ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA

Vol. 101

Perspectives on the History of Philosophy in Finland

Proceedings of the 150th Anniversary Conference of the Philosophical Society of Finland

Edited by
EERO KAILA
ILKKA NIINILUOTO
& SAMI PIHLSTRÖM

HELSINKI 2024

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ISBN 978−952−7585−02−3
ISSN 0355-1792
Hansaprint Oy
Helsinki 2024

Table of Contents

Introduction 5

Finnish Philosophy and the History of Philosophy

Pascal Engel: History of Philosophy, Finnish Style 15

Claudine Tiercelin: Peirce's Pragmaticism and Finnish Philosophy: Many Virtues in Common 29

Corrado Claverini: Philosophy and Local Thinking 57

Early Finnish Philosophy

Tuomo Aho: Logic in the Age of Stagnation 71

Juha Himanka: Snellman's Philosophical Action 83

Juhani Ihanus: Confusions and Conflicts between Philosophy and Psychology in Finland from the Late 19th Century to the 1910s 97

Edward Westermarck

Olli Lagerspetz: Edward Westermarck's "Rehabilitation" after the Turn of the Millennium 123

Jani Sinokki: Westermarck on Demarcating the Moral from the Nonmoral 143

Eino Kaila

Ilkka Niiniluoto: Eino Kaila's Lectures on the History of Philosophy 161

Teemu Toppinen: Eino Kaila's Quasi-realism 175

Oiva Kuisma: On Eino Kaila's Views on Art and Aesthetics 193

Bernt Österman: Aristofilos, Eubulos or both? The Disquietude of Eino Kaila's Thought 211

Georg Henrik von Wright

Friedrich Stadler: Georg Henrik von Wright and Austrian Philosophy – Personal and Intellectual Encounters with Family Resemblances 229

Lars Hertzberg: Wittgenstein in Finland 263

Jonas Ahlskog: The Metaphilosophy of Action Explanation: Exploring G. H. von Wright's Later View of Philosophical Inquiry 279

Markus Weckström: A Rational Conversion towards the Reasonable? G. H. von Wright, Theoretical Science, and Society 295

Widening the Horizon of Finnish Philosophy in the 20th Century

Anssi Korhonen: Archival Excavations: The Söderman Affair ... 313

Kimmo Sarje: Sigurd Frosterus's Philosophies of Technology 333

Jari Palomäki: The Legacy of Leibniz's Intensional Logic 349

Simo Knuuttila

Risto Saarinen: Simo Knuuttila and the Academy of Finland's Centres of Excellence 2002–2013 369

Sami Pihlström: Realism and Hope: Simo Knuuttila's Presupposition Theory and Pragmatist Philosophy of Religion 391

Philosophy and Education

Tuukka Tomperi: The Long History of Philosophy as a School Subject in Finland: Continuities and Controversies 411

Mika Perälä & Eero Salmenkivi: The Teaching of Logic in Finnish School Philosophy: A Historical Perspective 433

Heli Nykänen: Pedagogical Philosophy in Finnish Schools against Indoctrination 453

Introduction

The papers collected in this volume are based on presentations at the international conference, "Perspectives on the History of Philosophy in Finland", organized by the Philosophical Society of Finland, in collaboration with the University of Helsinki, in celebration of the 150th anniversary of the Society, in Helsinki on October 19-20, 2023.[1] The Philosophical Society of Finland was established by Professor Thiodolf Rein in October 1873, and the conference from which this collection of essays emerges was the highlight of the anniversary year 2023.

As editors, we would like to warmly thank all the individuals who made the conference as well as the other events marking the 150th anniversary of the Society possible, that is, the entire Board of the Society and especially the special Jubileum Committee, whose members included, in addition to the *ex officio* members Päivi Seppälä (as the Treasurer of the Society), Eero Kaila (as the Secretary), and Sami Pihlström (as the President), some of the former Secretaries and the former President of the Society: Ilkka Niiniluoto, Leila Haaparanta, Ilpo Halonen, Risto Vilkko, and Mikko Salmela. The Jubileum Committee also functioned as the organizing committee of the conference. In addition, we wish to acknowledge the very significant work by Lari Ahokas, who served as the archive coordinator of the Society in 2021, organizing the digitization of its archives, which will thus be available for future generations of scholars working on the history of Finnish philosophy and academic life generally.

We would like to express our particular gratitude to the three keynote speakers of the conference: Claudine Tiercelin

[1] This introduction is partly based on the opening words delivered by Sami Pihlström (as the then President of the Philosophical Society of Finland) at the conference on October 19, 2023.

(Collège de France), Risto Saarinen (University of Helsinki), and Friedrich Stadler (University of Vienna). Stadler's role in the arrangements of the National Library Vienna Circle exhibition in conjunction with the conference and the anniversary celebrations in fall 2023 was absolutely crucial, and his Georg Henrik von Wright Lecture, published in this volume, was the culmination of the conference. In addition, Dagfinn Føllesdal (University of Oslo and Stanford University), who has collaborated with Finnish philosophers for several decades – starting from the 1950s – was invited to give a keynote talk, but unfortunately this plan had to be cancelled, as his high age prevented him from attending. Furthermore, we are obviously grateful to all the speakers of the conference, most of whom submitted their final contribution to this volume. All published papers, including the invited ones, have gone through a rigorous peer review process.

We very much regret the fact that the list of contributors is strongly male-dominated; achieving an appropriate gender balance in philosophy is often a problem, but this time the unbalance is even more serious than usually. This is because, despite our multiple efforts, we received very few submissions by non-male philosophers. As editors and conference organizers, we apologize for this.

We wish to gratefully acknowledge the support we received for the conference from the Finnish Federation of Learned Societies, the Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth Foundation, the University of Helsinki, and the Finnish Association of Philosophy Teachers and Culture, Worldview, and Ethics Teachers.

* * *

Finnish philosophy pre-exists the Philosophical Society of Finland, of course. We don't just mean *The Kalevala* or Väinämöinen, but the long tradition of academic philosophy in our country starting with the early days of the Royal Academy of Turku, established in 1640. It was 233 years later that our Society emerged within the same university, which had by then been moved to Helsinki and renamed the Imperial Alexander University (and which later came to be known as the University of Helsinki).

However, *why* study Finnish philosophy and its history, or why study *any* national histories of philosophy? The national obviously contrasts with the international. Various nationalisms, some of them perhaps moderate but others more extreme and even dangerous, are on the rise today. One might suppose that there is no reason to promote any such potentially exclusive nationalisms by suggesting that Finnish philosophy by itself is worth investigating. It could be argued that Finnish philosophy should only be explored as an element of international philosophy. In a sense this is obviously true, and certainly we are not challenging the picture of philosophy as a thoroughly international – indeed, global – project hopefully unifying instead of dividing humanity.

