences in Finland,²⁴ and they also helped the study of law and history to make important contributions to the development of Finland as a democratic *Rechtstaat*.²⁵ When the parliament declared the independence of Finland on December 6, 1917, after the disorder of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, a Civil War between the “white” and “red” forces broke out in 1918. After the Civil War, the parliament decided that Finland would be a monarchy, but in 1919 the constitution of Finland as a republic was designed by K. J. Ståhlberg, professor of administrative law

²⁴ For a survey of the social sciences in Finland during the 19th century, see Allardt (1997).

²⁵ For the studies in law and history during the 19th century, see Klami (1981) and Klinge (2012).

at the University of Helsinki, and the first elected President of Finland.

Professors of Philosophy in the Grand Duchy of Finland 1809-1917

Theoretical Philosophy

Andreas Johan Lagus 1805-12

Gabriel Palander 1814-21

Fredrik Bergbom 1823-30

Practical Philosophy

Franz Michael Franzén 1801-11

Anders Johan Lagus 1812-24

Johan Jakob Tengström 1827-30

Philosophy

Johan Jakob Tengström 1830-48

Germund Fredrik Aminoff 1849-52

Johan Vilhelm Snellman 1856-63

Karl Gabriel Thiodolf Rein 1869-1900

Arvi Grotenfelt 1905-06

Arvi Grotenfelt 1906-29

Edward Westermarck 1906-1918

Personal Extraordinary Professors of Philosophy

Andreas Wilhelm Bolin 1870-73

Johan Julius Frithiof Perander 1879-84


2.1. Varieties of Idealism: Franzén, Lagus, and Hartman

During the last decades of the 18th century, some professors of the Academy of Turku were able to reach internationally recognized results in their empirical research: Pehr Kalm in botany, Anders Johan Lexell in astronomy, and Johan Gadolin in chemistry. Even though the influence of German universities, especially Göttingen, was strong, the philosophical impact of the rationalist metaphysics of Wolff was weakening, and the main figures of British empiricism from Francis Bacon to Isaac Newton and John Locke were well known. The neohumanist Enlightenment was developed by Henrik Gabriel Porthan, the powerful professor of eloquence in 1777-1804, whose historical studies on medieval culture introduced the method of source criticism in Finland.

The Rise of Idealism: Kant and Kantians

The development of European philosophy took a turn, however, which would change the course of philosophical activities in Finland as well. The dualist metaphysics of René Descartes divided the world into the material and spiritual substances. As his famous argument “cogito ergo sum” attempted to prove that our mind has certain knowledge of itself through reflection, our ability to know the “external world” became problematic. This started an inner difficulty within the British empiricism as well. In the 1710s George Berkeley argued that Locke had uncritically assumed the existence of the external world. In his criticism of the notion material substance, Berkeley concluded that what appear as physical objects are merely perceptions in our mind. His slogan “esse est percipi” avoids subjective idealism only by the postulation that objects exist in the mind of God. David Hume continued with a critique of the spiritual substance: our minds are just bundles of ideas. He also rejected all proofs of God’s existence. In his epistemology, Hume repeated traditional skeptical arguments, denied the idea of causal necessity, and questioned our ability to justify inductive inferences.

In Königsberg, Immanuel Kant (originally trained in the tradition of Leibniz and Wolff) was “awakened from his dogmatic slumbers” by Hume’s skeptical empiricism. In his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781, 2nd ed. 1787), Kant argued that our consciousness is not only a passive receiver



Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).

of impressions but actively organizes them. As objects cannot be perceived without placing them in time and space, and as objects cannot be thought without imposing causal relations between them, Kant concluded that space and time are forms of sensible intuition and causality is one of the categories of understanding. Thereby the world of phenomena (or things-for-us) is constituted by the epistemological or tran-

scendental subject. However, Kant's transcendental idealism does not deny the existence of mind-independent objects which affect our senses, but he contended that we cannot cognize or know these things-in-themselves (*Dinge an sich*). This explains how we can have a priori knowledge about some aspects of mind-dependent phenomena, but at the same time we must remain ignorant about the things-in-themselves.

In his first Critique, Kant followed Hume in his rejection of the proofs of God's existence. But in his *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788) he suggested that God and immortal souls can be accepted as "postulates of practical reason". In *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785), Kant presented his "compatibilist" solution to the free will problem: as a member of the phenomenal world the human being is bound by causal laws, but as an intelligible being he is free from laws of nature.

In *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), Kant discussed judgments that are needed in the appraisal of art. By his three Critiques Kant consolidated the distinction between science, ethics, and art, which is often considered as the hallmark of modernity.

Kant had immediately many followers or "epigones". An important spokesman for Kantian critical philosophy was Karl Leonard Reinhold in Jena and later in Kiel. But all philosophers did not think that Kant's distinction between the noumenal world of *Dinge an sich* and the phenomenal world of *Dinge für uns* resolves the Cartesian gap between matter and mind. In particular, it was unclear how the category of causality, which

Kant restricted to the phenomenal world, could be applied to the relation between things-in-themselves and their appearances.²⁶ One possibility would have been the return to a realist view where cognition involves a relation between the subject and the mind-independent object. But the most influential reaction, favoured by Johan Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling in Jena in the 1790s, was to accept idealism by dispensing with things-in-themselves. In Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* (1794), the foundation of reality is a freely self-positing subject, or the I which by its act generates the non-I. Fichte was a politically active Jacobin, who had to leave Jena in 1799 when he was accused of atheism. Schelling's holistic philosophy of nature (*Naturphilosophie*) became the principal doctrine of German Romanticism. His absolute idealism, which claims that the subject and the object are identical in the absolute, paved way for the grandiose system of objective idealism that Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel constructed in the first three decades of the 19th century in Jena, Heidelberg and Berlin.

Porthan was not impressed by Kant's critical philosophy, which he considered as a transitory and even dangerous fashion.²⁷ His copy of Kant's first Critique includes a handwritten quotation from Cicero: "This was a firey and long-winded speech that greatly differed from our points of view." In his letter to Matthias Calonius in 1795, Porthan complained that Kant's philosophy is based on its "mysterious language and own terminology which can be understood only by the adepi". In his 1796 letter to Nils von Rosenstein, secretary of the Swedish Academy, Porthan wondered how Kant can seriously propose that we should believe in God's existence as a moral postulate after teaching that it cannot be proved.²⁸ Porthan and von Rosenstein agreed in their moderate and common sense approach to the Enlightenment, feeling that Kant's and Fichte's line is too radical.

In spite of Porthan's opposition, Kant's influence was transmitted to Turku via Sweden, where Daniel Boëthius and Benjamin Höijer started to teach Kantian philosophy in the 1790s. Porthan's favorite student Frans Mikael Franzén (1772-1847) met these radical thinkers in Uppsala already in 1790, and published in 1798 in the Kantian spirit two dissertations on moral philosophy: *De principio ultimo officiorum hominis* and

²⁶ This problem is noted by Rein (1908a), 292.

²⁷ For the Kant reception in Finland, see Rein (1908a), Salomaa (1927) and Oittinen (1999, 2004).

²⁸ See Porthan (2006).



*Frans Mikael Franzén (1772-1847). Portrait by Fredrik Westin.
Helsinki University Museum, photo by Matti Ruotsalainen.*

Dissertation ideam perfectae humanitatis defensura. The former argues that the basis of the moral law lies in human reason. The latter argues that human perfection includes both happiness and virtue, but the reward of virtues presupposes God and immortality.²⁹ In 1801, Franzén was appointed professor of practical philosophy in Turku, but already at this time he was distancing himself from Kant's aprioristic basis of morality and Fichte's

²⁹ See Manninen (1989).

Anders Johan Lagus. Portrait by an unknown artist.



atheism in favor of a pious commitment to the religious faith of his youth. Franzén, who served as professor until 1811, moved to Sweden and continued there his career as a poet and priest.

Among Porthan's and Franzén's students one can mention Jacob Judén (1781-1855), who left the Academy in 1810 without a degree, but made a notable career as an author and poet with the name Jaakko Juteini.³⁰ He promoted Finnish language and folk education in the spirit of the Enlightenment, and was conferred as doctor honoris causa in 1840.

Anders Johan Lagus (1775-1831) has been called the "first Kantian" in Finnish philosophy. He also learnt about Kant in Uppsala in the 1790s. In Turku, he first became docent of Greek literature and gave lectures on Plato. In 1804, he defended his dissertation *Immanuelis Kant de tempore doctrina* on Kant's philosophy of time. In the same year, just after Porthan's death, he was appointed professor of theoretical philosophy, even though the applicant in the first place was Nils Magnus Tolpo, who had defended eudaimonism against Kantian duty ethics in 1800 and tried to refute Kant's critique of the teleological proof of God's existence in 1804. Tolpo continued his career as a priest until his death in 1853.

Lagus, who clearly understood the difference between Kant's transcendental idealism and Fichte's idealism, lectured on Kant's doctrine of pure reason and on logic on the basis of a Swedish translation of J. G. Kiesewetter's textbook (published in Åbo in 1806). Lagus, who came from an influential clerical and academic family, obtained an important academic position in the university, and was given the honor to present a *laudatio* for the Russian Emperor Alexander I in the celebrations of the Academy of Turku as an imperial university in 1811. In 1812, Lagus suc-

³⁰ See Teperi (1972).

ceeded Franzén as professor of practical philosophy and further moved to the Faculty of Theology in 1824. He continued to study and teach ethics and theology in the historical and Kantian spirit until 1828.

The first professor of history Johan Henrik Avellan (1773-1832), in the chair separated from practical philosophy in 1811, treated aesthetic judgments about beauty on the basis of Kant's third Critique, but in his dissertation *Läran om den absoluta friheten* (1827) he criticized Kant on the basis of Hegel.

Hartman's Theory of Knowledge

The most original thinker in this period was Gabriel Israel Hartman (1776-1809).³¹ His dissertation in 1801 discussed the role of axioms as a foundation of human knowledge. Such immediately evident axioms include the principles of identity, contradiction, and causality. In 1802, Hartman was appointed docent of theoretical philosophy, and in 1804 he published an essay on real and instrumental judgments. Hartman applied the chair of theoretical philosophy in 1804, but was placed third after Tolpo and Lagus. He published in 1806 a popular textbook of geography, *Lärobok i allmänna Geografien*, with the 19th printing in 1879. He worked since 1807 as the librarian of the Academy, but was also actively preparing an ambitious philosophical system which was intended to show the mistakes of all of his predecessors. Hartman asserted that he had developed his philosophical system independently, but it is clear that he was well acquainted with debates on critical and idealist philosophy. Hartman's *Kunskapsläran* (Theory of Knowledge) appeared in two parts in 1807 and 1808, but death from nervous fever at the age of 32 interrupted his studies in March 1809, when the city of Turku had already been occupied by Russian troops.

Hartman's philosophical system is "critical" in the sense that it starts by analyzing our cognition. He used the Swedish term "kunskapsläran" before the term "Erkenntnistheorie" became popular in Germany. The tasks of the theory of knowledge are to explain how knowledge is possible, how certainty is possible, how the contents of knowledge are possible, and how the system of knowledge is possible. In the first part of *Kunskapsläran*, Hartman gives credit to Locke for the view that knowledge originates from sense experience, but he argues that Locke fails to

³¹ See Rein (1908a), Oittinen (1979, 1996a).

Gabriel Israel Hartman (1776-1809). Portrait by Augusta Pipping. Helsinki University Museum, photo by Pia Vuorikoski.



explain the general and necessary foundation of our knowledge. Kant's attempt to solve Hume's skepticism also fails, because it involves many contradictions. Hartman unfairly interprets Kant's doctrine so that it leads to solipsism, where nothing exists outside me or everything is just my dream or phantasy (here his true target may be Höijer who had adopted Fichte's version of idealism). But he also gives examples of weak points in Kant's approach: it is not legitimate to separate space and time from objects and place them only within our sensations, or to assume that our knowledge about some conditions of things-in-themselves could not be real. So against skeptic and idealist views Hartman is seeking a realist epistemology, with a foundation as secure as the Cartesian *cogito*, and by tools taken from the critical philosophy. In this respect, he was striving against the main currents of the 19th century philosophy, where the rationalists turned to idealism and the empiricists tried to answer skepticism by probabilistic theories of induction.

Hartman's solution has some resemblance to Reinhold's "elementary philosophy": the apodictic fundament of our cognition and the utmost principle of knowledge is the "act of consciousness", which can be expressed as a relation between the subject, the object, and the representation (*Vorstellung*). According to Hartman, this principle has to be "clear, self-evident, and comprehensive as a presupposition of all conviction". It cannot be a concept, sentence, or a picture, but rather "an act through which knowledge is born for the Self and as it were merges into it". But the object is not created by the subject, as the idealists like Fichte contend. The subject is not a passive receiver of impressions, as the empiricists suppose. In this cognitive act, the subject not only knows but also

knows that it knows. The subject as a unity, which is independent of the variable contents of our consciousness, is a thing-in-itself. For Hartman, this means that we can have knowledge about real things, and this knowledge of the self is also a warrant for our knowledge of objective things-in-themselves.

The second part of Hartman's book belongs to anthropology or psychology: he analyses our mental capacities, like consciousness, will, and emotions. While consciousness produces knowledge, will generates actions. His term for the will is "själfverksamhet" which literally means "self-action". Hartman argues that we can always choose between alternative ends and between means, so that we could have done otherwise than we actually did. This shows that he accepts the power and freedom of the will.

The third but unfinished part of Hartman's book was supposed to deal with the origins, grounds, content, and value of knowledge. It was also known that he had written a manuscript *Bestämmelselära*, which outlines his practical philosophy. It was believed that this Nachlass was destroyed in the great fire of Turku in 1827, but an account of some of its parts was published in Moscow in 1830 by Karl Sederholm (1789-1867), a friend and student of Hartman's, who had moved to Russia in 1811 and made there a career as a priest in the Lutheran church.³² Hartman's recovered manuscripts include earlier versions of *Kunskapsläran* (but not its third part), *Bestämmelseläran*, and writings about the philosophy of religion.³³

As far as we know, Hartman's ethics was based on the eudaemonist principle that the purpose of human life is happiness. But happiness for him comes from virtues, and the most prominent of those virtues is to fulfil one's duties. The principal duty is to seek for truth, which helps us to distinguish between right and wrong. So ultimately Hartman agrees with Socrates that virtue is knowledge: if one has a clear idea of God, virtue and humanity, one cannot act in a vicious or inhumane way. This rational Enlightenment optimism is moderated by the appeal to emotions as the ultimate source of meaning and value in life.

³² Sederholm himself wrote a doctoral dissertation for the University of Königsberg in 1825, corresponded with Schelling, and published works in the philosophy of religion.

³³ In 1993, Georg Henrik von Wright was able to find some of papers of Sederholm's collection in the Russian State Library. They had been preserved in the monastery of Optina pustyn where Sederholm's son Karl lived as an Orthodox monk Kliment in 1862-78. See von Wright and Oittinen (2002).

In connection with the university reform of 1811, a new position of assistant in philosophy was established. The first assistant in theoretical philosophy in 1813-23 was Fredrik Bergbom (1785-1830), who started from a Kantian position but soon moved toward Schelling's idealism. Bergbom was one of the figures of the new wave known as the Turku romanticism.³⁴

The successor of Lagus as professor of theoretical philosophy in 1814-1821 was Gabriel Palander (1774-1821). Educated as a mathematician, he gave detailed lectures on Kant's first and third Critiques and published a dissertation on analytic and synthetic judgments. His lectures on logic were based on Kiesewetter's textbook, but he was also familiar with Hegel's logic which appeared in 1812-16.

When Palander died in 1821 and Lagus moved to theology in 1824, the period of Kantianism in Turku came to its end, and other varieties of idealism took over the academic life. The Schellingian Bergbom became professor of theoretical philosophy in 1823-30. The new assistant of philosophy Johan Matthias Sundwall (1793-1843) still published studies in Kantian themes, like *De dialectica intellectus natura* (1817), *De judiciorum analyticorum et syntheticorum discrimine* (1822) and *De principio ethicae Kantianae* (1823), but he started to give lectures on Hegel's speculative logic in 1823.³⁵ Another important person in the transition from Schelling to Hegel was Axel Adolf Laurell (1801-52), who became docent of theoretical philosophy with his dissertation *De principio idealismi transcendentalis Schellingiani* (1826), but wrote Hegelian studies on education in the 1830s.³⁶ Both Sundwall and Laurell became professors of theology in the 1830s.

The interest toward Hegel was rising, when the Academy was moved to the new capital Helsinki in 1828. The successor of Lagus in practical philosophy since 1827 was Johan Jacob Tengström (1787-1858), who after Bergbom's death in 1830 became professor in the joint chair of theoretical and practical philosophy.³⁷ J. J. Tengström was the nephew of the powerful archbishop of Turku, Jacob Tengström, who was one of Porthan's close friends.³⁸ He had started his influential lectures on Hegel already in 1824, and his appointment as the only professor of philosophy in Finland

³⁴ See Chapter 2.2.

³⁵ Rein (1908a), 307; Manninen (1986a), 119-120.

³⁶ Rein (1908a), 309-311.

³⁷ See Chapter 2.3.

³⁸ For Jacob Tengström, see Björkstrand (2102).

(with the support of Sundwall and Laurell in the faculty of theology) guaranteed the dominant position of Hegelianism for several decades.

2.2. Romanticism in Turku: Bergbom, Ottelin, Arwidsson, and Hwasser

In the wake of the lively debate on Kant's philosophy, later currents of German Idealism and Romanticism had also found their way to the Academy of Turku around 1800. Although the reception of such figures as J. G. Fichte, the Schlegel brothers, and F. W. J. Schelling had been first negative due to the dominant position of the realistic theory of knowledge, just over a decade later the intellectual climate in Turku was already more favorable to the Romantic thinkers. An intermediary role was here played by those younger Finnish scholars and students who had visited at the Uppsala University in Sweden, where Romanticism was much more prevalent than in the Grand Duchy of Finland. For instance, the multifaceted Swedish scholars E. G. Geijer (1783–1847), P. D. A. Atterbom (1790–1855), and V. F. Palmblad (1788–1852), together with their literary monthly *Phosphoros* (The morning star, 1810–13), acted as important sources of inspiration to the Finns.³⁹

In general, the increasing interest in Romanticism signified a more definite turn away from the Enlightenment thinking with its appreciation of all that was rational, utilitarian, and concrete. Instead of the allegedly “one-sided worship of Reason”, new emphasis was placed on emotions and inner experiences. At the Finnish academe, this trend was partly fused with a broader German rethinking about universities, which opposed mechanical learning, strong scientific specialization, and narrowly vocational education, and rather emphasized the importance of moral maturation and self-cultivation (*Bildung*) of the students. However, Romanticism also influenced diverse academic disciplines from theology to physics. Its effects were perhaps most comprehensively felt in philosophy, resulting in a shift from empiricism towards speculation.⁴⁰

³⁹ Rein (1908a), 281–282, 292ff; Castrén (1944), 81ff.

⁴⁰ Klinge (2010), 239–244. See also the Chapter 2.5 on academic freedom.

Schellingians

In the early 1810s, assistant Fredrik Bergbom (1785–1830) and docent Johan Edman (1783–1857) were first to lecture on the new currents with an approving tone. Although the main target of Idealistic criticism had initially been the Enlightenment rationalism, Kant, too, was soon considered a surpassed phase. This nascent stand was already visible in Bergbom's thesis for the docentship in philosophy, *Kantianorum de re in se (Ding an sich) doctrina* (1811). There he argued that Kant's doctrine of the thing-in-itself as opposed to what is called the phenomenon – the thing as it appears to an observer – is based on false dualism. Echoing Schelling's *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur* (1797) as well as his reading of Spinoza and



F. W. J. Schelling (1775-1854).

Fichte, Bergbom claimed that form and matter are inseparable in the living organisms, which means that the apparent difference of subject (the mental) and object (the physical) is grounded in an identity which links them together. The Schellingian claim of the totality of Being was further elaborated in Bergbom's next thesis, *De libertate cum necessitate concilianda* (1813), in which he discussed the relation of necessity and freedom. The apparent opposition of free will and the causality of empirical existence was solved by the unity on a higher level. As Bergbom cited Schelling, "Only that is free which acts according to the laws of its own inner being and is not determined by anything else either within or outside it". Nevertheless, despite his criticism of Kant, in his lectures he continued to use Kantian textbooks, thus avoiding an open conflict with his senior colleagues. In public, he became mostly known as an adherent of an idealistic university model, not as a rebellious Schellingian.⁴¹

⁴¹ Rein (1908a), 292–298; Manninen (1986b), 42–44.

A more radical version of Schellingism was soon personified in Turku by two young scholars, Carl Gustaf Ottelin (1792–1864) and, in particular, Adolf Ivar Arwidsson (1791–1858). They both had close relations with Swedish Romantic circles and belonged in Turku to a larger group of enthusiasts, later known as “the Turku Romantics,” who published two short-lived literary periodicals, *Aura* (1817–18) and *Mnemosyne* (1819–23). Although neither of these publications was in a strict sense philosophical, they promoted ideas typical to the early nineteenth-century Idealistic philosophical thinking, for instance, *Naturphilosophie* that rejected the old mechanical physics and perceived nature as a living force or Spirit. Moreover, the poems and articles published in *Aura* and *Mnemosyne* testified to an increasing interest in Finnish national identifications and the Finnish language, which, at that time, was merely spoken by the uneducated common people. The influence of J. G. von Herder’s philosophy of language was obvious on these reflections, for it was considered that the language spoken by the people both expressed and constructed their particular way of being human, which is why Finnish should have been favored in Finland.⁴²

In the case of Ottelin, himself a highly religious person, Schelling’s influence was most evident in the field of the philosophy of religion. After studying philosophy at the Uppsala University in 1815 in the guidance of the Schellingian professors Samuel Grubbe (1786–1853) and N. F. Biberg (1776–1827), Ottelin defended at the Academy of Turku his doctoral thesis, entitled *De fide religiosa* (1816). There he rejected both Protestant Enlightenment-theology that laid stress upon the rational understanding of Christian doctrines and the practical nature of Christianity as well as the Kantian view according to which religion was based on the demands of moral consciousness. Quite the contrary, he posited religious feeling as the basis of religion, claiming that in his/her religious feelings the individual intuitively understood the boundless universe and his/her own relation to the centre of that universe. Therefore, in religious faith both a subjective experience and an objective act of revelation in the human spirit were united, which, according to Ottelin, was not the same as morality nor based on it, as Kant had suggested. As an ardent proponent of Kantian philosophy, Ottelin’s examiner, professor Lagus, was deeply indignant at this criticism and suggested that the thesis should be failed, which the majority of the Faculty members agreed with. Ottelin, however, refused to give up, and with the active support of his teacher in Uppsala

⁴² Jalava (2005), 79–80, III–II5; Karkama (2006).

la, Professor Grubbe, he was granted the right to present a new doctoral thesis. Although this new thesis, which was largely a summary of Kant's doctrine of radical evil, was accepted next year, Ottelin got discouraged and quit his academic career, finally ending up as the Bishop of the Diocese of Porvoo. With this "flight from theology," he was not alone, for ideological conflicts evidently caused a general loss of interest in theology and scholarship at Turku around the 1820s.⁴³


Arwidsson's Nationalism

Nevertheless, Ottelin's academic setbacks were relatively small, if compared to those of A. I. Arwidsson. Broadly speaking, Arwidsson's Romantic endeavors in Turku can be divided to two consecutive phases. During the first phase, starting in the early 1810s, he had become acquainted with German and Nordic Romantic literature and started to cherish a hope of becoming a celebrated "poet-hero." Due to these literary activities, he became interested in Schelling's philosophy of art. A crucial premise to him was Schelling's claim that art is paramount to philosophy, because it accomplishes an absolute identity and unity between man and the world. In other words, art was the point where the unconscious world of nature and the conscious one of moral action and history rejoined each other, thus manifesting the Absolute rather than just conceptualizing it. From this point of view, the artist – also the poet, as Arwidsson liked to saw himself at that time – was nothing less than a vehicle of Spirit, because true works of art could harmonically depict infinity in a finite form.⁴⁴

These poetical visions were arguably the main reason behind Arwidsson's decision to finally write his thesis in history after drifting years at the Turku Academy without a clear goal. This thesis, entitled *Ingenii romantici, aevo medio orti, expositione historica* (A historical presentation of the nature of medieval Romanticism, 1817), was related to the broader Counter-Enlightenment currents of the time, and its purpose was to revalue the Middle Ages, a period labelled by the Enlightenment thinkers as dark, brutish, and degenerate. Following such scholars as Schelling, Herder, Friedrich Schlegel, and the Swedish historian E. G. Geijer, Arwidsson paid tribute to the medieval Germans and their gallantry, heroism, and

43 Castrén (1944), 135–139; Manninen (1986b), 46–47; Murtorinne (1988), 27–29.

44 Arwidsson (1821a); Castrén (1944), 81–83; Jalava (2005), 105–106.



Adolf Ivar Arwidsson (1791–1858). Portrait by Erik Johan Löfgren. Photo by Helsinki University Museum.

ecstatic defiance, which, in his eyes, like “a reborn *Phoenix*, rising from the ashes” had given “new strength to the old and weary limbs of Europe.” Of special interest to him was the medieval courtly literature of the chivalry, which he interpreted to manifest the Schellingian idea of the poet as a vehicle of Spirit. In general, his image of the Middle Ages was highly idealized; for instance, he mentioned only in passing that the knighthood might also have had a vested interest in participating in the Crusade. Not surprisingly, such a biased view was met with harsh criticism by the senior academic staff, but the thesis was eventually accepted with niggardly recommendations.⁴⁵

The second phase in Arwidsson’s Romanticism started during the academic year of 1817–18 at the Uppsala University. At that time, mostly because of the lukewarm reception of his literary products, he had given up his dream to become a celebrated poet, and, instead, he became now interested in nascent nationalist thinking in general and the Finnish language, the study of Finnish folklore, and Finnish history in particular. This nationalization and politicization of his scholarly activities was accompanied by his growing anti-Russian sentiment that manifested itself in the smuggling of prohibited political literature into the Grand Duchy and the publishing of anonymous articles in Stockholm that were critical of conditions in Finland. In addition to his long-term interest in such philosophers as Schelling, Fichte, and Herder, he acquainted himself with the works of the German patriot and poet Ernst Moritz Arndt, who has been considered an ideological father-figure of the German *Burschen-*

⁴⁵ Castrén (1944), 131–149.

schaft movement, a pan-German fraternity of the university students that started to promote the German unification during the Napoleonic Wars. Among the Russian and Finnish administrative elite, the mobilization of the students and younger academic staff was followed by increasing anxiety, particularly after a rebellious theology student, Karl Sand, had killed a Russian political agent, the writer and privy councilor August von Kotzebue, in Mannheim in 1819. In the shadow of this tightening international situation, the student unrest in Turku together with the new Romantic philosophy – to cite the secretary of the Committee for Finnish Affairs in St. Petersburg, L. G. von Haartman, “that phosphorist mentality, Schellingism, natural philosophy, or whatever one should call it” – were labelled as potentially insurgent phenomena, with Arwidsson being identified as the leading spokesman of these “leftist” ideas in Finland.⁴⁶

Unlike most of his fellow academic countrymen, however, Arwidsson was not scared of the growing governmental hostility to Romanticism. On the contrary, his old Romantic ideal of the brave, self-sacrificing medieval knight-poets found now a new channel in his political activism. To disseminate his ideas, he established in 1821 *Åbo Morgonblad* (The Turku morning post), the first political newspaper in Finland that was based on the idea of the media as a public sphere where the educated citizens could identify and freely discuss societal problems. As its philosophical justification, he introduced the conception of the state that he had derived from the Schellingian *Naturphilosophie* with its principle of the productivity that emerges through the logic of polar oppositions. According to Arwidsson, the State, similar to Nature, is an organism that is capable of an infinite development. In order to take a definite form, to become an empirical construction in a certain time and place, the State requires legislation that acts as a force limiting its fluidity. However, since everything in Nature is conceived continually in becoming, before long there appears a struggle between the fluidizing principle of life and the petrified forms that dam it up. As a result, the prevailing legislation has to be renewed, for otherwise it is destroyed by a violent revolution. As Arwidsson put it, “All stagnation in nature and in the humankind means death and dissolution”.⁴⁷ Despite his bombastic speculative language, it was obvious that Russia as the pillar of the system decreed by the Congress of Vienna

⁴⁶ W. Söderhjelm (1915), 174–179; Castrén (1944), 192–197, 251–256, 301–310; Castrén (1951), 145–155; Klinge (2010), 260–269.

⁴⁷ ”Allt stadnande är i natur och mensklighet död och upplösning”; Arwidsson (1821b), citation in p. 186.

was considered by Arwidsson to be a petrified form that restrained the development of Finland, whereas the freedom of speech and the press that he himself was insisting contributed to the fluidity of life.

In the light of the latter Finnish theories of the state and nationality, of special interest in this context is also Arwidsson's nationalist thinking which he formulated in *Åbo Morgonblad* and *Mnemosyne* in 1821–22. Once again, he based his reasoning on two seemingly opposing forces that, nevertheless, were united on a higher level. On the one hand, the concept of 'people' (*folk*) signified to him those indefinable emotional sentiments with which individuals were bound to their relatives and the consanguinity. These emotional forces were the breeding ground for patriotic feelings, and they were manifested in the specific national character (*national karaktären*) and the national spirit (*national andan*) of the people. On the other hand, the concept of 'state' (*stat*) represented to him reason and necessity. It was both the proper guide of indefinable national emotions and the ultimate goal that the people should aim to realize during their centuries-long journey on earth. These two aspects were further united in the definite national mindset, conscious nationality (*nationaliteten*). National language played here an indispensable role, for, according to Arwidsson, "Only where it exists, there exist a specific people; the nation is inextricably united with its language".⁴⁸ Consequently, while his mission was to elevate the Grand Duchy of Finland and its population to real peoplehood and statehood, the rights of the Finnish-speaking populace gained a new significance. Although he did not propose any detailed social program and, in general, his conceptions of the people and the state were rather abstract and unhistorical, he constantly ended up criticizing the ruling civil servants and officers in Finland for their lack of true nationality and patriotic feelings that were essential for the national "rebirth" of the Finns.⁴⁹

This criticism was ultimately used as the nominal reason for expelling docent Arwidsson from the Academy of Turku in the spring of 1822. Without a possibility to an academic career in Finland, next year he was forced to immigrate permanently to Sweden, where he after a while managed to get a post as a librarian at the Royal Library. When Arwidsson's expulsion was discussed by the consistorium, the professor

⁴⁸ "Blott der det [det inhemska modersmålet] finnes, der är ett eget folk; ty nationen är oåtskiljelig förenad med sitt språk"; Arwidsson (1821c), citation in p. 82.

⁴⁹ Castrén (1951), 150 ff; Jalava (2005), 110–116.

of Greek literature and an ardent defender of academic freedom, Johan Bonsdorff, lent openly support to him, with the result that Bonsdorff was ordered to ask a life-long leave of absence from his post. These dismissals were further accompanied by the removal of the professor of general jurisprudence, Anders Afzelius, whom the authorities also associated with the dissemination of indiscreet “leftist” or “democratic” thoughts at the university. Moreover, in 1824 there was a tightening up of travel regulations for university staff and students as well as strengthened censorship of books, spying of personal correspondence, and the increased activity of the police force. As a whole, these measures can be seen as the most drastic “cleansing” in the whole history of the university in Finland.⁵⁰ In the study of philosophy, Romanticism fell into disfavor, which paved the way for the unexceptionally early breakthrough of Hegelianism.

Hwasser’s Speculative Medicine

Before turning to the Hegelian philosophy in Finland, however, another representative of Romantic philosophy at the Academy of Turku is yet worth mentioning, namely Israel Hwasser (1790–1860), the professor in theoretical and practical medicine. Although he was not a philosopher by profession, he presented an interesting contribution to *Naturphilosophie*. Moreover, the case of Hwasser shows that the transfer of philosophical ideas also worked the other way round, from Turku to other Nordic countries. Hwasser had gained his doctorate in medicine at the Uppsala University in 1813 and moved to Turku four years later, staying in Finland until 1830 when he returned to Uppsala. While his early interests in Sweden had mostly been of practical nature, only during his stay in Turku he became fascinated by speculative medicine. In addition to the general literary influences of “the Turku Romantics,” this reorientation can be explained by his becoming good friends with the Kantian philosopher Gabriel Palander and the Schellingian Fredrik Bergbom, who introduced to him, among other things, Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie* and Hegel’s logic. Of special importance turned out to be the German physician D. G. von Kieser’s theory of animal magnetism, the idea of a vital fluid or force that was assumed to cause a wide range of effects ranging from nocturnal dreams and religious prophecies to what was termed the “crisis.” However, since Hwasser, typical to Romantics, appreciated the

⁵⁰ Klinge (2010), 278–279.



*Israel Hwasser (1790-1860).
Portrait by Johan Erik Lindh. Helsinki University
Museum, photo by Timo Huvilinna.*

absolute originality of thoughts, his comments on other scholars' works were predominantly critical and his own authorship highly eclectic.⁵¹

Hwasser's speculative system can be characterized as methodical vitalism that was based on the principle of 'Life' (*Livet*), understood as the supreme creative force. As a deeply religious person, he associated this force with God, claiming that God had not only conducted the Creation once, in the beginning of time, but the Creation is in the constant state of becoming. By postulating that the divine force of Life is above and beyond all individual living organisms, he ranged against such figures as Schelling and Kieser, who had suggested that the living organisms are animated by Spirit which is localized to them in the sense that there is an absolute unity between man and Spirit. For Hwasser, this view represented unacceptable pantheism, if not downright materialism and atheism.

⁵¹ Rein (1901), 298–300; Liedman (1971).

In his view, instead, the greatest possible freedom and perfection of a living creature could be equated with its dependence on God. Similarly, he also emphasized the individual's subservience to the social order and national culture, which made him a strict conservative and an anti-individualist in issues related to society and the state.⁵²

The main thesis of Hwasser's speculative medicine was that "illness is self-destruction" (*självförstörelse*). By this he meant that illness occurred when the organism became isolated from a greater whole, that is, from the creative divine force of Life that made it possible for the organism to develop and function. In accordance with the idea of polarity that was crucial to *Naturphilosophie*, he saw that the organism was now left alone to cope with its two opposite poles which he termed as 'assimilation' and 'respiration/secretion'. Once the supreme principle of Life did not control these two poles anymore, sooner or later one of these became dominant, and a disease ensued. However, if the organism in this state of crisis managed to re-establish its contact with the divine force of Life, it did not only recover but was in a better health than before getting ill. According to Hwasser, the same was the situation with nations, states, and the humankind in general. Since God alone could guarantee a healthy and good development, such horrible phenomena as the French Revolution manifested the French nation's malady, which he compared with fever, the archetypical illness in his taxonomy. Moreover, similar to individuals, if the nation or any other social organism survived the crisis, it, too, was stronger and healthier than before, as Europe was after the 1789 Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, thanks to the Holy Alliance that had reasserted Christian and monarchist values in political life. In Hwasser's eyes, this general applicability elevated medicine to the top of all sciences, because it was able to give proper guidelines both to the good social order and the life's journey of each and every human being.⁵³

At the Academy of Turku, Hwasser was an exception among the "Schellingians", for he did not cherish democratic or anti-governmental sentiments that were prevalent among the younger academic staff and students. In fact, he was even subjected to a violent attack by a "Finnish Karl Sand", J. E. Gadolin, the mentally disturbed undergraduate son of the professor of chemistry. According to Gadolin, with this attack he wanted to oppose any limitation of academic freedom and the transfor-

⁵² Hwasser (1868–70); Rein (1901), 301–302; Liedman (1971), 88 ff.

⁵³ Hwasser (1868–70); Liedman (1971), 104–116, 135, 162–163.

mation of the university to a “workshop.”⁵⁴ In reality, this accusation was somewhat misleading, because Hwasser, despite his political conservatism, was a fervent opponent of strong specialization in different sciences. In his view, the ultimate purpose of higher education was to reach a deeper understanding of life, in which human beings, nature, and society were all seen as the parts of a whole, and this was possible only at the university with all kinds of knowledge and sciences – if with the peculiarity that the very essence of this understanding was to be found in medicine instead of philosophy or the humanities, as the standard version of *Bildungsuniversität* suggested. Once back in Sweden, he successfully led a decades-long campaign against the attempts to move medical education from the Uppsala University to the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm. In retrospect, his most important impact both in Finland and Sweden turned out to be precisely his noble idea of the role of medicine and physicians, which made him a popular and respected teacher among the medical students. His theories of speculative medicine, instead, were left without any successors.⁵⁵

A sort of epilogue to the Turku Romanticism was played in the form of a debate between Arwidsson and Hwasser in Sweden at the turn of the 1830s and 40s. The topic of this debate was the nature of Finnish statehood after it had been incorporated into the Russian Empire as a Grand Duchy. To sum up, Hwasser argued that a state treaty had been concluded between the Russian Emperor Alexander I and the Finnish Estates at the Diet of Porvoo in 1809 in accordance with the principles of natural law. Simultaneously, the Finns themselves had deliberately detached from their previous relationships with Sweden. As the Finns were pleased with their new position, and law and order prevailed in the country, nobody wanted anymore the return of Finland to the Swedish realm. Quite the contrary, Arwidsson emphasized that Finland had been conquered by Russia against the inhabitants’ wishes, and since the Finns were now forced to live under the oppressive foreign rule, there was no grounds for Hwasser’s optimism. In Arwidsson’s eyes, it was certainly an option that Finland could develop into a nation state in the future, but it was also fully possible that the Grand Duchy would fall apart and entirely disappear from world history. Although neither Hwasser’s nor Arwidsson’s opinion was unanimously accepted in Finland, the debate became an important turning point, because it popularized the idea of a

⁵⁴ Klinge (2010), 277.

⁵⁵ Liedman (1971), 60–83, 222–226.

Finnish state and established the idea of Finnish sovereignty as the point of departure for further studies in political philosophy. In this sense, it has even been argued that Israel Hwasser might be called “the father of the Finnish state.”⁵⁶

2.3. J. J. Tengström’s Teaching of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right⁵⁷

We have become accustomed to seeing the 19th century presented as a time for nation-building. This view is not false in the case of Finland, but it is one-sided: teaching had already directed attention towards the state when work began at the university in Helsinki in 1828. In Stockholm, J. V. Snellman published a book in 1842 that was titled the doctrine of the state, *Läran om staten*, not the doctrine of the nation, *Läran om nationen*, even though he did also write about the nation. The idea of a Finnish nation was old and had been acknowledged internally since the 18th century, but what was new was the analysis of the state in connection to nation, as something separate from the larger patchwork states of Sweden and Russia.

Certain historians have insisted that an earlier Turku Romanticism continued as a sort of “Helsinki Romanticism” or “national Romanticism”, until J. V. Snellman changed the climate of ideas. However, the defining ideas of the national activity that began in the 1830s were different from Romanticism and included from the beginning a new kind of understanding of the state, one might also say: of state-building.

When all printed products were subject to censorship before publication under the act of 1829, and with Nicholas I as the Emperor and Arseni Zakrevsky as the Governor-General, it is futile to expect that this would have been stated directly in any publication. The country’s only professor of philosophy, the recently appointed Johan Jakob Tengström (1787-1858), did lecture in Helsinki on political science in the autumn of 1830 and the following spring. From that time, this topic would be a regular feature of his teaching, though he never published on it.

During the academic year 1830-31, Tengström’s lectures were attended by many young men such as Snellman, Fredrik Cygnaeus and Frans

⁵⁶ Junnila (1972); Jussila (1987), 69–75.

⁵⁷ This chapter is based on Manninen (2003b). Translation by Alisa Manninen.

Ludvig Schauman. Johan Philip Palmén, only nineteen when the lectures started, is especially deserving of a mention because he made careful notes on all he heard. The result, the 112-page *Anteckningar i statsvetenskap under J. J. Tengströms föreläsningar*, has lain for more than a hundred years in the publicly accessible Palmén collection in the National Library of Finland.⁵⁸ Tengström was a senior member of the famous Saturday Society. His views were surely influential in this circle of friends, which included practically all of the century's future literary heroes, among them a dozen future university professors and, of course, the poet J. L. Runeberg and his family, who were close to Tengström; not many documents regarding the society have been preserved, but plenty of guesses have been made.⁵⁹

This circle's views on the state have been most accurately defined against their dramatic background by Matti Klinge in his lecture on Runeberg and the university.⁶⁰ The matter might be stated thus: Runeberg was politically loyal but not servile. This is the attitude that Tengström had taught and would teach to all in his circle. It acquired immense meaning in the history of Finland. How was it possible to have such an attitude, then? Tengström's lectures offer an essential piece of the answer to this question.

In his 1841 preface to the work he published in Tübingen, *Idee der Persönlichkeit*, Snellman did thank his teacher, though with some simplifications and possibly to advance his own career. Fredrik Cygnaeus told in a letter to Snellman that this mention cheered up Tengström (SA II, 654).⁶¹ Snellman declared that whereas the Romantic movement of ideas still flourished in Sweden, in Finland a Hegelian philosophy had become dominant:

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- ⁵⁸ Signum Gö.IV.3-9. This may have been influenced by the fact that the text is undated. It has been dated in Manninen (2003a). J. Ph. Palmén (1811-96) became professor in the Faculty of Jurisprudence in 1844-67 and Pro-Chancellor in 1873-96.
- ⁵⁹ Havu (1945) is a gathering of all that might possibly relate to the Saturday Society, but it remains rather superficial as no information has been preserved of the conversations that took place. Tengström's lectures offer a view of where he may have directed the attention of his young listeners.
- ⁶⁰ Klinge (1992b) is a focused summary of the same author's more extensive presentations.
- ⁶¹ However, Cygnaeus felt "the dearly departed rascal Avellan" might perhaps have denied Tengström's primacy.

“For this step of progress, the country may thank above all the present professor of philosophy, Johan Jakob Tengström. Due to his efforts, we have come so far that all future officials study solely Hegel’s philosophy of right in preparing for the customary degree in natural law, morals and constitutional law, and all doctors [=Masters of Art] will familiarise themselves in detail with at least one part of his system.” (SA II, 197)

Snellman also stated that Tengström lectured yearly on the basis of Hegel’s philosophy of law, logics and psychology. Palmén’s notes make it possible to discover what this teaching was like in the academic year of 1830-31. How did Tengström instruct future officials and what did he expect of them in matters relating to the state, ethical orientation and legal thinking? During which era and under what conditions did he do this? What followed from all this, if anything?

The State of Civil Servants and its Gatekeeper

This era is shadowed by later discussion of “the era of autonomy”, a term that does not do justice to the narrowness of the foundation for Finnish statehood that existed at the time and the insecurity of being part of an autocratically governed empire. Finland did have its own economy and central administration, a domestic government or the Senate, but no parliamentary life because the Estates were not called after the oath of allegiance to the Emperor in Porvoo.

In this narrow sense Finland was an economic state because it had finances, i.e. a ‘stat’ separate from Russia and an organ that was responsible for governing it, which had itself been made necessary by the fact that the old laws and privileges of the Swedish era had been confirmed in the country. According to Osmo Jussila, this was also the limit of the view that Finland’s leading men had of the Finnish state. It was seen as a means to uphold law, rights and security in a situation in which Finland had been joined to “a realm governed by a despotic ruler.”⁶²

During the transitional period that created this peculiar unit, Chancellor Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt had commented on the duties of the university, stating to the country’s spiritual leader, Bishop Jakob Teng-

⁶² Jussila (1987), 60.

ström, that “To begin with, Finland needs nothing but skilled and honest officials.”⁶³

Official positions did form the core of Finland’s statehood and the guarantee of the stability that was upheld by observation of precise official habits. Matti Peltonen has drawn attention to the great structural change that resulted from the end of the Swedish military establishment in Finland. As the elite that had previously made a living from officers’ positions was left unemployed, they, or rather their descendants (due to officers’ pensions), faced a change in their way of life: “Instead of haughty officers, noblemen had to become cultivated civilian officials, the equestrian had to transform into a scholar.”⁶⁴ The nobility did have opportunities for education in St. Petersburg, but especially those from lower backgrounds had to settle for Helsinki. Peltonen notes the increasing emphasis on the position of the Senate and the numerical increase in the state’s civil servants: there were around 500 civil government positions in Finland at the beginning of the century, but by the end of the 1860s the number had already tripled.⁶⁵

For a long time, the view has been that in Finland there was no theory of the state as such before Hegelianism. This has been the case from Sven Lindman to Osmo Jussila.⁶⁶ Less has been said of what precisely this new theory was and how it was formed. A curious detail about Snellman’s *Läran om staten* is that none of the preparatory papers related to it or any notes that would tell of the process of learning about Hegel’s philosophy of right have survived, though otherwise such remnants have been widely preserved. A possible explanation is that the topic was already familiar from Tengström’s teaching. In any case, Tengström’s lectures provide a precise answer to the question of the birth of the new state theory in Finland, a theory in which the state was not merely an institution for the needs of the nation but in itself the highest goal for both citizens and, especially, officials.

To Hegel, the state as a historically constructed, conscious, spiritual formation rose immeasurably above the mere “nation” or “people”.

⁶³ G. M. Armfelt to J. Tengström 22.3.1812. See Mylly (2002), 69.

⁶⁴ Peltonen (1990), 91.

⁶⁵ Peltonen (1990), 99.

⁶⁶ Jussila (1987), 81; Lindman (1948), 84–85, 93. Both of these authors felt that the story of Hegelian philosophy of politics in Finland only began after Snellman published his doctrine of the state, and Nordström leaned on it in his lectures in the 1840s.

According to him, only the people who formed a state had a place in world history.

The philosopher Tengström was the nephew of Archbishop Tengström and, as a scholar of Finnish history, his close associate and fully aware of his uncle's aims.⁶⁷ It does seem that the archbishop, as a confidante of the Emperor's aides, influenced the fact that his associate received an appointment by the Emperor from St. Petersburg as a professor of philosophy, a position for which the university had placed him third among the candidates with no voter placing him first.⁶⁸ In 1817-18, Turku's *Aura* calendar had published a significant piece by Tengström on the factors that hindered the development of Finland's literature and culture: it described the state as an "organism" and sketched out the nature of a civilisation and a civilised class that refrained from worship of profit.⁶⁹

Tengström had initially sought a position on Greek literature. After the situation had settled down, he expanded his views on a three-year journey in Europe, travelling through Sweden to Paris, Pompeii and German countries. In one letter to his homeland, he drew attention to the fact that Hegel was moving from Heidelberg to Berlin.⁷⁰ Among the Swedish Romantics the philosopher F. W. J. Schelling was the latest craze, and in Munich Tengström's travelling companion and cousin, the bishop's son Johan Magnus af Tengström, was able to meet both Schelling and the Holy Alliance ideologue Franz Xaver von Baader.⁷¹ During his stay in Berlin, J. J. Tengström could hardly avoid hearing rumours about Hegel from the scholars he met. Hegel was expected to be arriving in the city soon: there were high hopes of his system's encyclopaedic presentation, which had just been published, at a time when Prussia, a coun-

⁶⁷ Mustelin (1957) and especially the extensive work Björkstrand (2012).

⁶⁸ See Autio (1981), 166-167. The consistorium ranked Sundwall in the first place, Avellan in the second, and J. J. Tengström only in the third.

⁶⁹ Tengström's only strictly philosophical study, *De fundamento virtutis* (1826), dealt with virtue ethics against Kant. See Manninen (1986a), 111-126, (1996a), 176-181. In this earlier presentation, neither the existence nor the content of Tengström's lectures on political science were known. For Tengström's philosophical views, e.g. his critique of the Enlightenment's stress on utility, see also Jalava (2005), 123-145.

⁷⁰ J. J. Tengström to C. G. Westzyntius 2.6.1818. Åbo Akademis bibliotek, af Schultenska samlingen.

⁷¹ Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland's archive has preserved J. M. af Tengström's massive travel diary, Jannes resejournal. It has not been very much studied.

try formed of many patchwork elements, was being reformed so that it might be governed in a spirit of unity.

Later in the 1820s, Tengström had worked for the library of the Academy of Turku while also holding a docentship of the history of ideas and for a time even a professorship as a substitute. This phase involved close cooperation with the archbishop, guidance from the uncle who represented a Porthanian heritage. It led Tengström in a direction that was different from that of the dreamers in Turku; their star was falling due to both the very newest Hegelian views that were reaching the city and resistance from officials. At this time, he wrote his books on the lives of both of the great bishops Gezelius, elder and younger, based on research of historical sources, as well as a work on the two-hundred-year-old Finnish university that made use of the academy's archive and library.⁷² His publications would have made him suited to being a professor of the history of ideas, but he was made a philosopher. In this position his historical research, which had ranged from the era of Count Per Brahe to the present day, made him exceptionally well aware of conditions in which civilisation, science and education had developed in his homeland. He had also formed a view of the needs related to them.

This, then, was the man who came to Helsinki to tell young men who were eager for knowledge about the essence of the state as it is "according to its idea" or, in Hegel's words, "by and for itself." This was a contradiction and a criticism of earlier views. Future officials did need to be educated about this question, but Tengström made sure that no subjective, defiant dream could come into being that would be inappropriate for officials in a very small state. He emphasised that "Every individual affects the development of the State as far as he seeks to understand what the State is, and in this manner fosters its development."⁷³

72 Especially important to later research has been J. J. Tengström, *Gezelii den yngres Minne* (1833), because it was partly based on sources destroyed in the Turku fire. His work *Chronologiska Förteckningar och Anteckningar öfver finska universitets fordna procancellorer samt öfver faculteternas medlemmar och adjunkter, från universitets stiftelse inemot dess andra sekularår* (1836) has also not been rendered unnecessary to those interested in our early university history by later expansive presentations.


73 J. Ph. Palmén, *Anteckningar i statsvetenskap under J. J. Tengströms föreläsningar*, 4, The National Library of Finland, J. Ph. Palmén collection. Later references to these notes will be included in brackets in the text itself.

A Source for Hegelians

In September 1830, as Tengström began his lectures in Helsinki, G. W. F. Hegel's year as the Rector of the University of Berlin was coming to an end. A Finnish medical researcher, Immanuel Ilmoni, had visited Hegel the previous year and told him that lectures were being given in Turku according to his system, which had amazed the philosopher.⁷⁴ Soon after the 1821 publication of Hegel's *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, a Turku bookstore had announced in the literary magazine *Mnemosyne*, which was interested in new German literature, that it had the book for sale. As far as is known, the work was never subjected to censorship in Finland: after all, it was a heavy theoretical presentation.⁷⁵ Furthermore, its country of publication, Prussia, was seen as the vanguard of the Holy Alliance and did not awaken suspicion. It could not have been known that Hegel's political position was by no means undisputed. In Finland, there had been lectures on Hegel before Tengström, but not on Hegel's political philosophy.

⁷⁴ Heinricius (1912), 97.

⁷⁵ In practice censorship was mainly aimed only at openly revolutionary, anarchist, anti-monarchist and anti-Russian literature, but not for example at Hegelian theory of the state or works dealing with representative government. In an edition of Hegel's collected works that belonged to Finland's first female Master of Arts, Emma Irene Åström, this series began publication in 1832 and includes a printed list of preorders for the work. The number of orders for the whole series was announced as 700 and in addition there were 64 orders for single parts. Most went to Berlin, where 263 orders had been made for the series and 11 for individual parts. The largest individual customer was the ministry of education (40 series). Other orders are distributed quite evenly in small sets across numerous German-speaking towns; orders from the outside had only come from Paris (26, of which 5 for the king), Helsinki (15), Copenhagen (10), Tartu (9), the Hague (7), St. Petersburg (6), Riga (3) and one each from Strasbourg, Rotterdam and Utrecht. Not included were, for example, England, Sweden and Italy. The largest amount, after Berlin's ministry of education and the local Nicolaische Buchhandlung (20), was ordered by G. O. Wase-nius's bookstore in Helsinki, the previously mentioned 15 sets.



G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) lecturing. Lithograph by F. Kugler.

Hegel was the son of an official from Württemberg, and when considering the formation of his views the final phase of his life in Prussia should not be emphasised too heavily.⁷⁶ While writing the book, Hegel had had to keep an eye on the demands of censorship. Hegel's expectations had been aimed above all at the new Prussia of the Reform Movement, which was, however, replaced by the Restoration of many pre-Napoleonic features after the death of Karl August von Hardenberg, who had been directly responsible to the king for reforms; matters of education were, nonetheless, still under the control of a protector of Hegel and his students, Karl Altenstein.⁷⁷ The Prussia of the Junkers, the landed nobility committed to the Restoration, remained permanently foreign to the urban Hegel.

Thus Hegel was not a Restoration man. In his political philosophy he had harshly criticised the work for which the Restoration was named, *Restauration der Staatswissenschaften* by Karl Ludwig von Haller, an ultraconservative at the core of this group. In Heidelberg he had already criticised the estates of Württemberg for having learned nothing from the

⁷⁶ This is the modern view, for instance in Avineri (1972), Pelczynski (1971), Riedel (1975), and Losurdo (1989).

⁷⁷ The most informative work on the acceptance of Hegel's work among his contemporaries is Toews (1980).

past twenty-five years, which were among the richest in world history and to which “our world and our ideas” belong.⁷⁸ The beginning of revolution was seen by Hegel as the fight of a rational constitution against the existing mass of law and privilege. However, abstract principles proved to be all-destroying. The work on a philosophy of right was an attempt to bring together the processes that began during the French Revolution and the traditions Hegel felt to be essential to the stability of states.

In 1830-31, Hegel lectured on the philosophy of history. At the time, Europe seemed to have again fallen into a ferment of revolts and revolutions: in France the king was driven into exile, Belgium became independent, Poland rebelled against the ruling Russian Emperor, there were even tensions in German towns. This was a confusing experience for Hegel, who had expected an era of stable reforms. In his opinion, the revolution so easily carried out by the French in July 1830 repeated the errors of the earlier one. How could mere gatherings of individuals rise up to support a concretely viewed “unity” and avoid breaking apart into struggling groups? Hegel nonetheless returned in his lectures to his feelings about the French Revolution of 1789: “It was thus a wonderful sunrise. All thinking creatures have celebrated this era.”⁷⁹

Hegel believed that history was the spirit’s rational work through obstacles, in constant progress towards awareness of freedom and its fulfilment through developing state institutions. When his young students thought in the same terms about the July Revolution, they were disappointed to discover that Hegel had grave doubts about the events of the day. After also following English newspapers’ discussion on parliamentary reform, Hegel finally published in the spring of 1831 his pamphlet “Über die englische Reformbill” with his topical thoughts on what he felt to be the most correct and necessary direction of state reforms.

Hegel did not approve of forms of popular representation that had attracted widespread attention: those that were founded on individuals or, alternatively, on property. He felt that “the nation’s various great interests” should receive representation: this had been the case in England, despite all the corruption, thanks to the country’s very expe-

⁷⁸ Hegel (1970), *Werke 4: Nürnberger and Heidelberger Schriften 1808-1817*, 507. The last word is in the original text *Vorstellungen*. In English, for example, it is translated as *ideas*. However, the translation does not capture Hegel’s emphatic term *Idee*.

⁷⁹ Hegel (1970), *Werke 12: Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, 529.

rienced politicians, and “in a way also in the old estates of all Europe’s monarchies, and this still, for example in Sweden’s constitution, forms a foundation for representation in the Diet”.⁸⁰ To Hegel, the estates were the best representation of the state’s current great interests: “as in the previously mentioned example of Sweden, the estates of the nobility, the clergy, the burghers and the peasantry” represented the state.⁸¹

The Swedish Diet, therefore, represented in Hegel’s eyes a sensible union of freedom and tradition as a contrast to the goals of the French and the English. Prussia, unlike Sweden, did not enshrine the representation of the people in the law: Hegel had to be thankful for lesser forms of local representation as “the realisation of freedom” so that he would not come into direct conflict with the ruling house. Through his views, Hegel rounded out the earlier positions of his philosophy of right, but at the same time remained within the basic parameters it had set out.

Hegel received official support for his criticism of the English parliamentary reform, some of it published by *Allgemeine preussische Staatszeitung*, but he was surprised when he attended the crown prince’s lunch. He had already left behind his lectures on the philosophy of right; since 1825, he had passed this task to his follower Eduard Gans, who developed his ideas in a more openly liberal direction.⁸² Hegel heard from the heir to the throne that his protégé’s lectures were revolutionarily anti-monarchist and republican. Therefore, Hegel should again begin holding the lectures himself.

The reprimand hit a sore spot. In truth, the constitutional monarchy outlined by Hegel’s philosophy of right was not like the reality of autocratically governed Prussia. When Hegel was writing his book on this subject, he seems to have taken seriously the promise that in time Prussia would be given a constitution, which would set a seal on the reforms. The purpose of the philosophy of right was to present the whole matter with a foundation that was more solid than a mere promise, which Hegel had learned to treat with suspicion. This proposal did not mean opposition but giving substance to the issue. Hegel was famously opposed to utopias in the preface to his philosophy of right. Yet the fate of this book was to end up among them because the promise that had been made was not fulfilled; this was also the sad fate of many other gestures that had sought to calm Europe after the upheavals.

⁸⁰ Hegel (1970), *Werke 11: Berliner Schriften 1818-1831*, 106.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁸² See Gans (1971), Reissner (1965), Hoffheimer (1995).

The new lectures that had been requested by the highest authority never took place. Cholera arrived from Russia and, after it reached Berlin, Hegel died in December 1831.

Hegel in a Helsinki style

Tengström could not have known of these events in Berlin, yet they form an interesting point of comparison. At that time, only in Helsinki had Hegel become such a magnet for thoughts as in his home town. The university's arrival from Turku, where dreams had been buried in the town's ashes, to the country's new centre of power was a literal one: because the university building was not yet finished during Tengström's lectures, the Senate's rooms were allowed to be used for teaching. As a subject of the Russian Emperor, Tengström did not dare to refer to the Swedish Diet while lecturing even though it was more familiar to him than to Hegel, but he did present all that Hegel had felt to be essential to existence as a state in his work on the philosophy of right a decade ago.

In addition to the theory of state, Palmén listened to Tengström's introduction to philosophy. This was based on the second edition of Hegel's encyclopaedia, published in 1827, that was a broad presentation and assessment of various relations to reality – old metaphysics, empiricism, Kant, religious philosophy – and, of course, a revelation of Hegel's own idealism. This led Palmén to make 134 pages of notes, *Anteckningar vid Prof. Tengströms Föreläsningar öfver Inledningen till Philosophien samt högre Logiken, efter Hegel*. At different times Palmén worked on the transcribed versions of both of the lectures by Tengström that he followed: these have been preserved to our day.⁸³ He passed Tengström's verbal exam more easily than he had expected. In the summer cholera arrived in Helsinki and during the autumn term of 1831 the university was closed. When academic activity returned to normal, Palmén focused on his law studies.

⁸³ The matter is clear from the diary notes that have been preserved in his collection in the National Archive; in them he repeatedly comments on the lectures by Tengström that he followed in the academic year 1830-31.



*Johan Jakob Tengström (1787-1858).
Portrait by J. E. Lindh. Finnish Heri-
tage Agency.*

Before Hegel, the usual way to examine matters was to proceed towards discussion of states by beginning with their historical founders. Tengström had adopted Hegel's pursuit of an unlimited generality and accordingly he wanted to present something that concerned all states:

“In asking what is the Legal Foundation of a State, the view of Justice through which the State is realised and which forms that which sustains the State, the question is not addressed to how the State has been born historically. Such is due to many incidental conditions, as is shown for example by the United States of America, Rome or the Greek state. But our present concern is how they all have been born, thus not only their first birth but their continuing stability or, in other words, that which keeps them together.” (p. 4-5)

The new political connection with Russia and the fragility of Finland's own statehood would, of course, have been an excellent motivation for this kind of question regarding the prerequisites of stability for states, but Tengström did not allude to any such delicate matter in his public lectures. The students of a university that had been evicted from Turku by imperial command and was in the middle of large-scale construction work could be expected to know about such matters without a separate mention.

The time and place and the speaker's personal history exclude the possibility that Tengström would have been interested in this matter only by chance and from a purely theoretical point of view. The lectures include emphases, including silences, that show individual consideration and differ from Hegel to such a degree that Tengström cannot be considered a mere echo of him.

Tengström did not address Hegel's texts in the same way that the historian of today would do. Hegel was, after all, a notable contemporary thinker. His books were of interest because of the topical theoretical foundation they created, which was undoubtedly also political. Tengström placed his main emphasis on the issue, not the source, so that in the lectures Hegel's text and Tengström's own speech blend together inseparably. The listener received no hints as to which of them was speaking at what point: he was only told anonymously how matters stood and how they would develop. Today this way of lecturing would seem scandalous. It was not such in its time, and especially not when understood as a mannerism of Hegelian presentation. If Tengström's lectures are compared to the lectures of his contemporary Eduard Gans it can be seen that their styles were similar. Both received their ideas from Hegel but held the ideas to be more important than the person who originally presented them, propelling those ideas in directions that they had chosen. None of the listeners of the lectures could be presumed to have had the opportunity to separate the ideas of Hegel and Tengström when they were presented in this manner. To them, Tengström spoke with the authority of Hegel. This did not elevate Tengström's own reputation, but it did increase the weight of his words.

Tengström did not have the spark that moved Gans's students, yet in its place he could offer the benefits of his gravity when it came to important questions. Palmén, unused to the strange Hegelian cadence, complained about Tengström's flawed lecturing ability in annotations to his diary, yet then made appreciative mentions specifically of Tengström's lectures on the theory of the state.

As he proceeded to the more detailed examination of his topic, Tengström made it clear that he did not want to speak about states at all times and in all their forms but to discover what was characteristic of modern states. This Hegel had sought to do in the philosophy of right that Tengström was explaining to his students. The state was necessary to the shared human life of rational creatures. All should subject their individuality to the general will that was expressed in the laws of the state.

However, this union of wills was no random contract, targeted at an external goal and founded on the mutual agreement of those who entered into it freely. According to Hegel, ethical life – morality – was not founded on a contract, it was the goal itself. This was why marriage could not be seen as a mere contract. Hegel in the words of the philosophy of right:

“It is equally far from the truth to ground the nature of the state on the contractual relation, whether the state is supposed to be a contract of all with all, or of all with the monarch and the government. – The intrusion of this contractual relation, and relationships concerning private property in general, into the relationship between the individual and the state has caused the greatest muddles in both constitutional law and the reality of the state.”⁸⁴

Both marriage and the state belonged to ethical life, they were goals in themselves and not merely instruments belonging to the sphere of contracts, such as safety and the common good. According to Tengström, ethical life was the existing general will that had become a habit, as though it were second nature. It formed the “prevailing spirit” in the individual and the community that no one could ignore.

If the doctrine that claimed the contract was the foundation of the state was mistaken, then equally mistaken and for the same reason was Karl Ludwig von Haller’s claim that the state was born from the grace of the ruler. Law in general could not be founded on such an arbitrary act; it was not valid simply because of material superiority. According to Tengström, legislation “besides is not anything that belongs to the Ruler because extant law is born from the given conditions and not from a subjective realisation. . . .” (p. 29). It was left to be clarified later what this meant in practice.

The state was born as a manifestation of a union of families and their ethical life, but only by first taking a detour through the stage of a civil society independent of families. In addition to the family, this stage was the second foundational element of the state that gave its members “the freedom to satisfy their needs, freedom in sources of livelihood” (p. 14). Tengstrom explained the thinking of Adam Smith, which he had learned from Hegel, thus:

⁸⁴ Hegel (1952), § 75.

“ . . .when working to satisfy their needs citizens are civilised, develop themselves through their action towards formal universality; namely, they act really in their own interest, but in such a manner that this activity is also compatible with the interest of others, and the use of this civilisation or understanding advances with the development of industry.” (p. 14)

In other words, the state received its basic dynamics from freedom of livelihood in a bourgeois society and the development of industry that was tied to it. At the same time, the state also required an ethical life to be created in the family through education, as a result of which the individual would come to see his personal interest as being to a degree compatible with the common good. In turn, the general ethical will was expressed “through the laws of the state and the state order, and as soon as the nation has become aware of itself it progresses to establishing these at once” (p. 35). In this special sense, the state should be understood “as an ethical spirit that passes through the entirety”.

According to its highest definition, the state should be aware of itself as its own goal. In Tengström’s words, “One who wants an ethical life must want a state, and to truly want the state and its stability is to want it as independent of the individual’s own subjective ethicality. . .” The lecturer felt it necessary, however, to add a warning that it should not be “imagined that the state is above those individuals of whom it is formed” (p. 36).

From these elements Tengström arrived at his Hegelian definition of modern states:

“The principle of modern states, which is fostered by Christianity, is that subjectivity is allowed to develop by itself and to return through its free development to the essential oneness with the general, and in being allowed to develop itself it comes to understand the general. The strength of modern states lies in how each one is allowed to develop itself freely, whereas old states were *castes* that hindered the free development of subjectivity because they did not understand it as being compatible with the common good. Modern states are, therefore, on a higher level than old ones; the development of the subjective Right is understood as the Right of the State, - subjectivity has become aware of itself and the State recognises it.” (p. 38-39)

To Tengström – following Hegel – ethical will lost its Kantian universal meaning and became committed to the state. It was altogether impossible for it to not want the state. At the same time, Tengström emphasised that the state must be one, like the individual: the state must unite separate rights in its oneness. Therefore, it had to have a constitution that defined the state order. The stability of the state was founded on two factors: the prevailing national spirit on its subjective side, the state order on its objective side.

Tengström named the first of these factors as patriotism. It was the result of the state's institutions, a will that had transformed into habit, a frame of mind that involved trust in and awareness of the fact that the interests of the individual are preserved in the interests of the state. Hegel had reservations about nationalism; he was a theoretician of the state, not of nationality. Tengström, on the other hand, proposed that the realisation of the idea of the state, as well as its operation, were dependent on the development of patriotism.

Tengström was silent on Hegel's extensive arguments for the separation of church and state, which Hegel related to the religious frame of mind.

The state order involved, first, the legislative power that defined the "general", second, the governmental power comprised of the state's highest officials that applied this generality to the state's various spheres, and third, the princely power that brought everything together in one person. Together these formed the foundation of a rational state order in a modern constitutional monarchy.

Tengström mentioned that in recent times the word "constitution" must be understood especially to involve participation in state matters by those social classes that "mostly keep to their own particular concerns". In his opinion, the demand for such participation was double-edged and its sensibility depended on how far "the state itself has developed, or on general civilisation" (p. 45).

The comment was not surprising: the debate on constitutional government raged across Europe. More interesting than the reservations Tengström included was his way of joining the development of the state to the development of general education. There was a precedent for this in Hegel's claim that "the state order of a specific nation is in general dependent on the manner and the formation of its self-awareness" (§ 274). In Tengström's presentation, this view became a foundational way of thinking.

To Tengström, the state order was an expression of the nation's level of development, its general education. In this way, the real and the rational

were joined to each other, which meant that the rational should be something that “moves onward with its own strength, not as a violent rupture” (p. 49). Therefore, a constitution could not be “given” arbitrarily without regard for the historically developed degree of civilisation of the nation in question. This reiterated Hegel’s view that a constitution is not simply something that is made but the result of the work of centuries.

When speaking of the progress of general civilisation, Tengström also expressed a certain self-satisfaction: “England is usually referred to as the model of a developed state order; but with regard to citizenship and criminality as well as educational institutions (especially those for the lower classes), it is far behind the educated northern Europe.” (p. 65) Tengström did not repeat Hegel’s criticism of the doctrine of national sovereignty, the definition of the nation as “a *dim* image”, “an unformed mass” (§ 279) as distinct from an organised state.

On the recent demand for equality in the state order, Tengström stated, in an adaptation of Hegel’s view on humanity, that the recognition of others as persons was the result of humanity’s long development:

“In the very civilised states of Greece as well as in Rome, such a recognition did not exist in the sense that *slaves* were excluded from all. – When speaking of equality between men as the goal and the result of a state order, it is said that this equality is *natural*, and yet this equality is not from nature but the result of the spirit’s deepest principle, the generality and formation of awareness, and, therefore, it is the fruit of thought and a development of the right.” (p. 48)

The Ruler, the Government and Legislative Power

“In a true state all powers are united in the person of the ruler, and he is their highest truth.” (p. 48)

With these words Tengström led his listeners towards the analysis of the ruler’s power, which had to be understood with regard to the entirety.

In modern states every right had to originate in the power of the entirety, in the sense that “specific powers become ever more separate but are at the same time held together” (p. 51). This was not the case in the past, for example in the mediaeval states that were collections of corporations and where the estates with their privileges were not yet subjected

to the general but independent of it. The patriarchal form of government was not, according to this principle, a developed state, and neither was democracy, the participation of all in opposition to the principle of the distribution of power.

In addition to the ability to diverge yet remain united, this meant that different organs of the state should belong to the state, not be bound to individuals who were in charge of affairs or transformed into private property. Individuals should have their places in them according to their general and objective qualities. Therefore, state positions could not belong to any specific estate.

These two sides formed the modern state's "internal sovereignty". This might be confused with despotism, but Tengström assured his listeners that it was its direct opposite. Hegel had written that "despotism means any state of affairs where law has disappeared and where the particular will as such, whether of a monarch or a mob (ochlocracy), counts as law or rather takes the place of the law" (§ 278). Sovereignty, on the other hand, referred specifically to the observation of legal, constitutional forms.

The position of the monarch was not based on any form of divine right but on the same conditions as the stability of the state in general. From the perspective of subjectivity, it involved mutual trust and the specific national spirit that would result from it, love for *one* individual among the many out of whom power is formed. This spirit, according to Tengström, guaranteed the stability of the state better than the hereditary principle that was discussed by Hegel. Tengström did mention heredity, but he left untouched the paragraphs concerning the monarch's birth-right and right of inheritance, as well as the royal succession that was part of the monarchical state order.

The objective side of the prince's power was formed first of the ultimate decision-making power that ratifies and enacts laws, second of the prince's right to choose his councillors and his power to pardon. This power was "absolute autonomy" in the sense that the monarch had been freed of all accountability, whereas all his councillors were accountable.

The subjective and the objective side should be joined here, too. Tengström proposed: "The *third* side of the prince's power involves in itself and for itself the *general*, which from the subjective position consists of *the monarch's conscience*, from the objective position of *the state order's entirety* and *laws*. The prince's power in its reality is located in the monarch's conscience, which requires and wants laws and state order." Tengström added, "The prince cannot want anything other than the development of

the state order, which forms the definition of his power.” (p. 57)

The division of power formed the objective guarantee of the preservation of the state and of the monarch’s power, to the degree that it could be secured externally. Because a constitution secured the monarch’s position, the monarch had to want a constitution rather than arbitrary power. Drawing on Hegel but being more direct than he had been, Tengström presented the sharing of power as a fundamental prerequisite of the stability of the modern state:

“In mediaeval Feudal Monarchies, as in both older and newer despotic Asian states (in Europe, Turkey), there is an endless series of revolutions and dreadful upheavals because they have the flaw that the division of the state’s activities is mechanical, or the parts are not separated from each other by their definition and form but by a greater and lesser amount of power. The Grand Sultan is the highest, and the pashas nonetheless have in the provinces the exact same power as he, though less of it. The division of state powers in the developed states of the new era forms precisely this guarantee of the stability of the state in an objective sense.” (p. 57)

The organic division of state power protected the prince from precisely these upheavals, as a result of which the development of the state order towards constitutional monarchy also became the will of the monarch. Tengström held on tightly to his principles: he also observed that Daniel Boëthius, the Swedish natural law theoretician, added a special legislative power to the prince’s power, but this was not acceptable because “the law cannot in its general meaning be born from an individual decision. . .” (p. 58).

The realisation and the maintenance of laws, especially their subjection to the general, belonged to the administrative power, the judicial branch and the police. In relation to this, Hegel had also addressed corporations, but Tengström, on the contrary, noted that “only on the lowest level of civilisation” (p. 59) can emphasis be laid on corporations.

The acts of officials were by their nature objective, defined by the thing itself, so Tengström felt, like Hegel, that individuals who carry out government should be required to have skills needed for the task. Birth was not allowed to determine the distribution of these tasks. According to him, the road to officialdom, the “general estate” responsible for government, should be open “to every individual citizen” (p. 59).

Officials should observe their duties. This required them to have a certain moral frame of mind. On the other hand, it was not their place to seek general popularity by becoming “interpreters of justice”, something that only appeared in primitive social conditions. Officials needed ethical and intellectual civilisation, a sense of duties and freedoms, and they should act with freedom from passions, ties of family and kin, and partiality.

When speaking of the responsibility of officials, Tengström diverged from Hegel by adding a mention of developed forms of state “in which the *estates* review the defects of officials’ service” (p. 61). When Hegel concluded his section 295 on this topic with a reference to interventions from a higher position and one such act by Frederick the Great (that is, with accountability to the monarch), Tengström also brought out the possibility of control derived from the opposite source, the estates.

Further complementing Hegel, Tengström proposed that individuals who are active in government form the majority of the middle estate and represent the mass of the people righteously: “They are from the people and in them the people’s awareness of justice sees itself.” (p. 62)

When beginning his treatment of actual legislative power, Tengström stated at once that laws are born from the people. This idea was in keeping with Hegel’s view of legal norms and habits, their refinement and rationalisation, but it was Tengström’s addition to characterise habits as belonging specifically to “the people”. So that traditional definitions would turn into extant, valid laws, they first had to be reviewed within the domain of legislative power, which required the use of legal expertise. In this the people could not take part, but their consent was required. “In order to serve as a power such as gave laws its consent”, Tengström explained, “the people must be formed through the constitution (*statsförfattning*) and the constitutional laws themselves (*grundlagarne*) must be realised their manner of thinking and wanting.” (p. 63)

Moving beyond Hegel again, Tengström claimed that the people (*folket*) knew most intimately and best the matters related to them. Yet it was not possible to separate the people from the entirety of the state, so “the entire state order is also indirectly under the same review” (p. 63). Thus, it also had to be essentially founded on the consent of the people. This can be compared to the view expressed by Hegel in his philosophy of right, according to which the people (*Volk*) refers in the state to “that part that does not know what it wants” (§ 301). Hegel was convinced that the rational will was “the result of profound knowledge and understanding that is hardly the concern of the people”. Hegel, who had had enough of

the anti-Napoleonic nationalism of the German Wars of Liberation and its heirs, was positively afraid of the “elemental, irrational, wild” (§ 303) people, but Tengström simply ignored a section that referred to this.

Furthermore, the people’s actual legislative power had to be responsible for establishing taxation. The needs of the state were the basis of taxation, but it had to be just and apply to all. Neither Tengström nor Hegel acknowledged a privileged class freed from taxes.

Legislative power existed in the estates. According to Tengström, it was obvious that in all states where the rule of law prevailed the people are “as such prescriptive of the law, and especially prescriptive of the law they are particularly in those states in which they are represented through the estates. . . .” (p. 64). The estates were part of the state’s development and they were necessary. They also realised subjective freedom and the need for a meaningful life for individual persons. When the individual will was given an opportunity to prove general in this manner, then “the ethical spirit that forms the main prerequisite of the state’s stability comes alive” (p. 66).

Following Hegel, Tengström set out three main estates: landowners, merchants in civil society and officials. It is among the ironies of history that even as Tengström referred to Hegel’s theory of the three estates, Hegel himself elevated the Swedish system of the four estates as an example for Europe. Hegel had no particular fondness for the clergy that Tengström now left out, but the Swedish model nonetheless served him as an example of the need for popular representation to be built on an organic foundation that had grown historically.

However, neither Hegel nor Tengström identified this foundation with tradition, as in the historical school of law during the Romanticism: it was still a matter of reason. For example, when speaking of landowners neither noted a difference between the nobility and the peasantry, and in general they avoided the term nobility. In their structure, landowners formed an estate with a natural ethicality that was founded on family life. This estate was stationary and took care of its property according to its natural will, which was independent of other estates, the wealth of state and the search for profit that led to change. Therefore, all states included such a landowning estate. The most opposed to the state and at the same time the most in need of its reinforcement were the mobile element of civil society, the merchants. Tengström expressed particular concern that officials should not be shut out of shared gatherings of the estates. The execution of justice belonged to this general estate; it had relevant information about the interests of the state, which was to be brought to Diet meetings and thus made public.

The members of the Diet (*deputerade*) were no proxies in the sense that they would be bound to a contract. Instructions were also impossible because they would take part in meetings in which questions would come up that could not have been predicted. Where Hegel sketched out for representatives a foundation of corporate guilds and professions, Tengström placed greater emphasis on the naming of representatives as a display of the general trust they had earned. This trust was born from skill that surpassed others, understanding of the organisations of the state and civil society, and a stately frame of mind. Basing representation on property as in ancient Rome or contemporary France was, if not meaningless, then at least shallow as a demand because “even a great fortune is not enough to render one qualified as a distinguished member of an estate” (p. 72).

Like Hegel, Tengström presented the structure of the Diet as bicameral. On this point Tengström’s presentation was very unclear, but he at least seems to have planned for landowners to be in the upper house and merchants in the other chamber.

To both Hegel and Tengström, the consultations of the estates were to be public. Central to this, according to their view, was that in this way the estates’ gatherings had an effect of civilising the people – in Tengström’s words – “with those higher views that state officials have of the interests of the state” (p. 75), and at the same time officials received appreciation and honour in the noblest manner. It almost seems as if the purpose of such a lecture would have been to encourage the future officials in the audience to become supporters of the Diet system.

However, public recognition could not be expected from contemporaries for such ideas because the era had not yet learned to see the strength that could be found in them. Nothing truly great was possible without going beyond what it was possible to acknowledge in public at that time. Like Hegel, Tengström felt that the more rational the state order and the stronger the government, the greater the freedom of publicity – of communication, speech and the press – that would be possible. If those who belonged to the state were civilised, extremes would be punished by expressions of contempt in this area of publicity, which was difficult to regulate.

After dealing thus with matters regarding the state’s internal sovereignty, Tengström proceeded, following in Hegel’s footsteps, to the external sovereignty of the state. It involved

“. . . a necessary aspiration to define oneself externally or *in relation to other states*, from which is born independence (*sjelfständighet*), which makes it possible for the state to look at its own existence. This independence is the state's first freedom and highest honour. It is a contradiction to speak of a nation that wants to lose its independence; because the nation that is independent or recognised by others cannot rationally want to be *without* recognition, just as little as an individual recognised as free by others can want to be without recognition, if he knows what he wants.” (p. 82)

To Hegel, independence was “the nation's most fundamental freedom and highest honour” (§ 322). Unlike in his other sections, here Hegel did not hesitate to speak of the nation. Hegel also referred to the possibility of the state forming an entity with another state, but finally he determined that those who speak of such “know little about the sense of wholeness and self-esteem that the nation has in its sovereignty”.

Tengström mentioned nothing about this. Instead, he returned to the topic a little later, with words that were somewhat puzzling, when speaking of the recognition of the state's existence by other states. This recognition involved “independence only to the degree to which the state is developed in its state order and condition; like recognition, the degree to which it includes the oneness of two states depends on the motives of the other state” (p. 89-90). Therefore, external recognition was not enough by itself for independence. The internal sophistication of the recognised state was also needed, in the same way that the individual needed to be sophisticated in order to grow into sovereignty. In the case of the “oneness” of two states, the matter still depended on the motives of the other, with the possibilities relating to this left unaddressed by Tengström.

All banal nationalist feeling was alien to Hegel, who emphasised reason. Yet in his philosophy of right he did talk about the defence of independence during war and the ethics it required. The purpose of civil society was the preservation of life and property, but if the state itself was in danger, the demands of ethical life were positioned differently. Then one must “expose to danger one's own possessions and life, as well as one's opinions and all else that naturally belongs within the sphere of life” (§ 324).

Tengström had fully adopted this ethics of preparedness for sacrifice and reiterated it in Hegel's words:

“In this manner, the interest of the individual is positioned as perishable matter, the realisation of individual individuality is positioned as the individual’s highest duty in the recognition of the state, in which the individual has his reality as a free, rational being. . . . This recognition of the state as something that creates obligation is the sacrifice of individual individuality for the stability of this highest individuality. . .” (p. 83)

In Prussia, universal military conscription had been implemented and self-sacrifice for the state was, in Hegel’s words, “*a universal duty*” (§ 325). It was such also from Tengström’s point of view: “. . . when the state as such, meaning its independence, is in danger, duty calls all its citizens to defence” (p. 85).

Where Hegel continued on courage, Tengström, however, proceeded to a discussion of officialdom. Duty was not only a matter of wartime situations. The scrupulous observation of the forms of government, without regard for one’s own self, interests and subjective opinion, was of the same self-defined ethicality as the defence of independence: “This kind of self-restraint also includes courage, tenacity, which surely is as worthy of respect as that required in defending the state against enemies. The work of an official, which appears mechanical on the outside, thus is actually an expression of the highest internal independence. . .” (p. 87) States’ external recognition of each other was merely the formal side because “the legitimacy of the state is essentially an *internal* matter” (p. 90).

The agreements between states, tracts, formed the foundation of international law. However, in addition to rights, agreements always included the possibility of wrongdoing; therefore, states would be in a natural condition of potential conflicts of interests in relation to each other “as long as there is no question of an organisation or an institution that would end the possibility of breaking agreements” (p. 91). Hegel did not have such an institution in his sight; neither was Tengström ultimately able to say anything other than that there must also be “a higher imperative, which in relation to the state forms a higher spirit, the kind in which providence manifests over the course of all world history” (p. 94).

In art, religion and philosophy, “humankind’s awareness of itself” was developed (p. 100). Despite everything, Tengström defined world history as “the highest confirmation of how the Right endures, or of the endurance of all individual Right” (p. 99).

One Nation, One State

Tengström's lectures on the state in 1830-31 coincided with a European period of upheaval. For Finland, it was naturally significant that in another country subject to Russia, Poland, the explosive situation broke out into open rebellion. Of course, censorship was also fully active in Finland and information was slow to get through, yet it did arrive nonetheless. Authorities would certainly see to it that information spread in Finland about the decisive manner in which the rebellion was crushed.

In 1831, Palmén noted in his diary on 9 March that he had heard "*a rumour about a Polish toast*", underlined. On 30 April, he made a note about the nightly student unrest related to the celebration of Russian Easter. The rector of the university and other bureaucrats had arrived to calm down the situation. Palmén noted how fast information about what had happened and fear related to these events had spread in the town.⁸⁵ A little later he noticed that students of philosophy were rushing up their exams in fear. It did not seem in any way impossible that the university, which had only recently been moved to Helsinki and operated in temporary accommodation, would be closed down. Considering this, the year was truly a dangerous one for Finland. However, on 7 May, Palmén mentioned that he had received information that "our university will continue". On 19 May, he finally passed the exam by Tengström.

Was Tengström even aware of how sensitive were the issues that he talked about? He was in no way inexperienced, and neither do his lectures give the impression that he would merely have repeated a Hegelian mantra. Surely, news must have reached him of the upheaval in Europe, as it reached Hegel in Berlin. Perhaps Tengström's lectures were what he felt to be a necessary intervention in Finland, comparable to Hegel's writings at the same time on English parliamentary reform, which surely also had a domestic message.

By the end of the spring of 1831, there was ferment in Helsinki and St. Petersburg due to the need to have students under control because of the "Polish toast" and the events of Easter Eve. At least by this point Tengström must have understood how thin was the ice that he had dared to step on. It is possible that his lectures on political philosophy, in the form described here and as intended for a large audience, were a unique event. From 1834 to the end of his work as a teacher in 1847, he did continue

⁸⁵ Much has been written on these events, see Klinge (1969), 15-21. However, information of Tengström's lectures at this time was still missing.

his introductions to Hegel's philosophy of right but in private lectures to more advanced students. This was not in conflict with the idea he had adopted of the official as an anti-rabbleroising educator.

There is no reason to suspect that Tengström might have abandoned his views. They would not have been suited for print. In safe conversation, as when he was among the Saturday Society's circle of friends, he surely did not remain silent. For example, Runeberg's *Fänrik Ståls Sägner* can be seen as an illustration of Tengström's ethics of self-sacrifice.⁸⁶ It can be considered a deliberate choice that Tengström mentioned neither Finland nor Russia in his lectures. They are also not mentioned in Snellman's work on the state, and neither did Hegel's philosophy of right acknowledge Prussia, even though in all these cases the authors had something to say about their own societies.

In his 1836 history of the university, Tengström addressed the issue by proposing that Finns had, even in patriarchal conditions as a subject nation, preserved their nationality and through their own efforts claimed their share of the civilisation of Europe's most respected nations. Therefore, Finns could appreciate their good luck in being part "of a large state and through it a system of states in which high politics does not merely allow but encourages it to remain faithful to its assigned nature, and by precisely this means to be responsible in their limited position for what is the most valued in the Entirety and for its sake".⁸⁷

A freer expression of speech, from a different era when societies were on the move again, was found in his letter to Snellman on 18 January 1848:

⁸⁶ "To die for the fatherland and one's beloved is the highest stage of freedom because it unites all four elements, love, freedom, the state and death." Pertti Karkama (1982), 156. Runeberg had numerous sources, but this summary by Karkama captures the same view that Tengström expressed clearly in his lectures. This thought is one of the culminations of Snellman's work on the idea of personality. Military aggression was not included in this defensive idea, as Finland was seen to have won for itself only the victories of civilisation and to be able to build its future on such. Gunnar Tideström (1941) sought to describe Tengström's meaning to Runeberg, but he could not go all the way because he was only familiar with Tengström's professorial dissertation.

⁸⁷ Tengström (1836), 323.

“Nationalist movements within nations also belong, according to my view, to the realisation of a single state: One nation, One State.” But he continued: “. . . national Finnish culture will not reach beyond its present ethico-religious stage until it elevates itself to industry. The external prerequisite is population growth, the farming of the land, industrial connections and communications, education, the cultivation of understanding, practical education. In order to achieve these, a protective power is required.”⁸⁸ (SA VI, 703)

There might be discussion about the time and the practical conditions required in order for this goal to be reached, but the shared starting point was the idea of the necessity of national independence that was clearly defined by Tengström in the winter of 1830-31 and conveyed to his connections. The rational person did not, according to his words, make his entrance through violence but by making the already extant more rational. In Tengström’s teaching, the building of the nation always meant the building of the state.

Tengström led several generations of students to Hegelianism when he guided them towards a new kind of educated officialdom. In their studies, they came to know that the internal sophistication of the modern state, the general level of education, the national spirit, the Diet of the Estates, the constitutional form of government, an independent and capable officialdom, and, more remotely, national independence were all interconnected. To act for one was, at the same time, also to act for the others and for the entirety. The new teaching about the state set these as the goals, not merely as the means. It defined a programme. By strengthening each individual element, a spiritual resistance was created even against great material superiority: an “internal sovereignty” in keeping with the idea of the modern state and its institutions.

⁸⁸ For more on Tengström’s and Snellman’s exchange of opinions and its background, see Manninen (1986a), 151-155.

2.4. J. V. Snellman's Career: Philosopher, Journalist, Senator

In 1822 three young men started their education in the Academy of Turku. Elias Lönnrot studied medicine, but became the most important collector and compiler of Finnish folklore. Johan Ludvig Runeberg became the national poet and Johan Vilhelm Snellman the national philosopher of Finland.