On the other hand, considering the international status of analytic philosophy, in particular, and the leading role of English-speaking nations in the field, there might also be a reason to focus on small countries like Finland and small languages like Finnish and Swedish. English is the lingua franca of philosophy today, and this is a positive thing, enabling us to discuss serious philosophy with scholars coming from anywhere in the world, but it does not follow that we should simply neglect the interesting work that philosophers representing small nations are doing both in English (or other world languages) and in their own national languages. Finnish philosophers, for example, have used many different languages in their publishing activities, and as is well known, before the Second World War it was German rather than English that functioned as the main publishing language – also for the internationally active Finnish philosophers at that time, including Eino Kaila, whose work is discussed in several contributions to this collection.

In brief, we ought to study national histories of philosophy, such as the history of Finnish philosophy, in order to enrich our overall picture of international philosophy and of philosophy as a general human pursuit taking different shapes in different historical and cultural contexts. Just as we study the different periods in the history of philosophy, there is no reason why we shouldn't also explore local and limited traditions, which may never get any international attention unless their own representatives try to say something about them. We should, however, never study them in the spirit of nationalism. Rejecting nationalism, we can still be legitimately interested in

our own tradition, the history that has made us what we contingently are.

Sometimes a local national figure may both significantly contribute to the international development of philosophy and do this in a distinctive way deeply grounded in their own cultural tradition. An internationally active Finnish thinker like Eino Kaila is a case in point. It is not a wild exaggeration to suggest that Kaila was one of the first-rate philosophers in Europe during the peak of his career – when he established his networks (as they would now be called) with the Vienna Circle members and other logical empiricists in Europe – to the extent that when the Philosophical Society celebrated its 75th anniversary (75 years ago) under Kaila's presidency, the visiting main speaker Ingemar Hedenius from Uppsala called Kaila the leading philosopher in Scandinavia (as reported in the protocols of the Society). However, some of Kaila's most original publications, such as the dialogical work *Syvähenkinen elämä* (1943), were first written in Finnish (and partly Swedish). In his contribution to the centenary conference on Kaila in 1990 and the volume *Eino Kaila and Logical Empiricism* based thereupon (published in *Acta Philosophica Fennica* in 1992), Jaakko Hintikka, another Finnish philosophical giant and of course a much more strongly international figure than Kaila ever was, somewhat surprisingly compared Kaila to a famous character appearing in the poetry of Eino Leino, who is often considered one of our national poets. Kaila's dramatic intellectual personality, according to Hintikka, resembled Leino's Lapin Kouta, a mythical sage, capable of "everything that humans and gods are capable of", who nevertheless was unable to "chain the blue fire", or bring the past back. (Hintikka's paper in the Kaila volume is aptly titled, "Eino Kaila's 'Blue Fire'".)

Presumably it is not wide off the mark (even by us Finns) to suggest that Finland, as a remote Northern nation, has been "larger than its size" in the world history of philosophy. The internationally widely recognized work by distinguished thinkers such as Hintikka and Georg Henrik von Wright – both of whom got their own volumes in the *Library of Living Philosophers* series – has been continued in a more diversified form by later generations, first by Hintikka's many students who at some point, especially in the 1990s, occupied almost all Finnish philosophy professorships, and later by their students and

students' students. While analytic philosophy has undoubtedly been the core of the "Finnish tradition" and continues to be a dominant approach in Finland even today, it flourishes in friendly coexistence – and critical dialogue – with orientations such as phenomenology and pragmatism, among others. Finnish philosophers continue to make international contributions to various fields of study, both established and emerging ones. In seeking to do so, we may recognize the significance of the ways in which our predecessors, including the "giants" but also the less famous ones, have over the decades brought international currents of thought to our country and developed original ideas of their own.

* * *

Largely thanks to Oiva Ketonen's (who was the President of the Philosophical Society of Finland between Kaila and von Wright), von Wright's, and Hintikka's, as well as later Niiniluoto's activities, the Philosophical Society of Finland was in the mid- and late twentieth century the most important forum for the internationalization of Finnish philosophy and philosophers. The Society had started its international publishing series, *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, already in 1935 (when Arvi Grotenfelt was still President), and this series – for decades edited by Niiniluoto and currently edited by Leila Haaparanta – contributed to the celebration of our anniversary by reaching its hundredth volume by the end of year 2023 (while the 80th volume of *Ajatus*, the Yearbook of the Society appearing in Finnish and Swedish, was published by the end of the same year). The early internationalization of the Society was also manifested by the fact that some foreign guest speakers were invited to the Society meetings already in the late 1930s and during World War Two – some of them were also somewhat problematic guests due to Finland's collaboration with Nazi Germany in 1941–1944. However, it was only in the early 1960s that an internationally high-level conference activity in philosophy was started in Finland under von Wright's presidency, with a major conference on modal and many-valued logics being one of the first truly prominent international philosophical events in our country. The speakers included Saul Kripke,

Ruth Barcan Marcus, and Alfred Tarski, among many others, and the proceedings were published in the *Acta* series in 1963.

Already during Kaila's presidency, the Philosophical Society established good working connections to the international scene of philosophy by being officially represented at World Congresses of Philosophy (e.g., in Amsterdam in 1948, with von Wright appointed as the Society's representative) and by thus becoming a member of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP). Incidentally, it seems that in those early days of institutionalized international collaboration it was not entirely clear – at least not to the Finnish participants – whether the Society was a member of FISP or of I.I.P., the International Institute of Philosophy (or Institut International de Philosophie), even though the difference between the two is that the members of FISP are societies or organizations whereas I.I.P. invites only individual members. While a World Congress of Philosophy, organized every five years by FISP, would presumably be too massive an undertaking for our small academic community in Finland, the Philosophical Society of Finland has been active in co-organizing I.I.P. conferences, most recently in 2019 (with proceedings published in the *Acta* series). Notably, the present volume is also honored by the contribution by Pascal Engel, the General Secretary of I.I.P.

In addition, the Philosophical Society of Finland also has a long tradition of collaborating with a wide variety of more specific and thematic philosophical societies, both internationally and nationally. In many cases, the Society has acted as a local co-organizer or a "sponsor" of various events organized by Finnish philosophers together with, for example, societies or institutions operating at some special fields of philosophy. One of the most memorable among such events was the Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science in 2015 – presumably the largest philosophy event that ever took place in Finland, with some 700 participants, and also the conference in which Hintikka gave his last paper, passing away just a few days after the event – but also smaller-scale conferences have been organized, for example, together with Nordic and European networks and associations representing, say, pragmatism or phenomenology.

Nationally, the Philosophical Society has continued to collaborate with other learned societies, such as Suomen Oppihistoriallinen Seura (the Finnish Society of the History of Ideas) as well as the Finnish Society of European Philosophy, which publishes the Finnish philosophical quarterly *niin&näin* as well as a book series. Different societies can and should have their different profiles, and there is no need for any rivalry – especially not in a small country in which we should work together for the internationally high quality of Finnish philosophy.

* * *

A few words need to be added on the contents of this volume. As the conference papers were selected on the basis of an open call, we did not design the structure of the conference, or this book, aiming at any full coverage of the history of philosophy in Finland. While a general history of Finnish philosophy still remains to be written, there are several previous publications examining important aspects of that history.[2] Hence, the word "perspectives" in our title must be taken seriously.

Accordingly, while some major Finnish philosophers of the past, including Edward Westermarck, Kaila, and von Wright (to whom also some earlier volumes in this series have been devoted) are discussed in several contributions to this collection, there are no papers specifically addressing Hintikka's philosophy, for instance – or, say, Raimo Tuomela's, for that matter. Such omissions are merely accidental and reflect no editorial choices. Similarly, some philosophical traditions that have had an interesting influence in Finnish philosophy are unfortunately absent, most obviously phenomenology (and

[2] In addition to the previous volumes of this *Acta* series dedicated to the philosophy of figures such as Kaila and von Wright, we might here mention, e.g., Leila Haaparanta and Ilkka Niiniluoto (eds.), *Analytic Philosophy in Finland* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003), and Juha Manninen, Juhani Ihanus, Marja Jalava, and Ilkka Niiniluoto, *A History of Philosophy and Psychology in Finland, 1809-1917* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 2021). The history of the Philosophical Society of Finland itself has recently been explored (in Finnish) in Sami Pihlström, Lari Ahokas, and Ilkka Niiniluoto (eds.), *Suomen Filosofinen Yhdistys 1873–2023: 150 vuotta suomalaisen filosofian historiaa* (Helsinki: The Philosophical Society of Finland, 2023).

largely also pragmatism), as we received no submissions focusing on them. On the other hand, considerable attention is given to the history of philosophy teaching in schools in Finland, while our leading historian of philosophy, Simo Knuuttila, who unexpectedly died in 2022, has himself been turned into a figure in the history of Finnish philosophy due to the fact that two papers on his work are published here.

We have organized the essays thematically rather than chronologically without forgetting historical chronology, however. Reflections on the nature of Finnish philosophy in relation to the history of philosophy and its methods open the volume, followed by papers on the early stages of philosophy in Finland. Sections on the major thinkers mentioned above (Westermarck, Kaila, von Wright) contain several fresh analyses of their ideas, while papers on somewhat overlooked figures such as Max Söderman, Sigurd Frosterus, and Raili Kauppi complement the picture. Knuuttila gets a small section of his own before the final papers on philosophy education concluding the volume.

We wish our readers a lively encounter with the history, both distant and more recent, of philosophy in Finland.

The Editors

Finnish Philosophy and the History of Philosophy

History of Philosophy, Finnish Style

PASCAL ENGEL

In memory of Simo Knuuttila

1. Introduction

The historian of philosophy is confronted with at least three familiar dilemmas:

a) between reading philosophers of the past in the light of present-day discussions, thus running the risk of anachronism and of partiality, or preserving the past doctrines in their details in placing all these in the light of the social and intellectual context in which they are located, thus risking transforming them into museum pieces;

b) between interpreting philosophical doctrines and concepts as historically continuous, thus neglecting the changes within their development and their potential incommensurability, or emphasising only the discontinuities;

c) between taking the style of writing the history of philosophy as a narrative, explaining its development in the light of a common interpretative thread, or practicing a method of rational reconstruction of doctrines and authors, in order to be able to evaluate their arguments.

These oppositions are in many ways orthogonal to two others, equally familiar: between an historical and a systematic approach of philosophical problems, and between an internalist and an externalist approach of philosophical doctrines. Here I shall concentrate mostly on the dilemma between narrative and historical reconstructions.

As everyone knows, these dilemmas are in many ways exaggerated, for good historians of philosophy manage to evade

the horns of continuity and discontinuity, of contextualism and a-contextualism, of narrative and rational reconstruction. But it seems clear that some traditions accentuate certain styles more than others. Thus German and French historians have adopted in many ways the narrative Hegelian style. The British and American historians have often favoured the reconstructive and whiggish analytical style. Narratives as well as reconstructions are often written within the background of schools and doctrines, and are often embedded within traditions. Some books, such as Strawson's *The Bounds of Sense* (1966), Martial Gueroult's *Descartes* (1953) or Dieter Henrich's *Hegel im Kontext* (1971) seem paradigmatic of each tradition.

Finnish philosophy has followed a number of trends since its beginnings. For almost a century it has been dominated by analytic philosophy. It has incarnated its virtues, but also some of its defects. Finland in the twentieth century has, unlike other traditions on the Continent, escaped the fate that has been called the "colonization" of philosophy by the historiography of philosophy, thanks to the influence of philosophers like Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright and Jaakko Hintikka. The outlook has been dominantly systematic, with a strong background in logic and the philosophy of science. But this image is in many ways false since not only philosophers like Kaila, von Wright and Hintikka, but many of their disciples and associates have practiced the history of philosophy, which is now a well-established field in Finland. The interesting fact is that it has in many ways a distinctive and original style.

2. Styles of writing the history of philosophy

In his famous article "The historiography of philosophy: four genres" (1984), Richard Rorty draws a distinction between the history of philosophy proper, which he calls *historical reconstruction*, and *rational reconstruction.* Historical reconstruction is supposed to seek after faithfulness to the texts and the actual doctrines of philosophers of the past and tries to respect Quentin Skinner's maxim (1969) that "no agent can't eventually be said to have meant or done something which he could never be brought to accept as a correct description of what he has meant or done". In other terms, this style of history prescribes not to use criteria of classification, or descriptions alien

to the very context of the work of a given writer. Rational reconstruction, in contrast, consists in presenting the theses and arguments of philosophers of the past in such a way that they can be evaluated rationally and be potential objects of discussion today.