Docent

Johan Vilhelm Snellman was born on May 12, 1806, in the harbour of Stockholm on a frigate *Patience*, where his father served as first mate.⁸⁹ The father Christian Henrik Snellman (1777-1855) was from a Swedish-speaking Finnish clerical family, educated in Uppsala with strong interest in the mystical teachings of Swedenborg, but had a profession as a sea captain. At the time of Johan Vilhelm's birth, the family lived in a wooden house in Södermalm, Stockholm. The family moved back to Finland to the coastal town of Kokkola in 1813, where Johan Vilhelm spent three years before he went to school in Oulu. At the age of 16 the young Snellman enrolled in Turku to study theology. He participated in the student life in the Ostrobothnian nation (regional student association), and was influenced by the Turku Romanticism, following lectures on history by Avellan, Latin by Linsén, and ethics by A. J. Lagus. When Tengström became professor of practical philosophy in 1827, Snellman changed his major subject to philosophy. His deeply religious father did not fully appreciate this move, but continued to support the son's activities.

Studies in philosophy with Tengström started in 1828 in the new environment in Helsinki, where Snellman lived in the same student apartment with Runeberg and Fredrik Cygnaeus (later professor of aesthetics). In 1831 he finished his master's degree in eleven subjects, with the highest grades in theoretical and practical philosophy. In 1831-37 he was an active member of the Saturday Society, a free association led originally by J. L. Runeberg and his wife Fredrika (archbishop Tengström's niece), Johan Jacob Nervander (later professor of physics), Johan Jacob Nordström

⁸⁹ For biographies of J. V. Snellman, see Rein (1928), Salomaa (1944), Savolainen (2006), and Jalava (2006). See also Kallio (2021).

(professor of political economics), and Zachris Topelius (later professor of history) to discuss political and cultural questions.

In 1834, Snellman was elected curator of the Ostrobothnian nation, and as a student leader he demanded discipline and responsibility from his fellows but also stubbornly defended the autonomy of the academic life against the conservative ideology of the university authorities. The new statutes of the Imperial Alexander University in 1828 had reconfirmed its direct subordination to the Emperor's "special protection", and the task of the university was defined to "promote the development of sciences and the liberal arts in Finland, and to educate the youth of the country in the service of the Emperor and the fatherland".⁹⁰ Student protests and academic dissent were delicate matters in the Russian empire, since in 1832 (the same year when the new Main Building of the university was constructed in Helsinki), the Emperor Nicholas I decided to close the University of Vilnius.

Snellman, who worked part time as teacher in high school and private families, promoted his academic career with a dissertation defending Hegel's system against the critique by B. G. Jäsche and C. H. Weisse. *Dissertatio academica absolutismum systematis Hegeliani defensura* was published in 1835, and thereby Snellman gained an appointment as docent of philosophy in the same year. In his first lectures on logic in 1835 Snellman praised his own university as a place where "the deep significance of Hegel's speculation has been understood", possibly with less dependence on authorities than "in the nearness of the overwhelming personality of a genius". In 1836, he published a second dissertation, *De vi disciplinae philosophicae Leibnizii historica meditationes*, on the relations of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. On the basis of his lectures Snellman prepared in 1837 two textbooks, *Försök till framställning af logiken*, on logic as "a science of pure thought", divided into doctrines of being, essence, and concept,⁹¹ and *Psykologi*, on "the science of subjective spirit as spirit". These ambitious but not entirely successful attempts to present and even correct the difficult ideas of Hegel's intricate system as a "philosophical elementary course" were continued in 1840 by two further texts, *Logiken* (Logic) and *Rättsläran* (Philosophy of Right), published in Stockholm.

In the fall of 1837, Snellman interrupted his lectures on logic and asked permission to give three lectures on "the true meaning and essence of academic freedom". Rector F. W. Pipping feared that the controver-

⁹⁰ See Klinge (2010), 290.

⁹¹ See Manninen (1987c).

sial topic might encourage student unrest and declined Snellman's right to announce these lectures publicly, even though private lectures might be permitted. In his letter to Acting Chancellor R. H. Rehbinder in St. Petersburg, Pipping characterized Snellman as "a dangerous leader of the academic youth", who finds satisfaction from being "a martyr of truth and freedom". Snellman wrote a complaint to the consistorium about the rector's negative decision, but without success. Pro-Chancellor A. A. Thesleff threatened the young docent with serious consequences, and in Rehbinder's letter of February 1838 the "inconsiderate and disobedient" philosopher was forbidden to give these lectures and to publish the lecture manuscript on academic freedom.⁹²

Another dispute concerning the role of the nations, and Snellman's defiant request to be relieved from the appointment as the curator of the new Northern Ostrobothnian nation in January 1838, led to a debate in the consistorium and eventually a judicial action against him, and in the end of 1838 he was suspended from his docent position for six months. In the summer of 1839, the court of appeal made its final decision and granted Snellman the right to publish the protocols of the case, which took place in December 1841.⁹³

In his clash with the university authorities, Snellman was bold and unyielding. The students had opposed the splitting of the Ostrobothnian nation and therefore did not propose the curator, and Snellman was ready to risk his career by defending their right. In spite of the rector's public reprimand, he refused to accomplish the acts of a curator, since he argued that the consistorium has no right to order a docent for this task. The rector charged Snellman for neglect of duties and disobedience, and in the meeting of the consistorium on February 2, 1838, seven professors were on Snellman's side and ten against him. Snellman was then accused

⁹² The lecture manuscript is published in original Swedish in Snellman's *Samlade arbeten* I (1992), 615-630, with a commentary by Juha Manninen, 779-785, and in Finnish translation in Snellman's *Kootut teokset* I (2000), 344-363. Hereafter we refer to these collections as SA and KT, respectively.

⁹³ *Rättegångs-Handlingar uti ett emot Magister Docens Johan Wilhelm Snellman utfördt mål, om ansvar för fel och förseelse i tjensten* (Helsingfors, 1841). See SA II, 406-467, KT I, 436-506. For summaries of the case, see Rein (1928), 118-127, and Savolainen (2006), 191-197. Savolainen mistakenly tells that the court of appeal sentenced Snellman to six months suspension.

of misconduct in office, but the uncompromising docent continued to argue that he had the right to decide whether he complies to the commands of the consistorium or not. He continued in his rejoinder that the university should lead the youth “from childish belief in authorities to independent conviction . . . and to law-abiding based on the law’s rational necessity” (KT 1, 452). On November 3, 1838, the consistorium convened to decide about the sanctions, concluding that Snellman will be suspended for six months and lose his scholarship. His strongest defenders were J. J. Nordström (law) and Gabriel Rein (history), while A. A. Laurell (dogmatics) and J. J. Tengström (philosophy) had moderate positions. His hardest critics included J. G. Linsén (Latin), M. Sundwall (theological ethics), and vice-rector N. A. Ursin (medicine), who thought that Snellman’s principle of disobedience would “demolish all social order”. It is remarkable that Snellman was judged by the ordinary professors of his home university, and some of them were his friends from the Saturday Society. The irritation about Snellman’s “mocking” speeches, up to the demand about the dismissal of a promising scholar from academic teaching, seems to have been motivated by conservatism and opportunism under political pressure. But it is also clear that ethical principles and practices for public officials were not yet well developed. Both the university and Snellman drew the case to the court of appeal in Turku, which gave its verdict in the summer of 1839: fine of 48 silver rubles for obstinacy and disobedience. The outcome was a loss for the ambitious philosopher, but he had proved to his academic colleagues a serious and courageous commitment to an ethical stance as a key element of his character. By these events Snellman also gained respect and admiration among the youth.⁹⁴

Journeys: Stockholm and Germany

After several failed applications Snellman was granted in September 1839 the permission to be absent and travel abroad for two years. So in the end of 1839 the contentious philosopher moved to Stockholm and sent from there bitter comments to his friends on the bicentennial celebrations of his home university in the summer of 1840 as “dances in a funeral”. Besides editing and writing three volumes of the literary journal *Spanska*

⁹⁴ On the negative side, as Snellman tended to be very sure about his opinions, many of his friends and follies during his later career had to withstand his short-tempered combative behavior.

flugan, which appeared in 1839-41, and publishing in 1840 a novel *Det går an, en tafla ur lifvet* against C. L. J. Almqvist's idea of "free love", Snellman participated in political debates in the Swedish journal *Freja*.

In the summer of 1840, Snellman started his tour via Copenhagen to Germany where during one year he visited universities and met other members of the Hegelian school. His travel went via Hamburg and Heidelberg to Stuttgart, where he met David Strauss, and then settled down in Tübingen for seven months. In the fall of 1840, Snellman published in Stockholm his essay *Om det akademiska studium*, a revised version of his forbidden 1837 lectures,⁹⁵ but by the Emperor's decision the import of the book to Finland was not allowed.⁹⁶ In the spring of 1841, he published in Tübingen his major work *Versuch einer speculativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit* on the Hegelian philosophy of spirit and religion⁹⁷. Thereafter his journey continued via the Alps to Munich, where he met Friedrich Schelling, and then via Vienna to Berlin, where he met Carl Ludwig Michelet, and finally back to Stockholm in September 1841. Snellman published in May 1842 the book *Tyskland* on his journey to Germany,⁹⁸ and in November 1842, just before his return to Helsinki, *Läran om staten*, his main work on the theory of the state.⁹⁹ So during his two years voluntary exile, at the peak of his creative talents, Snellman was able to write and publish three of his most important philosophical works.

Journalist

When Snellman returned to Helsinki from his journeys to Sweden and Germany, he was a mature philosopher at the age of 36 years. As there were no prospects for an academic career in Finland, he thought of the possibility of moving to Berlin. But in the summer of 1843 Snellman accepted the position as a headmaster of a higher elementary school in Kuopio in Eastern Finland, where he started his campaign for national awakening in the Finnish journal *Maamiehen ystävä* (Farmer's compan-

⁹⁵ See SA II, 152-171, with a commentary by Juha Manninen; KT 2, 452-476.

⁹⁶ However, the book found its way to the library of the student nations in Helsinki.

⁹⁷ See Ch. 2.6 below.

⁹⁸ See Snellman (1984).

⁹⁹ See Ch. 2.7 below.

ion) and the Swedish-language journal *Saima* (appeared in 1844-46). In order to build Finland as a nation state with a “national spirit”, Snellman argued in many articles, the educated class should adopt Finnish as their language. When the censure banned the publication of *Saima*, Snellman with the help of Lönnrot started a new journal *Litteraturblad för allmän medborgerlig bildning*.

Snellman sent his application to the professor of practical philosophy in Lund in 1845, but withdraw it when Tengström and Nervander warned him that later return to Finland might not be allowed. In the same year he married in Kuopio a pharmacist's daughter Johanna Lovisa (Jeanette) Wennberg (1828-57). In 1847, he made his second long journey abroad to Germany, France, and England. In 1849, Snellman withdrew his application to professor in Uppsala, since “a man's obligation is to serve his own country in good and bad times”. The most dramatic loss of academic aspirations had taken place in Helsinki, when after Tengström's retirement in 1848 the consistorium placed Snellman first among the candidates. His dissertation for professorship, *De spiritus ad materiam relatione*, dealt with the relation of spirit and matter, showing his interest in the philosophy of nature. Yet in 1849 the Emperor Nicholas I appointed Germund Fredrik Aminoff (1796-1876), assistant of philosophy since 1831, whose merits were clearly meager than Snellman's. Aminoff had studied in Uppsala, written in 1830 on philosophical skepticism in Hegelian spirit, and his dissertation for the professorship dealt with the notion of “absolute honesty”. The decision was political: Europe had just witnessed “the crazy year” of 1848, Snellman had the reputation of being a radical journalist with difficulties with the censure, while Aminoff had worked in the censure and was known to be more loyal to the authorities. But Aminoff's period as professor lasted only three years,¹⁰⁰ since in 1852 all chairs of philosophy – as seats of revolutionary ideas – were closed in the universities in the Russian empire.

In 1849 Snellman moved with his family back to Helsinki to a relatively modest office work. But the death of Nicholas I and the reign of a more liberal Emperor Alexander II in March 1855 suddenly opened up new possibilities. Snellman was able to continue his work with *Litteraturblad*. The new Pro-Chancellor J. R. Munck asked him to serve as his secretary,

¹⁰⁰ During Aminoff's period as professor, three doctoral theses on Hegel were defended: Fabian Collan (1850) on logic, Robert Lagus (1852) and Carl Immanuel Qvist (1853) on the philosophy of right. See Manninen (1986a), 156-158, (1996a), 236-238.

but Snellman proposed to Munck that he is appointed to an extraordinary professorship of “hodegetics” with the task of advising students to good manners and to industrious and enthusiastic studies. In November Snellman negotiated in St. Petersburg with the minister state secretary Alexander Armfelt that the strange title is changed to “ethics and the system of the sciences”. Without mentioning the word “philosophy”, Snellman stated that this will rehabilitate “a discipline whose deportation from the university has created surprise and sorrow” – and added that he expects to have the same freedom of teaching as other professors. It is indeed clear that the title of the new chair covered both practical and theoretical philosophy, and in 1860 it was again changed to “philosophy”.

Professor 1856-63

Snellman was appointed as professor on January 30, 1856. The new professor gave his inaugural lecture “On the system of the sciences” on May 14, 1856, two days after his fiftieth birthday.¹⁰¹ Snellman argued that “science is systematic knowledge” which cannot be just a collection of separate empirical experiments. Curiosity wishes to know what various things are, but it is more important “to know what place that thing has in the world and to understand its lawlike causes, the grounds of its existence, and its purpose”. To understand the unity of science one has to study the relations between scientific disciplines. Therefore, the system of the sciences is “a science of science”. As long as there is rational inquiry, there will be philosophy which studies the meaning of the most general concepts like concept, judgment, right, virtue, science, art, matter, life, organism, perception, understanding, reason, and will. In later terms, Snellman is here describing the task of the philosophy of science.

¹⁰¹ See SA VII, 542-547, *KT* 13, 258-265.

Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806-81). Portrait by Bernhard Reinhold. Helsinki University Museum, photo by Matti Ruotsalainen.



Snellman interpreted Hegel's principle that "reality is rational" so that we should not arrogantly emphasize the advancement of the present in relation to the past, but rather seek rational grounds also for those developments that can be held as errors in science. In this way we learn to avoid repeating mistakes. Hegel's influence can be seen also in the dynamic picture of scientific change which will never come to an end.

"Each age has its own systems of knowledge which include its *own* truth. There does not exist a complete system valid in all times, and the humans will never reach such a system. That would mean the death of science, just as complete knowledge would end the whole of human spiritual life. Science is living, not the dead letter in printed products, not even a word sealed in the memory, but rather itself the continuous spiritual work, grasping and systematizing. There is no standing still in the life of human spirit. Nor can that be found in sciences and systems either.

Like many objective idealists, Snellman favoured the coherence theory of truth ("knowledge should agree with itself without contradictions") instead of the "superficial" correspondence theory ("knowledge should agree with its object") (KT 14, 320). But his dynamic account of scientific progress does not reduce simply to a sequence of internally coherent systems. Even though a complete system of knowledge is never reached, this

does not mean that truth is only a limit to which science as it were converges. To say that each age has its own truths is not a purely relativistic position, either, since Snellman thinks that there is some general or universal truth immanently present in all scientific systems. Here Snellman offers an original alternative to some later philosophical views inspired by Hegel, such as the American pragmatist Charles Peirce's thesis that truth is "the limit of inquiry", the Marxist doctrine of "the dialectics of absolute and relative truth", and the British Hegelian F. C. Bradley's theory of "degrees of truth and falsity".

Snellman complained that having been out of philosophical research for 14 years the tasks of a professor are heavy. In the summer of 1857, he lost his wife to childbed fever, and had to take care of his five small children. But he hoped that by his example he can show to the young generation his "love for knowledge and fatherland". During his almost seven years as university professor Snellman gave altogether nineteen lecture courses on many fields of practical and theoretical philosophy, such as academic studies, abstract theory of justice, obligations, practical ethics, psychology, pedagogic, history of the philosophy of law, history of social studies, and political science.¹⁰² Snellman's first course "On academic studies" in the fall of 1856 is especially interesting, since it was professor's rematch for the lectures forbidden two decades earlier.¹⁰³ His basic starting point was Hegel's system, which he followed in most lectures but was also ready to criticize when he disagreed with the master. Hegel's logic he taught to the best students in private lessons. In 1860-61 he acted also as professor of education.

As an active professor, Snellman's most important achievement was to promote philosophy as "a science of science" in the centre of the academic life. At the same time, he also wrote sharply polemical articles and reviews for *Litteraturblad* on many national, social, and cultural questions.¹⁰⁴ Besides his lectures, he did not publish new books or essays on philosophical issues. However, in 1862 he wrote two articles for the journal *Der Gedanke* of the Berlin Hegelians, but for some reason they were not published.¹⁰⁵ One of them defended Kantian duty ethics against eudaimonism, and the other discussed the relations of national and international justice.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² The lecture manuscripts are published in SA VII-X and KT 13-19.

¹⁰³ See Ch. 2.5.

¹⁰⁴ See Chapter 3.11 below.

¹⁰⁵ The original German versions are published in SA XI.1, 439-443, 444-460, and the Finnish translations in KT 19, 266-289.

¹⁰⁶ See Manninen (1986a), 138-141; Sihvola (2008).

Senator

Snellman's career in the university ended in March 1863, when he was asked to serve as the chief of national finance bureau. This gave him a position in the senate of Finland which corresponds to minister of finance. As a senator – in a powerful political role which is rare to a philosopher – he was able to work in close cooperation with the administration of Alexander II for many important national reforms. These reforms, which were key issues in his campaign of national awakening, include the language decree on Finnish and the currency *markka*. With them Snellman consolidated his status as the leader of the Fennoman movement (the Old Finns) and his fame as the “national philosopher” of Finland. Since 1866 he also had a seat in the Nobles' Chamber in the Finnish Diet.

In 1868, Snellman was forced to resign from the senate, and he took up a position as the chief of an investment bank in Helsinki. But he was still the great hero of the students, who were able to realize in 1868 his original 1856 proposal of establishing a student union, and his influence in the university continued when his favourite pupil Thiodolf Rein was appointed as his successor in 1869. His 75th birthday in 1881 was a grandiose national celebration, and the funeral after his death on the 4th of July in the same year was a day of national sorrow.

The first biography of Snellman's life and philosophy was published by Th. Rein in two volumes in 1895 and 1899, and the first collected works under Rein's guidance in Swedish in 1892-98 (ten volumes) and selected works in Finnish in 1898-1901 (five volumes).¹⁰⁷ The centennial anniversary of Snellman in 1906 was highlighted with many families who changed their names from Latin and Swedish into Finnish. A new edition *Kootut teokset* (twelve volumes) in Finnish were published in 1928-

¹⁰⁷ For a bibliography of Snellman studies during a century after his death, see Manninen (1987c), 181-208.

33, and *Samlade arbeten* (in twelve volumes, with a critical commentary) in Swedish in 1992-98. *Kootut teokset* (in 24 volumes) were published in 2000-2005 for Snellman's bicentennial anniversary.¹⁰⁸

2.5. Academic Freedom and *Bildung*¹⁰⁹

Snellman as a Philosopher

The writings of J. V. Snellman are often easy to read, even lively, but they include pitfalls. It causes confusion that Snellman defines his concepts differently in different places. What characterisation should then be taken as the one that best corresponds to his intentions and is thus the most suited for examination? It does not help to search for all possible uses of a concept if there is no singular meaning to be discovered.

This problem received attention immediately after Snellman's work on the philosophy of politics, *Läran om staten* (1842), was published in Sweden. A professor of jurisprudence, Per Erik Bergfalk from Uppsala University, sent Snellman a long letter where he complained that Snellman had defined the concept of freedom in three different ways.¹¹⁰ Snellman admitted to two of these (SA III, 695-696), but did not even attempt to argue that he would always use the concept of freedom consistently. It had different levels of use and therefore different shapes.

Although *Läran om staten* appears to be ordinary academic prose at first sight, like his other works it was directed by a method for dealing with concepts that had been adopted from G. W. F. Hegel. Snellman did not seek a strict dialectics in his book, but he still found it natural to

¹⁰⁸ The complete works in twelve volumes, together with an index and supplement, that were published in 1992-1998 contain approximately 12 500 pages. A three-part facsimile of Snellman's journal *Saima* was also published as a supplement. The initiative for this critical edition came from Juha Manninen. A Finnish translation of the complete works was published in 2000-2005 in 24 small-sized volumes. In the translated books, the detailed commentaries by experts that were in the complete works were left out and each volume instead had a popular introduction.

¹⁰⁹ This chapter is partly based on Manninen (2006c). Translation by Alisa Manninen.

¹¹⁰ Letter from P. E. Bergfalk to JVS, 26 May 1843 (SA III, 667-673).

progress from the abstract to the concrete, overriding his earlier concepts by adding new definitions to them and thus raising them to ever higher levels. The concrete, which tied together many definitions, expressed a deeper truth than the abstract, yet it did not displace the abstract, which it included as an element. The areas in which the concepts were valid remained separate.

When one reads Snellman, it is therefore worth noting at which stage of a concept's development an issue is presented and what later follows from it. This does not apply only to one work but to Snellman's various writings on the whole, if claims are to be made regarding Snellman's opinions on a specific topic. Snellman constantly found new knowledge, especially from literary experiences, though his fundamental philosophical views changed remarkably little. We might marvel at the speculative flights of Snellman's earlier career, but whatever the opinions regarding them, it must be stated that Snellman was not the type to view theory and practice as entirely separate.

When speaking of Snellman, we can place some of his writings in a special position. The first proposal is a manuscript for the banned lectures that had been intended for the autumn of 1837 on the true nature and essence of academic freedom (SA I, 615-630), and especially the well-written presentation based on the same topic, *Om det akademiska studium*, that was published in Stockholm in 1840 (SA II, 152-171). The second and the third are his main work in speculative philosophy, *Versuch einer speculativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit* (SA II, 197-344), published by Ludwig Friedrich Fues in Tübingen 1841, and his magnum opus in political philosophy, *Läran om staten* (SA III, 298-498), published by Zacharias Haeggström in Stockholm 1842. They complement each other. The doctrine on the state, as well as all later thinking by Snellman, includes fundamental emphases that can be understood only as a take on Hegelianism, although the doctrine on the state – in addition to structures adopted by G. W. F. Hegel himself – speaks of what might be referred to as Snellman's own empirical observations and his specific ideals. Especially the work on personality is a development of a concept that is extremely thorny and foreign to a modern reader. Yet there are, later, partly more mature developments of the same ideas. Therefore, as the fourth work we may mention the lectures Snellman held in Helsinki on the essence of the spirit in the spring of 1843 (SA III, 607-634). They include a summary of what was characteristic of Snellman's work on the idea of personality. According to Robert Tengström's words, a hundred listeners attended the lectures, which was a huge number at the time.

As the fifth work, we may refer to a writing on education and the universal spirit, in the original Swedish “Bildning och allmän anda”, from the end of 1846 (SA III, 607-634). It was a kind of last will and testament for the groundbreaking publishing work Snellman had carried out in his Kuopio-based journal *Saima*. If we ask why “education” was chosen as the theme of Snellman’s bicentennial in 2006, the answer may be sought in this work.

Snellman occasionally returned to questions of nationality, which he had dealt with mainly in *Läran om staten*, but only once, in 1862, did he prepare a specific work on nationality that was meant for an international audience in the Berlin-based Hegelian philosophical journal *Der Gedanke* (SA XI.1, 444-460), edited by Carl Ludwig Michelet who had asked Snellman for contributions. It remained unpublished in Snellman’s lifetime, probably due to its sensitive nature. Yet this writing must be considered Snellman’s most thorough stand on this topic.

A first reading of Snellman should also include letters, at least the one Snellman wrote in Sweden in the summer of 1840 and addressed to Fredrik Cygnaeus and Bengt Olof Lille (SA I, 687-691). It reveals the real motivations that led Snellman, who wrote in Swedish, to promote the cause of the Finnish language. Simplifying Snellman into simply a “fighter for language” has wronged his thinking on the whole.

Snellman’s journalistic article from 1863 on war or peace for Finland (SA XI.1, 141-151) was important not only for its own time but also for later times. Many think, for all times. This writing is inseparably connected to the lectures on the doctrine on the state that Snellman held in the spring term of 1863. They are the most developed form of Snellman’s thinking on the state and international relations, a perspective from which “War or Peace for Finland?” can be understood in the manner intended by Snellman. Only by recognising Snellman’s ideas contextually, as they were at their strongest, can we see how they can be transcended. This was the time when Finland received its *own* Diet for the first time. And Snellman wrote for the autocratic Emperor of Russia the sovereign’s pledge to the Grand Duchy of Finland.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ On the political context of Snellman’s writing at the time, see Savolainen (2006), 713. This was not about the newly-appointed senator’s oath of allegiance to the ruler, at stake was “far more, the fruits of 20 years of patient work which were almost ready to be picked”.

Defending the Freedom of Academic Studies

J. V. Snellman was not the first Finnish philosopher who was interested in the aims and nature of the university, but his exposition was so powerful and original that it has become a classic statement of the ideal of *Bildungsuniversität*.¹¹² His study of the university was also crucially significant for his own more general vision of history as a progressive process of civilization and for his national project of creating Finland as a nation state with its own language and culture.

Already the neohumanists in Turku – Porthan and his students Franzén and Lagus – followed the rise of German research universities in Göttingen and Halle. The representatives of Turku romanticism were aware of the writings on universities by leading philosophers like Fichte, Schiller, Schelling, and Schleiermacher. Schelling's *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums* (1803) was read by academic circles in Turku. Also Herder's writings on education and humanity could be found in the university library in Turku.¹¹³ In Prussia, Wilhelm von Humboldt reformed the University of Berlin in 1810 as an alternative to the French model, where research is concentrated in scientific academies while universities are seen as vocational school giving professional education. Humboldt's principle *Bildung durch Wissenschaft* gives priority to independent and free research but sees this as the basis of the intellectual and moral education of the students. In 1817-18, J. J. Tengström expressed the aim of true higher education as a combination of knowledge and morality. Reflections of the Humboldtian ideal can be seen in the new 1828 university statutes in Helsinki.

Snellman's first formulation of the new university ideal can be found in his speech at the Ostrobothnian nation in November 1833. His primary source is the book *Die gegenwärtige Zeit, und wie sie geworden, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Deutschland* (1817) by Henrik Steffens. Its author was born in Norway, but worked as professor of philosophy in Germany. Steffens argued that in a university theory and practice are united so that every teacher should be a scholar and the students share this scientific spirit by enjoying academic freedom. In the same vein, Snellman emphasized in 1833 that universities should not be downgraded as schools, but they should foster the development of the students "to freedom and to independent personalities", who by their respect to the teachers learn to promote scientific and moral progress.

¹¹² See Niiniluoto (2011).

¹¹³ See Ollitervo and Immonen (2006).

Snellman's 1837 lecture and 1840 essay give the same message, but the former is more philosophical, the latter more critical of the current state of the university. In both texts, he grounds in a novel way the difference between school and university – and the respective roles of their students and teachers – on a distinction between types of knowledge. In comparison to Schelling's aristocratic idea of university, Snellman gives more emphasis to the rights and duties of students and their organizations.

Snellman starts his lecture manuscript by distinguishing memory knowledge, where a content is passively preserved without thinking, and grasping knowledge, where the subject actively adopts and understands the content by his own concepts and abilities. Memory knowledge, or knowledge contents as such, constitutes the tradition which is independent of the conscious subject. Its opposite is creative knowledge where the new content is freely formed by a self-conscious subject. Creative knowledge is a priori in the sense that it refuses to make any presuppositions and prejudice about its object. Its subject is an abstract self with volitions and thoughts.

Snellman next argues that memory knowledge and creative knowledge are both abstractions which should be united in true knowledge. Concerning memory knowledge as such we can only say that this knowledge is or exists, but it can be true and correct only in relation to human consciousness. In the same way, self-consciousness as such only can be said to exist, but creative knowledge and consciousness of oneself is possible only for a subject who has grasped the tradition and uses part of this tradition to assess the truth of other parts. Thus, knowledge is a process which moves from memory-based tradition to freely created products of a subjective self. A human being can be "rational and ethical only in this unity of self-consciousness and tradition, freedom and necessity".

According to Snellman, school is an institution where an individual is educated to self-consciousness, to a thinking and willing subject. Its teaching is wholly based on memory knowledge and learning exercises by heart, and the teacher is an authority to his students. University, on the other hand, is an institution where a thinking and willing subject is educated to "a reconciliation of self-consciousness and tradition". The aim of a university as a civilizing institution is *Bildung*, which includes education both in knowledge



*Main Building, University of Helsinki, 1832.
Helsinki University Museum, photo by Ari Aalto.*

and morality.¹¹⁴ When a self-conscious young man enters the university, he wants to decide for himself all matters of knowledge and conduct. This abstract self-consciousness can be reconciled with tradition only by recognizing its rights. Academic freedom consists in this recognition of the right and obligation of self-consciousness. Its basic principle can be expressed by the Biblical words: “Try all things and keep that which is good”.¹¹⁵

The pamphlet on academic studies was a strong presentation of the way of studying that Snellman saw as correct and of the inevitable requirements of university teaching, in practice a programme for the creation of a university that produced a new kind of scientific research, on the basis of a new model for scientific universities that had been taken from German idealism.¹¹⁶ At the same time, it presented the foundation of the dialectics of “education” (*vetande*) and “ethicality” (*sedlighet*), the

¹¹⁴ Snellman uses the Swedish term *bildning*, which is direct translation of the German *Bildung*. The original medieval connotation of this term refers to the idea that human beings become more and more images of God through education. The Finnish translation *sivistys* was introduced by Reinhold von Becker in 1817. There is no good English translation, but alternatives include *education*, *edification*, *acculturation*, *civilization*, and *cultivation*.

¹¹⁵ 1 *Tess* 5:21.

¹¹⁶ On this, see Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 7-32.

birth of self-awareness and ethical life, that was central to Snellman.¹¹⁷

The writing began with a description of the prevailing situation: “Let us each put hand to heart and confess what our academic studying has been. Can anyone answer save in a depressing manner: the reading of homework.” (SA II, 152) Depression was deepened by the consequences of such studies. Those who graduated from university did not have a conviction founded on research and studies that they would have been prepared to fight for later in life while carrying out their various tasks.

On the other hand, rational argumentation as the opposite of mere cramming meant that “self-awareness and doubt alongside it have already awakened” (SA II, 161). And the development of awareness did not stop there:

“The contradictions of content, which come up in the reviews of various writers, teachers and fellow students, lead the student to place a specific piece of knowledge in opposition to another, searching for a norm in the given rule in order to abolish the discrepancy. Thus he, however, slowly frees himself from being bound to content... and the student himself is forced to *build* for himself the necessary rule. Thus, a mere analytical understanding slowly transforms into *productive* knowledge that acquires knowledge by producing it.” (SA II, 161)

Snellman was aware of the straightforward demands that had already been made during the previous century to accelerate academic studies, but this did not prevent him from listing a programme that is a horror to every era that emphasises the speed of studies:

“Everything is free, everything depends on the free choice of the student, work or neglect, independent or teacher-driven work, subjects, the order of studies, systems and writers. In a word, academic studies are limited only by the student’s own will and meticulousness.” (SA II, 165)

Only then would the legitimacy of self-awareness be recognised and only then would self-awareness finally be reconciled with tradition. This required voluntary effort to find the rational that was included in the tra-

¹¹⁷ For the concept of morality or ethical life, Snellman uses the Swedish term *sedlighet*, which is a translation of Hegel’s *Sittlichkeit*.

ditional and its separation from that which was to be abandoned. The finding of conviction and ethical life required academic freedom.

The other side of the matter was that this did not apply only to secondary school graduates but to the spirit of the entire university. Even a touch of authority made teaching repulsive and only made students search for mistakes. The demands for the university teacher, in the spirit of Humboldtian research-based education, were also strict:

“He *must* first of all show in his lectures that his knowledge is from his own research, and he must not only present results but, as much as possible, lead the listener along a road that he himself has walked. Thus the student is directed to understand what real research is, and the student sees in the independence of the teacher the recognition of the legitimacy of self-awareness. So the student easily reaches from the legitimacy of research and judgement shown by the teacher the conclusion that he too has the same right.” (SA II, 163)

“A love for the sciences awakens in the student, eagerness to search tradition for a solution to that which is true. Through this awakened desire, the student has recognised his dependence on tradition, entirely denied himself subjective and arbitrary assumption and thus taken his first step towards reconciling self-awareness and tradition, which his whole life will see realised. The student’s knowledge has thus also transformed into his own voluntary decision, into conviction and insight, and belief in authority and plain memory knowledge is transformed into true knowledge.” (SA II, 164)

Snellman thought it was no use to say of a university teacher that he was not a maker of science but a good teacher. You could not be the latter if you were not the former. And even this was not enough:

“scientific interest has ceased to belong to a specific profession and the solution to every question regarding the good of society is eagerly sought in science. Therefore, the scientist has to understand his own era and to become acquainted with those issues of his era that are interesting with regard to knowledge. This kind of outward action strengthens the university internally, and the student gains confidence

in his teachers, who are already well-established in the field of science. This more than anything else will make him love the sciences.” (SA II, 167)

Yet a student who had graduated did not need to have solved all mysteries of science and life: “It is enough that he has solved *one*, in the case that *he has solved it himself*.” (SA II, 164)

While students are still juvenile in the state, they are declared as “moral citizens” when they graduate from the university (SA II, 158). By learning the method of creating new knowledge the graduates have gained permanent love for the truth and willingness to use their capacities for the benefit of the society and the state as a rational and ethical order.¹¹⁸ In this way, by generating the process of civilization by means of academic freedom, the university has achieved its cognitive and moral goal:

“Education does not end with school or some specific exam, but the whole life is a school, where an individual is transformed into a human being, and this process of *Bildung* itself constitutes what is humane in a human being.” (SA II, 157-158)

With these words Snellman formulated his conception of humanity and what is later known as the idea of lifelong learning.

Snellman had come into serious conflict with university leadership after he had announced that, exceeding his rights as a docent, he wanted to lecture on academic freedom to the entire student body and refused the curatorial post of the North Ostrobothnian student nation that the university had appointed him to. The refusal was followed by a court case for misconduct, a retreat from Helsinki to write in his home region and finally a journey to Sweden and Germany, which could be interpreted almost as exile yet nonetheless provided him an opportunity to earn a living as an author in Sweden.

It is easy to see that a book that supported the importance of student unity, among other things, did not show humility.¹¹⁹ Its defence of tradition as

¹¹⁸ While Snellman agrees with von Humboldt about the autonomy and freedom of inquiry, and the unity of research and education, he is more outspoken about the graduated student’s responsibilities to the service of the state.

¹¹⁹ See Ch. 2.4. For more on the situation, see Klinge (1978), 56-69.

another source for an ethical life that was based on self-awareness was among the regular elements of Snellman's thinking, both earlier and later.

But what tradition? Had Finland even had a tradition that would have been worthy of being embraced after rational criticism? If not, apparently such had to be created – based on models found somewhere else. It was a theoretical challenge to find out what kind of tradition was required by the era. It would not be the first time or the last that a trip to observe different conditions abroad, later combined with a dive into theory, would offer surprising ways of seeing familiar things.

The question became topical for Snellman in a new way in 1840, the year of the pamphlet's publication: in Sweden, through correspondence with his friends Bengt Olof Lille and the voluble Fredrik Cygnaeus, Snellman received information about the celebration of traditions in the university of his homeland. Cygnaeus detailed extensively the centennial of Henrik Gabriel Porthan that he had held for North Ostrobothnian secondary school graduates, which had been banned from being aimed at the entire student body (SA I, 674-680, see also Lille's letter SA I, 662-663). The university, on the other hand, was celebrating the bicentennial jubilee of its founding and received attention from the West and especially from the East.

Snellman did not join in on the joy of the messages from Helsinki. Others' contentment with the fuss made over these traditions only made him squirm. Something essential was missing. Snellman's mind was filled with criticism that was not solely aimed at others but also at himself.

What did the Finnish peasant, belonging to the group that constituted nine tenths of the nation, know of the jubilee of his brothers, of the entire university? Snellman, who had "made up his own mind", announced that he dismissed all hesitations and comfort: "I do endure battle and enjoy it well; but I need space when my blood boils." (SA I, 687-691) With seven points, he summed up his view of the moment, according to which "our poor fatherland has, due to the influence of centuries of lack of independence, been brought to such a condition that there is *no patriotism* at all there" (SA I, 688). Furthermore,

"the educated (Swedish) part of the population *does not have the slightest interest* in the spiritual or material advancement of the (Finnish) uneducated. Look around you to see which powerful official is concerned with the material poverty of a part of the country or which university man troubles his head even for a minute with the enlightenment of the Finnish common people."

The large majority of the population was, in its subjugated position, turned inwards. “It has hardly ever had the thought of what might be better, interest in shared issues, the parish, the province, the country, in a sense other than that of a savage, that is to say during open war.” It also could “never be elevated to a higher level, as long as Swedish is the language of legislation and education”. Snellman did admit one thing:

“those few who thought about something reckoned that they would be able to form a nobility that would be able to resist Eastern influences that would be too baleful. This became a nobility of officials that kowtows and subjugates the nation. I presume that the same good intention has steered those who have eagerly advocated for the Swedish or German language. I hope that they will perceive their incomprehension. An artificial tie, even if it has the noble colour of education, namely does not hold when it has not even a single thread of nationality.” (SA I, 688)

“So the *Finnish nation* has been lowered in its grave”, Snellman gloomily noted. “The fundamental truth that all this ultimately relies on is: *Finland can do nothing by force; the power of education is its only salvation.*” (SA I, 689)

On Sweden, his location at the time, he stated that

“Usually they know very little about our country here. About the general frame of mind, government etc. nothing is known. The university is also a similar terra incognita to the local academicians. Those are known who have visited here, of the others no one.... It makes me shiver when I think of the rest of the world where our significance is even lesser than here.... There is no internal firmness in us and we have no grappling hook with which to strike outwards.” (SA I, 690)

The picture’s final, timely and threatening form was completed by Snellman’s belief that Finland faced acts of repression similar to those Russia had enacted in Poland and the Baltic provinces (SA I, 691).

One thing remained: “the power of education”, *bildningens makt*. Yet according to Snellman, such education should be different than before.

Education or Bildung in the sense of G. W. F. Hegel

In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel conceived education as a basic principle of civil society. By means of education, individuals attained the formal universality characteristic of civil society, and that allowed them to develop their own particularities and private ends within the confines of definite boundaries. In the general paragraphs (§ 187) on civil society, Hegel described the situation as follows:

“Individuals in their capacity as burghers in this state (i.e. in the *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) are private persons whose end is their own interest. This end is mediated through the universal which thus appears as a means to its realization. Consequently, individuals can attain their ends only in so far as they themselves determine their knowing, willing, and acting in a universal way and make themselves links in this chain of social connexions. In these circumstances, the interest of the Idea – an interest of which these members of civil society are as such unconscious – lies in the process whereby their singularity and their natural conditions are raised, as a result of the necessities imposed by nature as well as of arbitrary needs, to formal freedom and formal universality of knowing and willing – the process whereby their particularity is educated up to subjectivity.”

Hegel further clarified this process, which is what he now means by *Bildung*. The end of reason that is at work in it is

“to banish natural simplicity, whether the passivity which is absence of the self, or the crude type of knowing and willing, i.e. immediacy and singularity, in which mind is absorbed. -... The final purpose of education, therefore, is liberation and the struggle for a higher liberation still; education is the absolute transition from an ethical substantiality which is immediate and natural to the one which is intellectual and so both infinitely subjective and lofty

enough to have attained universality of form. In the individual subject, this liberation is the hard struggle against pure subjectivity of demeanour, against the immediacy of desire, against the empty subjectivity of feeling and the caprice of inclination.” (§ 187 *Zusatz*).

By educating himself, a human becomes capable of acting in the universal way required by the members of the civil society. The conduct of uneducated ones, in contrast, is not governed by the universal characteristics of the situation but by their desires, needs or inclinations. Snellman, again, defined education as the process by which the spirit overcomes its needs as some merely indefinite strivings, determines their content by a free decision and sets itself as a free being by this act of its own.

The human needs still belong to the blind and mindless natural order, and the spirit is not fully self-determining if it lets them direct its actions. It still remains in the toils of nature. But through *Bildung* it achieves a self-determination which admits of no external impulses. The suspension of naturally given, fortuitous needs, or, to speak with Snellman, *ein Sichaufheben des Geistes als unmittelbaren*, is simultaneously the process of the spirit's liberation, *ein sich setzen desselben als freien*. Consequently, Snellman emphasises that education has always to be a free activity. Even the bringing-up of children presupposes a preliminary education on their part, a free decision to step out of their *Natürlichkeit*. This decision, however, can be only of their own making, and thus the freedom of the will is fundamental for all development of human spirit.

However, the free will itself is not without determinations, or, in other words, a mere caprice. It would be wrong to equate it with arbitrary choice (*Willkür*).

F. W. J. Schelling's Guidance about Freedom and Evil

Interestingly, at this point, Snellman in his discussion of free will in *The Idea of Personality* does not refer to Hegel, but to another author, F. W. J. Schelling, who has – according to Snellman (SA II, 300–303) – demonstrated that the will is necessarily a determined will (*bestimmtes Wollen*). Snellman imposes the restriction that this applies only to the self-conscious spirit, but otherwise he leans readily on Schelling's *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (1809, briefly *Of Human Freedom*). Schelling was speaking about the “intelligible” in hu-

man and Snellman interpreted this as meaning the personality as follows: “the personal spirit is the self-knowing, substantial spirit, and its action continues therefore the activity of the world-spirit” (SA II, 300). In order to be free, an action has to be in harmony with the substantial spirit, or a continuation of its works. This determination is required if it is to be actually free.

A significant shift became apparent in Schelling’s attention after the transcendental system of 1800. His motivation became increasingly religious, particularly after the publication of his book *Philosophie und Religion* (1804). In his thought, the mystical strivings of late Romanticism were beginning to dawn. But this break did not prevent Schelling from always asking the same questions, although now in a somewhat different atmosphere. His interest was now focused upon the origin of the finite world, evil and matter. How was the Fall from Grace possible? The study *Of Human Freedom* tried to provide answers to these questions.

Schelling now devoted extensive discussion to the problems of human freedom and choice, and especially their relation to the potentialities of God. He no longer saw the Absolute – i.e. God – so much in terms of “reason” as in terms of “will”. This shift provided a background for his explanation of the birth of the finite world. The Absolute was originally a Will, but this Will was divided, due to the relative autonomy of human. The finite world was born through a complete leap out of the Absolute, a sudden break, or a cosmic catastrophe, caused by human’s use of his own selfhood against the original, universal will of God.

Snellman did not accept the newly awakened religious current in Schelling’s thought. Snellman noted that a primary aim in Schelling’s philosophy was to mediate the necessity of nature with the freedom of spirit. In Snellman’s opinion, Schelling was initially advancing this programme in its purity. Only later did Schelling shift the solution of his basic problem to an extramundane original Identity. As soon as Schelling began to refer to the Identity as a *personal* Absolute “all further progress was barred and the old opposition between the finite and the infinite made its appearance again” (SA II, 317). Snellman was against such a “imaginary” solution, and pleaded for a mediation in the “living, real spirit”. All this was driving Schelling away from those of his ideas that were true and really valuable. Time and again, Snellman emphasised that Schelling has understood the concept of freedom in a deep and truthful manner, despite his failure to organise these insights coherently and to remain faithful to them.

The ideas of freedom and evil were inextricably intertwined in Schelling’s thought, but Snellman succeeded in extracting some characterisa-

tions that pertain to freedom in particular. In *Of Human Freedom*, Schelling located the freedom in a pretemporal decision. All of the temporal life of a human being was determined through this “intelligible act”, and by necessity followed from it. This act was itself outside all causal connexion, as well as outside or over all time. Only in it was a human able to use a “free causality”, otherwise he was bound. Beings who acted in history were not free. They no longer had a choice. Their actions were predetermined through the intelligible act in which their sole freedom consisted.

Snellman was not satisfied with such a picture. He saw that this idea was connected with Schelling’s belief in creation through a personal God. The intelligible act was simultaneous with the acts of the Creator. Schelling claimed that humans were co-creators, though only in their pretemporal mode of being. In Snellman’s opinion, this co-creation should be extended into the real world and history.

“The personal spirit is the self-knowing, substantial spirit”, Snellman wrote in his reading of Schelling, “and its activity is therefore in continuity with the activity of the world-spirit.” (SA II, 300)

Lectures on Academic Freedom in 1856

Snellman returned to the nature of academic studies in his first lecture course as professor in 1856.¹²⁰ He starts again with the question “What is knowledge?”. This time Snellman’s answer shows clearly his commitment to idealism. Even though the objects of knowledge are divided into sensuous and supersensuous, all knowledge is supersensuous, since its objects belong to the mental realm of conceptual thoughts. Mental conceptions can never be “adequate”, so that they would completely correspond to what they intend to represent, since conceptions are finite, while the external world is “as an endless class of determinants and existents”. Within reflective understanding it turns out that “the external object is in fact an object inside a conception” and “the external world is inside the consciousness”. Human spirit is the negation of matter, and matter exists only by this negation.

Snellman discusses Francis Bacon’s theory of experience and induction with references to Kuno Fisher’s and John Herschel’s works. However, the distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge should be replaced with the distinction between consciousness and self-conscious-

¹²⁰ The lecture manuscript is published in SA VII, 559-651, and KT 13, 338-451.

ness: perceptual consciousness is the spirit's knowledge about something different from itself, but "that other is by this very process negated and made internal to the spirit". While natural science gives knowledge about the causes of natural phenomena, "the relation between cause and effect is a matter of thought". Quantitative methods improve empirical induction, but cannot raise it from probability to objective truth. On the other hand, mathematical proofs rely on the laws of identity and contradiction, and therefore can give generally valid a priori truths (like $2+2 = 4$) which are true at all times on the basis of their form.

Snellman cites Bacon's thesis that knowledge is power, but does not approve the view that natural science has only instrumental value for material utility. These sciences – which include anatomy and physiology as sciences about the human body – lead to the higher level of grasping thinking where the order of nature is transformed to the order of spirit. Forms of self-conscious knowledge include psychology (knowledge of thinking, volitions, and language) and history (knowledge of the free creations of human spirit, such as law and the state, in contrast to the unchanging nature as a realm of necessity). The third level, studied by theology, is absolute knowledge where a human being knows that he knows God. An important task of philosophy is to analyze this system of the sciences.

Finally Snellman returns to the nature of academic studies. This time he cites Fichte's statement that university is "the most important and holy institution of mankind". He repeats his own thesis that the task of the university is to reconcile tradition and self-consciousness, but emphasizes that the development and creative renewal of the tradition is a function of science. Academic freedom of teaching and learning should be respected so that choices are not "sinking to tradition". Indeed, tradition should be presented to new generations in novel forms, by learning from "great independent minds" instead of those who just "lag behind". In the same way, morality consists in voluntary action in agreement with the rational state, but "the prevailing custom is not rational just by its existence but by its development". Thus, academic studies invite students "not only as persons who preserve customs but also develop them".

2.6. Personality, Spirit, and Nation¹²¹

G. W. F. Hegel's Philosophy as the Focus of Controversies

In the early stages of the formation of the Young Hegelian Party, the South Germans, such as Ludwig Feuerbach and David Friedrich Strauss, had played a decisive part in shattering religious dogmas. Originally, the debate was concerned with such questions as the immortality of the individual soul and the relations between God and human, but it was soon enlarged to become a wholesale rejection of traditional Christian faith, and a criticism of existing social and political institutions.

Snellman was drawn to this debate after his journalistic stay in Sweden, and especially to Tübingen. Strauss had been teaching in Tübingen, but at the moment of Snellman's German sojourn in 1840-1841 he was living in Stuttgart. It was only natural for Snellman to visit him.¹²² While still in Finland, Snellman had written a brief note on the discussion provoked by Strauss's *Das Leben Jesu*.¹²³ During his stay in Tübingen, Snellman contacted many of the South German Young Hegelians, F. Th. Vischer and Friedrich Reiff among others.

The result of the winter Snellman spent in Tübingen was the book *Versuch einer speculativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit* (1841).¹²⁴ In it, Snellman discussed a number of topics connected with the development of the spirit from immediate being through subjectivity to a mediated substantiality. His aim was a more adequate determination than had earlier been the case of the concept of personality in general, and of the relations of divine and human personality in particular. During the

¹²¹ This chapter is based on Manninen (1980) and Manninen (2006c). Translation by Alisa Manninen.

¹²² Snellman wrote a book about his travels in Germany, titled *Tyskland, skildringar och omdömen från en resa 1840-1841* (SA III, 1-170). It was published in Stockholm when he had returned there in 1842. H. P. Neureuter has made a German edition of the book. It was published by Otava jointly with Klett-Cotta in 1984, together with a volume of commentaries by the editor.

¹²³ "D:r David Friedrich Strauss", *Spanska Flugan*, Sectio antepenultima, Helsingfors 1839, 44-46; SA I, 198-199.

¹²⁴ The original German text is published in SA II, 196-344, with Juha Manninen's commentary, 672-689. For the Finnish translation, see KT 3, 59-228.

course of his discussion, he presented minute dialectical developments of such concepts as self-feeling, individuality, consciousness and self-consciousness, need, education, free will, ethical consciousness and evil. He touched upon questions connected with the immortality of the soul, and the purposes of human life embedded in a moral world order.

Snellman's contemporaries characterised him as a Hegelian of the Left Centre.¹²⁵ Such labels were not only products of idle pedantry; a close look should be taken at the controversies following Hegel's death to see what was at stake. Without this background, it is practically impossible to understand Snellman's book and, consequently, to understand Snellman.

Snellman was a bit of a latecomer in the controversy but still well within some of its peak moments. In many ways his problems resembled those of Ludwig Feuerbach in the very first attempt this materialist-to-be made to develop the views of his dissertation in a book titled *Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit*, published anonymously in 1830. In fact, in some passages of *The Idea of Personality* Snellman explicitly relied on that early declaration of war against theology and its doctrines of individual immortality. However, after Strauss's famous *Das Leben Jesu* (1835/1836) the discussion began slowly to move in another direction that was bound to remain outside the scope of Snellman's speculative development of the concept of spirit. Strauss interpreted the Gospel stories as unconsciously created myths expressing the spirit of a community. The new line of thought, inaugurated by Feuerbach and Strauss, was radicalised in a hitherto unseen way by the publication of Feuerbach's *Das Wesen des Christentums* in 1841. Feuerbach's new work gained immediate popularity. Together with the programmatic writings succeeding it, it provided a basis for Young Hegelians from Moses Hess to Karl Marx to emancipate themselves from the strains of Hegelian spiritualism. Compared with this simultaneous explosion, Snellman's book had little hope of popular success or even of philosophical influence.

One could say that the theological controversy partly arose from misunderstanding Hegel's subtle double front against both subjectivity (*Subjektivität*) and substantiality (*Substantialität*). Hegel attempted a reconciliation, or better, a dialectical mediation between these two principles.

In Hegel's political theory, subjectivity was the principle of modernity, represented by the civil society. As such, it was something better than the immediate substantiality of the family, but it gained its full significance only as a mediating principle of the rational state. In his analysis of the

¹²⁵ See Michelet (1843), 314, 382-384.

civil society Hegel stood in the liberal tradition, and fashioned his concepts along the same lines as the classical English economists with whose works he was acquainted. Hegel strictly opposed this concept to that of state (*politische Staat* or *Staat* used without qualifications). In Hegel's usage, the concept of civil society gained a negative colouring. It connoted the sphere of individual self-interest and universal egotism. Hegel wished to give it free reign, but at the same time to put it in its proper place. To Hegel, the state proper – in contradistinction to civil society – was to be determined as “the actuality of the ethical idea”. Such a concept of state presupposed the rehabilitation of ethical bonds of the same type as those at work in the family, but with the important qualification that these new bonds between men could arise from the civil society only as a result of free choice and conscious submission to the historically evolving “ethical substance” underlying every state that was rational and embodying concrete freedom.¹²⁶

Hegel tried to do justice to the principles of subjectivity and substantiality in giving both of them a place in his theory of rational state, and simultaneously he criticised their absolutisation. In his view, they had only a relative justification which was laid bare by the dialectical scheme. Since Hegel believed that a logical representation has the same content as historical development, his categories had historical applications as well. He hoped that in the modern state neither substantiality nor subjectivity would be one-sidedly dominant, as both were necessary.

In his philosophy of religion, Hegel constructed an analogous scheme for the development of religious consciousness. Here, the first stage was natural religion, in which the spirit was seen as separate from the human, and was described in myths concerned with disembodied spirits and personified natural forces. In artistic representations of gods, however, the spirit was consciously externalised. These concrete representations marked the second stage in its development. Finally, the alienation of spirit was overcome in absolute religion, in Christianity, where divinity achieved self-consciousness in the human, and where the opposition between matter and spirit was cancelled out.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ See Avineri (1972), Pelczynski (1971), and Ottman (1977). A comprehensive view is given by Taylor (1975).

¹²⁷ In Tübingen, Snellman studied Hegel's philosophy of religion and made extensive notes concerning it. These notes are preserved among his papers at the Helsinki University Library. They are printed in SA II, 549-561, together with other preparatory philosophical notes for the book.

This developmental scheme was extremely problematical. How was the unity of God and human to be interpreted? What was the role of subjectivity in this final stage of religious consciousness? Was it simply annihilated, and consequently the individual soul assimilated into the historically developing universal *Gottmensch*, the substance of history? In this case, pantheistic consequences loomed large. Or had the human subjectivity to be regarded as something absolutely different from God? This interpretation seemed to be a denial of human universality and substantiality, an assertion of usual theism, with its doctrines of transcendent God and personal immortality.

The pantheistic resolution of this problem among the Hegelians was first explored by Feuerbach. His *Todesgedanken* have been aptly characterised as *Wende zur Natur*.¹²⁸ The book was a rather extreme criticism of theologies of subjectivity. Feuerbach interpreted substance largely in the sense of romantic *Naturphilosophie* with its unification of matter and spirit, and the polemical edge of his anthropology was formulated in terms that more resembled the categories of biology than those of social history. Of special importance was Feuerbach's view of the human as a species-being. Only the species was immortal. From the beginning, this was a characteristic feature of Feuerbach's anthropology. The life of an individual human was finite and vanishing, but if he was able to participate in the life of the species by contributing to the furthering of its social and cultural expressions, he had his share of the infinite life of the species, and could not hope for anything more. Consequently, only the social substance had lasting importance. Human subjectivity could not do any better than to deny itself and to assert the infinite life of the species.

Feuerbach's *Todesgedanken* also contained a denial of individual immortality. The book was banned, and when its author was discovered he naturally lost all chances of an academic career. Later, D. F. Strauss was to develop a very similar line of thought, although he spoke in terms that were more culturally oriented than Feuerbach's almost naturalistic *Gattungswesen*. In both cases, however, the substance was given predominance over subjectivity.¹²⁹ The pantheism of the Hegelian theological left was universalistic in its spirit.

A steadily escalating debate on this subject was initiated by the publication of Friedrich Richter's *Die Lehre von den letzten Dingen* (1833). Peter

¹²⁸ Cornehl (1969), 53 ff.

¹²⁹ See Brazill (1970), and, as more detailed studies, Wartofsky (1977) and Harris (1973).

Cornehl, in his study of the immortality debate, comments that Richter's book was not original in its main theses.¹³⁰ The belief in the immanence of the absolute in things, and in the presence of God in humankind, was shared by Feuerbach, as were the opinions on death and the analysis of the belief in immortality as a compensatory illusion nourished by the human egoistic subjectivity.

Richter's book gained its importance not so much on its own merits as on its being vehemently attacked by two prominent figures. Christian Hermann Weisse reviewed it in 1833, and Carl Friedrich Göschel in 1834. Both authors saw it as a revival of the premodern substance metaphysics. Their savage criticism was successful, at least if it is judged by the harm it did to Richter's career and life.¹³¹

Weisse was critical of Hegelian philosophy in general. Richter's position seemed to confirm his doubts about its incompatibility with religion. On the foundation of the later Schelling, Weisse preached a belief in a personal God, and the rebirth of the human in an infinite spirit. Göschel again accused Richter of misunderstanding the Hegelian dialectics. In his book *Von der Beweisen für die Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Seele im Lichte der spekulativen Philosophie* (1835), he further developed his argument, which was to form the kernel of the "orthodox" Hegelian position, a position which was, in fact, more orthodox than Hegel's own. It was made possible only by a significant shift in the dialectics. Göschel strengthened the speculative arm of the dialectical method; this could not happen without a corresponding loss of its "negative" or "destructive" tendencies.

Contrary to the pantheists, Göschel preserved Hegel's double criticism of both substantiality and subjectivity. His basic criticism was that the pantheists tend to reify the universal (*das Allgemeine*) in their concept of species and to destroy all individuality.¹³² The universal had, however, to be thought of as mediated by subjectivity. The Hegelian system thus culminated in concrete, dialectically mediated individuality, not in an abstract universal or undialectically posited *Gattungsbegriff*. Göschel defended his thesis by taking as his paradigm the whole of Hegel's theory of the subjective spirit. The first stage of its dialectical development, that of immediate unity, was represented by anthropology, which explored the concept of the individual soul in its abstractness. In Hegel's systematics,

¹³⁰ Cornehl (1971), 267.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 274-276.

¹³² Göschel (1835), 150 ff.

this was followed by phenomenology, in which the abstract individuality was overcome by reflective self-consciousness. The soul became aware of its difference from God, but in psychology a mediated unity between them was restored. In conscious union with the absolute spirit, the human soul achieved its highest determination. It was now to be seen as a personality (*Persönlichkeit*). It was this concept that Göschel wished to put in place of the pantheistic concept of species and species-life.

One important feature in Göschel's concept of dialectics was his emphasis on continuity, as Cornehl shows in his study.¹³³ This emphasis is directly connected with Göschel's concern with human survival. *Kontinuität* and *Fortdauer* are only different names for the same phenomenon. Göschel meant to assert that in the dialectical process the original individual who stood at the beginning never got lost. When categories were dialectically superseded, this was to be understood only as a further determination of them, never as a wholesale rejection or even as something which essentially changed the original. The development from immediate individuality to a mediated, spiritual personality was also to be conceived as something which preserved the individuality and only added new moments to it. There were no abrupt leaps or interruptions or discontinuity. Consequently, the individual soul survived as such its whole development towards a unity with the absolute spirit. The pantheistic claims against the survival of the soul lost their ground.

Göschel's defence of *Seelenfortdauer* was also brought about by a weakening of the properly dialectical arm of the Hegelian method. Göschel had to abandon the concept of the dialectical negation in its strictest sense. Instead of contributing to negative dialectics, he concentrated on the speculative uses of the Hegelian method. This revision of dialectics was motivated by a wish to leave intact certain ontological presuppositions that were endangered by the pantheists. Feuerbach's thought, in correspondence with that of others of his kind, was already moving towards an anthropological materialism, but Göschel and other Hegelians of the Right wished to preserve the priority of subjectivity and spirit.

Göschel's position can be seen as the main representative of the Hegelian Right in the immortality debate. However, it is important to notice that the Hegelian Right was not the most conservative position in the debate.

It has already been indicated that Weisse rejected all Hegelianism, and that he had got some impulses from the later Schelling. This was, in fact,

¹³³ Cornehl (1971), 295-296.

very common with the “speculative theists”, as the most traditional group of philosophers called themselves. The opposition between the Hegelians and the Schellingians in theological matters had its counterpart in the philosophy of right, in which the Historical School of Law, represented by F. C. von Savigny, G. F. Puchta and others, maintained that laws must be seen as growing organically from national habits and customs and denied all Hegelian claims of basing laws on reason, that is, on the dialectical development of concepts.¹³⁴ In a similar way, the speculative theists, such as Weisse, Hubert Becker and I. H. Fichte, opposed the use of the dialectical method in theological problems, claimed that rational methods were insufficient, and wished to vindicate revelation as a source of and justification for religious belief.¹³⁵ Both the Historical School of Law and the speculative theists paid respect to Schelling’s idea of a new “positive philosophy” that should be based on “positive” religious experience and on faith.¹³⁶ Schelling’s arguments were taken as a philosophical legitimation of emotionally-coloured faith, and of the most conservative tendencies of restoration and romanticism in politics. All varieties of Hegelianism, be they Left or Right, were opposed in some way or other to these tendencies.

Apart from the controversy between proponents of positive philosophy and dialecticians, a further remark still needs to be made. The first proposed classification of the Hegelian School was not a dichotomy but a trichotomy of the Right, the Centre and the Left. It was coined by D. F. Strauss in an apology to his *Das Leben Jesu*.¹³⁷ It was solely motivated by the stands the Hegelians had taken in christological questions. Strauss placed himself to the Left, Karl Rosenkrantz to the Centre, and G. A. Gabler and, naturally, Göschel, to the Right. C. L. Michelet made use of this division in his *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel* (1838). He connected it with the debates on the possibility of rational philosophical knowledge, on the immortality of soul, on the personality of God, and on christology. Five years

¹³⁴ The argument of the Historical School was originally developed in F. C. von Savigny, *Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft*, Heidelberg 1814. For the differences between the Historical School and Hegelianism, see e.g. Reissner (1965).

¹³⁵ See e.g. Cornehl (1971), 278.

¹³⁶ Cf. Grosser (1963).

¹³⁷ “Verschiedene Richtungen innerhalb der Hegel’schen Schule in Betreff der Christologie”, in Strauss (1841).

later, Michelet described the scene again, and in more detail, in his book *Entwicklungsgeschichte der neuesten Deutschen Philosophie* (1843). It seems that the original trichotomical classification was used in this work for the last time in a detailed and reasonably accurate form. Later it was abandoned in favour of simply “Old Hegelians” and “Young Hegelians”. The Hegelian Left was already expanding in directions that could no longer be brought under Strauss’s or Michelet’s categories, which primarily were theologically oriented.

Snellman’s Criticism of Theism and Pantheism

Snellman chose as his motto for the introductory chapter of *The Idea of Personality* Hegel’s sentence, “Self-consciousness is absolute knowledge; knowledge of the Absolute is self-consciousness.” This dictum contains the main idea Snellman wants to defend.

By “personality” Snellman means the personality of the spirit in the highest stage of its developments, as absolute spirit. In Hegelian philosophy, the absolute spirit is God, and a definition of its nature is tantamount to giving an exposition of the essence of God. This is what Hegel in fact claims to do in the *Science of Logic*.¹³⁸ This is also Snellman’s aim. As a good Hegelian, he believes that absolute knowledge is possible, and that God is not only an object of faith but of strictly conceptual knowledge as *absolute Wissen*, and that a philosophical criticism of categories provides the human with this knowledge. The Hegelian God, however, is not a transcendent one, as Snellman realises. A human’s knowledge of the absolute spirit is not directed to any external object, outside his own consciousness. It is a reflexive knowledge that is solely about the consciousness itself. This is what Hegel meant when he stated that knowledge of the Absolute was self-consciousness. This is also the reason why Hegel thought that logic was the proper way of attaining such knowledge. Logic was the study of thought-determinations; in the last analysis, they were the sole object of absolute knowledge, or the self-consciousness of the Absolute.

On the other hand, this concept of self-consciousness should not be identified with any form of knowledge that the human could possess as a finite being. The human had to ascend to the Absolute by suspending all that characterised him as an individual opposed to the universal and

¹³⁸ Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (1969), 50.

infinite being of God. In a sense, the human ought to become identical with God. His knowledge ought to be the knowledge the absolute spirit has of himself, and his deeds ought to be the way in which the absolute spirit manifests itself in the world. This is Snellman's concept of truthful "personality": a consciousness that is the Absolute's consciousness of itself, self-consciousness as "absolute knowledge" in which the knowing subject and the known object are identical (SA II, 202).

Snellman saw this identity thesis as the pivot on which turned the whole edifice of Hegel's philosophy of spirit. He was thus drawn very near to the pantheistic position of Strauss and Feuerbach. In fact, he denied all duality of the spirit, which means that he denied a transcendent God. On this ground, he opposed Göschel, I. H. Fichte, C. Ph. Fischer and other "modern theists", as he called these philosophers who wished to restore the belief in a separate God (SA II, 203-208). Similarly, he denied the belief of the speculative theists in individual immortality. This criticism also was founded upon the identity thesis. If the individual soul is immortal, it has to be thought as something separate from God. This would, again, amount to a restoration of pre-Hegelian dualism. With a reference to Feuerbach's *Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit*, Snellman condemns as vain and unphilosophical the attempts to secure an infinite life for the human's finite self (SA II, 278). The hopes for a life after death have to be abandoned.

Snellman put forward his opinions in a straightforward way, and displayed no sympathy for the theists' position. The question must be asked why he did not prove eventually an atheist, a naturalist or a materialist. Does some dividing line still remain? First of all, Snellman wished to defend the Hegelian philosophy to the letter. There is every reason to believe that he was more faithful to its spirit than were the theists. Hegel's God was immanent in history, arriving at self-consciousness in humankind's philosophical retrospect.

It is a pertinent feature of Snellman's argumentative strategy that his criticisms against theism and pantheism are both backed up with remarks on the true meaning of the speculative method and on the categories of dialectical logic. Snellman's criticism is, so to say, a "logical" criticism.¹³⁹ This is easily observable if his individual arguments are given closer examination.

In his adherence to Hegel, Snellman is able to detect the main peculiarity of Göschel's concept of method. He notes that Göschel interprets

¹³⁹ Cf. Michelet (1843), 382.

individual subjectivity as a presupposition that is not suspended in the speculative development. Thus Göschel tries to preserve the human finite spirit as something separate, without assimilating it into the infinite spirit. In contrast to this *Kontinuität*, on which Göschel's doctrine of the survival of the soul is based, Snellman emphasises *Aufhebung* as the essence of the speculative method (SA II, 204-205). He criticises Göschel for his acceptance, as such, of the naive, commonsense beliefs in immortality. This runs contrary to the idea of speculative development, by which alone new truths are attained in philosophy. A fundamental discontinuity between finite and infinite spirit has to be recognised. The former is *aufgehoben* in the latter, as the proper speculative method requires. There is no need to preserve the faults of the finite spirit, still less to immortalise them. In their stead, the substantiality of the spirit, its universal essence lying beyond all individuality and subjectivity, has to be vindicated. Only by a total *Aufhebung der Subjektivität* is the finite spirit capable of becoming identical with infinite spirit. "But the concept of death is contained in the suspension of subjectivity", Snellman writes, referring to the anonymously published *Todesgedanken* by Feuerbach (SA II, 256). In this context, Snellman does not speak about *Aufhebung* alone. Once, he even uses the stronger, undialectical term of *Verschwinden der Subjektivität*, which he connects in the very same passage with the death of consciousness in the human's natural death. This is something that can not be denied or avoided, Snellman says. It is only another aspect of this same finiteness of the human that is contained within the requirement that the subjective self-consciousness of the human has to die in order to make place for the self-consciousness of the substantial spirit.

Without denying the concept of natural death, there is still another kind of "death", since the human is bound not only to nature, but is a spiritual being as well. It is this "death" that Snellman indicates by speaking of the *Aufhebung* of subjectivity into substantial spirit. The subtle difference between *Verschwindung* and *Aufhebung* in this phrase leaves intact a very special meaning of immortality, which is revealed when Snellman cites, in his support, and against the theists' position, a passage from Hegel stating that a human being is immortal only in the activity of knowing, as a thinking being (SA II, 275-276).

This is, too, the only form of immortality recognised by Feuerbach. By contributing to the development of the self-consciousness of the substantial spirit, manifested in objective and universal thought, the human

could transcend one's finite and mortal nature.¹⁴⁰ Thinking is an impersonal matter. It is the human's link with the infinite spirit, the human's identity with it, as Snellman says, or, as Feuerbach puts it, the individual's assimilation to the universal life.

So far there has been agreement with Snellman and Feuerbach, but the pre-eminence given to the concept of the species by Feuerbach is something that Snellman no longer accepts. Again, his criticism is "logical".

Snellman identifies the pantheistic doctrine of the personality of God with Strauss's concept of the *Allpersönlichkeit*, and with Feuerbach's concept of the *Gattungsbegriff der Menschheit* (SA II, 209). His disagreement with Feuerbach is clearer and more marked than his disagreement with Strauss. For Strauss, the divine spirit finds himself in humankind as a totality, as *Allpersönlichkeit*. The union of God and the human takes place in history. Feuerbach conceived the process in more naturalistic terms. His early exaltation of Gattung was very far from Strauss's philosophical humanism. However, in the book *Über Philosophie und Christentum* (1839), that Snellman mentions, Feuerbach was already anticipating the humanistic criticism of Christian faith that he presented in his most popular work *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1841). Though the latter was not yet available to Snellman, he was consequently acquainted with some of its basic ideas.

Feuerbach claims in his book of 1839 that God is the *Gattungsbegriff* of humanity:

"The positive difference between the human and the animals is only this: that human's species is an object for him. Through it he has an inner life, which the animal lacks. What else are all the predicates which speculation and which religion itself can attribute to God but ideas which the human derives from his knowledge of himself as species? And what is a subject without its predicates; what else is the subject at all but the sum of its predicates? Will, Understanding, Wisdom, Being, Reality, Personality, Love, Power, Omnipotence – what else are these but species-concepts (*Gattungsbegriffe*) of the human?"¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ See Brazill, *op.cit.*, 140-141. Cf. Sass (1963), 89-90.

¹⁴¹ Quoted according to Wartofsky (1977), 164.

It was also suggested that the divine predicates are nothing but predicates by which the human species is described. This insight was later to become the key concept of Feuerbach's book on the essence of Christianity, which became an immediate success. It was translated into all the major languages, and effectively emancipated the Young Hegelians of the 1840s from the theological controversies of the 1830s to a new, humanistic anthem. Together with Feuerbach's programmatic writings, it was effective in putting an end to the speculative appropriation of the Hegelian legacy. Karl Marx, for one, used Feuerbach's "transformational method" in 1843 in his critique of Hegel's philosophy of right. The concept of the human as a species-being (*Gattungswesen*), partly inspired by Feuerbach, was used by Marx as a critical concept in the famous *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844. In view of this historical influence, it is of some interest to see Snellman's comments on Feuerbach's concept of species. It is certain that Snellman did not anticipate that he was dealing with something that was almost immediately to give rise to rather explosive intellectual developments. He is apparently interested only in discovering Feuerbach's "logical" blunders. He notes that *Gattungsbegriff* is not logically self-determining (SA II, 209). It is merely a *Reflexionsbestimmung* that presupposes such empirically-given determinations that could not be "developed" as necessary consequences of its own nature. In this sense, it is not really a *Begriff*. As an example of a proper *Begriff*, Snellman mentions the concept of right. Its various determinations have to be spelled out, but they do not add anything not implied in the general concept of right. The concept of spirit should not be seen as a *Gattung*, but as a *Begriff* in the proper sense of the word. It is something that determines itself as a universal within its own sphere, by suspending its determinations one by one, and is unique as such. Snellman is apparently saying that the spirit has to be self-contained, and not be in need of any external determinations. Its development has to be of its own making. In this respect it has to differ from a mere *Gattung* that indicated external determinations and a dependence on natural conditions.

It is easy to see that Snellman here argues against the naturalistic strain of thought contained in Feuerbach's concept of the species. He goes even so far in pressing the logical difference between a mere *Reflexionsbestimmung* and a *Begriff* proper, by means of which he is able so effectively to separate the spirit from the human species in general, as to remark in a footnote that his opinion on this matter partly differs from Hegel's (SA II, 209). Nevertheless, he feels confident, since Hegel has given in his logic, according to Snellman's lights, only one example of a *Gattung* that in



*David Strauss (1808-74).
Portrait by an unknown artist.*

itself contains its determining principle. As a consequence of this overall criticism, Snellman rejects, as crude and dangerous, Feuerbach's interpretation of "truth, goodness and justice" as simply species-concepts. "In seeing *all* determinations of thought, because they are *universal*, as species concepts Feuerbach thus casts away the very best that we owe to the latest speculation, the speculative logic." (SA II, 209-210) This is something that Snellman is not prepared to accept.

Snellman's arguments against Strauss's concept of the *Allpersönlichkeit* resemble his criticism of Feuerbach in their "logical" emphasis, but Snellman does not completely reject the Straussian definition of the spirit. We shall not go into the details of his discussion of the inappropriateness of the category of *Fürsichsein* as a designation of the personality of spirit or other flaws he discovers in Strauss's work, but we shall try instead to indicate the most general line of his dissatisfaction with Strauss's ideas. This is, we believe, brought out clearly in the following passage by Snellman himself: "If one... conceives the universal, here the *Allpersönlichkeit*, only as a species and finds in it something more than in the individual, it must be, on the other hand, remarked that the individual, too, contains something more than can be found in the species. The universal as separated from the individual is not at all the more perfect of these, since only in its uniqueness (*als Einzelnes*) is the universal perfect. Only as such can it be considered the real (*das Wirkliche*), the fulfilment of the merely intended, abstractly universal." (SA II, 211)

Snellman lays heavier emphasis than Strauss on the realisation of the substantial spirit in the individual. He is at pains to shift the attention

from the pantheists' preoccupation with the species, or with humankind in general, towards an appreciation of the changes required in an individual human's mind. It would be wrong to conclude that his approach is therefore more "individualistic" than that of his opponents. The difference is best characterised as a "logical" one. Snellman is so greatly indebted to the speculative method that he cannot accept the "abstract" universality of the human species as the most perfectly developed, highest category. According to him, the universality of the spirit is fully actualised first in the self-consciousness of the individual human.

For Strauss, the *Allpersönlichkeit* is a totality present in the consciousness of every single individual. It is something of which the human is conscious. But for Snellman this is not enough. The *Allpersönlichkeit* should be identical with the *Einzelpersönlichkeit*: these two are only different aspects of the *Persönlichkeit* as Snellman wants to understand it. The universal shall "descend" into the individual, to be realised in it while the individual "ascends" to the universal. Snellman stresses that in a truthful conception of personality this process should be seen as going in two directions. Strauss and Feuerbach have not understood this, and they remain caught in a one-sided doctrine of the individual's ascent to the absolute.

The species-concept of the human – or of God, for that matter – had in Snellman's opinion to be replaced by a concept of personality as a double process between two opposites that are fundamentally identical. The infinite is not simply an *Aufhebung* of the finite, obtained by negating it, but it is simultaneously a *Setzen seiner aus dem Endlichen heraus* in a positive sense (SA II, 259). The finite cannot be posited as the infinite without suspending the subjectivity of individual self-consciousness, but this very same process gives birth to a new kind of subjectivity, *übergreifende Subjektivität*, in which the self-consciousness of the individual human is replaced by the self-consciousness of the substantial and infinite spirit – of God – in the human (SA II, 260). With satisfaction, Snellman accepts the description that through this process the human becomes identical with God, but by "humans" he does not mean, naturally, any particular individuals in all their finiteness. He refers to them only to the extent that the individuals are able to identify themselves with the substantial spirit in their consciousness and self-consciousness and in their aims and purposeful actions.

What, then, is this substantial spirit? So far Snellman has only denied its identification with a transcendent, personal God and with a concept of the human species. It would be a mistake to read Snellman's message

solely in terms of a “speculative theology”. The peculiarities of his idealism cannot be fully appreciated until we have answered this question in ethico-political terms as well.

A Drift away from Hegel

Snellman’s definition of the personality was relevant not only to the post-Hegelian immortality debate but to a re-evaluation of Hegel’s philosophy of the spirit in general. Snellman was also aware of this. His doctrine was at least to some extent an attempt to overcome certain views which he considered as Hegel’s restrictions.

In a relatively long passage in *The Idea of Personality*, it is evident that Snellman’s drift from Hegel was not completely unconscious. At first Snellman states his overall result. The law, the state and world history, understood as moral world order, are not to be considered as something external to the human, like nature. They have their existence only in the “knowledge and will of the human as a personal spirit” (SA II, 289). They are external and objective only in the sense that they are also realised in other subjects. All “substantial powers” of the moral world order are “empty words” if they do not effect a special disposition of the mind (*Gesinnung*) in individual humans. Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* was a history of the development of self-consciousness, and Snellman notes that his own pursuits come very close to it. Hegel interpreted the various shapes of self-consciousness as mere “appearances”, but Snellman criticises him on this point, and claims an objective validity to them. Moreover, he insists that the philosophy of right should be reconsidered in this respect: “Hegel has neglected here the aspect of self-consciousness all too much. Ethical life is here given the meaning of an ethical substance, not that of an ethical temper, an ethical consciousness.” (SA II, 290)

This drift of meaning seems to have been, so to speak, the “speculative presupposition” that made possible Snellman’s book on the doctrine of the state, *Läran om staten*. This book was written shortly after *The Idea of Personality* and developed a view of the spirit in all its social manifestations as an “ethical temper”. In it, Snellman concentrates his attention on individual men’s ethical consciousness in a way that would have been impossible if he had stayed in Hegel’s orbit.

Nonetheless, one must be cautious, and not draw any hasty conclusions of Snellman’s concern with the individual. For Snellman, the required ethical temper had to be, naturally, not an egoistic or individualis-

tic self-consciousness, but rather the self-consciousness of the substantial spirit. It was not that of the men *per se* but that of the men as executors of the “eternal decisions of the world-spirit”. Snellman claims that individuals have to recognise themselves as the *Präsenz des Weltgeistes*, and he adds that “this is even Hegel’s true opinion, though it comes into sight less in his presentations of the state and the world history than in his treatment of the absolute spirit” (SA II, 290).

The last remark is significant. It informs us beyond all doubt that Snellman made use of Hegel’s views of the nature of the absolute spirit for his interpretations of history and society. Hegel did not himself proceed in this way, and it is highly doubtful that this was his “true opinion”. In Hegel’s systematisation, the historical world belonged only to the realm of the “objective spirit” and not to that of the “absolute spirit” which consisted of art, religion and philosophy. Despite Hegel’s tendency to overcome all distinctions by means of the speculative method, this distinction remains important. Hegel’s thesis of identity was a part of his philosophy of the absolute spirit. It was not intended as a description that could be applied, for instance, to the historical actions of individuals. It was not an ethical requirement in the sense that Snellman interprets it. In Hegel’s system of philosophy, the subject and the object, the subjective and the substantial spirit, the finite and the infinite spirit always fell more or less apart, until their complete identity was achieved in the “thinking of thinking” that Hegel tried to capture in his logic and which was the main activity of the absolute spirit. Hegel’s philosopher-God was, much like Aristotle’s, engaged in the purest activity. Unlike Snellman’s, he was not pursuing his ends in the historical world through the self-conscious actions of ethically tempered individuals. Snellman’s *The Idea of Personality* is certainly a most speculative work, but nevertheless his God was not so prone to contemplation as that of his great predecessor.

An ethical approach presupposes the existence of some norms. As is to be expected, Snellman has his own thoughts about the origins of norms. In this connection he uses the term “moral world order” (*eine moralische, sittliche Weltordnung*). Sometimes, Snellman seems to think that the moral world order consists of “God’s eternal decisions”, but usually he identifies it with the existing laws and traditions, with the state and the habits of a people or with world history. There is probably no significant discrepancy between the two descriptions if it is remembered that Snellman’s God is no transcendent being in opposition to the finite spirits. In the last instance, the moral world order is of the spirit’s own making, and is the source of ethical norms.

In much the same way as Strauss, who stresses that the *Allpersönlichkeit* is present totally in every individual, Snellman maintains that the human, as a rational being, already stands in the absolute, is identical with it, and that the problem is only that of how the human could overcome one's own finite subjectivity and become conscious of the absolute in oneself. In this respect, there are no essential differences between any two individuals.

Snellman goes even further in his "egalitarianism". Not only do all individuals stand in the same relation to the infinite spirit but as a consequence of this thesis of his, Snellman is compelled to adopt the view that all points of time are "equal" in this respect too. If all human beings are to be at least unconsciously identical with the absolute, the historical period of their birth could not make any difference. Thus the process of assimilating the finite spirits to the absolute substance cannot be one that is taking place in time (SA II, 270). It has already to be contained in the precious present. Snellman goes on to deny the absolute self-consciousness of all temporal development. Absolute knowledge as the self-consciousness of the substantial spirit is not an end towards which humankind is progressing in history, but something that is complete and present in every moment (*in jedem Jetzt total und gegenwärtig*) (SA II, 264). The human knows oneself as the absolute not as a temporal being but as eternal, and this "eternity" is a strictly *gegenwärtige Qualität*. By restricting "immortality" in this manner to the identity of finite and infinite spirit in every moment of time, Snellman was driven to a deification of the present and existing forms of the substantial spirit. Following his thesis of identity, he has to accept them as the last normative sources. In his treatment, the substantial spirit obtains a specifically "presentist" colouring in addition to its general ethical significance to individuals.

The crucial step that Snellman now takes is that of identifying the substantial spirit with the national spirit. This is, accordingly, what he means by the substantial spirit in the last instance. Although Snellman speaks of the "world-spirit", his universalism does not transcend the boundaries set by nationality. He argues against all "empty cosmopolitanism, abstract humanity that is without any determination" (SA II, 336). No individual can step out of the *Volksgeist*, because this is the substantial ground of his personality. There is a world-spirit, but this world-spirit can appear only "in the history of separate states", embodying different ideas of the proper ethical life.

What is Evil?

To Snellman, the Hegelian “negativity of spirit” meant that the spirit is perpetually engaged in negating and overcoming its own determinations, and by this activity developing freely towards new forms. It knows every existing determination of objectivity for something that is not in agreement with its purpose. It is something to be overcome, something *incomplete*. The activity of “negating” existing contents occurs in the self-constitution of the free will in the process of *Bildung*. The developmental stages embodying less of it are less complete than others. This is an evil that has to be overcome. However, these lesser educational stages, signifying the as yet pernicious “naturalness of the spirit”, are not anything evil as such. Only when seen in a relation to spirit does “naturalness” become something incomplete, something that must be overcome. Snellman thought that the negativity of spirit determined not only evil, but good as well. Nature was indifferent to good and evil. History, on the contrary, seemed to be witnessing an absolute ascent in the scale of values.

In Snellman’s words: “As long as the free will is as yet an activity that is identical with the objective development, it has its self-consciousness in the determinations of the latter, and consequently it knows in them its own substantiality, its universal spirituality” (SA II, 309).

But when the unrealised purpose is separated from this objectivity, set apart from it, the objectivity ceases to be for the spirit its “objective self, the object of its self-consciousness”. Instead, the spirit is now to be seen as a “subject”, and its end, the good, is now something “subjective”, belonging only to it, and to it in separation from other “subjects” or individual spirits. In an “abstract” subjectivity of this kind, the free will aims at imposing its “good” upon the spiritual objectivity. However, its negating activity is now not only subjective, but also arbitrary. Snellman argues that abstract subjectivity leads only to wicked acts and, in the end, to failures. By its own deeds, the spirit is brought to a feeling of remorse and to a conscious turning away from subjective action towards the world of substantial spirituality as its own self.

The Hegelian insight into the essential negativity of spirit led Snellman to the very edge of acknowledging the importance of Hegel’s dialectics to the normative area. However, Snellman did not affirm these insights to the full. Instead of relying upon Hegel, Snellman sought support from F. W. J. Schelling when it came to closer characterisation of the nature of evil and its connection with human subjectivity.

After commenting on the views held by Spinoza, Leibniz and others in regard to the problem of evil, Snellman explained Schelling's position in *Of Human Freedom*. Snellman laid bare the main elements of Schelling's philosophy of evil. He then proceeded to a free interpretation of Schelling's views, translating them into his own philosophical jargon; and he appeared to be quite satisfied with the result.

Schelling construed a universal double principle consisting of two aspects. In God this double principle was indissoluble. It reflected a tension between rational and irrational forces, but in God there was always a balance between these two. In humans, however, the double principle was no longer indissoluble. Humans could make a choice between "the light principle" and "the dark principle", between good and evil. Schelling wrote: "So far as the principle stems from the ground and is dark, it is the self-will (*Eigenwille*) of the creature... The understanding stands opposed to this self-will of the creature as the universal will which uses the former and subjects it to its power as a mere tool."¹⁴²

When Schelling spoke of the universal will he meant God's will. This will was inherently rational. It embodied the light principle. Humans could accept this universal will as their own and choose to live in harmony with God. But they could also deny it. They could try to assert their own selfhood, their self-will. Then the unity of the two principles was destroyed. Humans lost their power, their freedom, and the irrational, dark principle gained domination over them. Its ascendancy to power was thus caused by humans use of their *Eigenwille* independently of the universal will. When they yielded to the temptations of their selfhood and opposed their particular self-wills to the universal will, they were lost to evil.

Snellman maintained that if we only "abstract" from certain late developments in Schelling's thought, we arrive at "the deepest insights about the nature of human freedom and evil" (SA II, 317). Snellman particularly wished to "abstract" from the distinction between an absolute personality (God) and a finite one (human). He suggested instead that "we should understand by the spirit only the spirit". The spirit is the process of overcoming nature. This is its desire. It constitutes itself through its free will. Through its actions – including the evil ones – the spirit achieves a consciousness of its own substantial essence as the victory of good.

Self-consciousness as such has a relative justification only as an in-

¹⁴² F. W. J. von Schelling, *Sämmtliche Werke*, I, VII, 363.

termediary stage which is needed in order that the spirit can achieve substantial self-consciousness. In one passage, Snellman remarks that “Schelling conceives subjectivity as the principle of evil” (SA II, 318). He obviously agrees here with Schelling.

“I, the dark tyrant”

Above, the central elements of the conception of personality presented by Snellman in the Tübingen writing were defined as a very strong thesis of identity and the centrality of the present and antisubjectivism.

A few words of warning are due. The conception of identity that we refer to is present in Snellman’s later work more as an unspoken precondition than as outright dogma, usually expressed only through rather conventional phrasings. Over time, the young Snellman’s strict anti-subjectivism would decrease somewhat, settling into a largely Hegelian form. Snellman always perceived as also belonging to the present the centuries-long traditions that, despite the need to confront them critically, acted as sources of wisdom. With these clarifications, we believe the characterisations are valid.

Particularly the thesis of identity, with its numerous consequences, separated Snellman from Hegel, though the roots of the claim were to be found in Hegel. It was one of the many interpretations of Hegel, differing from each other, whose variety characterised the debates of the German philosophy of the 1830s and 1840s.¹⁴³

The thesis of identity refers to a specific, special way to perceive the relationship of the “finite” and “infinite” spirit. With the finite spirit, Snellman referred to both the human individual and culture. Science related to this kind of spirit was thus no spiritualism but the study of culture, as would be said today. The infinite spirit was something else entirely. It meant divinity. The relationship of human and god received a new kind of interpretation in Hegel’s philosophy, more specifically his philosophy of religion.

Hegel’s philosophy was hierarchical, built on various levels. Religion was the highest of these levels, the area of the absolute spirit. History and state life are often imagined as the highest level of what Hegel had to say,

¹⁴³ For more on the debates, see Manninen (1985), also in Manninen (1987c). Especially on Snellman’s relationship to the debates, see Manninen (1996a), 249-297. Cf. Jalava (2005), 157-166, Kallio (2017).

but this is not true. To him, religion did not return to these areas. Hegel revived a certain early Christian eschatology. He returned to the doctrine on Christ the meaning which it had had in the early church, but at the same time speculatively interpreted it in a special manner. Jesus had been a historical creature, but his redeeming work included an issue that crossed history, through which the human rises to become divine matter.