The distinction is actually vague. Contrary to what Skinner's maxim seems to imply, historical reconstruction cannot be purely neutral and free of interpretative elements introduced by the historian, otherwise it would be a pure paraphrase or a doxography. It also depends on which features of the historical context are selected. It would be preposterous, given in many cases the uncertainty of textual evidence, to think that the historian can extract from the texts what a thinker has *really meant* or thought. Moreover, if one is reminded that interpreting a thought implies the use of a principle of charity and of a presupposition that the author interpreted is rational, the reading of philosophers is hardly free of such presuppositions. This is why Rorty grants that interpretative reconstruction is just as much a reconstruction as the rational one, even when it takes – as in Skinner's own studies on Renaissance political thought – the form of a very precise and patient description of texts and contexts. The same is true of the method of rational reconstruction. It is the method which is supposed to be practised by analytic philosophers, when they read philosophers of the past, to use Jonathan Barnes's famous image, as if they were colleagues with whom one could have a discussion over a cup of tea (presumably in an Oxford room). For this reason, it has often been called the "collegial" style in the history of philosophy. It is preoccupied chiefly by trying to find what doctrines can be true in philosophies of the past rather than what they mean within their culture or context. Jonathan Bennett's books on Kant and the British empiricists (Bennett 1966, 1971) are supposed to be paradigmatic examples of such a style within analytic philosophy. But this style of reconstruction is hardly neutral either: it operates on the basis of a certain argumentative style which was in practice in Oxford (or elsewhere) in the mid-twentieth century and reflects the interests of philosophers of this school.

The distinction between the two types of reconstruction is sometimes interpreted as implying that the historical one is a temporal narrative, whereas the second rests on the image of a

philosophia perennis, according to which problems and concepts are forever the same from period to period, and that the historian can just confront the thoughts of, say, ancient philosophers with those of modern or contemporary times. But this is a confusion. Historical reconstructions, on the one hand, are based on a narrative, but the narrative is oriented by a certain doctrine. This is typically the case with what Rorty calls *Geistesgeschichte*, which is, as its name indicates, mainly a German specialty, even if it has been imitated quite often in France, in Italy and elsewhere. *Geistesgeschichte* aims at explaining the work of a philosopher either as a step within a progress of ideas or as a response to a set of problems within a culture. Most of the time, it presupposes a kind of teleology, as with Hegel or Auguste Comte, or a common thread which unfolds in time, such as Heidegger's "history of being" leading to the end of metaphysics. Rational reconstruction, on the other hand, is hardly free from a narrative, even when it praises the evaluation of arguments and methods and their confrontation with present day thinking. This is particularly the case for positivism. Thus, when the logical positivists celebrate the advent of scientific philosophy, they mean to show that today's scientific culture has rendered obsolete most of the philosophical thinking of the past, especially when it rests on a metaphysical or religious outlook.

As Simo Knuuttila (2006) remarks in his article on Hintikka's style of history of philosophy, this shows that the study of philosophers of the past is always conditioned by the present situation of the historian, hence that the idea of the "true" and "originary" meaning of texts is largely a myth. In that respect, suggests Knuuttila, the positivists and Gadamerian hermeneutics are on a par: both start from the present-day situation, in an a-historical setting.

This is quite evident when one compares the almost everlasting controversy on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione 9* on future contingents and Diodorus' *Master argument*. We can contrast two styles of reading this famous argument. One, in particular in Hintikka's book *Time and Necessity*, is based on a careful analysis of the classical texts, from Epictetus' rendering of the *kureion logos,* to the interpretations of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Cicero, to contemporary readings, and on a logical reconstruction, using time and modal logics. The other, von Wright's in

his essay "The Master argument of Diodorus" (Von Wright 1984), is, in his words, "unscholarly" and its aim "is not primarily to reconstruct a piece of past history but to say something of interest about things which continue to puzzle us", analysing the *kureion logos* in logical terms, within the kind of approach that von Wright has illustrated in his systematic writings on determinism in relation to time (von Wright 1984a). This also contrasts with Jules Vuillemin's project, who in his book on the Master argument (Vuillemin 1984) attempts to reconstruct the whole of history of philosophy from the reactions of philosophers, from Aristotle to Kant, to the Argument, basing a classification of systems upon these reactions. In this case we do not have scholarship only, but a wide-ranging interpretative reconstruction, based on a philosophical thesis about the whole philosophical tradition.

Before investigating whether the historical style of Finnish philosophers can fit in these debates, I need to mention two other important distinctions. One is between history and *archaeology*. The history of a concept, of a question or of a thesis is supposed to give the continuous development of this question or concept from a certain starting point to an end point at some moment. It presupposes that the meaning of this question or concept remains the same throughout the period studied. The archaeology of a question does not presuppose that the concepts have at each period the same meaning. It aims at studying the discontinuities and breaks within a history. The archaeology of a notion or problem is, especially in Michel Foucault's work (who meant to write archaeologies of knowledge, medicine, sexuality, practices of avowal and other notions such as the self) intended to reveal both the contingency of the "discursive formations" and the difficulty of translating the concepts from one archaeological layer to a subsequent one. The question that the archaeological style raises is whether the concepts studied really have incommensurable meanings. If one accepts Davidson and Gadamer's remarks on interpretation, the claim of incommensurability is moot: interpreters have to presuppose a large background or truth and agreement in order to be able to read philosophers of the past, and to evaluate their views. How can the archaeologist draw the genealogical profile, of a notion of a type of question or

problem, if there is no common core within the uses of concepts at a given time and at a later time? (Charles 1984).

A second important distinction related to the previous ones is between *holism* and *atomism* in the treatment of concepts and problems. Holism is the view that a concept, a problem, or an argument can never be understood and evaluated in isolation from others. Atomism is the oppositive view. Most partisans of historical reconstructions and of *Geistesgeschichte* are holists. This is, for instance, the view defended in Collingwood (1940). More recently the holistic view has been defended in particular by historians of medieval philosophy. Thus, the French historian Alain de Libera believes that it is impossible to consider the philosophical views of Aquinas, or Ockham, in logic and in semantics independently from their theological views (de Libera 1992). The radical expression of this view is that certain problems, such as the problem of universals, or the nature of time and necessity, cannot be studied in terms which could be, at least to some extent, close to those in which they are studied today. As we shall see, many philosophers in the Finnish tradition agree that one has to consider the theological views of medieval philosophers, if only because the problem of time and necessity was raised in the context of discussions of divine foreknowledge, but they disagree with this radical kind of holistic and incommensurabilist claims.