According to Jesus, the kingdom of God came to exist in the real world. God was no longer on the other side but belonged to the present. Living in the congregation, setting aside his selfishness, by following the redeeming work Christ had begun, the human as the image of God became part of divinity, eternity, in this world already.

Hegel's apt pupil, Karl Rosenkrantz, recalled how the wings were clipped from all imaginings regarding the hereafter among the philosopher's followers. The divine spirit was seen as present in people themselves:

“If we ask about the foundation of inspiration, it was undoubtedly in that consciousness that the human spirit is not in its nature different from the divine, that the content of history is therefore in truth divine by nature, that the human of this earth has not been abandoned by God in the corner of the universe but pressed to his world-creating breast by the heavenly father as his child, his image. The shiver of the most noble emotion due to this closeness of the divine, the happiest, humbly serious enchantment due to this ancient Gospel has then shaken many and ennobled their lives again. What others seek, that the Hegelians had found.”¹⁴⁴

This shiver also seems to have touched Snellman, because precisely this is the issue in his teaching about the oneness of the finite and the infinite spirit. Contrary to Hegel and radicalising Hegel's conception of identity, Snellman did not see oneness as being realised in the congregation but as universal in its meaning. The opportunity to experience it was for the human spirit in general, entirely without institutional limitation.

In his university lectures on the nature of the spirit, Snellman presented a rejection of the view of the creator as something separate from the world, and the world in turn as something separate from him (SA

¹⁴⁴ Rosenkrantz (1840), 353.

III, 619). These two were one, not opposites: “The Christian faith repeals dualism through the doctrine of God’s presence in the finite spirit. Good is not the work of the finite spirit, but God’s work in it.” (SA III, 611) Snellman explained that through the concepts of the criticism of the idea of personality, he had sought to reach the realisation that religion would express through the words “Not I, but Christ in me.” (SA III, 618)

In addition the concepts of religion, however, Snellman also used other concepts while talking about the topic. When we look at his work on the idea of personality, we can observe that it largely builds up to the praise of patriotism in precisely this sense of self-denial.

To conclude one central examination of his, Snellman proposed that alongside the God who had become man there was no room for the “self”. In his explanation of his belief, he quoted Friedrich Rückert’s German translation of a 13th century Afghanistan-born Muslim and mentor of dancing dervishes, the Sufi mystic Rumi:

Where love is born, dies
I, the dark tyrant
Let it die in the night
And breathe deeply at dawn.
(SA II, 284)

Snellman’s thinking did not stop at the nation, though it did have a special meaning for him. In his lectures on the nature of the spirit from the spring of 1843, neither the nation nor the state was much discussed. Some might see in this a sign of political correctness at a time when Snellman was seeking an academic post. However, Snellman was not being particularly correct in his attack on the idea of a separate creator god. Another, more relevant reading is that Snellman focused on the core of his doctrine. To be born to a specific nation and at a specific time was not a matter of will. The nature of the spirit, on the other hand, involved freedom. Addressing this was the topic of the lectures.

Lectures on the Essence of the Spirit

Snellman saw religion as teaching that “the good that takes place is the work of God in man, and in general a virtuous act requires faith in providence in world history”. (SA III, 633)

The thought of the presence of the spirit of God in the human spirit was, according to him, so foundational that other doctrines of faith and their differences lost their meaning. He assured: “Before this certainty, every sentence, every theology vanishes; that is why, from this perspective, difference in the form of faith becomes irrelevant. And an educated person must thus confess that everyone becomes blessed in his own faith.” (SA III, 633)

Above religious feeling was knowing. Awareness of nature required observation through the senses, although this too was conveyed through education, but the human awareness of oneself, self-awareness, was different in nature: “in the world of the spirit the object is not outside knowledge. What makes the word, the action, what they are is not a sensual phenomenon but the meaning that the spirit places in them.” (SA III, 609) Snellman imagined, like Hegel, that the world of nature was eternally permanent, repeating itself, whereas characteristic of the world of the spirit was constant development, process, the transiency of every form.

History existed in each awareness that concerned the self: “education is always present. Thus also the past and the future of world history have their meaning, it is immanently in the present.”¹⁴⁵ (SA III, 636) The task of the philosopher, according to Snellman, was to reach through intelligent thought the presence of the infinite in the finite, that connection of the divine and the human, and make it public.

Philosophy was the most universal of the ways of knowing. It was the intelligent development of thinking, but at the same time it should reach into all the fields of knowing that existed in its time. By itself, like any spiritual matter, it could not be unchanging: “it is the form of the awareness of every time and thus develops over time into new forms. The collapse of a certain philosophical system thus proves the power of truth in the human spirit, not its inability to know truth.” (SA III, 634) In the Young Hegelian way, Snellman began to speak of the “spirit of the

¹⁴⁵ This observation comes from Snellman’s draft in the spring of 1843 for lectures on the relationship of Hegel’s logic to the other parts of the system.

times” as the object of philosophy. As insight into the spirit of the times, even speculation expressed the power of education. To Hegel, philosophy famously was one’s own time, conceived through thoughts. Yet the owl of Minerva, taking flight as the evening faded, did not satisfy Snellman, who fervently sought the present day.

With a close look at the development of idealism in Kant, Fichte and Schelling, Snellman argued in his lectures that the absolute, or the divine, becomes one with the awareness, the spirit’s self-awareness, that concerns it.

As a result of his imaginings, Snellman arrived at a form of awareness in which the opposition of the subject and the object, and at the same time of awareness and self-awareness, was undone: at “personal self-awareness”. This was finally concrete self-awareness. Using a concept he had adopted from Hegel, Snellman proposed that it was made such by the expression of the “world-spirit” in it: “the subjective spirit’s awareness of the spirit as the world-spirit, i.e. of its own self, as the manifestation that was mentioned, forms that true self-awareness that we call *personal self-awareness*.” (SA III, 625)

The concept of personality was indivisible from the concept of the world-spirit. Yet here it is necessary to note that Snellman’s “world-spirit” was not the same as Hegel’s. The teacher’s concept referred to some form of spirituality that functioned above individual actors and used individuals from world history as its tools to realise the goal of history, awareness of freedom. This superindividual Hegel named the “cunning of reason”. The doctrine could be interpreted as a kind of large-scale equivalent of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”, but Hegel nonetheless used more personalised expressions when describing it.

Snellman had no doctrine of the cunning of reason and the world-spirit was not superindividual to him. To him it manifested itself in every developed self-awareness, as “personalised” self-awareness, to use his terms, and otherwise in the form of the individual’s religious feeling, as faith in providence. Expressed in other words, it was about Snellman’s view of identity, according to which the infinite is present in the finite, the divine in the human.

The world-spirit did not, however, set the pace for the common march of individuals. Individuals had their opportunities for subjectivity, arbitrariness. This kind of exercise of will was the indispensable, inescapable matter of historical action. It was partly to do with the same basic pattern that appeared in Snellman’s writing on academic freedom. Only the free and critical attitude of the subject made possible the formation of a per-

sonal conviction that shaped all later life, a personal reconciliation with the “substance” included in tradition, its intellectual matter.

The work on the idea of personality, however, made an addition that had far-reaching consequences: subjectivity in itself, in “abstract”, was evil. Yet it was a necessary and inevitable phase in the development of the spirit. Equated with evil, it had to be overcome for the good of the objective expressions of spirituality.

The Acts and Fates of Nations

Snellman’s philosophy became strictly antisubjective. Another side, from a Hegelian perspective, was that the “substance was subjectified”, manifested itself in the awareness and will of the individual.

When connecting this process directly to human individuals, Snellman nonetheless inevitably had to adjust, for example, Hegel’s doctrine on civil society, the free circle of selfish action. All egotism was bad in Snellman’s view. Diverging from Hegel’s definition of the concept, civil society also became a field for patriotic activity in Snellman’s view. Hegel’s contrast between bourgeois society and universal state was transformed in Snellman into a simple difference, between citizens who obey laws and those who represent citizens and create laws.

Now it may be asked whether states in their relationships to other states were not egotistic, concerned solely with their own interests, as the matter was seen in the old European tradition and as Hegel also saw it. In his doctrine on the state, Snellman admitted that “the acts and fates of the nation are directed by something other than the laws of natural justice and morality” (SA III, 492), but he immediately expanded his statement by references to the public opinion and its influence. It was doubtful to what degree wars that had been declared unjust by the public opinion profited the state that engaged in them. Thus, history seemed to prove that the fall followed pride, favouring the existence of *nemesis*, “however late the punishments decreed by it sometimes appear” (SA III, 492).

Placing one’s own views of justice before what one knew to be best for one’s state was treason in Snellman’s view. Yet Snellman also held the following view: “Now it is asked whether the strength and esteem of the nation is the highest law of world history? It is not; instead the highest form of the development of the national spirit, morality, is that.” (SA III, 495)

Snellman had an unwelcoming attitude to the idea of the existence of one superpower, assessing its consequences:

“the dominion of one single nation means decadence for humankind. But when all nations seek power, this aim is compatible with the aim of humankind and the individual development of each nation means victory for humankind.” (SA III, 495) “And when the nation has independence, real and acquired through one’s own strength and not borrowed, derived from external conditions incidental to the nation, then the nation also has the power to independently affect humankind with its education and develop its own national spirit.” (SA III, 496)

Despite everything, nations, like individuals, were limited. Snellman concluded his work on the state with the rather pessimistic view that only by knowing can a human rise above this limitation. Did morality and ethical life and action, which Snellman once referred to as the very highest, thus not have a place in world history after all?

In his doctrine on the state, Snellman simply stated concisely:

“in any case it is certain that the right lives and is preserved on earth, that people know and recognise it and that evil is thus objectively atoned for in world history.... And awareness of this is faith in Providence in world history, knowledge of an eternal reason that without being bound to the moment or the limited existence of the individual constantly rules over the fates of humankind. Yet a human does not reach this knowledge by examining the past or imagining the future. He must feel the eternal in the present, passing moment...” (SA III, 498)

Was Snellman’s providence, in the end, anything save another name for Hegel’s world-spirit? The concept for a letter to Per Erik Bergfalk in June 1843 answers this:

“I am nonetheless not bound to agree with Hegel. I have on pages 444, 445 abandoned his view regarding world history, which made him say: ‘it appears to have reached its goal,

there where – the spirit is reality as the spirit.¹⁴⁶ I consider, namely, this whole view of the goal of world history to be an inconsistency in Hegel’s doctrine. It also follows from this that imperfection and evil in general do not belong to world history, but the history of mortal nations and individuals.

Brother remarks for this reason, quite with cause, that I have taken Hegel’s claim about the sameness of the real and the sensible farther than he himself.” (SA III, 677)

There was no world-spirit in the sense meant by Hegel in Snellman. He saw as particularly objectionable Hegel’s idea that the world-spirit might reach some stagnant, finite goals. To the degree to which it was possible to speak of the world-spirit, it had to be something that manifested in the conscious, free-willed action of nations and individuals. Through this, the essence of the spirit could constantly develop into ever more perfect forms of expression in the lives of nations and individuals, without finding a final resting place. A perfect form of expression never arrived, yet despite this, it was somehow at every moment in hand because the choice between good and evil always had to be made. All forms were perishable, but “the spirit is nonetheless *permanently* in this process, as eternal and real in all forms”. (SA III, 677)

Snellman continued to enlighten Bergfalk:

“Free spiritual development would not exist without the quest for perfection. It is nonetheless in itself the pursuit of this individual, this nation, this era.... If, on the other hand, there is justice in the world, it manifests only in the knowledge and customs of each nation.... I will thus not say at any point that the individual must submit to irrationality, but that he must control his *own* reason and admit that the universal reason manifested in the will of the nation is a little more.” (SA III, 678)

¹⁴⁶ Corresponding with the pages SA III, 496-497 on the influence of education for the nation. The quotation is from SA III, 677.

It was precisely these topics that Snellman developed further in his lectures on the essence of the spirit. He even appears to have been planning a book on the topic,¹⁴⁷ but such a project led to nothing when his academic career came to a halt.

His lectures developed, from a basis of freedom, the concept of an objectively extant “ethical world order” that would no longer be the mere elevation of knowing above the finite world but also action, concrete acts. This *den sedliga verldsordningen*, or in another place *den moraliska verldsordningen*, required the abandonment of subjectiveness and evil deeds.

The concept of the ethical world order had been in an important position in the philosophy of J. G. Fichte and Fichte’s followers. It is possible that Snellman ran into it again while preparing the historical review included in his lectures. The concept did not come from Hegel. In his lectures on philosophy, Hegel had noted Fichte’s faith in the ethical world order, confidence in moral action producing a good result. For Fichte, religion was practical faith in an ethical world order. In its day, this caused a sensation and the fatal accusation of atheism that was aimed at Fichte. After all, the object of faith, God, had to be something more! Hegel, on the other hand, saw Fichte as having harmed philosophy by making it a doctrine for the few and he dismissed the Fichtean view with the dry statement: “As something believed in, the object of feeling, this form belongs in religion, not philosophy”.¹⁴⁸

In this, there is not a particularly weighty difference between whether we talk about a “virtuous”, “moral” or “ethical” world order. All mean roughly the same thing. The term used by Fichte was the “moral world order”. When a Hegelian, like Snellman, adopted the concept to complement his doctrine, it was natural to talk about *Sittlichkeit* or *sedlighet*, an ethical life as a contrast to the mere observation of moral rules.

The concept had an important meaning for Snellman’s teacher and supporter, the Hegelian Johan Jakob Tengström, who was at the time Finland’s only professor of philosophy. The pursuit of the highest good was the basis of ethical life to Tengström, but he insisted that from there one had to proceed to the “understanding of objective ethical conditions” and finally to the demand for a “universal objective will, such as it is

¹⁴⁷ Thus may be determined from the letter Snellman received from his Stockholm publisher, Z. Haegström, dated 14 April 1843 (SA III, 649).

¹⁴⁸ Hegel (1971), 409.

when expressed in the entire world order”.¹⁴⁹ The ethical world order (*den sedliga världsordningen*) was, therefore, not a mere Kantian supposition of practical reason to Tengström, who used the concept repeatedly.

In his lectures, Snellman clarified:

“The spirit now has its awareness of its freedom in this objectivity, which forms the world of the free determinations of will. But these determinations are finite and variable. This finiteness forms evil as ‘malum metaphysicum’ in the world of freedom. Knowledge of this, therefore, also includes that freedom is not given in this world, realised, but the spirit’s knowing of its freedom is only knowledge that freedom should be in this objectiveness as an end” (SA III, 629).

From the ethical world order, the individual received the obligation to perform good deeds and advance freedom in the shared world, as required by the spirit. The ethical world order was entirely the work of the spirit, it becoming an object in culture and social institutions. It could not be shaken by an individual’s evil deed, because it, the ethical world order, “is what it is, in the manner and moral awareness of other subjects” (SA III, 631).

To Snellman, ethical life was communal. This was what was meant by referring to it as “objective”. When realising good in the world of the spirit that was understood as the ethical world order, freedom had, according to Snellman, a real objectivity that was separate from subjective arbitrariness. He assured that “free will as a rational thing influences the aforementioned rational development of objectivity” (SA III, 631). Snellman did not tolerate the idea of individuals as playthings of the Hegelian world-spirit but glorified the importance of free will, saw it as an active factor, while simultaneously rejecting subjective arbitrariness.

Snellman rejected with irritation Hegel’s idea of some goal that had already been reached conclusively. This did not mean that he would have rejected thinking on purposes in general. On the contrary, he asked in the following manner, demanding and promising an answer, “Why must we think of education as progressing towards a goal?” (SA III, 621)

Nothing connected Snellman to Hegel’s new home state, Prussia, if we do not count as a connection the promise of a constitution that was

¹⁴⁹ J. Ph. Palmén, *Anteckningar vid Prof. Tengströms Föreläsningar öfver Inledningen till Philosophien samt högre Logiken*, Helsingin yliopiston kirjasto, signum D II 40, p. 82.

made by the ruler and even fooled Hegel: it was left unrealised but received written form in Hegel's philosophy of right. In this sense, the situation in Finland was quite different from Prussia, although the ruler here was the Emperor of a large empire. In the early 1840s, it was not entirely clear what would be Finland's constitution or whether there would be one. The country was governed entirely by bureaucracy. The "independent state" was of course a mere oddity in the heads of some who had read their Hegel.

Through both Hegel's writings and Tengström's teaching, education had acquired a special meaning for Snellman. Tengström understood the state order as an expression of universal education, which should develop alongside the level of civilisation. Snellman, for example, supported open national elections while emphasising the "level of education" as a prerequisite. In the series of writings he had made for *Freja* on the reformation of Sweden's Diet, he saw the level of education as a prerequisite for political participation and supported Norway's model moreso than Sweden's (SA I, 311-325, 348-349).

On the political models of his thinking, Snellman told Bergfalk, referring to what he had presented in his political philosophy, that

"In the United States of North America, political freedom is... nothing other than what was presented before, which is also shown by the fact that every voter must be a man and he must have a manly education that is part of mature years. If my definition also covered Turkey and Prussia, it would be too wide. If America could not fit within it, it would be too narrow.... I cannot help it that in England, France, Sweden, there is no political freedom according to this definition." (SA III, 698)

In his doctrine on the state, Snellman did not shy away from using the most modern sources, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, later perceived as a classic writer, who had written about the United States of his day and greatly inspired Snellman. At the end of 1843, Snellman explained to one German philosophical ruminant, J. F. Reiff,¹⁵⁰ whom he knew from Tübingen:

¹⁵⁰ Reiff wrote a positive review of Snellman's study of personality in *Theologische Jahrbücher* in 1842. Another favourable review was published in Berlin by C. L. Michelet in *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* in 1842. Michelet kept contact to Snellman still in the 1860s.

“I do strongly believe that the speculation of the present day (Hegel with his students, unworthy me among them...) will one day be placed alongside scholasticism... I was freed from German philosophy by the old, superficial French one. In this superficiality I find, Lord help me, more warmth, more seriousness related to the matter than in the current thoroughness of German philosophers. The spirit of truth has strayed from these. Hegel himself has much depression and distortion.” (SA III, 746)

The letter was written at a time when Snellman’s academic dreams had run onto the rocks and he had headed to Kuopio. At such a moment, he summed up his conviction: “Like for the individual human action is the test of his knowledge, so speculation must also test its truth in the work and action carried out by one nation at one moment.” (SA III, 746) This Snellman would do. At the same time he admitted, “It is true that I am still under the power of Hegelianism, but my goal is to separate myself from it as far as possible.” (SA III, 747)

The turn in thinking that Snellman referred to had already happened in his doctrine on the state, largely as a result of him becoming familiar with open, public debate in Sweden. Though of course others were involved, too. He had described the birth of his book to Bergfalk:

“The 19 printing sheets that are now the matter I wrote, except for a pause of a couple of weeks, for nearly nine months, and the effort took even my bodily strength. I had already in 1840 published a textbook-like philosophy of right, which is not a mere summary of Hegel’s philosophy of right. Before that, in addition to German philosophical presentations of the legal basis of the state, I have read Hallam, Guizot on England’s constitution, Michelet (French) etc. shorter writings. In 1841, I was sorting out the meaning of moral action and world history to the self-awareness of the spirit (presented in a German-language book on the ‘idea of personality’) and at the same time I read with special interest Rousseau, Montesquieu, all the works of Machiavelli, the writings of Madame Staël and Benj. Constant. During both years, I also busied myself a lot with daily politics. Note. If all this now is proof of a ‘noble and liberal spirit’, as Brother has said, I hope it will affect the public in a corresponding manner.” (SA III, 677)

Snellman's opening up to new influences – and one might also say “experiences” – was a fact and immensely meaningful as something that made possible his later activity. After all, in Kuopio the man could have retreated into being a philosopher in the wilderness, though he already knew his father as a warning of the fate of this breed.¹⁵¹ At the same time, it is clear that Snellman never fully detached himself from the philosophical speculation that gave his thinking a certain conceptual basis.

At the latest, Snellman set out on his own path away from Hegel in his work on the idea of personality, despite his at times excessive references to Hegel. Partly this happened consciously and was stated in public, partly it was a simple misinterpretation, but of course it was also due to the pursuit of original thinking. This was typical of all Hegelianism. Tengström's teaching activity, in turn, formed an important preparatory work for Snellman, in his fundamental doctrine on the state as well as in more speculative themes. Tengström can be seen as one source of Snellman's antisubjectivism, although there were also other sources – starting with the philosopher's own home, his parents.

It might be asked how deeply Snellman had adopted the idea of the ethical world order. Should that kind of name not refer to the world in general or more specifically to the world without limitations? Should a life in accordance with it not be founded on an ethics that presents universal demands for competence, perhaps citizenship of the world? Must it be thought that to Snellman, national ethical life excluded the ethics of the citizen of the world? Nothing suggests that Snellman would have wanted to join the society of “journeymen without a fatherland” that was despised at the time, but neither is there an indication that his perspective would have been limited to the homeland.

Seeking an apparent general applicability, Snellman stated in his lectures that “the subject is the servant of the ethical world order” (SA III, 633) – a servant, but a servant making his own contribution to the order. As an interpretation of this kind of stand, would a view of humanity's global ethical life be fitting? Snellman did present in his work on personality the equation “world-spirit = humanity” (SA III, 337), although he added qualifications to it.

Snellman was a nationalist, but not a narrow one. For instance, he did not in any way wish to exclude educational influences that passed from one nation to another. On the contrary, in his search for the present he sought it specifically in the world, breaking open doors and windows to

¹⁵¹ Manninen (1995).

Europe and even across the Atlantic, to everywhere he could find knowledge and saw as the civilised world. As a Hegelian, he valued the cultural heritage of humanity. He dreamed of a time when even Finns could contribute to it as an independent nation.

The Ethical World Order

As the work of spirit, the ethical world order was no reflection of the Platonic world of ideas. And it could not be summed up as a series of sentences from which all other ethically meaningful sentences would follow. It was changeable. It developed, as the essence of the spirit should, but it only developed so that people in their current historical context placed themselves in its service, directed their wills according to it, rationally and searching for objectivity.

Snellman proposed:

“And since this development is therefore realised out of the free decision of the spirit, so it is only through this that the world order manifests itself as the spirit, the world-spirit, not only for the knowing of the subject, but at the moment of the act as the free action of the spirit.... No one rationally denies that the ethical world order would be of the spirit, would exist in the spirit and be the work of the spirit. But when it already exists and develops in the ethical activity of the subject, this action also forms the actual manifestation of the world-spirit as the spirit. The subject, however, is not the world-spirit, it is rather the transcending of subjectivity that forms the world-spirit.” (SA III, 633)

Expressed through philosophical terms, “the transcending of subjectivity is also the transcending of substance, which are both thus transcended moments in the spirit as the absolute spirit” (SA III, 633). The tricky sentence opens up when it is understood that transcendence did not mean destruction. In the Hegelian sense, transcendence – or overcoming – was always a double concept, *aufgehoben und aufbewahrt*, in other words: transcended by surpassing and preserved in the higher form that had been reached. The matter might be expressed by saying that the human needs God and God needs the human, each in order to become what the true essence of their spirit is. The “presence” of the higher united

these two, but it did not make them the same. Hegelian "identity" was a concept of process and not sameness. It still included a certain difference. It was a constant process to surpass that difference. The presence of the infinite in the finite, thus Snellman says, "makes of the absolute spirit an object meant for the finite spirit, an ideal, which the latter only may approach eternally in knowledge as well as in action" (SA III, 634).

The ethical world order and world-spirit received in Snellman an interpretation that drew on Hegel's philosophy of religion yet still differed from Hegel's system. In 1841, the presentation on the development of the personality ended with a flood of quotations from Hegel's philosophy of religion. Compared to the work on the idea of personality in the later 1843 lectures on the essence of the spirit, the role given to the ethical world order in the final act of the philosophy of the spirit was new. It was revealed to be the objective shape of the world-spirit, present in individuals. But Snellman's world-spirit was no Hegelian deceiver using individuals as its tools. It worked in the free, rational will of human individuals.

This was the way in which divinity, the absolute spirit, was present in world history and the individuals who shaped it. The good that happened in the world was the work of God in the human, the presence of the spirit of God in the spirit of the human. The world-spirit was not part of a mere total sum of all people but is in every human individual, "immanent in its totality in every self-awareness" (SA III, 626). The relationship with the highest did not only become visible as the result of the long work of history. Neither did it apply merely to some of the few. It was present always and in everyone. In its subjectivity, in the doing of evil, in the search for personal good, while selfishly pursuing one's own benefit or pleasures, the human could, with one's free will, turn away from it.

In his doctrine on the state, Snellman remarked that humankind will never become perfect, although on the other hand it had always been such, namely in relation to the conditions of its time. Perfection always expressed something purely relative. But it was precisely the pursuit of perfection that was "that eternally enduring desire, due to whose influence history will never stop and this desire, the life of the spirit, forms the greatest perfection of the human" (SA III, 497). The doctrine ends on a gloomy note regarding action: "The individual can see in his action that temporary, limited forms that oppress the freedom of his spirit blur the presence of the truth. The world of action is, you see, external, sensual.... In knowing, on the other hand, the spirit is freed." (SA III, 498)

The concluding words of the book on the state: "And this freedom belongs to all, to slaves as much as to the republican: in its enjoyment,

the wisdom of the scholar is no more valuable than the simple comfort of the unlettered.” (SA III, 498)

Snellman did not reject the superiority of knowing, but made it relative and achievable by all. Yet he did not develop a philosophy that would have declared everything to be acceptable. When we look at his career, the conclusion is quite different.

When Snellman lectured on the essence of the spirit, he included the idea of the ethical world order in the final stage of the spirit’s development and considered its relationship to the individual. He arrived at a more optimistic view than before. The idea of the ethical world order no longer made the world of action mere external, sensual struggling while bound by the chains of nature.

Snellman’s conclusion may be considered more ethically focused than Hegel’s philosophy, as foreign as his ethics might be to the conceptual classifications of today’s philosophy. This was already hinted at by the view presented in his book on personality, according to which Hegel has paid too little attention to self-awareness. In Hegel, ethicality received “the meaning of ethical substance, and not the meaning of the ethical frame of mind, ethical conscience” (SA II, 290). Instead, according to Snellman, the person had to observe “the presence of the world-spirit and the knowing by this spirit of itself in itself, so that he would know the absolute spirit not only as substance but as spirit, as self-consciousness” (SA II, 290).

After crushing with his philosophy the Hegelian world-spirit into individual pieces and giving it new content as a link to the ethical world order, Snellman was able to see the world of action as parallel to the world of knowing, after all. The absolute spirit – truth and goodness, we might say – became through the change something that could eternally be approached in knowledge as well as in action.

The Making of a Philosopher of State

The sceptic might see in Snellman’s ethical world order a tactical choice through which he, without a post and without money, sought to bring himself into the favour of philosopher J. J. Tengström and other academic fathers. Before going to Kuopio, Snellman did propose to Tengström’s daughter, though he was rejected. Perhaps all was merely the creation of a front by a man who sought a career by any means, as some quarters that consider themselves enlightened have allowed to be understood about

the upstart, humbly born generation of Snellman and company.

Firstly, it must be noted that if it is claimed that this was about securing support, Snellman had already mentioned Tengström's great importance to Finnish Hegelianism in the preface of his work on the idea of personality. This was not about idle flattery: We have been able to prove that the mention was founded on genuine grounds.

The mention probably had some significance. Tengström was not among Snellman's correspondents when he studied abroad, but during the Kuopio era he and a member of Tengström's family, the philosopher's talented son Robert Tengström, were Snellman's most valuable correspondents. Even earlier, Snellman had been in Tengström's circle, but after he returned to Finland his importance in it increased. Splendid literary activity was undoubtedly more important here than some presumed tactical moves. The differences between Snellman and Tengström that gradually revealed themselves did not break the companionship that was based on mutual respect.¹⁵²

Secondly, in his lectures on the essence of the spirit, Snellman did not shy away from his speculative views on questions that were significant from the perspective of the church and consequently the university. The God of Snellman's lectures was not fierce and angry, but neither did he show mercy. Snellman rejected all anthropomorphic definitions connected to God and in general God as a creature separate from "creation", in other words from human individuals. "The divine in us" was his doctrine. As an idealist, Snellman was not a Spinozist and of course not a materialist, but ingenuity was not needed to discern that neither were his views in harmony with the teaching of the church.

Snellman began to feel that instead of squabbling over concepts, philosophy should enact reforms in both church and state. As someone who carried out reform of the state, Snellman left his indelible mark on Finnish history. He is not known as a church reformer. Why? When he was still in Finland, Snellman composed for his minor publication *Spanska Flugan* in 1839 a piece on "the learned and skilful" D. F. Strauss. Its latter part, which apparently took more of a stand, was banned by Porvoo's church censorship. In Germany and Sweden, Snellman was able to participate fully in the Strauss debate on philosophy of religion, but he

¹⁵² Manninen (1986a), especially see p. 148-155.

had received a lesson on why it would not be possible in Finland.¹⁵³ He would focus on what he considered to be possible, and probably more important.

It must be admitted that Snellman's development of the idea of an ethical world order remained incomplete. When Snellman much later received a professorship in Helsinki, many other things, far more tangible, filled his mind and he directed his teaching only at that area of practical philosophy that he still considered the most meaningful, or in any case possible to teach in a university.

However, it is possible to examine the heritage of conceptual, "speculative" material that manifests in Snellman's later activity, as a journalist in Kuopio as much as a university professor in Helsinki. Nothing suggests that there would be a conflict between Snellman's publications and the writings that remained private. Snellman left certain issues in the shadows. What he did take up show no signs of a lack of courage.

The Universality of Education

In his 1846 writing in the Kuopio-based newspaper *Saima*, which later was discontinued by censorship, Snellman addressed universal education. The writing is completely accessible and includes no problems of interpretation. It must be noted that in the Hegelian dialectics of education and ethics, education was the first phase of the natural prerequisites for arrival at freedom and the universal competence of the spirit. Without it, ethical life would not be possible. To his readership, which he knew to be limited, Snellman did not preach about ethical

¹⁵³ Snellman participated in the Swedish debate in a series of 17 writings in *Freja* in 1841-42 (SA II, 344-388, with commentary by Jouni Alavuotunki). A popular edition of Strauss published in Stockholm in the summer of 1841 was confiscated and its publisher was sued. In spite of his philosophical differences with Strauss, Snellman vigorously defended the right of critical reason to investigate religious doctrines. Bitter attack on the hypocritical and reactionary Lutheran state church in Sweden, and sharp appeal to the freedom of conscience, irritated the conservative journal *Svenska Biet* led by reverend C. O. Angeldorff. The debate was regularly followed by the journal *Aftonbladet* until the sue was cancelled in November 1841 (see Savolainen, 2006, 294-299). Snellman's reputation among the authorities in Sweden and Finland was bruised, but he gained fame among the Swedish liberals.

life, the ethical world order, but about what was first needed to make it possible.

The universality of spirit that education was meant to offer did include the foundational prerequisites of ethical life, although education alone was not yet enough to justify the kind of conviction that, in Snellman's eyes, was worthy of the name of ethicality. It can be stated that since the days of the university pamphlet, Snellman's view of the civic prerequisites of education had changed fundamentally. To him, it was no longer something tied to the university as opposed to the school, but rather founded on an attitude that was reachable by everyone.

Right at the beginning of this writing, Snellman noted that there is also another name for education: humanity, humaneness. He saw that the meaning of humanity, real humaneness, "had to be sought in that perfection to which humankind aspires" (SA V, 455). When speaking of the pursuit of perfection by humankind's spiritual life, Snellman was not able to wholly avoid the language of speculation, but now he wove it into his view on life, which had grown with experience: "the human cannot think of Christ, the perfect creature, without seeing in this Highest Being, too, the effort to raise other beings as well to perfection. From this, then, follows compassion for the imperfection of those others and the need to ennoble them that is experienced together with them. This compassion that manifests in the Highest Being is also called mercy, grace and love." (SA V, 455)

In the same breath, Snellman claimed that "every time and every nation is directed by a universal spirit, irresistibly, regardless of the egotistic pursuits of individuals and as risen above all caprice" (SA II, 456). So, Snellman saw as the first demand to be set for the education of the individual the knowing of one's own time and its spirit. The demand was built on the idea that the spiritual development of humankind leads to ever higher forms of humanity, so that the era being lived represents the highest that can be sought.

Reason and freedom were needed to separate the spirit of the era from "stray spirits", but according to Snellman, the former were attributes that in principle belong to all: "The peasant, that is to say, can be educated, whereas the scholar or noble wreathed with laurels can be lacking in education. The peasant can, in his own time, seek to understand what the era demands of him.... This element of civilisation can thus exist in any social class at all and can be lacking in any at all." (SA V, 456)

The educator showed ethicality if his desire and effort are aimed at "the universal education of the educated to benefit humankind and the

fatherland” (SA V, 457). Humankind and nation were constantly parallel in Snellman’s presentation. The nation was placed in first place only by a certain necessity, or “because the education of one’s own time cannot reach the individual except by being conveyed through the education of that nation of which he is part, so it follows from this that he should seek to understand the position of his own nation in relation to other nations and the relation of the education of his own country to the universal culture of humankind” (SA V, 458).

According to Snellman, the modern age was characterised by the pursuit of the universality of education, the right of all to have access to it. He saw it as the only secure foundation of modern society, the foundation of the free development of nations and international law. Snellman continued:

“This is the source of the present’s various doctrines on universal freedom of conscience, shared political and civil rights, equality before the law, freedom of establishment, free trade etc. All these were based on requiring universal education and therefore they can only be realised to the degree to which education truly is a matter that belongs to all members of society.... Also due to this is the respect for human dignity that manifests in the efforts of our time to improve the education and livelihood of the lower classes, the founding of schools, refuges and rescue services, the mitigation of penal codes, the abolition of slaves and all projects that touch all the nations of the world.” (SA V, 459)

“But this spirit is not the one that saw it as a deed acceptable to God to convert the fellowman by the sword to recognise a faith, and not the one that condemns with bitter unconditionality the conviction of a fellowman. To this spirit, the difference of races, nations, religions, social order, doctrines or customs is not a foundation for condemnation. It respects in every human the eternal right of human dignity, reason and education, and fights to bring it into being for itself and others.” (SA V, 460)

Thus spoke Snellman, who is usually not considered a liberal.

It is worth noting that in his writing, Snellman did not pause to consider women seriously. The doctrine on the state presented marriage as

a foundational social institution. It remained cool with regard to the demands for women's emancipation that were part of the "spirit of the time".¹⁵⁴ A certain revision of attitude is to be seen in Snellman's 1846 article in *Saima*, "Can an educated woman in Finland benefit from Finnish-language literature?". In it, he argued that "woman also needs knowledge of humankind's universal pursuits and interest in them so that she could be sheltered from narrow spiritual heresies" (SA V, 154). The idea was clarified: "the participation of woman, too, in the universal pursuits of the nation is a sure path on which she can acquire higher education and learn to know the value of her own calling as a mother and a spouse, her own task in general. Directed by this kind of participation, she can in her own circle feel her life to be as valuable as that of a man's." (SA V, 154)

Snellman himself did not set out to break that "circle of her own". The question was what kind of "feeling" could be achieved within it, which did have a practical significance for the future of the nation and its advancement of humane education. "And the mother, who prepares a path to this kind of life for her daughter, has given her protection against vanity and the sorrow that often distresses the noble female mind with the thought that she is condemned to life in an unthinking servant's station." (SA V, 154)

It remained foreign to this suggestion of participation that women would not be satisfied with rising above that station "in thought". After all, nations were not satisfied with surpassing the limitations on their independence merely in the "world of knowing". Snellman wrote without hesitation about "every individual", but it was left to others to reach conclusions about this with regard to women. Snellman did not move far beyond the Rousseauian view of the gendered division of labour: women's education was needed so that women, with their specifically emotional and moral nature, would best be able to raise boys and prepare them for higher tasks.

¹⁵⁴ Snellman's view of gender is analysed by Jalava (2004).

Liberation and Higher Liberation Still

When describing the era we are examining, the term “national liberalism” can be used: liberalism and nationalism were partners, both subject to attacks by conservatives. In 1862, when Snellman was writing an article on issues of nationality that was “left in his desk drawer” but had been intended for the philosophical journal *Der Gedanke*, nationalism was above all an ideology of liberation, not an oppressive or destructive one. Today, it can show both of these faces. The parting of the paths of liberalism and nationalism happened later and was so thorough that it makes it difficult to understand the era that is now being discussed.

Since it is known that Snellman did not abandon his nationalism, there is reason to examine its specific nature. His doctrine on the state included a great deal of talk about the national spirit, as did the works of certain other people at that time, especially after Snellman’s book was published. Snellman’s “desk drawer” writing can be considered more mature and analytical. The timing was such that Snellman apparently saw it as more important to invest in the internal political development of Finland, which was beginning to open up, than to be caught presenting his sensitive true goals in foreign publications. The writing presented clear conclusions, one might also say: a nationalist political programme.

Snellman understood his writing as philosophical, but in his view philosophy should rely on various sciences. Therefore, he felt the examination of the nationalism issue to be meaningful at least to political philosophy, the study of history and international politics, and international justice. Most of these, he thought, had addressed the topic insufficiently, if at all. In this context, he did not say a word about fields such as the study of folklore or popular life. Sociology going unmentioned is explained by the field not yet being in existence. It was Snellman’s goal to examine nationalism from a modern perspective, though with its history included.

Snellman firmly condemned the idea that externally perceptible natural characteristics were signs that defined nationality. Disposition, the colour of skin or hair, cranial shape, average lifespan and other such characteristics, even a separate language, were incidental; some were more permanent than others, but this did not make them rationally indispensable to the examination of nationality. From the beginning, nationality was the work of the spirit, in other words cultural, historical, social. It was “the social life of the nation in the family, civil society, external and internal state activity, its scientific, literary and artistic production and

the enjoyment of it" (SA XI.1, 446). To earn the name of a nation, these had to be original in spirit, separable from others. Unity of birth and language belonged to the nation to the degree to which this was historical.

Here we encounter the concept of "unity", which is central to the writing on nationalism. It turns out that though Snellman defines his concept of unity with references to experience, the issue is not entirely separated from his lectures of nearly two decades earlier on the essence of the spirit. If not the precise words, then at least the foundational tendency of thought has remained the same.

What was the "nation" in Snellman, really? It becomes clear that nationality was in no way already hiding within the people: "The tribe breaks into various groups of people and different tribes unite again into one nation. History is full of examples of this. But it appears that a higher level of culture tolerates assimilation less." And further, "There is not one state in Europe whose population, even if it were united today, had not been formed of multiple ethnic groups" (SA XI.1, 447).

Nations and the many ethnic groups that might possibly belong to them were initially equated in Snellman with natural conditions, the population. He explained,

"Where there still are states formed of separate tribes, as for example in Austria, a pursuit of national unification is nonetheless visible. We must leave it for the future to answer whether the separate nations of the Austrian Empire, some or most, were able to reach independence as states. But considering what has happened elsewhere in Europe, a state that consists of many ethnic groups must either splinter into several states or several ethnic groups must blend together into one nation." (SA XI.1, 448)

Snellman wisely left the question unanswered. His either-or logic has nonetheless proved to be entirely valid.

As a consequence of the First World War, the Austrian Empire splintered into several states founded on the basis of ethnicity: assimilation into Germanic Austria had not succeeded at all in the diverse state united mainly by the figure of the Emperor. The incident that set off the events leading to the First World War took place in Austrian Serbia, and the process of dissolution was not complete until after the collapse of European socialism and the breakup of Yugoslavia into multiple states. Such developments can be said to have shown the flaws of the way of thinking,

still popular some decades ago, that first there is the state and the state makes the nation.

In the states of Ancient Greece, the same tribe had been divided into several states. “The situation was still recently the same in Italy and it is also the current form of the state in Germany. Who would want to deny that one visible feature of the history of all these countries has been the pursuit of national unification.” (SA XI.I, 448) Germany, Snellman suspected, might be able to unify, Italy had already succeeded in principle.

Snellman saw Hungary’s future as lying in the independent state, whereas on the other hand he had no faith in another example, Lippe-De-tmold, that appeared to meet all the requirements for an independent German state. “It cannot be... denied”, Snellman wrote,

“that the Hungarian people still have that kind of existence in the form of a state that would have its roots in their own culture, or in the original form the people gave to universal education. The people of Hungary thus have all the ingredients on which it can build its sovereignty in relation to all other external states so that this kind of independence can be born – and many believe that it will be born. The name of nationality honours this real possibility, this possibility that as the seed of the coming reality exists in real national formations. The German national spirit, on the other hand, pursues national wholeness, or the undoing of Lippe-De-tmold’s national independence.... I would guess that no one doubts the success of Germany’s political pursuit of unity.” (SA XI.I, 459)

Finland did not fit precisely within the models of either Hungary or Lippe-De-tmold, but undoubtedly at the beginning of the 1860s, Snellman saw Finland as being more in the company of the former than the latter. Independence did not rely solely on material power.

Nationalities that had only a limited state existence should not demand external sovereignty as a matter of course. The degree of education and culture was its prerequisite: “If the culture has not yet reached the necessary level, external independence would not endure.” (XI.I, 459)

“Through one’s own culture, ties are strengthened that connect the nation to universal culture, and political interest grows in preserving the nation in question.... A cultural na-

tion... does not fight until it is defeated, because it knows that its future is precisely in its culture. This not only gives it greater resistance and endurance but also makes it part of a community of educated nations following the law of nations, which compensates for the lack of material power.” (XI.I, 460)

Did the community following the law of nations, or in other words international law, have any significance to nations that lacked their own independent state? Classic international law did not recognise such significance, but Snellman’s reply to the question was affirmative. Contrary to tradition, he saw as belonging to this community of law also the nations whose statehood was limited to internal sovereignty. They did not have foreign policy as such:

“They cannot wage war against other states, cannot make peace or sign treaties. But their existence as states is nonetheless guaranteed by agreement. Therefore, they can make treaties in one quarter after all, namely with the state on whom they are dependent. Rarely does it happen that some foreign power is the guarantor of the treaty. Yet this does occur, though. It is, however, rare that this kind of guarantor would seize the sword to keep the treaty in force.” (XI.I, 460)

In contrast to reliance on a stranger, Snellman emphasised in his public lectures from the autumn of 1862 that “All people develop towards internal and external independence. They go through their hard school in order to be eligible to represent the ethical world order.” (SA XI.I, 351)

Snellman had followed closely the latest stormy developments of Europe and felt that they would confirm the rights of nationalities. Above all, Italy’s long and difficult process of unification had needed the “sword” of the French in order to be realised. Napoleon III did promote the “Europe of nationalities”. The initiative in politics had moved to France and England. Alexander II’s Russia could no longer be the upholder of the power of princes, like during the Vienna System, or the dam that held back European nationalities, as his predecessor had once been. Poland was in a ferment again and its local nationalism had not yet been harshly suppressed by Russia at the time Snellman wrote this.

Snellman’s discussion took place on a general level, independently of more precise locations, perhaps also wondering at the same time whether

he dared to address this issue. The only thing that can be deduced with certainty is that Snellman did not act independently of European development and that he also shaped a reasoning for his activities that was a consequence of his theory of the state and its development.

In the Shadow of J. G. Herder

The traditional law of nations began with states as independent actors that define their own national interests, protect the safety of their citizens, form alliances with each other and increase their power through their ability to pose a military threat. The monitoring of borders and internal law and justice belonged to states whose sovereignty required international recognition to be realised. A sovereign state might form treaties with others and declare war, but it was not allowed to interfere in the internal matters of other states. There was no higher power that punished violations of the law of nations, and the actions of states could not be judged on the basis of ethics. The selfishness of states was, in this doctrine, their natural quality. Snellman was dissatisfied with precisely this way of understanding international justice.

As the setting for his examination, Snellman saw the idea of the universal history of humankind, world history, that formed in different quarters during the 18th century. In a series of lectures from the Spring 1863, Snellman clarified his reference: “The doctrine on universal development, the history of humankind in the 18th century. Herder’s *Ideer* as a turning point.” (SA XI.1, 548) Even in his earlier lecture series, Snellman had listed authors who had been considered significant in Finland, among them Herder (who had been translated into Swedish), and added: “At least I remember all these from my youth – and the dreams that were awakened by reading them.” (SA IX, 582) The Swedish translation of Johann Gottfrid Herder’s four-volume work, *Ideer till Mennisko-Historiens Filosofi* (1814-1816), was in the library of the Kokkola reading club that Snellman used as a youth. Herder appears to have been among his earliest philosophical reading material. As late as 1873, Snellman recalled how Herder and Schiller had opened for him the first doors to the “lives of European nations” (XII, 181).

There are no signs that Snellman would later have confronted his views on Herder. Yet Herder does seem to have left a mark on his dreams.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ Compare to the much-read interpretation by Berlin (1976), and a Nordic view, Ollitervo and Immonen (2006).

On the other hand, it must be stated that Herder understood nationalities as cultural attributes, whereas Snellman saw them as something that formed the state. Instead of the natural, Snellman appreciated the historically created, the kind that had the air of doing. The concept of universal education was so strong in him that he cannot be said to be a believer in the incompatibility of cultures, as Herder is often interpreted as having been despite holding some universal views as well. On the basis of different writings, it has been possible to understand Herder in different ways, and it is good to know Snellman's Herder.

In any case, Snellman felt that on the basis of a view founded on a new kind of history of philosophy, it had become possible to see different states as having "their own historical task, a task in service of humankind" (SA XI.1, 449). States should not merely seek to preserve themselves, which in Europe appeared to be the main concern of the Austrian Empire, for example. More was expected of states: participation in the fostering of universal education. Snellman knew his examples of this, too: "England, France, as well as Germany as a whole, as the sum of states, are of course at the forefront of general human civilisation." (SA XI.1, 449)

The size of the country was not decisive in this regard. Instead, Snellman saw as such the unity of the population:

"Even the smallest states that draw on a nationally united population are taken into consideration in European politics and in shared cultural pursuits they have their independent, valued place – as examples, the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands. Whereas others, like Belgium, Switzerland and Portugal, hardly have a place in politics, and neither do they have much of their own to present in spiritual life – because, I would say, their population belongs to other, larger nations or is not homogenous at all." (SA XI.1, 449)

When the nation and the state matched each other, this increased the significance of the state. Yet Snellman felt that it was necessary to admit that in fact it was the nation, rather than the state, that had its task for the sake of humankind. States were born and disappeared and their borders were quickly adjusted. The borders of nationalities were preserved in quite another manner (SA XI.1, 450).

A good state required something other than the violent bringing together of different population groups: "in all states comprised of many

peoples, there is one ruling tribe that makes its mark on state life, forms the core of the assimilation process and represents the nationality that is the foundation of the state.” (SA XI.1, 450) Snellman emphasised that he did not mean “tribal oneness” but precisely nationality. The former appeared naturally, nationality on the other hand was understood as something spiritual that was made, thus historically born.

Unity existed, in Hegel’s terms, “for itself” or as aware of itself, not only as observed by external monitors. This, in turn, required unity of language in Snellman’s view, at least for the governing section of society. “States have their firm existence when”, Snellman added, “this oneness does not only enclose within itself the entire population but exists as a spiritual, historically formed tie and is understood as such. Only then can there be talk about national unity, a specific nationality.” (SA XI.1, 450)

Every state should be formed of one nation and every nation should form one state, but the state alone did not cover “the calling of the nation, its historical task”, which extended beyond the world of will and action “and forms the knowledge that finds its expression in the science of the nation, especially its national literature. The history of literature is no longer the history of the state. The latter gets its explanation from the former, as deed generally does from knowing.” (SA XI.1, 450)

As an example of the nation’s historical significance not being limited to the state, Snellman referred to Jews, who had achieved very little on the level of the state: “Their tradition, on the other hand, including Christianity, has influenced the world in a transformative manner.” (SA XI.1, 450-451) Nations did not exist only for themselves but for humankind. They had, Snellman explained, this duty. But it followed that they also had this right: “they must exist to develop in themselves a general human culture, they must make themselves members in the chain of universal development.” (SA XI.1, 451) Snellman agreed with the idea presented by Ferdinand Lassalle in a philosophical society in Berlin that nationality is a principle of right. From this, Snellman reached the most fundamental proposal of his writing: nationality should be a principle of international justice.

Public opinion had long understood this, but not science. As an example of the latter, Snellman brought up the views of the well-known 18th century Swiss jurist, Emeric de Vattel. Vattel equated individuals and states with each other in both their duties and their rights. Both were equal and their internal matters and personal self-determination should not be interfered with except in the sense of self-defence. To Vattel, specifically states were extant. And when they were extant, Snellman

interpreted Vattel, nations existed too. So the Roman nation, according to the view of that time, consisted of all the conquests of Rome, the same for Napoleon's nation – and then they shrank again.

“Vattel truly reaches... the conclusion that nations are produced with acts of peace and treaties.... he finally admits that once conquest has taken place, whatever the cause of the war may have been, and even though conquest has only gained the quiet approval resulting from the end of war, then the conquest is just and remains such.” (SA XI.I, 452)

Snellman could not accept this kind of positive justice. He saw Vattel as treating states as actors in private law and nations as objects:

“A tribe that does not yet have a prescribed, shared government is thus *res nullius*, which the first to come along can take into his possession.... Populations are treated as though they were an incidental detail that belongs to the land area, they are exchanged by agreement along with the land” (SA XI.I, 453).

This kind of justice had existed, but no Christian nation in Europe would in the present let itself be inherited, exchanged or sold. Nations had the right and power to speak up.

Public opinion had become a political power. Those in power found it imperative to try to get it on their side. If any state included “an alien, enslaved and subjugated nationality”, within its own borders there was criticism of a situation like this, which caused problems for the government of the country (SA XI.I, 454). The great powers, however, determined through treaties what was valid in international law. In the complicated joining of the interests of Europe's states, even the smaller states were protected and “each state receives its value according to the degree to which the nation is part of universal human culture and generally fosters it in its activity” (SA XI.I, 455).

Development in World History

Rather naively, Snellman saw wars as no longer possible in a Europe that had been knit into one. This was quite a contrast to Hegel, who saw world history as a slaughterhouse, though one whose goal was awareness of freedom. In a writing for the chronicle of Hegelian societies, it was suitable to refer to the well-known philosopher. Snellman did this in his own way, but so densely that for one who was not more widely acquainted with his thinking it was impossible to sort out his intentions.

In paragraph 340 of his philosophy of right, Hegel started from the idea that a universal spirit, world-spirit, is born out of the fate of national spirits and their actions in relation to each other. "It realises its justice – and its justice is the highest – in *the world history* of national spirits, which is *the tribunal of the world*." In paragraph 342, he added, "Further, world history is not the mere tribunal of its *power*, or the abstract and irrational inevitability of blind fate, but, because it is in itself and to itself *reason* and to itself in its being knowing in the spirit, it is... the interpretation and realisation of the universal spirit." There was no one above states in justice, but despite the power of world history in the form of blind violence, there was still a universal spirit that developed and whose development Hegel believed to be rational.

Snellman read Hegel in the following manner:

"because the ethical world-spirit manifests in the existence of every national spirit, is only in it present and real, the state is thus sovereign outwardly. This immanence makes the national spirit the spirit of the nation, in other words one supporter of the historical task, gives it a universally human meaning. Therefore, world history, as Hegel says, 'is not the mere judgement of nations' – but 'national spirits have their reality and meaning... in the world-spirit'. This higher moment, which looks like the end result, forms, as Hegel always presents the matter, in fact the real foundation of the process. *Even the state as such has the ground for its existence in the world-historical task of its people*. It is the form in which the ethical spirit of the people is realised" (SA XI.1, 456).

Snellman did not believe in a world-spirit understood in the Hegelian manner as a superindividual actor, but when writing for a Hegelian publication he seems to have considered it necessary to still use this concept. Snellman added a few things to the image received from Hegel, such as the “spirit of the nation”, which was not the same thing as the “national spirit” that appeared in Hegel and was more modest in its content. Snellman made the rights of nationalities the foundation for the external sovereignty of the nation, but with regard to this kind of right, “the higher or deeper principle is in the ethical world-spirit, which also creates the real foundation of existence as a state in general” (SA XI.1, 456).

Hegel’s world-spirit was rational, but he did not call it ethical. Its rationality, which increased the forms of freedom step by step, was realised in a manner that was beyond ordinary individuals: by individuals in world history, but by the world-spirit using them, too, as its instruments. For Hegel, the stage of ethical activity was in the state, the rest was left to the world-spirit. The “ethical world-spirit” mentioned by Snellman is to be seen as merely another term for his idea of the moral world order.

This was a permanent element in Snellman’s thought. A year later, in a very different context, he returned to the topic when he referred to the ability “to live for that future which is given by civilisation, and which has mostly become the lot of Christian nations, because they have a faith in the ethical world order and through this faith hope for the future” (XI.1, 147). Yet he never clarified this concept of his more thoroughly. At times, it seemed to be equated with the “spirit of the time” or the power of “public opinion”, but above all “universal education” was a term parallel to it.

Neither the moral world order nor universal education stopped at the borders of states or nationalities, though the latter created different reflections of them. Snellman saw ideas of order and education, despite their variations, as universal obligations. To him, they formed a source of duties and rights for every individual, even the least of us, unlike the Hegelian world-spirit that went about its noble business behind the backs of individuals.

To Hegel, the religious “providence” of the issue was popular rhetoric that was of less significance than philosophy. To Snellman, it was part of the core of his philosophical religiousness, which could not be spoken of in detail due to ecclesiastical censorship. No one interfered if you claimed that providence decided the fates of states in world history. On the other hand, Snellman’s view of identity, the thought of the presence of the infinite spirit in every finite spirit, was religiously controversial. In Germa-

ny and Sweden, it had been seen what enormous conflicts were caused by views like this that differed from traditional religious doctrine. Snellman did not make himself the importer of a divisive religious dispute. He saw Finland's problems as being summed up in the question of education and its general accessibility.

It was not right to separate political philosophy from concrete history:

“The justification of every nation can namely be proved only historically; *its justification extends as far as its power does*. This sentence, simplified like this, would appear to legalise material power, violence without justice. But it only appears so. Because the power of the nation is not, as has already been said and which is also proven by history, material in its nature.” (SA XI.1, 456)

The only power of small states lay in education due to its consequences. Treaties could be thought to protect small states, but the breaking of treaties had always been possible. Yet here Snellman thought that the situation was changing in an educated world that was ever more firmly bound together:

“holding on to treaties more firmly is due to them having become a necessity to every state, even the stronger ones. This imperative necessity in turn is nothing save the universal human culture of the peoples, civilisation as an acknowledged common good presupposed by the undisturbed civilisatory process of every people. Even the most mighty is subjected to this imperative dependence.” (SA XI.1, 457)

Snellman clarified what he meant by these ties of dependence:

“In politics, it can at different times appear in different forms; in the form of the freedom of movement and trade, economic and financial benefits, the need for the fostering of constitutions and laws as well as defensive and offensive alliances, even in the form of the benevolent disposition of rulers and nations and the approval of the public opinion. Neither can it be denied that an honourable history, a significant position in science, literature and art, even a wise form of government, good laws

and a stable historical order by themselves awaken sympathy for the nation in other nations and thus safeguard its independence.” (SA XI.1, 457)

The ethical world order was eternal, but Snellman did not present any kind of listing of its contents. It was reflected in different eras and in different nations in different ways, at each moment, and every individual had to seek to become aware of it by oneself.

In history, no achievement was permanent. Every achievement demanded constant struggle. The same applied to things such as nationality that were more durable than states: “Nationality in itself is never a permanent result; as a level of human culture it is everywhere a process.” (SA XI.1, 458) It also always included difference even among those nations that were more unified in their origin. Education levelled things, but it did not remove permanent differences.

Snellman worked with success to see Finnish become an official language in the country. By the removal of the oppression aimed at the majority of the population, he did not mean the creation of a new oppression but the advancement of equality. From a European perspective, it was natural and everywhere observable that the nation was comprised of different ethnic groups and that several languages were spoken within it.

Existence as a recognised state was the goal of a nation, since the law of nations required recognition. Here Snellman joined with Vattel, which was not surprising. Recognition was a central idea in Hegel, too. Yet unlike what had been imagined by Vattel, nationality did not follow directly from the existence of the state:

“while nations fight for recognition, states are born and disappear, leaving the nations tossed together to be the same as they were before. The states born out of this struggle include in the early phases mostly subjugated nations, which are as foreign to each other as to the state, and the state thus is in no way the work of their spirit.” (SA XI.1, 459)

It might be thought that Snellman made a turn of some kind a while later, in May 1863, when he published in *Litteraturblad* his famous article “War or Peace for Finland?” and the series of writings that followed it. In them, a practical politician was speaking, a political reformer who evaluated what was possible in the prevailing situation, considering events in the world that might be imagined as the demands of the “world-spirit”.

The 1863 January Uprising in Poland took place when Finland was preparing for the first meeting of the country's own Diet and constitutional development was beginning. Under these circumstances, Snellman saw as irresponsible the talk in domestic and foreign newspapers about Finland seeking in some way to detach itself from the Russian Empire, inviting a possible war on Finnish soil. A Finland that waited for military support from the West would, Snellman quoted Napoleon's words, become Russia's "geographic enemy".

It would be a misfortune: "it is certain that a nation that seeks its future in the fortunes of war without being able to affect its course even with a fingertip would be frivolous folk, and would also have the future of the frivolous – ruin and a bad, sudden death." (SA XI.1, 146) When thinking about a possible offensive war, Swedes would not consider Finnish sufferings but their own interests and neither France nor England would find any interest at all in sending troops here. Snellman wrote that "no country has ever gone to war for anything other than its own interests" (SA XI.1, 148).

The following three quotations are among the most frequently referenced stands by Snellman and constantly give cause for consideration. "This is what I would want, if only I could", Snellman wrote, "to inscribe indelibly onto the conviction of my countrymen: *the nation is to rely only on itself*". (SA XI.1, 146) And at a later point: "Only in the imaginings of youth do nations work for the good of humankind by sacrificing for others. In reality, every nation pursues its own interests and so it should do." Snellman added at once, however: "But the success of these endeavours depends on how they fit together with the interests of humankind." (SA XI.1, 149)

National and Universal Human Interests

The quotations above are from Snellman's well-known article, "War or Peace for Finland?" It was not an academic exercise but a direct political act in a concrete, crisis-like situation. Often, only the first of these three points has been quoted, or the first and second. Our emphasis is different: the third and final point made by Snellman is not a meaningless gesture.

The good of humankind was meaningful to Snellman. He has been misread when it has been thought that he considered the activity of nations solely from the perspective of their own narrow interests. How far has this been due to lack of sufficient knowledge of the "mature Snellman"? Without again going over the commentary, which is clear as day,

there is nonetheless cause to go into its background, not only the political but the philosophical context of the remarks.

The article was a political stand on an exceptional political situation and the objective conditions that defined it. Snellman always saw it as necessary to clarify general principles when a concrete act was made in response to a challenge derived from a historical – or geographical – situation. He did not hide or betray his general opinion, but the need for a literary political act made him place an emphasis on specific issues. This was fully in keeping with what Snellman required of a specific ethical act.

Neither Snellman's almost simultaneous lectures, "disturbed" by state acts, nor his still recent writing for *Der Gedanke* support the view of a meaninglessness of general humane interests in Snellman's thinking.

There is an easy interpretation of the sentence on the interests of humankind. According to it, there is a field where the interests of the nation and of humankind are compatible: most interests of the nation can fit together with the interests of humankind. There is no clash. It can be considered apparent that Snellman would have accepted this. And what if the good of the nation and the good of humankind came into genuine conflict? Which one decides?

Snellman said clearly that success in the pursuit of the nation's interests depends on whether these interests are compatible with the good of humankind. The reference to the success of action and the interests of humankind as a requirement for its realisation excludes the possibility that Snellman would have been thinking of the interests of humankind as stepping aside for the interests of the nation. The ethics of duty had a great meaning for Snellman, but not one that would have excluded the assessment of the practical and actual consequences of action. In fact, in his lectures in the spring of 1863, Snellman stated that it was impossible "that, led by patriotism, a law would be implemented of whose harmful consequences to the country there is a certainty" (SA XI.1, 550). In addition, Snellman was convinced that it would be harmful to the country if action was against the interests of humankind.

There is cause to look at Snellman's lectures more closely. In his very first lecture in the spring term of 1863, Snellman explained that it was the passionate goal of young people to work for the good of humankind:

"Young people least of all want to live on earth for their own sake, with their own self as their purpose. They want to sacrifice – for the sake of other people, the fatherland, humankind. Of a state that would have been made only for

their own happiness, they want to hear nothing... Everyone is to work for and seek the good of humankind. This is usually the highest goal, the final goal that is not only on the other side of the narrow borders of the fatherland but also on the other side of the present moment – it expands the horizon in time and place.” (SA XI.1, 523)

This kind of pursuit found strong support in Snellman’s own view: “the right does... not exist, it is not real, it does not exist as made and the result of action anywhere except in human activity”. From this, Snellman deduced that “The state and society and in general all arrangements that belong to the world of action are therefore not institutions that exist to satisfy the individual, but they are to be called institutions so that the right would exist on earth, in the world.” (19, 316)

Yet according to Snellman, there was nonetheless a question here that remained unanswered. What was the humankind for whose sake everyone should sacrifice? How and under what terms would the right come to exist in the world of action, how would the “thought of God” become real, not a mere fantasy?

Family, civil society and the state were, to Snellman, the earthly, real, realised forms of ethical life. In his theory on civil society, Snellman already differed from Hegel. To him, civil society was not merely the circle of self-interest, selfishness, egotism that Hegel had sketched out. Yet Hegel, too, placed within this circle the old guilds or corporations as a counterweight to the general egotism that otherwise ruled in civil society. In his opinion, they formed a transition towards the state. Yet breaking from Hegel, Snellman instead defended liberation from the demands of the corporations that had outlived their day and was for the free connections of civil society, such as societies or associations, as well as municipalities, which could in his view advance both patriotic and universal pursuits.

Snellman clarified “the right” with three concepts that, according to him, all described the indispensable components of it.

The first of these was natural law, which Snellman, like Hegel, called abstract justice. According to Snellman, it had existed for ages in the customs of nations and been given scientific form in the modern era. It was “right to the body and objects as instruments, personal freedom, right of ownership” (SA X.I, 539). It was composed of general sentences, in whose absence there was room for arbitrariness. Natural law existed “regardless of special objective conditions or the intentions and purposes

of the subject” (SA X.I, 530).

The second form of the right was morality. For example, the freedom of the person was defined in natural law only in a negative sense, as lacking in positive content, a goal that required a subject in order to be set and which was to become universally prevailing in order to be rational. “The human is to take the right from one’s own *subjective* awareness. Otherwise, it is not the right – and not freedom. The pinnacle of this awareness is the conscience.” (SA XI.I, 531)

“The gentlemen know how revolutionary the effect of Socrates’ performance was in Greece. Its core was the demand for subjective freedom – the freedom of the subject to determine right and wrong – morality.... In Christianity, this is a principle.... This principle of Christianity involved the doctrine that was derived from it, that all people are equal before God. This leads to the justification of universal human right.” (SA XI.I, 532)

However, it was a matter of chance whether the goal of the subject was realised or not. In action, the subject faced “objective order, civic life, history, the ethical world order that is independent of the subject’s determination”. According to Snellman, these had a decisive significance: “A goal is realised only when it is line with this objective order – otherwise not.” (SA XI.I, 533) The morally right was to have its significance, but “only when it is capable through action of making itself take effect, in other words when it sets as its foundation the prevailing right, acknowledges it as such and makes its decisions based on the right – takes up actions that are the inevitable consequence of the prevailing right” (SA XI.I, 533).

Snellman no longer repeated the view from his 1841 idea of personality that subjectivity in itself would be “a principle of evil”. The limitations of subjective morality were formed by the possibility of arbitrariness, but otherwise Snellman now saw it, quite like Hegel, as an important requirement and phase of development for ethical life.

The ethical world order placed itself, as a higher form, above natural law and morality. In his book on the state, Snellman had already claimed that “the actions and fates of the nation are directed by things other than the laws of natural law and morality” (SA III, 492). He still took the same stand. He did admit that the interests of the state might demand war or other sacrifices for the existence of the state, but at the same time he saw that this was “the most common situation for nations at a lower stage of

development, among whom the care of state affairs is left to a narrow band” (SA XI.1, 565). War, in other words, was an undeveloped means of settling conflicts between nations.

For Snellman, this was not a question of abandoning natural law and subjective morality as such, but neither the abstract nor the subjective was in his opinion enough to define a concrete ethical act:

“The act altogether cannot be defined on the basis of some general legal sentence, nor of good intentions. It is *omni modo determinatum*. It happens under circumstances that are precisely characteristic of it. The legal sentence must be applied to them. The intention and purpose are to be qualified to be in keeping with them.” (SA XI.1, 534)

This was precisely how Snellman acted in “War or Peace for Finland?”, which it is possible to clarify on the basis of his lectures. It is worth returning to this piece of writing for a moment. Above all, Snellman was forced to “clarify” his general way of thinking according to how he saw the existing objective conditions. Snellman wrote with care. His writing can also be assumed to have included both deliberate silence and conscious exaggeration. There was reason to stay silent with regard to the possibility that Russia might aim at Finland policies as crushing as those enacted in Poland and instead blame the selfishness of Western powers. Snellman was placing his hope in the reformist Emperor Alexander II. When reconstructing Snellman’s views, these factors must be taken into consideration.

In the spring of 1863, the goals in Finland were, according to Snellman’s view, aligned with the interests of humankind where they were tied to meeting the prerequisites for the country’s democratic path, but for the great Western countries Finland was a minor aspirant among nations, if that. Russia, on the other hand, of course inspired passion. War for Finland would not be possible unless it offered benefits that were not in sight.

Sketched out like this, the situation left only the possibility of relying on oneself. Instead of the deficiencies of the moment, thinking had to focus on the long term. Under the prevailing conditions, Finland had achieved results that usually were only for independent nations:

“no nation, defeated and subjected to the justice of war, has been able to preserve a greater degree of independence. What so many European nations seek: personal govern-

ment, personal taxation, personal militaries, personal legislation – those we already have, and a constitutional form of government, which for us has long been only a demand, is now in our hands as surely as something ever can be in the natural course of things.” (SA XI.1, 147)

Snellman’s explanation was that when Finland realised its national interests through this work, it also served the interests of humankind even though it did not offer itself up as a military sacrifice. Success could be expected to follow the practical approach. National and humane interests were joined together. Snellman taught that even the smallest nation is able to preserve

“that which already is, and therefore to bend to the inevitable and manfully endure it, keeping an eye on the moment when reform is possible, and thus also not seeking more than can be defended and preserved in changing circumstances.... Through the education it has achieved, the nation becomes aware of this.... Only savage tribes are seen to fight to their destruction. They have no ability to live for the future that is given by education, and which has become mostly the lot of Christian nations, because they have faith in the ethical world order and through this faith also hope for the future.” (SA XI.1, 147)

Patient progress along the path set out by the ethical world order was, in Snellman’s view, a more appropriate solution than jingoistic confidence that the help of a stranger would achieve at once everything that was sought.

The Rights of a Nation

In his lectures over the spring of 1863, Snellman gradually reached the core of his teaching: the work of the individual in one’s own nation. Above it, there was “no justice, no judge, no power”. The nation was “the sovereign power.” (SA XI.1, 537)

Hegel had said the same things about the state. Snellman applied them to the nation. The intention also becomes clear when Snellman assures that “the life of a subjugated nation that has no political independence also be-

longs to the ethical world order" (SA XI.1, 542). No specific country needed to be mentioned here. Listeners could be assumed to be able to reach their own conclusions. In Snellman's doctrine on the rights of nationalities, the nation referred to "a tribe whose right and task is an independent, sovereign existence 'among nations', or whose task in what it does and does not do is to represent the ethical world order" (SA XI.1, 542).

Snellman argued that it had become the conscious principle of the life of nations that they did not exist solely for themselves. They had a task for humankind: "We say that the task is to lead the ethical right to become predominant in itself and for itself – to carry out the work of the ethical world order. The states of Europe must increasingly act with this kind of principle as the starting point" (SA XI.1, 542). All nations, according to Snellman, had had this task, although it had only recently been consciously formulated. And what if nations did not carry out their task for humankind? Snellman's comment was harsh: "When they have no longer been fit for their task, history has thrown them away." (SA XI.1, 541)

Like his teacher J. J. Tengström, Snellman emphasised that nations as such are not actors. Only individuals act, create the activity of their nation: "The individual – thinking and desiring – the rationally thinking and desiring subject must decide and act." (SA XI.1, 542)

Action should rise from an ethical interest. Snellman gave it the name of "patriotism": "The subject is to have principles in all his political activity, a view of his nation's historically given conditions both per se and in relation to other nations – he must negotiate with others, himself consider all that this requires of his work.... The decision must be made and the act must happen here in a blink. Patriotism is the deciding interest, then. But it must also direct consideration, then, because in action there should be no other interest than this." (SA XI.1, 543)

By saying this, did Snellman leap from acting for the good of humankind to one-sided patriotism? Were patriotism and the good of humankind incompatible in his thinking, after all? In the midst of his paean to patriotism, Snellman presented his take on what is today called globalisation:

"It may be said: the task of the nation is to work for the good of humankind. Cosmopolitan interest should therefore direct activity. But that kind of interest is without a rational foundation. No one can know what humankind wants, because no one knows the will of the humankind living now – and humankind as a totality does not yet exist, moreover – it is unborn. The interests of humankind are

included in the interests of every nation, or the interests of each nation demand a consideration of the relationship it has in relation to other nations. Among Christian nations, this is conscious and the system of states is currently weaving its web over the globe – so that European nations are reliant on what happens in America, India, China, Japan and Australia. And vice versa. What all these conditions demand of nations – this, the human can know – at least that can be demanded of him. And patriotism gives vision – cosmopolitanism as an interest is empty guesswork.” (SA XI.1, 543)

Although Snellman rejected cosmopolitanism with direct words, it may be stated that he rejected only that form of cosmopolitanism that may be called “strong”, which sees human rights and other global values as always being the sole issues that determine foreign policy. Instead, his way of thinking was perfectly compatible with a cosmopolitanism that was understood in a weaker sense. According to such cosmopolitanism, national interest must not always be the sole issue that determines foreign policy: human rights and global values do have meaning.¹⁵⁶ If global selfishness ruled over the relationships of nations and states, talk about the ethical world order would have been worth less than nothing. Patriotism and cosmopolitanism could be made compatible – at least when cosmopolitanism was not meant as an anarchism that aimed at the destruction of statehood.

Natural law, that abstract justice, allows selfishness, such as the constant accumulation of wealth. It had its place in civil society, but contrary to Hegel, Snellman saw an opportunity for something else even within civil society. The interests of interconnecting nations in an educated world did not, for him, exclude each other, requiring the selfish subjugation of others, as he had still largely felt in his book on the state. If the will of the totality of humankind remained a mystery, in international politics there could, in Snellman’s view, be said a great deal about interests that applied to all, about the ethical world order that was taking shape.

¹⁵⁶ For more on the distinction, see Sihvola (2006), 12: “Foreign policy in accordance with weak cosmopolitanism is defined as a field where three dimensions must be taken into consideration: (1) human rights and other aspects related to global good, (2) national interest and (3) aspects related to conditions (caution, efficiency etc.).”

Snellman of course was a patriot who arose from the specific situation of his country and sought to elevate it, but in a way that did not exclude a cosmopolitan perspective when appropriately understood.

According to both classic international law and the prevailing line of thought, Snellman could not have foreign policy because Finland was not an independent state. Snellman does not mention Finland in his lectures. He talked on a general philosophical level, in keeping with his views. Yet he clearly gave nations the same kind of significance that Hegel had reserved for states, namely in that, according to Snellman, there was no judge above them: “when the individual acts with the might of the nation – when his deeds are the deeds of the national spirit, then no power on earth is above them – they have the right of absolute validity – they are in other words the highest legal decision on earth.” (SA XI.1, 544)

Again, a clarification followed: “the decision cannot and must not be arbitrary, not even a mere subjective opinion on the right, but it must act according to what history, the ethical world order, requires of this act, meaning that it must be rational. But what is required for this, what is rational, that is for the subject to decide” (SA XI.1, 544). The solution should follow “from the ethical world order and for it”.

The ethical world order existed objectively, as a given, although everything related to it passed through the decisions of individuals, developing alongside them and due to their influence. Snellman saw this kind of view as higher than the social contract theories that had begun with Thomas Hobbes due to the special significance it assigned to individual freedom:

“It is not only abstract, formal freedom to reach an agreement on the existence of state power – but the freedom of the subject to decide on the content of the agreement. On right and wrong – that is, to rationally decide on the ethical rights – what is required by the task of the nation in the ethical world order.” (SA XI.1, 548)

Differing from Hegel, Snellman did not see history as having any fixed goal, but this did not make it impossible for him to make comparisons and see lines of development. He was active in seeking to restore the Diet of the era of Swedish rule because to him it appeared as the only possibility under the prevailing conditions, but this did not mean that he held it to be any kind of final ideal. In the lectures under consideration, he remarked: “History teaches that constitutions are becoming ever more

democratic.... This is the direction everywhere among educated nations.” (SA XI.1, 558)

On the relationship of the Diet and the government, he lectured: “A more positive form of participation in the meeting of a legislative government is the so-called government of ministers. It does not, however, exist save in England, but it is a model that is pursued elsewhere.” (SA XI.1, 559) Or, at a different point: “A more developed form is undoubtedly the parliamentary government of ministers. For the time being, it exists only in England.” (SA XI.1, 563) There also followed an explanation of why the model, in Snellman’s opinion, could not simply be adopted, although undoubtedly there were also other arguments: “The most rational solution is to be found in England, because the tasks of the government are guaranteed by the parliamentary majority. But such conditions are not made. They are born.” (SA XI.1, 553)

The most essential thing was that government was, despite different systems of the representation of the people, always fundamentally the power of the nation. It had not been surrendered to any other sovereign force. In this realisation there lay, according to Snellman, the principle that moved all pursuits of freedom for the state. Despite the emphasis on the rhetoric of selfishness in his talk on war and peace, Snellman’s general perspective preserved faith in the ethical world order. He ended his lectures emphatically: “sensible politics is that the good of the nation would be the good of humanity.” (XI.1, 566)

A Singular National Spirit?

What ultimately was Snellman’s solution to a situation in which the good of the nation and the good of humankind were in conflict? Snellman did not recommend placing the good of humankind above the good of the nation, but neither did he favour the opposite solution, the good of the nation under all circumstances. He seems to have avoided placing these two in opposition.

Although Snellman used the concept of the good of humankind, he felt that between various interests there existed an asymmetrical situation: the good of the nation was fit to be the object of knowing, but it was not possible to know the good of all humankind, and in general humankind was far more in a state of being born than nations were. Thus, he assumed that one way or another these interests would find harmony in the interests of nation, perhaps with requirements related to the philo-

sophical-theological relation of the finite and infinite spirit, which in the lectures under consideration is referred to with talk about how the “idea of God” – in other contexts Providence – is realised in the right that is based on the rational decisions of people on earth.

When discussing education, Snellman’s view was clear. According to him, national education could not be mere imitation. Universal human education had to acquire a national form, and then the universal and the national were inseparably bound together. This hints that Snellman would have found it difficult in general to imagine a firm opposition of universal human good and national good. Snellman truly could not see what kinds of forms and what kind of power patriotism that was not rational might develop in the 20th century.

In fact, neither did Snellman note one contradiction in his own thinking that no dialectics will manage to fix. To him, the national spirit was as one within one nation and as such directed those making decisions. This was in conflict with the admiration that he aimed at English parliamentarism and the trend of democratic development that he had observed in the world.

A singular national spirit that gives clear answers to decision-makers can be joined to the political pluralism that belongs to democracy only in crises and under exceptional circumstances. When used as a general guide it becomes a doctrine of intolerance, and the political history of Finland has suffered due to it. There is reason to ask what role this intolerance has played in the darkest conflicts of Finland’s history, such as the Finnish Civil War, although as an example of its positive side we may present the unity of the Winter War. Snellman did praise the diversity of Europe, but he did not pause to consider the possibility that diversity might lead to benefits also within one nation.

The emphases on universal interaction and universal human rights that were among Snellman’s positive contributions did not form an unbroken thread in the history of Finland. Snellman had to take into account censorship and also practise self-censorship when considering the effects of his words. Therefore, determining his actual opinions is not simple at all and is not made easier by his Hegelian phrasings and intellectual detours foreign to later eras. Snellman has offered a starting point for the most varied of statements. Often it has been enough to pick out a detached piece of text, to create a Snellman by quotation.

The “Emperor policies” taught to Snellman by J. J. Tengström undoubtedly have connections to the post-World War II Eastern policy tied to the names of two presidents, J. K. Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen.

Paasikivi had long suspected, at least since 1932, that Snellman's political philosophy would not suit small states: you should not have too much faith in yourself alone. Indeed, in the Continuation War a partner was found in the Third Reich. In 1941, as the German army headed east, Paasikivi could only note in his diary a cynical objection to the statement that again the man of Finland was the shield of our freedom and fatherland: "No, it is the man of Germany. Everything depends on that."¹⁵⁷ Here a genuine conflict between the good of the nation and the good of humankind might have been seen, since German human rights violations and the massive persecutions and expulsions aimed at Jews were of course known about.

Snellman truly did not make a decisive separation of the small and the great because according to him, a state could achieve recognition of its sovereignty only by showing its strength in relation to others, whether based on education and civic excellence or military power, or both. In his lectures during the spring term of 1863, he remarked frankly, pushing aside his emphasis on the significance of education, that "The recognition of those located nearest is always received from war and peace.... Sovereign power is, in the end, the achievement of the entire nation. It takes the weapon in hand, it shows its might." At the same time, Snellman presented the other side of the issue, his positive faith in Europe: "In today's Europe recognition is included in the system of nations – meaning the history of humankind, the ethical world order.... the nation as a state belongs to the ethical world, it has in it its task and might.... The European system of states is also the safeguard of the weakest." (SA XI.1, 549)

This Europe envisioned by Snellman did not exist at the beginning of the Second World War when Germany, Italy, England and France reached an agreement in Munich on the question of Czechoslovakia without even listening to the small country. What could the weaker rely on any more? When Germany and the Soviet Union reached an understanding on the division of Europe, the events to come were sealed.

There were the ingredients of power politics in Snellman, that is true, but he could also have offered ingredients for the thinking on international law that began to develop strongly near the end of the 19th century, though part of Snellman's thought in relation to this topic still lay hidden in archives. It would have been enough to interpret the ethical world order through the concepts of international law. After all, Snellman was imagining an order that bound actors in international politics more se-

¹⁵⁷ On Paasikivi's various notes on Snellman, see Polvinen (1995).

riously than subjective morality, though in the conditions of his era the pursuit of this kind of “right” was left to be more a matter of faith than science.

Snellman was not a Hobbesian thinker, but his view of a universally valid “right” was not fully developed. Without seeing beyond the prevailing conditions of his time, he joined the view of his mentor Hegel that there could be no judge above states other than the later judgement of history. Snellman’s thought did not include arrangements like a constitution that was above states, “constitutional treaties” to use the terminology of the European Union. Faith in the ethical world order did mean to him that the demand for an ethical life that considered others and worked for their good as well should be extended beyond nations and states to the shared world, but it must be stated that for our time mere ethics is not enough here.

Every way of thinking that does not make its starting point an increased emphasis on international law in international matters, highest among them the securing of peace and human rights, the “state of citizenship of the world” meant by Immanuel Kant, includes the risk that Snellman saw as being connected to subjective morality. Good intentions can, for numerous reasons, result in something other than the intended result, for example due to insufficient knowledge of the existing objective conditions.

2.7. Snellman’s Doctrine of the State¹⁵⁸

J. V. Snellman’s *Idee der Persönlichkeit* (1841) presented a theoretico-philosophical argument on how the individual will develops to be consistent with the general will while preserving its individual personality. The next year *Läran om staten* (1842), which was completed and published in Stockholm after the trip to Germany, in turn sought to show how the individual will can position itself to adhere to the general will while preserving its freedom.¹⁵⁹ This presupposes that the general will is to be understood only in a historical and national sense.¹⁶⁰ In this work of his, which became a monument in political philosophy, Snellman transferred

¹⁵⁸ Jalava (2005), 157-183, forms the framework of this chapter, up to the last subsection. Translation by Alisa Manninen.

¹⁵⁹ See Snellman (1842); SA III; KT 5, 32-293.

¹⁶⁰ The term “general will” comes from Rousseau’s social contract theory.

his view of the human and personality to civic life by taking as the object of his examination the family, civil society and the state, following the structure of the third part of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. (The first parts of Hegel's opus, on natural law and morality, he had already addressed in the "beginner's course" pamphlet that had been released in 1840.)

Läran om staten was published in Swedish, so it was not aimed at Hegelian colleagues in the same way as the German-language treatise on personality. Nonetheless, it was the first complete Hegelian presentation in book form on the topic since the 1821 *Philosophy of Right* by the Berlin master. In it, despite the Hegelian foundation of his thinking, Snellman more strongly than before brought forward views that differed from Hegel or were even openly critical of him.¹⁶¹ This was partly due to the influence of the new literature that had come out after Hegel's death, but it was also a question of differences in emphases that were already to be found in J. J. Tengström's lectures on Hegel.¹⁶² Namely, in his mature work Hegel was not a nationalist; on the contrary, in many ways he was an opponent of nationalistic views. Neither did Hegel connect patriotism to language or nation and hardly ever even used the concept of the "nation" because to him it meant a people without history. In a comparable manner, to him language was also merely *an sich*, "in itself", a kind of natural monument that preceded history and did not, properly speaking, belong within the sphere of a philosophical scrutiny that was dedicated to the demands of history, the formation of the state and reason. When Snellman instead determinedly emphasised in his doctrine language, nationality and the uniqueness of national individuality, he took a long stride towards Herderian language nationalism and national thought. His views also come close to the historical school of legal theory that Carl von Savigny formulated in 1814, according to which laws and legal order are not formed in accordance with the conscious decisions of individuals but develop organically on the basis of a tradition offered by the national spirit (*Volksgeist*). An important difference from Hegel is also present in Snellman's way of understanding civil society (*medborgerliga samhälle*) as bound to respect for state laws.

Snellman's *Läran om staten* has been regarded as a significant expansion of Hegel's abstract philosophising towards the consideration of

¹⁶¹ Rein's (1928) presentation on the differences of Hegel and Snellman has been re-evaluated by Grotenfelt (1927), Teljo (1934), Manninen (1976a) and Pulkkinen (1989) among others.

¹⁶² See above chapter 2.3.

empirical, experiential knowledge. Whereas Hegel's philosophy of right understands the state as rational and constructs it as what it should be, in Snellman the Hegelian dialectic of the conceptual and the normative descriptions of concrete institutions that exist in everyday experience were blended into one another. Thus, Snellman's work played a role in influencing the development of social science and political science in Finland.¹⁶³ At the same time, as an original social philosophy it sought to engage in dialogue with a wider educated audience beyond professional philosophers and gave a philosophical foundation for the Fennoman programme of national awakening and reform. In Sweden the publication of the work was noted in daily newspapers and in Finland it passed pre-publication censorship and was on sale in the spring of 1843.

Snellman's social philosophy examines the construction of the modern Western moral subject and the relationship between the individual and society. The key concept is *sedlighet, Sittlichkeit* (ethics, ethical life), according to which the Snellmanian ethical moral subject was not only to submit to the law and custom of his nation but to identify with them to the degree that his free will and individual commitment would have been in alignment with them even if there would have been no laws. The rule of force in a society consisting of estates was thus exchanged for the internalised self-discipline of civil society, because "justifiably it is thus said that the ultimate purpose of every law is to make itself redundant".

Snellman's social philosophy also seeks to solve the moral problem of modernity: divine authority could no longer be legitimately invoked in matters involving civic questions. If "secularisation" means a process in which an all-encompassing, divine religious system dwindled in a modern society where functions had diverged to become one subsystem among many, losing its say over other subsystems, this was not a phenomenon that sociologists only invented in the 1960s but a development that Snellman already considered to be inevitable in the early 1840s. The unification of state and church into one power had, according to him, been inevitable in the childhood of a nation when neither the nation nor its individual representatives had reached a sufficient level of education in order to form an independent view of the tenets that were the foundation of social order. When individuals in Snellman's own time did have the opportunity to receive higher intellectual education, as a result of which they would be swept up in secular life, increasingly the practice of piety would be limited to fixed hours, come into conflict with the secular sphere of life and become a

¹⁶³ See Allardt (1997) and the articles in Niiniluoto and Vilkkö (2006).

personal matter of private life and the family. Although religion is necessary to the education of children and the state, the state must not bind all its members to the same form of belief. In Snellman's words, to this there was "no other response than to make an active life a divine service by making it ethical" (SA III, 314 note 1, 328, 364–366; see also SA II, 379–380). Snellman thus completed the ideological transformation in which a Lutheranism that looked to the hereafter was transformed, on a foundation of Herderian national thought and Hegelian philosophy, into an immanent, intraworldly civic religion in which divine criteria that lay outside the world and history could no longer be presented for dogmas. In this civic religion, the position of the individual, omnipotent God was assumed by the national spirit, with which Snellman meant the body of universal education that was characteristic of a nation, at hand here and now, and constantly developing. Christianity, in other words, no longer functioned as the "supreme good", on the basis of which the value and significance of other matters could have been measured, but was replaced by "the designated knowledge, custom and law of the nation" – "when in Rome, do as the Romans do". As Snellman explicitly stated, "love for the fatherland, respect for its laws etc." now appeared "in a way as a religion alongside the historically given [religion]" (SA III, 305–306, 313–315, 328, 414–415). As it was to Arwidsson and Tengström, to Snellman as well the development of the individual into a self-aware, autonomous subject was largely a process concurrent with the development of the nation's self-awareness and external independence. At the same time, the fatherland was also equated with the mother who fed her children spiritually and bodily (SA III, 468, 487–488).

The Family

In Snellman's doctrine of the state, the family was the first foundational pillar on which he built the development and adaptation of the individual subject. It is noteworthy that he consistently used the Swedish word *familj* for family, with which he meant the modern nuclear family formed by parents and children, a unit of upbringing that led a life that was "isolated" and "closed in on itself". Servants and employees were to be excluded from it and their activities to be understood as a temporary solution until they formed their own nuclear families (SA III, 317, cf. SA IX). Until the beginning of the 19th century, *familj* was – on those rare occasions when the word was used – mostly a synonym for the wider household (Swedish *hus*, *bushåll*) formed by relatives and servants. Snellman's

narrower definition reflected the disappearance of preindustrial communality and wide family networks due to the separation of the spheres of production and housekeeping, public and private life, as a result of the modern division of labour – as well as an ideological effort that was just as determined to see local and familial solidarity replaced by loyalty to the nation state and the nuclear family as the source of social cohesion.

In the part on family in *Läran om staten*, Snellman was not content only to note the effect on family and kinship relations of the change that had begun around him: he set the nuclear family that had been separated from the life of economy and production as the moral foundation of the nation state. Beginning in the 1840s, the new family ideal rose to become dominant in Finnish public discussion and its most eager exponents were men precisely like Snellman, of the middling estates and part of the rising educated class. Like Arwidsson's, Snellman's critique was also aimed particularly at the nobility, whose "ostensible families" (*quasi-familjer*) also ruined other social classes with the power of their example.¹⁶⁴

From a Hegelian perspective, the family was ethical in the concept's least recognised emotional form, ethical *an sich*, "in itself".¹⁶⁵ According to Snellman's definition, the family is "the objective existence of ethics as love". The family had no ethical purpose outside the state; rather, its ethicality was expressed in "parents fulfilling with love their duty to bring up their children to rationality and ethicality or, as is said in everyday speech, as good citizens of society" (SA III, 316). The moral and religious education of a child is the task of the parents, in which the mother's role is primary in comparison to that of the father. The teaching of children, for which primary school and grammar school were responsible, is instead the public task of the state.

Neither did an intimate relationship have an intrinsic value. Rather, the "rational", "objective" purpose of marriage was child-raising "in the widest meaning of the word". Implicitly, Snellman even seemed to consider it more acceptable to have a child out of wedlock than to have a

¹⁶⁴ Snellman accused the nobility specifically of not raising their children themselves, which he assumed to be due to the wish of the parents to be ruled without distraction by their egoism, irrationalities and vices (SA III, 325).

¹⁶⁵ See Hegel (1952), § 158, 161.

childless intimate relationship that sought “mere blissful happiness of the individual subject”.¹⁶⁶

Despite what was said above, the family was, nonetheless, not “a mere instrument with the state as its purpose”. The state in turn had the task of being an instrument for the existence of the family by protecting its property, securing its domestic peace and claiming in relation to other nations a share of the common treasures of human culture, through which the state upheld the education that manifested in the family as natural feeling, love. Furthermore, individuals had an absolute right to enjoy the benefits of family life and the family had the right to live in its mutual love, “which no power foreign to it may invade” (SA III, 316–317, 523). In the context of civil society, Snellman again returned on a more general level to the question of the individual’s right to the pleasures of life. He stated that the doctrine of ethics did not reject sensual pleasure as evil or demand asceticism, only the “sensible satisfying” of desire. Pleasure should be rejected when it transformed into an intrinsic value that would cause “life’s serious pursuits” to be forgotten. “Instead, as soon as the human also counts work among his pleasures, through it he ennobles all others [pleasures] as well”. If puritans had given instrumental thought and instrumental relation to the world a spiritual value in the sense of work and wealth being understood as instruments for the realisation of God’s will, Snellman’s similar instrumental rationalism moved to the core of service for the nation’s common good, with the consequence that a useful life became a central national moral value and demand to him.

The family had a special position in Snellman’s thinking because in no other institution was it possible to create an emotional, fundamental tie through which the members of the family were bound “to the land of *birth*, the ways of the *fathers* and the *mother* tongue”. Family was the “forge of patriotism”, a forge for selfless love that later, in both civil society and the state, sought its pleasure in work for the good of others and freed the human through self-sacrifice. Teaching could later give the individual concepts, knowledge and skills, even create a conviction regarding

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 323–325. Snellman did not consider an extramarital sexual relationship to be ethical, but had an understanding attitude to a woman’s “natural drive to achieve the name of mother”. Those guilty of indiscretion or adultery could be punished, but illegitimate children were innocent of their birth and, therefore, their position should be secured with legislative measures. Snellman’s demand for equal rights for children was radical considering the era when it was made.

their truth, but it could not give the will the strength to keep to this conviction, to live and die for it. Only the emotional forge of the bourgeois nuclear family was capable of this; in ethical life within the family, patriotism was planted in young minds as natural feeling and love (SA III, 316–317, 319, 331–333). “Transformation into the nuclear family” was, therefore, an essential part of Snellman’s “programme for bourgeoisification”, in which both the distress and misery of the nation’s majority and the absolute pleasure-seeking and vanity of the privileged social classes were removed through a mutual moral system that was binding to all.

“Because the entire life of the human is the same education in different forms, it is a passage from compulsion to freedom. This is what child-raising also is”, Snellman summed up in the oration he made in 1844 (KT 6, 362). In the child’s earliest years of life, the educator directed the child towards “good custom” through unconditional commands, so a habit of obedience and love and respect for parents were the primary prerequisites of all education. If the child wanted to know a reason for some kind of doing, a sufficient explanation was that the will of God bound all, “just like his all-seeing eye urges the child to truth, his goodness to a grateful mind and so on.” Thus, in the loving atmosphere of the home there was planted in the child “a childish obedience to God’s commands” and “a childish trust in his grace” – in other words, an unquestioning subjugation to the will of the parents. This was “with regard to all life immeasurably important”, because “when doubt awakens, and reason demands to be allowed to examine those matters adopted in good faith, this conviction that has taken root in childhood is the point of reference from which all examination of reason sets out”. It also directed action away from doubt and towards recognition of the rationality that was present in the traditional even when reason believed it had separated itself from its ties to tradition. This was how the nuclear family thus built a foundation that had an emotional and unconscious effect on the individual, a basis that all autonomous use of reason and awareness was later to set out from.

Snellman’s views on gender roles were conservative in comparison to the rest of his thinking on social issues and the general debates of the era. To him, the woman was spouse and mother, weaker than the man in form, more emotional, religious, moral, selfless and sacrificing. Snellman gave women an important role in the moral education of children, but

there was no place for them as actors in society and state.¹⁶⁷ Only Snellman's followers, beginning in the 1860s, began to defend gender equality and women's right to education, paid employment, property and citizenship.¹⁶⁸

Civil Society

While the family represented in the Hegelian system ethics in the natural, least developed state, the contract and the freedom of choice that moved beyond the borders of the family and led to its breakdown were part of bourgeois society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, *borgerligt samhälle*), of which Snellman, differing from Hegel and J. J. Tengström, used the term civil society (*medborgerliga samhället*). In English, both are usually translated as civil society. The difference in concept was not a coincidence; in its background lay a tradition of interpretation that had been begun by Tengström and took a stance on "subjectivity", or all kinds of individual arbitrariness of action and awareness, that was notably more critical than that of Hegel himself.

To Hegel, bourgeois society was ethics *für sich*, for itself, for its own sake, as something that had reached individual self-awareness, but at the same time also a Hobbesian "battlefield of all individuals' private interests against all". Well versed in classics of economic liberalism such as Adam Smith, Hegel adopted from them a new perspective on the social tie in which society was no longer held together by the legal system postulated by classical political science but by a tie born out of work, exchange and the satisfying of material needs. This tie was born without anyone particularly wanting it, so he characterised it as a system of necessity or compulsion. When all individual incidents of birth and luck were able to influence matters in bourgeois society, it offered in its contrasts and

¹⁶⁷ Snellman expressed his views on "rational love" in the beginning of the 1840s in his own novel on marriage as well. In 1845, he proposed to J. J. Tengström's daughter Sofia but was rejected. He was finally married at the age of thirty-nine to Jeanette Wennberg, who was twenty-two years younger. After the death of his wife in 1857, Snellman became a single parent who conscientiously participated in raising his five children in addition to his work as a professor. See Jalava (2006), 163-191.

¹⁶⁸ See below Bolin, Westermarck and Lagerborg.

their messiness “a play of lewdness, misery and the physical and ethical corruption shared by both of these”.¹⁶⁹

Snellman, on the other hand, determinedly rejected an idea that had been established through liberal economic activity: that in a society ruled by markets, the market economy, people would be able to freely pursue their egoistic efforts, directed by the invisible hand of the “cunning of reason”.¹⁷⁰ For example, in a book review that he published in 1840 in the Swedish newspaper *Freja*, he stated that the doctrine of the general freedom of trade was connected “to liberalism of the sort in which reason is placed outside the state and its institutions, in which case reason manifests as violence and arbitrariness” (SA I, 330). He himself emphasised that the individual’s needs, inclinations and education defined civil society only in part because it was also defined by “special institutions of society (laws)” that directed the individual’s actions so that all other members of the society could also realise themselves as freely. Freedom was thus not arbitrariness or the mere absence of negative external limitations, as even civil society relies on laws enacted in the state. Therefore, civil society is about no single individual being allowed to act in violation of the law, which is the expression of the general will, even as he is otherwise allowed to use his powers according to his wishes in the pursuit of his own good and private goals. Thus, to Snellman civil society, like the state, was primarily a defined stance that individuals had in relation to their community. He considered its most accurate definition to be, “this indispensable form of the state is the presence of ethicality as lawfulness” (SA III, 333–335). On this basis, *Läran om staten* addresses among other things the independence of jurisdiction, the witness’s oath, freedom of the press, citizens’ self-sufficiency, freedom of establishment, the position of officials, educational institutions, national education, the duties of municipalities and the position of the church.

When Snellman, in the context of civil society, spoke of the “overthrow” of the family, he meant that the purpose of the family had been fulfilled when the individual – above all, the male individual – detached himself from his childhood family and left behind the solely passive stance he had had as a child in relation to his parents and “the right expressed through their mouth”. When the ethicality of the child was present in the good habits born out of love and respect for his parents’ commands, transitioning from the family to civil society required the

¹⁶⁹ Hegel (1994), § 185, 289; see also Manninen (1976a), 241.

¹⁷⁰ See Manninen (1976a), 243–244; Pulkkinen (1989), 15, 128–130, 534.

development of an ethical awareness, the achievement of a conviction regarding what was right, spontaneous action and adherence to one's own conviction in this action. On this level the individual's self-reflection increased, as ethicality was no longer an emotion that immediately aligned with the subject's awareness regarding it: through reflection, the individual separated the law from the awareness regarding it. Obeying the law was, therefore, no longer a matter of unquestioning obedience but the result of the individual's free decision, in the background of which lay a personal conviction of the law's rationality (SA III, 335–337). People who had learned to engage in individual thinking and action could no longer be steered with mere external compulsions but were governed through their own selves – with their own conviction and civil faith (SA III, 339).

Because the law was a valid power given to the individual citizen that he could not violate without punishment, it might appear as though freedom could only be realised by force in civil society. This perspective, however, was based on a misunderstanding regarding the nature of freedom: if the human was recognised to be free only if he was rational and if reason was not the whim of the individual but generally valid, then it was also understood that the human had his true freedom only when he acted in a way that was generally valid. Using Rousseau's concepts, Snellman separated from each other each nation's rational general will (*den allmänna viljan*) and the will of the majority (*flertalets vilja*), demanding that the law should be assumed to be equally above both the mere numerical "despotism of the majority" and the lowliest of individuals, if the law was to be acknowledged as being something other than arbitrariness and violence. According to his view, the laws that existed in a nation were an expression of its national spirit or awareness as it was at that moment, regardless of who had been the direct legislator. Thus, laws could be understood as manifestations, matching the nation's level of development, of the reason that reigned in humankind (SA I, 355). The citizen had to follow this command of the reason if he wanted to be free, as his spirituality and freedom were formed of thinking and action that were in accordance with the general reason (SA III, 339–340).

Snellman's conception of the human was extremely culture-focused, as by nature he saw the human as even more pathetic than the animal, "senseless" and "unfree" (SA II, 255; see also SA X, 535). Humans, like animals, did have basic instincts like hunger and thirst, and certain biological differences, as well as terrain and climate, could to some degree create a foundation for differences between nations, kindreds and individuals. Snellman nonetheless estimated that the significance of natural inclina-

tions was immeasurably small, since they were in themselves already defined by history and modified by culture. Correspondingly, neither could a “normal organism” be found in nature, since unless organic anomalies such as deaf-muteness or blindness were being discussed, “the type of the kindred is a mere fantasy image” and “the more perfect or less perfect structure” was related only to the image of the ideal that was created by the human. Thus, all features that could be considered characteristic features of a certain nation were a “second nature” created by culture and education. “Because the nation is not a race or a tribe but a historical product”, Snellman concluded.¹⁷¹

According to Snellman, the awareness of the individual subject had no direct relationship to the outside world but was determined through the national spirit or, to phrase it in a more modern manner, the cultural tradition.¹⁷² Although he thus did admit that moral principles had a nature that altered depending on time and place, his ethical thinking was relativistic only in a collective sense, not on an individual level. In a specific nation, the values and norms that were in accordance with its national spirit were at each moment inviolable and absolutely right, so that every nation was sovereign in every time and in its own law and custom it had the highest power to decide what was right and what was wrong.¹⁷³

Like the individual upon becoming aware of itself, understanding itself as the self, separates in it and through it from other individuals, whose Self he is not, in the same way does the nation also know itself at the same time to be a closed, independent whole and understands other nations to be the same kinds of individualities dependent on their selves. (SA III, 488)

¹⁷¹ SA X, 545–546, 595–596. Snellman was familiar with his era’s debate on racial science and, in accordance with his idealistic worldview, rejected materialistic-biological theories that claimed the physical organs of the body determined a human’s spiritual development. According to him, the truth was that the human spirit shaped its body, just like it did external nature, to be the servant of its own goals, from which were also derived the different spiritual abilities of the races (SA V, 502).

¹⁷² Pulkkinen (1989), 45. Snellman’s “national spirit” is, however, not translatable simply as cultural tradition, because the Hegelian-Snellmanian absolute also included a religio-mystical dimension.

¹⁷³ SA III, 348, 448; on the “collective relativism” of Snellman’s ethics, see Tenkku (1973).

The principle of national sovereignty also applied to the pan-European heritage of ideas and universal values that concerned all humans on the basis of their shared humanity because they too were realised, according to Snellman, only when the nation had understood them independently and given them a form that was due to its national spirit – “otherwise it is a mere external habit, comparable to the training of a monkey or a dog” (KT 5, 314–315; SA IV, 4–5). At the same time, the criticism of a nation’s “knowledge, custom and law” on the basis of a supranational ethical ideal became impossible. The do-gooder who demanded in its name that the members of his community change their lives and the modes of operation that had been painstakingly adopted was, in Snellman’s eyes, equated with the lawbreaker “in whose position he also places himself when he moves from word to deed” (SA III, 357–358). The undertone of Snellmanian national thought was thus not pluralistic but total, since the division of the national will into two or more wills that were in opposition to each other but equally justified was already impossible on a conceptual level. The Absolute, God, Reason was one and indivisible and despite its dialectic did not, in the end, tolerate discrepancies.

The view of humanity’s tie to culture also raised the language question to a central position on Snellman’s agenda. “So that the human will be brought to be party to the Word, this makes in the intellectual mind his spirit the human spirit,” Snellman stated (SA X, 595). To him, language was not the mere instrument and outward form of the expression of thoughts but thinking, language and knowledge required each other; the individual was constituted in language. Snellman assumed that all realisation and thinking required language in the linguistic sense and a language community to whose knowledge and custom every user of the language was connected in his self-awareness and self-expression. Thinking before the word was the mere empty possibility of thinking, as in order to be able to think the individual had to think in the words of a language and rational thought was nothing other than the word through which it was declared (SA IV, 413; IX, 347).

As Snellman expressed the matter in 1844:

Is language possibly something so irrelevant to the human that he can dress the education that he received from his fatherland, shared by him and his nation, in any costume at all? Maybe it is thought: a sound is a sound, a language is a language; they are only different ways to declare the same thoughts. But the human does not only convey his thoughts

in the word, he believes and feels, knows and wants verbally and his thinking, his entire rational being moves and lives in language. (KT 6, 350)

Because the nation recognised its uniqueness by expressing with words what was original and authentic about it, an indispensable prerequisite of the “unity of knowing and custom” was the unity of language. For the nation’s self-awareness and the expression of this knowing, there was no word other than the nation’s own language, “in which its knowing lives as one original form of the universal”. “The independent education of one nation must express itself in the nation’s own language.” (SA IV, 4–5) With his characteristic acerbic tone, he presented Christianity, the social order and the higher level of education among the country’s Swedish-speaking population as the result of a lesson taught by Swedish conquerors through violence and the powerless repetition of this dictation, through which not only the external conditions of the nation but also its internal conviction had been brought under the sword (SA IV, 4II–4I7). When he insisted that Finnish gradually had to be made not only the official language of Finland but also the language of literature and higher education, and that the new generation had to learn to use the Finnish language in addition to loving it nominally (SA IV, 420–423), this was not only about the ability of the educated class to communicate with the common people and understand their culture. Yet, there was a tension in Snellman’s thinking, as a solution to the language question had to take into account the future role of Swedish in Finland.¹⁷⁴

Solution to the Language Question

Snellman’s career as a professor ended on 21 March 1863 when he became a member of the Finnish Senate. There were plans that the Emperor would come to Finland in the summer of that year. Snellman began sketching out ideas that Alexander II should express in his public speech, together with the decisions that the Emperor should make in order to show his benevolence toward this loyal nation. These ideas were not minor. Snellman’s aim was to improve the status of the Finn-

¹⁷⁴ See J. J. Nervander’s objections to Fennomans in a letter to JVS in 1846 (SA III, 628). The “contradiction” in the equivocation of “national” and “Finnish” was noted also by Rein (1928), 346–348.

ish language spoken by the majority of the people and introduce to Finland its own currency.

Other members of the Senate thought that Finnish was still too undeveloped as a language and civil servants did not have a sufficient mastery of it. Swedish was the official language in public life, except in the church where people should be spoken to in their own language. It was thought that the time was not ripe for such a great language reform. However, Snellman had good relations with persons near the Emperor and preparations for a change in the language situation could begin. When the Emperor came to Hämeenlinna in the southern part of Finland to observe military exercises, Snellman took action independently of the Senate. He travelled there and was allowed to meet the Emperor, who already knew about his ideas concerning the languages.

The language decree was presented to Alexander II on 30 August 1863. With pleasure, he approved it immediately. Finnish should, within the next twenty years, be taken into use in addition to Swedish in public offices and courts of law so that the great majority of people could use their own language. Of course, there was much criticism of the route Snellman had chosen. And there is no reason to think that the Emperor and Snellman would have had precisely the same aim. To Alexander II, the improved position of the Finnish language meant the country's further distancing from Sweden. In Snellman's view, if civil servants and the common people used different languages the nation would not be able to survive under the influence of Russia.

Regarding the future of the Swedish language in Finland, Snellman had written earlier in 1859:

“First, it must be spoken by those who dedicate themselves to administration, judicature, education and the service of the church among the Swedish population. This ability will also be indispensable to those who wish to learn to know Finland's history, laws, institutions, literature and general culture from the sources. For this reason alone, Swedish would stand out from other foreign languages. Undoubtedly, Swedish literature will in the future always preserve its notable value, which is founded on this, to Finland's educated class. Swedish would thus always be one of the principal subjects of study in Finland's schools, and knowledge of it will be a primary element of scientific education in

Finland. But it will not be an indispensable prerequisite of general literary education.” (SA IX, 18)¹⁷⁵

Not everything was possible simultaneously. Finland eventually received its own currency, *markka*, but it still had to wait. Something else remained in store for Snellman: he was asked to write the Emperor’s Speech from the Throne. He was able to get into the speech the promise of regular meetings of the Diet and the possibility for the estates to make legislative initiatives.

The State

To Hegel, the state is the “reality of the ethical idea”, the full realisation of the idea of *Sittlichkeit*, a self-subsistent community based on the rational will. As concrete freedom, it reconciles the fully developed individual subjectivity and the universal.¹⁷⁶ In the state, an ethical “general interest”, which is freed from bourgeois society’s pursuit of private interest, is realised. Correspondingly, according to Snellman, the state is the highest form of civic life, the “peak of ethical freedom”, where laws are not only obeyed but also enacted so that the morality and the legality of action coincide.

To understand Snellman’s way of thinking, it must be remembered what individual freedom and freedom in general meant in the tradition of German idealism. Individual freedom, from this perspective, could never mean a negative freedom from norms and restrictions, as without determinations there was no subject with a will – not even a defined human, because only through determinations could the human be something specific and not a mere empty possibility of existence (SA II, 216–223, 228). True freedom was thus the state of being in which the human, conscious of the defining nature of his cultural tradition, sought through state activity to develop his culture further – in the words of Snellman, to reconcile tradition and his own self-awareness (SA I, 618–619, 623–627). “*The human is what he makes himself be*”, Snellman wrote, “but on the

¹⁷⁵ The Constitution of the Republic of Finland in 1919 stated that Finnish and Swedish are the two national languages. The Language Act 1923 specified that a municipality is either unilingual or bilingual (if the minority comprises at least ten per cent of the population).

¹⁷⁶ See Hegel (1952), §257, §260.

other side: *the human should not want other than that which he should be*, this is reason, true freedom” (SA X, 534). The pinnacle of freedom was thus for the human to take a creative approach to the values of his culture and define his determinations as a rational and autonomous moral subject by creating, through the independent understanding of tradition, new laws and binding customs to replace obsolete ones.

In Snellman’s thinking, the state is an area where freedom and the right were realised objectively and absolutely (SA III, 435). The state is here primarily a defined attitude that individuals had in relation to their community. This was about how the individual, through the reconciliation of tradition and self-awareness, was able to independently understand what kinds of reforms were a fitting continuation of the development of the nation and in the proper relation to its customs, habits and spiritual level of education. State activity was, therefore, reflexive or, as Snellman defined it, a “dual process”. Although an individual citizen did have to obey the nation’s law and custom, these could not be in opposition to the nation’s needs and views: the nation’s citizens had to be convinced that they were justified and to see them realised through their own actions. The legislator, therefore, had to recognise what in the specific historical situation corresponded with the nation’s needs and make a public, legally regulated custom out of what, in constantly changing conditions, was best at any given time. This in turn required the legislator to have patriotism, love for that special, constantly developing form through which his nation advanced the mutual good of all humankind (SA III, 357, 426–428, 433, 459–461). Thus, the state is the “existence of ethicality as the national spirit” or the absolute existence of ethicality, which removes all conflict between the state and the right of the individual.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ In his work *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945), Karl Popper condemns Plato, Hegel and Marx as enemies of the open society. To him, Hegel was a reactionary defender of the Prussian monarchy whose doctrines had encouraged the 20th century’s totalitarian ways of thinking, fascism and communism. In Popper’s opinion, identifying activity as for the good of human freedom and the state equates justice and power: the individual was only offered an internalised mastery, voluntary submission as a subject of the dominant state. With regard to Hegel, these accusations are questionable (see Manninen, 1987a). Nor is this an apt criticism of Snellman, since he emphasised in his *Läran om staten* in 1842, and later in his lectures the development of the national spirit, the ethical will to create new laws.

Yet not just anybody was, in Snellman's eyes, fit to appear as the interpreter of the national spirit, since the nation was, properly speaking, formed only by that portion of the nation that had awakened to national awareness (SA I, 312). Because of this, only they were allowed to enact laws, reform the state's institutions and adapt national ways of living; after all, their activity for the mutual interest of the nation was absolutely impartial, correct and rational activity, whereas the power of the numerical majority was mere acts of violence. Instead of democracy, the essential thing was *national* power, because any form of government at all was good in Snellman's view, as long as the government was national, the "expression of the nation's rationality" (SA I, 312; III, 422–430, 679–680). This view was a challenge to estate-based thinking without, however, including demands for legal, political and social equality, since education was now placed as the criterion for assessing the status of the individual. When addressing alternative forms of government (despotism, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy), Snellman follows Hegel, to whom the best of these is constitutional monarchy and the expansion of suffrage is not an integrally important matter. He supported representation by estates in the sense that higher education would simultaneously be guaranteed the main role in the formulation of laws. Snellman had already taken a stand on this question in 1840 when he was spending time in Stockholm and participated in a debate on the reform of Sweden's Diet in the newspaper *Freja*.¹⁷⁸ Snellman was worried that a unicameral representative body elected in a general election could lead to the unrestrained supremacy of the majority without protection for the minority. The solution was tying the vote to the estate (while abandoning the hereditary advantages of the nobility) but making eligibility independent of residence and difference of estate.

How was the vanguard of educated and patriotic national citizens finally to be convinced, then, that its activity was in accordance with the development required by the national spirit at the time? How was an individual human, in other words, to receive information about moral ideals, right and wrong, in order to be able to do here and now what he as a human, a national citizen and an autonomous moral subject was meant to do? Although the national spirit appeared to set certain criteria for the activity of the individual, ultimately the responsibility returned to the individual member of the nation's elite himself. On the basis of his ethical conscience, he had to decide what was in accordance with

¹⁷⁸ SA I, 311–325. See Manninen and Alavuotunki (1979).

the national spirit – to follow the norm that was found “only in his own breast”. The value of these acts would be judged by future history and – if it found them to be good – it would spread “a veil of expiation over the indiscretions of a true patriot” (SA III, 426, 438, 491. Cf. XI:1, 477). In Snellman’s words:

“Or in brief: the individual must act as the nation would have acted; but this is not said to him by anyone; he must himself decide what is the will of the nation; if he is mistaken in his decision, his action is to be abandoned. Dare! – One must succeed or collapse! – This judgement remains unshaken. It is written on every page of world history.” (SA III, 426)

Snellman concludes his work with a consideration of the right of sovereign states to defend their own interests in international competition by means of war. Like Hegel, he abandons Kant’s idea of the possibility of eternal peace, so he has often been interpreted as supporting Machiavelli’s doctrines of international politics. Yet in his writings in the 1860s, Snellman ended up emphasising the possibility of uniting national and cosmopolitan interests.¹⁷⁹ “Sensible politics is that the good of the nation would be the good of humanity” (SA XI.1, 566).

The Snowball Effect

Snellman’s *Läran om staten* was an essential part of a complex process that Juha Manninen has characterised as a “snowball effect” caused by J. J. Tengström’s lectures on Hegel.¹⁸⁰ One of these consequences was that in 1847 the neologism *valtio* (state) was created in the Finnish language, with the root word being – instead of Latin *status* – Finnish *valta* (power). Finnish terminology and, therefore, the way of thinking has been state-focused: English *political science* is in Finnish *valtio-oppi* (i.e. doctrine of the state), and the Faculty of Social Sciences founded for the University of Helsinki in 1945 is named *valtiotieteellinen* (i.e., science of the state), though in addition to political science it also includes other fields such as sociology and political economy.

¹⁷⁹ See Sihvola (2008). Compare to chapter 2.6.

¹⁸⁰ Manninen (2003), 244-247.

Israel Hwasser, who had returned from Finland to Sweden, had already in the late 1830s defended the idea that Finland could form a separate, independent state, but in his letter to Snellman in 1847, J. J. Tengström did not believe that an independent Finland would be possible for another few centuries (SA VI, 698). Echoing his uncle the archbishop, J. J. Tengström remained loyal to Russia and emphasised this policy to his son Robert and Snellman.¹⁸¹ This conciliatory line became a central doctrine to Old Finn Fennomans, who readily invoked the thoughts of the aging Snellman. Yet Young Finns, who pursued independence more radically and through faster means, were also able to invoke that work of building a national identity that had been carried out in the mid-19th century by the humanist professors and docents of the Imperial Alexander University in Helsinki (Snellman, Runeberg, Lönnrot, Topelius). The national project that was based on Snellman's teaching about the state played its role in inspiring lawyers, among whom was Snellman's friend J. J. Nordström, who argued in his lectures in the beginning of the 1840s that Finland had already become a constitutional state in 1809 when, immediately after the conquest of Finland, Emperor Alexander I had called the Finnish Estates to Porvoo. In this interpretation, it is customary to speak of Porvoo's *valtiopäivät* (literally *state days*).¹⁸² Later, lawyer Leo Mechelin and historian J. R. Danielson-Kalmari prepared the ground for the possibility of Finland's independence as a state, which was realised in 1917. Constant references to the views of Snellman's classic work on relations between nations were still being made in the latter half of the 20th century when an independent Finland formed a "realistic" foreign policy after its wars with the Soviet Union, taking into account geographical facts.

Another discussion that had already been begun by Tengström and Snellman involved the parliament and its configuration. Only in 1863 did Emperor Alexander II return to the promise to convene the Estates that were responsible for the autonomous government of the Grand Duchy of Finland. Snellman had supported a bicameral representation of the Estates, but among his philosophical successors, Wilhelm Bolin defended

¹⁸¹ See Manninen (1986a), 152-155.

¹⁸² Nordström, on the basis of the historical school, later set himself in opposition to Hegel's idea that the state is a goal in itself (Lindman, 1948; Allardt, 1997, 46). Snellman was vexed when Nordström "unpatriotically" moved to Sweden in 1846 as an archivist of the National Archives and did not accept a call to the Senate of Finland in 1863 (Rein, 1918).

universal suffrage in his work on European political life (1868/1871).¹⁸³ In 1885, professor of philosophy Thiodolf Rein favoured the change from the four estates parliament to a bicameral model where the lower chamber is democratically elected by universal suffrage but the upper chamber is constituted by representatives of estates, counties and civil servants.¹⁸⁴ As a member of the nobility, Rein participated in the preparations that resulted in representation by estates being replaced in 1906 by a unicameral parliament elected through proportional representation and universal suffrage (including for women). He was a member of the committee established by the senate and the Constitutional Law Committee where, after hesitating, he determined to support the radically democratic reform of the parliamentary system on the grounds of universal and equal suffrage.¹⁸⁵ In his 1919 memoirs, he notes on this reform, reflecting the thinking of his teacher J. V. Snellman, that

Political development is heading in an international direction these days in all lands of culture. The inadequacies of the democratic parliament are comprehensively fixed only by elevating the spiritual and ethical level of the nation itself.¹⁸⁶

As late as in 1918, Arvi Grotenfelt proposed amending the parliament in the direction of the British bicameral system through an election carried out in groups according to profession, so that “matters will be considered closely”.¹⁸⁷ The next year, the parliament of the independent Finland confirmed that the form of government would be republican.

¹⁸³ On Bolin, see chapter 2.8.

¹⁸⁴ Rein (1919), 333.

¹⁸⁵ Rein (1919), 492-497.

¹⁸⁶ Rein (1919), 505.

¹⁸⁷ Philosophical Society of Finland, November 8, 1918. See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 452-455.

2.8. Fight for Enlightenment: Wilhelm Bolin¹⁸⁸

“I lost out on the professorship. It was given to a dyed-in-the-wool Hegelian ruminant.” The words are bitter and the sharp blow would sting for the rest of the writer’s life.

The matter concerns the successor of national philosopher Johan Vilhelm Snellman in his professorship. The resentful swipe was aimed at the triumphant Hegelian “ruminant”, Thiodolf Rein;¹⁸⁹ this troubled message was sent on 22 March 1869 to Ludwig Feuerbach, the last representative of classic German idealism.¹⁹⁰ The person who had been so shamefully defeated on the field of academics was Andreas Wilhelm Bolin (1835-1924).

However, the ultimate significance of Wilhelm Bolin as a philosopher cannot be evaluated on the basis of a defeat that occurred in his homeland. Rather, the academic defeat he suffered in Finland was essential to Bolin eventually achieving his goal, though only nearer the end of his life and by turning to Europe.

From St. Petersburg to Helsinki

Andreas Wilhelm Bolin was born on 2 August 1835 on the Kamenny Island of St. Petersburg in the Neva estuary. His parents were of German-Swedish origin; his father, like his mother’s ancestors, had been drawn to the flourishing economy of the Imperial capital.

Bolin’s family background was multilingual. His father, Carl Edvard Bolin, worked for a Swedish export company and his mother, Ernestina Catherine Römpler, was the daughter of the court goldsmith, whose shop had been founded in 1791. After their marriage, Carl Edvard rose to be the director of the jewellery, which came to serve five Russian emperors and later three Swedish kings during its long and remarkable history. The family spoke German at home, and naturally French and Russian as well. The boy was sent to the German Saint Peter’s School where he learned

¹⁸⁸ This chapter is based on the joint articles Manninen and Gimpl (1990, 1991). Translation by Alisa Manninen.

¹⁸⁹ For Rein’s career and philosophy, see Ch. 3.2 below.

¹⁹⁰ The collection of all letters between Ludwig Feuerbach and Wilhelm Bolin is to be found at the Finnish National Library, Helsinki. It is being published in Feuerbach’s collected works.

Latin, Greek and later English. Afterwards he would fondly recall the school's lessons in literature. His education in art was also seen to at an early stage; among other things, he learned to play the violin. The family was clearly interested in culture and had a particular appreciation for St. Petersburg's high-quality French theatre.

As concerned religion, Bolin's background was unremarkable. The Greek Orthodox church remained foreign to him all his life. As a family that was of Jewish origin and – at least formally – belonged to a Lutheran church, they lived their life in accordance with the traditions of the Enlightenment and liberalism. When Wilhelm Bolin spoke of “baptised Turks”, he was referring to Russians. Now Bolin sought an atmosphere of freedom, and when he had to begin university studies he moved to Helsinki in 1851. Tartu was too Russian – furthermore, it “cultivated a German student life” abhorrent to him.¹⁹¹ In St. Petersburg Bolin had also learned the Swedish language needed for education at the University of Helsinki.

In the beginning the young man's expectations were not disappointed. “Arrival in Finland meant to me arrival in Europe”, Bolin wrote in his memoirs.¹⁹² In Finland he came to know Berthold Auerbach's village stories, which were forbidden to read in the Emperor of Russia's realm, as well as real country folk and people “who had been given the spiritual strength to rise through their own power above the troubles that had been heaped on them for centuries.”¹⁹³ His relationship to Finland remained contradictory and divided, however. Bolin did not even attempt to learn the Finnish language but kept his whole life to the same German- and Swedish-speaking circles. He never seems to have published in Finnish.

Bolin entered university in 1852 at the age of sixteen and decided to study philosophy. At that time in Finland, it meant mostly the study of Hegel.¹⁹⁴ There were only Hegelians in Helsinki – Johan Jakob Tengström, Germund Fredrik Aminoff, Johan Vilhelm Snellman and others – and the entire country also had only one chair of philosophy. But the Feuerbachian spirit was already simmering underneath, supported particularly by the Nyland and Vyborg student clubs. Their “leader of the rebellion” was Carl Immanuel Qvist. Critical observers thought that they

¹⁹¹ Bolin (1920), 152.

¹⁹² Bolin (1920), 285. For Bolin's bibliography, see Gimpl (1996), 183-197, Manninen and Niiniluoto (2007), 47-57.

¹⁹³ Bolin (1920), 290.

¹⁹⁴ “Das Hegelsche Erbe in Finnland”, in Manninen (1996a), 175-248.

sensed “materialism”, “atheism”, “cosmopolitanism” and “abstract, exaggerated freedom detached from the law”. And not entirely without cause: these reformers “eagerly rejected the efforts aimed at the birth of a Finnish culture, for to them they seemed too limited, like all that is to do with religion, because adopting a religion means a limitation.”¹⁹⁵

Bolin had probably already had contacts with these groups. He himself later recalled that in Helsinki, around 1854, he had gotten to know the “quite excellent writings by Feuerbach”.¹⁹⁶ Around this time the teaching of philosophy had been discontinued in Helsinki, as had happened earlier in Russia’s universities. According to the Emperor, chairs of philosophy were the workshops of the revolutionary and anti-religious current that had come from Europe. For a while it seemed that Bolin would also have to bury his hopes of completing his studies of philosophy. But happily for him, the Crimean War changed the situation. Finns proved to be loyal subjects and in the beginning of 1856 Snellman received a professorship – although he was named the professor of “ethics and the system of sciences” because philosophy was still too sensitive as a concept. Bolin was able to listen to lectures by a Hegelian and take his exams from him.

Meeting with Feuerbach

After completing his studies for the degree of a Master in 1857, Bolin set out on a long journey abroad that lasted for 18 months and passed through Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and France. In Sweden he came to know Christoph Jakob Boström’s system and in Dresden he met his great literary role model Berthold Auerbach. In Weimar he was present at the unveiling of Rietschel’s Goethe-Schiller Monument. In Berlin he met Willibald Alexis, alias Wilhelm Häring. As a result of the meeting, Bolin was able to publish his first German writings in the annual *Der neue Pitaval*.

The high point of the journey was his meeting with Ludwig Feuerbach (1804 -72), the famous left Hegelian and critic of religion, in Bruckberg (Bavaria, near Nuremberg). This had been arranged by Feuerbach’s Leipzig publisher Wigand; Bolin had shown him his first (later lost) literary scribble, which revealed a clear intellectual kinship with the author of *Theogony*. The meeting led to a correspondence that lasted until the

¹⁹⁵ Described by the student S. G. Elmgren.

¹⁹⁶ Bolin (1904a), 54-55.

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72).



fading of Feuerbach's strength and his death. The correspondence was also complemented by many personal meetings. According to the author of a biography of Feuerbach, these letters are among "the most interesting and integrated that Feuerbach composed in the last decades of his life".¹⁹⁷

This exchange of ideas was not merely a schematic dialogue between master and student. Feuerbach explained to Bolin the approach of his new philosophy to realism, the national and political reality. Bolin, on the other hand, kept Feuerbach aware of the trends of philosophy and his own experiments, in which he was able to make use of the perspectives Feuerbach offered on the reinterpretation of the classic tradition. Their correspondence was based on mutual respect: it was always open and lacked ulterior motives.

Over the years Bolin acquired self-confidence both as a philosopher and in his social interactions. Feuerbach's wife comments in one of her letters: "We have always considered you to be only an abstract scholar, who does not, however, lack – I emphasise this especially – even a deep spirituality, but at the same time we have noticed that you also have practical talent. Most particularly we have been pleased to notice you paying increased attention to other people; you do not affect your environment in a positive and civilising manner only through your writings but also your social interactions."¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ Kohut (1909), 266.

¹⁹⁸ Wilhelm Bolin Collection, the National Library of Finland.



Wilhelm Bolin (1835-1924). Portrait by Bernhard Reinhold. Helsinki University Museum, photo by Pia Vuorikoski.

Bolin's activity in Finland in 1857-64 reinforces the view of this great change in his personality. He developed into an author who actively observed and commented on the events in his new homeland and sought to influence them. This change corresponded precisely with Feuerbach's aims and hopes, but its cause was also the period of liberalisation that had begun in Finland and with which Bolin was closely involved. Feuerbach did not have a similar experience in the still reactionary Germany and contact with the young student living in Helsinki infused him with trust and optimism. Due to Bolin's activity, Feuerbach's philosophy was able to develop in Finland in a way that had no equivalent in Germany.

The First Dissertation: Family

In Helsinki, Bolin's close intellectual circle included young liberals who defended the position of the Swedish language and opposed both Snellman's nationalism and Hegelianism. Many of his kindred spirits, such as Leo Mechelin, C. G. Estlander, Jakob Estlander, Robert Lagerborg, Henrik Borgström, Robert Montgomery, Carl Mannerheim and Theodor Lind, later rose to considerable positions in the country's political and economic life, journalism or the fields of science and culture. Bolin's first publications after his doctoral dissertation in 1860 were published in the journals edited by these circles, *Papperslyktan* and *Barometern*, and in the liberal newspaper *Helsingfors Dagblad*, which was born from the abovementioned journals in 1862.

The topic of Bolin's doctoral dissertation was the development of family.¹⁹⁹ He had received this topic from his professor, as was customary at the time. Snellman himself had also addressed this theme on many occasions; for instance, in a novel he defended his Hegelian view against the Swedish C. J. L. Almqvist. Snellman also defended this view in his opening lecture, which he held at Bolin's public thesis defence on 14 April 1860. The family should not be seen as "isolated from the life of the community" and philosophy must legitimise "in a sensible manner its starting point, its principles, its concepts – in this case the concept of justice" (SA IX, 757).

Bolin addressed the topic historically and limited his research to how the family had developed up to the Reformation. He was largely able to agree with Snellman yet simultaneously consider Feuerbach's interpretation of Luther "without revealing myself as a supporter of your doctrine", as he wrote to Feuerbach, the master he kept secret, and he clarified, "thus I was able to consider Protestantism as the end point and give Luther, 'the first man of the history of the Christian faith', the floor." Feuerbach had characterised Luther with the words that Bolin quoted.

The most interesting comment in Bolin's dissertation is to do with his evaluation of the development of family, "the essence of the family in general". According to him, "the development of the concept of family is to be measured on the basis of the recognition of the value of woman and the human dignity of children."²⁰⁰ Although this first work was not revolutionary overall, it did include new topics and arguments that clearly went beyond Snellman's views.

The first time Bolin appeared in public was on 22 March 1861 when he held a lecture in Helsinki on the question of North American slavery. The article, which was later published in the literature journal *Från nära och fjerran*, concludes confidently that "The phenomena show that the abolitionist states do have something that it was feared they lacked: a public opinion, a public moral awareness".²⁰¹

The next year Bolin travelled to Paris through Copenhagen and Berlin. He also comments on the journey in some of his letters and expresses his revulsion to the uniforms visible everywhere in Berlin: not only Potsdam but also the capital is "Kasernopol", as he comments bitinglly. Paris, on the other hand, made a great impact on him: "Formerly it was

¹⁹⁹ Bolin (1860).

²⁰⁰ Bolin (1860), 6.

²⁰¹ Bolin (1861), 55.

customary to greatly mock local trends, *les idées napoléonniennes*... but... Paris is the reality of the era of Napoleon.”

In 1862 the conditions of censorship were relaxed. Finland received a new Governor-General and a promise to summon the Estates to participate in legislation. Bolin was involved in working on a new political newspaper, *Helsingfors Dagblad*. He published two rather expansive articles simultaneously in the annual *Der neue Pitaval*, with two others also appearing there later.

In his articles Bolin analysed criminal cases that had taken place in Finland and whose legal consequences he found worthy of special attention. In addition, these writings were meant to convey key information about Finland to foreign readers. The most interesting of them may be the article on Elias Nygren.²⁰² Bolin also addresses the problem he presents here in a later work for the 1864 *Pitaval* annual: “Ein Bild aus den Fronverhältnissen Finnlands”. The core of this case study is formed by the legal problem that was caused by the enactment of serfdom or so-called forced labour in Finland according to the decree of 1852. Serfdom had never really existed in Finland, but when Finland was joined to Russia in 1809, especially in the eastern region called Old Finland there was created a zone of unclear legal relations because this area had for a time belonged to Russia. The contradictions were simmering underneath for the entire first half of the 19th century, but the consequences were minor when the Russian Emperor left untouched the fundamental rights that he had promised to his subjects. Yet the decrees of 1852, according to which previously free employees were “again” ordered into compulsory service, deeply injured subjects’ old constitutional rights to move freely in their country and change their place of employment. “Strictly enacted forced labour caused dissatisfaction and mayhem in the whole country.”

Nygren had become a victim of these regulations. He killed his four children rather than leave them at the mercy of the retroactive influence of serfdom. “The case is”, Bolin observed, “a lesson to all bureaucrats. It shows once more how dangerous it is to regulate the life of the people through decrees and orders from a writing desk.”

Bolin’s *Pitaval* articles show that he was in complete support of those liberal ideas that argued the power of the Russian Emperor was to be understood in Finland as constitutionally restricted. Precisely this issue had been under debate and now it again became topical. The expectations

²⁰² Bolin (1862).

of Finns were different, and thus there was a decisive importance to the fact that Alexander II summoned the Diet in 1863 and held the opening speech himself. For the first time, the autocratic Emperor of Russia made a direct promise to Finland that he would act as a constitutionally bound Grand Duke.

The writings of the young Bolin make apparent that he was very much concerned with such historic events, although he was not a particularly significant figure in his new homeland. However, in a theoretical and ideological sense his activity soon acquired greater significance.

Since the spring of 1862 Bolin had worked in the university library. Because there was only one chair of philosophy in the entire country, which was expected to remain Snellman's for decades, Bolin did not seem to have had any immediate aim to be a philosopher – at most he was searching for his own personal worldview. He was more attracted to the theatre and the author's career. In 1862-63 Bolin participated in work on scripts for the plays of Helsinki's Swedish Theatre. He also wrote two plays himself: *Kungens Gudsdotter*, which was a drama based on a tale by Karl Gutzkow, and *Ett förlorat Paradis*. Both were performed in the Swedish Theatre; the latter was also published.

In the March of 1863, the news came out that Snellman had been appointed a member of the Senate and was responsible for the economics of the country. Suddenly Hegelianism had influence in government and the only chair of philosophy was surprisingly available. Bolin's plans changed at a stroke.

Despite experimenting with an author's career, Bolin had never completely given up on his plans regarding philosophy. He planned to expand the topic of his doctoral dissertation and deepen it from a theoretical perspective. This he carried out in his book *Familien. Studier* in 1864. His work did not only explode the academic framing earlier created by Snellman. It also acquired topical significance due to the political changes in the country. The woman question in particular was discussed eagerly in the Diet in 1863-64.

Bolin's views proved to be much more radical than Snellman's. His way of addressing female emancipation was positively trailblazing in Finland. He became familiar with the ideas of Charles Fourier in particular. Feuerbach's *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft* was also represented in Bolin's thinking, though in disguise. It was Feuerbach who had emphasised that marriage is the key to a "communal, societal life"; "You are in a mysterious manner indispensable to 'me' – the truth is that no creature, whether human or god or spirit or me, is a real, perfect, absolute

creature alone, but real and perfect is only the connection and the oneness between two creatures alike in their essence”.²⁰³

In his ethics of obligation Bolin, by contrast, kept to Snellman. According to Bolin, the heart of the issue had not been reached until Rousseau, who felt the foundation of the “mutual relationship between the sexes” to be not only a relationship of natural subjugation but also a mutual emotional tie. A supporter of Kantianism, Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel had developed these ideas even further in *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber* in 1792. According to Hippel, a woman had the right to education, employment, freedom of person and property, and representation in political life.

Bolin was in complete agreement with these ideas. Consequently, it was perfectly clear to him that universal suffrage that also included women was needed. Furthermore, Bolin felt that demands for the improvement of the position of women were significant on a positively world-historical level: “As women reach intellectual and legal equality with men, it is merely a realisation of the tendency that directs human development”.

In the Finland of that time, which was undergoing the early stages of industrialisation, Bolin’s views on the position of the working class were something new. He represented a social-liberal perspective and mainly supported the views of Max Wirth and his guiding idea of the “worker who masters himself”. Bolin stated directly that the social system was not the enemy of the worker. To Bolin and to the authorities he valued, it was the family that was the fundamental connection through which the moral values of both society and, particularly, the working class developed. “With the help of the family, the worker will overcome all the misery in which he has lived until now because only domestic life has lasting value through precisely this existence.” Only with its help will the worker’s relationship to the state change. Bolin quotes Lamennais, “The external dependence of families creates the new order of duties: duties to the fatherland.” Thus, according to Bolin, the worker will also “take part in the life of the nation with full awareness”.

This is not yet a mature work by Bolin, however. He was in a hurry now that the professorship was surprisingly available. It turned out that he was the only applicant. Yet Bolin had to prepare a new thesis for the professorship.

²⁰³ Ludwig Feuerbach, Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft, in Feuerbach (1975), 321-22.

New Dissertations: Kant and the Freedom of the Will

Bolin still did not feel that he could reveal his hand. He had to hide his secret fondness for Feuerbach and he focused on researching the relationship of Leibniz and Kant. Feuerbach promised to offer emotional support to Bolin and he indeed took part in Bolin's work in many ways. Only now did Feuerbach's philosophy thoroughly take root in Bolin's thinking.

The correspondence of Bolin and Feuerbach shows that Bolin did not adopt Feuerbach's thinking – as many others did – through *Wesen des Christentums* but *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft*. According to Bolin, Feuerbach's ideas could not be limited only to the first of these works, which he thus did not consider a comprehensive presentation of Feuerbach's philosophy. Rather, he felt that that only with *Grundsätze* this philosophy could have been and was set aright. This work considered above all the significance of sensualism in Feuerbach's thinking; Bolin felt that it reinforced his own views. "The importance of Feuerbach's great invention", Bolin wrote in one of his notes in the summer of 1864, "is that from Descartes to Kant and his many imitators, philosophy has suffered from a mutual error. This is, of course, the unholy alliance formed with theology, the harm of which becomes ever more apparent due to the increase in information about natural science. As long as we keep to theology, philosophical systems are forced to repeat themselves. Philosophy cannot become unified or acquire the esteemed position of science until it separates itself from theology."

The realistic approach that Bolin adopted from Feuerbach, which was not based only on criticism of religion and distancing from Hegel, is separate from the general history of the influence of Feuerbach's philosophy in Germany. In one early note on *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft*, Bolin wrote that it is claimed that Feuerbach had "denied philosophy, given up on it". In reality, he had simply moved it from the position of the queen of sciences to "the same level as other sciences". "In this position it is, however, last and requires all other sciences, but the matter is that 'the last becomes the first and the first becomes the last'. Rigorous sciences, which have until now so greatly despised philosophy... become the first."

However, Bolin's thinking cannot be simplified into the mere imitation of Feuerbachian ideas. Their historical starting points alone are completely different. Bolin was a freethinker from the beginning. Nothing suggests that he would have experienced a special religious phase at

some point in his youth. His relationship to religion was even more lax than Feuerbach's, who had once begun his career as a theologian. In his unpublished notes on religion, Bolin rejects it in a manner that resembles the criticism of religion during the Enlightenment. Above all, Bolin differs from Feuerbach in his relationship to Hegel. His independent study of philosophy led him directly to Feuerbach. Bolin, therefore, did not need Feuerbach in order to free himself from Hegel; rather, he started directly from Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel. Of course, one can see in his attitude a reaction against the dominance of Hegelianism in Finland.

Interest in Feuerbach decreased swiftly in German-speaking countries after *Das Wesen des Christentums*, and due to increasingly reactionary politics it was impossible to have a university career if you had adopted Feuerbach's demands. There was no heir to *Grundsätze's* scheme in Germany. Bolin was, therefore, in a unique position.

In his new dissertation Bolin was able to make use of his decades of conversation with Feuerbach on the topic of *Kant und das Grundproblem der Philosophie*. Bolin's exchange of ideas with Feuerbach is also important in the sense that it illustrates Feuerbach's later development, which has received less attention due to Karl Marx's interpretations of Feuerbach. The Bolin-Feuerbach correspondence is an interesting source precisely for Feuerbach's later connections and influences. Bolin actively followed the birth of Neo-Kantianism and the growth of Schopenhauer's popularity, and he repeatedly advised Feuerbach to comment on the phenomena of the day, above all on the critical assessment of Kant's philosophy. In Feuerbach's lifetime, Bolin himself devoted most of his own creative work to this task.

Bolin's work was further inspired by his familiarisation with Kuno Fischer, the "Neo-Kantian evening star" who practiced "one-sided speculation" – as well as the "hopeless Hindu", Schopenhauer, in whose thinking Bolin saw the revival of the clash between knowledge (*Vorstellung*) and the thing itself (*Wille*). Objections were aimed particularly at Kant's doctrine on space and time and his standpoint on the freedom of will.²⁰⁴

On 4 February 1864, Feuerbach was able to present the results of his investigations: he had now "finally gotten to write about the matter or topic towards which you above all once gave me a push in Bruckberg. Namely: is space, is the world only something imagined, subjective, as Kant, Fichte and Schopenhauer claim? My answer is, by the way, in no

²⁰⁴ In his critique of Kant's apriorism, Bolin was also influenced by Spencer's empiricism.

relation to how much time and effort I have spent on these investigations.... Why not? Because my own starting point is that 'I' and the 'alter ego' – which, of course, only exists through the senses – are indivisible... so to me this question has seemed and seems senseless, positively insane." "You can surely imagine", Bolin answered on 27 March 1864, "how pleasant it was for me to notice that my humble thoughts have in some way affected your activity."

Bolin's study *Leibnitz ett förebud till Kant* (1864), which Feuerbach had examined and on whose "worst errors" he had commented "briefly or rather through notes in the margins", received harsh criticism in Helsinki, however. Bolin cancelled his application for the professorship for this reason and he was, for the moment, content with a docentship. He told his friend C. G. Estlander that he was applying for Finnish citizenship, using all his time to create a new and better work in order to be able to apply for the professorship again. As his topic he now chose freedom of will. Once more he asked for Feuerbach's support, especially since the solution to the problem "was not to be found from the perspective of the isolated subject" and Bolin was able to "preserve a rigorous, factual-genetic method without revealing his inclination against the systems of theology and philosophy."

Feuerbach was not sparing with his advice: "so you had better seize the topic historically, approximately in the same manner as in the case of Leibnitz, who you treat as the opponent of the Hobbesian principle of necessity, then you move both opposites forward in time and place them in opposition through clearly phrased sentences, finally a critical – and thus not characterless and miserable – reconciliation between these two. But do listen to your own voice! After all, in the end everyone does as he wills."

Once again Bolin also turned to Kuno Fischer, which clearly made the master Feuerbach just a little bit jealous. He thinks nothing of the kind of renewal of philosophy, as he writes to Bolin, that does not at the same time "take as its starting point the renewal of humanity, religion, social life. This is how I think in general about particularistic special philosophy that avoids the burning issues of the present day and only tinkers with matters that will interest no one except some professor of philosophy." Bolin took this blow hard. On the side he was preparing his lectures on the topic of *The development of political ideas in Europe from the 16th century to the present day*. He himself was satisfied with these lectures and felt them to be useful, and they did attract widespread interest.

After serving in 1865-68 as acting professor of philosophy, in the autumn of 1868 Bolin finally defended his new dissertation *Undersökning af*

läran om viljans frihet, med särskildt afseende å Kants behandling af problemet. In it, he defended determinism and attacked Kant in particular but also many others. He developed his own perspective by drawing on Spinoza, whose approach to problems received a great deal of space in his study.²⁰⁵

Bolin tells about the results of his work in his letter of 19 March 1868 to Feuerbach: “I have written my presentation with my very strongest heart’s blood, and if I have managed to find the right direction better than the usual advocates of freedom, then above all I have to thank those tools and principles of thinking that I found with the help of your hints.” Bolin’s research can, however, justifiably be considered a work independent of Feuerbach. His interpretation of the freedom of will does not come from Feuerbach; at crucial points it can even be considered a criticism of him. But it has features that connect Bolin to Feuerbach. For example, Bolin’s attempt to build his ethics on an I-you-relationship, in which he makes his starting point the “you” he prioritises, is clearly connected to Feuerbach. Bolin, however, does not frame his position in Feuerbachian terms.²⁰⁶

The new dissertation on the freedom of will received both defenders and opponents at the University of Helsinki. The long and heated debate ended with the result mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, which Bolin noted on 22 March 1869. The battle for the professorship thus meant a definitive defeat; Thiodolf Rein had won. When the opportunity arose, years later in 1873, Bolin took up for forty years the position of the University of Helsinki’s head of the library.

²⁰⁵ Bolin argued that Kant’s compatibilism, which takes man to be free as a subject in the noumenal world and bound by laws in the phenomenal world, leads to contradictions. Bolin agrees with Spinoza that freedom is self-determination governed by reason, while non-freedom means resigning oneself to external things and passions. However, Bolin differs from Spinoza in his conclusion that free will is not only associated with individual self-preservation but with self-preservation based on “solidarity” with fellow human beings. See Manninen and Uusitalo (1979) and Oittinen (1996b).

²⁰⁶ Feuerbach defended in 1866 ethical eudaimonism on the basis of his anthropological materialism: free will is determined by the drive to happiness.



*Helsinki University Library, 1840. Helsinki University Museum.
Photo by Linda Tammisto.*

The Politics of Europe

Bolin nonetheless did not leave the university immediately. In 1870-73 he served as a personal extraordinary professor of philosophy. For a while he worked on adapting his successful lectures on the history of philosophy and state policy into literary form. *Europas statsliv och filosofins politiska lärör* came out in two parts in 1870 and 1871.²⁰⁷

The topic of the lectures had not been chosen arbitrarily. The political upheavals of his own country demanded that the deputy of Snellman's chair immerse himself in questions of state policy. As Bolin let Feuerbach understand, in his research he aimed at the presentation of the actual progress of rights and democracy. The goal of the research "was to show that facts come before philosophical thinking and, therefore, the former shape the latter, as for example conditions of climate and soil shape vegetation." (April 1870). Bolin had connected historical and philosophical research tightly to each other.

According to Bolin, it is possible to detect in the modern era's ideas on the state "two phases of one and the same development". The main

²⁰⁷ Bolin (1871-72). See also Manninen and Uusitalo (1979), Manninen (1996), Uusitalo (1996). Another author in the same period with radical ideas about political philosophy was J. J. F. Perander (cf. Chapter 2.9). Unlike Bolin, Perander was a Fennoman who admired the *Kalevala*, the Finnish novelist Aleksis Kivi and Finnish theatre.

phase, which was presented in the first part of Bolin's research, stretches from Niccolò Machiavelli to Baruch Spinoza and examined political life "from the perspective of power and strength". Bolin paid special attention to Machiavelli's scientific approach to politics, which paved the way for the development of nation states. In the second part Bolin justifies the world-historical importance of England's Glorious Revolution and its role as an example. In Bolin's view this revolution, too, had been prefigured by doctrines that promoted nations' rights to self-determination and had roots that reached Machiavelli's era. The principle of power and strength did not mean that the people would have been unable to affect the course of events. The doctrine of self-determination merely defines the perspective differently and is thus a kind of "reverse Machiavellianism": according to it, power and strength guarantee that the prince cannot misuse power; the doctrine even tries to justify the murder of the prince.

In Bolin's view, the proper breakthrough of a new way of thinking about the state was signified by the writings of John Milton, Algernon Sidney and John Locke. In the thinking of all three, as Bolin emphasises, the highest state power remains in the hands of the people. They were the source of the new European development that extended all the way from the French revolution (Montesquieu's division of power, Rousseau's social contract), with reflections in Kant, Fichte and Hegel, to the recent history of Humboldt and political theory and whose goal is to examine political life from "the perspective of justice and freedom".

The young Humboldt's *Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen*, which was initially censored and only published in 1851, was a particular target of Bolin's attention. Humboldt's 1819 *Denkschrift über Preussens ständische Verfassung* also received recognition from Bolin. "Humboldt had understood and tried to make clear that only the radical rejection of autocracy can mean a true blessing for the nation", Bolin thought. Probably he was also thinking about Finland's conditions at the time, even though he does not say a single word about them. To Bolin, the essence of his era's political beliefs was that the people were to be allowed to see to their state matters independently. This had also been the view that Humboldt defended. The book ends with remarks on Mill's, Laboulaye's and Spencer's liberal theories.

Bolin had hardly had time to finish his work on state policy when his difficulties increased further. After the loss of the professor's chair, he experienced another heavy blow: he lost Feuerbach. To Bolin, the death of Feuerbach in September 1872 meant the loss of a source of philosophical inspiration for almost fifteen years. In 1867 he had met Feuerbach

for the last time in Konrad Deubler's home in Bad Goisern. There they discussed a shared plan that, based on their correspondence, concerned a joint presentation on Feuerbach's life and work. Later, the manuscripts of Feuerbach's estate were found to contain parts of a character study that he himself had written and which Bolin used almost a quarter of a century later when he published Feuerbach's biography *Ludwig Feuerbach. Sein Wirken und seine Zeitgenossen*.²⁰⁸

Bolin's last letter to Feuerbach was dated 15 May 1871. In his letters Feuerbach seemed mentally vibrant to the last. Even in the beginning of 1870 he had drawn Bolin's attention to the American women's movement and its justified demands. Bolin did not visit Feuerbach near the end of the philosopher's life. He did not want to travel to Germany because according to him – as he wrote in his letter on 15 May 1871 – there “blood and rotteness still smell far too much.”

Yet Bolin was not through with Feuerbach. “...carry out what you know and think, let your secret fondness – not for my person but for the cause I represent – grow public, honest, fruitful, create new things”, Feuerbach wrote to Bolin in his letter on 15 February 1862. As paralysing as the influence of Feuerbach's death initially was on Bolin, he still had to execute Feuerbach's will.

At first Bolin experienced a deep spiritual crisis. Disappointments and the abrupt change in his life were also reflected in the paralysis of his actual philosophical output. Bolin's path began to fork and, when its philosophical branch had lost its strength, above all his literary side began to strengthen and brought out the “theatre man” (Jodl) in him. Until his death he would lead an internally broken and conflicted life. Days were spent at the library, which to him mostly meant “slave labour”; during evenings and in his free time he devoted himself to his actual inclinations, especially literature and theatre.

He worked as a reporter for *Finsk Tidskrift*, a magazine for which he also wrote numerous reviews. He still worked as a translator and a dramatist for Helsinki's Swedish Theatre. He had one foot firmly in the library of the University of Helsinki: as its head he could form many socially and scientifically significant connections and, additionally, at his work he could freely use books of such importance that his colleagues could only dream of them. His other foot cautiously approached Europe and especially Germany: he arranged his long summer holidays so that it would be possible for him to visit his actual spiritual homeland to revive his strength.

²⁰⁸ Bolin (1891).

Bolin's literary efforts have only been examined in part, but we may dare to claim that he has not received the position he deserves in the history of Finnish-Swedish literature. A significant indication of his immersion in literature are his studies in the annual *Jahrbuch der deutschen Shakespeare-Gesellschaft*. But Bolin was not only a connoisseur of German and Swedish literature; his reviews, whose topics came from many directions, prove that the multilingual librarian had become familiar with the literature of the whole of Europe. He seized almost everything that had the feel of high-quality classical literature. Bolin's collection of valuable books had another thread tied to it: he was especially interested in how classics might be adapted to enable, through a kind of detour, the inclusion of the history of ideas and criticism of religion and culture. It was fitting that alongside Shakespeare his work came to include two other leading stars of European world literature who clearly pointed to the future: Paul Heyse and Ludwig Anzengruber. Bolin's contacts led to a large correspondence with both.

In her thorough introduction to the recently edited correspondence of Bolin and Heyse, Susanne Frejborg shows how Bolin initially observed that there were hidden signs in Heyse of a folksy Feuerbachianism that had remained in the background.²⁰⁹ To Bolin, this seems to have been a promise of "duality" and "the happiness brought by the free relationship of like-minded people". Bolin began the correspondence by sending a copy of his small 1877 study on Feuerbach, which was a critical assessment of those works of Feuerbach that had been published by Karl Grün. An affinity that was based purely on literature connected the "theatre man" Bolin to the "playwright" Heyse. Yet the fact that Bolin himself quite clearly considered a theatre career in order to get out of the library-dungeon makes his relationship with Heyse especially charged.

This relationship, too, should not be seen only from the perspective of Heyse. Heyse himself suffered from the fact that he was not considered a real playwright. The constant accusations that his plays had only been written "on a writing desk" and "for a writing desk" were hard for him but, apparently, they were also justified. Bolin, who knew theatre work from the inside, also saw his weak spots and sought to help by all means possible.

Yet the friendship of Bolin and Heyse did not develop into a truly successful relationship. Heyse, who was widely celebrated,²¹⁰ at first did

²⁰⁹ Freijborg (1992).

²¹⁰ Heyse received the Nobel prize in literature in 1910.

not know how to responds to his forthright admirer who lived “far in the North” when Bolin quite openly asked to be near the genius at work. The prince of poetry learned too late to understand and take seriously the real qualities of the companion who was dismissive of his own abilities. And especially the thoughts of the “philosopher” Bolin only truly dawned on him in 1904: “I could not conceive as your starting point anything other than philology.”

By contrast, the relationship of Bolin and Ludwig Anzengruber was different, more successful. This much later acquaintance with the star of Austrian theatre who was critical of religion has been researched more extensively. Already in 1901, Anton Bettelheim published the letters Anzengruber had addressed to the friend and admirer who lived in the distant North and commented thoroughly on them. Georg Gimpl recently published extracts from Bolin’s letters to Anzengruber. Juha Manninen, in turn, has examined this correspondence, which took place during the Austrian late Enlightenment, for the first time from the Finnish perspective.²¹¹ The most notable fact of the correspondence must be Bolin’s activity as Anzengruber’s secret patron in the finishing and adaptation phase of Anzengruber’s *Schandfleck*. Without revealing his identity, Bolin gave the reward he received for his translations of Shakespeare – this was a notable amount of money – to Anzengruber, who was in great distress.

Bolin also brought Anzengruber’s plays to Finland and Sweden. To Bolin’s great annoyance, an incident took place at the time that is a blatant example of the battle of language and culture that was taking place in Helsinki. Kaarlo Bergbom, Bolin’s great counterpart from the Finnish National Theatre that was then in the process of being born, had managed to bring Anzengruber to Finland even before him. One can practically feel how deeply shocked Bolin was when he got to hear about this: “First a few words on the person whose intention is to translate two of your plays into ‘the language of this county’. I in no way wish to deny you this honour, but because you are too good for this masquerade, which is being carried out here in the manner of your own ‘nations of dozens’, it makes me angry that you are drawn into something like this that you cannot very easily prevent. This fellow of ours, who I find a horrendously repulsive person, is a rogue like masters Riegen and company over there – which you surely guessed based on his name. His main hobby is an opera fraud in the Finnish language and he wants to pretend to ‘the world’ that this nationalism trash has its roots around here. At the same time, *prin-*

²¹¹ See Gimpl (1986), 48-70, 71-85.

cipiis causa, a single national company is maintained that travels across the country – and is doing as poorly as possible here in the capital of the country. Thus, your works are being presented in a most terrible form.... But this thing made me angry for another reason as well, especially when you yourself mentioned it: namely, that the nations of culture have done nothing for you. In devastation I beat my breast and add: it would be my task to rush to your aid.”

And Bolin did this. He set out to fix the situation at such speed and with such eagerness that he was able to cleanse the stain of his shame. Anzengruber's *Der ledige Hof* had already been presented in Stockholm as Bolin's dramatisation in 1883, but it only found mediocre success. The close collaboration ended after another play. Together with the writer, Bolin had created a German stage version of Anzengruber's *Der Einsam*; later, he also translated it into Swedish, yet due to censorship it was not possible to present it on German stages after all. But this “interlude” by Bolin had nonetheless led to Anzengruber himself later being inspired to adapt into a new form his tale *Stahl und Stein!* In one of his latest letters, Bolin was unable to hide that he “is quite curious indeed to get to know more closely this half-brother of our *Einsam*.” (14/15 May 1887) Thus, Bolin maintained intense relationships with most South German writers who favoured the theatre and became their friend on many different levels.

Bolin's theatre era and the middle phase of his life came to a climax with his rather unlucky task as the leader of Helsinki's Swedish Theatre in 1884-87. As Susanne Frejborg shows, Bolin was deathly serious about this work and even had to pay for it. Above all, he had two goals: to fight “the day's quirks of taste” and to raise the repertoire to a European level. He also wanted to have a Finnish company because he felt that actors who had come from Sweden had been too controlling there. He created scripts and translated Shakespeare, Heyse and Anzengruber. He also supported and financed their theatrical offspring. Anton Franck, Antinous in Heyse's play *Hadrian* and the lead in Anzengruber's *Einsam*, was among the actors openly favoured by Bolin. At least in the case of Franck, Bolin's expectations were met. Franck himself was the head of the Swedish Theatre in 1894-98 and 1905-09.

Yet Bolin was hostile to the founding of an actual Finnish national theatre in the spirit of the small nations, *Dutzendnationchen*, and saw Kaarlo Bergbom's efforts only as a “betrayal of culture”. Thus, the political spirit of this time left him untouched. And he did not truly even notice that by keeping strictly to a post-classical repertoire and criticising naturalism, “operetta fraud” and “Wagner-trash”, he unwillingly drove himself into ever greater isolation.

New European Contacts

In Bolin's life the theatre phase seemed a season of death for philosophy, yet his first love had not utterly burned out. Some individual reviews, for example in *Gegenwart*, show that he had constantly observed the development of Germany's philosophy and cultural politics. Initially, his perspective remained limited. His purpose was again to complement the armoury of the old "headquarters of Enlightenment": this included Spinoza at the top, then Voltaire, Rousseau, Kant and Spencer, and after them the small group of the kindred spirits of his era: B. von Carneri, J. St. Mill, F. Jodl. Bolin also recruited the pessimist Schopenhauer and nihilist Nietzsche, in the sense that he did not oppose them directly. Of course, he considered all Feuerbachians. In addition to criticism of the previously mentioned estate of Feuerbach that Karl Grün had published, in 1876 he examined Julius Duboc's *Leben ohne Gott* and two years later his other work, *Reben und Ranken*. A widespread correspondence with this author, as with Albrecht Rau, was among the bounty of his literary journeys. Bolin did later destroy Duboc's letters, but his correspondence with Rau illustrates both the underground stream of a kind of Feuerbachianism in Germany and Bolin's persistent networking.

In 1884 he managed to catch a particularly big quarry. The librarian had heard about a doctoral dissertation on Feuerbach that had come out in Danish from the University of Copenhagen in 1883. He contacted its young author, Carl Nicolai Starcke, and encouraged him to translate his work into German. At first Starcke refused and turned the matter upside down: "It would be my greatest hope to one day be able to see a book on Feuerbach by you. I am convinced that then it would be completely unnecessary to translate my little work."

But Bolin did not give up. The translation of Starcke's book was published in 1884 and received recognition from Bolin. He wrote about the work and saw it as an attempt to present "Feuerbach's philosophy for the first time in its entirety" and "in relation to Kant".²¹² Starcke's translation had nonetheless begun another movement in the history of the influence of Feuerbach's philosophy, which had an unpredictable historical consequence: Friedrich Engels's study *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*. It had originally been published in 1888 in *Neue Zeit* and two years later as its own pamphlet. It was the German translation of Starcke's theory that had given Engels the push

²¹² Bolin (1885).

to study Feuerbach more closely, and in Engels's work the fundamental question of philosophy had for the first time been framed from a Marxist perspective while using theoretical generalisations. The irony can be seen here: although Bolin was not able to comprehend Engels's way of seeing Feuerbach, he had nonetheless indirectly acted as Engels' midwife and thus – by setting out on what was initially a detour – had been able to repay his debt to his master.

In this sense, Denmark was Bolin's link as he appeared in Europe for the first time as a philosopher. Yet Austria was to become the actual base of support from where he set out on his numerous philosophical journeys to the terrain of German Enlightenment, liberalism, literature and philosophy. He made his journeys from the periphery. Bolin's philosophical connections stretched backwards in time to Bad Goisern, to the circle that had been born around the freethinker, restaurateur and baker Konrad Deubler.

Deubler had supported the revolutionary activity of 1848. As an atheist and revolutionary republican, he had endured a prison sentence of seven years. Even though he acted far more cautiously in his "Feuerbach-mansion" in Primesberg after his release, the considerably freer atmosphere of contemporary Austria provided support for his activity. His house soon became a gathering place for summer guests who represented freethinking, and there the fading strands of Josephinism began to revive. Deubler's address book included everything that had the even the slightest sound of Enlightenment: Feuerbachians and materialists, socialists, liberals and republicans, freethinkers and Darwinists...

Bartholomäus von Carneri was one of these people.²¹³ Bolin sent to him – as he did to many others – his criticism of Grün, and he did not choose his target by accident. In his scientific work, Carneri addressed above all the significance of Charles Darwin to the modern worldview and sought to explain the difficult relationship of ethics and Darwinism. He had already addressed this topic in *Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus. Drei Bücher Ethik* (1870). Carneri's book *Der Mensch als Selbstzweck, eine positive Kritik des Unbewussten* (1877) was also precisely along Bolin's lines.

Their philosophical starting points were different, however, especially since Carneri considered his starting point to be Hegel, who even Bolin could not banish from his thinking. Despite this difference, Carneri and Bolin were close to each other in their interest in two thinkers, and these two were the central topic of their philosophical discussions.

²¹³ For Carnieri, see Sieber (1912).

Bolin found a sympathetic conversation partner in Carneri when the topic was Spinoza. Carneri encouraged him to write on Spinoza and this did lead to results: in 1894 Bolin published *Spinoza. Ein Kultur- und Lebensbild*, which was dedicated, in keeping with Friedrich Jodl's suggestion, to "Bartholomäus Carneri, the loyal defender of a united, ideal worldview". The work would not have been born without the first push given by Carneri.

Bolin's encouraging support of Carneri also produced results. Feuerbach, the other central topic of their exchange of ideas, soon became a permanent intellectual feature of Carneri. He had read Feuerbach for the first time when he was too young; now he practically devoured him. In Carneri's late publications, such as the 1886 essay collection *Entwicklung und Glückseligkeit*, Feuerbach's influence was apparent from the titles onwards. Carneri's most popular work, *Der moderne Mensch* (1891), is especially stamped with Feuerbach's way of thinking, which had been passed on to him by Bolin. When he reviewed this book in 1894, Bolin drew attention precisely to this fact: "Life and happiness are one and the same thing", Bolin reminded the reader. Carneri's ethics did not aim at an individualism that cared for nothing. "From the perspective of 'I' we must move to the equality of 'you'," as Bolin states in his review. "On the other hand, it is fully justified to seek a happiness in which 'I' finds in 'you' its natural extension and in 'us' the fulfilment necessary to us. This is defined by the especially important observation that what is also useful to the other is even more useful to the self and, similarly, the common good is the most useful of all to the self."

Ego and Alter Ego: Jodl and Bolin

However, Carneri was not Bolin's last or most important philosophical find from the intellectual field of Austria-Hungary at the end of the century. "Because there was a mutual understanding between us on the most important questions of life, this man quite simply attacked my heart from these basic premises. He had quite obviously decided to conquer it. And in this relationship, I would have had to have been spoiled in another way than I am in order to even attempt in any way to resist such efforts. He has the very greatest personal cordiality and quite without intending to do so he awakens trust in another by being himself worthy of trust in every way." Friedrich Jodl (1849-1914) wrote thus in his diary after he met



Friedrich Jodl (1849-1914).

Wilhelm Bolin on his first visit in the summer of 1890.²¹⁴ Later, the visits became annual.

Bolin was then writing his own monograph on Feuerbach, inspired by Starcke, in which he sought to create as complete a picture as possible of the history of the influence of Feuerbach's thought. Carneri had advised him to draw attention in his work to the second part of Jodl's recently published *Geschichte der Ethik* (1889). In this work, Jodl had dedicated one of the most important chapters to Feuerbach, "ein capitales Kapitel", as he himself wrote to his friend Carl von Amira. He showed his respect to Feuerbach as the "spiritual father of German positivism". "Only a thinker who supports a speculative and half-theological perspective, an opponent of Feuerbach's positivism and anthropologism who is simultaneously a secret defender of Hegel, is able to misunderstand the fact that in addition to a criticism aimed at Kant, Schelling, Hegel and idealism in general, Feuerbach developed a way of thinking that offers a message for solving many of our day's bitter problems."²¹⁵

Bolin was excited beyond measure. Someone had at last truly understood the meaning of Feuerbach. Bolin's eagerness must have flattered the young Jodl. Exiled to the "dungeon" of Prague, as he conceived of his hideaway in the local German University, he was in sore need of such encouragement.

At first, Jodl rejected the "name tag of Feuerbachianism", not only for the reason that he was open to many intellectual influences but also

²¹⁴ See M. Jodl (1920), 136.

²¹⁵ Jodl (1906), vol. 2, 256.

because an admission of such a tendency would still have been too dangerous at the time. After all, he was a professor of philosophy. Presenting oneself as a supporter of “reality philosophy” would have meant suicide, as he openly confessed to Bolin.

But Bolin did not give up. Gradually Feuerbach, through Bolin, received a still greater foothold in Jodl’s home and thoughts; Bolin always found new ways to influence Jodl’s thinking. The bust of Feuerbach, his collected works and related literature soon travelled as donations from Finland to Prague. There was quite a cult of Feuerbach, which even acquired pathetic tones. Their letters revolved around this one topic, especially now that Jodl was in turn encouraging Bolin to finish writing his monograph on Feuerbach.²¹⁶ So the book was published: *Ludwig Feuerbach. Sein Wirken und seine Zeitgenossen. Mit Benützung ungedruckten Materials dargestellt.*²¹⁷ Jodl wrote pertinently about it and Nicolai Starcke also expressed his satisfaction. He was especially fond of the part “where you present the important thesis that it is not about an isolated ‘I’ but ‘I’ and ‘you’, or the individual, who is not an isolated creature but one who lives in the community and requires the community”.

Feuerbach was not their only shared topic of interest. When Georg von Gizycki, together with Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster Senior and Friedrich Jodl, founded the Berlin Ethical Society and thus began the German promotion of the ethical movement from the US and England, Bolin was fully involved in the matter. He was of help in many ways: he wrote reviews, acted as an intermediary, created networks of connections. He did all this for his friend as well. Bolin had time and he was also free enough to say what had to be said. Jodl also worked for the cause and was soon in a leading position as a thinker on this issue. Yet he did not discount the other important qualities of his friend. The kind of philosophy that had determinedly made it its task to come down from the lectern and become popular in the best sense of the word – that thus wanted to be philosophy also meant for the people – required exactly the kinds of qualities that Bolin had.

It would, therefore, be utterly wrong to criticise the already elderly Bolin’s literary output only from a perspective of academic hair-splitting. His activity for Enlightenment was characterised particularly by the popularisation and adaptation of works. Bolin’s 1884 *Spinoza. Ein Kultur- und Lebensbild* is a good example of the mission of providing information

²¹⁶ For Jodl’s briefs to Bolin, see Gimpl (1990).

²¹⁷ Bolin (1891).

that he established for his literary activity. In addition to large works, he wrote numerous small essays, reviews and comments in which he addressed, among others, Spinoza, Lessing, Herwegh and David Friedrich Strauss. In addition to these, writings that dealt with the works of Bolin's contemporaries (above all Jodl, but also Starcke, Carneri, Riehl, Rau and G. von Gizycki) reinforced the armoury of the "headquarters of Enlightenment" that had been founded in Germany.

The motives of Bolin's writings drew on Feuerbach's philosophy in particular and their paths and starting points are rooted in Bolin's academic heyday – as well as in his Swedish-language publications, which German research has not yet become familiar with. All these writings by Bolin also demonstrate the intersection of his and Jodl's mutual interests and form the core of the work of both men: "You are right: the further astray the world goes from its proper path to Mr. Elohim's realm, the greater the cause for the wise person to secure with his thoughts a place of shelter and forge one's weapons there or least protect them from rusting, so that later generations can use them to carry out the ideas of the 18th century even more thoroughly."²¹⁸

The significance of connections and helpers should not be underestimated because it was precisely at this time that philosophy began in many ways to assume social responsibility and embrace new forms of communication in a world that was visibly growing smaller. Unions, alliances, cartels and societies; movements and parties, petitions and protests, congresses and meetings were undergoing their incredible rise. The social conditions of scientific research had changed fundamentally, and these networks saw those conditions realised. They also reflected philosophy's identity crisis and need to reshape and reform its identity.

Jodl did not underestimate Bolin's expert aid. He gladly received the literary advice and the aid with reading that were offered by his helpful friend – once, for example, he allowed the literature catalogue of his *Lehrbuch der Psychologie* to be supplemented by hand from Helsinki.

It was precisely in their shared battle against the rise of the "Slavism" that both so hated that these two brothers-in-arms of Enlightenment and "culture" discovered each other; the German-Swedish Bolin was influential in Helsinki during Russia's rule over Finland and Jodl, a representative of the German state, in the Bohemian Prague of the "Czech-Hungarian fatherland" (Grillpartzer), as well as among German Austrians in Vienna.

²¹⁸ 12 January 1899. Gimpl (1990), 193.

Bolin's complaints about "the invasion by Asia Minor" of "half-Asian" Finland and his fear of "being thrown from the Europe that seeks to move forward back to the darkest Orient" were not falling on deaf ears in Jodl's case: "when I read your last letter, in which you described Asia Minor, I received a stab in my heart. What does all the effort matter when there is no ocean to be placed between the nest of barbarity and our culture, and when the disturbers of peace from among the immediate neighbours of this barbarian (Emperor) again and again receive the power to riot in civilised Europe, as for example the Slavs of Austria."²¹⁹ In this sense, the capital of Czechism in Austria, where linguistic, academic and national conflicts were brewing, offered enough lessons from observation: "You may be certain that I feel most deeply for all that you say about the public conditions in Finland. Ever since I have myself been on the front lines against Slavism and have known you personally, I have followed these issues with much greater interest. Who knows what would happen to us if Czechism were to one day receive the advantage here. I have always felt instinctive aversion towards the essence of Slavism and Slavic literature; ever since I have been here, I also know why."²²⁰

Jodl, of course, supported from Vienna the petition *Pro Finlandia* against the Russification of Finland that was delivered to the Emperor of Russia, though he did not attach overly great expectations to it: "The moral scolding of the Emperor provided me with great joy, which compensated to some degree for the time I spent on it. Also, the Finnish woman who is very close to me... who was involved in the matter here, Mrs. M, the wife of a Helsinki docent, whose eyes shine so for her unfortunate fatherland and who can start looking so angry when she speaks of Russia that no one can resist her.... Actually, I think that it would have been wiser to send her to deliver documents to the Emperor than... Nordenskiöld and Nansen."

The ideal friends had thus found each other, and quite understandably they sometimes addressed each other in their letters as *ego* and *alter ego*. In the letter dated 24 June 1906, the words Jodl addressed to his friend truly came straight from the heart: "allow me... to thank you for your warm friendliness, which you have shown me since the completion of my work's part II. It has meant equally much to me personally as well as with regard to the issue. I have never lacked the company of pleasant, well-meaning people; yet even more so that of those who truly

²¹⁹ 24/25 June 1892. Gimpl (1990), 124-125.

²²⁰ 10 February 1891. Gimpl (1990), 105-106.

understand my life's mission and who have taken their own as seriously. Your correspondence has been to me, since the start, a gift of fate as unexpected as it is precious, and only with your help have I truly grown close to him (Feuerbach) who stands in the midst of our time's murky, billowing waves like a lighthouse in the midst of a stormy sea. The aims of the present day hint at a different direction: thus, when one is rooted for good, it is to be hoped for and pleasant that you know another on whom you can lean."²²¹

The friendship arrived at a new phase in 1896 when Jodl was invited to Vienna to become Robert Zimmermann's successor. Jodl's path had been smoothed by *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, which had first been conceived as a demonstration of learning and as instrumental in nature but later developed into "a work of great quality". His disagreements with the ethical movement, where the drift towards socialism had led to internal arguments, also influenced the matter.

Jodl was thus successful, but Bolin's opportunities for influence also increased with Jodl's career. Was it now possible at last to fight for Feuerbach, Bolin's old friend and master, in Germany as well? Bolin truly seemed to be nurturing thoughts of this kind. When would "reality philosophy" become reality if not right now! Although Jodl's time was initially taken up by the massively increased workload of his academic career in Vienna, it did not take long before he was reminded of the centenary of Feuerbach's birth. Jodl had plenty of work, but his monograph on Feuerbach came out, appropriately, in 1904 "like the sound of doom among the blacks (Christian-Socialist party)".²²² Jodl's delight after the completion of the work revealed how great his debt to Feuerbach was: "How closely my thoughts are related to old Feuerbach, how much over the years, since the first meeting, has grown in me that I only notice now when I have begun to systematically classify all the peerlessly rich material. This is an entire system that old Feuerbach had brought together in his head; a real programme for all that is today called scientific philosophy. I have the feeling, as I write this down, as though I were writing my own philosophical last will; what an incredibly calming thought. Even if I never had the time to sketch out my own worldview, it would already exist in its main features and perfectly in Feuerbach." Bolin had influenced in an essential manner Jodl's arrival at this direct confession.

²²¹ Gimpl (1990), 258.

²²² 11 June 1903. Gimpl (1990), 228.

Soon the plan of plans to overshadow all other Feuerbachians was formed: the idea of republishing the collected works of the “almighty” in honour of Feuerbach’s centenary, edited by “Jodl und Bolin in Comp.”²²³ What could have been a better seal on and crowning glory for their friendship? “I am extremely thrilled with this cooperation,” Jodl wrote with emotion, “although most of the work will in every way fall to you. It will tell the wide world about the uniformity of our ways of thinking even in the smallest details, which, when we meet, overcomes us with happiness, double happiness because we meet so rarely”.²²⁴ Bolin slowly entangled his friend in this giant project, which occasionally wreaked quite a bit of havoc on Jodl’s schedule.

It would be unreasonable and entirely contrary to the perspective of the time to blame this project for the fact that it did not become an actual critical edition. It had not been conceived as such and this would not even have been possible. The translation of Feuerbach’s doctoral dissertation, which opened it up to wider circles, and especially the cheap edition of *Das Wesen des Christentums* show by their example that the purpose of collected works was also to popularise Feuerbach in the Germany “encircled by the wall of China” (20 January 1890), as the country was still not ready to receive his philosophy. And Grün’s old edition was still not nearly sold out – how could a critical edition have found a publisher or enough buyers in this situation? It soon turned out that even for this edition there were money problems from the start. Cotta was initially afraid to get involved, Hauff also had doubts. “He will not quickly achieve very great sales with the almighty. Just think about our ever more illiberal and intellectually rusty time.” (13 April 1899) Frommann – in Jodl’s eyes, absolutely a realist – only had the courage to become one of the patrons. Bolin, on the other hand, ultimately made the publication of this edition of Feuerbach possible by paying the required security deposit as a secret patron.

In the concrete work phase of the edition itself, the university librarian proved himself to be its spiritus motor, which was no small show of strength for a sixty-four-year-old. The first part was released in 1903 and in 1911, when Bolin was seventy-six, the work was complete. Parts V, VI, VII, VIII and IX were his work, but Bolin also did much of the preparatory and routine work that was officially under Jodl’s name. The collected works were preceded by two publications of letters, *Ausgewählte*

²²³ 25 November 1897. Gimpl (1990), 184.

²²⁴ 27 June 1899. Gimpl (1990), 195.

Briefe von un an Ludwig Feuerbach. Zum Sekulargedächtnis seiner Geburt in 1904.²²⁵ In addition to this, Bolin published other works: *Pierre Bayle* (1905), the translation of David Hume's *Anfänge und Entwicklung der Religion* (1909), *Ewiges Leben. Hauptinhalt der Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit* (1912), not to mention smaller literary works. Bolin's labour is worthy of admiration.

Jodl gave full recognition to his friend's work. After the final part was completed, he was happy from the bottom of his heart: "You have apparently already made a money order for part X to our friend Maas. However, now I cannot conclude my letter without congratulating you most heartily on the completion of this monumental work, for which you have made such great sacrifices. I would yet like to add that I am extremely proud to have been able to be of a little help to you in the making of this work. Our people, to whom you have always had such strong intellectual ties, will feel lasting gratitude to you, and the thanks for this valuable gift which you have given to Germans and their intellectual liberation will be redeemed, if not now then surely later, and it will be done by future generations."²²⁶

Yet one cannot avoid sensing a sigh of relief when the work was complete. After all, Jodl had already once been afraid that old Bolin would die in the middle of it. Now Feuerbach had been secured and Bolin was content. His path in life was badly fractured and stretched out in many directions. In the end, it had nonetheless received a handsome crown. Yet it would be wrong to think that Bolin had now had enough of everything.

One more time a mutual project tied the friends together. It prepared the path for Enlightenment in Germany and sealed their friendship even beyond death. This was the Academy of Free Thought, Akademie des Freien Gedankens. The idea of founding this kind of educational institution, independent of the state, had apparently already begun to grow in Berlin in the orbit of the ethical movement, as Friedrich Wilhelm Forster had already been planning an Academy of Ethics. The actual plan only got moving when Arthur Pfungst, a Frankfurt industrialist and the author and editor of *Das Freie Wort* and *Neuer Frankfurter Verlag*, gave a significant amount of his inheritance to its use. Jodl also influenced the matter. He had gotten involved purely by chance: Jodl often appeared as a keynote speaker for the ethical movement and in this context he had become acquainted with Pfungst, who specifically wanted to have Jodl involved in the academy project.