There is also a darker side of these discussions, which is actually present in Rorty's discussion. When Rorty says that there is no real distinction between narrative and rational reconstruction, he suggests that there is an irremediably subjective and possibly arbitrary character of every kind of writing in the history of philosophy, and that the historian is threatened by a form of relativism at every stage of his work, except perhaps the philological aspects. The archaeology of knowledge, especially in the hands of a writer like Foucault, is a clear case in point. Foucault used to joke that he may have always written fictions. His works illustrate in large part this avowal. Recognizing the difficulty of separating narrative from reconstruction, however, should not lead us to this kind of relativism and subjectivism.

3. The Finnish style

Finnish philosophers have of course encountered these questions. They have fully been immerged within the trends of European philosophy. But they followed a distinctive path.

Here as elsewhere, the work of Jaakko Hintikka, his capacity to orientate the inquiries of his disciples, and the strength of his insights on so many philosophical issues have inspired his students and colleagues. It is characteristic of Hintikka's work that it has always been historically informed, as he deals with authors as diverse as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, Frege or Wittgenstein. Except for a few notable exceptions, such as Kant and Wittgenstein, Hintikka's approach is not primarily the study of a specific author, but of a problem, a question, or a concept, such as the problem of the relation between time and modality, the question of the universality of logic, or the concept of plenitude. As I suggested above, his basic unit of investigation is not a text, or a doctrine, or a system, but a question and a problem, and the various answers to which it gives rise. This is actually in line with his constructive work in the logic of questions and problems (see, e.g., Hintikka 1984). But this selectivity does not mean that his method is atomistic. On the contrary it is holistic in the sense that he is very attentive to the coherence and implications of an argument or a principle not only within a philosophy, but also along a timeline which often covers, as with the principle of plenitude, the whole of the philosophical tradition since Aristotle. Unlike Lovejoy who took the principle of plenitude as a "unit idea" which reproduces itself during history, Hintikka insists on the context-dependence of this idea with other philosophical concepts and arguments in various settings.

Hintikka's approach to philosophies of the past has been often considered as paradigmatic of the way analytic philosophers deal with the history of their discipline. Indeed like many analytic philosophers he often uses the resources of formalism and translates philosophical statements and arguments from Aristotle, Leibniz or Kant into contemporary vocabulary. Most of the time, he uses concepts and formalisms which he has himself contributed to construct in order to illuminate classical philosophical concepts. In this respect, he adopts the same approach as von Wright in his use of modal

logic to discuss issues like determinism and necessity. This is the case with the semantics of possible worlds and his own notion of model sets, with his analysis of Kant's notions of analytic and synthetic truths through concepts borrowed from contemporary quantification theory (Hintikka 1973a), or his discussion of Descartes' *cogito* as a performance rather than an inference. The aim here is not primarily historical, but systematic, and Hintikka does not pretend to be faithful to the letter of the texts: what he is after is an explanation of the notions studied, rather than a commentary following Skinner's maxim. It is indeed an interpretation of the philosophical texts as well as a tentative explanation of their meaning. Von Wright (1968), and later Dagfinn Føllesdal (1982), have argued that there is no sharp distinction between understanding and explanation, and Hintikka follows their lead. Hintikka's readings of Kant, Frege, Husserl, and Wittgenstein are actually – if I may say so – Hintikka-oriented. And it is quite normal since the interpretations and historical reconstructions cannot be done without presuppositions that a particular reader borrows from his own background of thinking about the issues. In this respect, as Hintikka himself has often noticed, the Skinnerian maxim does not help if one attends larger presuppositions of whole periods of thought, as Collingwood (1940) famously argued. The hidden postulates of many thinkers about time and modality, or the attitude of many philosophers about logic as a language or as a calculus, are such larger presuppositions, and their study by Hintikka and his associates has proved very fruitful.

It is interesting, however, to distinguish Hintikka's enterprise from another one, which is probably less known. It is the kind of history of philosophy practiced by Martial Gueroult and his disciple Jules Vuillemin. Gueroult's approach has been called "structuralist", and he himself called it "dianoematics" (Gueroult 1979). It may be described as hyper-holistic, in the following sense: each philosopher considered as worthy of the name has his own system, which he deploys from a small set of axioms which he defends by arguments and reasons which purport to be objective, although the reality thus described is relative only to his system. Vuillemin accepts Gueroult principle that philosophical systems create their own truth, even though they pretend to tell only the truth, and the whole truth: in other words, there is truth-for-Descartes, truth-for-Spinoza,

etc., although this is no relativism, since each philosopher pretends to reach the whole truth, and denies that the systems of others are true. Vuillemin intends to formulate transhistorical principles which philosophers accept, but he interprets each in their own way. In his books *What are Philosophical Systems* (1991) and *Necessity and Contingency* (1984, English tr. 1996) he attempts to show that the whole of the history of philosophy consists in a series of answers to Diodorus' Master argument: each system answers and tries to solve in their own way to the aporia of determinism and free will, and each system incorporates principles about the nature of necessity, time, and knowledge which govern their metaphysics and their epistemology. The result is a strange combination of the view, defended by Hintikka and earlier by von Wright, that we can compare philosophies along the yardstick of a small set of principles about modalities and time, and of Gueroult's structuralist framework. The combination is strange because Vuillemin accepts the idea that we can translate and evaluate the basic modal notions and concepts out of which systems are built, but also believes that each system is, so to say, trapped into its own principles. Hintikka, as far as I know, never discussed Vuillemin's view, but his position is utterly different: he strongly rejects claims of incommensurability of philosophical views, and although he takes each system to interpret modal principles in their own way, he accepts a strong continuity. Vuillemin is a Kantian: he takes metaphysical propositions to lead to insuperable antinomies, and philosophical knowledge to be bounded. Hintikka believes that he can actually solve these antinomies.

Simo Knuuttila has followed Hintikka's lead in his investigations of the story of modalities in Ancient, medieval, and modern philosophy, especially in his collective volumes, *Reforging the Great Chain of Being* (1981) and *Modern Modalities* (1988). He has in particular isolated the difference between the statistical conception of modality and the conception of modality as referential multiplicity, which Duns Scotus initiated, which casts a long shadow in contemporary philosophy. Knuuttila's historical perspective is in many ways continuist, as he shows that modal notions undergo, from Antiquity to today, important transformations without losing their role in philosophical arguments. It is not as if the philosophical

mansion of modality has been destroyed and built anew, as some pictures of Descartes' revolution seem to imply: modal concepts are displaced, but not eliminated. Leila Haaparanta in her work on Frege (Haaparanta 1988) has shown how Frege tried to expel these concepts from his logic, taking them to be merely features of judgments, hence psychological, but gives them a transcendental status. In this respect Frege is much closer to Kant than to Leibniz. In fact, Knuuttila has shown, in an illuminating essay written with Lilli Alanen (1988), that Descartes was even more responsible for the banishment of modalities from modern philosophy than Kant, since he attacked the metaphysical basis of modalities and reduced it to conceivability. Knuuttila's investigation of these issues gives an eye-opening perspective on another doctrine which was born in the late Middle Ages and taken up both by Scotists and Cartesians, namely voluntarism, in the sense of the view that eternal truths and necessities are created by God's will, and as an epistemological principle of governance of the human understanding by the will. I suspect that in large part the lack of interest for modalities on the part of contemporary philosophers can be traced back to this Scotist and then Cartesian origins. Knuutila analyses these turns illuminatingly.