²²⁵ Bolin (1904).

²²⁶ 7 July 1911. Gimpl (1990), 291.

But how had Bolin gotten involved? Through Jodl, naturally. Russia had experienced unrest during the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, as a result of which Bolin had planned to give his inheritance to the underground movement in Russia. He had told Jodl about this plan of his. Only Bolin did not know how he might be able to create the necessary contacts there. When Bolin suddenly became gravely ill and it seemed to Jodl that he would not have long to live, Jodl remembered his own idea and was not shy to tell his friend about it. After all, Bolin had once before wanted to join his “name for eternity to the history of the ethical movement in the form of a noble last will.”²²⁷

“Dr. Pfungst told me in confidence on his last visit to Frankfurt that after his mother’s death it is his intention to use most of the apparently quite large inheritance that will come to him and his sister on founding the Academy of Free Thought, which would be a company with limited charges. He even asked me whether in this case I would be interested in retiring from the Austrian professorship and becoming the head of the academy. I find it self-evident that, considering the pressure bureaucrats place on universities, the founding of this kind of institution would be a blessing, not just in the religious sense but also with regard to political science. Consider, what if you could see to it in advance that your estate would also end up in this same stream of funds? For now, all this is, of course, still only a dream; yet perhaps it would already be possible to make the matter tangible at this point. If the idea happens to please you, I would gladly be prepared to contact Pfungst and arrange the matter.”²²⁸

There was no need to ask twice, although paying out Bolin’s inheritance money at first proved more difficult than Jodl had imagined. In the end, this brought 80 000 marks to Frankfurt – and there they would be held until they would be used for “a real necessity”.

Yet things turned out differently. The University of Frankfurt, which was founded instead of the Academy of Free Thought, “according to the proposal of the Frankfurt city council was finally imagined as a state university”;²²⁹ it was indeed founded in 1914, although the final decision was only made in 1918. Pfungst died late in the autumn of 1912 and Jodl in January 1914 – old Bolin lived a full decade longer.

There is no clear information about the fate of the money. Margarete Jodl had apparently either kept for herself or destroyed all letters related

²²⁷ 7 September 1895. Gimpl (1990), 161.

²²⁸ 12 February 1905. Gimpl (1990), 243-244.

²²⁹ 29 March 1912. Gimpl (1990), 296.

to financial matters, but two letters of the Pfungst siblings, which are kept in the library of the University of Helsinki, nonetheless shed light on the matter. According to them, the sum in question was found in Pfungst's estate and Bolin, so that inheritance tax officials would not be able to get their hands on it, had to go retrieve his money. This is apparently what he did, after which he presumably transferred all his money to Vienna. Jodl was nonetheless able to confirm the arrival of the "Frankfurt deposit" in Vienna (1913) and his last letters show that he had handled these bonds.

Perhaps further research will show where the money finally ended up. It is at least known for certain that Jodl's wife was involved in the matter. According to the correspondence, money was nonetheless transferred to her "in case of one's own death", and one exuberant letter from Jodl shows that Bolin had also agreed to his friend's "condition in favour of my widow".²³⁰ "As a result of this genuine and honest show of friendship you may allow me to once more thank you with a handshake in my mind."²³¹ Definitive information is also available from the correspondence of Wilhelm Bolin, Margarete Jodl and Wilhelm Börner. According to it, it appears likely that Bolin's money was used, among other things, to publish Jodl's literary estate. One letter that Margarete Jodl addressed to Bolin describes this kind of aid when Börner, experiencing difficulties during the First World War, asked her for an equivalent loan.

It also seems certain that Margarete Jodl was allowed to keep the interest from part of the capital because for reasons of principle she was not able to make use of Bolin's offer and keep "the other", "large part" of the interest for herself. But it is likely that Bolin also gave money for saving Jodl's library; in keeping with Jodl's own wish, his wife should have sold it to secure her own financial situation.

Bolin died poor, and if his money was not devoured by inflation, considering his patronage activity he likely gave it away.

As a result of the First World War, Bolin's life grew quiet. After his forty-year career as a librarian he finally retired in 1912. His tenure was not particularly significant to the library – of course, this weak link should not be left without a mention. Rumours said that he hated books because they were difficult to file.

During the war, Bolin's wide network of European connections broke down for five years. He did try to get some signs of life from Europe through Sweden. Bolin, a person who had fought for humanity and En-

²³⁰ 16 June 1905. Gimpl (1990), 248.

²³¹ 9 August 1906. Gimpl (1990), 260.

lightenment his whole life, found the war traumatic and during it he sided fully with the Allies.

Bolin seems to have wished fervently for the total collapse of Wilhelmine Germany. He had great respect for German culture and in his opinion the Prussian military regime had betrayed Germany's great intellectual heritage. "Horrible selfishness has become a greater threat to culture than the troubles caused by nature. We have had to endure conditions that are comparable to Walpurgis Night, the Thirty Years' War, the intrigues of the Holy Alliance and the whims of both Napoleons. Their ingratiating and hypocritical calmness made many people lose their sleep. So, the homeland of Goethe and its intellectual ideals were profaned in a manner that will always be a reminder of those who committed the acts", he wrote to Margarete Jodl on 10 October 1919 as he commented on past events.

He felt deeply aggrieved and disappointed by the treatment of some relatives from St. Petersburg who had at one time been quite pro-German: they had had bitter experiences when they were travelling through Germany as war broke out and were driven from the country as though they were Russian spies. Bolin demanded that belligerent Germany should be held accountable: "It was not enough for this band of robbers that Germany had the position of respect in Europe that it had deserved; Prussia wanted to rule all Europe as it ruled the rest of Germany and Austria.... That is why I hope with all my heart that Germany will be cleared of Prussians and Prussia itself of Hohenzollerns with all their aggressions." (30 July 1920)

This is why he showed no sympathy for the political dreams of White Finland. He had a totally realistic view of the meaning of German forces for Finland: "The admirers of success who care for nothing else are thrilled with this too, and they do not understand what luck our country had when Prussian forces left from here. If the 'helpers' who had been called here had been allowed to stay longer, our political situation would be as questionable as during the rule of the Eastern neighbour that is now falling apart. For the future Europe, it is necessary that Prussians are made to stop their boasting", he complains to Margarete Jodl (10 October 1919).

Yet for Bolin, the worst blow may have been the breakdown of the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, especially as he felt that Austria's old monarch had been tricked. He saw the fall of this multinational state as the result of the strengthening of all national tendencies along the lines of the *Dutzendnationchen* model. He had fought against this all his life and

had considered it a reactionary development in his own country as well.

After the end of the war, Europe's political map changed utterly. New borders were drawn that influenced Bolin's own life deeply. All three empires that had previously been part of his life were wiped away. In this situation, too, Bolin's response was conflicted. As a bourgeois liberal he did not mourn the Russian Empire, but he was even less able to tolerate the Revolution that was not what had been desired. Bolin experienced one blow after another as he heard from his relatives about requisitions of their property; his correspondence with his nephew Bob is the most detailed account of these. In 1919 his letter contacts with his family broke down completely.

In the end, Bolin only had contradictory feelings for the independent Finnish nation state. What choice did this "nation" make with regard to "culture"? At least, it did not inspire Bolin to words of praise.

Of course, correspondence was revived after the war as soon as it was possible to breathe and exchange ideas. Even before the war Bolin had gotten in touch with Wilhelm Börner, who may have been the student most influenced by his teacher Jodl. Concern for Jodl's large estate gave enough cause for the rebuilding of connections. The correspondence discussed the settlement of the estate's care and administration and the publication of works related to it, as well as the writers' own plans for publication. The torch of Enlightenment had to be passed forward.

The exchange of ideas on Jodl's thoughts was a fascinating phenomenon because it did not only repeat past events. Things are seen from the perspective of their consequences and their already considerable history of influence, which can be said to be a sign of the existence of Jodl's "school". At the same time, this reveals ever more clearly the critical differences that friends had previously kept discreetly quiet about.

Especially as Bolin reviews the last chapter of Jodl's *Kritik des Idealismus* – Jodl's posthumously (1920) published "philosophical last will" – he reveals his clearly more radical approach to criticism of religion, which Börner apparently shared with him. The monograph Margarete Jodl wrote about her husband, *Friedrich Jodl. Sein Leben und Wirken* (1920), was also criticised in the correspondence of Bolin and Börner. The philosopher's wife seemed to be concerned that the reactionary spirit of mysticism was again resurfacing, but Bolin and Börner were more optimistic about the future: "in the end, there is the clear, free spirit of the 'almighty' [Feuerbach] and the 'only one' [Jodl].... I think – as you write – that mysticism is in this chaotic and sad time a very understandable phenomenon. But the victory is ours, or freedom's, reason's, humanity's!" (30 July 1922).

It was Börner who seems to have encouraged Bolin to write Jodl's biography. Börner himself had written a small monograph about his teacher in his lifetime, yet Börner's estate also included Bolin's nearly completed manuscript. Bolin was ready for a scientific fight even at the age of eighty-five. Based on a letter by Börner, Bolin seems to have seriously considered publishing a heretical "Kant-criticism". And there had already been talk of publishing Bolin's "collection of articles" in 1923. Bolin had offered his manuscript to F. A. Brockhaus – apparently, this was a work comparable to Jodl's collected articles in *Vom Lebenswege*. However, Börner suspected that the matter could not be brought to a proper conclusion "because in Germany these days printing costs hundreds of millions, an investment that no publisher will undertake at the moment or in the near future." (9 September 1923) Enquiries regarding Feuerbach's estate – Eleonore Feuerbach had turned to Bolin on this issue – and the plan, which had later fallen apart, of the founding of a Feuerbach society were among Börner and Bolin's last topics of conversation. On 1 September 1924, Börner announces that he is worried that no one has heard anything about Bolin...

Bolin's final glimpse of Europe was grim. In a card addressed to Margarete Jodl he wrote, "A dreadful feeling about Europe's miserable conditions, which keep on getting worse. The party of heroes works hard for the war to come because it has no other ideal." In his last postcard on 19 May 1924, Bolin again writes about Friedrich Jodl: "I value the independence developed by the 'only one', which he also manages to realise with overwhelming skill. Because knowledge is based precisely on self-realisation, and for this reason is not to be separated from doubt. Humanity has not been taken forward by the smug security of faith found in those people who are instantly ready to refer to their religion in order to prove reason ad absurdum. Neither did the greatly admired Kant succeed at this. Only by separation from him can progress be achieved."

Wilhelm Bolin died on 16 June 1924. He had lived far longer than the era he represented. It was the end of a history of philosophical development, at times complicated and tempestuous, that had begun when he met Feuerbach. Yet the need for Enlightenment remained.

2.9. Ways out of Hegel

J. V. Snellman's long career was a period when Hegel's influence was rising and falling in Finland. He was never a dogmatic Hegelian, as his main philosophical works contain subtle attempts to improve the master's system. In his 1842 travel report from Germany, he reminded that "there is nothing permanent under the sun". But in his comment on Schelling's failed attempt to build a system besides Hegel's, Snellman argued that the only way over Hegel goes via Hegel.²³²

In his letter to J. J. Tengström in 1844, Snellman told that French philosophy of Enlightenment, especially Rousseau, at least slightly helps "to get rid of the straightjacket of German scholasticism".²³³ But when he finally was appointed professor in 1856 at the age of fifty, he was too deeply engaged in political *via activa*, and in his lectures he confined to follow the structure of the Hegelian program with minor original contributions.

Perhaps the most promising young philosopher in the early 1840s was Robert Tengström (1823-47), professor J. J. Tengström's son and Snellman's good friend.²³⁴ He wrote his Master's thesis on Hegel's philosophy of right in 1844, and two dissertations on aesthetics in 1846: *Doctrina philosophiae Hegelinae de essentia artis pulchrae* and *De metaphysica pulchri idole*. The first of these Latin studies argued that Hegel fails to answer the question about the essence of art, and the second seeks his own logical answer. In Swedish he wrote articles and edited volumes on Finnish folklore, especially *Kalevala*. Already in 1843 he had the opportunity to follow Michelet's lectures in Berlin, and in the end of 1846 he returned there to meet young Hegelians. Tengström thought that mere academic play with words is not enough, but it is necessary to return critically to Hegel's method and to transform philosophy into practical activity within reality. With admiration of the radical Left of Strauss, Bauer, Feuerbach, and Ruge, Tengström proclaimed that philosophers should listen to the "beat of the time's own heart" and express "the unrest that moves it". This sound can be heard in the new movement of socialism. Tengström moved on May 1847 from Berlin to Paris, where Arnold Ruge and Karl Marx had edited the journal *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. He wrote from there to his father that "the spirits of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot are again on move and predict storm". Soon after

²³² SA III, 60; KT 4, 96, 237. For Snellman's critique of Hegel, see Väyrynen (1992).

²³³ SA IV, 615-616.

²³⁴ Manninen (1986a), 148-153.

that Robert Tengström died of typhus at the age of 24, a year before the revolution of 1848 in France.

The next breakaway with Hegel's political philosophy was made by Carl Immanuel Qvist (1827-95) in his doctoral dissertation in 1853. Qvist was well known as a radical liberal in student life, with the fame being a Feuerbachian materialist and atheist. In his dissertation he questioned the primacy of state in relation to societal relations between individual subjects. The state does not exist in itself but is formed to balance the outcomes of the competition between social classes.²³⁵ After the cholera epidemics in 1867 Qvist studied medicine and became the city doctor of Helsinki.

Wilhelm Bolin made personal acquaintance with Ludwig Feuerbach in 1857, and was strongly influenced by his materialism. Even though Bolin was formally Snellman's student, his liberal political philosophy distanced him clearly from Hegel. However, failing to be appointed as Snellman's successor in the chair of philosophy, Bolin served for a short period (1870-73) as an extraordinary professor of philosophy, but then made his career as the chief librarian of the university without participation in the teaching of philosophy – and without followers among Finnish philosophers.²³⁶

Outside academic philosophy, August Fredrik Soldan (1817-85) moved from left Hegelian influences to Herbart. Soldan was educated as chemist and military engineer. After spending long periods abroad (Russia, Germany, France, Sweden, United States), he returned to Finland in 1859. After the establishment of the currency *markka*, he was appointed as the first director of the Finnish mint in 1861-85. In his extensive unfinished notes on philosophy, Soldan was the first to discuss the concept of work in Finland.²³⁷ His emphasis on work as the essence of man and the precondition of freedom follows Hegel, but Soldan argued that the Snellmanian brand of Hegelianism was too narrowly oriented to *Bildung* as intellectual education. The development of industry and culture, or practice and theory, go hand in hand in mutual interaction, and work as a combination of mental and material aspect (*praxis* and *poiesis* in Aristotle's terms) should be studied by psychology and cherished morally as the "object of true glory".

Johan Julius Frithiof Perander (1838-85) was Snellman's student and Fennoman, whose doctoral dissertation *Kritisk undersökning af statsbegreppet i den hegelska filosofin* (1870) gave a critical evaluation Hegel's concept

²³⁵ Manninen (1986a), 156-158.

²³⁶ For Bolin, see Chapter 2.8.

²³⁷ Manninen (1994).

of state (though without references to Snellman).²³⁸ According to Perander, Hegel's doctrine about freedom as the essence of the state is correct, but remains abstract, since it does not understand the interaction among parties and opinions within the international and internal life among nations. Therefore Hegel in emphasizing the role of war does not understand the significance of peace. The French revolution remained a mystery for Hegel, as he did not see how it brought "the workers' self-consciousness in the world history" and thereby the old estate society was developed into the clash between work and riches. Already in 1866 Perander published in Finnish an article "Yhteiskunta uutena aikana" [Society in the new age], where he considered – via Montesquieu and Adam Smith – the revolutionary year of 1848. Unlike other Fennomans (like Thiodolf Rein), who strived for national cohesion, Perander presented here the conception of class oppositions and conflicts as the motor of societal progress. He did not refer to Karl Marx's doctrine about the contradiction between work and capital, but mentioned the anarchist philosopher Proudhon.²³⁹ In 1878 Perander wrote about Aristotle's ideal state, and in the next year – already in a softer manner – on John Stuart Mill's political philosophy. Perander also supported the Finnish National Theatre. In 1879-84 he served as an extraordinary professor of practical philosophy, but his appointment as professor of education was interrupted by untimely death in 1885.

When Snellman's favourite student Thiodolf Rein travelled to Berlin in 1865-66 (soon after Snellman had moved to the Senate), he observed that Hegel and his supporters and opponents were already regarded as "outdated celebrities", and "the ruins of old philosophical schools were split all over".²⁴⁰ This was a result of the dynamic development of philosophy, but also the rise of natural science as a challenge of speculative metaphysics. Rein was appointed 1869 as Snellman's successor as a presumed Hegelian philosopher, but soon he turned to Hermann Lotze's version idealism.²⁴¹ In his later work Rein cannot be characterized as a Hegelian anymore, even though he supported Snellman's Fennomans program and contributed to the biography of his respected teacher.

Marja Jalava has called Perander the "last Hegelian in Finland". It is true that the influential philosophers of the next generation did not have any special interest in Hegel. It is remarkable that the Neo-Hegelians in

²³⁸ Manninen (1986a), 159-163.

²³⁹ Lahtinen (2004).

²⁴⁰ Rein (1918), 207.

²⁴¹ For Rein, see Chapter 3.2.

Johan Julius Frithiof Perander
(1838-85). Helsinki University Museum.



the United States (around the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* since the 1860s) and in Great Britain (F. Bradley's absolute idealism in the 1880s) and were not known in Finland. As alternatives to Hegel's system, Rein's students Hjalmar Neiglick and Arvi Grotenfelt studied experimental psychology with Wilhelm Wundt. Neiglick was an outspoken naturalist, like his friend Edward Westermarck who leaned on British evolutionary empiricism and Westermarck's culturally radical student Rolf Lagerborg. Neo-Kantianism as a trend from the 1860s was not discussed until Grotenfelt as Rein's successor studied philosophy of history around 1905. Even pronounced anti-Hegelians, like the pessimist Arthur Schopenhauer (the world as will) in Germany, the subjectivist Søren Kierkegaard in Denmark (faith against reason), and the anti-metaphysical American pragmatists became popular and known in Finland only in the first years of the twentieth century.²⁴²

But a renaissance of historical Hegel-studies was commenced in Finland in the 1980s, when academic Marxist scholars recognized Hegel with his dialectical method as the most important teacher of Karl Marx. Parallel developments happened in many European countries, but in Finland this coincided with the revival of interest in Snellman's philosophical contributions.²⁴³

²⁴² For Kierkegaard in Finland, see Niiniluoto (2016); for William James, see Pihlström (2003).

²⁴³ See Manninen (1987a), Manninen (1996a), Pulkkinen (1989), Patoluoto (1984).

PART THREE

ENTANGLEMENT OF
PHILOSOPHY AND EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH

The first scientific society in Finland, *Societas pro Fauna et Flora Fennica*, was established in 1821 in Turku. It was followed by the Finnish Literature Society in 1831 and the Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters in 1838 – they were founded in the new capital Helsinki, where the University had moved in 1828. Also cooperation with the Academy of Science in St Petersburg increased.²⁴⁴ The Philosophical Society was founded by Professor Thiodolf Rein in 1873.

According to the German model with its scholarly spirit, research gradually became an integral part of the activities of the University, and the Faculty of Philosophy (or its Historical-Philological Section) obtained a new position as the center of the academic life and learning. This also meant that Philosophy, combined into one professorship in 1830, gained a highly respected status in Helsinki. All the chairs in this subject were closed for political reasons in Russia during the years 1852-56, but then it was reintroduced in Helsinki with a new title “ethics and the system of the sciences”, which indicates that philosophy was expected to reflect and give advice about the methods of research. Thereby the relation between the speculative a priori method of philosophy and empirical research became an acute question, with implications to the gradual separation of psychology from philosophy.

²⁴⁴ Tommila (2006) gives an outline of the research system in Finland in the 19th century.

The University in Helsinki was a center of national awakening. One of the leaders of this programme was the Hegelian philosopher Johan Vilhelm Snellman. This movement was assisted by Elias Lönnrot's (1802-84) publication of the *Kalevala*, the pioneering studies of the Finno-Ugric languages by Matthias Alexander Castrén (1813-52), the romantic and heroic poetry by Johan Ludvig Runeberg (1804-71), the aesthetics of Fredrik Cygnaeus (1807-81), the music composed by Fredrik Pacius (1809-91), and the books and stories by the historian Zachris Topelius (1818-98). In *Maamme-kirja* (Book about our Country, 1875), used in primary schools as late as in the mid-twentieth century, Topelius gave a definition of Finland – its landscape, population, and culture – in a way which has ever since been a part of its national self-identity. It was Topelius who made the famous statement that Finland, which is not rich with natural resources, has to compete with other nations by means of the prosperity of its education and civilization.

During the 19th century, history, aesthetics, and education gained an independent status with own professorships. Psychology was still considered as a part of philosophy, but it started to seek its own paths with the development of experimental psychology in the 1880s.²⁴⁵ At the turn of the century, the philosopher Edward Westermarck helped sociology to emerge as a new discipline.²⁴⁶

In the 1870s, the University accepted women as students by special permission, and the first woman, Emma Irene Åström (1847-1934), graduated in 1882 – after studies in history and philosophy. Finnish was used for the first time in a doctoral dissertation in 1858, and soon also in some lectures.

In the University, the national sciences made significant advances. The study of Finnish folklore was developed by Julius Krohn (1835-88) and his son Kaarle Krohn (1863-1933) and the study of Finnish by E.N. Setälä (1864-1935). International fields like mathematics, astronomy, geology, botanic, and physiology were able to make important progress. In 1871, C. G. Estlander (1834-1910), Professor of Aesthetics, founded a School of Carpentry in Helsinki (since 1966 the University of Industrial Arts) and in 1887 the national art museum, the Ateneum.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁵ For surveys of the history of psychology in Finland, see Ihanus (2000, 2006), See also Aho (1988, 1993).

²⁴⁶ See Allardt (1997).

²⁴⁷ For Finnish Aesthetics in the 19th century, see Kuisma (2006) and Wrede (1995).

The artists, who were mainly influenced by French and German schools, participated in the fight against “Russification” by developing a style of national romanticism, often inspired by Karelia and the *Kalevala*. Painters Albert Edelfelt (1854-1905), Akseli Gallen-Kallela (1865-1931) and Eero Järnefelt (1863-1937), architect Eliel Saarinen (1873-1950), composer Jean Sibelius (1865-1957), and writers Juhani Aho (1861-1921) and Eino Leino (1878-1926) belong to this “Golden Age” of Finnish Art. The Finnish National Theater was founded by Kaarlo Bergbom (1843-1906) in 1872. The national spirit was also expressed by success in sport: the Finnish athletic team as an independent unit participated in the Stockholm Summer Olympics in 1912. The Finnish word *sisu* became famous in expressing the somewhat stubborn and tough energy of the enterprising Finns.

Areas of applied research were also developed. A Technical University and a School of Business Administration were founded in Helsinki in 1908 and 1911, respectively, and, due to their economic importance, agriculture and forestry were promoted, so that eventually they formed a special Faculty within the University of Helsinki in 1924.

3.1. From Philosophical Psychology to Experimental Psychology

Systems Philosophies and Psychology

In the Royal Academy of Turku, H. G. Porthan had already lectured, in 1788 and 1800, on natural philosophy and “romantic” psychology, discarding both materialistic and mystical (Swedenborgian and Mesmeristic) currents of thought.²⁴⁸ Porthan held psychology as a discipline about two mental capacities, thought capacity and will, and thus as a basis for logic and morality.²⁴⁹ Gabriel Israel Hartman’s *Kunskapsläran*, in its second part in 1808, discussed human consciousness, will, and emotions.²⁵⁰ In the 1820s, Fredrik Bergbom lectured on “empirical psychology”. Johan Jacob Tengström, one of the main Finnish introducers of Hegel’s philosophy, lectured on psychology, partly according to Hegel, between the years 1835–1846 in Helsinki at the Imperial Alexander

²⁴⁸ Rein (1908a), 225–226.

²⁴⁹ Rein (1908a), 223–224.

²⁵⁰ See Chapter 2.1.

University of Finland.²⁵¹

However, it was Johan Vilhelm Snellman who more extensively brought Hegel's philosophy forth to Finland, including some of his conceptions of psychology. Snellman's early work *Philosophisk elementar-curs. Första häftet, Psychologien* (1837; "Philosophical elementary course. First part, Psychology") was meant as a textbook for gymnasiums, but it turned out to be too abstract and difficult for teaching.²⁵² In his treatise *Versuch einer speculativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit*, published in 1841 in Germany, Snellman presented and slightly modified Hegel's and Carl Friedrich Göschel's basic thinking about the development of the idea of personality.²⁵³ In the preface to the same work, Snellman gives credit to his older colleague Tengström for making Hegel's speculative philosophy, since the middle of the 1820s, the dominating academic pursuit.

In the Hegelian system of the sciences, anthropology studies the lowest degree of the development of "the subjective spirit", in other words "individuality" as such, the "immediate soul" or the "natural spirit". Phenomenology studies the mediated spirit, in other words consciousness, while psychology scrutinizes the self-determined spirit, the actual personality that is pierced by the two lower layers of development. The highest spirituality of the human personality, the self-consciousness of the spirit, is in turn pierced by the principle of the divine personality, which in the speculative philosophy of Hegel represents the self-consciousness of the absolute spirit, the highest and undisputed truth.²⁵⁴ In his treatise, Snellman divided the idea of personality into three developmental stages, individuality, subjectivity and personality, respectively ascending from the lower to the higher stage.²⁵⁵

On the other hand, alongside speculative and idealistic philosophy, natural philosophical and more empiristic natural scientific approaches began to develop. The mechanistic, physiological and positivist conceptions of scientific research challenged idealistic, mystic, pantheist or vitalist ideas and emphasized logical conclusions, rationality and the re-

²⁵¹ Manninen (1981), 129–130.

²⁵² Snellman scolded the earlier textbook, *Försök till en lärobok i psykologien* by L. M. Enberg (1824), but his own textbook was not at all used at schools. In the years 1838–1843, it sold 490 copies.

²⁵³ See Chapter 2.6.

²⁵⁴ Snellman (1841), 252; Hegel (1817), (1830/2000), § 381.

²⁵⁵ Snellman (1841), 8–9; on Snellman's personality philosophy, see Kallio (2017).

placement of the soul (or spirit) for the empirical investigations of the human conscious and unconscious mind and the physiological functions attached to the sensory, perceptual, attentive, memory, learning and thought processes. Exact quantitative experimental methods and psychophysical laws were proposed, and scientific psychology was emerging when the first psychological laboratories started in the 1870s, especially initiated by Wilhelm Wundt in Germany and by William James in the United States.

Psychological literature in Finland before the 1880s was still quite meager. As basic works, besides Snellman's works (1837; 1841) and his lectures on psychology (1837; 1858; 1860), there were only Z. J. Cleve's introductory *Försök till lärobok i psykologi* ('An attempt for a textbook on psychology', 1854; 2nd edition 1858; translated into Finnish in 1869; 3rd edition 1871),²⁵⁶ Th. Rein's *Försök till en framställning af psykologin eller vetenskapen om själen* ('An attempt for a presentation of psychology or the science of soul', 1876; the second volume was published as late as 1891, see also 1898) and the Finnish-language small work *Sielutieteen oppikirja* ('Textbook of the science of soul', 1884) by Rein.²⁵⁷ After Snellman retired, Wilhelm Bolin, as an acting professor, held in 1866–1867 lectures on psychology, partly based on Wundt's (1863) early work and the Herbartian and Humboldtian traditions. In Finland, Bolin was the first advocate of naturalistic and deterministic conceptions, briefly touching on experimental psychology and psychophysics, which, however, did not have any central position in his philosophical writings.

Cleve's psychology textbook for schools was mainly Hegelian since Cleve had used as his model Hans Lindhult's (1843) textbook, which in turn had abridged and copied Carl Ludwig Michelet's (1840) Hegelian work²⁵⁸ with neo-Christian spiritualistic ingredients. Cleve was also in-

²⁵⁶ As professor of education and didactics, Zacharias Joachim Cleve (1820–1900) was still committed to Hegelian idealism. His follower J. J. F. Perander, "the last Hegelian" in Finland, wrote a critique of Herbart, but Waldemar Ruin (1857–1938) defended Herbart's program in education (see Ruin, 1887). For Ruin's bibliography, see Manninen and Niiniluoto (2007), 337–340.

²⁵⁷ On the early textbooks of psychology in Finland, see Lehtovaara (1979). – On the early history of Finnish psychology from the middle of the 19th century to the beginning of the 1920s, see Jouko Aho's thesis (1993a); for the overviews of the history of Finnish psychology, see Jääskeläinen (1985), Ihanus (2000) and Pietikainen (2012).

²⁵⁸ Soininen (1938), 64.

fluenced by Wolffian thought in making the distinction between rationalistic and empiristic psychology, the former being the main frame of reference, without neglecting empirical knowledge. Cleve already described psychological functions and their connections to anatomy and physiology but opposed psychophysical materialism, mechanism and dualism in favor of emergent idealism.²⁵⁹ In addition to Cleve's psychology, only Fredrik G. Afzelius's textbook (1854) had been accepted for Finnish schools at that time. Afzelius represented in Sweden strict Hegelian thinking, against Boström's more modern approach. Idealistic philosophies dominated in Sweden most of the 19th century.²⁶⁰

Between Philosophy and the Natural Sciences

The status of psychology in the tension field between philosophy and the natural sciences had already been noticed by Kant who accepted introspection as the method of knowledge but denied psychology the status as a natural science because it lacked the proper means of quantifying its object of study. At the same time, Kant left psychology hanging loose in relation to philosophy because psychology did not address the premises or principles of knowledge. In the 19th century, this dilemma became intensified. Wundt, caught by this dilemma, advanced experimental introspection in the laboratory, not the armchair introspection. For him, experiment was by no means to take the place of introspection, but to make scientific (measurable) introspection possible. He still first hoped that psychology would be connected to and nourished by philosophy but was forced to admit that most of his psychology students gradually turned into the camp of the natural sciences.²⁶¹ In his later years, Wundt tried to ground *Völkerpsychologie* as a humanist and cultural field of knowledge and an antidote to natural science psychology but this "second psychology" project did not get any mainstream academic support.

²⁵⁹ Aho (1993a), 28.

²⁶⁰ On the philosophical scene in the 19th century Sweden, see Nordin (1981; 1987); Rydberg (2008), 22–23.

²⁶¹ Danziger (2002), 41.



Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920).

Among pioneer psychologists, who planned to build a modern and independent empirical science, psychology was even seen as a basis for philosophy and human sciences interested in the human mind and behavior. Martin Kusch has depicted the “psychologism” dispute that took place in Germany from the 1880s to the 1920s.²⁶² Wundt’s and Lotze’s students often embraced psychologism and leaned toward experimental psychology as a basis for the renewal of philosophy. New experimental psychologists started to conquer the chairs of philosophy, which raised opposition from the side of “pure philosophers”, like neo-Kantianists (Dilthey, Rickert and Windelband), and, even stronger, phenomenologists (Husserl) and life philosophers (Scheler, Jaspers, and later Heidegger). After World War I, the conflict was less evident, while psychologists could include the phenomenological points of view and phenomenological philosophers faced the situation that psychology had become a more independent and developing field of research and even practice.

The transformation of the disciplinary field affected philosophy that had to go through certain phases of the encounter with, and the accommodation of, more modern approaches. In Finland, too, Hegelianism, as an idealistic system philosophy, dominated academic philosophy in the wake of Snellman’s and his disciples’ contributions. Through its total system and its conceptual argumentation and demonstration of truth,

²⁶² Kusch (1995/2005).

idealistic philosophy was to build knowledge about the absolute. The positivist and naturalistic currents of thought challenged the premises of such a system philosophy by referring to the necessity of experiential knowledge to be gained through the experimental method and inductive logic instead of conceptual a priori analysis. Metaphysical tendencies were targeted by scientific criticism. Rein and Grotenfelt represented transitional figures who acknowledged and, to some extent, even accepted the paradigmatic turn but were unable to discard their idealistic underpinnings. Neiglick, Westermarck and later Lagerborg, for example, belonged to the antimetaphysical, anticlerical and cosmopolitan vein of the 1880s, turning away from the exclusively German influence, toward French and British influence.

At the turn of the 19th century, the positivist and antimetaphysical philosophy and psychology were challenged by value-centered philosophical currents (for example, William James's pragmatism) and philosophies of life²⁶³ (for example, Henri Bergson's intuitionism). Distancing from relativism, mechanism, positivism and psychologism, these currents, not binding to old idealistic system philosophies, insisted on human creative values and life experience, instead of exact science, empiricism, naturalism and rationalism.²⁶⁴ When comparing all Nordic professorships of philosophy in the period 1860–1915 Heidegren has noted that a successive modernization took place. In 1870, all Nordic professors of philosophy were still positioned in the field of idealistic system philosophy; in 1890, among ten professors of philosophy, two represented value-centered idealism and two the positivist side. In 1910, most philosophy professors are either value idealists or positivists and a few others are on their way to leave behind idealistic system philosophy.²⁶⁵

²⁶³ Georg Simmel (1912) had started to use the term *Lebensphilosophie* referring to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bergson (Stockelberg 2006, 278).

²⁶⁴ Heidegren (2004), 34.

²⁶⁵ Heidegren (2004), 509.

3.2. Logic and Psychology in Lotze's Spirit: Thiodolf Rein

In 1853, a boy of fifteen years entered the University in Helsinki. Eventually he became J. V. Snellman's favourite student and later Snellman's successor as the only professor of philosophy in Finland, the founder of the Philosophical Society, and an important academic leader.

Karl Gabriel *Thiodolf* Rein was born on February 28, 1838, in Helsinki. The prominent academic family originated from the Reinilä house in Southern Ostrobothnia, but had a clerical tradition in several generations. His father Gabriel Rein (1800-1867) was professor of history in 1834-1861 (after J. H. Avellan), the Rector in 1848-1858, and founder of Statistic Finland in 1865.²⁶⁶ The family was Swedish-speaking, but Gabriel Rein was a member of the Saturday Society and one of the founders of the Finnish Literature Society, and the young Thiodolf met at their home important university professors like J. J. Nervander, M. A. Castrén, G. A. Wallin, and Fredrik Cygnaeus.²⁶⁷ As a schoolboy Thiodolf's private teacher was the father Nils Christian of the later philosopher Edward Westermarck.

In 1852, chairs of philosophy had been closed in all universities in the Russian empire. As the Rector's son, Thiodolf Rein started his studies in classical languages, literature, and history. His teachers included Topelius, Cygnaeus, and Lönnrot. But when J. V. Snellman was appointed professor of ethics and the system of the sciences in 1856, Rein became one of his most devoted pupils, both in philosophy and politics. From the lectures of his teacher, he adopted Hegel's idealist system. Rein belonged to the inner circle of the best students who were allowed to follow Snellman's private lessons in Hegel's logic.

Th. Rein finished his Master's degree as a primus in 1860, and in the autumn of 1863 he was appointed as docent of philosophy on the basis of his dissertation *Grunddragen af den filosofiska imputationsläran* (73 pages).²⁶⁸ In this work, Rein relies on Hegel's *Philosophie des Rechts*, Michelet's *System der philosophischen Moral*, and Snellman's unpublished lectures on psychology and philosophy of law. The task is to consider concepts within conceptual systems in their internal necessary connections.

²⁶⁶ See Klinge (2012).

²⁶⁷ See Th. Rein's Memoirs (1918).

²⁶⁸ For Rein's complete bibliography, see Manninen and Niiniluoto (2007).

*Thiodolf Rein (1838-1919).
Portrait by Magnus Enckell. Helsinki
University Museum, photo by
Timo Huvilinna.*



Here “imputation” is a juridical term from Roman law which means that fault or guilt is ascribed to a person. Imputation is thus related to actions which aim at the right by the agents knowing and willing. According to Rein, judgments of legal and moral responsibility presuppose that human actions are based on free will. To defend this position, which agrees with Snellman’s lectures, he gives a survey of human action and grades of *Zurechnungsfähigkeit*, from cases of lacking or limited responsibility to full reasonable goal-directed self-determination. He contrasts the indeterminist view of free deliberation (*liberum arbitrium*) to the denial of free choices by the determinists like Spinoza.

When Snellman became senator in the spring of 1863, Rein acted as professor of philosophy for a while in 1864-65, lecturing on philosophical theory of society, but then left this task to Snellman’s other student Wilhelm Bolin.²⁶⁹ Bolin applied the chair, but after Z. J. Cleve’s hard critique of his dissertation on Leibniz he withdrew the application. From the end of 1865 to early 1867 Rein travelled in Germany and France, to witness how “the ruins of old philosophical schools were scattered in a mess” in Europe. He met Carl Michelet and Adolf Trendelenburg in Berlin and Kuno Fischer in Jena. Returning home in 1867, he defended for the licentiate degree a new dissertation *Om kunskaps möjlighet* (70 pages). Rein starts by arguing against most classical and modern philosophers that it is naïve to try to explain the substance of the world with first asking how knowledge is possible

²⁶⁹ See Ch. 2. 8.

at all. Knowledge has to satisfy the subjective condition of internal certainty and the objective condition of truth. Referring to Kant and Kuno Fischer, but mainly following Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Rein describes the development of cognition from sensations in space and time to perceptual knowledge about individual things with properties and relations. According to Rein, "the subject discovers behind the sensible existence a supersensible intelligible world of laws and forces which constitute grounds for the sensible appearances", and thereby explanation proceeds to more and more general grounds toward the ultimate ground from which everything else follows. Jumping over Hegel's chapters on self-consciousness, reason, spirit, and religion, Rein concludes with the chapter on "absolute knowing", where the subject and the object have become identical, cognition equals reality, without a separate or external objective world.

In 1867, the chair of philosophy was opened for completion, with Bolin and Rein as the main candidates, whereas J. J. F. Perander failed to finish his dissertation. Rein wrote for the professorship a dissertation *Om den filosofiska methoden i sitt förhållande till öfriga vetenskapliga metoder* (1868, 118 pages). Unlike Hegel, he allows here a theory of knowledge as "a philosophical propaedeutic" which discusses the method of philosophy in relation to other scientific methods. According to Rein, philosophy should respect other sciences and accept the empirical standpoint, since "the true idealism does not exclude but rather includes empiricism". In Jena, Rein had studied John Stuart Mill's *A System of Logic*, and gives an account of the inductive methods in empirical sciences. But the aim of philosophy is to give expression to the "ideal world view", which strives for truth, good, beauty, and freedom, and approves the ultimate principle of the absolute: "All objectivity, all reality is essentially thinking, and reversely objectivity is the essence of thinking." Here, Rein concludes, Hegel's systemic improvements of the earlier steps of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling are so far the highest stages of philosophical reflection.

Bolin wrote a dissertation *Undersökning af läran om viljans frihet, med särskildt afseende å Kants behandling af problemet* (1868), where he argued that the direction of will is not arbitrary but determined by "self-preservation", combined with awareness of necessities which help to raise above momentary impressions and passions. Bolin's defense of the determinist position with references to Spinoza shocked the opponent, the Hegelian professor of education Z. J. Cleve, even though Bolin cautiously concealed his personal connections and sympathies to the materialist philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach.

In any case, Bolin had a more extensive philosophical production than his rival, but it was known that he does not continue the long idealist tra-

dition in Finnish philosophy. When the evaluation of the candidates was started in the faculty, Cleve as the dean criticized Bolin and supported Rein. In the debate, Bolin found five supporters (among them the professor of aesthetics C. G. Estlander) against Rein's four. At this stage, Cleve proposed in the consistorium that an additional assessment of the candidates would be asked from the senator J. V. Snellman. This unusual procedure was approved by voting, and Snellman gave his statement where he found merits and weaknesses in both professorial dissertations. He argued that Bolin's criticism of Kant does not adequately consider Kant's practical philosophy, and instead of returning to Spinoza the starting point in the discussion of free will should have been German philosophy after Kant. Snellman did not agree with Rein's account of philosophical propaedeutics, but praised Rein's dissertation as an excellent introduction to academic philosophy. Some members of the consistorium argued that Snellman's evaluation is not impartial, but in the final discussion some members like Topelius changed their view in favour of Rein. The final vote was 16 to 10 for Rein against Bolin. In his letter to Feuerbach on March 22, 1869, Bolin bitterly complained that the chair of philosophy was given to "a most idle Hegelian ruminant".²⁷⁰

While Thiodolf Rein was appointed as a Hegelian to a professorship, which he was to hold for 31 years in 1869-1900, he started in the early 1870s to feel doubts about "the sustainability of this grandiose and ingenious speculative structure built upon a too abstract basis", so that he wished to find a way "in the open sea of thought forward beyond Hegel".²⁷¹ In 1873, he founded the Philosophical Society, where is encouraged open dialogue with the students and visitors on philosophical themes.²⁷² For example, in 1875 Rein had an exchange with Johan Ludvig Snellman²⁷³, who eagerly defended Hegelianism, concluding that "existence is endless negation", and suggested that Rein's wish to acknowledge the role of sense experience in concept formation leads him back to the old Kantian doctrines.²⁷⁴

²⁷⁰ A detailed story of the Bolin – Rein competition is told by Manninen (1987a), 157-178.

²⁷¹ See Rein (1918), 281. See also Kurkinen (1991).

²⁷² See Ch. 3.

²⁷³ J. L. (Janne) Snellman (1850-1909) was J. V. Snellman's son, who made a career as a lawyer.

²⁷⁴ See Niiniluoto and Manninen (1996), 44-45.



Hermann Lotze (1813-81).

Rein was impressed by Hermann Lotze's work *Microkosmos* (1856-64). Lotze had a background in medicine, and his philosophical system included an interest in empirical methods of natural science. Another system with somewhat similar intentions was earlier developed by Johann Friedrich Herbart, and in 1878 August Fredrik Soldan wondered why Rein preferred Lotze's approach to Herbart's.²⁷⁵ For Rein, however, Herbart's metaphysics was artificial, as it assumed the immutability of all real things (including souls), and Herbart's strictly deterministic theory of the will was unacceptable. Meeting with Lotze in Göttingen in 1878 confirmed Rein's interest in Lotze as a thinker who had "the courage to raise the flag of idealism" and save idealism from materialism.²⁷⁶

While Rein remained open to new ideas and never finished his own philosophical system,²⁷⁷ he never gave up his idealism. In Lotze's system, the real things are like Leibniz's monads, which are souls from the inside but material objects from the outside. Natural objects, including brains, are only phenomena, and the interaction of souls with brains are basically

²⁷⁵ See Soldan (1878), cf. Chapter 2.7. Soldan's life and amateur philosophical activities are described by his son-in-law the novelist Juhani Aho in Aho (1901). Rein's belated reply to Soldan was given in his review of Aho's work in 1902. See also Jouko Aho (1993).

²⁷⁶ Lotze's philosophy of religion was studied in 1889 by G. G. Rosenqvist (1855-1931) who was professor of dogmatics and ethics at the University of Helsinki in 1894-1916.

²⁷⁷ This character of Rein is emphasized by Grotenfelt (1918, 1938).

interactions with those real things whose phenomena those brains are.²⁷⁸ Lotze's and Rein's position is thus a form of emergent idealism. The view was summarized in Rein's lecture in the Philosophical Society on February 16, 1883 with the thesis that "only the spirit is real, nothing else is real".²⁷⁹ According to the protocol, Rein argued that physical events are not real in themselves but only phenomenal. Only this consistent idealism can overthrow positivism. But one has to acknowledge that the domain of phenomena is governed by laws of nature, and it should be studied by using empirical scientific methods. However, Comte's positivism is mistaken in thinking that our knowledge is limited to phenomena, since philosophy has its own positive role in establishing the idealistic explanation of reality and ideal world view.

As a follower of Snellman and Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen (his father's successor as professor of history), Thiodolf Rein was also a Fennoman. But his position in the language issue was moderate, as he wished to grant the rights to both Swedish and Finnish. As a schoolboy, he was sent to Savolax in Eastern Finland to learn Finnish, and finally at the end of the 1870s he felt that he is able to speak and write in Finnish.²⁸⁰ In 1882 the first edition of his textbook in logic was published in Swedish as *Lärobok i formell logik* and in Finnish as *Muodollisen logiikan oppikirja*, and in 1884, the first edition of his textbook in psychology, *Sielutieteen oppikirja*, appeared. Both works had an important impact on the philosophical terminology in Finnish.²⁸¹

Rein's book on logic was used in the university for half a century: the last 5th edition appeared in 1933. Rein himself was not a logician: no references are given to the British algebra of logic (Boole, De Morgan), and later editions do not mention the new mathematical logic (Frege, Russell, Hilbert). In the Preface of the first edition, Rein refers to the elementary high school textbooks by Fredrick Georg Afzelius, *Utkast till lärobok i logiken för elementär undervisningen* (1839), and Johan Jacob Borelius, *Lärobok i den formella logiken* (1871). Afzelius and Borelius were known as the last Hegelians in Uppsala in Sweden. Even though Rein's exposi-

²⁷⁸ See Rein (1925), 20-22.

²⁷⁹ See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 101-102.

²⁸⁰ In the Philosophical Society, the first protocol in Finnish is dated on February 23, 1877.

²⁸¹ The first philosophical classics translated into Finnish were Plato's dialogues "Phaidon" (by J. W. Calamnius in 1882) and "Apology" (by Emil Hårdh in 1882).

tion follows closely their style, it is remarkable that the former admirer of Hegel does not follow at all the steps in the dialectical “science of logic”, and there is no trace of the “labyrinths” of Hegel’s logic taught by Snellman. Instead, Rein mentions in the Preface the names of Überweg, Lindner, Hagemann, Prantl, Sigwart, Lotze, and Mill. So his textbook is firmly based on the 19th century German tradition of logic which largely followed Jäsche’s 1800 edition of Kant’s *Logik*.²⁸² While it hardly contains any novel ideas or results in logic, it shows clearly the systematic and pedagogical abilities of its author.

According to Rein, formal logic is a part of “logic in the broad sense” or theory of knowledge. While psychology studies the “natural history” of human thinking from a descriptive point of view, theory of knowledge considers thinking as a means in finding truthful results or knowledge. He quotes Kant’s statement that “in logic we do not ask how we think but how we ought to think”. Logic is thus a science of the duties in thinking, free of subjective disturbances. In the narrow sense the rules of logic concern only formal truths, but in the broad sense theory of knowledge gives an account of the sources and methods of finding scientific knowledge with a truthful content. In this sense, Rein’s work is not only an introduction to logic but at the same time a textbook in epistemology and philosophy of science.

The first part of the book about the “elements” is, in a traditional way, divided into concepts, judgments, and inferences. A concept (*conceptus*) is the meaning of a word. Each concept has characteristics which together constitute its content. The extension of a concept includes all things which have this concept as its characteristic. The most general concepts are categories. Concepts can be related in various ways with respect to their content or extension. A judgment (*judicium*) is expressed by a sentence which links a subject and a predicate. Following closely Kant, Rein divides judgments into affirmative and negative;²⁸³ universal and particular;²⁸⁴ categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive; assertoric, problematic, and apodictic; analytic and synthetic. The relations between judgments are described by the classical square of opposition. An inference (*syllogismus*) is a relation between one or two premises and a conclusion. Mediated inferences with two premises can be categorical (analyzed by Aristotle’s syllogistic figures), hypothetical (like modus ponens and modus tollens), or disjunctive (like modus ponendo tollens).

²⁸² See Vilkkio (1999, 2006).

²⁸³ Here Kant’s infinite judgment of the form “S is not-P” is missing.

²⁸⁴ Here Kant’s singular judgments are missing.

The second part of the book about the “system” presents the correct forms of systematic or scientific thinking. The topics include definition, division, demonstration, principles, and methods. Demonstrations are first divided into direct and indirect, and then to certain and probable. Probable demonstrations can be inductive, analogical, or hypothetical²⁸⁵. *Principia cognoscendi* can be accepted as premises without demonstration. Rein repeats here his idealism by noting that some statements like “Material things exist external to our consciousness” may only seem self-evident without being so. Formal principles include all logical laws which can be based on a few “laws of thought”: law of identity, law of contradiction, law of excluded middle, and law of sufficient reason. Finally, methods can concern inquiry (search of new truths) or invention (presentation of knowledge). In empirical sciences, inquiry follows the analytic method, which starts from what is familiar to us and proceeds inductively to its explanation (here Mill’s principles of induction are introduced); in rational sciences, inquiry proceeds deductively from the most general laws. Sometimes analysis and synthesis work together. Methods of presentation can be descriptive or explanatory, esoteric or exoteric, and dialogic or Socratic.

Rein remained, still at the beginning of the 20th century, mostly loyal to his idealistic background, even when he clearly noticed that new theories and experimental methods made it necessary to revise system philosophies. For him, this meant reconciling idealistic and empiristic currents, in accordance with Hermann Lotze’s works. Rein followed Snellman’s lectures on psychology in 1858, but started already in the 1870s to take distance from Hegel and to modestly reorient toward more empirical points of view. He published some articles that attested to his knowledge of psychological issues, for example, of studying memory by introspection (not by natural science observation)²⁸⁶ and of Fechner’s psychophysical law²⁸⁷. He had visited Wundt’s Leipzig quarters at an early phase in 1878 and listened to Wundt’s “vividly and energetically held lectures.”²⁸⁸

At the beginning of the 1880s, other scholars from Finland had visited Wundt’s lectures, for example, Jarl Hagelstam, Maximus Widekind af

²⁸⁵ Hypothetical inference from effects to causes is called abduction by Charles S. Peirce.

²⁸⁶ Rein (1868).

²⁸⁷ Rein (1876b).

²⁸⁸ Rein (1918), 287.

Schultén and Robert Tigerstedt²⁸⁹ from the medical field, educationalist Waldemar Ruin and writers Petrus Nordmann and Arvid Järnefelt. Possibly the earliest Finnish link to Wilhelm Wundt was established by physiologist Konrad Hällstén who studied in 1869–1870 at the University of Heidelberg where Wundt was the assistant professor and Hermann von Helmholtz professor of physiology.²⁹⁰ At Heidelberg, Wundt had given, in 1862, the first course ever in scientific (physiological) psychology.²⁹¹ Wundt had received one room and some equipment for his psychology laboratory in Leipzig in 1875 and he received his first psychology laboratory students in 1879. His larger Institute for Experimental Laboratory was officially recognized in 1884. When Wundt, in 1875, had told Fechner that he was about to set up his psychological laboratory, Fechner had responded: “Then you will get the whole of psychology ready in a couple of years.”²⁹² Both pioneers optimistically believed in the new experimental methods but at the same time, they limited the area of psychology mainly to psychophysics.

Thus, Rein had visited Wundt’s lectures when independent psychology was emerging. During his professorship of philosophy (1875–1917) in Leipzig, Wundt supervised several students from different countries.²⁹³ He also edited the series *Philosophische Studien*²⁹⁴ (founded in 1881, published in 1883–1903) and *Psychologische Studien* (1906–1918). For example, when Hjalmar Neiglick and Arvi Grotenfelt attended Wundt’s seminar for experimental psychology in the term 1885–1886, 16 students were

²⁸⁹ On Robert Tigerstedt and his scattered attempts at Wundtian-style “mental chronometry” and apperception studies, see von Bonsdorff (1975), 31–45; Aho (1993a), 74–78.

²⁹⁰ On Konrad Hällstén and his early connections to von Helmholtz and Wundt, see von Bonsdorff (1975), 24–35; Aho (1993a), 64–69.

²⁹¹ Published in Wundt (1863).

²⁹² Oksala (1934), 113; see also Nilsson (1978); Jääskeläinen (1983a).

²⁹³ Cattell has depicted Wundt’s behavior with his students: “Wundt himself visits the laboratory every day, and is glad to answer questions and give help; he, however, tries to encourage the men to think for themselves, and to be responsible for their own experiments. He suggests subjects for research at the beginning of the semester, but he lets the students choose the direction in which they prefer to work, and encourages them to independently find problems and the methods of solving them” (Cattell, 1888, 39).

²⁹⁴ Hjalmar Neiglick’s (1887a) doctoral dissertation was reprinted in this series (Neiglick 1888), followed by Wundt’s (1888) comment.

listed, among them James McKeen Cattell, later the first professor of psychology in the United States, Harry Kirke Wolfe, another early American psychologist, and Alfred Lehmann, who established the laboratory of psychophysics at the University of Copenhagen and became an ardent supporter of the emancipation of psychology from philosophy.

Although aware of Wundt's, Darwin's and Spencer's contributions to the revision of psychology, Rein held the conceptual speculations of idealistic philosophy applicable to psychology and never used himself any empirical research methods. From the point of view of Finnish psychology, Rein's most notable achievement is his two-volume *Försök till en framställning af psykologin* (1876, 1891). He abridged its main ideas to the Finnish-language textbook *Sielutieteen oppikirja* (1884; several editions: 1896, 1908b, 1910, 1925, 5th edition 1934), which developed Finnish psychological vocabulary and was used until 1931 as a psychology textbook at the University of Helsinki when Eino Kaila finally renewed the requirements for the studies in psychology.

Rein had gained a vast knowledge of philosophical and psychological literature. In 1872–1894, he held altogether 11 series of lectures on psychology. He had noticed the definitions of psychology as an empirical science: “Based on internal and external observation, psychology is a so called empirical or experience science.”²⁹⁵ Its object of study was the direct internal world of experience and its phenomena. Besides the primary method of introspection, psychology could use the observation of the external behavior of other human beings, even animals.²⁹⁶ Rein strongly doubted the possibility of any collective psychology or *Völkerpsychologie* that Wundt had first suggested as early as 1863.²⁹⁷

Rein described many physiological processes of the nervous system in relation to the functions and contents of the soul, but he did not accept any reduction of the active soul life to the physiological and material bases.²⁹⁸ For him, the “interaction” between the soul and the body meant that the neurophysiological processes were guided by the soul,

²⁹⁵ Rein (1884), 7.

²⁹⁶ Rein (1876a), 328–363. In his textbook, Rein (1884) characterized the difference between human self-consciousness and animal mentality by the principle that horses and dogs may know and remember something but they do not know that they know and remember this, i.e., animals do not conceive them as “selves”.

²⁹⁷ Wundt (1863), part 2.

²⁹⁸ Rein (1876a), 319–328, part 2, chapters 3–4.

which in turn received, through the nervous system, information from the material world.²⁹⁹ However, only the spiritual basis and its “rational plan” made possible both the spiritual soul and the material body.³⁰⁰ Rein argued against the parallel theory that Darwin’s theory of evolution requires causal interaction between mind and body.³⁰¹ Though rejecting the Kantian distinction to the empirical soul and the rational soul, Rein conceived of psychology as an empirical-metaphysical enterprise, searching for the essence of the soul in the inner experience and through rational and categorizing thinking.³⁰² He did not accept Herbart’s psychology and its determinism either, only ethical and indeterminist Herbartian pedagogy was more acceptable to him.³⁰³ It was impossible for Rein to discard the principles of his idealistic Lotzean commitment, even when he recognized the ongoing changes in the scientific status of psychology.³⁰⁴

Rein’s doubts about the experiment as the new method of psychology and about the physiological points of view in psychology were evident, but he still gave credit to Wundt and Fechner for detecting the mathematical rules of law concerning the relations between the psychic

²⁹⁹ Rein (1876a), 451, 491–492.

³⁰⁰ Rein (1876a), 504–505.

³⁰¹ See Rein (1891). The same argument from Darwinism to interactionism is presented by Karl Popper (1987), but on the basis of emergent materialism instead of Rein’s emergent idealism. For Rein’s debates with Neiglick and Westermarck, who supported the parallel theory, see von Wright (1982).

³⁰² Rein (1876a), 328–342.

³⁰³ Rein’s opinions of Herbart were criticized by August Fredrik Soldan, who admired Herbart and maintained that Herbartian ethical pedagogy should be grounded on deterministic principles (Soldan 1877–1878). Soldan left a large collection of unpublished manuscripts containing philosophical and psychological reflections. He also had a close relation with Neiglick and Waldemar Ruin.

³⁰⁴ Rein admitted his Lotzean commitment, for example, at the meeting of the Philosophical Society (10 May 1889) when he defended the conception that the psychic is “something independent”, not secondary in comparison to the material, and that the soul (and the “self-agent”) is “substantial” and constant, “not to be substituted”. Against this view, young Neiglick claimed that the “notion of a constant ‘self-agent’ is an illusion” and mentioned the “doubling of self-consciousness” in dreams and “several pathological phenomena” as confirming that the self is not a “pure identity” (Manninen & Niiniluoto, 1996, 148–149).

phenomena and the observable events of the external world. However, the limits of the experimental method in the self-observation and the restricted value of physiological knowledge for the psychological study of the soul were obvious to Rein whose argumentation was typical of the idealistic philosophers under the influence of *Geisteswissenschaften*. But he was open-minded in supporting the studies of his own students Neiglick and Grotenfelt in Wundt's experimental laboratory in 1885-86.³⁰⁵

Besides his work as the professor of philosophy and chairman of the Philosophical Society³⁰⁶, Th. Rein was a man with many duties. In spite of his fairly conservative philosophical position, he was open to many social reforms. He wrote articles to many newspapers, and in 1885-87 edited the journal *Valvoja*, which was the forum of the liberal wing of the Young Finns. Rein supported the first Finnish novelist Aleksis Stenvall (Kivi) in his financial troubles, and in 1886 he founded with E. G. Palmén the Finnish Secondary School in Helsinki. Rein encouraged women in academic studies, and was an important mentor of the first female graduation of Emma Irene Åström in 1882. In 1872-1906, he was a member of the Finnish four-estate Diet, where he belonged to the Fennoman minority of the Nobles' chamber. Rein was largely appreciated for his expertise, balance, and calm ability of conciliation. The title of "real state councilor" (todellinen valtioneuvos) was conferred on Rein in 1899. In 1884-87, he served as the Vice-Rector and in 1887-96 as the Rector of the university. In 1896-1903, Rein was the Pro-Chancellor, but was expelled by the acting Chancellor W. von Plehwe who was dissatisfied with Rein's attempts to defend the autonomy of the university against the Russian authorities. But in 1906-10 Rein was again asked to serve as the Pro-Chancellor.

Still, Rein had some time for his own philosophical studies. As the Rector, he still gave lectures on theory of knowledge, metaphysics, ethics, and psychology, but the last courses were given in 1894.³⁰⁷ He published in two volumes the first biography of his teacher, *Juhana Vilhelm Snellmanin elämä* I (1895), II (1899), and edited the first Collected Works (*Samlade arbeten I-X*) of Snellman in 1892-98. In 1900, Rein retired from his professorship. In the next year, he criticized Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. The collection *Uppsatser och tal* of his writings appeared in 1903.

³⁰⁵ See Ch. 3.3 below.

³⁰⁶ See also Ch. 3.10 below.

³⁰⁷ See Kurkinen (1991), 333. One of Rein's last students was Zachris Castrén (1868-1938), who wrote a dissertation on the philosophy of religion in 1899 and became docent of practical philosophy in 1903.

In 1908, Rein published a pioneering study of the history of philosophy in the Academy of Turku, *Filosofins studium vid Åbo universitet* (327 pages). In 1915, he authored a book on the life of professor and senator *Leo Mechelin*, who was a prominent defender of the constitutional autonomy of Finland.

After Rein's retirement, the chair of philosophy was opened for competition in 1902. Grotenfelt was travelling in Germany and only two candidates submitted their applications: Edward Westermarck and J. A. Lyly³⁰⁸ But Lyly died in 1903 and the applications were cancelled. In the next round Westermarck was competing with Grotenfelt and was found to be more competent, but as he refused to take the exam in Finnish language the appointment was given to Rein's nephew Arvi Grotenfelt in 1905. Grotenfelt became also the chairman of the Philosophical Society. In the next year, the chair of philosophy was divided into theoretical and practical, thereby reintroducing the old division which had been in operation in 1640-1830, Grotenfelt took theoretical philosophy and Westermarck was invited to practical philosophy.

In his last years, Rein made plans for a synthetic volume *Filosofiska uppsatser* which would summarize his teleological metaphysics, theory of knowledge, ethics, religion, and optimistic vision of the ideal world view. Only fragments of this plan were realized, so that his philosophical testament was unfinished.³⁰⁹

Rein lived to see the day of independence of Finland in 1917. A Festschrift dedicated to Th. Rein in his 80th birthday appeared in 1918, and his own Memoirs (up to the year 1906) were published in Swedish and Finnish before his death at his desk on November 18, 1919, at the age of 81.

3.3. Psychological Laboratory: Hjalmar Neiglick

The research carried out in Wundt's psychological laboratory and soon in many other laboratories was first focused on sensations (especially the sense of sight, the auditory sense and the time sense) and sensory perceptions, association tests, psychophysics, and reaction time tests. British empiricism and association psychology and German physiological re-

³⁰⁸ Julius Anselm Lyly (until 1883 Bergh) (1856-1903) had made his dissertation on Plotinos in 1889. In Berlin, he received the news that he has been deported from Finland and committed suicide.

³⁰⁹ See Kurkinen (1991), 309-326.

search on the senses and the nervous system by, for example, Ernst Weber, Hermann von Helmholtz, Gustav Fechner and Johannes Müller had laid the foundation for experimental psychology that gradually expanded to include research on attention, memory, learning, thinking, decision making, and emotions. The laboratories of psychology were already part of the institution of science. They contained social interaction, shared experience and knowledge construction, negotiations about the choice of research methods and the theoretical points of view.

Georg *Hjalmar* Garibaldi Neiglick (1860-89) studied philosophy in Helsinki for his master's degree in 1879-1885.³¹⁰ Young Neiglick had received impressions from Switzerland and France during his travel in 1881-1882. His international or cosmopolitan stance reached beyond the traditional German connection and adopted French naturalism and positivism. In 1883, Neiglick, using the pseudonym Arius, defended freedom of thought against conservative academics. He also wrote critics of theatre and literature. In the fall of 1885, Neiglick traveled to Stockholm and Copenhagen, arrived in Leipzig in October-November 1885 and made slowly acquaintance with Wundt and some members of his circle, for example sociologist Émile Durkheim and Wundt's Danish assistant Alfred Lehmann. His compatriot Arvi Grotenfelt stayed at the same time in Wundt's laboratory, listened to Wundt's lectures and took part in the meetings of the local philosophical society. Grotenfelt has shortly characterized Neiglick as "knowledgeable, with extremely quick intelligence and wit, it was easy for him in discussion to skillfully and clearly develop his opinions."³¹¹

³¹⁰ On Neiglick's life and literary production, see Ruin (1917); W. Söderhjelm (1916); Lagerborg (1939); von Wright (1946); Mustelin (1966).

³¹¹ Grotenfelt's unpublished memoirs. – A central arena for such discussions in Finland was Philosophical Society where, for example, Neiglick had "duels" with Th. Rein (see Manninen & Niiniluoto, 1996, 114, 116-118, 121-123, 126-131, 144-151). After Neiglick's death, Rein (15 November 1889) praised that Neiglick had been a "lively element in the [Philosophical] Society through his pronounced opinions and through the clarity and sharpness of thought" (Manninen & Niiniluoto, 1996, 153).



Hjalmar Neiglick (1860-89). Portrait by Albert Edelfelt. Photo by Helsinki University Museum.

With Lehmann, Neiglick made experiments on perceiving the intensity of light, thus testing the validity of the Weber–Fechner law that was published in Fechner’s *Elemente des Psychophysik* (1860). The law consists of two laws, Weber’s law stating that the perceived change in stimuli is proportional to the initial stimuli, and Fechner’s law stating that the subjective sensation is proportional to the logarithm of the stimulus intensity.

In 1886, occasionally visiting other cities, Neiglick continued his studies in Leipzig for ten months and later that year completed the experiments by Lehmann in Copenhagen. He did not like the German atmosphere of formalities and “platitudes” and was not in a friendly relation with Arvi Grotenfelt, simultaneously attending Wundt’s seminar.³¹² Shortly before leaving Leipzig, Neiglick had met 85-year old Fechner, who regarded “Weber’s law”³¹³ as a special law about the interaction between the soul and the body and could not accept Neiglick’s conception (shared by Wundt and Lehmann) that Weber’s law referred to the interrelation of and relativity between all human psychic states, the special relativity between different light perceptions being a “contrast phenomenon.”³¹⁴ At the end of 1886, Neiglick returned to Finland and finished his thesis on the psychophysics

³¹² Mustelin (1966), 94–95.

³¹³ Neiglick (1887b), 276–277, had used, as was usual at that time, the name “Weber’s law” to include “Fechner’s law.” Later, it was named the Weber–Fechner law. Fechner himself called Weber “the father of psychophysics” (Fechner, 1860, viii).

³¹⁴ Neiglick (1887a), 14; Mustelin (1966), 179.

of the sense of light, *Zur Psychophysik des Lichtsinns* (1887a; reprinted in 1888 in Wundt's *Philosophische Studien*), which was his main publication.

In his thesis, Neiglick explicated his conception that Weber's (and Fechner's law) was a special case of the contrast phenomenon.³¹⁵ He had used the method of "mean gradations", first applied by Joseph Delbœuf in the measurement of sensations³¹⁶, and found inconsistencies in the earlier law. His own conception, which Kai von Fieandt called Neiglick's law,³¹⁷ states that the gradient halving two extreme light intensities is an intensity that, related to the reciprocal contrast effect of the extreme light intensities, is in their midway. Rein acted as Neiglick's opponent during the public defense of the thesis on 2 February 1887 in Helsinki. Neiglick's subject was, on the whole, strange to the Finnish academic community³¹⁸, and Rein acquiesced to some minor remarks, admitted that Neiglick was an outstanding psychophysicist and accepted his thesis. At the post-thesis party, when giving a toast, Rein even suggested that the Imperial Alexander University of Finland should have a psychophysical laboratory where Neiglick would work for the benefit of humankind. He was supported by professor of physiology Konrad Hällsten, but Neiglick himself did not trust that he could have led the whole laboratory and no laboratory was founded.³¹⁹

In August 1888, Neiglick received the title of docent of experimental psychology at the Imperial Alexander University of Finland and became soon acting professor of philosophy while Rein was Rector of the university. During the term 1887–1888 Neiglick gave lectures on the psychology of perceptions and ideas. His thesis was commented by Wundt, who acknowledged Neiglick as "a young ambitious researcher who had completed this research with such praiseworthy diligence."³²⁰ Wundt did

³¹⁵ Neiglick (1887a), 73; see also Neiglick (1887a), 344–345; Mustelin (1966), 180–183.

³¹⁶ Neiglick (1887c); Delbœuf (1873).

³¹⁷ von Fieandt (1949), 49–50.

³¹⁸ Ophthalmologist Gustav Albert Nordman, who had done experiments at F. C. Donder's laboratory in Utrecht, was an exception in this regard. In his thesis, published in May 1887, he had studied, in psychophysical ways, the stimulus time needed for visual shape sensation in relation to some other variables (Nordman, 1887). After his thesis, Nordman did not continue in such studies but concentrated on medical practice. (Von Bonsdorff, 1974, 240 – 241; Aho, 1988, 37, 40.; Aho, 1991.)

³¹⁹ On Neiglick's defense of the thesis and the post-thesis party, Mustelin (1966), 184–186.

³²⁰ Wundt (1888), 116.

not accept Neiglick's claim that the just-noticeable difference (differential threshold) is not in accord with contrast phenomena. Wundt proposed that the contrast follows Weber's law and that the deviations from this law are based on the confounding disturbances that the contrast effect faces during the "adverse difference."³²¹

Neiglick's work was noted shortly in other international contexts of psychological research. For example, in the United States, William James paid attention to Lehmann's and Neiglick's contribution to the contrast effect and criticism of earlier experiments, especially Delbœuf's results that proposed "that the objective intensity of a light which appeared midway between two others was really the geometrical mean of the latter's intensities."³²² Joseph Jastrow, American professor of psychology and an expert in experimental psychology and psychophysics, reviewed Neiglick's work and remarked that "it proves the extreme intricacy of this psychophysical method, and yields an excellent instance of the way in which side effects can entirely distort the law of a series of phenomena."³²³ On the other hand, he reproached Neiglick about the lengthiness, typical of many works from Wundt's laboratory, stating, "important as these results are, the author has no right to subject one to the reading of 84 pages to winnow them out."³²⁴ James McKeen Cattell, in his article in *Mind*, summarized his evaluation of Neiglick's thesis, suggesting some insightful reservations:

"The observer tries to give the shade of gray which seems to him equidistant from a lighter and a darker shade, or from white and black. If it were possible to find a sensation

³²¹ Wundt (1888), 113–114.

³²² James (1890), 543. – James also referred to Merkel, who used the method of doubling the stimulus, as disapproving Delbœuf's results. James was somewhat skeptical about the outcome of the discussion concerning Weber's law and mostly supported the physiological interpretation of Weber's law, approvingly mentioning Ebbinghaus's supposition "that the intensity of sensation depends on the *number* of neural molecules which are disintegrated in the unit of time" (James, 1890, 548).

³²³ Jastrow 1888, 310. – Jastrow also sent a card (dated 3 February 1889) to Arvi Grotenfelt asking a copy of his thesis: "I should like to notice your work for the American Journal of Psychology; and am much interested in the line of work you have begun" (Arvi Grotenfelt Letter Collection, Box 2). Unlike Neiglick's thesis, Grotenfelt's work was not reviewed in that journal.

³²⁴ Jastrow (1888), 311.

y as much weaker than x as it is stronger than z we could take a unit of measure and speak of one sensation as three times as strong as another, &c. [...] The fact, however, is that we are not dealing directly with sensation but with our estimates, and even these seem to me, to a certain extent, conventional. I can say that a very dark gray seems to me more like black than like white, but when I come to pick out a shade which seems equidistant from the two, I am in doubt within rather large limits, and only come to any decision by thinking of the number of differences of shade I could distinguish in each direction. If this view be correct the method is reduced to a less accurate version of that of the “least observable difference”. Neiglick found that his estimate remained constant, and that other observers, varying considerably at first, finally agreed with him. He naively concludes that some persons naturally judge differences in light with accuracy, others only after practice. The fact probably is, that Neiglick, knowing the objective measure of the light, was unconsciously aided by association, and, perhaps, to an extent which invalidates his results. The other observers, comparing their results with his after the series had been completed, naturally tended next time to approximate to his judgment. It is difficult to decide that one shade of gray is equidistant from two others, but after the decision has once been made it seems quite evident and the point is easily held in mind. Lehmann’s results were disturbed by contrast, and he was led to study its influence. He found that, whatever the illuminations of two contrasted surfaces might be, the contrast was the greatest when there was a constant ratio (1:4.76) between them. Neiglick found Weber’s law to hold the more accurately the more nearly the contrast between the compared surfaces was a maximum.³²⁵

³²⁵ Cattell (1888), 43–44. Right after Neiglick, Julius Merkel, who had earned his doctorate at Wundt’s laboratory in 1885, continued the same kind of research as Neiglick and reached parallel results – though using stronger intensities of light – through the method of doubling the stimulus (Merkel 1888, 569, 587). – Johan von Wright’s (1951) experiments at the end of the 1940s repeated Neiglick’s experimental design and gave support to Neiglick’s results.

In his last psychological article, Neiglick concluded that experimental psychology needed some supplementary points of view, for example, research on psychopathology, hypnosis, child and animal psychology, social groups and the cultural history of the human psyche.³²⁶ He planned to study moral emotions and behavior based on physiological processes and instincts, not on intellect and ideals. His plan included a critique of too simple “naturalism” that trusted in utilitarianism and British empiricism.³²⁷ Neiglick’s friend, the later professor of pedagogy and didactics Waldemar Ruin, had taken his own more neo-Kantian path in the “fight against naturalism”³²⁸ that Neiglick did not want to follow. Neiglick’s plans to study ethics and psychic phenomena did not come true.

In the spring and summer of 1887 in Paris, Neiglick had again met Durkheim in friendly terms and listened to Ribot’s, Charcot’s and Magnan’s lectures and even published a short summary of his thesis in *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger*³²⁹, edited by Ribot. This journal published articles, for example, by Binet, Janet, Durkheim and Tarde and many other famous scholars, their subjects ranging from suggestion, hypnotism and somnambulism to various psychological, sociological and cultural issues. Neiglick also took part in Madame Blavatsky’s séances, but did not become her follower and supported, on the contrary, anti-spiritism.³³⁰

Neiglick’s promising career was interrupted, when he died of typhus and sudden meningitis in November 1889, at the early age of 29. His role as a defender of empiricism, naturalism and freethinking was continued by Edward Westermarck, but the deputy in 1889–1894 and 1897–1899 and eventually successor of Rein as professor of philosophy was Arvi Grotenfelt, whose mother was Rein’s sister.

Arvi(d) Grotenfelt was born in Helsinki in 1863 in a prominent academic family. He studied philosophy under his uncle Th. Rein, and

³²⁶ Neiglick (1887b), 349.

³²⁷ Mustelin (1966), 187–191.

³²⁸ Ruin (1885). Ruin dissertation *Kunskap och ideal* (1886) developed a moralistic neo-Kantian view on the limits of knowledge. Ruin was professor of education in 1888–1926 and Rector of the university in 1915–20.

³²⁹ Neiglick (1887d); Mustelin (1966), 191–193, 267.

³³⁰ Mustelin (1966), 193.

finished his master's degree in 1884.³³¹ After his studies in Leipzig with Wundt in 1885-1886, Grotenfelt had published a series of articles on experimental psychology, presenting different areas of experimental psychology, Weber's and Fechner's laws, Ebbinghaus's memory research, mental chronometric studies and applications of experimental methods to studying esthetic emotions.³³² Grotenfelt did not oppose to experimental methods but pointed out their restrictions concerning the "deepest nature of soul life"³³³, thus denying any naturalistic, mechanistic and materialistic conceptions of the soul.³³⁴ Grotenfelt noticed that "experimental psychology was no *philosophy* and did not claim to be that".³³⁵ However, its incoherent achievements made it so far necessary that it resorted to philosophical reflection, child and animal psychological and anthropological observation.³³⁶ He never carried out any experimental studies and leaned on Th. Rein's Lotzean philosophy.

Grotenfelt's thesis on Weber's law and its psychological, physiological and psychophysical interpretations was purely theoretical. Its strenuous philosophical style and argumentation were targeted against the quantification of the psychic phenomena, against the measurement of the soul. The main conclusion of the thesis is that Weber's original law is valid since it states that the just-noticeable differences of the sense-perceptual intensities (*Verhältnisshypothese*) are related to each other in certain ways (proportions), so that there is no need to hypothesize (*Unterschiedshypothese*) any psychic scale or geometric series for the differences.³³⁷ Thus, Grotenfelt abandoned Fechner's law and held Weber's original law as purely psychological.

Grotenfelt also mildly criticized authors, like Wundt, who did not clearly make a difference between physiological and psychological concepts. Grotenfelt's thesis maintains that the psychophysical measurements

³³¹ Grotenfelt's life is described in his (so far) unpublished Memories. For Grotenfelt's complete bibliography, see Manninen and Niiniluoto (2007), 62-69. For Grotenfelt's later career and work on the philosophy of history, see Ch. 3.4 below.

³³² Grotenfelt (1886; 1887).

³³³ Grotenfelt (1887), 5.

³³⁴ Grotenfelt (1887), 67-68.

³³⁵ Grotenfelt (1886), 453. He remarked further, "Psychology as a whole will therefore separate itself from philosophy to become more fully an independent science. And it is precisely experimental psychology that investigates and determines the 'details', just like the natural sciences" (p. 454).

³³⁶ Grotenfelt (1886), 453-454.

³³⁷ Grotenfelt (1888), chapter 7.

of the intensities of the sense-perceptions cannot be absolute but only proportional and psychic experiencing of the intensities of the stimuli cannot be causally derived from physiological events. Grotenfelt admitted the relevance of psychophysical parallelism and psychophysical correlations, but keeping psychological and physiological concepts separate from each other made it possible to study psychic processes independently, without underestimating the importance of physiological processes in examining the psychic phenomena.³³⁸

It was one of Neiglick's academic duties at the Imperial Alexander University of Finland, on 31 May 1888, to be the opponent of Arvi Grotenfelt's thesis on Weber's law. He did not esteem Grotenfelt's results nor his theoretical reflection high, because he preferred the experimental approach. When writing his opponent statement of Grotenfelt's thesis to the faculty, Neiglick turned to Wundt in his letter (dated 5 September 1888), telling about his critical remarks and asking Wundt's opinion. Neiglick's 14-page letter contains several comments that maintain the claim that Grotenfelt tries to save *Verhältnisshypothese* by "circular conclusions" and ends up in the "cul de sac" because it is "no more possible to save" that hypothesis: "The concept of psychic relativity is from the beginning wrongly tackled by him [Grotenfelt]."³³⁹ In spite of his reservations, Neiglick, in his official statement to the faculty, accepted the work as an academic dissertation and as a "very readable page in the psychophysical discussion literature."³⁴⁰

Grotenfelt's thesis was soon discussed critically in Wundt's *Philosophische Studien* by Julius Merkel.³⁴¹ Grotenfelt had discarded Merkel's studies³⁴² on the relation between the stimulus and the estimated perception by claiming, for example, that Merkel's method of mean gradation (also used by Neiglick) was not theoretically soundly based in comparison with the method of just-noticeable difference.³⁴³ Merkel judged that Grotenfelt tried again to make valid "the already abandoned conception

³³⁸ Grotenfelt (1888).

³³⁹ Nachlass Wilhelm Wundt, Briefe, NA Wundt/III, 1346, Universitätsarchiv, Leipzig, pp. 2–3, 7, 10.

³⁴⁰ Protocol of the historical-philological section, 9 November 1888, § 3; Mustelin 1966, 212.

³⁴¹ Merkel (1889a), 245–253; (1889b), 547–548, 554.

³⁴² Merkel (1888).

³⁴³ Grotenfelt (1888), 108–116.

of the dependence between the stimulus and the estimated perception.”³⁴⁴ Merkel supported his own method and concluded against Grotenfelt that the progressive stimuli in the geometric series match the perceptions that form an arithmetic series and a geometric series.³⁴⁵ Frank Angell compared Grotenfelt’s and Merkel’s arguments.³⁴⁶ Angell valued Grotenfelt’s work that had pointed how widely psychophysical researchers had silenced and excluded the “purely psychological interpretation” and still used assumptions that revived the “relation hypothesis”.³⁴⁷ In spite of his positive attitude to Grotenfelt’s work, Angell was more in favor of the “difference hypothesis” and did not hold Grotenfelt’s arguments for the “relation hypothesis” as scientifically exact, having at most a “dialectic value”.³⁴⁸

Grotenfelt received the title of docent of psychology in January 1889 and was appointed in 1905 professor of philosophy (from 1906 to 1929 professor of theoretical philosophy) in Helsinki. He was not very active in the field of psychology, only commenting on the Wundtian tradition and Rein’s psychological work³⁴⁹, experimental pedagogy³⁵⁰ and special areas of “psychical research” (later parapsychology), hypnosis, and sug-

344 Merkel (1889a), 245.

345 Merkel (1889a), 251–253. See also Merkel (1889b), 547–548, 554.

346 Angell (1892).

347 Angell (1892), 415.

348 Angell (1892), 418; see also 417–421.

349 Grotenfelt (1894; 1896). – Grotenfelt visited Wundt’s institute also in the summer of 1889, when he sent a letter from Leipzig to Hermann Ebbinghaus (dated 28 June 1889; Hermann Ebbinghaus Collection, Kollegenbriefe G 12), reporting about the great development of Wundt’s laboratory and its apparatuses (chronoscope, control hammer and Hipp fall apparatus) carried forward by, for example, Oswald Külpe. From September 1894 to September 1895, and from September 1899 to March 1900, Grotenfelt stayed in Germany (mostly in Berlin and Leipzig) and in France (in Paris) listening to lectures, taking part in congresses and meeting academic scholars, for example, Eucken, Liebmann, Haeckel, Windelband, Rickert, Külpe, Ribot, and Richet.

350 Grotenfelt (1908).

gestion.³⁵¹ Occasionally, he held lectures on psychology in 1905–1906, 1908, 1925–1926 and 1928–1929. Otherwise, Grotenfelt’s main areas were focused on the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history.

As a professor, Grotenfelt was responsible for the field of psychology, too, and had noticed that academic teaching of psychology was of great use not only in philosophy and pedagogy but also in theology and law. Such teaching had been sporadic. Since no regular teaching of psychology was arranged, the stagnation of academic psychology was obvious in Finland through the 1920s. Examination requirements in philosophy included works by Wundt, Külpe, Ebbinghaus and James, but more recent orientations and research fields were absent. Zachris Castrén, Edward Westermarck, Rolf Lagerborg, Gunnar Landtman, Rafael Karsten, Hans Ruin and the young talent Eino Kaila had given lectures on psychological issues in the 1910s and 1920s.

Grotenfelt esteemed Kaila’s contribution as a docent (1919–1922) at the University of Helsinki, because Kaila was the only one to give guidance in experimental psychology. In 1919, at the meeting of the Philosophical Society (28 November), Kaila had already proposed that the chair of theoretical philosophy should be divided into “two series”, the “epistemological” and the “psychological” one, and that the students of philosophy should get acquainted with exact natural science, without “ancient concept analysis”.³⁵² Kaila moved to the University of Turku where he held the chair of philosophy (1921–1930) and founded, in 1922, the first Finnish academic psychological laboratory. In the field of “practical” or applied psychology, the first Finnish (and Nordic) psychological laboratory was also founded in 1922. It was the Psychotechnical Laboratory of the State Railways headed by Ester Hjelt, one of the pioneers, with Anitra Karsten and Aksel Rafael Rosenqvist, of Finnish applied psychology in the 1920s.³⁵³

³⁵¹ Grotenfelt (1888b; 1892; 1923; 1926). Grotenfelt, who tried to demystify paranormal phenomena and usher them to scientific investigation, was also elected the first chairman (1907–1932) of Sällskapet för Psykisk Forskning (the Finnish Society for Psychical Research), founded in 1907. The early booklet on dreams by theologian Antti F. Puukko (1904), who had also studied in Leipzig, was critical against the spiritual and paranormal conceptions of dreams. On the history of Finnish parapsychology, see Aho (1993b).

³⁵² Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 446.

³⁵³ On Ester Hjelt, see Ihanus (2017), and on Karsten, see Ihanus (2010).

Grotenfelt's interest in securing the academic independence of psychology at the University of Helsinki was attested when he proposed, in 1925–1927, to the historical-philological section that, first, an extraordinary professor of psychology would be appointed and, second, that a chair of general and experimental psychology would be created.³⁵⁴ His proposals were not successful, and the academic status of psychology was unclear until Eino Kaila became in 1930 professor of theoretical philosophy and the psychological laboratory was founded in 1932.

3.4. Philosophy of History: Arvi Grotenfelt

J. V. Snellman's Influence on the Finnish Philosophy of History

In the Grand Duchy of Finland, the philosopher Johan Vilhelm Snellman was the first scholar to be particularly interested in the philosophy of history. At a general level, his thinking was based on the long, largely German tradition of speculative approach to the subject, which sought for a direction and meaning in history. Simultaneously, however, he tried to adapt this tradition to the emerging empirical historical research that shunned metaphysical speculation. As opposed to Hegel by whom he was inspired, however, this field of study did not form him an independent subject of investigation. Instead, he dealt with the topic indirectly or in passing, and mostly published his views in newspaper and journal articles in *Saima* and *Litteraturblad* in the 1840s and 1850s. Nevertheless,

³⁵⁴ Protocols of the historical-philological section 1925–1927. Grotenfelt (12 February 1927) gives his reasons for his proposal: “Psychology has, as is well-known, for a long time become more and more a special science that can no more be treated as a part of philosophy. Special studies and their literature have grown so large that a professor of theoretical philosophy, who has to consider other large research ramifications his main area, cannot keep pace with psychological special research in such detail as would be necessary, so that he could fully satisfactorily guide to scientific work in that field.” – Grotenfelt had at the same negotiated with professor of psychiatry Harald Fabritius about the establishment of the psychological laboratory to the quarters of the Lapinlahti mental hospital and its psychiatric laboratory. Fabritius had agreed on that and Eino Kaila had also been informed about this plan (Protocols of the historical-philological section, 19 February 1927).

throughout his life, the philosophy of history formed an integral part of his philosophy of the state and nation.

Snellman formulated his philosophical ideas during an era that was marked by the profound historicization of European thought. The diverse lines of thought that have been grouped under the contested term “historicism” explicitly rejected the natural law tradition of the Enlightenment, i.e. that there are universal moral standards that apply to all cultures and epochs and, correspondingly, a universal human reason that would endorse the same moral values for all epochs and cultures. Instead, the historicists argued that everything in the human world was historically constructed, changeable, and radically context-dependent.³⁵⁵ To cite Snellman’s summary of this idea, the only permanent feature in the world seemed to be “the transitoriness of all forms, the transformation of all that exists, the process.”³⁵⁶ Since there did not exist any transcendent justifications for social, political, or moral values, everything that happens in history had to be explained within history.

In a certain sense, Hegel himself can be considered a historicist, too. As he emphasized in the famous passage from his *Preface to the Philosophy of Right* (1821), “every one is a son of his time; so philosophy also is its time apprehended in thoughts.” Most of the leading German historicists, such as Leopold von Ranke, Johann Gustav Droysen, and Wilhelm Dilthey, were highly critical of Hegel, however. In their view, the Hegelian teleological conception of world history as a series of stages in the realization of Reason, the Absolute, or the Idea was too metaphysical and continued to subordinate history to the mere handmaiden of speculative philosophy.³⁵⁷ Snellman was well aware of this criticism, for he keenly followed the development of modern historical research particularly in Germany and France.³⁵⁸ According to him, teleology was an illogical aspect in Hegel’s idealist system, for if everything was in a constant state of flux and transformation, how could the development of world spirit be ever fulfilled and history thus reach some alleged end-point, as Hegel had assumed. For Snellman, the logical

³⁵⁵ Beiser (2009).

³⁵⁶ Snellman, SA II, 401.

³⁵⁷ Beiser (2009), 156–57. Karl Popper in his *The Poverty of Historicism* (1957) used the term “historicism” for the view that there are inexorable laws of historical destiny. While Hegel was one of the prime examples of this view about “the end of history”, Snellman was not a historicist in the Popperian sense.

³⁵⁸ See Rantala (2013), 212–239.

conclusion of Hegel's doctrine of "what is rational is real and what is real is rational" was the abandonment of the vain assumption that there would be a universal plan or idea that history was supposed to fulfill.³⁵⁹

While Snellman distanced himself from Hegel in this respect, he was simultaneously aware and afraid of the relativism implicit in the fully historicist approach to human values. His solution to the problem of relativism were the concepts of nation and national spirit, and, consequently, a strong emphasis on the importance of nationality and national culture. On the one hand, he agreed with the historicists that each national culture and age was an end in itself. For him, within a certain nation, the values, norms, and customs that were in accordance with the nation's national spirit were inviolable and could not be judged by some eternal and universal standpoint. This meant that each nation was in a given moment sovereign in its laws, knowledge, and customs. On the other hand, however, he continued to believe in the uniformity of humanity and the universality of human development in history. Despite the fact that the true agents of history were for him the nations, progress in history was ultimately universal, although it could only be realized and understood in its specific national manifestations. To sum up, this solution enabled him to dismiss radical relativism by maintaining the validity of universal principles of reason, right, and truth, while simultaneously accepting in a historicist vein the culture-specific, context-dependent nature of these principles according to each nation's particular and constantly changing national spirit.³⁶⁰

Yet there remained an inner contradiction in Snellman's thought. Namely, he was strongly convinced that the historical change in the form of incommensurable national cultures nevertheless resulted in the progress of history as a collective singular. In other words, although Snellman included the expression of the goal in history in the process of constant improvement (the never-ending process of *Bildung*), the teleological tendency of which he had criticized Hegel slipped back into his own thinking, too.³⁶¹ The reason for this was presumably Snellman's unwillingness to abandon Christian faith and the consequential belief in Providence, i.e. that God directs history for the good. As he straightforwardly put it

³⁵⁹ J. V. Snellman to Per Erik Bergfalk, June 5, 1843, a concept, published in Snellman SA III, 667; see also SA III, 315, 430-431, 496-498.