In a way, he comes back to this theme of the voluntariness vs unvoluntariness of the mental in his landmark book of 2004, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*. It is interesting to compare this book with previous work on the emotions, such as Anthony Kenny's *Action, Emotion and Will* (1963), which has often been the main reference for these issues within analytic philosophy. Kenny starts, like Knuuttila, from the scholastic background, and aims to defend a form of neo-Thomistic view against Descartes' understanding of emotions. Knuuttila has no such project in this book. In contrast with his previous work on modalities, he does not propose a paradigm or master-thought orienting all theories of emotions, and his style in this book is much more narrative than reconstructive. He tells us that he came to the study of emotions in the Ancient and medieval period because he read the contemporary discussion of these issues, but at no point does he confront the former with the latter. But he actually reveals his view: "Contrary to some authors I believe that many of the emotional phenomena to which past philosopher refer are similar to those we are

familiar with". This is a strong claim of continuity, in a field where so many writers tell us that words like "passion", "emotion", and particular emotions such as fear, or anger do not have the same meaning over the centuries.

Lilli Alanen (1989), like Knuuttila, is very attentive to the continuity of the philosophical scholastic tradition that Descartes inherited from his French Jesuit background. She is also concerned with rejecting the so-called Cartesian myth of the "ghost in the machine" which has hypnotised so many Anglo-American commentators, and with insisting on Descartes' notion of an embodied mind, rather than on his dualism.

In these respects, can we contrast Knuuttila's and Alanen's work with the archaeology style in historiography. Foucault takes it to be the companion of genealogy, in the Nietzschean sense of a debunking of a phenomenon, such as morals or of a practice such as truth telling. Foucaldian archaeology has also a strongly externalist component: it is the study not only of a set of doctrines and concepts, but also of a set of practices and institution within a sociological context. It is clear that Hintikka and his collaborators' project is utterly different. They are interested, when they study the history of philosophy, in the internal logic of the concepts and theories. They do not intend, unlike Nietzscheans and Foucaldians, to show that the meanings of these concepts and theories are determined by social and cultural factors, and they certainly escape the fate promised by Rorty of writing only "narratives".

At this point, we reach a fork, which Finnish philosophy, like any other tradition in Europe, has encountered. Von Wright and Hintikka, even though they were strongly influenced by Wittgenstein, have resisted the naturalist and anthropological reading of his philosophy, although Hintikka has often, in his writings on truth, been tempted by a form of deflationist and quietist view (Engel 2006). Hintikka and his associates have always discussed Quine's doctrines especially in logic, but they have not been tempted by his sweeping form of naturalism. Hintikka always kept a strong interest in Husserl, and Leila Haaparanta has, in her work on logic (Haaparanta 2009), been faithful to the rationalist commitments of Husserl's phenomenology. But there is, on the other side of the fork, a strong naturalist line, which has taken many forms in contemporary philosophy. One of these forms is pragmatism. Another

is what one might call naturalistic phenomenology. These views are distinct. But they rest on very different conceptions of truth, meaning, and the scope of rationality from those of the Hintikka-von Wright school. But they originate in distinct readings of Wittgenstein. I have not addressed here the issue of the nature of the properly philosophical and metaphysical commitments of writers like von Wright, Hintikka and Knuuttila. These commitments cannot, at one point or another, fail to surface in their historical work. I would say here that a strong Wittgensteinian influence pervades the work of von Wright and Hintikka, and this should indeed be unsurprising. Quite often Wittgenstein's views on metaphysics can be interpreted as a rejection of the very subject of metaphysical inquiry. But they can also be interpreted as an attempt to find a middle way between realism and anti-realism. The work of philosophers of the next generation, such as Sami Pihlström (2021), who proposes a form of pragmatic realism, seem to me to further in many ways the line initiated by von Wright and Hintikka.

4. Conclusion

I have tried to suggest that this tradition, when it comes to the study of the history of philosophy – and at no point, even the most formalistically minded members of this tradition deny that systematic and analytic philosophy can be divorced from the study of their history – has been very original. I have only mentioned a few key figures. But if we try to locate it on the map of philosophical traditions, it is unique. Why? Because it has produced a distinctive style of analytic philosophy, oriented towards the search for philosophical truths as distinct from scientific truths, although it has always been faithful to scientific methods. But also because it has produced, along with this truth-oriented enterprise, a style of historiography which aims at understanding the past of philosophy without taking it only, to borrow Bernard Williams' phrase, as a "humanistic discipline". In this respect it seems to me that the Finnish tradition has kept together the search for truth and the search for meaning and understanding.

École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris

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Peirce's Pragmaticism and Finnish Philosophy: Many Virtues in Common

CLAUDINE TIERCELIN

Dagfinn Føllesdal was right when he wrote in 1993 that "the philosophers of the Nordic countries", by which he meant the Swedish, Danish, Norwegian and Finnish philosophers, "are renowned for their encyclopaedic curiosity and their good knowledge of several philosophical traditions" (1993, 254). Anyone familiar with the writings of Finnish philosophers cannot fail to be struck by all the epistemic virtues they have always displayed[1]: a perfect combination of the history of philosophy, its authors and its texts, never to the detriment of the problems; a style of their own which has been so creative that it has led to pioneering discoveries in many areas that had remained unexplored for too long, in ancient or medieval philosophy, but also in contemporary philosophy, with fruitful comparisons between authors (Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Leibniz) and problems, more readily tackled by analytic philosophers (Frege, Russell, and the whole current of logical empiricism) and the great names of phenomenology (notably Husserl[2]); an acute awareness of the crucial importance of logic and semantics as a necessary propaedeutic for philosophical reflection, which again gave rise to so many fundamental achievements, from various possible forms of logic to reflections on modality, to give but a few examples. This attention is also remarkable in philosophy of science, from the examination of scientific realism[3] to the still much debated modes of inference (deduction,

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[1] See Manninen et al. (2021).

[2] See Haaparanta (1994), (2009); Haaparanta & Hintikka (1986); Haaparanta & Koskinen (2012); Haaparanta & Niiniluoto (2003); Pihlström (2004).

[3] See the influential book by Ilkka Niiniluoto (1999).

induction or abduction). Not to mention research into ontology, ethics and the philosophy of religion.

Such a rather rare combination of concerns with the most scrupulous history together with the highly technical problems and ethical issues they raise for philosophers may explain why so many Finnish philosophers were among the first scholars to realize the importance for philosophy of the pragmatist tradition, and among the pragmatists, of the overwhelming originality and scope of Charles Sanders Peirce's revolutionary achievements in logic, mathematics, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, as well as in metaphysics, ethics and philosophy of religion[4]. In the chapter he devoted to "The Place of Peirce in the Pragmatist Tradition", in the *Cambridge Companion to Peirce*, Sami Pihlström complained about those "aggressively orthodox Peirceans" who "think only Peirce's views deserve philosophical attention" (2004, 27). And he rightly observed that it was inaccurate to "overlook the remarkable integrity we find among pragmatists, despite their occasional profound disagreements", so that "we should be skeptical about all attempts to find just two forms of pragmatism (e.g., Peirce's and all others) opposed to each other" (*ibid*., 29). However, this should not lead us to underestimate some important differences and even "tensions" among philosophers working in the classical or contemporary pragmatist tradition, depending, in particular, on whether one is more in line with some form of non-realistic neo-pragmatism, and less interested in metaphysics, or whether one thinks metaphysics can still be done and be a source of genuine *knowledge*, provided it is conducted, at least as I view it, along a realistic program, committed to rigorous logical and scientific methods. In order to explain why this is the case, I shall present Peirce's insights in favor of what he took to be a fruitful *pragmaticist* defense of a scientific and realistic metaphysics. In so doing, I hope to show that such a position makes sense, and even more, that it may also explain why Peirce inspired so many Finnish colleagues, who, in their turn, became, and still are, genuine sources of inspiration today, not only for pragmaticists like myself, but for us all philosophers.

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[4] For the younger generation, see for ex. Pietarinen & Snellman (2006); Bergman (2019); Rydenfelt (2014), (2018) and (2021).

Is metaphysical knowledge possible? A genuine challenge for a pragmaticist

It is quite a challenge to try and defend the possibility of metaphysical *knowledge* in 2023, and, even more, with some avowed pragmatist inclinations in the background. Indeed, "pragmatism and metaphysics suffer both from a bad reputation" (Tiercelin 2023, 191). If there are as many figures of metaphysics as there are metaphysicians, there are at least as many definitions and varieties of pragmatism as there are pragmatists: should we emphasize the oppositions between them, that is, the vulgar or the revolutionary pragmatists – some scientistic, some literary – versus the reformist ones, the latter focusing more on objectivity, truth and *knowledge*, than on "human" practice and action, the primacy of *life*, vital, psychological *and* religious issues? Or consider that, since "the reformist aspirations of the classical pragmatist tradition have been transformed by contemporary neo-pragmatists into one or another form of revolutionary anti-intellectualism", an evolution which can be "traced from Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead, through Schiller, Lewis, Hook and Quine, to Rorty's literary-political neo-pragmatism", we should "begin to worry that Russell was right to predict that pragmatism would lead to 'cosmic impiety' or at any rate to fascism" (Haack 2004, 5)? Or should we rather stop trying to find out who has the "right" version, and instead decide to have an "open attitude" about it (Pihlström 2001/2024, 2023)?[5] As far as metaphysics is concerned, the situation is no better: it has been a long time since the definition, nature, aim and value of what was once the "Queen of Sciences" have been called into question, its links with science and theology denounced. And at the turn of the twentieth century, we have been taught by many, from the logical positivists to Heideggerians, that it was just dead.

Nevertheless, despite their various misfortunes, Peirce, pragmatism and metaphysics are still alive and, in many

[5] In Pihlström (ed.) (2011), reedit. (2024), Chapter 1, Introduction, Pihlström claims that there is no "essence of pragmatism" and that it may be "advisable to leave the exact status of pragmatism open" (6, 7). See also Pihlström (2023).

respects, thriving[6]. Perhaps, paradoxically, because they are mutually reinforcing. We should therefore begin by mentioning some of the *contra* and *pro* features of the metaphysical program shared by Peirce and the pragmatists. However, the Milford logician and metaphysician is the only one who, after having decried it, explicitly claimed not only the possibility but also the necessity of metaphysics, and even went so far as to defend one that was *scientific* and *realistic*. Reviewing a few aspects of his approach, which he preferred to rename *pragmaticist*, I shall show that through the emphasis he placed on logic, semantics, inquiry and science (without scientism), within a realistic agenda, he provided key tools for any enterprise committed to the study of metaphysics, so as to face the "Integration Challenge" consisting in "binding metaphysics and epistemology together" (Peacocke 1999, 1-2), which should be addressed by any metaphysician concerned with questioning "the nature of ourselves as rational thinkers" (Peacocke 2004, 267), if he or she hopes to be able to lay down the conditions of possibility for genuine metaphysical *knowledg*e (Tiercelin 2011b, 21). In its turn, metaphysics so conceived might also enrich the pragmatist agenda the founders may have had in mind when they gathered in Harvard in the 1870s, and chose, "half-ironically, half-defiantly", the name "Metaphysical Club" for what became the birthplace of pragmatism.

Pragmatists, pragmaticists and neo-pragmatists: a common fight against metaphysics and a variety of metaphysical agendas

However opposed they may be, most pragmatists have taken up the torch of fierce criticism *against* metaphysics (Tiercelin 2023, 192). Which may explain why they have often been viewed as close friends of the logical positivists who have also been well received by so many Finnish philosophers. But how should we understand such a claim? It might be helpful here to recall one of Rorty's earliest – accurate and inspiring[7] – papers (1961, 197-223), in which he praises Peirce – later shown

[6] Such is also the case in Finland. See for example, the remarkable work by Tuomas E. Tahko.