³⁶⁰ SA III, 348, 357-358, 488. See also Allardt (1997), 26-27; Jalava (2005), 154-156, 174-175.

³⁶¹ On a general level, see Koselleck (2002), Ch. 13.

in 1842 in *Läran om staten* ("The study on the state"), "If this was not the case, there would be no consolation in human life."³⁶²

In the academic philosophy of Finland, similar to Continental Europe in general, the latter part of the nineteenth century was marked by the crisis of the Hegelian system. Thus, the direct influence of Snellman's philosophy of history became mostly visible among the nationally minded historians rather than in philosophy. Both Zachris Topelius (1818–1898) and Georg Zacharias Forsman (1830–1903, known by his author name Yrjö-Koskinen), who became the professors of history at the Imperial Alexander University in 1854 and 1863 respectively, had got acquainted with the Hegelian system in general and Snellman's philosophical thinking in particular already as young students. The academic position of Topelius reflected the undifferentiated nature of Finnish historical field at the time, for he was, above all, a historical novelist, who did not conduct scholarly historical research in the strict sense of the term. In any case, a belief in Providence was an essential part of Topelius's philosophy of history, and he tended to equate Providence with universal Reason in a Hegelian manner. Unlike Hegel and Snellman, however, Topelius emphasized the religious dimension in his thinking, assuming that the Finns were the chosen people whose sufferings in history were a part of God's plan. Later in life, he was prone to eschatology, in which progress had been moved aside to make way for the waiting for the Kingdom of God to come.³⁶³

While Topelius's influence was chiefly limited to the field of popular history, his fellow professor of history, G. Z. Yrjö-Koskinen, was a pioneer of modern historical research in Finnish, contributing significantly to the academization and professionalization of history as a discipline in Finland. He was also interested in the philosophy of history, dedicating his time to this subject particularly in the 1870s. An important impetus to him to focus on this theme was given by the English historian Henry Thomas Buckle, a major figure in the positivist movement in historical scholarship, whose two-volume *History of Civilization in England* (1857, 1861) had been a topic of lively discussion at the meetings of the Philosophical Society in Finland in 1873.³⁶⁴ Broadly

³⁶² SA II (1993), 497; see also SA V, 455–456, Jalava (2005), 152–153.

³⁶³ Noro (1968); Tommila (1989), 87–89; Rantala (2015).

³⁶⁴ Records of the Philosophical Society in Finland, November 15, 1873 and November 29, 1873. See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 35–36. At these meetings, Buckle's study was presented by Ernst Palmén, who became appointed as the professor of Finnish, Russian, and Nordic history at the Imperial Alexander University in 1884.

speaking, Buckle suggested that history should determine laws of cause and effect that apply as rigorously in human affairs as the deterministic laws of nature applied in the physical world. While such a positivist conception of history was a serious challenge to historicism both in its Hegelian and Rankean forms, Yrjö-Koskinen felt obliged to publicly oppose Buckle, whose view of history he considered “the natural history of human-as-animal” (*ihmis-eläimen luonnon-historia*). As a result, he gave a series of lectures on the topic in the 1870s, which were published in 1879 as a book entitled *Johtavat aatteet ihmiskunnan historiassa* (‘Leading ideas in the history of humanity’).³⁶⁵

Building on Snellman’s conception of history as the never-ending process of self-improvement (*Bildungsprozeß*) of humanity, Yrjö-Koskinen claimed that the proper research subject of world history was the development of the idea of humanity (*ihmisyyss-aate*). Believing in progress in history, he suggested that history possessed directionality and a fundamental purpose behind the apparent arbitrariness and contingency of historical events. According to him, the final goal of humanity was to strive for right and truth, which is why history as an academic discipline was ultimately studying “God in history.” In world history, similar to life in general, the living spirit both favored and demanded multiplicity and variation to remain viable. Since Yrjö-Koskinen was an ardent nationalist and the ideological primus motor of the emerging Finnish Party, it is not surprising that for him, this essential multiplicity and variation was realized by different nations as collective agents of history, which he equated with living organisms and a sort of genetic individuals. If a nation-as-person (*kansa-henkilö*), big or small, did not join in work for humanity, “it will be mercilessly crushed under the wagon wheels of history,” he stated.³⁶⁶ Consequently, he interpreted that the history of Finland ultimately manifested the pursuit of becoming a “member of the great alliance of human progress.” At bottom, similar to Snellman, his philosophy of history thus tried to reconcile the particularity of nations with the universality of the Christian Faith.³⁶⁷

The political importance of Yrjö-Koskinen’s historical view was far-reaching, for he purposefully coupled history as an academic discipline to the construction of the Finnish nation-state and national consciousness. In the field of philosophy, however, his speculative philosophy

³⁶⁵ Yrjö-Koskinen (1900/1879), 3–4. See also Klinge (2010), 216–218.

³⁶⁶ Yrjö-Koskinen (1900/1879), 14–16, 372–373, citation in p. 373.

³⁶⁷ See also Tommila (1989), 90–91.

of history marked the end of an era. As the philosopher Th. Rein, the former disciple of Snellman and an authority on academic philosophy in Finland, complained in 1880 at the meeting of the Philosophical Society in Finland, Yrjö-Koskinen's idea of history was too narrow, insufficient, and placed too much emphasis on the development of the state and politics. In general, the members of the Philosophical Society were inclined to challenge the very foundation of Yrjö-Koskinen's philosophy of history, i.e. that there would be a "leading idea" in history, into which all events and facts of the past could be reduced.³⁶⁸ The same held true for the next generation of academic historians. Although such prominent Finnish historians as J. R. Danielson-Kalmari and Ernst Palmén were nationalists and sympathetic to the attempts to find progress in history, instead of a belief in Providence, they rather tried to justify the conception of progress by a Darwinian theory of evolution.³⁶⁹

Arvi Grotenfelt's Critical Philosophy of History

As the grandson of the professor of history Gabriel Rein, the nephew of the professor of philosophy Th. Rein, and the younger brother of the future professor of history Kustavi (Gustaf) Grotenfelt, the Finnish philosopher Arvi Grotenfelt grew up in the family with strong humanistic orientation. His early work in the 1880s dealt with psychology.³⁷⁰ In his own research, particularly from the 1890s onward, he focused on both the philosophy of history and the history of philosophy.

In the history of philosophy, Grotenfelt's main work was an overall exposition of the historical development of modern philosophy – for the first time in Finnish. This study was published during forty years in three parts.³⁷¹ Grotenfelt's neo-Kantian inspiration can be seen in the fact that he divided modern philosophy, from 1460 up to 1860, in three periods: before Kant, Kant, and after Kant.


In the philosophy of history, Grotenfelt became a mediator in the debate between idealism and positivism. On the one hand, despite his national idealism, he was critical of Hegel and Snellman's philosophy of

³⁶⁸ The Records of the Philosophical Society in Finland, November 19, 1880. See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 78-79.

³⁶⁹ Tervonen (1991), 203-204.

³⁷⁰ See Ch. 3.3.

³⁷¹ Grotenfelt (1896-99, 1916a, 1938).



*Arvi Grotenfelt (1863-1941).
Portrait by Yrjö Forsén. Helsinki
University Museum, photo by
Timo Huwilinna.*

history and doubted whether there was a plan or Providence in human history. On the contrary, he emphasized that many events that had significant effects in history were purely coincidental and did not manifest a higher purpose.³⁷² On the other hand, he also rejected the positivistic philosophy of history that tried to make of history a natural science dependent on universal, general laws.³⁷³ Instead, like his uncle Th. Rein, he leaned towards the German philosopher Hermann Lotze's "ideal-realism"³⁷⁴ and was in his philosophy of history influenced by the neo-Kantian scholars Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, albeit with the intention to revise their ideas.

In addition to scholarly reasons, Grotenfelt's interest in the philosophy of history was motivated by the political situation in the Grand Duchy of Finland. It even seems that the beginning of the First Russification Period in Finland in February 1899 gave him a decisive incentive to study the topic further. Namely, he applied to the Imperial Alexander University for a grant for studying the philosophy of history in Germany in March 1899, that is, just a month after the Emperor Nicholas II had issued the February Manifesto aiming to reduce the autonomy of Finland. For Grotenfelt, the threatened position of his homeland was emblematic

³⁷² Grotenfelt (1903a), 21–23; Väyrynen (2015), 314–315.

³⁷³ Luukanen (1979), 329–330.

³⁷⁴ For the philosophical ideas of Th. Rein and Hermann Lotze's influence on his thinking, see Ch. 3.3. See also Aho (1993), 155–156.

of the international relations in fin-de-siècle Europe in general. Throughout Europe and its colonies, increasing power politics, national self-interest, and imperialism had challenged the ideals of justice, tolerance, and humanity. Thus, he wanted to focus on the relation of politics to morality, and, at a more general level, on the question of what things and factors are truly valuable in human life as well as in the development of human history, in other words, what is ultimately the meaning of history (*der Sinn der Geschichte*).³⁷⁵

Grotenfelt's main studies on the philosophy of history were *Die Wertschätzung in der Geschichte. Eine kritische Untersuchung* (1903) and *Geschichtliche Wertmaßstäbe in der Geschichtsphilosophie bei Historikern und im Volkbewusstsein* (1905). The starting point of his discussion was the ongoing critical revision of German Idealism in which it had become customary during the nineteenth century to distinguish between natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*) and humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*). The neo-Kantian philosophers Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert regarded this distinction as unfortunate, because it included the false opposition of material nature and mind (*Natur* and *Geist*). They argued that similar to chemistry and biology, such disciplines as psychology and history were empirical sciences in the sense that they sought in the knowledge of reality, not merely in the reflection of inner world. Simultaneously, however, they claimed that there was a fundamental difference between the two categories of empirical sciences with respect to the formal character of their knowledge goal: the relationship of the general to the particular. The first category of empirical sciences sought in the knowledge of reality in the general form of the natural law, whereas the second one focused on the particular in the historically determined form. To cite Windelband's famous neologism, scientific thought was in the case of natural sciences nomothetic but in the case of historical disciplines idiographic.³⁷⁶ This did not mean that the particular would be a synonym for subjectivity. According to Rickert, the objectivity of historical sciences could be based on an unconditionally valid system of values that was common

³⁷⁵ Grotenfelt (1905a); Grotenfelt (1905b); Grotenfelt (1924); Luukanen (1979), 330–334. It should be noted, however, that the problem of values and the relation of the individual to society were central issues also in the German neo-Kantian philosophy of history; see, e.g., Windelband (1893/1958), 660–681.

³⁷⁶ Windelband (1900/1998).

to all cultures and historical constellations, which the historical sciences could employ to orient their inquiries.³⁷⁷

Grotenfelt adopted an intermediary position in this discussion. In principle, he agreed with Windelband and Rickert that the main purpose of historical inquiry was to examine phenomena that were individual and unique in the development of humankind. He argued, however, that this task was not possible without taking into account “general, collective factual relations and causal connections regulated by law” that formed the preconditions for historical actions and agency. In other words, one could not know what was particular in a given historical event, action, or phenomenon, if one did not know what was general and common to a large number of events, actions, and phenomena. Thus, he claimed that the difference between the two categories of empirical sciences that studied the human past, above all, between sociology³⁷⁸ and history, was that they laid emphasis on different aspects of past reality. While sociology was especially interested in what was general, typical, and regular in society, history chiefly focused on the individual and the particular.³⁷⁹

Consequently, Grotenfelt also criticized the dichotomy between *erklären* (explanation) and *verstehen* (understanding), initiated by the German historian Gustav Droysen. Broadly speaking, Droysen had argued that the scientific technique of explanation was sufficient to investigate the repetitive causal chains of nature, whereas the method of understanding alone was capable of grasping the unique inner world of spirit. By “understanding,” Droysen did not mean some vague form of intuition, but rather the comprehension of ultimate spiritual connections through thought. For him, the issue at stake was not only the defense of the epistemic distinctiveness of the natural and human sciences. The real problem of positivism was that it obscured the genuine normative significance of historical study by rooting the logic of historical development in inexorable laws rather than human will, thus reducing men from autonomous actors to an undifferentiated mass of passive automatons.³⁸⁰ As Grotenfelt was greatly influenced by the scientific psychology of Wilhelm Wundt and Hermann Lotze, he adopted a different approach to causal-

377 Rickert (1924), 118.

378 Similar to Émile Durkheim, among others, Grotenfelt assumed that the research method of sociology was going to remain historical for a long time; see Luukanen (1979), 351.

379 Grotenfelt (1903a), 2–4, 17–19, 62–72.

380 Maclean (1982), 348–349, 357–358.

ity in history. Hence, he disagreed with Droysen and claimed that the analysis of historical actors' intentions and endeavors could be reduced to causal factors, although only to some extent. In history, according to him, human freedom was always relative, which is why the creative role of individuals had to be set in proportion to the realistic leeway of actions allowed by their era. This did not mean for him the rejection of free will but rather the acknowledgement of its context-dependent nature. Thus, he adopted also in this case an intermediary position by arguing that explanation and understanding ultimately complemented each other in historical research.³⁸¹

As already mentioned, the ethical dimension of history was crucial to Grotenfelt for both scholarly and political reasons. Being anxious about the future of Finland, he strongly opposed *Realpolitik* that dismissed ethical premises in the evaluation of historical development as well as in international relations. Hence, he could not accept the Hegelian doctrine of "what is rational is real and what is real is rational." For him, the idea of such historical necessity was untenable, because it merely seemed to justify the history written by the winners. Instead of "worshipping unjust successes and historical facts as such (*vollendeten Tatsachen*)," it was important to acknowledge that the beaten and defeated nations and peoples had often represented higher principles of right and truth in history than the strong and mighty ones. In general, the historical value of a given event or phenomenon had to be evaluated on the basis of what were its long-term immaterial, mental effects on the inner life of humankind, not by its short-term outer, material outcomes.³⁸² Unlike Rickert, however, Grotenfelt admitted that there was no unconditionally valid system of values common to all cultures and historical constellations. Therefore, historical research always included a subjective element that stemmed from the historian's judgement and ethical conviction. These personal considerations also partly guided the historian's decision about what events and phenomena to include in his research. According to Grotenfelt, the true "sense of history" (*his-*

³⁸¹ Grotenfelt (1903a), 31–39; Luukanen (1979), 352–353; Väyrynen (2015), 313–314.

³⁸² Grotenfelt (1905a), 174–176, 203–207; Grotenfelt 1905b, 16–19. As Kari Väyrynen (2015, 316) remarks, Grotenfelt's compassion for small nations and peoples that were oppressed by great imperial powers did not include the indigenous peoples. In his view, these "primitive peoples" had to assimilate into "more advanced society."

toriantaju) emerged only from this dialogue between the past and the present.³⁸³

Grotenfelt wrote his main works on the philosophy of history in German and published them in Leipzig, thus managing to attract attention among the international readership. As a result, such prominent scholars as the German theologian and the philosopher of history Ernst Troeltsch and the French historian Henri Berr reviewed his books. Generally speaking, the tone of the reviews was polite. The reviewers praised Grotenfelt's extensive knowledge of the issue as well as his way of dealing with diverse topical points of contention in a composed manner. Simultaneously, however, his moderate, conciliatory approach was considered his major weakness. As Troeltsch summed up, instead of advancing the treatment of the scholarly problems, Grotenfelt's approach rather offered a way to circumvent the primary questions.³⁸⁴ In retrospect, we may say that Grotenfelt was the sociologist Max Weber's contemporary not only literally but also in the sense that they both tried to reduce the alleged epistemological and methodological difference between history (the particular) and sociology (the general). While Weber famously solved the problem with his novel concept of the ideal type, Grotenfelt mostly sought a compromise between the already existing views, however, and did not develop such an innovative contribution of his own.³⁸⁵ It is also noteworthy that Grotenfelt completely passed over the hermeneutic approach to history presented by Wilhelm Dilthey, who argued that historical knowledge depends upon interpretation of meaningful human actions and practices. Because of his silence, it is impossible to say whether Grotenfelt ignored Dilthey with intent or if he had been acquainted with Dilthey's philosophy of history at all.³⁸⁶

In Finland, Grotenfelt's philosophy of history attracted rather critical attention from within a group of young historians, above all, Karl Robert Brotherus (1880–1949), Ernst Nevanlinna (1873–1932, until 1906, Neovius), and Gunnar Suolahti (1876–1933, until 1906, Palander), who were all inspired by the German historian Karl Lamprecht's *Kulturgeschichte*.³⁸⁷ Lamprecht had become world-famous in the mid-1890s because of the *Methodenstreit* ("the methodological controversy") in German historiog-

³⁸³ Grotenfelt (1905a), 176–177, 193–195; Luukanen (1979), 338–342.

³⁸⁴ Berr (1904); Troeltsch (1904).

³⁸⁵ Luukanen (1979), 353.

³⁸⁶ Väyrynen (2015), 317; Kallio (2020).

³⁸⁷ See, e.g., Jalava (2014).

raphy, in which he had challenged the dominant neo-Rankean political history, dealing with state leaders, military actions, and diplomatic maneuverings. Instead, he aimed to define the long-term historical development of the German people from the perspective of economic, social, and cultural history. According to him, human history was not to be understood in terms of individuals, but rather in terms of larger collective entities. Simultaneously, he wanted to establish a framework that afforded comparison with other peoples throughout the world, thus permitting the uncovering of the general laws of historical change.³⁸⁸

Although the young Finnish historians were not uncritical partisans of Lamprecht, they campaigned under the banner of Lamprechtian “collectivism” in order to question two dominant trends in Finnish historiography, first, the sweeping idealism of Topelius and Yrjö-Koskinen, and, second, the descriptive, untheoretical, and narrowly fact-based empiricism of their fellow historians focused on particular events and great men.³⁸⁹ While Grotenfelt had argued in his *Die Wertschätzung in der Geschichte* (1903) that the individual was the major factor in history,³⁹⁰ he was labelled as the supporter of the “old school” individualism. In a polemical review of Grotenfelt’s book, Ernst Nevanlinna pronounced that as a science, historical research could only address phenomena that were general, whereas the “absolutely individual” was reachable only by an artistic intuition.³⁹¹ Grotenfelt, for his part, emphasized that the individual in history was always relative, which is why there was no strict qualitative difference between the particular and the general.³⁹² To some extent, it seems that Nevanlinna and Grotenfelt were talking past each other, because their definitions of such key concepts as “individuality,” “generality,” and “objectivity” were vague and equivocal.³⁹³ Besides that, however, there was a major difference between their conceptions of what history as an academic discipline should be. Ultimately, Grotenfelt was inclined to emphasize the centrality of the “immaterial aspects” of history, such as the meaning of religion, sciences, and art, as well as the prominent role of such great men as Martin Luther and J. V. Snellman.³⁹⁴

³⁸⁸ For Lamprecht’s *Kulturgeschichte*, see, e.g., Smith (1991), 187–192.

³⁸⁹ See, e.g., Brotherus (1903).

³⁹⁰ Grotenfelt (1903a), 21–23.

³⁹¹ Neovius (1903), 159–161.

³⁹² Grotenfelt (1903b); see also Luukanen (1979), 345.

³⁹³ See also Luukanen (1979), 355.

³⁹⁴ Grotenfelt (1903b); Grotenfelt (1906).

On the contrary, Nevanlinna and other Lamprechtians chiefly looked out for typical behavior, collective entities, and general patterns in order to address the great underlying long-term tendencies, structures, and regularities in history, which left little room for uniqueness and incomparable individual characteristics.³⁹⁵

Another controversial issue in the Finnish debate was the question of values in history and historical inquiry. In this topic, Grotenfelt's main opponent was K. R. Brotherus, who dealt with Immanuel Kant's philosophy of history in his doctoral dissertation. Although Kant had suggested that history should be examined in the light of general moral and religious ideas, according to Brotherus, Kant had simultaneously insisted that the results of historical inquiry should be independent of a priori metaphysical views. In this respect, Kant had greatly advanced the development of modern historical science.³⁹⁶ While Grotenfelt analyzed in his *Geschichtliche Wertmaßstäbe* (1905) the ways in which the human mind selects those historical facts that are considered significant in history, in Brotherus's eyes, his argumentation ended up with an inner contradiction. Despite the fact that Grotenfelt, on the one hand, admitted that the principles of selection were necessarily relative, on the other hand, he nevertheless claimed that the decision was always ultimately made between hedonism and ethical idealism, in which case "our natural common sense" as well as the "consciousness of the people" (*Volkbewusstsein*) clearly chose idealism. Brotherus considered Grotenfelt's analysis fruitful merely in the sense that if the historians started to pay more attention to the selections they made in the course of their research, this alone would make their studies more objective. In practice, however, scientific historical research, that is, the collectivist conception of history, excluded the very question of what are the most legitimate personal motives of the scholar when selecting between diverse historical facts, because history as an academic discipline was solely interested in causal relationships and empirical factors. It was irrelevant whether the historian himself considered these factors noble and fair or not, for they were effective in history just the same.³⁹⁷ According to Brotherus, the practicing historians were not in the least striving for a coherent, logical, and comprehensive system

395 Neovius (1903); Brotherus (1904); the Records of the Philosophical Society in Finland, November 21, 1903 (Manninen and Niiniluoto, 1996, 354-356).

396 Brotherus (1904), 121; Brotherus (1905a), 122-136.

397 Brotherus (1905b), 70-72; cf. Grotenfelt (1905a), 107, 179-180, 183.

that would explain historical development as a whole, whereas the philosophers of history seemed to “love such a wonderfully systematic totality that is achieved only through thought.”³⁹⁸

As a sort of an epilogue to the “Finnish *Methodenstreit*,” Jalmari Edvard Salomaa, at that time a 24-year-old doctoral student in philosophy and the future professor of philosophy at the University of Turku, published an article on the issue in 1915. In his detailed and critical analysis, Salomaa described Karl Lamprecht’s historical method as epistemologically narrow and biased. For instance, according to Salomaa, Lamprecht confused the validity of the law of cause and effect (causality) with the idea that there would be a general law of historical change. As a whole, Lamprecht’s idea of historical development as a collective process governed by the laws of history and ultimately based on the collective psyche of the people was, for Salomaa, a fully metaphysical construction, a “giant with feet of clay.”³⁹⁹ At that time, however, the most theoretically oriented historians, K. R. Brotherus and Ernst Nevanlinna, had already changed over to the emerging social sciences,⁴⁰⁰ whereas the philosophical mainstream, headed by young Eino Kaila, was busy making its way towards Logical Empiricism of the Vienna Circle. During the interwar years, Salomaa thus became the only Finnish philosopher who was seriously interested in the philosophy of history.

Grotenfelt as a Teacher

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, Grotenfelt and Westermarck were the two professors responsible for the education of the new generation of philosophers in Finland. Westermarck’s school in practical philosophy concentrated in ethics, but also contributed to the separation of sociology and cultural anthropology from philosophy. Eino Kaila’s dissertation in experimental psychology in 1916 eventually promoted the independence of psychology from theoretical philosophy. Most of Grotenfelt’s students worked in the history of philosophy: Jaakko Puupponen wrote a doctoral thesis on Schleiermacher’s ethics in 1909, A. A. Laitinen on Michael Wexionius-Gyldestople in 1912, J. E. Salomaa

³⁹⁸ Brotherus (1903), 255–256.

³⁹⁹ Salomaa (1915), 138–146.

⁴⁰⁰ Brotherus and Nevanlinna became the professor of political studies and the professor of financial studies, respectively, in 1924.

on Schopenhauer and von Hartmann in 1918, Karl Ekman on Nietzsche's aesthetics, Heikki Lehmusto on Snellman in 1923, and Kalle Sandelin on Kierkegaard in 1927. Other dissertations supervised by Grotenfelt included Juho Hollo on imagination in education in 1919, and objective aesthetics by Eino Krohn in 1935. Master students of Grotenfelt included Otto Ville Kuusinen,⁴⁰¹ Erik Ahlman, and Sven Krohn. J. E. Salomaa (1891-1960), who worked mainly in the history of philosophy, became the professor of philosophy at the University of Turku in 1931-1958.⁴⁰² Erik Ahlman (1892-1952) doctorated in Latin language 1916, but wrote an "ethico-idealistic" treatise *Arvojen ja välineiden maailma* in 1920, and published later studies in ethics, justice, philosophy of culture, and philosophical anthropology.⁴⁰³ He became professor of philosophy at the new University of Jyväskylä in 1935-48 and practical philosophy in Helsinki in 1948-52. Sven Krohn (1903-1999), who made his MA in Helsinki in 1929 and PhD in Turku in 1949, became J. E. Salomaa's successor as professor of philosophy at the University of Turku in 1960-70.⁴⁰⁴ Ahlman and Krohn were the first philosophers to introduce ideas of phenomenology in Finland.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰¹ Kuusinen became a prominent Marxist in the Soviet Union. See Ch. 3.9.

⁴⁰² See Salmela (1998). For Salomaa's bibliography, see Manninen and Niiniluoto (2007), 357-361.

⁴⁰³ See Ahlman (1920, 1938, 1939), cf. Salmela (1998). For Ahlman's bibliography, see Manninen and Niiniluoto (2007), 26-32.

⁴⁰⁴ For Krohn, see Salmela (1998). For Krohn's bibliography, see Manninen and Niiniluoto (2007), 195-200.

⁴⁰⁵ Hermann Friedmann (1873-1957) had an unusual international career in philosophy. He was born in a Jewish family in Poland, studied law in Geneva and chemistry in Riga, and received the Finnish citizenship in the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1906. He learned Swedish and worked as an advocate in Helsinki, moved to London during World War II, and became Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the University of Heidelberg in 1950. Friedmann (1904, 1905, 1930) developed an original theory of morphological idealism as an alternative to materialism. His metaphysics of "the world of symbolic forms" was based on his account of visual and haptic sensation. See his bibliography in Manninen and Niiniluoto (2007), 60-61. See also Siro (1984, 1991) and Ylä-Kotola (2014).

3.5. Psychological Ethics and Social Anthropology: Edward Westermarck

Young Westermarck and the Progress of Humankind

Edward Westermarck was born in 1862 in Helsinki, where his father Nils Christian was a chief accountant in the University and his mother's father Alexander Blomqvist had served as professor of the history of learning and chief librarian.⁴⁰⁶ Edward's sister Helena (1857-1938) was an artist, novelist, and pioneer in the feminist movement.

After enrolling in the University in 1881, where Th. Rein was the professor of philosophy, young Edward Westermarck completed his honors thesis in philosophy in 1886, titled "Gör kulturen människoslägtet lyckligare? En psykologisk studie" 'Does culture increase the happiness of the human race? A psychological study'.⁴⁰⁷ He subscribed neither to the Rousseauan (or Biblical) utopia, nor to the "culturally pessimistic" philosophy, which influenced cultural discourse during his student years, emerging with Schopenhauer and especially evident in Eduard von Hartmann's work *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (1868). When working on his honors thesis, young Westermarck was already familiar with several philosophical and psychological writers (for example, Bain, Hartmann, Hartley, Hutcheson, Høffding, Mill, Smith, and Spencer). He had read the English writers in German, and, according to his memoirs, he had also read Spencer and Mill in Swedish translation during the summer of 1884.⁴⁰⁸

By giving a positive answer to the title question of his honors thesis, Westermarck claimed that the progress of culture increases the human race's possibilities for happiness. It increases knowledge and most of all enriches, intensifies, stabilizes, and ennobles human emotions, whether aesthetic, moral, religious, or "sympathetic".⁴⁰⁹ The belief that humankind will grow happier is crystallized in the final sentence of the thesis: "The fact that the human race becomes happier the more it develops, is one that brings us enormous joy about our work and consolation in

⁴⁰⁶ The Swedish-language forename was Edvard, but in international contexts he used the spelling Edward.

⁴⁰⁷ EWH, Box 77.

⁴⁰⁸ Westermarck (1929), 29.

⁴⁰⁹ EWH, Box 77, GKML, 1886, 22-34.

the face of setbacks.”⁴¹⁰ Westermarck leaned heavily on the arguments and to some extent even the utilitarian conclusions of English thinkers, even though they were somewhat alien to his later moral philosophy. As a student, he already disliked the dramatic German cultural pessimism or ostensibly profound speculation — especially Kantianism and Hegelianism. This was to mark his identity as a researcher. Westermarck comments on this dislike in a passage from his memoirs:

“German metaphysics came to my mind once in Morocco when I had to ride straight across a small river. It seemed to me so deep that I hesitated. But I determined at any rate to attempt it and — found that the water was scarcely above the horse’s hoofs. It gave the impression of depth simply because it was so muddy.

On the other hand I felt much attracted by the empiricism of the English school of philosophy. There I found clearness and a sense of reality; and if its hypotheses were not unfaillingly true, in every case it seemed possible that they could be corrected by a deeper search into the facts of experience. The study of psychology also interested me. But what gave me most pleasure of all was unquestionably the work at my Honours thesis, which bore the not altogether unpretentious title of ‘Does Civilization increase the Happiness of Mankind?’”⁴¹¹

In his honors thesis, Westermarck dealt with a problem born and actualized in the Enlightenment period. Like the Enlightenment thinkers, he gave the civilized man an opposite pole, “the primitive man” or “the savage” who had a deficient intellect and a reproductive, non-creative imagination, who was comparable to a child, and in every sense more poorly equipped against the forces of nature than the cultured man. Westermarck did not define culture in this context, but it is evident that he believed in the positive influence of culture; he also would express developmentally optimistic views later on in his career. Von Wright has supposed that such views expressed in Westermarck’s honors thesis remained

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁴¹¹ Westermarck (1929), 30–31.

characteristic for the rest of his life.⁴¹² Even though he does not refer to Darwin in the thesis, as a student Westermarck was already influenced by an atmosphere of evolutionist thought. Thus, he was to construct his own understanding of the preceding scientific tradition and of the Enlightenment era during a personal transition period, while turning toward Darwinism.

Darwin and other Influences

Darwin was to be the most important influence during Westermarck's career as a researcher. Darwin gave the impetus to Westermarck's interest in sexual modesty, a topic that soon changed to research on the origin of marriage, first in his licentiate thesis (1889) at the Imperial Alexander University in Helsinki and after that in its extension *The History of Human Marriage* (1891; 5th edition in three volumes 1921, abridged *HHM*). This work, published in London in 1891, was the first doctoral thesis written in English in Helsinki, and it attracted considerable attention and was translated into several languages. The three-volume fifth edition, published in 1921, became Westermarck's second major work in addition to the two-volume work *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (abridged *ODMI*; 1906, 1908).⁴¹³

Westermarck had made his first trip to London in 1887 to gather material for his thesis under the cupola of the Reading Room of the British Museum Library. Through Darwin's writings Westermarck learned about research on primitive promiscuity (by, for example, Morgan, McLennan, and Lubbock), and finally criticized these researchers in his history of human marriage. Westermarck received his earliest research examples from Darwin, as well as examples on how biological, psychological, and sociological factors affect the origin and development of human customs, practices, and institutions. Westermarck believed that the history of human civilization should be as scientifically studied as the history of organic nature.⁴¹⁴ G. H. von Wright calls this idea of a natural history of civilization "the regal idea of Westermarck's research".⁴¹⁵ In his licentiate

⁴¹² Von Wright (1979), 283, 312.

⁴¹³ For Westermarck's bibliography, see Manninen and Niiniluoto (2007), 410-420.

⁴¹⁴ Westermarck (1889), 1.

⁴¹⁵ Von Wright (1979), 286



*Edward Westermarck (1862-1939).
Portrait by Verner Thomé. Helsinki
University Museum, photo by
Pia Vuorikoski.*

thesis, Westermarck talks about Tylor's, Lubbock's, and Spencer's new way of looking at history ("a cultural history based on ethnographical grounds").⁴¹⁶ He also criticizes unilineal conclusions, which he considers fatal for the development of the "Science of Society."

Westermarck did not accept Darwin's theory entirely without his own additions and critical deviations. Particularly central for his own research, he said, was Darwin's theory of selection as applied to the examination of instincts. On the other hand, he considered Darwin's statements on sexual selection inconsistent with the general theory of selection.⁴¹⁷ According to Westermarck, precisely the theory of selection, not descent, was at the core of Darwinism and brought up new, if indirect, causes for the constant transformations in organisms. Even though Westermarck considered Darwinism basically biological, he believed that it could be used to solve a wider range of questions. Natural selection did not restrict itself to the physical life of organisms; in the struggle for existence, evolution also ruled the variation of social phenomena and the mental life of an individual. This broad definition of the theory of selection already reflects young Westermarck's scientific orientation and methodological linking of the three fields:

"The theory of selection has had a revolutionary effect on the three main branches of science: biology, or the science

⁴¹⁶ Westermarck (1889), 2.

⁴¹⁷ Westermarck (1929), 77-78.

of the physical phenomena of life; psychology, or the science of mental life; sociology, or the science of society.”⁴¹⁸

The methodological foundation of Westermarck’s research is built on three fields, biology, psychology, and sociology. They offer the methodological principles that he uses in his research on marriage, sexuality, religion, moral ideas, and Moroccan beliefs and ritual practices. This tripartition is particularly clear in Spencer’s production (*The Principles of Biology, The Principles of Psychology, The Principles of Sociology*). In his obituary of Spencer, Westermarck writes that as a biologist he was “a man of progress,” as a psychologist “a reformer,” and as a sociologist “one of the creators of a new discipline.”⁴¹⁹ In the end, Spencer was prepared to place ethics (*The Principles of Ethics*) as the most important part of his synthesis-seeking system – an emphasis that Westermarck shared concerning his own career. An undeniable Darwinian-Spencerian tripartite research program (including ethics) was already present in young Westermarck’s statements on the theory of selection:

“— I am not saying that Darwin’s explanation is the absolute truth, I have presented this example to show how psychology and even ethics have to take into account the principle of natural selection.”⁴²⁰

“I believe therefore that the human society in its basic forms is a product of the natural selection.”⁴²¹

Westermarck was particularly attracted to the way Darwin strictly kept to scientific hypotheses and explanatory models without religious assumptions about Providence or divine guidance. Westermarck was not the kind of humanist who would blindly adore humankind or culture, neither did he trust in their rapid progress. In his memoirs, when describing the Sunday services of the freethinkers, Westermarck straightforwardly expresses his dislike for idealistic worshippers of humanity: “There was, in addition, some kind of hymn-singing with ‘Humanity’ substituted for ‘God’. I do not feel much attracted by such relics of ritual, and the last

⁴¹⁸ Westermarck (1891b), 220.

⁴¹⁹ Westermarck (1904a), 46.

⁴²⁰ Westermarck (1891b), 233.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, 236.

thing I should dream of worshipping is humanity – although I am glad if I can be useful in its service.”⁴²² Atheist humanist congregations and their praises of humanity did not rouse Westermarck’s sympathies, although he obviously favored freedom of religion; he had, as a student, dissociated himself from institutionalized religion and adopted the agnostic position.

Westermarck could not agree with those who claimed that Darwinism seduced people into a denial of religion. In his interpretation, Darwinism neither denied nor accepted the hypothesis of the existence of a personalized God. Metaphysical statements about the essence of things were irrelevant to it:

“It [Darwinism] leads neither to materialism, pantheism, nor any other doctrine about the essence or origin of things, because it does not lend itself to the explanation of what life is. It only reveals the laws under which life develops and the conditions that determine its progress.”⁴²³

Timothy Stroup⁴²⁴ includes four names in his list of thinkers who influenced Westermarck the most: David Hume, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, and James Frazer. Without denying the importance of these four, there is good reason to add at least four others: Herbert Spencer, Edward Burnett Tylor, Alfred Cort Haddon, and Harald Høffding. Haddon’s anthropological and Høffding’s psychological-philosophical significance for Westermarck is obvious, and Tylor greatly influenced Westermarck, at least from an anthropological, if not a philosophical, perspective. Even though Tylor did not publish extensively after 1881, his earlier production as well as some of his later writings gave Westermarck the firm methodological foundation for the development of social anthropology.

Tylor was young Westermarck’s master; their correspondence began in 1890.⁴²⁵ Tylor also helped Westermarck to publish *HHM* by giving him a letter of recommendation to present to the publisher, Macmillan.⁴²⁶ Yrjö

⁴²² Westermarck (1929), 80.

⁴²³ Westermarck (1891b), 80.

⁴²⁴ Stroup (1982a), 126–127.

⁴²⁵ The cards and letters from Tylor (22 altogether) date from 1890–1908 (see BEW 31, numbers 4997–5018). Two of the letters from Westermarck to Tylor have been preserved (see ETP, 28.12.1896, 31.12.1898). See also Wikman (1940).

⁴²⁶ Westermarck (1929), 88.

Hirn, who closely observed Westermarck's English connections, considered Tylor an important teacher and a central role model: "If any one of Westermarck's English friends could be said to have been a teacher and an example to him, then it appears to me that E. B. Tylor would deserve that distinction."⁴²⁷

Tylor's non-unilineal methodological orientation is already present in Westermarck's dissertation. Right at the beginning of his career, Westermarck was acquainted with views that diverged from traditional Darwinism. In the late 1800s, anthropologists had begun to criticize unilineal evolutionism as well as the comparative method. The discovery of the fact that no clear and indisputable developmental stages could be found to be common to all societies revised anthropological evolutionism. "Stages" were, in practice, different for different communities. Thus, the comparative method was not without its loopholes.

Westermarck's work was based on Darwinism but later shifted to critical evolutionism, which emphasized the non-unilineal nature of cultural development and social evolution. Westermarck's comparative method was positioned round the intersection of the lingering Victorian interest in stages, Darwinian research principles, and the relatively critical "(early) modern" functionalist cultural research. Westermarck and other scholars noted the non-unilineal development of cultural institutions and concepts of morality, which failed to fit the classical evolutionist scheme. Westermarck and Hobhouse, who were both appointed to the Martin White chair of sociology at the London School of Economics in 1907 (Hobhouse permanently, Westermarck originally for five years, but his term was extended later), belonged to the early revisionists of the anthropological and socio-psychological applications of evolutionism:

"Unlike many previous writers, they [Westermarck and Hobhouse] each saw that the process of human evolution does not advance step by step with the growth of civilisation. Indeed, one side of a culture may develop yet bring with it no corresponding change in ethical concepts or practice. Moral development in history represents a winding curve rather than a linear growth. Similarly, the growth of an institution cannot be seen as a single continuous process from its origin to contemporary structure. All institutions and cultures are subject to ubiquitous crosscurrents of contact and interacting influence."⁴²⁸

⁴²⁷ Hirn (1947), 50.

⁴²⁸ Owen (1953), 31.

Still, Westermarck and his students continued to use the concept of “origin” (even in their titles⁴²⁹), but by then it had lost its “original” evolutionist significance. In Westermarck’s (*ODMI*) and Hirn’s (*The Origins of Art*) works, the concept of origin was no longer bound to the evolution of (temporally) “first beginnings,” but connected to that branch of evolutionist thought which emphasized the psychologically primitive and reached beyond the comparative method.⁴³⁰

Academic Career and Work

In August 1890, Westermarck was given the title of Docent in sociology, before his doctorate in philosophy (in September 1890) at the Imperial Alexander University. Westermarck took actively part in the meetings of the Philosophical Society between 1888–1897 and occasionally in 1903, 1908, 1910 and 1913, discussing, for example, the mind-body problem (first defending parallelism, later becoming more ambivalent about it), moral emotions, the development of morality, the task of ethics, the bodily expression of affects, and religion. He was acting Professor of philosophy at the Imperial Alexander University from 1894 to 1897 when he left Finland and stayed abroad, mostly in England and Morocco for eight years except for short periods in Finland (acting Professor of philosophy in Helsinki during the spring term of 1903). In 1906, he was appointed Professor of practical philosophy in Helsinki, but he spent half of his time as Professor of sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

In the meeting of the Philosophical Society on 21 November 1896, Westermarck gave a lecture on “Philosophy and its study” and reflected on the academic disciplines. For Westermarck, philosophy meant “thinking about the principles” such as those of being, knowing, and acting.

⁴²⁹ “Origin” was a key concept, which linked the Westermarckian researchers (see Susiluoto, 1981, 143). In addition to Westermarck and Hirn, this concept was used by Karsten (*The origin of worship*, 1905; *The origins of religion*, 1930), Landtman (*The origin of priesthood*, 1905; *The origin of the inequality of the social classes*, 1938), Holsti (*The relation of war to the origin of the state*, 1913), Holmberg (*Jumalauskon alkuperä* [The origin of the belief in God], 1916), and, as a late reflection, Numelin (*The beginnings of diplomacy*, 1950).

⁴³⁰ See Wikman (1953), 3.

Those principles do not belong to any special disciplines, which have their own philosophies. Westermarck mentioned especially “empirical psychology” and “social science” that should be recognized as independent academic disciplines, also suitable as starting points for the students of philosophy.⁴³¹

Westermarck’s teaching at the Imperial Alexander University included courses in philosophy, psychology, ethics, sociology, and the study of religions. He continued lecturing on the same kind of subjects at Åbo Akademi, more also on the history of philosophy and of family.

Westermarck’s own academic affiliation got an international start when he was appointed teacher of sociology in 1904 and Professor in sociology on 17 December 1907 at the London School of Economics (emeritus in 1930). He also held the Chair of practical philosophy in Helsinki (1906–1918) and professorship of philosophy at the newly established Swedish-language university Åbo Akademi (1918–1932), and he was the first rector of Åbo Akademi (1918–1921).

Westermarck’s first lecture series (“Seven lectures on early custom and morals”, Westermarck 1904b; in Swedish: Westermarck, 1912 and in Finnish: Westermarck, 1913b) at LSE started on 9 February 1904. He also gave ten lectures on anthropology at University College in London (see Westermarck, 1904c). From the fall of 1904 onwards, Westermarck taught sociology at LSE for two semesters, and from the fall of 1907 onwards, for one semester per year. Between 1910 and 1930, Westermarck’s instruction at LSE was scheduled in the summer term when he gave lectures, classes, and a seminar for advanced students. Typical topics of his lectures were sociology, social institutions, social rights and duties and family, but he did not deal with “pure” sociology; rather, he discussed the sociological, social anthropological, social psychological and biological approaches and the division of research tasks between these fields.

⁴³¹ Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 284. – In his response to Yrjö Hirn’s lecture “Preliminary studies toward art philosophy on a psychological basis” (in the meeting of the Philosophical Society on 4 December 1896), Westermarck defended Hirn’s emotional aesthetics and comparative folk psychological approach, wishing that psychology would not solely concentrate on experimental research and mathematical formulations but would also take into account the “development of the different forms of the psychic life” (“utvecklingen af sjäslifvets olika former”), even if such studies would not be as exact as the experiments (Manninen and Niiniluoto, 1996, 287).

“Pure” sociology was too mechanical for Westermarck who also anticipated the rise of social psychology:

“I should not be surprised ,however, if social psychology, when at last permitted to speak, should raise violent objections to many of the classifications and conclusions made by ‘pure’ sociology, for it seems to me that ‘pure’ sociology is liable to commit the most fatal mistakes by detaching social phenomena from their motive powers and treating them as mechanical processes, just as if men as members of society were a sort of automata.”⁴³²

During Westermarck’s times, anthropology had not yet clearly separate subfields. Westermarck’s research and teaching belonged mainly within the realm of social anthropology, but he wrote on the issues that could now be placed under more specialized subfields of anthropology. In his inaugural lecture at LSE in 1907, Westermarck defined social anthropology as a branch of sociology and placed his own work within comparative research on social institutions and within social anthropology.⁴³³

We should remember that Westermarck’s central work is not limited to anthropological writing. His Moroccan studies are the most characteristically anthropological. They are collections of material based on observations in the field, with some “folk psychological” and sociological observations. In his history of marriage, Westermarck emphasizes, in addition to the critical evolutionist angle, psychological factors, even more manifest in his theory of moral judgments and emotions, presented in his two-volume magnum opus *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (ODMI; 1906a, 1908b). Later, his use of psychology is further developed in the philosophical-psychological theories of *Ethical Relativity* (ER; 1932b). *Early Beliefs and their Social Influence* (1932a) is a kind of a return to sociological theory. *Three Essays on Sex and Marriage* (1934b) and *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilization* (1936) in turn exhibit Westermarck’s proficiency in the sexual psychological area. These areas were complemented by Westermarck’s ongoing interest in the study of religion and magic, largely based on his anthropological case material. His last work *Christianity and Morals* (1939) culminated his approach to the relations between religion and morality.

⁴³² Westermarck (1921a), 9.

⁴³³ Westermarck (1908c), 27–28.

Westermarck's central research topics intrigued him throughout his career. The topics intertwine and complement each other, and the examples accumulate from work to work. In his methodology and hypotheses, Westermarck remained true to the ideals of his youth, and his intellectual marriage with the comparative method. The forms of social life and the psychological motives of human action and consciousness are examined against the backdrop of the long developmental processes implied in the theory of evolution. Ultimately, Westermarck took his search for explanations all the way to biological "facts". He positioned them at the foundation of psychological and social phenomena, as he noted in connection with the study on marriage: "There is no question here of biological analogies applied to the explanation of social evolution — as has been mistakenly said — but we are concerned with biological facts underlying psychical and social phenomena."⁴³⁴ The claim that Westermarck viewed the phenomena under study as largely unchanging has been caused by a misapprehension. The schedule of change he posits may be unusual, but, especially in the Moroccan studies, he does take the social context into account, even if he does not abandon the hope to establish the evolutionary patterns of human social life.

When examining Westermarck's entire oeuvre, it does not feel appropriate to talk about the *stages* of his thought, but rather the *continua* and the *interactions* between the different topics. These continua interacted and changed places in their mutual hierarchy over the years. The starting point for the Morocco theme is the first journey to Morocco and the first travel descriptions that were published in 1898. Westermarck had obviously already been interested in these topics before the first publications. It is probably also not unjustified to say that he worked on all the topics unusually actively until the end of his life. Viewed in this manner (as continua, "along its many lines"), Westermarck's work forms a multifaceted but logical whole.

A continuum exists also in that Westermarck kept citing himself throughout his production. He often repeated even long previously published passages — either as such or partly revised — in later texts. Partly it concerned writing different versions of the same text for different audiences. Due to these repetitions Westermarck's entire production is not as broad as could be deduced from his list of publications. It is, however, even with these duplications, versatile and outstanding.

⁴³⁴ Westermarck (1921a), 22.

Main Methodological and Theoretical Positions

In his writings, Westermarck paid attention to the content of mental life (for example, ideas, beliefs, convictions, motives, emotions, and values). He attempted to reach from the level of social research to a psychological level and psychological explanatory factors behind social practices. Nevertheless, he often remained on the level of psychological “material” and “object language” referring to intentions, motives, desires, thoughts and emotions without reaching to the “function language” concerning psychological processes studied by experimental psychology. For Westermarck, the theory of evolution offered an empirical basis that could be applied when studying the formation of even psychological structures and processes. Compared to Rivers and Malinowski, Westermarck’s approach was methodologically “softer,” more closely connected with the humanities and Darwin’s empirical rigor of research. In his works, Westermarck did not comment on the precise context of his research, nor on the effects of his interactions in the field. With his practical attitude toward field research problems and his cosmopolitan mindset, Westermarck adapted well to local circumstances and cultural differences in customs, beliefs and ideas. His cosmopolitanism is expressed in *ODMI* where he comments on racism and nationalism that he considered a danger for humanity:

“The fervour of nineteenth century nationalism has not been able to quench the cosmopolitan spirit. In spite of loud appeals made to racial instincts and the sense of national solidarity, the idea is daily gaining ground that the aims of a nation must not conflict with the interests of humanity at large; that our love of country should be controlled by other countries’ right to prosper and to develop their own individuality; and that the oppression of weaker nationalities inside the state and aggressiveness towards foreign nations, being mainly the outcome of vainglory and greed, are inconsistent with the aspirations of a good patriot, as well as of a good man.”⁴³⁵

Westermarck was not a completely naïve realist. “Facts as such” left him indifferent. The interesting part of research was to examine the ideas, values and psychological motives behind the facts. On the goals of his Mo-

⁴³⁵ Westermarck (1908b), 184–185.

rocco research, Westermarck remarked, “In my study of native ceremonies I have not been content with ascertaining the bare external facts but have, so far as possible, tried to discover the ideas underlying them.”⁴³⁶ However, it was still the researcher revealing the ideas and motives of others – the research objects – rather than displaying the intentions and agreements that develop in the interaction between the researcher and the “informant,” transforming the research process itself. A rational ethos dominates the scene of fieldwork and social research. Westermarck sympathetically entered the life situations of the groups under study and approached the area of shared experiences and perceptions between the researcher and the objects of his study. Nevertheless, he did not actually document the contextual point of departure of these shared world-views.

His democratic and caring attitude toward the local inhabitants differed from the approach taken by many early British and French anthropologists who subscribed to aristocratic or colonialist values. Like Malinowski, Westermarck was an immigrant who had made England his home, and whose cultural background and intellectual heritage was not that of the mainstream. Furthermore, he had already in Finland belonged to a minority, the Finnish-Swedes, and to the subgroup of that minority who never properly learned the language of the majority, Finnish. His repetitive assurances of gratitude to British science and British academic institutions probably served in part to dispel his feelings of marginality.

Compared to Durkheim, Westermarck emphasized the role of biological instincts and the “psychic constitution” in the construction of social institutions. On the other hand, social institutions and habits also affect instincts and the “psychic constitution.” When Westermarck talked about instincts, emotions, and sentiments, he was not referring as much to intra-psychic processes as to collective, communal psychological stimuli and feelings which lay behind individual, even “private” inclinations and emotions. In his critique of the first volume of *ODMI*, Durkheim had specifically noted that Westermarck did indeed admit that the community was the “birthplace” of moral consciousness and that the “first” moral evaluations had expressed the emotions of the entire community,

⁴³⁶ Westermarck (1913a), 3. – On Westermarck’s Moroccan studies, see, for example, Pipping and Stolte-Heiskanen (1984); Suolinna, Hällström & Lahtinen (2000); Shankland (2014); Lagerspetz and Suolinna (2014; 2017); Melasuo (2018). – Westermarck’s travel book on Morocco was published in 1918.

not the private emotions of separate individuals.⁴³⁷ He thought it surprising, however, that Westermarck did not pay more attention to such an important matter — a remark which no doubt illustrates the difference between Westermarck's theoretical and methodological approach, and French Durkheimian sociology. For Durkheim, Westermarck's method of deducing moral concepts from emotions was but a series of introspective analyses and abstract deductions.⁴³⁸ Already, in connection with the publication of the French translation of *HHM* in 1895, Durkheim had criticized Westermarck for using a method that was in conflict with good method. In other words, Durkheim accused Westermarck of being faithful to Darwinism and to the union between ethnography and psychology, that old-fashioned cooperative relation.⁴³⁹

Westermarck, however, cannot be considered an orthodox Darwinist, not even in his early works. He was selective and critical of the theory of evolution, but also considered it largely well-founded and scientifically far-reaching. He had already, in 1897, defended himself against this accusation of Darwinism. Westermarck did not try to reduce anthropology and sociology into psychology and finally into biology. He was aware that individual psychology alone did not suffice to explain human thought and action in all social contexts. He did not think that sociological explanations were able to express the multiple aspects of social actions either. In Westermarck's work, the psychological and the sociological approaches thus complemented each other instead of serving biological research.

Westermarck was in favor of cordial cooperation between the French and the British school of sociology, although such cooperation mostly failed. Sociological academic organizations began earlier in France than in England. For example, the Institut International de Sociologie headed by René Worms invited Westermarck to become its member as early as 1894, its founding year. For its second congress, Westermarck submitted a paper on matriarchy which aroused vivid discussion.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁷ See Westermarck (1906a), 118; Durkheim (1907), 388–389.

⁴³⁸ Durkheim (1907), 390: “[...] une suite d’analyses introspectives et de déductions abstraites, à peu près vide de toute donnée objective.”

⁴³⁹ Durkheim (1895), 606–608.

⁴⁴⁰ See Lagerborg (1951), 217–218; (1953). The paper was published (Westermarck, 1896). In the year that the French translation of *HHM* was published (1895), Westermarck also published an article on marriage in *Revue Internationale de Sociologie* (Westermarck, 1895).

While he was residing in England around the turn of the century, Westermarck had the opportunity to witness how British indigenous academic sociology became independent. Westermarck took part in scholarly meetings and discussions in the Aristotelian Society, Sociological Society (both in London and in Manchester), Philosophical Society (in Oxford), Folk-Lore Society, Anthropological Institute, and the Economic Society of LSE. With sociologist Victor Branford, among others, he participated in the founding of the Sociological Society in London in 1903. Through Branford, Westermarck met the Member of Parliament Martin White in the fall of 1903, who contributed to the beginning of sociology instruction at the University of London. He also played a part in Westermarck's being invited to lecture at LSE and in his later appointment as the Martin White Professor of Sociology (1907-30).

In *ODMI*, Westermarck took it upon himself to thoroughly map out the various forms of the *universal* morals. Nevertheless, he examined moral phenomena as *social facts* and constructed a general theory about how the human society has taken form and changed as morals have gradually undergone processes of institutionalization.⁴⁴¹ Westermarck cannot be regarded as a trivial moral and social evolutionist. Compared with Durkheim's theory, Westermarck's theory offers an alternative attempt to explain the origins of social life and solidarity,⁴⁴² and the role that instincts, emotions, and customs play in the development of the values that regulate social interaction. Both Westermarck and Durkheim were part of a tradition which derived from Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith. That "moral sense" tradition or "moral sentimentalism" has been philosophical, more psychologically crystallized in Alexander F. Shand's (Westermarck's close friend) theory of sentiments, which Shand considered the basis of the "Science of Character."⁴⁴³ Emotions, sentiments, and sanctions, which form the core of social institutions and customs, take center ground, not only in Westermarck's and Durkheim's, but also in Giddings's, Sumner's, and Tönnies's sociological studies.⁴⁴⁴

Westermarck and Durkheim both emphasized the socio-psychological context of the formation of institutions, that is, the interaction of fundamental human emotions in social life. They both included psychological elements in sociological explanations, but Durkheim understood

441 See also Fletcher (1982).

442 Compare Pipping (1982), 350.

443 Shand (1896; 1914).

444 Compare Fletcher (1982), 210.

the collective representations produced by the group mind as social facts, whereas Westermarck emphasized the universal nature of individual psychic dispositions.

Psychological Connections

Westermarck's view on the purpose and methodology of psychological research is most apparent in his psychology lectures, and less so in his printed texts. It has been pointed out that Westermarck touched upon psychological issues in his lectures on philosophy and sociology. However, Westermarck's psychology lectures proper give a better view of his psychological connections. According to the program of the Imperial Alexander University of Finland, Westermarck gave lectures in psychology for the first time in the spring term of 1895, and next in the spring term of 1897, when his lectures were especially targeted to law students. These early lectures have not been preserved, but it is possible to see from Leo Ehrnrooth's lecture notes, which he made in Westermarck's class on social science in the spring term of 1894, that Westermarck included psychological material even in these lectures. This material contained a Kantian (or Mendelssohnean) division of consciousness into ideas, emotions, and the will, and a division of emotions into self-contained emotions and relational emotions, as well as a link between moral judgment and intention.⁴⁴⁵ For Westermarck, moral emotions were relational emotions, "determined by the agreement or disagreement between two intentions or rather between two conceptions of intentions."⁴⁴⁶ The lectures also show Westermarck's opinion on psychological classification, which he considered "artificial," that is, based on an abstraction and an analysis of concrete states of consciousness.⁴⁴⁷

The preserved manuscripts of the psychology lectures Westermarck gave in Helsinki in 1914–15 probably include material that he had used earlier, in the 1890s. Nevertheless, much of it was written later, in the 1910s. The description of the psychology class shows that Westermarck lectured on the same topics at Åbo Akademi in 1921–22 and 1924–25,

⁴⁴⁵ See Westermarck (1894), 32–40.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁴⁴⁷ See *ibid.*, 32. — Westermarck also states a similar view of psychological classification in his psychology lectures (EWH, Kapsel 78, FP I [1914], 146, 153a).

as he did in 1914–15, although possibly not in the same order. Overall, Westermarck's topics represent the academic psychology of the time. It is obvious that he, like Harald Høffding, put more emphasis on the study of sensations, ideas, and emotions than on the study of the will.

Westermarck's lectures show that he was not an original or creative psychological thinker. He presented a few examples, ideas, and critical remarks of his own, but mostly he relied in psychological questions on the venerable authority of Høffding. In a preserved lecture manuscript, Westermarck does not mention that he followed almost throughout his lectures the order found in Høffding's *Psykologi i omrids paa grundlag af erfaring* (from here on referred to as *Psykologi*). In many instances, Westermarck directly summarized Høffding's text.

In his undergraduate years in the 1880s, Westermarck had been inspired to use a psychological approach by Høffding's brand new *Psykologi*, published in 1882. Several editions of *Psykologi* were published at the time and it was translated into many languages (into Finnish in 1911). Lagerborg remarked that Westermarck was Høffding's (and Spencer's) "disciple,"⁴⁴⁸ but von Wright has deemed this statement an exaggeration.⁴⁴⁹ When it comes to psychology, however, we should not dismiss Lagerborg's argument. In moral philosophical questions, again, Westermarck cannot be considered Høffding's follower.

Westermarck remembered Høffding as his early guide to the world of psychology later, in a piece of writing published in honor of Høffding's 80th anniversary:

"For the student of the 80's, his work *Psykologi* came as a revelation. In the German textbook studied before, the soul had been lost in abstractions. Now it was rediscovered. In *Psykologi* by Høffding, you could recognize yourself, because it portrayed mental life as it really was and not as the metaphysicians thought it was."⁴⁵⁰

Høffding had defended an empirical psychology "without soul," without an absolute essence.⁴⁵¹ Høffding's psychology combined the German and the British psychological traditions. Because Høffding was Danish, he

⁴⁴⁸ Lagerborg (1951), 165.

⁴⁴⁹ von Wright (1979), 315.

⁴⁵⁰ Westermarck (1923), 3.

⁴⁵¹ Høffding (1882), 14–16.

could adopt the position of an outsider with respect to these traditions, a position which appealed to Westermarck as well. Høffding presented to Westermarck a foundation from which he could not only acquaint himself further with empirical psychology and psychological methodology, but also compare German and British psychology. Høffding was not too tightly connected with German culture and took advantage of the greatest achievements of British science, greatly admired by Westermarck. This approach inevitably included eclecticism, which Westermarck did not regard as a defect in Høffding's psychology.

Just as Høffding was for Westermarck a crucially important guide to psychology, another Danish psychologist, Alfred Lehmann, a pioneer of experimental psychology and (from 1910) professor of psychology at the University of Copenhagen, was his guide to the psychology of emotions. Lehmann's role has so far been ignored in the study of Westermarck's psychological ideas. Lehmann worked as Wundt's assistant in the mid-1880s in Leipzig, and he founded a psychology laboratory in Copenhagen. For Westermarck, Lehmann's most significant work was *Hovedlovene for det menneskelige følelsesliv* (1892). Westermarck by no means fully agreed with Lehmann's theories about the psychology of emotions. Lehmann claimed that he had experimentally proven that, contrary to the James–Lange theory, emotional states preceded bodily expressions instead of being caused by them. Westermarck did not take a stand in this question.⁴⁵²

Westermarck operated within the psychological terminology of his time. There had not yet developed an understanding of the processual nature and contextual conditions of mental life. A way to describe the system of consciousness was through a “law of relativity”: Sensations, ideas, and emotions are determined and defined in relation to different stages of consciousness.⁴⁵³ In his psychology lectures, Westermarck briefly commented on the concepts of “feeling” (*känsla*), “emotion” (*emotion*), and “affect” (*affekt*), but did not conceptually distinguish between them. He used “feeling” (and also “emotion” and “affect”) to refer to “concrete

⁴⁵² EWH, Kapsel 80, FP I [1914], 140.

⁴⁵³ See EWH, Kapsel 78, FP I [1914], 174. — Westermarck had adopted his views on the law of relativity (*Forholdslov*) from Høffding (see 1898, 127–129, 309). Westermarck (EWH, Kapsel 80, FP II [1915], 51a) considered Weber's law, known in psychophysics, as a special case of the law of relativity.

states of consciousness” in which the “emotional element” dominates, but in which there is also an “idea” and a “will element.”⁴⁵⁴

Even though Westermarck talked about “elements,” he believed that the taxonomy of emotions was a taxonomy of “concrete states of consciousness,” not a classification and an analysis of psychic elements. Nevertheless, he considered the systematization of emotions laborious and he understood why no classification system had yet been universally accepted. In addition to Lehmann, Westermarck considered Fechner, Bain, Nahlowski, Wundt, and Ribot, among the significant representatives of the psychology of emotions.⁴⁵⁵

Previous research on Westermarck has been ambiguous about whether the classification into relational and self-contained emotions presented in his lectures in 1894 was his own, or whether it was borrowed from somewhere else.⁴⁵⁶ Some writers have alluded to Bain.⁴⁵⁷ As a matter of fact, in his lecture at the Philosophical Society in 1895, Westermarck did indeed mention Bain and his reference to relational emotions.⁴⁵⁸ Nevertheless, Bain was not Westermarck’s main influence on this question. Westermarck presented in the most detail Lehmann’s system of classification, from which he also borrowed the division into relational and self-contained emotions.

Westermarck regarded the study of emotions as a broad task to be shared by various disciplines. He himself studied moral emotions within psychological ethics. Even though he did not favor any classification system, Westermarck chose to present in his lectures Lehmann’s division of emotions into relational emotions (directed by relations between ideas)

454 EWH, Kapsel 80, FP II [1915], 165–166. See also EWH, Kapsel 78, FP I [1914], 178a.

455 EWH, Kapsel 80, FP II [1915], 166–167.

456 Von Wright (1979, 317) has mentioned that he is not aware of where the classification that Westermarck presented came from.

457 Stroup (1982a, 65) mentions this possibility, but also remarks that Westermarck had not made any notes at the point in question in Bain’s (1859/1880) book.

458 Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 237 (“Den moraliska känslan,” 19.4.1895).

and self-contained emotions (directed by the contents of the ideas).⁴⁵⁹ Nevertheless, Westermarck did not fully accept Lehmann's classification or the principles behind it. He thought that Lehmann had over-emphasized the "idea element" of emotions and had neglected their "instinctive element" and "will element." A serious shortcoming was also that Lehmann's classification made no connection between anger and moral disapproval, or gratitude and moral approval, which was where Westermarck's own interest lay. In his own "classification" of moral emotions he used "retributive emotions" as a uniting term. It is noteworthy that Westermarck in his lectures obviously believed that his moral theory included an unbreakable connection between instincts, emotions, and ideas.⁴⁶⁰ Furthermore, it highlighted the role of will in the examination of sympathy.

Westermarck used "logical emotions" as an example of relational emotions. He believed that an "emotion of logical displeasure," caused by a disagreement between two ideas born of the same phenomenon, was especially significant for the advancement of science, for the formulation of scholarly hypotheses, and for scientific innovation. For Westermarck, the history of science reflected repeated attempts to find logical solutions for incompatible ideas, and to consequently reach an emotion of logical pleasure.⁴⁶¹

On Human Marriage, Incest and Exogamy

Of the wide range of topics included in Westermarck's history of marriage, his ideas about the universality of the family and the origin of marriage (monogamy) as well as his theory of the origins of the incest taboo and exogamy have become part of world-wide debates. Before Westermarck published his dissertation on the history of marriage, academic research

⁴⁵⁹ Lehmann (1892), 257–258. Lehman uses the words *Forholdsfølelser* and *Indholdsfølelser*. Westermarck introduced Lehmann's classification in his social science lectures in 1894, in his psychology lectures in 1897, and in his later psychology lectures (e.g., EWH, Kapsel 78, FP I [1914], 178a–178b and EWH, Kapsel 80, FP II [1915], 168–174).

⁴⁶⁰ EWH, Kapsel 78, FP I [1914], 178b and EWH, Kapsel 80, FP II [1915], 173–174.

⁴⁶¹ EWH, Kapsel 78, FP I [1914], 178a and EWH, Kapsel 80, FP II [1915], 169–171. See also Lehmann (1892), 170–172, 259–260.

on family and its origins had already gained momentum. Researchers who had written on the topic included Bachofen, Tylor, Giraud-Teulon, Lubbock, Maine, L. H. Morgan, Engels, McLennan, and Spencer. Westermarck was at first inclined to accept the dominant hypothesis which stated that primitive peoples had been (and partly still were) living in a state of promiscuity. The most famous supporters of the hypothesis of primitive promiscuity were Bachofen, McLennan, Lubbock, L. H. Morgan, Bastian, Giraud-Teulon, Lippert, Le Bon, Post, Wilken, and Engels. In the 1880s, many scholars considered primitive promiscuity a proven fact.⁴⁶² The general belief was that the regulation of marriage had progressed from promiscuity via group marriage to matriarchy, and finally to patriarchy.

Westermarck took it upon himself to research this challenging topic. Based on the broad range of material he encountered in the British Museum Library, he concluded that there was no convincing evidence to support the hypothesis of primitive promiscuity. In *HHM* he tried to show that (i) no known primitive people had been, or actually was, living in complete promiscuity, (ii) the arguments of earlier researchers were obscure and untrustworthy, (iii) in cases of some kind of group marriage formation, the group marriage had developed as a combination of polygyny and polyandry, (iv) in some hypothesized cases of “sexual communism,” no single woman was really married to more than one man; instead, individual marriages existed alongside sexual (male) libertinism, and (v) even in most early hunting and gathering groups the family, consisting of man, woman, and children, was a significant social unit.

Monogamy, according to Westermarck’s firm notion, was the earliest form of marriage, polygamy and group marriage were later and insignificant deviations from natural and universal monogamy. In the last chapter of his dissertation, Westermarck, while conceding that with some peoples intercourse between the sexes may have been on the whole promiscuous, had already decidedly denied the likelihood of promiscuity having formed a general stage in “the social history of mankind.”⁴⁶³ Westermarck believed that monogamy was the only form of marriage that had been universally accepted. It had been present even in the rare cases where po-

⁴⁶² Westermarck (1889, 65) presented an overview of research on family and its origin at the end of the 1880s. See also Westermarck (1927), 69.

— On Westermarck and the debate on primitive promiscuity, see also Ihanus (1996).

⁴⁶³ Westermarck (1889), 161.

lygyny, polyandry, and group marriage had taken place.⁴⁶⁴ Westermarck held firmly to his proposition that “marriage is rooted in the family rather than the family in marriage,”⁴⁶⁵ which he repeated in several connections. By this he meant that marriage is a result of natural selection and that it is based on instinctual family ties. He saw the family as a tight communal form which secures the survival of the offspring. According to Westermarck’s definition, the family is a social unit combined of individuals who are married to each other or who are each other’s blood relatives, and who usually live together.⁴⁶⁶

Westermarck’s theory claims that early sexual relations and forms of communal life were based on the instinct for monogamy and the maternal and paternal instincts. These instincts generated habits which have been sanctioned first by custom and then by law, and have thus been transformed into a social institution, marriage.⁴⁶⁷ Westermarck was a more ardent advocate of the hypothesis of universal monogamy than Darwin. However, he was not the first to criticize the hypothesis of primitive promiscuity. Back in the 1870s, C. Staniland Wake had presented harsh criticism against the promiscuity hypothesis. Westermarck was familiar with Wake’s *The Evolution of Morality* (1878) and had taken notes

⁴⁶⁴ Westermarck (1921c), 104.

⁴⁶⁵ See Westermarck (1921a), 72. — The original form of the statement reads: “Marriage is therefore rooted in family, rather than family in marriage” (Westermarck, 1889, 29).

⁴⁶⁶ Westermarck (1908b), 202.

⁴⁶⁷ Westermarck (1921a), 27–28, summarized his view on the origin of marriage: “As for the origin of the institution of marriage, I consider it probable that it has developed out of a primeval habit. It was, I believe, even in primitive times, the habit for a man and a woman (or several women) to live together, to have sexual relations with one another, and to rear their offspring in common, the man being the protector and supporter of his family and the woman being his helpmate and the nurse of their children. This habit was sanctioned by custom, and afterwards by law, and was thus transformed into a social institution. In order to trace marriage in its legal sense to its ultimate source, we must therefore try to find out the origin of the habit from which it sprang.” — On Westermarck as a historian of marriage, see Ihanus (1990), 160–177; (1998); (1999), 191–217.

from it before writing his dissertation.⁴⁶⁸ In his own arguments, Westermarck tried to prove that jealousy and monogamy had been universally prevalent from the early days of human kind: “[– –] if jealousy could be proved to be universally prevalent in the human race of the present day, it is impossible to believe that there ever was a time when man was devoid of that powerful feeling.”⁴⁶⁹ Both Westermarck’s study on marriage and his study on morality emphasize the fundamental role of strong emotion.

Westermarck defended on several occasions his argument that incest taboos result from the horror of incest. People who have grown up together feel no sexual attraction for each other, but instead an instinctive aversion to sexual intercourse with each other.⁴⁷⁰ These people do not have to be consanguineous kin, but the aversion, independent of both experience and education, is usually felt in the case of relatives. It thus regulates the relationship between parents and children, and between siblings. From these relationships within the nuclear family the aversion has expanded to include people who have lived in close contact with each other.

Westermarck speaks vaguely about “persons who have been living closely together from childhood.” We should note, therefore, that his model does not explain parents’ sexual aversion toward their children, since of course they have not lived with them since their *own* childhood. According to Westermarck, parental love toward their children is based on an “altruistic” instinct, not “sexual” or “egotistic.” Nevertheless, it can contain other instincts or emotions, and it tends to extend through the later life of the children and even spill over to other generations. Westermarck believed that children’s love for their parents was less developed and less crucial for the survival of the species than parents’ love for their children. He described children’s love for their parents as retributive, a

⁴⁶⁸ Westermarck used Wake’s book as a source in Westermarck (1889), and Wake’s other book, *The Development of Marriage and Kinship* (1889) in *HMM* (Westermarck, 1921a–c). In *The Descent of Man* (1871), Darwin, too, refers to Wake’s criticism against L. H. Morgan’s, McLennan’s, and Lubbock’s ideas on promiscuity.

⁴⁶⁹ Westermarck (1889), 143.

⁴⁷⁰ Westermarck stated his views on the incest taboo on several occasions; for a summary, see Westermarck (1891a), 290, 334, 352–353; Westermarck (1921b), 191–194, 236–239; Westermarck (1926), 78–109; Westermarck (1934a), 98–99. – A similar account of an aversion to intercourse between relatives was already proposed by Francis Hutcheson (1725); see Stroup (2004).

growing gratitude that children feel because of the pleasure caused by parents' good deeds.⁴⁷¹

Westermarck's theory of the origins of the incest taboo and its expansion, the exogamous set of rules, was not merely biological, emphasizing instinctive aversion. It cannot be considered only bioevolutionary or bio-social. In fact, he presented not a monolithic model for the construction of the incest taboo and exogamous rules, but one with three layers. The bio-socio-psychological nature of the model is best illustrated in Westermarck's own words: "It explains a world-wide institution [the social anthropological level] by a mental characteristic [the psychological level] which may be presumed to be common to all races of men. It traces the origin of this mental characteristic to the needs of the species [the biological level]."⁴⁷² Westermarck tried to find a biological foundation for the incest taboo, but he came to rely more on psychological facts, considering them experimentally proven, while biological explanations were merely hypothetical. He did not consider the validity of the biological explanation (the damaging consequences of inbreeding) decisive for the whole theory. Westermarck firmly believed that a single (though three-level) theory could cover the origins of both the incest taboo and exogamy. Later researchers have been skeptical about the possibility of forming such a broad single theory.

The relationships between the three parallel levels that Westermarck presented are still being reevaluated. Even though Wikman, in the 1960s, regarded Westermarck's incest theories as old-fashioned, the new socio-biological researchers added Westermarck to their arsenal in the 1970s and 1980s.⁴⁷³ There is empirical evidence that supports Westermarck's theory on incest. The most important and extensive studies that support Westermarck's theory look at the Taiwanese *sim pua* -marriage⁴⁷⁴ and the marriage patterns of people who have grown up on Israeli kibbutzim⁴⁷⁵. In a *sim pua* -marriage the family of the future groom adopts the future bride as a child into their home. In their monumental study, Wolf and Huang⁴⁷⁶ showed that people who have grown up together feel less

⁴⁷¹ See EWH, Kapsel 80, FP II [1915], 191–192, 204a–204b.

⁴⁷² Westermarck (1921b), 239.

⁴⁷³ See Wikman (1962a), 12; Wilson (1975; 1978; 1998); Ruse (1979/1985); see also Segerstrale (2017).

⁴⁷⁴ Wolf (1966; 1970); Wolf and Huang (1980); Wolf (1995).

⁴⁷⁵ Shepher (1971; 1983).

⁴⁷⁶ Wolf and Huang (1980); see also Wolf (1995).

sexual interest toward each other than in an average Chinese marriage. The researchers used the high rates of adultery and divorce and the low fertility rate among couples who have grown up together as indicators of a lowered sexual interest. This lowered sexual interest is most notable among couples who have lived together since before the age of four. In his kibbutz studies, Shepher⁴⁷⁷, similarly, found that out of the 2769 marriages studied, not one had been contracted between people who had lived on the same kibbutz from the age of six or less, even though there was no ban on such marriages.

Nevertheless, neither the *sim pua* -research nor the kibbutz studies have been able to recognize a particular “aversion mechanism” (or “Westermarck-effect”).⁴⁷⁸ They have mainly shown that an aversion (among members of the same generation) exists, but not why and how it develops or whether it is universal or not. These studies have also shown that a person’s developmental history and socialization experiences have a major impact on the person’s sexual choices and marriage decisions.

Sexological Issues

Westermarck wrote on sexual issues, family, and marriage in a variety of ways. He shed light on different forms of sexual behavior and sexual morality by exploring topics which included virginity, chastity, celibacy, *jus primae noctis*, jealousy, prostitution, “free love,” homosexuality, and secondary sexual characteristics. Westermarck’s merits as a sexologist are in his versatile descriptions and comparisons of different sexual practices and forms of their regulation, as well as in the sketching of preliminary sexual theories. Westermarck is both a classic of anthropology and a clas-

⁴⁷⁷ Shepher (1971; 1983).

⁴⁷⁸ Compare Spain (1988), 249–250. — After analyzing both the *sim pua* -case and the kibbutz case, Spiro (1982), 157, also adopted a skeptical stand: “[– –] the kibbutz case no more than the Chinese case constitutes proof for the Westermarck theory. Indeed, if my analysis is correct, the kibbutz case provides strong support for the contention of the vast majority of incest theorists that individuals who live together (whether they are family or nonfamily members) do indeed develop and retain sexual feelings for each other unless they are inhibited by countervailing social and cultural pressures.” – Antfolk and Wolf (2017), 83–84, remark that “direct, thorough and convincing support [for Westermarck’s hypothesis] is still lacking.”

sic of sexology. His name has usually not been listed among sexologists, because he was more active within anthropological circles than among sexologists. However, the topics of his research were, from early on, connected with sexology.

Westermarck's connections with the pioneers of sexology were not limited to his friendly relationship with his colleague Havelock Ellis and his membership in *Internationale Gesellschaft für Sexuallforschung* founded in 1913 and led by Albert Moll. In England, he followed the activities of the British sexual psychological association, founded in 1914.⁴⁷⁹ He also signed the appeal for sexual reform circulated by the reformist "world league" in 1929.⁴⁸⁰

Westermarck took part in promoting a more tolerant attitude toward homosexuality and other perceived sexual "perversions". The judgment of homosexuality as sin (unbelief, idolatry, or heresy), crime, moral corruption, or, at least, vice, stemmed, according to him, from the Christian tradition which "modern" people should question. In connection with no other issue did he perceive as large a difference between the teachings of Christianity and the customs and opinions of the human world. From Westermarck's progressive perspective, social practices, laws, and the public opinion appeared to have become increasingly more tolerant of homosexuality as people had become more alienated from ecclesiastical dogma and religious ideology. Academic research on sexuality had clarified the issue of homosexuality and moral ideas about it.⁴⁸¹ Westermarck thought it obvious that homosexuality had also been morally condemned on a non-religious basis, since it awakes instinctive aversion among heterosexual adults. However, this aversion does not form legitimate grounds for moral censorship:

"To be called wrong an act must then be productive of other harm than the mere aversion it causes, provided that the agent has not in an indecent manner shocked anyone's feelings. Any moral condemnation of homosexual practices (nobody can, of course, be blamed on account of his

⁴⁷⁹ The British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology published Westermarck's paper on sexual modesty in its series (Westermarck, 1921d). – On Westermarck, Malinowski and sexology, see Ihanus (1998; 2017).

⁴⁸⁰ See Lagerborg (1951), 401.

⁴⁸¹ Compare Westermarck (1908b), 480–489. See also Westermarck (1908a; 1909b; 1910a; 1910b).

abnormal desire) must be founded on an opinion of their hurtfulness, individual or public, whatever it may be. But thoughtful people will be on their guard against the common tendency to seek a rational justification for judgments springing merely from sentimental dislikes.”⁴⁸²

In Westermarck’s work, sexual research and moral research were interconnected. He believed that sexuality always had been morally evaluated to the extent that when people talked about “morality” they were generally thinking about “sexuality”. It was exactly here, in the area of sexual morals (for example the judgment of sexual perversions), that “sentimental aversions” had been given a central place.⁴⁸³ Westermarck, on the other hand, tried to rescue sexuality from moral principles based on aversion and religious dogmatism and move toward flexible sexual practices without feelings of sin or guilt.

Theory of Morality

The documentation Westermarck gathered on the history of human marriage led him to reflect further on the nature of morality. Already before Westermarck, Wake, Letourneau, Stephen, Wundt, Paulsen, Lecky, and Sutherland, among others, had examined the topic in their writings. Hobhouse and Sumner published their studies on morality in the same year as the first volume of *ODMI* was published (1906).⁴⁸⁴ However, Westermarck’s *ODMI* was the most extensive work in which the socio-psychological approach had been applied to the study of the origin and development of morality.⁴⁸⁵

Methodologically, Westermarck first describes the overall character of moral emotions and moral concepts. He then moves on to describe, in detail, practices that reflect the moral beliefs of different peoples, and, finally, he explains the origin and development of these practices by re-

⁴⁸² Westermarck (1936), 255–256.

⁴⁸³ See Westermarck (1936), 228–243.

⁴⁸⁴ Hobhouse (1906); Sumner (1906).

⁴⁸⁵ On Westermarck’s theory of morality, see Stroup (1982a; 1982b); Ihanus (1990), 208–237; (1999), 255–295; Salmela (1998), 38–70; Lagerspetz, Antfolk, Gustafsson & Kronqvist (2017), Part III and Part IV; Pipatti (2017).

ferring to either a “natural” or a “magical” basis. In the study of morality, Westermarck usually emphasized emotional factors on which he based moral concepts and judgments; however, he also believed that rational factors regulated and shaped the development of moral beliefs. In the background of Westermarck’s research on morality, a naturalist-evolutionist image of human beings can be seen, according to which the human fundamental egoistic tendencies enter the realm of social regulation as moral practices develop.

Westermarck’s theory of morality has often been evaluated in a philosophical context. Here is introduced the psychological-philosophical background that influenced Westermarck’s moral theory. An attempt is made to examine the psychological aspects of Westermarck’s moral theory: the psychological ethical approach, the socio-psychogenesis of moral emotions and moral consciousness, and the expansion of the altruistic feeling implied by ethical relativism or, rather, relativity.

Both Westermarck’s marriage studies and his moral studies were initiated by Darwin’s theories. As von Wright has pointed out, Westermarck’s Darwinist phase in the study of morality took place in 1890–1894.⁴⁸⁶ Westermarck’s earliest comment in the discussion on moral philosophy was a lecture he gave at the Philosophical Society in Helsinki on March 7, 1890, titled “Darwins hypotes betröffande den moraliska känslans uppkomst” [“Darwin’s hypothesis regarding the birth of the moral emotion”] in which he summarized Darwin’s (*The Descent of Man*) views on the origin of the moral emotion and the basis of the moral emotion in a “social instinct”. At that point, Westermarck was already interested in the study of the moral emotion. However, he did not present his own theory on the characteristics of the moral emotion (relational emotion and the correspondence of the emotion with the common will) until his more detailed lecture titled “Den moraliska känslan” [“The moral emotion”] on April 19, 1895.⁴⁸⁷ He had sketched a similar theory already in his lectures on social science at the Imperial Alexander University in Helsinki in the spring

⁴⁸⁶ Von Wright (1979), 297. — Westermarck (1891b, 231) has called as one of Darwin’s most brilliant chapters the one in which Darwin attempts to demonstrate how even the moral emotion can be explained through the theory of selection. — Darwin has discussed in detail the development of the moral emotion and the moral sense from social instincts in *The Descent of Man* (1871, vol. 1), chapter 4 (see also chapter 5).

⁴⁸⁷ See Westermarck’s lectures (in 1890 and 1895) at the Philosophical Society, Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 160–161, 237–244.

of 1894.⁴⁸⁸ This early theory was not to remain unchanged: Westermarck replaced the relational emotion with the retributive emotion, as well as correspondence with disinterestedness and impartiality.⁴⁸⁹ In a letter to Lagerborg from London (dated October 2, 1898), Westermarck described his change of ideas concerning the moral theory: “When I was teaching my little course on social science for the first time, I had a view on the moral emotion that I now regard as fundamentally incorrect [– –].”⁴⁹⁰

Westermarck had given psychological overtones to the study of morality in his lectures on social science (1894). He never abandoned this emphasis in his defense of “psychological” (“scientific,” empirical) ethics at the expense of “normative” (non-scientific) ethics. In his lecture at the Philosophical Society on May 8, 1896, titled “Etikens uppgift” [“The Task of Ethics”], Westermarck outlined his view of the task of scientific ethics. He crystallized the definition of ethics’ task in the lecture “Über normative und psychologische Ethik” (at an international congress on psychology in Munich in the summer of 1896). This was his first lecture in a foreign language.

The goal of normative ethics is to construct a system of the highest principles and rules for behavior. Good and bad are given normative limits. Every moral approval and disapproval are based on a standard. Even though morality would be normatively defined, it would not be automatically implied that norms are universal and unchanging. Westermarck, for his part, stated that the primary duty of ethics was not to lay out norms or laws for behavior (“what is right”), but to find the patterns of moral consciousness that were used as the basis of the moral judgment of actions (“what is considered right”).⁴⁹¹

Psychological ethics aims at the empirical study of morality, at the examination of the origin and nature of the moral consciousness, and at the comparative description of moral ideas, regulations, and behavior in different societies. Westermarck did not want to call normative ethics “scientific”; he reserved that definition solely for psychological ethics. Normative ethics might have much to give in practice, but Westermarck believed that psychological ethics was no weaker even in the practical sense: The aim of psychological ethics was to ascertain what it signified to

⁴⁸⁸ See Westermarck (1894).

⁴⁸⁹ See von Wright (1979), 302.

⁴⁹⁰ Westermarck’s letter to Lagerborg on October 2, 1898 (BEW 18, n:o 2895).

⁴⁹¹ See Westermarck (1897), 431.

regard something as right, how moral consciousness generated subjective values, and how these values were related to each other on a global scale. The task of psychological ethics was to examine the “fact” of the moral consciousness, not the moral “truth”.

The same year Westermarck sent Lagerborg the letter pronouncing his unshakeable conviction about the essence and foundation of the moral emotion, *The Literary Guide and Rationalist Review* published (on December 1, 1898) an interview with Westermarck in which he defined his own scientific ethics as the psychological analysis, explanation, and interpretation of the moral consciousness. His statement can be considered, in addition to the above mentioned lecture “Über normative und psychologische Ethik”, Westermarck’s clearest manifesto of psychological ethics:

“Ethics, as a science, is a psychological study, an analysis and explanation of the moral consciousness. It is a study, not of what is right, but of what is *thought* to be right, and why it is thought right. I cannot recognize a Right apart from the mind that conceives it, just as I cannot conceive of Beauty as distinct from the aesthetic consciousness. A belief in an objective Right would be a survival of the Platonic system of Ideas.”⁴⁹²

⁴⁹² Gould (1898), 187. — Psychological ethics was not Westermarck’s invention. For example, Sully (1892, vol. 2), 362–363, remarked: “[– –] we find from the history of ethics in ancient and modern times that psychological discussion has formed a large feature in the science. Thus, even in Greek thought about the subject, which was concerned with the individual problem of the highest and best living, we meet with ample psychological reference, as in the elaborate theories of happiness and of volition which may be gathered from the *Ethics* of Aristotle. It is, however, in modern times, in which the direction of ethical inquiry has shifted from the question of the highest (individual) good to that of the nature and grounds of duty, that we see this connexion with psychology most plainly illustrated.” — Sidgwick, Bain, Fowler, and Stanley, authors known to Westermarck, had also discussed the connection between psychology and ethics before Westermarck. Stanley (1895), 339, describes this connection: “[– –] psychological Ethics studies only conduct as moved by ethical emotion.” Nevertheless, Stanley did not consider psychological ethics scientifically valid.

When asked if fundamental ethical principles should be subjective, Westermarck answered in the affirmative, and gave a pithy statement on the link between value subjectivism and psychology:

“Yes; and deductions from a principle will only hold good for those who accept that principle; but they can hardly prove its universal validity. Thus we are carried on to psychology, and, apart from psychology, I do not think we can obtain a science of ethics. This science will not yield rules of morality, it will not teach us how we ought to act. A moral commandment rests on the sentimental and volitional part of our nature, and can therefore be called neither true nor false. The object of science is to find the truth, which always refers to our sensations and ideas. Morality is not a science, but it may so far become an object of science when we seek to analyze and interpret the action of the moral consciousness.”⁴⁹³

Westermarck was convinced that he possessed the right qualifications to undertake an examination of morality from a broad comparative perspective. For Westermarck, the anthropological counterpart of psychology’s experimental method was the comparative method. He believed that he could use it to draw conclusions on the psychic processes behind social practices and social regulatory systems. However, Westermarck’s psychological “empiricism” was based on the experiential context offered by the social environment and social institutions, as well as on the phenomena interpreted in this context. His “empiricism” does not involve laboratory research or the kind of plumbing of the individual psyche that is required by introspective psychology (or, later, clinical research strategies). In examining psychological problems, Westermarck mainly remained on the wake of social psychological and, more generally, evolutionary psychological research. He did not adopt an absolute research model from psychology, as such, but he considered it possible to combine complementary research approaches in the study of morality.

Westermarck’s division of ethics into normative ethics (at present usually called prescriptive ethics) and psychological ethics (at present usually called descriptive ethics) has been regarded as philosophically ambiguous

⁴⁹³ Gould (1898), 187.

and incomplete.⁴⁹⁴ His division completely ignores the logical-linguistic (meta-ethical) analysis of value judgments, norms, and moral concepts that even Westermarck himself partly practiced (in *ODMI* and *ER*) as he moved on from empirical descriptions of facts and from inductive generalizations to an analysis of the meaning of concepts and value judgments. This type of analysis can be found in Westermarck's theoretical observations of how moral judgments are founded on retributive emotions, how retributive emotions are disinterested and impartial, and how duty and merit (the good) are connected (they are, according to him, logically independent). It is thus possible to agree with von Wright who has claimed that Westermarck misunderstood the nature of his own moral theories:

“He [Westermarck] regarded as empirical research something which, in fact, was — not “normative ethics” but “moral philosophy.” This misunderstanding has had some confusing consequences which can be lamented. However, it does not in any fundamental way diminish the attractiveness and the worth of his theories.”⁴⁹⁵

Philosophical analyses of Westermarck's works (like those of von Wright and Stroup), however, make Westermarck's theories more philosophical than they were. To emphasize the philosophical side of the theories underestimates their psychological aspects. For example, von Wright prefers to call Westermarck's “psychological” ethics “sociological,”⁴⁹⁶ even though Westermarck himself did not use the latter term and, in general, was not in favor of the “sociologization” of the study of morality. Stroup, again, admits that Westermarck's “interest” in moral emotions may have been psychological, rather than philosophical, and that this might explain why Westermarck mistook the purpose of ethics.⁴⁹⁷

One wonders, however, what kind of logic justifies the claim that Westermarck was mistaken about the psychological purpose of his work. An interesting question is what might have caused the philosophical and analytical obscurity in Westermarck's writings. Part of the explanation probably is, that Westermarck, in the end, was not especially philosophically sophisticated, nor was he prone to philosophical abstractions. He

494 See, e.g., von Wright (1979), 308–309; Stroup (1982a), 72–73.

495 Von Wright (1979), 309.

496 *Ibid.*, 308.

497 Stroup (1982a), 146.

was not widely read philosophically and even his philosophical reading was guided by his interest in psychology (he read, for example, Smith, Hume, and Kant). Westermarck did not present detailed psychological theories, not even a theory of emotions. Nevertheless, a psychological perspective is present throughout his work: an attempt at socio-psychological and genetic-psychological explanations within an empirical (“comparative”) framework.

Already the subtitle of Westermarck’s honors thesis read “En psykologisk studie” [“A psychological study”]. In the introduction to his dissertation, he emphasized the attempt to find psychological explanations, an attempt which became more systematic in the last edition of *HHM*. Westermarck also considered *ODMI* a comparative study in psychological ethics, rather than a historical, anthropological, or philosophical study. He even had plans to subtitle it “a study in psychological Ethics.”⁴⁹⁸ In a letter to Tylor (dated in Tetuán on December 31, 1898), Westermarck wrote: “[I] am committing to writing the history of the moral ideas, or rather, the treatise on psychological Ethics, from a comparative point of view.”⁴⁹⁹ When Westermarck applied for a grant from the Imperial Alexander University (March 8, 1900), he mentioned that the book he was working on, *ODMI*, was first of all meant to fill a “gap in psychological literature.”⁵⁰⁰

If the heading “psychological ethics” seems inadequate to describe the kind of study on the moral consciousness that Westermarck practiced, the best description would probably be socio-psychological ethics. In his memoirs, Westermarck still referred to his idea of ethics “as psychological and sociological discipline.”⁵⁰¹ Westermarck also emphasized, early on, the necessity to regard empirical psychology and social science as independent disciplines.

⁴⁹⁸ Early manuscripts of Westermarck’s moral study (EWH, Addenda, “Introduction,” 3 [this manuscript is in blue ink; his other manuscript for an introduction is written in black ink]). In the same manuscript (p. 2), Westermarck opposed the psychological approach and the sociological approach. The latter contented itself with the collection of facts without an attempt at psychological generalizations. See also Stroup (1982a), 79.

⁴⁹⁹ Westermarck’s letter to Tylor on December 31, 1898 (ETP).

⁵⁰⁰ Cited in Lagerborg (1951), 55.

⁵⁰¹ Westermarck (1929), 218. See also Allardt’s (1950), 248, evaluation of Westermarck’s moral theory: “Edvard Westermarck’s moral theory should not primarily be regarded as a philosophical theory, but, rather, a sociological and psychological analysis on moral.”

Of the preceding theorists of morality, Westermarck gave the highest praise to Adam Smith, and his work *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), which he considered as the most important contribution to moral psychology by any British thinker.⁵⁰² Westermarck introduced what he regarded as the most central points of Smith's theory in his lectures on the history of philosophy.⁵⁰³ Smith linked moral emotions with resentment and gratitude and made retributive moral emotions the cornerstone of his theory. Smith was not the first to notice the connection between sympathy and morality, but he specified that sympathy worked as an intermediary when gratitude/resentment becomes moral approval/disapproval. Furthermore, Smith believed that moral emotions could be characterized as disinterested and impartial.

The disinterestedness and impartiality of moral judgments were clearly present in Kant's moral theory as well. Westermarck wrote that as a student he had become exhausted with Kant's style and his almost empty moral law.⁵⁰⁴ Westermarck's comments on Kant were usually polemically critical or ironic. Nevertheless, Westermarck was aware that his own moral theory and Kant's theory had their similarities regarding the disinterestedness and impartiality of the moral emotion. Von Wright has remarked that Westermarck downplayed the similarities between his own thought and Kant's theories when he failed to mention Kant in *ODMI* in connection with the disinterestedness and impartiality of the moral emotion.⁵⁰⁵

Westermarck, on the other hand, paid less attention to David Hume, even though his philosophy in places touched issues that were present in Westermarck's moral theory.⁵⁰⁶ Westermarck's critical comments on Hume and Smith were scarce. Westermarck considered Hume's detour into the area of "psychological utilitarianism" a deficiency in his phi-

⁵⁰² See Westermarck (1932b), 71. — For other statements on Smith by Westermarck, see Gould (1898), 186. In his lectures (EWH, Kapsel 78, FFH 1914, 21 [217]), Westermarck summarized his opinion of Smith: "[— —] I gratefully acknowledge that I have learnt from Adam Smith by far most of all moral philosophers and moral psychologists."

⁵⁰³ Smith's ideas summarized based on Westermarck's lectures (especially EWH, Kapsel 78, FFH 1914, 17–21 [213–217]).

⁵⁰⁴ See Westermarck (1927), 28; Westermarck (1929), 30.

⁵⁰⁵ von Wright (1979), 305.

⁵⁰⁶ On Westermarck's "debt" to Hume, see von Wright (1979), 306; Stroup (1976), Stroup (1982a), 134–138, 144–146.

losophy: Hume overemphasized the significance of human calculation. According to Westermarck, the greatest weakness of Hume's moral theory was that Hume identified moral emotions only with pleasure and displeasure. Westermarck remarked that moral emotions were retributive, and they involved strong instinctive elements. In Westermarck's eyes, Hume was clearly second to Smith as a moral psychologist. As an epistemologist, however, he was unsurpassed. When it came to Smith, Westermarck mentioned that he concentrated on the points on which he agreed with Smith, rather than on the ones on which he disagreed with him.⁵⁰⁷ Westermarck slightly criticized Smith for not having proved how general moral concepts (like duty) followed from moral emotions. The same point was, in fact, problematic in Westermarck's own theory. Westermarck did, however, manage to present at least a preliminary description of the influence that social customs and social institutions had on moral judgments becoming generalized and on subjective feelings becoming "objectified."

In *ODMI*, Westermarck expressed his view of the connection between communality, moral consciousness, and moral emotions:

"Society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness. The first moral judgments expressed not the private emotions of isolated individuals but emotions which were felt by the community at large. Public indignation is the prototype of moral disapproval and public approval the prototype of moral approbation. And these public emotions are characterised by generality, individual disinterestedness, and apparent impartiality."⁵⁰⁸

Westermarck's central idea was that public emotions, especially retributive emotions like public indignation and public approval, were at the foundation of the moral consciousness. Throughout his career, he presented different variations of this basic idea of the socio-psychogenesis of morality. According to Westermarck, "sympathy," supported by an "altruistic sentiment," produced naturally disinterested emotions.⁵⁰⁹ He admitted that the sympathetic, retributive kindness had a powerful rival,

⁵⁰⁷ For Westermarck's short criticism on Smith, see EWH, Kapsel 78, FFH 1914, 20–21 (216–217).

⁵⁰⁸ Westermarck (1908b), 740; see also Westermarck (1906a), 117–118.

⁵⁰⁹ Westermarck (1906a), 110–111.

its opposite, resentment (or envy, jealousy). He concluded, though, that “public praise and moral approval occurred, to some degree, even in the infancy of human society.”⁵¹⁰ Westermarck did not argue that the “individual conscience” would have been the “original form” of the moral consciousness, nor that the reactive attitude of the communal mind would have generated moral emotions. He stated that moral emotions were public, communal emotions.⁵¹¹ According to Westermarck, emotions did not suffice to explain the formation of the moral consciousness of humankind. Human rationality, legislative organization of social life, and social institutions formed the necessary basis on which Westermarck’s research on morality was grounded.

Westermarck required that the researchers of the origin and development of human moral consciousness use, in addition to an evolutionist approach, psychological, anthropological, historical, and legislative knowledge, as well as knowledge of the comparative study of religion, to be able to take into account the “humane” and subjective aspects of morality.⁵¹² Westermarck assumed that moral consciousness was globally alike. The development of moral consciousness involved the transformation of the community members from ignorant and non-thinking members to informed and conscious members. Westermarck argued that a consequence of the unity of the human psychic structure was that originally subjective assessments became objectified and rational.⁵¹³ Individual psychological research did not suffice to study the socio-psychogenesis of morality. Westermarck’s study on morality was a pathbreaker to a cooperation between research on emotions and cognitions, research on social interaction and institutions, and developmental psychology.

According to Westermarck’s ethical relativism, the objective validity of moral concepts was merely illusory. He disputed the view that moral judgments reflected external realities and claimed that these judgments were inevitably based on emotional projections. A connection with Hume’s philosophy is apparent here.⁵¹⁴ Westermarck frequently used the categories of relativity and subjectivity. Relativity referred to the moral judgment’s reflecting the relation between its utterer and the object of the judgment. Subjectivity simply meant that a person can at differ-

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 129–130.

⁵¹¹ See, e.g., *ibid.*, 123.

⁵¹² Compare *ibid.*, 2.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*, (1906a), 8–9.

⁵¹⁴ EWH, Kapsel 78, FFH 1913, 75–76.

ent times judge the same object differently, so that different persons can judge the same deed differently (holding it right or wrong), and still the judgments are validly expressing the emotions of their utterers. While Westermarck often talked about relativity, he did not analyze the notion of subjectivity. This reflects the limits and the “slackness” of his psychological approach.⁵¹⁵ Westermarck eagerly leaned on the old concepts of British empiricist psychology; he considered the category of subjectivity self-evident without bothering to differentiate or question it in his works.

Westermarck’s theory of morality is a combination of Hume’s and Smith’s legacies, and evolutionist ethics. Hume’s philosophy is characterized by subjectivity (radical skepticism) which questions the idea of an absolute and rational cognition of external reality and the future. Hume opened up a gap between “the stream of particular impressions and the universal”, between “the past and the future”, and between “the *is* and the *ought*”.⁵¹⁶ Westermarck was building a bridge between Hume’s philosophy and Smith’s more empiricist, psychologically founded explanation of retributive emotions. Westermarck’s skepticism was a milder version of Hume’s radical suspicions. Westermarck did not criticize the role of reason in the collection and processing of information the way Hume criticized it.

Westermarck was not the only researcher of morality to stress the essential role of instincts, emotions, and sympathy in the origination and

⁵¹⁵ See Edel (1982), 79; see also Stroup (1980), 70. — Also Høffding (see, e.g., 1887, 36) had in his ethics emphasized the importance of subjectivity. Besides that, Høffding (1890) had presented the idea of the appearance of relativity in ethics before Westermarck, who fails to mention this fact in his books. Westermarck and Høffding took part in a discussion of the position and tasks of ethics at the Sociological Society in 1904. Westermarck’s opinion was that ethics should examine when, how, and why certain behavior generated moral emotions and moral judgments; it should not set moral norms or moral ideals. Høffding disagreed with Westermarck and argued that scientific ethics could also draw conclusions about moral ideals, objectives, or motives. Høffding feared that Westermarck would face difficulties in trying to define moral consciousness, because this kind of a definition necessarily involves a formulation of norms. (On the debate between Høffding and Westermarck, see Westermarck, 1906b, 191–192.)

⁵¹⁶ Edel (1982), 80. — Lately, Hume has been brought up as a “philosophical father” of evolutionist ethics and neo-Darwinist epistemology (Ruse, 1986, xiv).

development of morality. In addition to Hume and Smith (whom Westermarck mentions as his “great” predecessors), Alexander Sutherland and his two-volume work *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct* (1898) was an important contemporary influence for Westermarck, as he was constructing his own theory of morality. Sutherland admitted the influence of Darwin and Smith and proved that it was possible to combine their thinking in the moral studies approach.⁵¹⁷ Sutherland also emphasized the interaction between the emotional and the intellectual aspects of morality, but he gave priority to the emotional aspects.⁵¹⁸

Westermarck was not a pure subjectivist; he mainly represented “soft” subjectivism.⁵¹⁹ The relationship between moral emotions and moral judgments cannot be covered by subjectivism alone. Westermarck was more interested in the biological, psychological, and sociological factors affecting the development and regulation of moral practices, than in a conceptual and logical analysis of subjectivity and moral expressions. He did not consider it probable that moral judgments would directly express or reflect moral emotions. Rather, they referred to perceived and “sympathized” deeds and qualities of behavior and character. He described moral emotions’ pursuit of objective validity as disinterestedness, impartiality, and generality. On the other hand, he firmly stated that moral values were neither absolute nor objectively valid.

Through his ethical relativism, Westermarck tried to relatively examine moral values and “truths” by placing the communally active individual at the center of his/her own normative world and moral network. Even though Westermarck, through his relativism, or “soft” subjectivism, always perceived moral emotions as public and communal, he did not tie the individual with communal moral ties; instead, he positioned moral values, in their most advanced form, beyond conformism and adjustment. Moral values were not the emanations or announcements of an

⁵¹⁷ On Darwin’s and Smith’s influence, see Sutherland (1898, vol. 1), vii–viii. Sutherland (*ibid.*, viii) remarks of Smith, in particular: “Though sometimes quoted in these pages, Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments* [1759/1907] has had more influence on them than I have specifically acknowledged.”

⁵¹⁸ Sutherland (1898, vol. 2), 304, talks about the interaction between emotion and judgment, but also remarks: “The intellect has its own subordinate part to play in morality. [– –] But in the main the effect will be the result of his emotional capacities.”

⁵¹⁹ See Stroup (1982b)

immutable moral intuition. They were a result of the expansive nature of the individual mind and of individual choices in a social context. According to Westermarck, a fruitful study of morality required a theory that took this into account:

“Emotions depend on cognitions and are apt to vary according as the cognitions vary; hence a theory which leads to an examination of the psychological and historical origin of people’s moral opinions should be more useful than a theory which postulates moral truths enunciated by self-evident intuitions that are unchangeable.”⁵²⁰

Westermarck did not specify the quality of the relationship between emotions and cognitions. He remarked in a general manner that human emotions were not as uniform as human reason, and that the influence of reason on moral judgments was probably very great.⁵²¹ Westermarck’s ethical relativism denied absolute and eternal moral standards, but it trusted that as people would admit the relativity of their values, they would become, on the one hand, more tolerant in their assessments, and, on the other, more critical and more willing to listen to the “voice of reason.”⁵²²

Westermarck’s analysis of moral concepts often remained disconnected from social and actual contexts, although he emphasized that the “actual use” of terms “should be our only criterion in fixing their meaning.”⁵²³ This “should,” however, remained an ideal that Westermarck never was able to reach. Nevertheless, his analysis of moral language did not

⁵²⁰ Westermarck (1932b), 59, on moral intuition, see also Westermarck (1932c) and Westermarck (1935). — In *ODMI*, Westermarck (1908b, 744) expressed his view of the relationship between emotions and cognitions: “All higher emotions are determined by cognitions — sensations or ideas; they therefore vary according as the cognitions vary, and the nature of a cognition may very largely depend upon reflection or insight. [– –] The change of cognitions, or ideas, has thus produced a change of emotions.”

⁵²¹ Westermarck (1906a), 10–11.

⁵²² *Ibid.*, 20; see also Westermarck (1932b), 59.

⁵²³ Westermarck (1932b), 135. — Westermarck has written down in a notebook a thought on the relationship between the term and the truth (in Tetuán on January 12, 1899; EWH, Kapsel 34): “When I’m reading certain philosophers, I think: One finds a term and believes to have found a truth.”

aim at a linguistic reduction as pursued by an “ordinary language” philosophy.⁵²⁴ Rather, his analysis was two-fold, even if these two levels mix at times. Westermarck distinguished the analysis of the logical structure of general, “contentless” moral concepts and judgments that he believed should be complemented with a psychological account of the emotional foundations of moral concepts and judgments (the subject–predicate attribution): “If I say that a certain mode of conduct is bad or good, and if I mean what I say, the predicate of my judgment implies that its subject is apt to evoke moral indignation or moral approval in myself.”⁵²⁵

A moral judgment refers to the emotional state of its utterer, even though its logical structure does not express the presence of a specific emotion in his/her mind. According to Westermarck, a moral judgment can even be stated without an emotion,⁵²⁶ and all retributive emotions are not necessarily moral. Westermarck’s ethical relativism does not include the idea that moral judgments would only be expressions of subjective preference. He admits that moral judgments are used to attach objective qualities to the things, situations, and actions that are being evaluated. Unlike supporters of ethical objectivism, Westermarck does not believe that this kind of an objectifying can succeed, because there are no moral facts to which moral judgments would correspond.⁵²⁷ At most, we objectify our emotions with the generally used concepts that we have adopted.

Expanding Morality

Even with all its conventional British aspects, Westermarck’s ethical relativism had the potential to accept and tolerate the presence of many moralities and the existence of many moral “truths,” if not moral nihilism. Even though he has been accused of it, he did not promote a moral chaos,

⁵²⁴ Compare Stroup (1984), 577.

⁵²⁵ Westermarck (1900), 184.

⁵²⁶ Westermarck (1932b), 114. — The difficulty of empirical study of morality still is that the moral judgments or attitudes expressed by a subject do not reveal much about the subject’s actual (“moral”) actions in different situations. The actions can alternate considerably from situation to situation, even when the expressed moral judgments remain rather constant.

⁵²⁷ See Stroup (1984), 577.

value nihilism, or fanatic omnitolerance.⁵²⁸ Whereas moral absolutism tries to preserve the world of “certain” and indubitable values, ethical relativism admits the multiplicity of value choices. However, ethical relativism does not fail to discuss the relationships between different choices, nor does it drift into an “anything goes” philosophy.

In Westermarck’s account, an evolutive and expanding morality was primarily based on the expansion of altruistic sentiments. Through the growth of social units and through social differentiation, the number of people to which moral rules could be applied had gone up. Moral consciousness and altruistic sentiments had expanded from a family, a clan, or a people to include all of humankind. Exclusion, racial and linguistic differences, differences in customs, and hostile and suspicious attitudes had limited altruism. Westermarck’s developmental optimism is reflected both in his confidence in the future of marriage and in a similar trust in the expansion of peaceful international interaction and global altruism:

“People of different nationalities feel that in spite of all dissimilarities between them there is much that they have in common; and frequent intercourse makes the differences less marked, or obliterates many of them altogether. There can be no doubt that this process will go on in the future. And equally certain it is that similar causes will produce similar effects — that altruism will continue to expand, and that the notion of a human brotherhood will receive more support from the actual feelings of mankind than it does at present.”⁵²⁹

A scholar’s optimism is visible in a statement like this, including progressivist stories. Westermarck obviously did admit that humankind was far from perfect and that global moral altruism was yet to be achieved.

⁵²⁸ See, e.g., Westermarck (1906a), 19: “I do not even subscribe to that beautiful modern sophism which admits every man’s conscience to be an infallible guide. If we had to recognise, or rather if we did recognise, as right everything which is held to be right by anybody, savage or Christian, criminal or saint, morality would really suffer a serious loss. But we do not, and we cannot, do so.” — Westermarck has been accused for an immoral acceptance of everything by, for example, Stace (1937), 58; see Stroup (1982a), 246.

⁵²⁹ Westermarck (1908b), 228.

Furthermore, altruism was not necessarily moral. Moral problems based on differing altruistic sentiments were difficult and persistent. Westermarck held it a delusion that “moral truths” would be intuitively deduced or that moral problems would be solved through sufficiently developed reflection: “Whatever part reflection may have played in the expansion of the moral rules [– –] it seems to me obvious that the dominant cause has been the widening of the altruistic sentiment.”⁵³⁰ The moral predicate was never identical with the intensity of a moral emotion.⁵³¹ According to Westermarck’s moral theory, moral emotions were “originally” social and altruistic, but “moral truths” and “moral norms” were not absolute. The “social” and the “altruistic,” the “right” and the “wrong,” could expand and transform, they could become multiplied in each “individual” mind.⁵³²

Based on Westermarck’s theories, it is possible to perceive the moral development of humanity through the “evolution” of the gods that people have worshipped. Rights and duties have been determined by what kind of gods have guarded morality, “truth,” and “good faith.”⁵³³ “Civilized” peoples had moved away from frightful and eerie gods to more tolerant and blessing gods. According to Westermarck, an autonomous morality existed before faith in gods, and it will continue to expand as this faith is replaced with a secular and global morality. For Westermarck, the evolution of the human mind was a process in which religion, law, and morality become differentiated from each other. However, ancient

⁵³⁰ Westermarck (1932b), 207. See also *ibid.*, 208: “I fail to see that any process of reasoning or any ‘intuition’ could ever harmonize the different views.”

⁵³¹ See *ibid.*, 219.

⁵³² Westermarck, 1906a, 20; see also *ibid.*, 122–123: “As will be seen, the evolution of the moral consciousness involves a progress in impartiality and justice; it tends towards an equalisation of rights, towards an expansion of the circle within which the same moral rules are held applicable; and this process is in no small degree effected by the efforts made by high-minded individuals to raise public opinion to their own standard of right. Nay, [– –] individual moral feelings do not even lack that flavour of generality which characterises the resentment and approval felt unanimously by a body of men.”

⁵³³ On duty to gods and on gods as guardians of morality, see Westermarck, 1908b (chapters XLVIII–LII). — On the transformation of gods, see also Goldenberg (1979).

gods die slowly.⁵³⁴ Changes in ideas and value assessments may appear rapid, but the foundations for these changes reach far back in the evolutionary continuum. The position of humankind in evolution is not stable; it requires constant balancing and the only morality evolution has is set by humans. It was not part of Westermarck's morality to worship or sanctify humanity.⁵³⁵ As human morality expands, a new kind of morality may develop.

Westermarck's School

Westermarck as an influential teacher and role model who founded a school of followers in philosophy.⁵³⁶ In 1905, he served as the opponent for two dissertations of his doctoral students: Rafael Karsten on *The Origin of Worship*, and Gunnar Landtman on *The Origin of Priesthood*. Karsten (1879–1956), who did field work on Inca religion in Peru, became Westermarck's successor as professor of practical philosophy in Helsinki in 1922 – 1946.⁵³⁷ Landtman (1878–1940), who did field work on magic in Papua, was acting professor of practical philosophy in 1916–1921 and became extraordinary professor of sociology in 1927.⁵³⁸ Rudolf Holsti (1881–1945) defended his dissertation *The Relation of War to the Origin of the State* in 1913, but made his career in diplomacy. Uno Holmberg (later Harva, 1882–1949), who studied the origin of the belief in God in 1916,

⁵³⁴ Wikman (1962b, 321) has remarked that Westermarck's ethical relativism included already outdated aspects in the 1930s. Westermarck postponed the publication of *ER* for too long. When *ODMI* was published [in 1906 and 1908; the German version in 1907 and 1909; the Swedish version in 1916], Westermarck's ideas regarding morality were still fresh. In the 1930s and 1940s, however, his moral theory appeared "ancient" to the mainstream of cultural research. At the time, the development of morality, moral emotions, and the relativity of moral judgments were not considered particularly central topics for cultural research. A later publication, still, was a posthumous text in Swedish on ethical relativism (Westermarck, 1949).

⁵³⁵ See Westermarck (1927), 85; Westermarck (1929), 80.

⁵³⁶ See Allardt (1997), Pipatti and Pietikäinen (2021).

⁵³⁷ Besides his studies in anthropology and religion, Karsten published in philosophy only a textbook on ethics (see Karsten, 1941).

⁵³⁸ Landtman published books on philosophical thinking (1920) and Kant (1922).

became professor of sociology at the University of Turku. Westermarck's student and faithful friend Rolf Lagerborg eventually succeeded him at the Åbo Akademi in 1929-43. After Westermarck's death in 1939, the impact of his school started to fade away in philosophy, but his memory is honored by the Westermarck Society, founded in 1940 as the main scholarly association of the Finnish sociologists.

3.6. A Promethean Philosopher and Psychologist: Rolf Lagerborg

Among the disciples of Edward Westermarck, Rolf Lagerborg (1874-1959) was undoubtedly the most controversial and quarrelsome one.⁵³⁹ While the fin-de-siècle Finnish intellectual milieu was dominated, on the one hand, by the legacy of German Idealism and, on the other hand, by the Anglo-Saxon empiricism of the Westermarckian school, the French-orientated Lagerborg was a rare bird. Broadly speaking, his conception of the world was firmly rooted in the liberal, anti-clerical, and anti-metaphysical ideas of the radical French Revolution. In Finnish intellectual life, he was a highly polemical character, who often managed to arouse public anger by way of his sharp-worded, deliberately provocative opinions on topics such as "free love," the desirability of blasphemy, and his disdain for nationalism. In his academic career, it was impossible to distinguish scholarly ideas from extra-scholarly activities. For him, a philosopher was essentially a public figure taking part in topical issues, not an isolated academic in his/her ivory tower.⁵⁴⁰ Consequently, for instance, he was a leader figure of the Prometheus Society in Finland (1905-14) that fought for freethinking and freedom of religion – or rather, in his case, freedom *from* religion altogether.

Already Lagerborg's debut in the Finnish philosophical scene in 1897 took place in an atmosphere of intense debate. At meetings of the Philosophical Society of Finland, he passionately defended the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche that the Danish intellectual and cultural mediator Georg Brandes (1842-1927) had promoted in the Nordic countries. As a contrast to his teacher and close friend Edward Westermarck, and even more so

⁵³⁹ For Lagerborg's bibliography, see Manninen and Niiniluoto (2007), 212-220.

⁵⁴⁰ See, e.g., Lagerborg (1901), 511-520.



Rolf Lagerborg. Åbo Akademi University Library, Picture Collections.

to dominant idealists Th. Rein and Arvi Grotenfelt, Lagerborg supported elitist “aristocratic radicalism.” His prime target was the utilitarian principle that the morally right action is the action that produces the most good for the greatest number of people. According to him, the Nietzschean *Übermensch* had a much higher mission in his life: to sacrifice himself for the sake of abstract aspirations, artistic, and scholarly activities.⁵⁴¹ As he polemically put it, “Let there be darkness at low ranks as long as the heights are bathed in light.”⁵⁴² To some extent, this youthful outpouring obviously manifested Lagerborg’s inherited feeling of superiority as a descendant of an old noble family. Simultaneously, however, it was also a reaction against the Fennoman nationalist movement that had labelled the Swedish-speaking upper class as the cosmopolitan Other to alleged “true” Finnishness and the national common good.⁵⁴³

Lagerborg’s Nietzschean period did not last long, however. Throughout his academic career, it was typical of him to get hastily excited by a certain intellectual current, only to give it up for the sake of the next source of inspiration. If one was forced to condense Lagerborg’s leading philosophical ideas into a few words, an apt definition would be that, for him, all moral norms and values were socially constructed and all mental activities

⁵⁴¹ The records of the Philosophical Society in Finland, 19 Nov 1897 and 3 Dec 1897. See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1998), 315–321.

⁵⁴² Lagerborg (1897), 21.

⁵⁴³ Jalava (2005), 320–334.

to be reduced to the physiological, material processes of the human body. His point of departure excluded the possibility of objective and absolute moral values, but also the naturalist attempts to base morality on some instinctive, pre-cultural feelings of sympathy or altruistic moral emotions. In Lagerborg's view, his mentor Edvard Westermarck was also guilty of naturalist assumptions. This view soon led Lagerborg to associate himself with the French Durkheimian School of sociological moral philosophy.⁵⁴⁴

Lagerborg's Sociological Moral Philosophy

Lagerborg's first effort to do sociologically oriented moral philosophy was *Reform af etiken* ('The reform of ethics', 1899), which was meant as a PhD thesis in philosophy.⁵⁴⁵ The Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at the Imperial Alexander University of Finland, Fridolf Gustafsson, interrupted the dissertation process before the official examination of the thesis, however. The failure chiefly resulted from the arrogant, pamphlet-like style of the work. Nevertheless, also its contents were a breakaway from the ideas of Lagerborg's academic teachers. Lagerborg's main argument was that all moral conceptions were of necessity without a solid foundation, no matter if one tried to seek it from idealistic speculations or evolutionary theories. If one wanted to establish philosophy as a truly scholarly activity, one thereby had to separate the academic task of explaining how and why certain moral norms and values had come into effect from the practical ambition to promote one's own subjective, hypothetical, or metaphysical moral ideals. As Lagerborg put it, one could not simultaneously serve two masters.⁵⁴⁶ At this point, however, even he himself admitted that the weak point of his thesis was that he treated the subject exclusively from a negative angle. While he occupied himself with defining what moral philosophy should *not* be, he had very little to say about his own demand for a theoretical "moral science."⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁴ See, e.g., Rolf Lagerborg to Edvard Westermarck, October 17, 1898. Sig. 12537a–b, Rolf Lagerborg's Letter Collection. Åbo Akademi University Library (ÅAUL); Lagerborg (1953), 9–25.

⁵⁴⁵ This chapter is largely based on Jalava (2005); Jalava (2014).

⁵⁴⁶ Lagerborg (1899), 70–71, 81–91.

⁵⁴⁷ Rolf Lagerborg to Edvard Westermarck, December 18, 1898. Sig. 12538, Rolf Lagerborg's Letter Collection. Åbo Akademi University Library (ÅAUL).

Lagerborg's second attempt to graduate with a PhD degree in philosophy took place in 1900 with the thesis entitled *Moralens väsen* ('The essence of morality'). In this work, he traced the mechanisms by which socially constructed, commonly accepted moral principles were adopted by the individual members of society so that they ended up considering these principles as being natural and universally valid. The starting point already anticipated the behaviorist psychological standpoint that he started to promote in the 1920s, inspired by the American psychologist John B. Watson (1878–1958). Namely, according to Lagerborg, social rewards and punishments played the crucial role in adopting moral attitudes. Thus, the concepts of stimulus and response replaced the old terminology of *Geisteswissenschaften*, such as soul, ego, and substance. The stimulus–response model explained why exterior guidance led to desired behavior; how the supposed essence of morality was socially constructed and internalized. "Our reasons of conscience and our morality are conveyed to us by our relatives and society in a manner similar to that of receiving our language and religion," he stated.⁵⁴⁸

The authorities were key factors in the internalizing process of moral norms and values, because they were the ones who governed internal moral affects by external rewards and punishments. In the early years of a child, the parents had the leading role. In a later stage, the state, government machinery, and religion replaced them. For the individual, public recognition and general approval were matters of life and death, for in Lagerborg's view, disobedience and foolhardy illusions about one's own strength and freedom were soon avenged by "the common will." This "headwind" made obedience to the common will "a moment in our drive for self-preservation," and thus, we could not help but believe in it. To cite Lagerborg:

"Witches believed in and pleaded guilty [about their accused crimes]; an artist or a thinker may reject, as it sometimes happens, his/her work that is too ingenious and therefore collectively disapproved of with one voice. How often do we find a person with such self-esteem that he/she does not lose his/her faith in his/her good cause if all the others align against it?"⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁸ Lagerborg (1900), 13–29.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 47–52, citation in p. 52.

On the contrary, if one sailed with the wind, the common will acted as a great source of encouragement and stimulation, prodding people to significant achievements. Thereby behavior that we first conducted only in order to gain a reward or avoid a punishment became by repetition our “second nature” or “organic morality” which, as Lagerborg assumed in the Lamarckian way, might have been inheritable as a certain structure of the nervous system. Moreover, as a byproduct of these internalized moral affects, one learned to believe in such ideals as the ethical world order, the fatherland, and the self as intrinsic values.⁵⁵⁰

Although Lagerborg firmly considered world history “a progressive development,” he was not a keen supporter of Darwinism that seemed to give too little room for social factors. Nevertheless, he had an idea of the evolutionary developmental history of morality. According to this view, in ancient times, the initial human communities had been based on sexual instinct and the drive for self-presentation. The harsh conditions of existence had forced people to relate to a community, and the stronger the pressure by outward circumstances, the harder the punishments for those people who dishonored the common good. Little by little, however, communities had expanded, getting more organized and segmented. Institutions such as administration, the judiciary, and religion were gradually founded. By means of this specialization, the common will became fragmented, too, because diverse subsections of society now established different aims and, thereby, different sets of moral values. In the conflict between competing moral units, Lagerborg suggested that one should prioritize those that were more progressive and wide-ranging: “One’s native country has to be prioritized over the family and a political party, the international cause of the working class – so we may hope – over the fatherland,” he argued, reflecting the simultaneous proliferation of popular mobilization. In general, he supposed that in large societies, the state of affairs irresistibly developed towards pluralism and the general acceptance of different moral codes.⁵⁵¹

In Finnish academic philosophy, Lagerborg’s openly relativist standpoint was considered radical. The majority of his senior colleagues received it with embarrassment and indignation that was heightened by his simultaneous promotion of freethinking and sexual freedom. Broadly

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 53–78.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 137–139.

speaking, according to his opponents,⁵⁵² the denial of the possibility of universally valid morality led to moral anarchism, nihilism, and decadence without a higher and wider ethical horizon that would recognize that there is the common good, binding to all human beings. While Lagerborg had already been associated with Nietzsche's ethical relativism, he was accused of the approval of the unlimited power of those "superhumans" who were the strongest and the most ruthless. If moral philosophy was stripped of God, Absolute, and metaphysics, for Lagerborg's opponents, the only alternative seemed to be unrestricted egoism and chaos. As a result, even his second PhD thesis was disqualified in 1900.

After this failure, Lagerborg transferred to the University Paris-Sorbonne with Westermarck's support and international connections. In 1903, the slightly updated French version of Lagerborg's PhD thesis, *La morale publique*, was finally accepted with the highest possible grade by the board of examiners consisting of the leading French sociologists, such as Émile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. Although Lagerborg claimed that he had not been acquainted with Durkheim's ideas before going to the University of Paris, his main arguments corresponded well with Durkheimian views, which soon became widely accepted assumptions in sociology.⁵⁵³

In Finland, however, Lagerborg became the first – and, for a long time, the only – representative of French sociological moral philosophy, albeit with an unmistakable Lagerborgian twist. Namely, while Durkheim emphasized in his thinking communitarian aspects and was worried about the danger of anomie (normlessness) in modern society, for Lagerborg, the legitimization of individualism became the central idea of Durkheimian sociology. In an almost teleological manner, Lagerborg envisioned that the global development was inevitably proceeding from "particular communities" (*partikulärsamfundet*) that constricted individuals to the "general society" (*allmänsamhället*), affirming true individualism. It was thus useless to nostalgically yearn after the lost community of pre-modern world, since modern individual freedom, based on diversity and mor-

⁵⁵² At the Imperial Alexander University of Finland, Lagerborg's most prominent opponents included Professor of Philosophy Th. Rein, Professor of Dogmatics and Moral Philosophy G. G. Rosenqvist, and Professor of Education and Didactics Waldemar Ruin.

⁵⁵³ For the reception of Lagerborg's moral philosophy in Finland and France, see Jalava (2005), 285 onwards; see also Allardt (1997), 109.

al pluralism, was the greatest achievement of civilization and the source of qualitatively higher social solidarity.⁵⁵⁴ In Lagerborg's words:

“Liberty, and by the same token, equality and fraternity, all that is humane and contributes to human dignity, develop only along with social progress. Social development is proceeding towards the individual, its high point and its goal.”⁵⁵⁵

Moreover, Durkheimian sociological moral philosophy also offered scientifically sanctified grounds for Lagerborg's cultural radicalism. This was based on his view that moral norms and values, entirely historical as they were, were in the state of continuous “becoming” – paradoxically, the only unchangeable “essence” of morality was its constant change. As a social phenomenon, according to Lagerborg, morality was established with a certain delay so that in the light of forthcoming social development, the prevailing morality was not necessarily any more beneficial to society, to say nothing of the individual. Therefore, once again paradoxically, every society apparently needed “immoral” persons who, when we examined the matter more closely, actually represented the higher morality of the future. Due to such forward-looking rebels that were ahead of their contemporaries, society progressed.⁵⁵⁶ Thus, when Lagerborg personally fought for individualism, religious liberty, and “free love,” he was not, as his critics falsely accused him, “an immoral, parasitic luxury flower” but “an agent of future fermentation and a manifestation of rich social life.”⁵⁵⁷ While fighting for his individual liberty, he was simultaneously fighting for the liberty of all humans, for progress, and for the higher social integrity of the species. As Lagerborg concluded, citing Westermarck, “We should not blame those people who go against old habits and customs but we should, instead, complain about the fact that there are so few of them and, thus, the outdated rules change so slowly.”⁵⁵⁸

⁵⁵⁴ Lagerborg (1902a), 1–3; Lagerborg (1902b), 3.

⁵⁵⁵ Lagerborg (1902a), 3.

⁵⁵⁶ Lagerborg (1903a), 461–466.

⁵⁵⁷ Lagerborg (1902b), 5–6.

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*; see also Lagerborg (1900), 19–21.

“*The Problem of Emotion*”

As already visible in his ill-starred PhD thesis *Moralens väsen* (1900), Lagerborg was early on interested in the socially conditioned, affectively based responses that, in his view, profoundly shaped morality. After he had finally managed to get his PhD degree in Sorbonne in 1903, he devoted himself to this topic. In 1904, he acted as a visiting scholar in the world's first experimental psychology laboratory that Wilhelm Wundt had established in 1879 at the University of Leipzig in Germany. The visit resulted in *Das Gefühlsproblem* (1905) that formed the basis for Lagerborg's future psychological studies. He intended the work as a qualification for the title of Docent in philosophy at the Imperial Alexander University of Finland. This time the value conservative theologian members of the University Senate foiled the attempt. After a complicated complaint process, Lagerborg's application for a docentship was defeated by eight votes to four. After this adversity, Lagerborg even considered to change to medicine. For this purpose, he took the freshman courses in medicine in Germany so that he was ready to start the major studies in 1909. While he was finally appointed as a Docent at Helsinki in the very same year, however, he gave up this backup plan. During the following two decades, he supported his family by various temporary academic teaching posts and scholarships, as well as by teaching French at secondary schools. It was only in 1929 that he finally managed to gain an extraordinary professorship and, after Westermarck retired in 1933, a full professorship in philosophy at the Swedish-speaking Åbo Akademi University in Turku.⁵⁵⁹

Although his senior colleagues at Helsinki considered his hypotheses “odd” and “biased,” in the international field of psychology Lagerborg's *Das Gefühlsproblem* represented a simultaneously occurred transformation that led psychological research from a mostly introspective study of consciousness towards physiological and behavioristic currents. The main influences on Lagerborg were the German-American psychologist Hugo Münsterberg's (1863–1916) experimental theory and the famous James-Lange theory of emotion that Westermarck had introduced in Finland in the late 1890s.⁵⁶⁰ Broadly speaking, these theories suggested that emotions occur as a result of physiological reactions to exciting facts and

⁵⁵⁹ Jalava (2005), 351–354.

⁵⁶⁰ The records of the Philosophical Society in Finland, November 8, 1895 and February 7, 1896. See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1998), 256–265.

events. In other words, they proposed that people have a physiological response to environmental stimuli and that their interpretation of that physical response then results in – or *is* – an emotional experience. In *Das Gefühlsproblem*, Lagerborg called his own theory based on this idea the “reaction theory.” He traced the physiological foundation of emotions to the functioning of peripheral nerves, which results in metabolic changes between the capillary system and muscles, simultaneously changing the chemical composition of blood and tissue fluids. An emotion occurs, according to him, when one cannot specify the exact bodily location of an environmental stimulus that is strong enough to cause the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Thus, in his reaction theory, a conscious emotional reaction is a mere tip of the iceberg, which is why he argued that emotions have to be studied *von unten* (from below) as results of peripheral and particularly metabolic reactions.⁵⁶¹ In the late 1910s, Lagerborg further buttressed his theory with the Swedish psychiatrist Bror Gadelius’s (1862–1938) view of “psycho-serology.” It aspired to explain emotional life, psychopathological phenomena, as well as organic cerebral diseases by an “affect intoxication,” that is, a biochemical state of intoxication caused by the endocrine system.⁵⁶²

In Lagerborg’s view, his reaction theory not only explained how emotions occurred but all other mental phenomena, too. Hence, he considered the entire mental life of the human being to be ultimately a part of a series of events, in which an exterior stimulus transformed into a bodily reaction, something of a reflex that, in its turn, caused emotions and consciousness. The theory left no room for the autonomy of consciousness or free will. The individual could merely try to learn to control his/her physiological outbursts, but the emergence of them was beyond his/her will. In this respect, Lagerborg’s standpoint reminded Wilhelm Bolin’s idea of the determination of will that Bolin had already presented in his 1868 doctoral thesis.⁵⁶³ Faithful to his polemical style, however, Lagerborg carried his stimulus–reaction model to the utmost so that the complicated mental life of the individual was ultimately reduced to reactions and reflexes caused by environmental stimuli. Somewhat paradoxically, despite his extreme individualism, he entered in his psychological thinking into the position that seemed to leave no room for selfhood and the indepen-

⁵⁶¹ Lagerborg (1905a); Lagerborg (1907a). See also Aho (1993), 128.

⁵⁶² Ihanus (1994), 141.

⁵⁶³ Lagerborg (1905b), 253–258; Lagerborg (1907b), 76–77, 82–87; cf. Bolin (1868).

dent role of human consciousness in receiving and analyzing its contents.

In addition, Lagerborg outlined a psychological theory of art based on the viewpoint of “reaction psychology.” In all fairness, he remained an amateur in the field of aesthetics, for he did not define, to begin with, what he meant by “art” or a “work of art.” Instead, he took it for granted that there exists such a self-evident material category of stimuli as art.⁵⁶⁴ He assumed that art and other similar architectonic and scenic stimuli course certain “vegetative reflexes” and, in consequence, reactions in the cortex, which results in a specific type of emotional experience, the “pleasure of art.”⁵⁶⁵ In 1918, he added to this theory a Freudian dimension, being the first scholar in Finland to use Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytical ideas in literary analysis.⁵⁶⁶ Few years later Lagerborg abandoned Freud, however, for he claimed that even Freud laid too much stress upon human consciousness. During the 1920s, Lagerborg thus gradually entered a fully behaviorist phase, arguing that “for natural scientific psychology [...] the depth of mental life equates to the life of the body.”⁵⁶⁷

Among Lagerborg’s multifarious philosophical activities in the 1910s, the philosophical discussion regarding love is yet worthy of a special mention. His main work in the philosophy of love was *Den platoniska kärleken* (‘The Platonic love’), published in 1915. On the one hand, this study highlighted his wide reading of classical literature and the history of philosophy.⁵⁶⁸ On the other hand, it was a continuation of his proto-behavioristic reaction theory, aimed to uncover the material, sensual, and physiological bases of the Platonic theory of *eros*, Christian mysticism, and idealized love in general. As he openly acknowledged, even he himself had a “shady inclination” to religious mysticism and the belief in metaphysical ideals. While he considered this yearning for the supernatural to be a result of “our weakness, ignorance, and fearfulness,” he wanted to subdue it with proper scientific knowledge of the issue.⁵⁶⁹

In *Den platoniska kärleken*, Lagerborg’s starting point was the fact that Plato aimed to transcend physical desire, based on the lower order of re-

⁵⁶⁴ Huuhtanen (1979), 117.

⁵⁶⁵ Lagerborg (1907c), 42, 44–52, 57;

⁵⁶⁶ Lagerborg (1918).

⁵⁶⁷ Lagerborg (1927), 81–84, 96; Lagerborg (1929), 38.

⁵⁶⁸ As an undergraduate student, Lagerborg had specialized in Latin literature and aesthetics, and he had written his MA thesis on the humor of Horace; see Lagerborg (1895).

⁵⁶⁹ Lagerborg (1907d), p. 13.

action and stimulus, by an idealized, un-carnal love that is produced by rational discourse and exploration of ideas, which in turn defines the pursuit of Ideal beauty. According to Lagerborg, Plato's philosophy of love forms a kind of a spiritual developmental path. Albeit initially starting from the carnal lust for beautiful young boys, love is supposed to transform itself, first, into the admiration for bodily beauty in general, and, second, into the ability to see the beauty of scholarly thinking (*philosophia* as "love of wisdom"). Finally, it will result in the comprehension that the philosopher is about to reach true Ideal beauty beyond the transitory earthly existence. Referring to the influence of Neoplatonism on Christianity, Lagerborg suggested that in a similar way as the Platonic love, such Christian mysticism as St. Augustine's reflection on *eros* and *agape*, the exaltation of St. Bonaventure, and the ecstasy of St. Teresa of Ávila could be interpreted as manifestations of carnal lust that is projected onto a heavenly object. Thus, all forms of love could ultimately be reduced to the distention of the blood-vascular system. The only difference to Lagerborg was that in the case of an idealized religious ecstasy, the state of excitation of the circulatory system took place in other organs than the genitals, which explained its non-lustful nature. As the vascular reflexes could readily change their place from one organ to another, however, the connection between sensual love and the Platonic love remained intimate: the first type of love easily lead into the second one, and vice versa.⁵⁷⁰

Once again, Lagerborg's philosophical reasoning managed to arouse mixed feelings in his Finnish academic contemporaries. While the critics agreed that he had captured the magnificent character of Plato in an imposing way, they were simultaneously embarrassed about his tolerant attitude to pederasty, the pronounced role of sexuality in explaining religious devotion and mysticism, as well as the naturalistic reduction of diverse historical phenomena to the physiological reactions of the vascular system. To cite Rafael Karsten, a disciple of Westermarck, who was specialized in religious beliefs during antiquity and in the indigenous cultures of South America, it was staggering to see how such a philosophically and aesthetically highly civilized person as Lagerborg could make himself guilty of such rude and old-fashioned materialism.⁵⁷¹

Finally, in the 1910s, Lagerborg contributed significantly to the Finnish philosophical discussion on the theory of knowledge.⁵⁷² As regards the

⁵⁷⁰ Lagerborg (1915a).

⁵⁷¹ Karsten (1915), 93.

⁵⁷² Lagerborg (1915b); Lagerborg (1920).

problem of mind versus matter, not surprisingly, he reflected a strongly empiricist and monistic viewpoint.⁵⁷³ In general, he actively continued his philosophical career throughout the interwar years until the 1950s, focusing on both the sensuality of religious phenomena as well as sociologically oriented moral philosophy, thus constantly elaborating the main interests of his philosophical thinking.⁵⁷⁴ Because of his polemical personality and his relative outsider position in Finnish academic philosophy – as already mentioned, Lagerborg got a full professorship only in 1933 when he was 59 years old –, he did not manage to have many disciples. Academic marginality is not a synonym for insignificance, however. As stated by sociologist Erik Allardt, among others, through his courage and openness for new ideas Lagerborg nevertheless gave inspiration and set an example for keen academic efforts by younger scholars.⁵⁷⁵

3.7. Logical Paradoxes: Hjalmar Magnus Eklund

After the boom of logic in the early years of the Academy of Turku in the 17th century, the next two centuries did not bring about many news about this field in Finland. Logic of course maintained its role in the curriculum of theoretical philosophy, and we have mentioned above the nineteenth century textbooks by Snellman and Rein with Hegelian and Kantian ingredients. J. S. Mill's inductive logic was known to Rein, but otherwise there is no evidence that the revolutions of mathematical logic since the mid-nineteenth century – such as Gottlob Frege's *Begriffsschrift* of 1879 and David Hilbert's programme in the foundations of mathematics in 1900 – were followed in Finland. Mathematicians of this time were not interested in logic, either, except some studies in axiomatic geometry, and even set theory introduced by Georg Cantor since 1874 was first discussed in the inaugural lecture of professor Ernst Lindelöf in 1903.

The situation of formal logic or “logistic” was changed in Finland, when Eino Kaila as the first professor of philosophy at the new Finnish University of Turku lectured on logic since 1924 and published his works *Die Prinzipien der Wahrscheinlichkeitslogik* in 1926 and *Probleme der Deduktion* in 1928. Especially the latter study shows that Kaila had a very broad knowledge of new works in mathematical logic and foun-

⁵⁷³ See Ch. 3.9. on debates on Mach.

⁵⁷⁴ See, e.g., Lagerborg (1934); Lagerborg (1937).

⁵⁷⁵ Allardt (1997), 110.



Hjalmar Magnus Eklund (1880-1937).

dations of mathematics, including the monumental exposition *Principia Mathematica* (three volumes, 1910-13) by A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell.⁵⁷⁶

It is historically interesting that Kaila is known to have had personal contacts to H. M. Eklund, who worked since 1926 as an insurance statistician in Turku. Eklund had published a study on Russell's paradox in 1916, and it is possible that he was the person who introduced the ideas of *Principia Mathematica* to Kaila. Eklund is classified as an "outsider" in the history of Finnish mathematics,⁵⁷⁷ and belongs to the "marginalia" in the logical turn of Finnish philosophy,⁵⁷⁸ but by his work on antinomies in logic and set theory he deserves a place in the history of philosophy in Finland.⁵⁷⁹

Hjalmar Magnus Eklund (1880-1937) was born in Turku. He studied mathematics, physics, and philosophy in Helsinki, and received the highest grade *laudatur* for his master's thesis. Later he studied phonetics and

⁵⁷⁶ An attempt to go beyond Rein's logic was made by Veikko Kerkkonen (1901- 1984), who was Grotenfelt's student with some contacts to Moritz Schlick, but his monograph in 1924 still belongs to the tradition of German school logic.

⁵⁷⁷ See Elfving (1981), 130-132.

⁵⁷⁸ See von Bogulawski (2011), 162-171.

⁵⁷⁹ The most important study of Eklund is by von Wright (1979), which includes Eklund's bibliography.

wrote a grammar for the artificial *ido* language. In 1911, Eklund passed the highest grade in philosophy with Ernst Schröder's *Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik*. His examiner was docent Rolf Lagerborg, instead of professor Grotenfelt, probably for the reason that Eklund was an active member and the first treasurer of the student association *Prometheus*, which was Westermarck's and Lagerborg's forum in their campaign for religious freedom. He wrote a series of articles in the Swedish language journal *Arbetet* on questions in the philosophy of religion, including essays in 1920 on Kant's later views of religion and in 1923 on the atheist Holbach. With influences from the Neo-Kantian Marburg school (rather than Marxism), he adopted a socialist political view and joined the Social Democratic party in 1917. When the civil war broke out in 1918, Eklund rejected the acts of violence of the Reds, but still he was sentenced to penitentiary. He was soon released, but could not continue his work as a secondary school teacher of mathematics and physics in Turku. Instead, he was appointed first as the editor of the journal *Demokraatti* in Turku and then for the years 1919-1926 the secretary of the Workers' Cultural Union (Työväen sivistysliitto) in Helsinki.

Eklund promoted his ambitions for an academic career with studies in mathematics in Göttingen in 1909-10, most likely following the lectures by David Hilbert, in Leipzig in 1913 and again in Göttingen in 1914, this time following philosophical lectures by Wilhelm Wundt, Johannes Volkelt, and Edmund Husserl. He also made personal acquaintance with the famous Neo-Kantian fictionalist Hans Vaihinger.

Hj. Eklund had a plan for a doctoral dissertation in mathematics, but instead published in 1916 at his own expense a philosophical study *Russells antinomi och andra paradoxala motsägelser: Logiska undersökningar* (Åbo, 144 pages). The theme of this book is the paradox found by Russell in 1901. In the simplest set-theoretical formulation, Russell considered the set B of all sets which do not contain themselves as elements, $B = \{x \mid x \notin x\}$. For example, the class of logicians is not a logician, so that it should be an element of B . Then ask whether B is an element of itself or not: if it is, the $B \in B$. and if it is not, then $B \notin B$, so that both alternatives lead to an impossibility. Russell communicated this paradox to Frege in a letter in 1902, and it seemed to shutter to ruins the great system that the German logician had erected in his *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* in 1893 in order to show that the whole of mathematics can be reduced to a small number of fundamental logical principles. The Cantorian set theory and theory of transfinite numbers suffered from similar antinomies. These surprising discoveries stimulated unprecedented activities in the investigations of

new systems of logic and the foundations of mathematics.

Eklund's book starts with a systematic summary of classical Zeno's paradoxes, the liar paradox, Kant's antinomies, and paradoxes in set theory (König, Richard, Burali-Forti, Berry, Russell). Using Russell's *Principles of Mathematics* (1903) as his main source, but referring to Whitehead's and Russell's *opus magnum* as well, he clarifies the terminology used by Russell, and presents Russell's alternative formulations of his paradox in terms of concepts, classes, propositional functions, binary relations, and propositions. After giving criteria of a satisfactory solution of the paradox, he first presents and evaluates Russell's five tentative proposals. The "way out" proposed by Frege in his reply to Russell is mentioned, but Frege's main work was not available to Eklund in the writing of his book. The next alternative is Russell's type theory, where each propositional function $F(x)$ has a range of truth (i.e. values of x which make the assertion $F(x)$ true) and a range of significance (i.e. values of x which make the assertion $F(x)$ meaningful). For example, Frege belongs to the range of truth of "x is a logician", but Chaplin does not. On the other hand, there are values of x which make $F(x)$ meaningless. Type theory classifies propositional functions into a hierarchy where the minimal type consists of individuals, and the next levels sets of individuals, sets of sets of individuals, etc. When a set is defined by a propositional function, e.g. $\{x \mid F(x)\}$, all of its elements have to be of the same type which is one less than the type of $F(x)$. Modifications of this theory were given in Russell's later works, but the basic solution of his paradox is that expressions like "x is an element of x" and "x is not an element of x" are rejected as meaningless, so that the idea of a set which contains itself as an element is logically forbidden.

Eklund was not satisfied with Russell's six proposals. He continues the book by critically summarizing altogether twelve other solutions (by Schoenflies, Hilbert, Poincaré, Zermelo, Whitehead and Russell, Urbach, Samuel, Dingler, König, and Brodén), where again some references were not available to him. His own solution, formally developed in Chapter V in 29 pages, resembles Hugo Dingler's, as it allows for the existence of sets which are their own members.⁵⁸⁰ Eklund starts from two conditions about a set C:

- it is a set whose all elements are A (i.e. C is a subset of A)
- it is a set which includes all As (i.e. A is a subset of C).

⁵⁸⁰ The summary follows von Wright (1979). For a more formal analysis of Eklund argument, see von Boguslawski (2011).

A set could satisfy the condition (a) with satisfying (b), but if C satisfies both it is identical with the set A. But sometimes there is no set which satisfies (a) and (b) together, which can be illustrated by separating general, individual, and self-contradictory concepts F as defining the set C. To deal with Russell's paradox, consider the concept F that a class is not an element of itself, i.e. $F(x)$ is $x \notin x$. Using now conditions (a) and (b), define $K(a)$ as a class whose all elements are sets which satisfy F and $K(b)$ as a class which contains all sets which satisfy F. According to Eklund, both of these classes are logically possible objects, but their conditions cannot be combined so that $K(a) = K(b)$. To prove this, note that every set which satisfies F is an element of $K(a)$, so that if a set is not an element of $K(a)$ then it does not satisfy F. In particular, if $K(a)$ is not an element of $K(a)$, then $K(a)$ is an element of itself. From the law of proposition logic, $(\neg p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p$, it now follows that $K(a)$ is an element of itself. By the definition of $K(b)$, $K(a)$ cannot be identical with $K(b)$.

Eklund's main conclusion is that the set of all sets which do not contain themselves as elements is self-contradictory or impossible. Unlike Russell, he does not claim that formulas like $x \in x$ and $x \notin x$ are illegitimate, but rather that one cannot combine all sets which satisfy $x \notin x$ into a well-defined set. This solution resembles those later axiomatic versions of set theory and its model theory which systematically limit the notion of a set so that e.g. the collection of all sets or the collection of all ordinal numbers are not "sets" but merely "classes".

Eklund's book was critically discussed by the Swedish mathematician Torsten Brodén in an article in 1917. He could not accept the conclusion that some sets may include themselves as elements. Eklund replied with an article "Über Mengen, die Elemente ihrer selbst sind" (1918) in the same Norwegian journal. In addition to a disproof of Brodén argument, he formulated a method of constructing examples of such sets by using the algebraic technique of continued fractions. From the equation

$$x = \frac{a}{b+x}$$

one can generate new equations by substitution

$$x = \frac{a}{b + \frac{a}{b + \dots}}$$

By continuing this operation *ad infinitum*, we obtain a complex whose element or part is identical to the whole complex. Abraham Fraenkel in his well-known *Einleitung in die Mengenlehre* in 1919 sides with Eklund against Brodén, but probably the Finn was frustrated by the lack of attention to his work among mathematicians.

3.8. Modern Philosophical Currents: Eino Kaila

Among professor Arvi Grontenfelt's students, Eino Kaila has a special position. Unlike other future professors (Salomaa, Ahlman, Krohn) and their students, who largely continued the currents of German Neo-Kantian or cultural life philosophy, Kaila made a decisive turn of Finnish philosophy toward a new direction of logical empiricism and analytic philosophy.⁵⁸¹

Eino Kaila was born on August 9, 1890, in Alajärvi, where his grandfather Jonatan Johansson worked as a provost. Jonatan's father Gustaf came from a farm in Eura (near Turku), and worked as a vicar like four of Jonathan's brothers. The most influential of these brothers was Gustaf Johansson (1844-1930), who was professor of dogmatics and ethics at the University in Helsinki in 1877-85 and archbishop of Finland in 1899-1930. Belonging to the pietistic beekian theology, he was mostly conservative in religious matters. Jonatan's oldest son Erkki (1867-1944), who in 1906 changed the family name to Kaila, was associate professor of theology in Helsinki in 1896-1910 and became bishop of Viipuri in 1925-35 and archbishop of Finland in 1935-44. He was more liberal as a theologian than his uncle Gustaf, with interest in the history of philosophy and cultural philosophy. Erkki Kaila published in 1908 a book on religion and natural science and in 1909 a textbook in the modern history of philosophy, *Oppikirja uuden ajan filosofian historiassa*. In 1914, he wrote the preface to a Finnish translation of William James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. In his work *Aikojen murroksessa* in 1921 he was one the first in Finland to discuss the fate of Europe in the light of Oswald Spengler's cultural pessimism. In his essays in the journal *Kirkko ja kansa* (Church and nation), the future archbishop complained about moral decline and recommended ideals like home, family, love, and respect for God and civic authorities. Most members of the Kaila family were bilingual but belonged politically to the conservative wing of the Old Finns.

⁵⁸¹ Hintikka (1970).

Eino Kaila was the oldest son in Erkki Kaila's family with nine children. His brother Martti Kaila (1900-78) became professor of psychiatry at the University of Helsinki. Eino's wife since 1916 was the painter Anna Snellman, the daughter of J. V. Snellman's oldest son Anders Henrik.

Eino Kaila has later in several works described his "philosophical awakening" at the age of sixteen, on a beautiful summer day in 1907 when he lay in a rowboat in a Finnish lake watching the clouds drifting in the sky. Then suddenly it seemed to him "that everything which there is in some very deep sense a unified whole, so to say an 'all-unity', a self-structuring totality". This whole, *natura naturans* in Spinoza's terms, excludes everything super-natural and entails the rejection of all dualisms. The project of "clarifying, supporting and proving true this monistic or unitarian conception" is the main task which kept Kaila engaged throughout all of his career as a philosopher.⁵⁸² Kaila's philosophical "awakening" was intellectual rather than religious, and his attraction to natural philosophy was associated with aesthetics rather than ethics.

Kaila started his university studies in Helsinki in 1908. In less than two years he finished his Master's degree in May 1910. His professors were Arvi Grotenfelt in theoretical philosophy and Edward Westermarck in practical philosophy, and the retired Thiodolf Rein still had presence through his textbooks in logic and psychology, but no one of these teachers made a strong influence on his thinking. The young Kaila was an independent mind, and as a protest to the clerical family tradition he was also inclined to oppose dogmatism within religion and the church. Still, there is no evidence that he would have participated in the radical anti-religious student association Prometheus established by Westermarck and Rolf Lagerborg. But in the Philosophical Society Kaila was the secretary already in 1908-09 and gave there his first lecture in 1910 on Hugo Münsterberg's work *Philosophie der Werte*.

Eino Kaila was restlessly searching his identity within the landscape of science and art. In 1907-17 he wrote in the journals *Aika* and *Uusi Suomestar* 53 reviews of literary works, both novels and poems. Favourable reviews of Juhani Aho, Aaro Hellaakoski and F. E. Sillanpää (later Nobel laureate in literature) were influential. Through his school time contacts Kaila established connections to the artistic circles of the Young Finns, and made acquaintance in Tuusula with Juhani Aho, Eero Järnefelt, Jean Sibelius, and Eino Leino. In 1911-16, Kaila also wrote 49 reviews of theatre performances. In 1918-20, he was the secretary of the state committee of dramatic art (led

⁵⁸² See Kaila (1992), 505, von Wright (1992).

by professor Yrjö Hirn), and in 1919-21 he worked as a dramaturge in the Finnish National Theatre. Kaila's aesthetic taste emphasized the values of structural harmony and complexity, internal honesty and truthfulness, and the vividness and depth of emotions, with little sympathy for the emerging modernist trends in painting, poetry, and music.

In 1917, Kaila wrote editorials for *Uusi Suometar* on war time events, and in 1919-21 he was elected as the chair of the Student Union.

In spite of these various activities in the arts and politics, the scholarly side of Eino Kaila's personality was even stronger.⁵⁸³ Besides preparing his doctoral thesis in experimental psychology, Kaila went through most of the modern philosophical currents with critical reactions.

Kaila's early work shows his impatience with ready-made systems and world views.⁵⁸⁴ In 1911 he rejected the naturalist world outlook or "monism" of the evolutionary biologist Ernst Haeckel and the chemist Wilhelm Ostwald as "dogmatic popular philosophy" which ignores the depth of philosophical questions about reality. What the new physics has achieved resembles more the abstract reality of Pythagoras than the material atoms of Democritus.⁵⁸⁵

Instead, essays on the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1911), the Danish philosopher Harald Høffding (1912), and the American pragmatist William James (1912) were emphatic and mainly enthusiastic. Bergson's philosophy of intuition had considerable influence in the Finnish artistic circles, and Kaila listened to his lectures in Paris in 1911. But already a few years later, Kaila pointed out that "Bergsonism" is rudely dogmatic in comparison with "Renanism":

"Renan is constantly aware that metaphysical philosophy is merely poetic play of speculation, which albeit its unwithering charm has to be taken *cum grano salis*.... Bergson undoubtedly believes in his metaphysical mirages, which as visions of poetic imagination admittedly are attractive."⁵⁸⁶

⁵⁸³ A dramatic expression of the two aspects of Kaila's personality is his book *Syvähenkinen elämä* (Deep-mental life, 1943), written as a dialogue between a scientist and an artist on the ultimate questions about the meaning of life.

⁵⁸⁴ For Kaila's bibliography, see Kaila (1979), Manninen and Niiniluoto (2007), 150-158.

⁵⁸⁵ Kaila (1911b,c), (1913d).

⁵⁸⁶ Kaila (1916b).

Kaila contrasted speculation and empirical science: while “pure speculation” combines a priori judgements and attempts to apply unchanging rigid concepts (like “unity” and “plurality”) to reality, it runs into pertinent difficulties. These difficulties are avoided by empirical knowledge which whenever needed creates new concepts. The alleged inability of logic to reach different shades concerns only “speculative a priori logic”, which is horrific to the best scientists. So Bergson is trying to deprive the authority of science and replace it with his poetic “intuition” which cannot be controlled in any way and does not include any criterion for distinguishing truth from error.

In the small monograph *Renan* (1917), Kaila chose as his spokesman the French historian of religion Ernest Renan who in a sophisticated way combined respect for religion with scepticism toward the truth of religious beliefs. In the same monograph, Kaila further contrasted idealism and modern naturalism. The former interprets the world in the light of results and ideals realized in the historical development, the latter in the light of the causal determinants of events. The perspective with results is justified in the domain of organic life. The mistake of idealist philosophy is to generalize and apply this teleological interpretation into the world process as a whole.

So already at this stage Kaila criticized metaphysical thinking for its a priori approach or uncontrolled speculation independently of experience.⁵⁸⁷ A similar critical remark was given in 1923: Kant is wrong in demanding that the axioms of science are based upon unchanging reason and that the reality has to be adjusted to these necessities of thought; instead, we have to be ready to change these “sensitive feelers” into others if they are not successful.

In his article in 1926, Kaila used Arthur Schopenhauer as an example of “the metaphysical mode of thinking”.⁵⁸⁸ He admitted that “this great expert of the human heart” represents spiritualism in an aesthetically appealing way in the “metaphysical novel” *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. In 1919, just one year after J. E. Salomaa’s dissertation on Schopenhauer, Kaila translated with an introduction the appendix of this work on death and immortality. In his major work on human personality in 1934, Kaila cited many times Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche.

Eino Kaila’s initial view of pragmatism was favourable. After William James’s death in 1910, several of his works were translated into Finnish

⁵⁸⁷ See Niiniluoto (2012).

⁵⁸⁸ See the translation Kaila (2003).

in 1913-22, and Kaila wrote reviews of most of them.⁵⁸⁹ The first Finnish article on pragmatism in *Mind* in 1911 was by Johan Wilhelm Snellman,⁵⁹⁰ who contrasted the pragmatist “test” of truth and the trivial intellectualist correspondence account of the “meaning” of truth. Another early article was by Allan Törnudd in 1915.⁵⁹¹ Already as a student, Törnudd presented a lecture in the Philosophical Society in 1912 on “irrationalism and pragmatism”, where J. W. Snellman was present as well. With reference to James and F. C. Schiller, both of them emphasized the pragmatist principle that each truth has to have a purpose. In the discussion Grotenfelt argued that theoretical truths have to “stand on their own feet”, and Rein (in the same way as Russell against James) criticized with examples the idea of identifying the true and the useful.⁵⁹² Similar criticism of John Dewey’s version of pragmatism was later given by J. E. Salomaa in the 1920s.

Kaila’s 1912 article presents James’s “will to believe” as a new answer to the problem of how a human being as an actor in the world can without intellectual compromises “deal with his religious needs, with his wish to find some higher spiritual content in life, a wish upon whose satisfaction the happiness of his entire life may depend”.⁵⁹³ But in his 1913 review of James’s *Pragmatism*, Kaila remarked that the pragmatist theory of truth may remain “a queer mistake”. In his later work as a critical realist and logical empiricist in the 1920s and 1930s, Kaila did not endorse pragmatism, but he returned to the idea of “practical tests” of metaphysical and religious world views and value commitments in his 1943 dialogue on “deep-mental life”.

Kaila’s early period included an intensive struggle with Ernst Mach’s positivism.⁵⁹⁴ Mach’s monism attracted Kaila, but already in 1913 he defended the reality of atoms against Mach – but not in the coarse “reified” style of the old materialists. In 1919-20 Kaila definitely concluded that Mach’s program of “phenomenological physics” is mistaken – and even

⁵⁸⁹ For early influences of pragmatism in Finland, see Pihlström (2001, 2003).

⁵⁹⁰ Johan Wilhem Snellman (1890-1966) was the grandson of J. V. Snellman and the brother-in-law of Eino Kaila.

⁵⁹¹ Allan Törnudd (1889-1961) was the first chief librarian of the Åbo Academy University.

⁵⁹² See Niiniluoto and Manninen (1996), 399-400.

⁵⁹³ For an English translation of Kaila’s article, with Pihlström’s introduction, see Kaila (2011).

⁵⁹⁴ See also Ch. 3.9.

criticised Albert Einstein's theory of relativity as being too Machian or positivistic. Atoms have to be assumed to be real, which means that they belong to "a mind-independent causal nexus". Here Kaila appealed to the psychology of perception: psycho-physiological mechanisms make us to see things in a way which differs from the image on the retina. Even though our picture of the world is biologically conditioned, it also serves as a basis of scientific thinking. Physics operates in the same way as our natural world outlook, when it treats sensations as "signs of real functional connections independently of our consciousness": every physical thing or event transcends "a mere given complex of sensations".

So around 1920 Kaila had accepted a realist position in the philosophy of science against phenomenalism, which was defended by Rolf Lagerborg in *Vetenskapliga vanföreställningar* (1920). Lagerborg's book was a reaction to Robert Tigerstedt's account of empirical science in *Vetenskaplig kritik* (1919), which was a textbook presentation of basic ideas about methodology and philosophy of science based on his farewell lectures.⁵⁹⁵ A Finnish translation of Tigerstedt's book was made in 1920 by Kaila. Already in an earlier article in 1878 Tigerstedt had discussed the aims and limitation of the scientific world view, with reference to the *ignoramus-ignorabimus* thesis about unsolvable "world riddles" (like the relation of matter and mind) by the German physiologist Emil Du Bois-Reymond. This thesis was sharply attacked by the monist Ernst Haeckel. Both Lagerborg and Kaila were critical about the *ignorabimus* thesis, but in different ways. While the former argued that a too cautious and agnostic position about the great riddles of the world makes room for metaphysics and theology,⁵⁹⁶ the latter could not approve the former's denial of the existence of atoms. The heated debate between Kaila and Lagerborg about atomic theory continued still in the Philosophical Society in 1921.⁵⁹⁷

Kaila discussed theoretical problems about psychology since 1913.⁵⁹⁸ On the basis of his monistic insight, he accepted the parallelist view defended by Neiglick, Westermarck, and Høffding, against Rein's interaction theory, so that the physiological series of events is primary to the series of mental events, but still there is a "gap" between the brain and

⁵⁹⁵ Robert Tigerstedt (1853-1923) was internationally renowned professor of physiology at the University of Helsinki. See Niiniluoto (1979).

⁵⁹⁶ See also Ch. 3.9.

⁵⁹⁷ See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 463.

⁵⁹⁸ For a comprehensive study of Kaila's psychology, see Jääskeläinen (1983a). See also Ch. 3.10.

the mind. In his later work, with reference to G. E. Müller, he analysed this anti-reductionist dependence relation by conditions which correspond to the notion of supervenience. Kaila thought that Lagerborg's behaviourism, which treats human beings as physico-chemical machines with stimuli and reactions, leads to a "conceptual chaos", which should be avoided by accepting dynamic and holistic aspects of psychical phenomena. Early writings mention also the problem of animal psychology and the notion of subconsciousness.

Kaila chose experimental psychology as the topic of his doctoral dissertation *Über die Motivation und die Entscheidung: Eine experimentell-psychologische Untersuchung*, which he defended in Helsinki in 1916. The empirical material consisted of students who estimated the difficulty of mathematical problems and then decided whether they try to solve them. The framework was mainly based on Oswald Külpe's Würzburg school, which grounded the principles of "thought psychology" upon causal laws of association. In 1918-23, Kaila published several articles on experimental psychology of perception in the German journals *Zeitschrift für Psychologie* and *Psychologische Forschung*. These studies directed Kaila's attention to many important aspects of perceptual psychology.⁵⁹⁹ In 1920, he used some facts about human perception – like the tendency to experience the world as solid objects in space and time and the constant size of perceived objects – in his arguments against Ernst Mach's phenomenalism.

In his Finnish monograph on "mental life as a biological phenomenon" in 1920, Kaila sharply attacked vitalist approaches in biology and psychology.⁶⁰⁰ He rejected the idea of independent mental causation. In particular, he accused William James of the metaphysical assumption that consciousness could steer the central nervous system. Yet Kaila did not accept reductionism, as he claimed that the laws of psychology cannot be derived from biology and neurophysiology. In the same work, Kaila presented a thoroughgoing critique of vitalism which postulates special vital forces (like Bergson's "élan vital" and Driesch's "entelechy") to explain organic events, especially regeneration. His main argument is based upon the Humean notion of causality, but the difference between "vital forces" and Newton's notion of gravitation is clearly spelled out: the former merely states an anthropomorphic term, whereas the latter specifies quantitatively how gravitation influences moving bodies.

⁵⁹⁹ Kaila (1918, 1919).

⁶⁰⁰ See Niiniluoto (2010).

After Finland had gained its independence in 1917, new Finnish and Swedish universities were founded in Turku. In 1921, Kaila was appointed the first Professor of Philosophy at the Finnish University of Turku. One of his first actions in Turku in 1922 was the establishment of a laboratory of experimental psychology, the first of its kind in Finland. A new era of academic psychology in Finland had started. Among Kaila's students was Ragnar Granit (1900-91), who moved to Sweden and became Nobel laureate in physiology and medicine in 1967 for his studies in the psychophysics of color vision.

Kaila continued his own psychological studies with a large Finnish monograph *Sielunelämän rakenne* (The Structure of Mental Life) in 1923, with influences from Gestalt psychology.⁶⁰¹ The book includes chapters on "Gestalts" and "The Perception of Space and Things". Besides comments on James's stream of consciousness, and Brentano's and Husserl's notion of intentionality, Kaila argued that Christian von Ehrenfels's treatment of Gestalt qualities in 1890 was too "atomistic". With references to Wolfgang Köhler's and Max Wertheimer's studies, he went through basic results of Gestalt psychology on perceptual illusions, experienced time and space, and perceived movement. Questions were raised about Köhler's 1920 thesis on "physical Gestalts", and the "product theory" of Gestalts by Witasek and Benussi.

During his Turku period Kaila intensively read an enormous number of new literature in philosophy and science. He discussed regularly foundational problems of mathematics with the brothers Frithiof and Rolf Nevanlinna. Starting in 1923, Kaila searched contacts with the new empiricist trends of European philosophy, first with Hans Reichenbach and then Moritz Schlick. In the mid-twenties his mature period started with monographs in German on causality, deduction, probability logic, and "synthetic" philosophy of nature. In *Die Prinzipien der Wahrscheinlichkeitslogik* (1926) he coined the term "eine logische Empirismus" for his own position. It requires that "every statement about reality must imply something definite about experience which is ground for the truth or the probability of that statement". Kaila called this solution of the problem of reality "critical realism", represented among others by Külpe, Meinong and Schlick, but he added that these scholars have failed to see the role of probability in this solution.

According to Kaila, knowledge of reality is not based upon metaphysical speculation, but relies on the interpretation of the best current theo-

⁶⁰¹ See Niiniluoto (2013).



Eino Kaila (1890-1958). Portrait by Anna Snellman. Helsinki University Museum. Photo by Timo Huvilinna.

ries in science. A synthetic work in this spirit is *Nykyinen maailmankäsitys* (1929), with main chapters on time and space, matter, life, and mind. There is no sharp difference between philosophy and special scientific disciplines, but philosophy is “the highest own life of science”, “the alpha and omega of science, its beginning and end”. Philosophy is not metaphysics, but “strictly against metaphysics”.

When the Vienna Circle (or the Ernst Mach Society) announced in 1929 its manifesto on the “scientific conception of the world”, Kaila was mentioned as one of the thinkers close to the Circle. Kaila made his first visit to Vienna on May 1929 by the invitation of Schlick. This co-operation was well-known and debated by conservative humanists in the faculty meeting, when Kaila in the summer of 1930 was appointed Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki. His main rival was J. E. Salomaa. While the German referees Bruno Bauch and Ernst Cassirer did not express a preference over either of the candidates, the decisive statement was given by Arvi Grotenfelt who concluded that Kaila is “a more original thinker” than Salomaa (even though the latter’s work was closer to his own interests).⁶⁰² Salomaa became then Kaila’s successor at the University of Turku.

Kaila visited Vienna in 1929 in order to meet Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap, and then again in the spring terms in 1932 and 1934. In 1932, he met there Karl Bühler, who was the leading figure of the psychological

⁶⁰² See Niiniluoto (1986, 2017), Manninen (2012).

Wurzburg school after Külpe, and did experimental work on Gestalt psychology in the laboratory of Charlotte Bühler.

In Helsinki, Kaila again established a laboratory of experimental psychology in 1932. It became the centre of new studies in the psychology of perception and developmental psychology. In 1934, Kaila published his masterpiece in the psychology of personality *Persoonallisuus*, but thereafter again concentrated on philosophical problems of logical empiricism with his studies on the constitution of reality from invariances and the widely read textbook *Inhimillinen tieto* (Human Knowledge, 1939).⁶⁰³ Kaila succeeded Gröntenfelt also as the chair of the Philosophical Society of Finland in 1934. As a charismatic teacher, Kaila educated the next generation of philosophy professors in the spirit of logical empiricism (Georg Henrik von Wright, Erik Stenius, Oiva Ketonen).⁶⁰⁴

When Kaila was appointed in 1948 as one of the twelve full-time members of the new Academy of Finland, psychology was separated from theoretical philosophy in Helsinki,⁶⁰⁵ and in 1951 Kaila's student Kai von Fieandt became the first occupant of the new chair in psychology for twenty years. In the meantime, a chair in psychology had been established in 1936 at the College of Education in Jyväskylä (later the University of Jyväskylä), and its first holders Niilo Mäki and Arvo Lehtovaara were Kaila's students too.

When Kaila died on July 31, 1958, in his summer place, his great plan for a synthetic philosophy of nature *Hahmottuva maailma* [The world as a structuring whole] was unfinished. In its Introduction, Kaila argued that a new key for understanding the unity of matter, life, and soul is provided by the concept of "holism". He stated that Hegel and other romantic philosophers anticipated "field thinking", but in a form which "resembles more the slurring of an ecstatic than the articulated speech in science". In the article on romanticism and the present age in 1941, Kaila gave an enlightened interpretation of Johan Vilhelm Snellman's doctrines as a primitive form of field thinking whose scientific formulation is cur-

⁶⁰³ For a translation of this work in English, see Kaila (2014). See also Kaila (1979).

⁶⁰⁴ For studies in Kaila's philosophy and his significance for Finnish philosophy, see Niiniluoto et al. (1992), Haaparanta and Niiniluoto (2003), Niiniluoto and Pihlström (2012), and von Boguslawski (2011).

⁶⁰⁵ Kaila had proposed the separation of theoretical philosophy into epistemology and psychology already in the Philosophical Society in 1919. See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 466.

rently articulated in quantum theory, biological systems theory, and Gestalt psychology.

3.9. Debates on Mach

As already stated in this volume, the 1880s marked a major change in Finnish academic philosophy as well as in Finnish intellectual life as a whole. The dominant intellectual currents based on German Idealism were profoundly challenged by diverse critical-empirical approaches, raised by Darwinism and the promise of the emerging natural sciences to explain everything in the nature and in the human being scientifically, by repeated experiments and statistically proven laws. In these efforts to eliminate all superfluous, speculative, and metaphysical assumptions, the Austrian physicist Ernst Mach (1838–1916) was one of the scientific authorities.

In Finland, Mach's ideas were presented first time favorably in 1889 by Hjalmar Neiglick, the Finnish pioneer of experimental psychology and psychophysical research, who had made his doctoral dissertation in 1887 in Leipzig at Wilhelm Wundt's first psychological laboratory in the world.⁶⁰⁶ In Finnish academic philosophy of the 1880s, Neiglick was the leading advocate of psychology without the concept of soul (*eine Psychologie ohne Seele*).⁶⁰⁷ In his profoundly anti-metaphysical approach, he used Mach's *Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen* (1886) to defend his thesis that all abstract concepts as well as concrete ideas and recollections had to have a certain sensual correlate (in most cases, an audio feature, spoken words, or an optical picture, writing) to occur and to be reproduced.⁶⁰⁸ His premature death from typhoid in 1889, however, tragically broke off his promising academic career, and his references to Mach were left for several decades without further explication.

Thus, extensive treatment of the topic began only at the beginning of the twentieth century. These receptions of Mach were also among the earliest ones in the Nordic countries as a whole. Broadly speaking, the Finnish debates on Machian phenomenalism lasted two decades until the early 1920s, finally ending up with the victory of critical scientific realism. On a more general level, they were manifestations of the widespread

⁶⁰⁶ See Ch. 3.4.

⁶⁰⁷ See, e.g., Neiglick (1887).

⁶⁰⁸ Neiglick (1889), 238–240.



*Ernst Mach (1838-1916).
Portrait by H. F. Jütte.*

ideological and political stir of the era. In this early stage, the positive receptions of Mach were clearly entangled with leftist sympathies and anti-clericalism already cherished by many of the “1880s generation.”

Otto Ville Kuusinen's Machian phase

The earliest extensive reception of Ernst Mach was presented in Finland in 1905 by a young student of aesthetics and philosophy, Otto Ville Kuusinen (1881–1964), in his Master's thesis *Ernst Haeckel's monismi ja puhtaan kokemuksen kanta* ('Ernst Haeckel's monism and the position of pure experience'). In particular, Kuusinen referred extensively to Mach's *Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen* (1886) and *Populär-wissenschaftliche Vorlesungen* (1896). Kuusinen's ideas are of special interest, because he soon became the ideological leader of the Finnish Social Democratic Party and, after the Finnish Civil War and his flight into Soviet-Russia in 1918, a prominent leader of the Comintern (Communist International) as well as a future member of the Soviet Union's Politburo (the Central Committee of the Communist Party), the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In 1961, he was even nominated as the Hero of Socialist Labor. At the summit of his power, this son of a humble village tailor was arguably the most influential Finn so far in world politics.

It is not possible to find out with certainty how Kuusinen, in the first place, became interested in Ernst Mach. It has been hypothesized,

Otto Ville Kuusinen (1881-1964).

however, that the mediator might have been Edvard Westermarck, who in the spring semester of 1903 acted as a substitute for the professor of philosophy at the Imperial Alexander University and had for a long time been interested in the mind-body problem, a central question in Kuusinen's Master's thesis.⁶⁰⁹ Another possibility for Kuusinen to have become acquainted with Mach was his aesthetic studies. In a meeting of the University Students' Aesthetic Society in December 1903, he gave a lecture on the Austrian author Peter Altenberg, who, in his turn, based his impressionist view on art and literature on Mach's phenomenalism, that is, on the idea of the world in endless flow without a substance.⁶¹⁰ Finally, Kuusinen's simultaneously awakened interest in socialism could have led him to Mach. Similar to many young socialists with an academic background, Kuusinen was keen to show that Marxism was compatible with a scientific world view. In Germany, one of the most popular authorities in contemporaneous scientific, anti-metaphysical thinking was the biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919), famous for his materialistic monism, which postulated that all aspects of life were ultimately reducible to physical-chemical processes. From Kuusinen's point of view, however, an insurmountable obstacle in Haeckel's thinking was that Haeckel

⁶⁰⁹ Manninen (1996).

⁶¹⁰ Records of the University Students' Aesthetic Society 1900–1903, December 2, 1903, the National Library of Finland. See also Henrikson (1971), 88–89, 97, 172; Huuhtanen (1978), 120.

strongly rejected socialism, considering its claim for social equality to be contradictory to the Social Darwinist idea of “the survival of the fittest.” Thus, when Kuusinen in his Master’s thesis harshly criticized Haeckel’s monistic materialism and, instead, took a positive stand for Mach, it is obvious that he also aimed to use Mach’s ideas as a new basis of “scientific” socialist theory.⁶¹¹

Kuusinen based his criticism of Haeckel on the claim that the position of pure experience, which Haeckel insisted on representing, was actually something quite different from what Haeckel’s materialism stood for.⁶¹² According to Kuusinen, Haeckel’s idea of organic life as a mere series of physical-chemical processes was a biased view that contained materialistic metaphysics far beyond positive facts. Correspondingly, he contested Haeckel’s equation of the functioning of living organisms with the operation of mechanical automatons. As developed living organisms manifested in their functions an astonishing diversity of activities, they also had a far better ability for self-preservation than unanimated force systems. As Mach with good reason remarked, this inner activity – for instance, various phenomena of human memory – was not to be confused with age-old vitalism, let alone the existence of a soul. Nevertheless, contrary to Haeckel’s efforts, neither could one explain them by mere causal mechanical principles and the laws of nature. Referring to Kant and the Neo-Kantian interpretation of the German philosopher Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), Kuusinen insisted that in the case of living organisms, scientific study could only discover certain regularities. He also rejected Haeckel’s idea of the development of a living organism as a mere passive adaptation to the changes in its external circumstances. Anticipating the gradual rehabilitation of Kant’s conception of teleology in modern biology, he suggested that the concepts of goal-directedness and purposefulness were essential to the very definition of living beings.⁶¹³

In the second part of his Master’s thesis, Kuusinen hammered Haeckel’s psychological thinking, linked to the more general mind-body problem in philosophy. According to Kuusinen, psychology was for Haeckel only a subsection of biology, and a mental phenomenon, respectively, without any specific quality of its own. Hence, Haeckel assumed that atoms had sensations and plants had mental life, which for Kuusinen

⁶¹¹ See, e.g., Kuusinen (1906); Kuusinen (1916); Soikkanen (1961), 92–93, 138–139.

⁶¹² See the unnumbered preface in Kuusinen (1905).

⁶¹³ Kuusinen (1905), 4, 19–51; cf. Mach (1914/1996), 80–81.

was as meaningless and metaphysical as Haeckel's conceptions of "psycho-plasma" and "cell-soul." An even more serious shortcoming in Haeckel's explanation was his neglect of the biological significance of mental phenomena, that is, how various developmental stages of consciousness contributed to the self-preservation of a living organism. Being preoccupied with naïve materialism, Haeckel solved the mind-body problem in a fully causal, mechanical way.⁶¹⁴

Following the Machian ideas of the German philosopher Joseph Petzoldt and the Swiss philosopher Rudolf Willy, both proponents of Richard Avenarius's empiriocriticism, Kuusinen claimed that there was no rift between the psychical and the physical, and thus, no need for a postulate of psychophysical parallelism. A living creature was an indivisible whole, and although only a living, embodied individual could think and feel, the interaction between mind and body was functional, not causal. The ability to sense and think was developing simultaneously with physical development, especially with the development of the nervous system, and it was impossible to define exactly when a response to an external influence turned into a mental ability involving sensations and emotions. As regards the mind-body problem, Kuusinen referred again to the Neo-Kantian opposition of general rules and rigid laws, arguing that a scholar studying human activities (for instance, a historian) could never set forth any tenable laws. Based on this theoretical discussion, he also drew social conclusions. Instead of considering social life "the war of all against all" and "the struggle for survival," he cherished the highest and refined abilities of the human mind as crucial prerequisites for the integrated development of body and mind, which, from the evolutionary viewpoint, was ultimately at the service of self-preservation.⁶¹⁵

In the last part of his Master's thesis, Kuusinen considered epistemological questions, noting that they certainly were not the strongest part of Haeckel's argumentation. Following Mach, Kuusinen contested the common notion of an antithesis between "appearance" and "reality" as well as the need to find those mysterious entities of which the world was supposed to consist. "The things *are* as they *appear*," he summed up Mach's basic idea. Instead of atoms and molecules, our perceptions, presentations, and emotions, in short, the entire inner and outer world, were put together out of a number of elements, such as colors, sounds, smells, and pressures, which were commonly called "sensations." Strictly

⁶¹⁴ Kuusinen (1905), 58–63, 68–82.

⁶¹⁵ Kuusinen (1905), 63–64, 85–93, 95–107.

taken, there did not exist a distinction between the “inner” (mental) and the “outer” (material) world; the question was only about two different viewpoints.⁶¹⁶

The only major issue on which Kuusinen disagreed with Mach was the question about the self or ego, which Kuusinen briefly discussed at the end of his Master’s thesis. According to Mach, the primary fact was not the ego, but the elements; in Mach’s words, “Bodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of elements (sensations) make up bodies.”⁶¹⁷ In other words, Mach took body and ego simply as practical unities and makeshifts, put together for purposes of provisional survey and for definite practical ends. On the contrary, Kuusinen attached greater importance to the experienced distinction between an individual and his/her surroundings. As he pointed out with reference to Rudolf Willy and Wilhelm Wundt, an experience that was not an experience of a determinate subject was unthinkable. For him, this demonstrated that the subject had to have some consistence.⁶¹⁸

In his 1916 obituary for Mach, however, Kuusinen had revised his earlier stand. Now he praised the Machian conception of ego, saying that the need for self and soul reminded us of the old peasant who saw a steam engine for a first time and asked, “Where are the horses that drive this machine?”⁶¹⁹ Since Mach himself made this same comparison in his *Erkenntnis und Irrtum* (1905), Kuusinen might have taken this example directly from Mach.⁶²⁰ In the 1910s, Kuusinen’s criticism of Mach was concentrated merely on the way Mach limited his discussion only to the autonomous field of science, without taking into account how scientific advancement depended on economic development and, on this basis, on historical circumstances, conflicts, and struggles.⁶²¹ As such, the obituary testified to Kuusinen’s long-standing interest in Mach and, on a more general level, his strong German orientation in his socialist thinking. As regards to Kuusinen’s future political career in the Soviet Union, it is interesting to notice that V. I. Lenin had already insisted in 1908 in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* that the Bolsheviks had to choose Mach or Marx. In Lenin’s view, the supposedly new “phenomenalist”

⁶¹⁶ Kuusinen (1905), 109–111, 126–130, citation in p. 126, author’s italics.

⁶¹⁷ Mach (1914/1996), 23–29.

⁶¹⁸ Kuusinen (1905), 130–135.

⁶¹⁹ Kuusinen (1916).

⁶²⁰ Mach (1905/1976), 8.

⁶²¹ Kuusinen (1916).

philosophy of Mach and his followers simply repeated the old absurdity of philosophical subjective idealism.⁶²² Kuusinen claimed, however, that he had become acquainted with Lenin's literary production for the first time only in 1918 after his flight into Soviet-Russia. Only then could he find out Lenin's harsh judgement of Mach, which dominated Soviet philosophy ever since.⁶²³

Rolf Lagerborg in the Fight against "Scientific Misconceptions"

While Otto Ville Kuusinen preferred political action to academic research after the completion of his Master's thesis, the moral philosopher Rolf Lagerborg became the first and only Machist in Finnish academic philosophy. Because of the social, political, and linguistic differences between Lagerborg and Kuusinen, it is plausible that their interests in Mach were in no way connected to each other. Instead, Lagerborg was at that time developing his own monistic epistemology independently of such Finnish-speaking radical socialists as Kuusinen. Since Lagerborg watchfully followed the international discussion about topical scholarly issues, always looking for new evidence to support his own standpoint, it was actually only a matter of time before he found Ernst Mach, who was at the time famous for his contribution to the debate on atomic theory.

It seems that Lagerborg had become acquainted with Mach's ideas in 1908 at the latest. In his public lecture at the Prometheus Society in October 1908, titled "Själproblemet inför fysiken" ("The problem of soul in the eye of physics"), he already stated in a Machian way that the conception of soul in psychology, similarly to the conception of mass in physics, was only a common noun for certain phenomena, not the "thing-it-itself" with substantial properties of its own.⁶²⁴ In a debate at the Philosophical Society of Finland following his lecture, he denied the charge of being an old-fashioned materialist, and gave his support to "philosophers of immanence," without mentioning anyone by name, however.⁶²⁵

⁶²² Lenin (1908/1972), Chapters 1.6 and 6.5.

⁶²³ Tapiola (1970), 145-172.

⁶²⁴ Records of the Prometheus Society, October 19, 1908. Åbo Akademi University Library, Turku, Finland.

⁶²⁵ Records of the Philosophical Society of Finland, November 27, 1908. See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 371-372.

In 1915, Lagerborg made his first direct reference to Mach during a debate on Haeckel's monistic philosophy. The debate had started in 1914 with an article by Harry Federley (1871–1951), the Finnish geneticist and national expert in eugenics. In his article, Federley praised the achievements of Haeckel and the Monist League, an organization designed to perpetuate Haeckel's freethinking in 1905. According to Federley, the natural sciences had proved beyond question that all life was based on matter and, consequently, mental life on its material substrate, the brain. Together with the rejection of the dogma of an immortal soul, material monism rejected Christianity and the conception of God, as well as other such superstitious beliefs, hence insisting on an unconfessional school system, the disestablishment of the Church, and complete freedom of religion. With a scientific certainty of belief, Federley proclaimed, "Science will finally command everything and totally displace religion."⁶²⁶

As was presumable, the polemic words of Federley raised a number of protests that scrutinized in detail Haeckel's philosophical errors. Lagerborg, instead, had an urge to defend Haeckel, not least because his own materialist monistic ideas and freethinking were at the time close to those of Haeckel. Despite its awkward conceptions, Lagerborg considered Haeckel's monism useful for the pursuit of a scientific worldview. As a whole, he compared it to a pleasant building with some fake ornaments and decayed parts, which, nevertheless, had a solid foundation and hence was easily renovated with "a little critical cleaning." As the leader of this cleanup, he introduced Ernst Mach, whose phenomenalism seemed to offer a way to avoid Haeckel's "materialistic metaphysics." In an essentially Machian way, Lagerborg suggested that both consciousness and matter were phenomenal. This meant that the supposed distinction between them fell apart and turned out to be a result of our own narrow outlook.⁶²⁷

While Lagerborg and Federley had drawn the results of the natural sciences into their anticlerical campaign, Robert Tigerstedt, the internationally renowned Finnish-born physiologist specialized in the vascular system, decided to step in. In 1918–1919, he gave a lecture series at the University of Helsinki about general philosophical and methodological problems in the natural sciences, which was published in 1919 under the title *Vetenskaplig kritik: Några allmänna betraktelser* ("Scientific criticism: Some general reflections"). In his book, Tigerstedt stated that the sole purpose of scientific research was to reach the truth. In other words, its

⁶²⁶ Federley (1914).

⁶²⁷ Lagerborg (1915b). See also Niiniluoto (1979).

main task was to advance from scientifically proven facts to general conceptions and laws, as comprehensive as possible. As a cautious person, he warned repeatedly of the risk of considering scientific results too definitive or presenting them in an oversimplified form. As a warning example, he used Ernst Haeckel. Moreover, he emphasized that same cautiousness was necessary for a scientific worldview. Referring to the German physiologist Emil Du Bois-Reymond's famous *ignoramus-ignorabimus* thesis⁶²⁸, Tigerstedt stated that there were many questions, for instance, questions about free will and the immortality of the soul, that were beyond the limits scientific research. The only scientifically acceptable position was hence agnosticism, that is, the philosophical recognition that at the present state of our knowledge, we could not obtain absolute certainty about the ultimate reality. As Tigerstedt summed up his leading idea, "The truth discloses itself only to those who doubt."⁶²⁹

For Lagerborg, it was obvious that Tigerstedt did not doubt enough. On the contrary, Tigerstedt left too much room for metaphysical conceptions, such as matter, force, will, and soul, and was unwilling to break away from an anthropocentric or theological worldview. Bearing in mind that Tigerstedt was an authority in his domain, there was a possibility that his statements were beneficial to theologians and the Church.⁶³⁰ In fact, this had already been the case in the above-mentioned 1914-15 debate on Haeckel's monism, in which Lagerborg's "arch-enemy," the professor of doctrinal theology G. G. Rosenqvist, had referred to Tigerstedt's former agnostic statements in his defense of the existence of God.⁶³¹ The same happened again after the publishing of Tigerstedt's *Vetenskaplig kritik*. In 1921 in *Teologisk Tidskrift*, the Finnish theological periodical founded by Rosenqvist in 1896, Tigerstedt's book was warmly recommended to all students of theology as a work that defined the legitimate limits of natural scientific research.⁶³² Anticipating his enemy's movements, Lagerborg

⁶²⁸ According to this thesis, there exists many mysteries in the material world that we do not yet know (*ignoramus*), but the mysteries of what matter and force (*Kraft*) are and how matter and force can "think" we will never be able to know (*ignorabimus*). Mach, instead, was convinced that there is no problem that a man of science can regard as absolutely insoluble; see Mach (1914/1996), 358.

⁶²⁹ Tigerstedt (1919), 40, 48, 70-75, 89-93, 100-103, citation in p. 107.

⁶³⁰ Lagerborg (1920), 8.

⁶³¹ Rosenqvist (1914).

⁶³² Gyllenberg (1921).

thus entered into the writing of a long response to Tigerstedt, which resulted in his main study on the theory of knowledge, *Vetenskapliga vanföreställningar* (“Scientific misconceptions”) in 1920.⁶³³

With theoretical armature mainly collected from Mach’s *Die Analyse der Empfindungen*,⁶³⁴ Lagerborg aimed his *Vetenskapliga vanföreställningar* to be a counterblow against theological and metaphysical thinking, those two “underdeveloped stages of knowledge,” as the French philosopher Auguste Comte had defined in his “law of three phases” of society.⁶³⁵ A good starting point for Lagerborg’s criticism was Mach’s conception of matter. It provided a striking contrast to Tigerstedt’s self-evident way of explaining the world with material entities (*materie*) and their motions. As Mach had stated, matter had to be regarded merely as a highly naturalized, unconsciously constructed mental symbol for a relatively stable complex of sensational elements. In Lagerborg’s words, instead of a bearing substrate, matter is only a series of events, similar to fire. Hence, there is no point in contrasting “appearance” with “reality”: a “thing-in-itself,” detached from the world of our sensations and experiences, is just an empty word. Furthermore, Lagerborg challenged the conception of causality, claiming that “cause” and “effect” are simply our own partial views of a process that is actually continuous and unbroken. From an epistemological perspective, Lagerborg’s Machian standpoint clearly challenged Tigerstedt’s realistic theory of knowledge, which assumed (although in a cautious form) that our sensations correspond to external reality, which makes it possible for us to acquire reliable knowledge of the world.⁶³⁶

As regards to the metaphysical nature of matter, Lagerborg also briefly discussed atomic theory. While Mach was influential in this respect in many parts of Europe during the first decade of the twentieth century, the Finnish physicists (those very few individuals who were capable of assessing the international research at the forefront of development) seemed to

⁶³³ Lagerborg’s response to Tigerstedt was first published as a series of articles in *Finsk Tidskrift* during the year 1920. The contents of these articles are identical to *Vetenskapliga vanföreställningar* (1920).

⁶³⁴ Mach was by no means Lagerborg’s only authority in epistemological questions. In *Vetenskapliga vanföreställningar*, he eclectically referred, for instance, to Heraclitus, Aristotle, Kant, and Hume, as well as to more recent philosophers, such as Avenarius, Riehl, and Poincaré.

⁶³⁵ Cited in Lagerborg (1920), 20.

⁶³⁶ Lagerborg (1920), 15–27, 36–39; Tigerstedt (1919), 18–19. See also Niiniluoto (1979), 389.

support atomic theory by common consent and leaned toward accepting the reality of atoms. As Hjalmar Tallqvist, the professor of physics at the Imperial Alexander University of Finland, put it in 1913, since Albert Einstein's theory of relativity had revolutionized the conceptions of time, space, and mass, resulting in physics in a shift from a "system at rest" to a "system in motion," one could find solace in the fact that "matter is and will be tangible reality."⁶³⁷ In Lagerborg's ears, Tallqvist's half-humorous statement sounded suspiciously like an attempt to defend the existence of the "thing-in-itself." From Lagerborg's phenomenalist viewpoint, the discovery of subatomic particles gave proof of the divisibility of atoms, which was yet another verification of the claim that the atom was merely an auxiliary concept, similar to matter and force. Thus, the model of the atom was useful only as an orienteering scheme, not as the ultimate truth of reality. "It will never mirror the whole diversity and multiplicity of nature," he claimed.⁶³⁸ For some reason or another, Tallqvist did not say a word in reply to Lagerborg's view on atomic theory. In 1922, while discussing briefly the recent development of the relativity theory, the quantum theory, and the new atomic theory, he did not even discuss the possibility that these theories could have been contested, let alone mention Mach's or Lagerborg's name.⁶³⁹

While Kuusinen had presented in his Master's thesis certain reservation about the Machian conception of ego, Lagerborg was eager to follow in Mach's footsteps to the very end in this respect, too. For Lagerborg, the crucial philosophical consequence of the relativity theory was that all hopes of achieving something absolute and solid had crumbled to dust. Just as there was no "thing-in-itself" behind appearance, there did not exist any permanent "self-subject" (*jaget-subjektet*) behind our consciousness, and even our self-consciousness was constantly changing. This was manifested in a pointed way by psychiatric patients with a double personality, but the same held true for "normal" people as well. As the well-known British psychologist, Michael Foster, had aptly remarked, during a long life one's personality could alter so drastically that if all those personalities were introduced to each other, they would despise each other and separate as soon as possible without a desire to ever meet again, Lagerborg wrote.⁶⁴⁰

⁶³⁷ Tallqvist (1913); see also Tallqvist (1915).

⁶³⁸ Lagerborg (1920), 71–72.

⁶³⁹ Tallqvist (1922).

⁶⁴⁰ Lagerborg (1920), 72–78, quotation of Foster in p. 78.

If the conception of the ego as a definite, unalterable, sharply-bound-ed unity was given up, as Lagerborg suggested, at the same time, we could get rid of a number of pseudo-problems. A good example for him was Descartes's famous thesis *cogito, ergo sum*. From the Machian viewpoint, it went all too far to say *cogito*, if translated by *I think*. In fact, we could know only the existence of our sensations and thoughts, not the existence of *I* as an agent. In all, according to Lagerborg, the ego was just a spot where feebly connected lines of events temporarily crossed. "A subject is only a temporary projection point," he claimed.⁶⁴¹ Since it was possible to consider his conception an "attack on the majesty of man," it was no wonder that it was opposed in the same passionate way as people in the past had opposed the idea that the earth rotated on its axis and around the sun. Be it pleasant or not, however, science could make progress only with scholars who were not afraid to lose the steady ground under their feet. At the end of his book, Lagerborg finally agreed with Tigerstedt about one issue: "The truth discloses itself only to those who doubt".⁶⁴²

Although Lagerborg, faithfully to his personal style, defended the Machian ideas in a poignant manner, his interest in Mach was relatively short-lived. As already mentioned in the chapter about Lagerborg in this volume, throughout his academic career, it was typical of him to get hastily excited by a certain intellectual current, only to give it up for the sake of the next source of inspiration. Thus, his Machian phase should be seen mainly as one stage in his life-long battle against metaphysics and its "idols of spurious thought," such as soul, ego, and substance. In 1922, he was already enthusiastic about psycho-serology, the attempt to explain changes in mental states by bodily fluids and hormones.⁶⁴³ Five years later, in 1927, he introduced John B. Watson's behaviorism to the Finnish public, claiming that in many fields of study, for instance in sociology, the old terminology of *Geisteswissenschaften* should have been replaced by the concepts of stimulus and response.⁶⁴⁴ While reading Lagerborg's optimistic visions of social engineering based on the determinist assump-

⁶⁴¹ Lagerborg (1920), 83, 91, citation in pp. 93–95. See also the Records of the Philosophical Society of Finland, November 5, 1920 (Manninen and Niiniluoto, 1996, 476–478).

⁶⁴² Lagerborg (1920), 95–96.

⁶⁴³ The Records of the Philosophical Society of Finland, November 17, 1922. See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 500–501.

⁶⁴⁴ Lagerborg (1927).

tion that people responded in a programmed way to outside stimuli,⁶⁴⁵ it may be difficult to believe that the same writer had just a few years earlier insisted on the elimination of causality from the scientific vocabulary.⁶⁴⁶ Later on, he merely referred to Mach's theory of the economy of thought (*die Ökonomie des Denkens*), stating that science should aim at the most simple and "economic" descriptions of perceived phenomena and their relations.⁶⁴⁷ During the decades to come, he did not show any interest in the Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism or Logical Positivism.

Eino Kaila's Critical Position on Mach

Eino Kaila (1890–1958), the future leading figure in Finnish academic philosophy and the professor of philosophy at the University of Helsinki (1930–1948), started to study philosophy in 1908. The international background of his early intellectual development was marked by a controversy between "atomists" (e.g. Max Planck), "phenomenalists" (Mach), and "energetics" (Wilhelm Oswald), to which we still have to add the "trend philosopher" of the era, Henri Bergson with his *élan vital* ("vital force") as an explanation of life. While Kaila was at the same time modifying his scholarly way of thinking, he had to take a stand on the topical issue of Mach, becoming the first scholar in Finland to present a critical reception of Mach in the 1910s and thus, significantly contributing to the marginalization of Mach in Finnish academic philosophy.

It has been suggested that Eino Kaila's constitutive experience of the world might be described as "monistic" or "unitarist." To quote his own poetic expression, "We are passing ripples in the sea of all unity".⁶⁴⁸ This, however, did not make him sympathetic towards Haeckel's materialistic monism or Mach's phenomenalism. Already in 1911, he considered Haeckel's philosophy "a lousy popular philosophy," and a "banal compilation of philistinism and superficial natural sciences." According to Kaila, Haeckel seemed to be fully ignorant of the deficiency of our present state of knowledge.⁶⁴⁹ Referring to Henri Bergson, Kaila stated that materialism was based on *homo faber's* (the "working man") psychological inclination

⁶⁴⁵ Lagerborg (1927), 94–95.

⁶⁴⁶ Lagerborg (1920), 18–19.

⁶⁴⁷ Lagerborg (1927), 93; Lagerborg (1943), 57.

⁶⁴⁸ Kaila (1958/1979).

⁶⁴⁹ Kaila (1911a), 672.

to cherish solid objects and to materialize things. Instead of materialistic monism, in this early stage he supported a non-dualistic version of psychophysical parallelism, stating that in every point, mental processes corresponded to certain processes at the cortex. Although mental phenomena depended on certain corporal preconditions, he did not accept the reduction of psychology to biology, which is what Haeckel and Lagerborg were aiming at. To cite Kaila, “The metaphysical gulf between mental and material will exist just as before”.⁶⁵⁰ In the 1914–15 debate on Haeckel, he insisted against Lagerborg that every philosopher should acknowledge the empirical opposite of physical and psychical.⁶⁵¹

In general, the young Kaila was not fully negative towards Mach’s phenomenalism, although he considered it “exaggerated.” In 1911 he agreed with Mach that for the exact sciences, the most crucial issue was how various phenomena related to each other. Since the ideas about the quality of phenomena were created solely for the purposes of controlling their mutual relations, Mach’s theory of the economy of thought (*die Ökonomie des Denkens*) should have been taken as a working hypothesis. It was not, however, “the last result of science.”⁶⁵² In some respect, the position of Mach kept Kaila occupied to his death in 1958.⁶⁵³ He also transplanted this interest into some of his most prominent students, such as Oiva Ketonen, the professor of philosophy at the University of Helsinki in 1951–77, who presented his interpretation of the Machian theory of economy in 1965.⁶⁵⁴

For Kaila, however, Mach’s denial of the modern atomic theory was an unsurmountable error; for in 1913, he himself was already firmly convinced of the existence of atoms.⁶⁵⁵ In a meeting of the Philosophical Society of Finland in 1919, he stated that science had proven beyond question that atoms and molecules were “as real as various other things, which we cannot observe at the moment, for some reason or other, but which we have to consider existing.”⁶⁵⁶ In 1920, Kaila was ready to claim that there had to be a fundamental mistake in the seemingly logical argu-

⁶⁵⁰ Kaila (1913).

⁶⁵¹ Kaila (1915), 66.

⁶⁵² Kaila (1911b), 541.

⁶⁵³ See Niiniluoto (1979), 401.

⁶⁵⁴ Ketonen (1965).

⁶⁵⁵ Kaila (1913).

⁶⁵⁶ The records of the Philosophical Society of Finland, November 14, 1919. See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 463.

mentation on which phenomenalist physics were based. Because of our psychophysical mechanisms based on biology, we comprehend the world nowhere near in accordance with our initial sensations, for in our consciousness there exist mechanisms that strongly modify them. As Kaila put the question, "How could our sensations as such be sacred to a natural scientist, to a physicist, when they are not sacred to our consciousness, which treats them according to higher purposes?"⁶⁵⁷ In a heated debate with Lagerborg in a meeting of the Philosophical Society of Finland in 1921, Kaila unhesitatingly remarked that whoever denied atomic theory, in a certain sense denied rational thinking at the same time.⁶⁵⁸

Final Remarks

One might consider it an example of historical irony that while Ernst Mach primarily desired an understanding of the natural scientists, insisting that there is no such thing as "the philosophy of Mach,"⁶⁵⁹ in Finland in the beginning of the twentieth century, his position was solely discussed by philosophers and students of philosophy, interested in the theory of knowledge. The only Finnish physicist active in public discussion, the professor of physics Hjalmar Tallqvist, did not seem to pay any attention to phenomenalist physics. Even in philosophy, Mach's long-term influence was rather marginal, however. The most enduring part of his thinking seemed to be the theory of the economy of thought (*die Ökonomie des Denkens*), afterwards positively appraised by both Lagerborg and Kaila.

On a more general level, the earliest debates on Mach in Finland can be considered an epistemological contest between Machian phenomenism (Lagerborg) and critical scientific realism (Kaila). The struggle ended up with the clear victory of the latter.⁶⁶⁰ As the Machian neo-positivist Richard von Mises remarked in 1938, however, it is impossible to estimate the true effect of Mach's doctrines solely by the number and the success of those who were directly inspired by his writings and tried to continue

⁶⁵⁷ Kaila (1920).

⁶⁵⁸ The records of the Philosophical Society of Finland, April 15, 1921. See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 483-485.

⁶⁵⁹ E.g. Mach (1914/1996), 368-369.

⁶⁶⁰ Niiniluoto (1979), 399-400.

his work in a similar direction.⁶⁶¹ For instance, when Lagerborg explained his phenomenalist theory of knowledge in a meeting of the Philosophical Society of Finland in February 1920, even those who did not agree with admitted that the shaking of the foundations of dogmatic belief had a “purifying impact on modern thought.”⁶⁶²

Finally, it is important to note that the effect of Mach’s doctrines was not limited to a small circle of academic philosophers. As the case of Otto Ville Kuusinen manifested, the ideas of Mach shaped the thinking of young academic socialists and cultural bohemia in Finland, intertwined with more general political and anticlerical views, and, at least to a certain extent, we may hence consider Mach influential on the Finnish intellectual avant-garde of the early twentieth century. Seen in this context, Machian anti-metaphysics was a revolutionary standpoint within philosophical culture, clearly connected with freethinking and leftist political sympathies, cherished both by Kuusinen and Lagerborg, and mistrusted by Kaila, who, despite his radical philosophical thinking, remained politically conservative. Just as socialism was a political battle against social oppression and inequality, so Machian anti-metaphysics was a battle against dogmatic and idol-producing ways of thought. As the closing words of Mach’s *Erkenntnis und Irrtum* (1905) testified, this socio-political connection had certainly crossed Mach’s mind, too. It was indeed not a secret to his contemporaries that he was a socialist and an atheist.⁶⁶³ In his native land, Austria, this legacy was carried on by the *Verein Ernst Mach* as well as by some leading figures of the Vienna Circle, such as Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath, who all were anti-metaphysical socialists.

3.10. New Trends in Psychology in the 1910s

In the 1910s, the role of neo-Kantianism in Finnish philosophy was restricted to Arvi Grotenfelt’s philosophy of history, while Henri Bergson and William James became more under discussion.⁶⁶⁴ Journalist-writer Henning Söderhjelm (1888-1967) concluded that Bergson’s and James’s

⁶⁶¹ Mises (1939/1970).

⁶⁶² Remark by Aina Lähteenoja. The records of the Philosophical Society of Finland, February 27, 1920. See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 467-470.

⁶⁶³ Mach (1905/1976), 361.

⁶⁶⁴ Von Wright (1979), xii–xiii; Nygård (2011), 249, n. 3.



*Henning Söderhjelm (1888-1967).
National Library of Finland, photo by
Henning Söderhjelm.*

thoughts were “a reaction against all atheism, all materialism, all worship of blind natural laws [...] against the ‘latest results of science’, against the way of seeing the human situation in the world that the doctrine of evolution, bible criticism and many other issues have induced.”⁶⁶⁵ Both portal figures were dissatisfied with the negative values in the prevailing conceptions of life and in the rational facts of science and demanded that they should be reinterpreted and re-evaluated.

For a short while in the 1910s, especially Bergson’s ideas raised debates in Finland.⁶⁶⁶ For example, Eino Kaila, Hans Ruin and Henning Söderhjelm were moderate in favour of Bergson’s philosophy, while Lagerborg, close to the Durkheimian camp, was opposed to Bergson and leaned on Harald Høffding’s conceptions about Bergson.⁶⁶⁷ Lagerborg, like Høff-

⁶⁶⁵ Söderhjelm (1919), 77.

⁶⁶⁶ On the Bergson debates in Finland, see Nygård (2011).

⁶⁶⁷ Høffding’s history of philosophy (1907/1910) was the first work translated into Finnish that introduced Bergson, not solely in a critical tone. In his lectures given at the University of Helsinki in 1911, Høffding (1911a; 1911b) presented the principle of personality in philosophy and its psychological and ethical extensions, referred to Bergson and James and criticized Bergson’s concept of intuition and the unclarity of his literary style. In his review of Høffding’s (1914) work on Bergson, Lagerborg (1914b) held Høffding as an authority who conveyed many international currents of thought to the Nordic countries; Nygård (2011), 125–126, 254, n. 73.

ding, warned about Bergson's intuitionism and vitalism that could be used to support metaphysical and religious aims, like some Christian circles in Finland seemed to do. For Lagerborg, Bergson's intuitionism was a warning example of a fashionable philosophy that was about to launch a conservative mass movement.⁶⁶⁸ Ruin, Henning Söderhjelm, and later Erik Ahlman, J. E. Salomaa and Sven Krohn supported value-centered life philosophy and phenomenological approaches in Finland while Kaila continued the empirical tradition, already started by Neiglick.

Henning Söderhjelm, who had in 1913 presented at the Imperial Alexander University of Finland his academic dissertation on the instincts and their relations to human affects⁶⁶⁹, summarized his conception of the situation of psychology, on the brink of World War I:

“We can say that, until this day, psychology has only been able to make our general picture of the soul messier and more complex. Nevertheless, this is only natural, because the picture of the soul that corresponds with the practical needs of everyday life does not correspond with reality. For this reason, psychology must first be broken into pieces before we can start building a new psychology.”⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁸ Lagerborg (1914a).

⁶⁶⁹ Söderhjelm (1913a). Söderhjelm stayed in Copenhagen at Alfred Lehmann's laboratory in the spring terms 1911 and 1912 and took part, as a subject, in Lehmann's experiments that caused him the symptoms of claustrophobia for many years (Söderhjelm 1962, 68, 72–74, 77). Lehmann had suggested the topic for Söderhjelm's dissertation, which compiled different authors' (for example, Darwin, Wundt, Westermarck, James, McDougall, Marshall) conceptions of instincts and their relations to human emotions. Söderhjelm concluded that instinct-based affects have extended because the human intellect has influenced instinctual impulses and acts and that social, aesthetic, moral and even religious emotions still include instinctual affects. Although not highly original but more cataloguing, Söderhjelm's work touched on the issues that are still researched in affective neuroscience when tracing the neuroevolutionary origins of the human emotions (for example, Panksepp & Biven 2012).

⁶⁷⁰ Söderhjelm (1914), 582; Pietikainen (2012), 215.

Söderhjelm's remark was still attached to the assumption that psychology was mainly studying the soul, while the proponents of empirical psychology in Finland, Neiglick⁶⁷¹ at the front, had already tried to restrict the object of psychological study to psychic phenomena and their quantification without debating about the metaphysical questions, for example, about the materiality or immateriality of the "soul". Psychology without the old-fashioned concept of the "soul" would be "new psychology".

Eino Kaila's Early Psychological Contributions

Before his eminent role in the history of Finnish philosophy and psychology, young Eino Kaila actively followed several new currents of philosophy and psychology and presented them in his articles. He had read Bergson's, Darwin's, Høffding's, James's and Janet's works. He had given his first lecture at the Philosophical Society in November 1910 by presenting Hugo Münsterberg's *Philosophie der Werte* (1908). Kaila had stayed in Paris during the spring term 1911 when Bergson lectured on personality theory. First, Kaila was attracted by Bergson's thinking that stressed the active, creative, dynamic and holistic aspects of the psychic qualia and processes and resisted both dogmatic idealism and dogmatic naturalism. His initial enthusiasm was reflected in his writings.⁶⁷²

Kaila had also reviewed William James's translated work *Sielutiede ja kasvatatus* (1913b), praising it as "perhaps the most excellent existing overview of current psychology" and its author as "the greatest psychologist of all times".⁶⁷³ The conflict between the vitalist-poetic-intuitive approach and the strict scientific approach became more intense in Kaila's thinking. Already in 1911, when reviewing Rudolf Eucken's *Elämän tarkoitus ja arvo* (1910), Kaila expressed, poetically, the triumphal march of the natural sciences even into the field of the human soul life: "[...] the iron web of nature's events has tightened ever closer to even the depths of the individual soul life. [...] ever more gates to the trusted trans-experiential world have closed with thunder, ever more bridges to the serene eternity have turned out to be the deceptive color play of the spheres."⁶⁷⁴ Kaila's

⁶⁷¹ Neiglick (1887a; 1887b). See Chapter 3.3.

⁶⁷² Kaila (1911a; 1911d; 1913e). On Kaila's relation to Bergson, see Nygård (2011), 93–99. On young Kaila, see also Salmela (1998), 115–118.

⁶⁷³ Kaila (1913b), 265–266; see also Kaila (1915c).

⁶⁷⁴ Kaila (1911e), 101.

initial enthusiasm for Bergson, “a follower of the ancient mystics”⁶⁷⁵, and James soon faded, and he turned into more empirical research, first, in the 1910s, adopting experimental psychological research combined with association psychology, and, in the 1920s, the doctrines of Gestalt psychology.

“Depth psychology” and the question of the unconscious were shortly referred to in Kaila’s early article that based on Morton Prince’s case history and Janet’s theories about the “subconscious”⁶⁷⁶ and “dissociation”.⁶⁷⁷ Kaila did not find any coherent explanations in this area. Neither did he accept, in his review of Rolf Lagerborg’s *Den platoniska kärleken*, Freudian “sexual monomania” and the at times “brutal” undervaluation of “the conscious side of our being”.⁶⁷⁸ He was not sure whether Lagerborg was Freud’s advocate but he saw similarity between Freud’s “extremely radical” opinions and Lagerborg’s attempts at detecting “hidden sexuality” in the most different areas of religion, mystic, and poetry.⁶⁷⁹

Kaila’s essentially scientific and academic career started with his thesis *Über die Motivation und die Entscheidung* (1916), an “experimental-psychological research”, which is closely related to Ach’s, Michotte’s and Prüm’s experimental studies on volitional choices⁶⁸⁰ and to the Wundtian tradition, which was introspective, sensation-centered and element- and association-based and has been later called “content psychology”.⁶⁸¹ Kaila received decisive influence on his thesis from the Würzburg school, espe-

⁶⁷⁵ Kaila (1916b).

⁶⁷⁶ “Subconscious soul life” and Freud’s ideas were more approvingly welcomed in the 1910s by another young philosopher, Erik Ahlman in his two articles on the psychology of comics. Ahlman stressed parallelism between “the logic of comics” and “the logic of dreams” and the subconscious, intuitive, and empathic elements in the sense of the comic (Ahlman, 1914, 77; 1917, 353 – 354), even adding the “stereotypes” and the “automatisms” of *dementia praecox* (schizophrenia) to the phenomena related to comics and dreams (Ahlman 1914, 82–84). See Ihanus (1994), 51–54.

⁶⁷⁷ Kaila (1915a); see Ihanus (1994), 54–55.

⁶⁷⁸ Kaila (1915b), 432; see Ihanus (1994), 56.

⁶⁷⁹ Kaila (1915b), 432.

⁶⁸⁰ Ach (1905; 1910a); Michotte & Prüm (1910).

⁶⁸¹ Boring (1957), 385.

cially from Ach whose work Kaila often refers to.⁶⁸² Kaila tried to make his research design analogical to Michotte's and Prüm's (1910) study. The three subjects (including Kaila himself; Michotte and Prüm had also been subjects in their own experiment) were set in simple decision-making situations where they were given mental arithmetic tasks mainly with fractions. Subjects had to decide whether they wanted to try to solve the task. If they felt the task to be too difficult, they could refuse to take the task. This part of the research addressed the volitional act. After each completed task, subjects reported their conscious conception of the task ("Bewusstheit") and how they experienced ("Erlebniss") its possible solution.⁶⁸³ There were 105 preliminary tasks and 555 proper tasks: Kaila and the other subject chose to solve over 200 tasks while the third subject chose only slightly over 100 tasks in about two months' time.

On the basis of his research, Kaila postulated two laws of the will ("Willensgesetze"): 1) When content of consciousness, which is valuable to an individual on the basis of his or her earlier experience, does not appear "by itself", through a "passive" reproduction, a volitional act ("Willensakt"), an energetic concentration of attention to the image of the content of experience, is needed to reproduce that specific content of experience.⁶⁸⁴ 2) When the internal movement of the mind, flowing "by itself", does not seem to lead to the pursued goal, an individual consciousness is reproduced concerning the individual's capacity to direct one's inner movement of the mind by one's will, by focusing one's attention. Kaila called this act of consciousness "decision" ("Entschluss"), which is characterized by the consciousness of one's own will.⁶⁸⁵ This act is also linked to the question how the subjects reached a "total conception" ("Gesamtauffassung") in the decision-making situation.⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁸² Kaila also mentions K. Bühler, A. Messer and H. J. Watt as representatives of the Würzburg school but not O. Külpe, who was the founder of that school. According to Boring (1957, 405), Ach had introduced to psychology the following concepts: "systematic experimental introspection", "determining tendency" and "consciousness" ("Bewusstheit"). Ach (1910b, 24) situated experimental psychology as the mediator between the natural sciences and *Geisteswissenschaften*, not as a natural science as such but using natural science methods in order to determine the laws of the spiritual and mental processes.

⁶⁸³ Kaila (1916a), 12–14.

⁶⁸⁴ Kaila (1916a), 63–64.

⁶⁸⁵ Kaila (1916a), 120–122.

⁶⁸⁶ Cf. von Wright (1979), xviii.

In his thesis, Kaila discards a theory of “imageless thought” that was present in “thought psychology”. Kaila stressed reproduction tendencies and connections in the causal research of thinking. For Kaila, showing causal factors meant the “dynamic analysis” of thinking, whereas the examination of the specific elements of consciousness meant “phenomenological analysis”.⁶⁸⁷ Kaila’s position was still rooted in additive element psychology and its stress on association and reproduction, which are seen as the sufficient basis to explain both simple and complex mental events and volitional acts, including the conflicting motives. The mechanistic principle of causality emphasizes the lawful connections of mental elements: all contents of consciousness become actualized through association and reproduction. Consciousness of one’s will has no privileged position compared with other contents of consciousness. Ach (1905) had introduced “determining tendencies” as the highest instances of aim-directed associative tendencies. Kaila held Ach’s concept “descriptive” but by no means a causal-explanatory “functional concept” that the “reproductive tendency” appeared to be.⁶⁸⁸

Kaila’s thesis has only a few deviations, thought digressions, from the strict mechanistic and elementalist approach. Intentionality of thinking and the biological basis of volitional acts at least puzzled him but only briefly. For example, he asked if we should assume some “spontaneously effective, teleological force”, like “reason” (“Verstand”), which would be the opposite of mere mechanical association effects.⁶⁸⁹ He rejected the assumption because with such compilations as “reason” scientific psychology has not at all stepped forward. He admitted that it may be that in the future association and reproduction are not enough as explanatory

⁶⁸⁷ Kaila (1916a), 40. – Henning Söderhjelm presented Kaila’s thesis at the meeting of the Philosophical Society (20 October 1916), criticizing Kaila’s work for too few test subjects and for a solely intellectual approach to motivation and decision making, whereas Söderhjelm himself highlighted three main elements in human motivation and decision making: aspiration, emotion, and attention (Manninen & Niiniluoto, 1996, 439). Arvi Grotenfelt commented on the suspicious situation where both representatives of experimental psychology “had reached so sharply different results”, concluding that Kaila’s thesis “in the end teaches pure theory and not any simple analysis, when we specifically come into the physiological connections, nerve processes, at the base of psychic life” (Manninen & Niiniluoto, 1996, 440–441.)

⁶⁸⁸ Kaila (1916a), 43.

⁶⁸⁹ Kaila (1916a), 74.

principles, but abstinence in the adaptation and “fabrication” of new explanatory principles was necessary.⁶⁹⁰ Even if the empiricist and positivist bases of the natural sciences contributed to Kaila’s mechanistic explanations, he did not refer to natural science research in his thesis. Only the issue of the instinctual background of the volitional acts touches upon the area of biology but only superficially. According to Kaila, a volitional act must have been instinctually produced, but the instincts, as well as the innate teleological dispositions of the nervous system, are so far causally inexplicable.⁶⁹¹ Because of the incomprehensible order of nature, “all healthy psychic life is dominated by values”.⁶⁹² Thus, Kaila may have cryptically implied that also human values have a biological basis.

In his work *Sielunelämä biologisena ilmiönä* (1920), Kaila opposes to vitalism in both biology and psychology and tries to show that the “mechanistic principle” dominates all psychic processes. At the same time, Kaila opposes the reductionist views in the natural sciences, whereas psychological laws appear to him as special versions of the laws of biology, mentally manifest through association and reproduction and reflecting basic physiological principles.⁶⁹³ Kaila was in favor of parallelism instead of causal interaction between the body and the mind. Kaila’s position, which he held with some modifications, has been described by G. H. von Wright as “anti-reductionist monism”. Anti-reductionism here means the defense of “the conceptual autonomy of chemistry in relation to physics and of biology in relation to physics and chemistry – though not the autonomy of psychology in relation to biology”.⁶⁹⁴

Grotenfelt preferred young Kaila over the other aspirant, Henning Söderhjelm, by appointing Kaila but not Söderhjelm docent of psychology.⁶⁹⁵ Söderhjelm had revisited Wundt’s laboratory in the spring term 1913 and made more experiments at Lehmann’s laboratory in Copenhagen

⁶⁹⁰ Kaila (1916a), 133.

⁶⁹¹ Kaila (1916a), 65.

⁶⁹² Kaila (1916a), 93.

⁶⁹³ Kaila (1920a), 36, 48, 50, 90ff; von Wright (1979), xx.

⁶⁹⁴ von Wright (1979), xx.

⁶⁹⁵ Söderhjelm (1962), 93–94. Grotenfelt (1916a) had also published a rather positive review of Kaila’s (1916a) thesis.

later that year.⁶⁹⁶ Söderhjelm wrote some journalistic articles on psychological questions⁶⁹⁷ and published the results of his experiments in 1916⁶⁹⁸ and a small work on individuality.⁶⁹⁹ Compared with Kaila, Söderhjelm did not reach the academic support and decided to choose the career of a journalist. Kaila got the title of docent of psychology at the University of Helsinki in 1919. Before moving to the new University of Turku in 1921, Kaila reported his only clinical paper on the splitting of the ideation flow in the association anomalies of schizophrenic patients.⁷⁰⁰ At that time, he also made his first attempts at perception psychology and investigated the perception of optical figures, “Gestalts” formed through the “ideatory coordinations” of elements.⁷⁰¹ He had not yet clung to Gestalt psychology but saw the “meaningful psychic mechanisms” as associative mechanisms.⁷⁰² Another early perception psychology article addressed the depth localisation of double images.⁷⁰³

It was Kaila’s next step in his psychology to turn away, during the 1920s, from mentalistic and mechanistic element and association psychology and to come closer to the natural sciences and Gestalt psychology, which Kaila thought to give a solution to the epistemological problem

⁶⁹⁶ Söderhjelm (1962), 83–85. Söderhjelm (p. 83) gives a description of Wundt in his institute in 1913: “When the old man Wundt then opened the term [spring 1913] in his institute with a long statement he emphasized that all works done there had to be published in the institute’s own journal. [...] After this opening ceremony, one hardly saw Wundt at the institute, and when I went to the obligatory visit to his home [...] he waived away the rather vague work plans I presented. I was let to discuss those with the acting professor who was head of the laboratory. He himself was a kind of honorary head, having a title of *Geheimrath*, and he was called *Excellenz*.”

⁶⁹⁷ Söderhjelm’s mostly journalistic articles on psychological issues, see Söderhjelm (1913b) (an introduction to experimental psychology); (1915c) (a short overview of the Danish psychologist and precursor of Gestalt psychology Edgar Rubin and his work on figure–ground organization); (1915d) (on the psychology of witnessing); (1917) (on the concept “interest”).

⁶⁹⁸ Söderhjelm (1962), 86.

⁶⁹⁹ Söderhjelm (1916a).

⁷⁰⁰ Kaila (1918a).

⁷⁰¹ Kaila (1918b).

⁷⁰² Kaila (1918b), 35.

⁷⁰³ Kaila (1919).

concerning the laws of the psychic phenomena. After 1934 and his book on personality psychology, Kaila did not publish any full-scale psychological work. However, even in Kaila's later literary production, a strong dose of "synthetic philosophy", antireductionism and holism at the marvels of nature is evident.

Applied Psychology: Child Psychology and Experimental Pedagogy

Experimental psychology had researched "normal" adults, not children. In the pioneering time of experimental psychology, there was no psychological theorizing about the development of children and their abilities and how they differ from those of the adults. There were no conceptions of the life span development. Child psychology, and with it, differential psychology and developmental psychology, got its first incentives through scattered works. Of course, Charles Darwin had already in 1840 reported the data about the growth and development of his son, but the report did not have a psychological point of view and did not first have clear psychological following. Among the influential works in this emerging area were, for example, William Preyer's *Die Seele des Kindes* (1882) and G. Stanley Hall's *Adolescence* (1904) on the mental growth by evolutionary stages and his early articles (based on questionnaire studies) on children's lies (1882) and the contents of their minds (1883). At the beginning of the 20th century, Ernst Meumann⁷⁰⁴ and Edouard Claparède⁷⁰⁵ were the harbingers of experimental pedagogy.⁷⁰⁶ The special research area of infantile sexuality and psychosexual development was suggested by Sigmund Freud with his *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* (1905). James McKeen Cattell and Alfred Binet launched the mental (intelligence) test movement.

The dawning fields of child psychology, experimental pedagogy and mental testing were known to a small group of Finnish educators, mostly outside the academic field.⁷⁰⁷ These educators published some works and articles that manifest the beginning of applied (or "practical") psychology

⁷⁰⁴ Meumann (1901; 1907).

⁷⁰⁵ Claparède (1905).

⁷⁰⁶ On the international historical scene of experimental pedagogy, see Hopf (2004).

⁷⁰⁷ On the early history of these areas in Finland, see Korhikangas (1992); Aho (1993a), 191–217.

in Finland. This took place mostly in non-academic contexts, but these few educators were open to new initiatives from psychology although educational reformism was not very radical and was often regulated by the principles of Christian morality and moral pedagogy.⁷⁰⁸ Psychology was usually given the status of an auxiliary science in relation to the independent discipline of pedagogy.

The first Finnish article on child psychology was Nils Robert af Ursin's review of James Sully's work.⁷⁰⁹ The reviewer approvingly referred to Sully's conception of child psychology based on Darwin's doctrines, and intimately related to the natural sciences. He even stated that "without psychology no pedagogy can on the whole exist"⁷¹⁰ and that closer knowledge about child psychology, also from the professional side of philosophers, "would free the world from many pointless metaphysical speculations and set the conception of being more and more on a purely empirical ground".⁷¹¹ Soon another teacher, E. W. Malmberg, stressed the importance of child psychology and even mentioned Hall, Binet, Ebbinghaus and the scientific statistical method.⁷¹² He wished that teachers would want to lay a firm ground to their pedagogical effects through psychological research and with the help of academic researchers though remarking that the results from abroad could not be confidently applied to "our children who live in circumstances of other kind".⁷¹³ Teacher K.

⁷⁰⁸ School reform in the line of moral pedagogy was advanced by Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster whose work was translated into Finnish (Foerster, 1909). – From the theological point of view, mostly via William James's psychology of religion, Paavo Virkkunen proposed that child psychology would be applied to teaching Christian religion (Virkkunen, 1911; see also Virkkunen, 1914). Another booklet, by Johannes Kangasvuo (1915), recommended the ideas of child psychology and the psychology of religion to the clergy. William James's work *The Varieties of Religious Experience* was published as a Finnish translation (James 1914 [reviewed by Kaila 1915c]), as well as three other works (James 1913a; 1913b [reviewed by Kaila, 1913b]; 1916).

⁷⁰⁹ af Ursin (1899); Sully (1897). Sully's other work, *The Teacher's Handbook of Psychology*, was later translated into Finnish (Sully, 1912). – Karl Lange's monograph on psychology and pedagogy was also an early translation into Finnish (Lange, 1901). see also Dörpfeld (1902).

⁷¹⁰ af Ursin (1899), 68.

⁷¹¹ af Ursin (1899), 69.

⁷¹² Malmberg (1900).

⁷¹³ Malmberg (1900), 103.

G. Tamminen, summarized shortly at the time quite recent research that had connections to the “psychophysical development of children” by, for example, Meumann, Kraepelin, Ebbinghaus, G. E. Müller, Charcot, Bolton, and Netchaev.⁷¹⁴ More Christian, idealistic and spiritual views of the application of psychology were presented by lecturer Bruno Boxström in his work *Kasvatusopillinen sieluoppi* (1900), which was reprinted and used in many Finnish teacher seminars until the beginning of the 1920s.

To the majority of the Finnish teachers, the experimental methods of psychology were quite distant and unknown. Henning Söderhjelm admitted, in 1913, that areas like the psychic life of very early childhood, animal psychology and *Völkerpsychologie* were not graspable by experimental methods nor introspection, but in other areas of psychology it was possible to arrange experimental research; even psychoanalysis counted as a type of experiment though applied to pathological issues and not having the strict control needed for the psychological experiment.⁷¹⁵ In 1915, Söderhjelm raised his voice more in favor of the careful psychological experiment, statistical methods (mentioning Pearson, Spearman, the correlation coefficient and the big data) and knowledge about theoretical psychology even for the purposes of pedagogy.⁷¹⁶ He recognized the arguments of many opponents against “rationalism”, “positivism” and the intellectual “dissection” of the “soul life” and “all its hidden treasures” that are “set in categories, expressed in numbers and curves, lined in columns and tables”.⁷¹⁷ Nevertheless, ever since the experimental methods were put to use, the fast development of psychology showed that the right track was opened. With enthusiasm, Söderhjelm painted the way forward:

“Finally, exact research does not at all miss its enchantment, which need not be worth less than the enchantment of the intuitive flash, when an idea suddenly flames up. The life of the soul is chaos to which we, through our experiments, give shape. As we laboriously make our way through the labyrinths, we can feel the same joy as the sculptor, when he gives life to clay or the gardener, when he cuts and trims a wild hedge.”⁷¹⁸

⁷¹⁴ Tamminen (1905).

⁷¹⁵ Söderhjelm (1913b), 151–153.

⁷¹⁶ Söderhjelm (1915b), 268–269.

⁷¹⁷ Söderhjelm (1915b), 271.

⁷¹⁸ Söderhjelm (1915b), 271.

The most influential Finnish academic representative writing in favor of experimental pedagogy and child psychology was Albert Lilius (1873-1947), who was appointed docent of pedagogy and didactics in 1907 and professor in 1920 (until 1939) at the University of Helsinki. He studied in Hamburg in 1913 at Ernst Meumann's institute of experimental pedagogy. He had already in 1909 presented Meumann's contributions that were in conflict with the Herbart-Zillerian tradition but were adopted by Lilius not as totally revolutionary but supplementary to the old pedagogical thinking.⁷¹⁹ Lilius even planned to write a book on Meumann whom he regarded as the greatest European pioneer of experimental child psychology and pedagogy.⁷²⁰ The large article on Meumann's ideas remained Lilius's most extensive work on Meumann to whose vague definitions of basic concepts, such as attention, imagination and intelligence, he became later more critically attuned.⁷²¹ Thus, Meumann and his experimental pedagogy was never assumed and applied as such to Finnish pedagogy but it had a moderate role in the discussion about school reform⁷²² and other practical pedagogical issues.

Lilius also tried experimental methods in practice, studying pupils' interests in different school subjects.⁷²³ He was the first in Finland to raise the question of intelligence tests and their use.⁷²⁴ He was followed by Kaarle Oksala, who had stayed in Leipzig and Hamburg and acquaint-

⁷¹⁹ Lilius (1909) leaned on Meumann's *Vorlesungen* (1907) the first volume of which was also positively reviewed by Grotenfelt (1908), who did not actively support experimental pedagogy to be developed as a more academic field.

⁷²⁰ Lilius (1918), 32.

⁷²¹ Lilius (1918), 325–328. – In Lilius's magnum opus (Lilius 1922, 1924), Meumann has only a side role.

⁷²² Lilius (1913a).

⁷²³ Lilius (1911).

⁷²⁴ Lilius (1913b). – At the turn of the century, the term "intelligence" was used in a wide sense, including "sensation, perception, imagination, memory, understanding, and the different levels of reason" (Tamminen, 1905, 130), separating it from the emotions and the will. The term became more strictly defined in intelligence testing, and through calculating the Intelligence Quotient (IQ), which was coined by William Stern (1912) and further developed by Lewis Terman.



Albert Lilius (1879-1947).

Photo by Helsinki University Museum.

ed with Wundt's and Meumann's works.⁷²⁵ Oksala saw intelligence tests as potentially useful for selecting students for proper educational areas and for creating, in the future, a school system based on the intelligence levels.⁷²⁶ The first results of intelligence testing for school children were reported by Väinö Ora.⁷²⁷ Such tests were not, however, systematically used or standardized, and it was not until 1939 that J. E. Salomaa published the first Finnish work on intelligence testing.⁷²⁸ Salomaa had visited Leipzig and Wundt in the summer term of 1914. Wundt had even encouraged Salomaa to do an experimental research, as his academic thesis, on the scope of attention, but on the brink of World War I, the work, which had already started with some experiments, did not get ready.⁷²⁹

⁷²⁵ Oksala published an overview of the history of child psychology ("pedology"; Oksala, 1915b), an article on the meaning of psychology to pedagogy (Oksala 1916) and on the validity of the methods of child psychology (Oksala, 1917).

⁷²⁶ Oksala (1915a).

⁷²⁷ Ora (1915).

⁷²⁸ Salomaa (1939). – In the preface to this work, Salomaa tells that he had used Binet's tests for Finnish pupils during 1918–1922 but did not give out the results until the 1930s.

⁷²⁹ Salomaa (1954), 176–177, 197. – Salomaa, in his memoir, gives an impression of Wundt, who "had four lectures a week", and was said to "always walk the approximately three kilometers between the university and his home" (Salomaa, 1954, 180). Wundt had the "biggest audience of the university, the biggest lecture hall quite full. He lectured without papers, totally freely. No word did he take back" (Salomaa, 1954, 181).

Lilius compiled and updated introductions to child psychology in his works *Skolålderns sjäsliv* (1916)⁷³⁰, *Ur småbarnens sjäsliv* (1917a), and his magnum opus *De växandes känsloliv* (1922, 1924). In these works, Lilius continued to emphasize empirical methods and new ways (observations, tests and questionnaires) of reaching knowledge about children's psychic life. Lilius's biological and physiological interests were reflected when he also brought forth the evolutionary, instinctual, inherited and neuro-physiological aspects of children's psychic development.⁷³¹

In the 1910s, not only the theories but also the methods of experimental pedagogy and child psychology were presented, in addition to Lilius, Oksala and Söderhjelm, especially by the teacher of Russian language Aksel Rafael Rosenqvist (Kurki) (1880-1950) and a little later by Juho Hollo (1885-1967).⁷³² Rosenqvist's academic thesis *Valhe ja eettillinen kasvatus* (1914), on children's lies and ethical education, was the first extensive Finnish research based on child psychology and experimental pedagogy, but he also added strong ingredients from Foersterian moral pedagogy and practical ethics. Among the pioneers of applied psychology, G. Stanley Hall and William Stern had earlier studied lies, and Rosenqvist based heavily on Stern, also mixing ideas from association psychology and neuroscience. He had studied in St. Petersburg in 1909-1911 and received instruction for his research from Alexander Nechaev⁷³³, who had founded in 1901 the Laboratory of Experimental Pedagogical Psychology. After this large work, Rosenqvist published *Murrosikä ja kasvatus* (1915), which continued the moral pedagogical and experimental approach, con-

⁷³⁰ The missing end to this work is published in Lilius (1917b) where three phases of development are mentioned: early childhood (from birth to 6-7 years), later childhood (or early school years) and youth ("young boy and young girl age", starting from puberty to c. 20 years).

⁷³¹ In her educative guide for mothers, Julia Sucksdorff also expressed some physiological views of small children's development, even taking into account brain development and brain injuries (Sucksdorff, 1917).

⁷³² Hollo (1918-1919).

⁷³³ Rosenqvist (1914) thanks Nechaev for the subject of his thesis in his preface. – In 1898, during his internship in Europe, Nechaev had got acquainted with the laboratories of Wundt in Leipzig, G. E. Müller in Göttingen, Kraepelin in Heidelberg, Meumann in Zürich, and Binet in Paris. In 1921, Nechaev was elected professor at the Moscow State Psychoneurological Institute. – On Nechaev, see Romanov (1996); on Russian pedagogical psychology, experimental pedagogy, and "pedology" in late Imperial Russia (1897-1917), see Byford (2008).

centrating on puberty and expressing some parallelistic and materialistic views of the development of the brain and the psyche. Rosenqvist touched even upon sexual subjects and sexual education, mentioning Freud's (1905) work and sexual drives.

Rosenqvist borrowed from many authors in his works. His area of interests moved to psychotechnics launched in Germany by William Stern in 1903 and to vocational guidance in the field of industrial psychology initiated in the United States by Hugo Münsterberg at the beginning of the 1910s. Lilius and Kaila had noticed vocational guidance as a new branch of applied psychology⁷³⁴ and Rosenqvist optimistically presented Münsterberg's ideas on the choice of vocation and experimental psychology at the meeting of the Philosophical Society (20 April 1917).⁷³⁵ It took till 1920 when Rosenqvist gave out his large work *Elämänuran valinta ja kokeellinen ammatti-sielutiede*, which is the first Finnish presentation of the principles and methods of vocational guidance based on experimental psychology. In this work, Rosenqvist suggested the systematic intelligence testing of the pupils, the use of the "psychographs" of the pupils' abilities, and the establishment of the office of vocational guidance psychologist for the schools. Larger societal reforms and economic welfare would be advanced by choosing workers with the help of American-style business offices and laboratories.⁷³⁶

In the 1910s, personality psychology had not yet appeared as a separate field of psychology. The vacillating and indefinite status of the concepts "individuality" and "personality" in the works of famous psychological

⁷³⁴ Lilius (1913a); Kaila (1913c).

⁷³⁵ Manninen & Niiniluoto (1996), 447–449. No specific work by Münsterberg is mentioned in the protocols, but Eino Kaila comments that he had read the same work that Rosenqvist summarized. The work must have been Münsterberg's *Psychologie und Wirtschaftsleben: Ein Beitrag zur angewandten Experimental-Psychologie* (Münsterberg 1912a). The English works by Münsterberg (1912b; 1913) also contain the actual topics at that time. – Kaila gave as his opinion that Münsterberg convinced him with his experiments though work "efficiency" was not always decisive, since there were other elements involved, like "ambition". In Münsterberg's works Kaila saw connections to Taylorism, with an "aspiration toward the future, ample rationality, like often in the Jews" (Manninen & Niiniluoto, 1996, 448–449).

⁷³⁶ Rosenqvist (1920), chapter 12. – Rosenqvist became recruited, as a scientific expert and supervisor, to the Psychotechnical Laboratory of the State Railways, first headed by Ester Hjelt (1922–1927) and after her, Rosenqvist himself.

researchers, for example, Kraepelin, Stern and Meumann, was provocatively exposed by Henning Söderhjelm in his booklet *Individualiteten ur psykologisk synpunkt* (1916a). Söderhjelm wanted to show the unclear situation in psychology concerning those concepts without proposing any solutions. Differential psychology and experimental pedagogy had used vague theories of the “essence” of individuality, Söderhjelm maintained and raised criticism not only against experimental pedagogy but against the larger field of applied psychology as well.⁷³⁷ Aksel Rafael Rosenqvist attacked Söderhjelm’s negative conclusions and defended research on the individual differences and variations between the abilities and dispositions for practical pedagogical, educational, and social purposes.⁷³⁸ Rosenqvist approvingly mentions Herbart and Foerster who had made the distinction between individuality and personality (or character), the former referring to the instinctual and sensual dimensions, the latter to the spiritual and ethical dimensions of human beings.⁷³⁹ Rosenqvist was among the first in Finland to give the psychological and pedagogical views of the personality of the teacher⁷⁴⁰ and to discuss the “individual memory and thought types” and how to take them into account in teaching.⁷⁴¹ However, not until the 1930s did personality psychology reach the position as a special field of psychology, when also Eino Kaila, as an – at that time unrecognized – pioneer even in the international context, contributed to this field.

Other Areas

Even if Darwin’s theory of evolution was known in the 1880s, its evolutionary psychological ramifications did not gain ground during the Grand Duchy of Finland. Edvard Selander, a teacher of mathematics and

⁷³⁷ Söderhjelm (1916a); see also Söderhjelm (1916b).

⁷³⁸ Rosenqvist (1917), 327–328. – At the meeting of the Philosophical Society (9 February 1917), Rolf Lagerborg reviewed the same work by Söderhjelm, asking why Söderhjelm considered individuality to be the same as personality. Lagerborg judged that “it is as absurd to search individuality as it is to search ‘life’ and the ‘soul’”, with which Grotenfelt agreed by stating that Söderhjelm had proposed a “partly *impossible* mission” for the research on individuality (Manninen & Niiniluoto, 1996, 444).

⁷³⁹ Rosenqvist (1917), 333.

⁷⁴⁰ Rosenqvist (1918).

⁷⁴¹ Rosenqvist (1916).

physics and an amateur in the field of psychology, opposed, in his popularized work, metaphysical ideas by adopting Darwin's evolution theory and especially Herbert Spencer's (1855) psychological and sociological views. Selander's work *Själslivets grunddrag* (1889a) was thus the only work published in the Grand Duchy of Finland presenting, through the abridged Spencer, some tenets of British empiricism and evolutionary and deterministic ideas in connection with psychology. The work did not get any favorable reception from academic philosophy and Neiglick's review of Selander's work was, for the most part, negative, complaining it of numerous mistakes and one-sidedness. However, Neiglick was not totally rejecting, while he found merits in Selander's work, which popularized and forwarded Spencer's views to the larger audience:

“Above all, it is gratifying to see an elementary work in psychology as free from formalism as this. In this respect, the small book has a considerable precedence over a number of psychological compendiums, including those which, with regard to the treatment of details, are more comprehensive and written with greater expertise. This is where the good side of the writer's Spencer studies emerges; for Spencer's psychology – whatever objections one may make to the specifics of its results and hypotheses – nevertheless has the great importance of understanding the problems of soul life quite differently in concrete terms than is the case with the increasingly Aristotelianizing psychology of the continent's schools. It is extremely healthy for those who wish to penetrate into these issues to rid themselves of these strictly regulated divisions and subdivisions, which, unfortunately, play a far too large role in most of the basic psychological handbooks and thereby from the start impose a deceptive logical stamp on the phenomena of the soul.

Particularly for this reason, as a corrective to the usual psychological formalism, we wish many attentive readers to Mr. Selander's work.⁷⁴²

⁷⁴² Neiglick (1889a), 61. – Selander (1889b) tried to defend his work against Neiglick's criticism, but Neiglick (1889b) continued to reject Selander's work as too narrow and amateurish.

A couple of years later, in 1891, Th. Rein presented, quite extensively, some psychological theories of “naturalism” and Darwin’s, Spencer’s, Weissmann’s, Wallace’s and Haeckel’s ideas, as well as the importance of Darwinism to psychological research.⁷⁴³ He even admitted that it was possible to develop evolutionary psychology on Darwinistic grounds, but that project was alien to Rein and he never supported it. Edward Westermarck had in the same period as Selander and Rein acquainted himself with Darwinian doctrines and their applications to psychology for his history of human marriage, but neither did he pursue evolutionary psychological research as such. Westermarckian scholars, like Rolf Lagerborg, Yrjö Hirn, Gunnar Landtman and Rafael Karsten, referred to the biological underpinnings (instincts, drives, emotions) of the socio-cultural habits and institutions, mediated by the psychological level, but the psychological points of view remained quite superficial and included general remarks on instincts, drives and emotions added with animal psychological comparisons.

Besides Lagerborg, Yrjö Hirn used psychological ideas to elucidate why artists create works of art and why the audience likes them. In his thesis (1896) and in the enlarged work *The Origins of Art* (1900, in Swedish 1902), Hirn brought forth ideas about emotionalistic aesthetics, claiming that the origin of art lies in the expression (by the artist) and reception (by the audience) of the emotions. Starting from animal art and reaching sacral art, all artistic expressions and their reception is based, in this scheme, on the evolutionary art instincts and the need to express and receive emotions. This phase of psychological aesthetics in Hirn’s production did not continue but was replaced by the more traditional and humanistic conceptions of art and aesthetics. Rolf Lagerborg linked even the psychoanalytic conceptions of art and artistic creativity to Hirn’s ideas of emotionalistic aesthetics, which he saw as a predecessor of the psychoanalytic interpretations of art.⁷⁴⁴ Lagerborg supported the Freudian conception of art and other cultural products born out of rejecting the instant gratification of the drives and needs and sublimating them to the humanly meaningful cultural achievements and values. For him, like for Freud, “our whole culture is a desiring child who has not got enough

⁷⁴³ On the psychological theories of “naturalism”, Rein (1891), 3–53, and on Darwinism, Rein (1891), 54–122. – In spite of presenting and even accepting evolutionary thinking, Rein kept his idealistic foundations and saw evolutionary ideas as supporting psychophysical interactionism.

⁷⁴⁴ Lagerborg (1918a), 118–119.

and has therefore paved a new way".⁷⁴⁵ Lagerborg was a dilettante in art philosophy, an enthusiastic aesthete interested in artists and writers rather than an aesthete delving in the philosophical and psychological analysis of art and the creative processes.

Psychoanalytic views, on the whole, did not get much attention in Finland in the 1910s.⁷⁴⁶ From the side of medicine, only two psychiatrists paid attention to psychoanalytic themes. The first of them was professor of psychiatry (1904-1922) and the head of the Lapinlahti mental hospital Christian Sibelius (1869-1922), brother of the composer Jean Sibelius. In his article published in 1910, he mentions Freud's psychoanalysis though he concentrates more on the association method developed by Bleuler, Jung and Riklin at the Burghölzli psychiatric hospital in Zürich to study the patients' reactions to words and the possible repressed complexes underlying certain words. According to Sibelius, Jung's merit was the development of a "more objective" method than Freud's "intuitive-subjective" method of free association.⁷⁴⁷ On the other hand, Sibelius recognized certain shortcomings of Jung's method and especially his theory about complex, but was optimistic about the use of the methods of experimental psychology in the service of psychiatry, because they "already show the way that can lead us remarkably forward in our acquaintance of the mental illnesses".⁷⁴⁸ In 1910, Sibelius also included neuroses in the training program of clinical psychiatry and began, in 1918, to lecture the basics of psychology to medical students.⁷⁴⁹

The other Finnish psychiatrist-neurologist to treat psychoanalytic themes was Harald Fabritius (1877-1948), who had made study trips to Berlin and Vienna in 1910-1913 to specialize in neurology. In Vienna in 1912, he had listened to Freud's lecture series and participated in Viktor Tausk's private course. He had also encountered vehement criticism among psychiatrists and psychologists against Freudian doctrines. In 1913, Fabritius published the first Finnish article on Freud's theory of neurosis and psychoanalysis.⁷⁵⁰ In his article, Fabritius distinguished the psychoanalytic theories and the psychoanalytic therapy practice. Concerning

⁷⁴⁵ Lagerborg (1918a), 120; see also Lagerborg (1918b).

⁷⁴⁶ On the history of psychoanalysis in Finland before World War II, see Ihanus (1994).

⁷⁴⁷ Sibelius (1910), 23.

⁷⁴⁸ Sibelius (1910), 36.

⁷⁴⁹ On Sibelius's work, see Ihanus (1994), 38-40.

⁷⁵⁰ Fabritius (1913).

the theoretical side of psychoanalysis, Fabritius reviewed the notion of the unconscious, the psychodynamics of the neuroses, repression, resistance, parapraxes, the interpretation of dreams, symbol formations, and infantile sexuality. Although Fabritius recognized Freud's brave intuitions and sagacious observations, Freud's sexual theory ("of Freud's doctrines undoubtedly the strangest and, for the common sense, the most difficult to approach"⁷⁵¹) raised Fabritius's strongest resistance. The idea of the continuum between the "neurotic" and the "normal" psychic phenomena was also strange to Fabritius. From the point of view of psychiatric therapy work, psychoanalysis, as a treatment of neuroses through the method of free associations, seemed to Fabritius as arduous and time-consuming but also as a counterbalance to old-fashioned degeneration-based etiologies and physical therapies.⁷⁵² Later in his career, Fabritius advocated the separation between psychiatry and neurology and held it necessary that a course in psychology be included in the syllabus of psychiatry. Soon he distanced himself from psychoanalytic topics and concentrated on neurology in his research. Fabritius was appointed as professor of psychiatry at the University of Helsinki in 1925-1948.

Animal psychology or comparative psychology was an outgrowth of evolutionary theories, but it had only one Finnish representative, extraordinary professor of zoology Odo Reuter (1850-1913), who published popularized books on animal soul life, especially the soul life of insects (for example, ants and bees).⁷⁵³ These works are curiosities that contain claims about the insects' conscious aims, free will, aesthetic emotions, and individual differences in intelligence, not only about instincts, drives, and reflexes. By anthropomorphizing animals Reuter did not mean that animal research would lead to materialistic naturalism. On the contrary, he enfolded animal research into idealistic conceptions and referred approvingly to Rein's philosophy. In his later work, Reuter became more careful and left open the question of animal consciousness and warned about setting human characteristics into the animal souls although he still believed that animals also had higher psychic functions.⁷⁵⁴

In the aftermath of the Finnish Civil War, one more marginal application of psychology became manifest. Medical doctor Lars Ringbom,

⁷⁵¹ Fabritius (1913), 102.

⁷⁵² Fabritius (1913), 110.

⁷⁵³ For example, Reuter (1886; 1888). – On Reuter's works, see Aho (1993a), 103–110.

⁷⁵⁴ Reuter (1909).

in his booklet *Inbördeskriget i Finland: Psykologiska anteckningar* (1918a) connected a drive-based view to the Finnish Civil War, while he tried to reflect the “national soul” via mass psychology (Le Bon⁷⁵⁵, Gadelius⁷⁵⁶, Bekhterev) and psychoanalysis (Freud, Bjerre, Adler).⁷⁵⁷ Clearly, Ringbom’s view of the national soul and mass psychology stagnated in a stereotypical polarity between the red and the white. As a kind of compromise between Freud’s theory of the drives and Adler’s theory of the feelings of inferiority and their compensation, Ringbom proposed a “biological law” applicable to individual and mass psychology: If the “zest for life” or “psychic energy” becomes suppressed or subsided in some path, it will seek an outlet from some other path.⁷⁵⁸ From Freud’s theory of the drives, Ringbom derived two drives, the “life-sustaining” and the “self-sustaining” drive, in constant conflict with one another, unconscious in separation from one another, but conscious together, reflecting the two sides (love and hate) of the zest for life.⁷⁵⁹ The life-sustaining drive was for Ringbom collectivistic, uniting and emotion-centered, while the self-sustaining drive was individualistic, distancing and thought-centered.

On the basis of these two poles, Ringbom concluded that the “mass soul” was mainly attached to the emotions, not to rational reflection, and therefore liable to suggestion. The drive-economical dichotomy of the battlefront of the Finnish Civil War became simplified to the position where the red, inflicted with “mass psychosis” and “murder ecstasy”, had become channeled to “hate”, thus repressing “love” from consciousness. On the other side, the white were not governed by “hate” but by “enthusiasm” and “devotion”.⁷⁶⁰ Socialism was labeled by Ringbom as a hate and salvation religion whose followers could be caught by a “psychoinfection”.⁷⁶¹ In the abyss of the Finnish Civil War, the “collaborative drives” had been suppressed.⁷⁶² Ringbom’s adherence to analyzing drives

755 Gustave Le Bon’s classic work on mass psychology was translated into Finnish (Le Bon, 1912). Mass psychology was shortly discussed also by Ruin (1918)

756 Bror Gadelius’s work on mass psychology and “psychic contagion” was translated into Finnish (Gadelius, 1908).

757 Ringbom (1918a). – On Ringbom, see Ihanus (1994), 59–61, 265–266.

758 Ringbom (1918a), 18.

759 Ringbom (1918a), 18, 34–36.

760 Ringbom (1918a), 20, 35, 102–107, 113.

761 Ringbom (1918a), 67–68.

762 Ringbom (1918a), 47.

and the national character did not advance historical, social and political research, but he had, in his own way, noticed possible connections between Freud and Marx⁷⁶³, which later fueled cultural debates.

3.11. Philosophy and Public Affairs: The Philosophical Society

With J. V. Snellman in the mid-nineteenth century, philosophy became the most prominent academic discipline as “the science of science”. But besides their professional work at the university, Finnish philosophers have also made a significant public impact outside the academic world through their writings and speeches in the two native languages, Finnish and Swedish. An important forum of participatory philosophy was the Philosophical Society established by Thiodolf Rein in 1873.

Participation in public affairs was started by Snellman in 1840s, when a philosopher deeply engaged with Hegel’s system moved to Kuopio and started his career as a journalist in *Maamiehen ystävä*, *Saima*, and *Litteraturblad*. His program of building Finland as a nation state was based on a dynamic philosophy of history derived from Hegel and Herder: the historical development is carried forward by a “national spirit” which manifests itself and evolves with nations with their own language and culture. But this national endeavor has to be interaction with what is universal in the progress of humanity.

As a journalist, Snellman wrote news, articles, travel stories, poems, and literary reviews. He recommended practical reforms in many political and cultural areas, including the position of Finnish language, the organization of public education in primary schools, the arts, customs, child care, poverty, transportation, agriculture, forestry, dairy farming, industry, and trade. In the last issue of *Saima* in 1846 he lists among important humane trends in the “spirit of time” general freedom of thought, equal political and civic rights, respect for human dignity, liberation of slaves, improving the conditions of poor classes, foundation of schools and foster homes, and free trade.⁷⁶⁴ During his period as university professor in 1856-63, Snellman opposed the establishment of new professional institutes of higher education outside the capital and debated with the mathematician L. L.

⁷⁶³ Ringbom (1918a), 64.

⁷⁶⁴ KT9, 443.

Lindelöf about voting systems. He continued to contribute polemical articles to *Litteraturblad* on the national program, railroads, farming methods, private banks, economic crisis, state loans, school reforms, schools for girls, position of women, prisons, community administration, alcohol taxation, freedom of speech, and the position of journals. Finally, as senator in 1863-68, he wrote articles in *Finlands allmänna tidning* concentrating on economic issues. Even though he continued to emphasise the intrinsic value of civilized education, he granted that economic activity has an instrumental value. The Emperor Alexander II approved the language decree about Finnish in the summer of 1863, and in the end of 1865 the monetary reform the Finnish *markka* was finalized. Snellman was celebrated as “the father of *markka*”, and in 1924 his statue was uncovered in front of the Bank of Finland and his portrait was printed in the notes of 5000 markka in 1940, 10 000 markka in 1955, and 100 markka in 1963. What an unusual career and exceptional honor given to a philosopher!

Snellman was a role model for his successor Thiodolf Rein, who in his Memoirs tells in detail about his political activities in the Finnish Diet.⁷⁶⁵ As a philosopher, he was able to formulate and negotiate moderately liberal and balanced views about many hot issues, among them the parallel position of Finnish and Swedish languages, women’s rights in education, the problem of prostitution, religious freedom for minorities, and rejection of death penalty. He was active in the progressive Fennoman circles around the journal *Valvoja*. Rein appreciated the idealist ethical message of religion, but was ready to question specific doctrines of the Christian church, like trinity and virgin birth.⁷⁶⁶ In 1904-06, he was a member of the constitutional committee which was planning the parliamentary reform of 1906. As the Pro-Chancellor of the university, he participated in demonstrations against the language manifest in 1900 and law of military service in 1901, which reduced the rights of the citizens of Finland.

In his Memoirs, Rein mentions only in passing that as a newly appointed professor he founded a Philosophical Society in 1873. Fortunately, there is quite detailed documentation of its activities in the form of minutes of the meetings which also summarize the lectures and discus-

⁷⁶⁵ See Rein (1919), p. 280.

⁷⁶⁶ See the article “Religion ock vetenskap” [Religion and science] in Rein (1903).

sions.⁷⁶⁷

Professor Rein invited, with the Rector's permission, the first meeting of *Filosofiska föreningen* to the Student House on the 18th of October 1873. Without other formalities, Rein opened the discussion with the thesis that "the common view that the difference of human beings and animals is that the former lacks instincts and the latter has them is very incorrect". In the next meeting in two weeks Rein lectured on Boström's philosophy. Eventually the minutes by a student secretary grew longer, so that the discussed thesis and the main points raised by the participants were recorded. Besides professor himself, the opening lecture was often presented by a student but also by visiting masters of philosophy or other related fields.

One model for the new Society was the so called "student faculty", actively organized by Fredrik Gygnæus since 1852, where scholars of the university could present public lectures for an audience. But Rein's Society can at least initially be regarded as professor's seminar, which as a form of teaching was not yet well developed.⁷⁶⁸ It did not have a list of regular members, and its first statutes were accepted as late as in 1915. The first protocols are in Swedish, but after 1877 mostly in Finnish, so that the Society allowed Rein to follow his tolerant policy with teaching languages. The intensive meetings, with heavy smoking and tea service, were open also to the first female students of the university. The old J. V. Snellman never participated in the meetings, and neither did Wilhelm Bolin, but otherwise the growing list of speakers is impressive.

In his Memoirs, Edward Westermarck has described with gratitude Rein's role in the Philosophical Society in the following way:

"To value Rein's power as a teacher at its true worth it was essential to have heard him at the Philosophical Society. This was the darling of his heart ... The discussion often assumed the form of a duel, in which the contending parties were the chairman on the one hand and perhaps some younger graduate on the other. Rank and age were forgot-

⁷⁶⁷ The original protocols are preserved in the archive of the Philosophical Society of Finland. As the chairman of the Society in 1962-73, G. H. von Wright was able to collect scattered minutes from many sources. The minutes from the years 1873-1925 are published in Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996).

⁷⁶⁸ This is argued by Juha Manninen in Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996).

ten; it was not the learned professor speaking, but an older comrade – so it seemed – who was trying to tempt others out to a tussle. It was evident that Rein enjoyed the dispute; *in verba magistri jurare* was a demand that he never dreamed of making. He did not spare facetious remarks at his opponent's expense, but he was never either bitter or crushing in his jokes. When it was all over the disciple might perhaps feel some self-reproach lest he should have treated his honoured master with less than due respect, but there was never any indication that the professor felt his dignity had been wounded in any way ... In the Philosophical Society Rein's open-minded and humble search for truth was seen in its brightest light... He could most energetically vindicate a certain view of a fundamental philosophical problem and just as violently attack another. But he expected opposition, and if it did not come he might speak again and show how the matter could be viewed from another side as well.⁷⁶⁹

Rein's period as the leader of the Society lasted until his retirement from the professorship in 1900, but in the minutes in 1903 he is still mentioned as the chairman. His last lecture on natural rights was in 1913.

In 1905, the new professor Arvi Grotenfelt took up the chair until 1936. In some meetings between 1900 and 1905 possibly Westermarck and professor of education Waldemar Ruin temporarily functioned as the chair, but this cannot be verified without missing protocols. During Grotenfelt's period *Filosofinen Yhdistys* – *Filosofiska Föreningen* became a registered association on the 27th January 1925 in the Republic of Finland (J. E. Salomaa as secretary), the first volume of its yearbook *Ajatus* [Thought, Gedanke] appeared in Finnish and Swedish in 1926, and the monograph series *Acta Philosophica Fennica* (first mainly in German, then in English) started to appear in 1935. Thereby the Philosophical Society of Finland consolidated its position as one of the scientific societies.

During its first fifty years, the speakers in the meetings included, among others, Thiodolf Rein, J. L. Snellman, Axel Heikel, J. A. Bergh (Lyly), Waldemar Ruin, Arvi Grotenfelt, J.V. Tallqvist, Hjalmar Neiglick, Edward Westermarck, Tekla Hultin, Zachris Castrén, Arvid Järnefelt,

⁷⁶⁹ See Westermarck (1927), 30-31, (1929), 32-34. See also Grotenfelt (1918).

Yrjö Hirn, Rolf Lagerborg, K. S. Laurila, Gunnar Landtman, Otto Ville Kuusinen, Eino Kaila, Aarni Voipio, Henning Söderhjelm, Aina Lähteenoja, Uno Holmberg (later Harva), Hermann Friedmann, K. R. Brotherus, Juho Hollo, Ragnar Granit, Kalle Sandelin (later Sorainen), Hans Ruin, J. E. Salomaa, Erik Ahlman and Arvo Lehtovaara.⁷⁷⁰

Many lectures discussed classical philosophers like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, Plotinos, Augustine, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Carlyle, Kierkegaard, Comte, Mill, Marx, Snellman, Spencer, Schopenhauer, Lange, Lotze, Wundt, Mach, Haeckel, Taine, Nietzsche, Høffding, and James. Philosophical problems included idealism, free will, things in themselves, space and time, and ethics. Rein, Neiglick, and Westermarck debated on the psycho-physical parallelism in several meetings. Theological issues about religion and its relation to science were also discussed. Some visitors presented papers related to their own disciplines like history, education, aesthetics, and philology.

Besides philosophical, psychological, and other scholarly questions, Rein encouraged the participants to express their views about many social and political matters. Some of these themes were related to Rein's public role in the parliament and university administration, so that he could practice these issues with his students and younger colleagues. In this way, the Philosophical Society was an important forum of participatory philosophy and practical ethics.

Examples of topics with general public interest include socialism (1874), freedom and the French Revolution (1874), the utility and necessity of wars (1875), freedom of religion (1876), the church and the state (1876), women's emancipation (1876), compulsory military service (1878), death penalty (1880), ethics of public servants (1881), national independence (1881), universal suffrage (1881), rights of the Jews (1882), Finnish as a language of philosophy (1882), liberalism (1890), eternal peace (1892), curriculum of elementary schools (1893), suicide (1895), historical progress (1895), socialism and salaries (1898), representative democracy (1906), socialism and individual freedom (1906), the idea of peace (1911), women and philosophy (1916), League of Nations (1918), parliament and consti-

⁷⁷⁰ For a summary of the first 75 years of the society, see Sorainen (1948).

Kalle Sorainen (1893-1983, until 1936 Sandelin) was Grotenfelt's student, secretary of the Philosophical Society in 1919-20 and 1934-36, who wrote his doctoral dissertation in 1927 on Søren Kierkegaard's philosophy of personality.

tution (1918), Spengler (1921), Tolstoy (1922), the concept of nationality (1924), and contemporary imperialism (1925).

Even though Grotenfelt's period was even longer than Rein's, in his *Memories* he does not tell much about his activities in the Philosophical Society.⁷⁷¹ But he participated in public debates in many journals and followed in many issues his uncle Thiodolf's position: he had a moderate view about the roles of Finnish and Swedish, accepted religious freedom, favoured the bicameral parliament with 24 as the age of voting, and supported the republican constitution against the monarchists in 1919.

In 1907-32, Grotenfelt was the first and longtime chairman of Sällskapet för psykisk forskning (Society for Psychical Research), which promoted the study of paranormal phenomena like spiritualism with media, hypnotism, and telepathy. As the highest authority of psychology in Finland, his presence gave some credibility to parapsychology, even though he remained cautious or skeptical about some forms of occultism or alleged paranormal abilities like clairvoyance or telekinesis.⁷⁷² Another Finnish language society Suomen Parapsykologinen Tutkimusseura (The Finnish Society of Parapsychological Research), oriented to theosophy, was founded in 1938 and chaired by Sven Krohn, who had started his studies under Grotenfelt in Helsinki in 1921.⁷⁷³ The efforts to establish an academic professorship to parapsychology were hindered by the criticism of Kaila and Lagerborg.⁷⁷⁴

Temperance was one of Grotenfelt's passions: he joined A. A. Granfelt's society Raittiuden Ystävät (Friends of Temperance) in 1883. In 1897-99 he was the chairman of Suomen Nuorisoliitto (The Finnish Youth Society), in 1909-18 the chairman of Kansanvalistusseura (Society of Public Education), and in 1920-25 chairman of Suomen Rauhanliitto (Finnish Peace Society). These activities give expression to Grotenfelt's idealist faith that selfish and violent periods in history are temporary and civilized nations will be committed to the principles of liberty, independence, and justice in their mutual efforts toward a better life of the humanity.

Westermarck was an active participant at the Philosophical Society during Rein's period. His dissertation on human marriage 1889, connections to the London School of Economics, and field work in Morocco made him an international celebrity, but he defended from England in

⁷⁷¹ See Grotenfelt: *Memories* (unpublished).

⁷⁷² See the conclusions in Grotenfelt (1926).

⁷⁷³ Krohn's doctoral thesis in 1949 was a critique of logical empiricism.

⁷⁷⁴ For the history of parapsychology in Finland, see Aho (1993b).

1899 the political autonomy of Finland against the Emperor's so called February Manifesto. He published an article "Finland and the Tsar", and helped to organize an international cultural address *Pro Finlandia*. As the inspector of the Swedish-language student nation in 1915-16, Westermarck participated in the campaign for the recruitment of Finnish young men to military training in a "Jaeger" battalion in Germany. In 1920, he wrote a memorandum which contributed to the solution of the special status of the Åland Islands (between Sweden and Finland) within the League of Nation.⁷⁷⁵

In 1894, Westermarck argued at the Philosophical Society that the Christian doctrine of life after death leads to immoral consequences like egoism and indifference to social problems like slavery and wars.⁷⁷⁶ With his younger friend Rolf Lagerborg, he founded in 1905 a student association Prometheus to promote religious freedom in Finland. In its program the association demanded the separation of the church and the state, the freedom of all citizens to separate from religious nominations, the rejection of compulsory religious baptism, confirmation, and oaths. The first publication *Siveys ja kristinusko* [Morality and Christianity] in 1907 was written by Westermarck, and the second one in 1908 against compulsory religious teaching in schools by Lagerborg,⁷⁷⁷ who also was able to bring about with an intentional scandal with his fiancée the implementation of civil marriage in 1911. The activity of the association, with Westermarck as the chairman, continued until 1914.⁷⁷⁸ The law of religious freedom was finally enacted in Finland in 1923. Westermarck was convinced that his moderate ethical relativism promotes tolerance in society, and his public statements helped to improve the status and rights of many oppressed and marginalized groups in society.⁷⁷⁹ In spite of his relativism, Westermarck believed in the possibility of moral and social progress. He continued his critical account of religion in *Christianity and Morals* (1939), which attacked many conservative and inhumane aspects of Christian ethics. The book was so radical that its Finnish translation, prepared already in the 1950s, had to wait until 1984 for its publication.

Eino Kaila participated in the meetings of the Philosophical Society from 1908, and eventually became its chairman in 1936-52 after Groten-

⁷⁷⁵ See Salmela (1998).

⁷⁷⁶ See Manninen and Niiniluoto (1996), 214-224.

⁷⁷⁷ See Westermarck (1907b), Lagerborg (1908).

⁷⁷⁸ See Luoma (1967).

⁷⁷⁹ See Timosaari (2017).

felt. In the 1930s and 1940s, he was the leading academic intellectual in Finland, who attracted students from all fields to his eloquent lectures. In *Persoonallisuus* (1934) he characterized organized religions as “mental insurance companies”, and in *Syvähenkinen elämä* (1943) and its Swedish version *Tänkens oro* (1944) he criticized the fatalism of Nostradamus and treated religious and metaphysical world views as prescriptions without real content. The fact that the leading philosopher was the archbishop’s son annoyed K. S. Laurila to write in 1944 a polemic reply to Kaila in defense of Christian doctrines.⁷⁸⁰ An attack from the left, against Kaila as a “Machian idealist” whose hidden intention is to keep the “lost sheep” in the Church, was presented by the Marxist Tuure Lehén in 1950.⁷⁸¹

The Finnish tradition of participatory philosophy was continued by Kaila’s students Oiva Ketonen⁷⁸² and Georg Henrik von Wright⁷⁸³ in their public writings. Ketonen chaired the Philosophical Society after Kaila in 1952-62 and von Wright in 1962-73. Both of them were active in science and university policy, thereby keeping up the high profile of academic philosophers in Finland.

⁷⁸⁰ K. S. Laurila (1876-1947) was extraordinary professor of the philosophy of art in 1929-46.

⁷⁸¹ Tuure Lehén (1893-1976) was a Finnish communist, who lived in the Soviet Union in 1918-45 and worked as the first rector of the Petrozadovsk University.

⁷⁸² Oiva Ketonen (1913-2000) was Kaila’s successor as professor of theoretical philosophy.

⁷⁸³ Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003) was the first Swedish-language professor of philosophy in Helsinki in 1946-63, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s successor at Cambridge University in 1948-51, and Academician since 1963.

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Turku, Finland:*

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af Schultenska samlingen.

BEW Brev till Edvard Westermarck [Letters to Edward Westermarck]

EWH Edvard Westermarcks Handskriftsamling [Edward Westermarck
Manuscript Collection]

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