[7] As I recalled in Tiercelin (2019).

to be in total opposition with him (Haack 1997) – for his "sound and important" identification of the major vices of any metaphysical undertaking. In a nutshell: "(1) What Peirce called 'nominalism' and what present-day philosophers call 'reductionism' are forms of a single error. (2) The error in both cases goes back to 'the Protean metaphysical urge to transcend language.' (David Pears). (3) Peirce's attempt to give sense to the notion of *universalia ante rem* is not a result of succumbing to this urge, but is rather his device for repudiating it as strongly as possible. (4) When Peirce says that 'vagueness is real', and when Wittgenstein points to the difference between causal and logical determination, the only differences between what they are saying are verbal (or, to give the cash value of this overworked word, uninteresting). (5) The similarity of their insights about language reflects that fact that the slogans 'Don't look for the meaning, look for the use' and 'The meaning of a concept is the sum of its possible effects upon conduct' reciprocally support each other." (1961, 197–8; see Tiercelin 2019, 13-16).

Rorty rightly locates some crucial metaphysical vices, as I have done myself for years[8], namely, the various ways in which "nominalism" – or "reductionism" – involves a dramatic lack of attention, on the level of language, meaning, knowledge, inquiry, and plain ontology, to such an important phenomenon as "vagueness"; he is right, too, in identifying major links, on that count, between Wittgenstein and Peirce, and many insights common to the numerous branches pragmatism has grown into, including Peirce, James and Dewey, indeed, but so many others, Wittgenstein, Ramsey[9], Putnam[10], and, more widely, all those who objected to a "Platonistic", "Great Mirror" like (Rorty 1980) or representationalist (as

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[8] Tiercelin (1986), (1989b), (1991b), (1991c), 1(992), (1993a), (2019).

[9] Ramsey's pragmatism has received more and more attention: Sahlin (1990); Hookway (2000); Dokic and Engel (2002); Tiercelin (1993a), (2004a), (2005/2016), (2014), (2015); Misak (2016). For ex. compare Peirce (5.453; 6.348; 4.344) with Ramsey (*PP*, 7).

[10] See his rejection of "metaphysical realism and his long search for an "internal" then "natural" realism, which drove him to view pragmatism as "a way of thinking … of lasting importance and an option (or at least an 'open question') that should figure in present-day philosophical thought" (1995), xi; (1994); Tiercelin (2002a).

Huw Price called it, 2011) approach to metaphysics. (Tiercelin 2023, 192.)

Now, this is not really new either: metaphysics has always been charged of infinite scholastic disputes, of being incapable (Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas) of truly separating itself from theology (or even, for some, from ontology), of having outrageous ambitions for entities outside phenomenal experience, of sinking into antinomies, of crossing the limits of knowledge by pronouncing on a supposed "essence" or "nature" of reality and its *properties*. And it is no coincidence either that philosophers who were fairly critical of metaphysics, such as Berkeley or Kant, have often been presented as precursors of pragmatism, that parallels have been drawn between Peirce and Wittgenstein, together with the Vienna Circle[11] and its heirs (Carnap, Quine), and a host of contemporary metaphysicians who, rather than metaphysical audacity (or, rather, temerity), claim to prefer "humility", be it "Humean", "Kantian" or "Ramseyan"[12].

Peirce was certainly the most systematic, and in a sense, the most virulent critic of metaphysics, but he was not alone among the pragmatists. This could just as well be shown in the case of James, Dewey, but also Ramsey, and of many contemporary pragmatists and neo pragmatists such as Putnam, Price or Kitcher.[13]

The relevance of Peirce's metaphysical project

It is also true that, far from being *radical* foes of metaphysics, most pragmatists had a *metaphysical* agenda (see Tiercelin 2023, 195 ff.). And again, this could be shown, as far as James, Dewey, and also, to a certain extent, Putnam are concerned[14]. However, Peirce was undoubtedly the one who not only launched the battle *against* metaphysics but who also provided

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[11] See Tiercelin (1993a), 28-36; Pihlström, Stadler, & Weidtmann (eds.), (2017).

[12] See Lewis (2009), 203-222; Jackson (1998); Langton (1998). I have criticized them in Tiercelin (2011a), 361-380, reedit. (2023), 269-282.

[13] For a detailed recent analysis, see Tiercelin (2023), 192-195.

[14] See Tiercelin (2023), 195-197.

the most detailed (and it seems to me) the best reasons *in favor of metaphysics* (Tiercelin 2023, 192). In what way?

1. As far as the *pars destruens* or therapeutic diagnosis is concerned, Peirce kept denouncing the "deplorably backward" and "immature" condition of metaphysics, "injurious to the physical sciences", which "greatly hampered the progress of such special sciences as the moral or psychical sciences" (CP 6.2). For the deeply pious man he was, the "puny, rickety and scrofulous" state of current metaphysics, stemmed from its remaining too long, not so much in the hands of "parish priests" or "christian ministers" as in those of "professional theologians" or "seminarian philosophers", a "much more tragic fate", because "the principal business of theologians" – "who must be judged as scientific men, since theology pretends to be a science"– "is to make men feel the enormity of the slightest departure from the metaphysics they assume to be connected with the standard faith" (CP 6.3). Now: "nothing can be more unscientific than the attitude of minds who are trying to confirm themselves in early beliefs. The struggle of the scientific man is to try to see the errors of his beliefs -- if he can be said to have any beliefs." (CP 6.3) Hence: "historically we are astonished to find that it has been a mere arena of ceaseless and trivial disputation. But we also find that it has been pursued in a spirit the very contrary of that of wishing to learn the truth, which is the most essential requirement of the logic of science." (CP 6.5)

Therefore, pragmatism's mission was to get rid of the pseudo-problems encumbering metaphysics. For in blocking the way of inquiry, "the one unpardonable offence in reasoning, metaphysicians have in all ages shown themselves the most addicted to" (CP 1.136). Hence, pragmatism was to be "no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things", no "*Weltanschauung*" (CP 5.131), but "a mere maxim of logic instead of a sublime principle of speculative philosophy" (CP 5.18), "merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464) so as to separate mere grammatical from real distinctions, in order for us neither "to mistake the sensation produced by our own unclearness of thought for a character of the object we are thinking" (CP 5.398) nor "to mistake a mere difference in the grammatical construction of two words for a distinction

between the ideas they express" (CP 5.399). So, in what we might call a pre-Wittgensteinian or Carnapian way, pragmatism had first to tidy up the room: "It solves no real problem. It only shows that supposed problems are not real problems" (CP 8.259). "What is wanted, therefore, is a method for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign" (CP 5.6), and "pragmatism will serve to show that almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is either meaningless gibberish – one word being defined by other words, and they by still others, without any real conception ever being reached – or else is downright absurd" (CP 5.423). Hence a program of eradication of pseudo-problems, among which the "salad of cartesianism", and such foundationalist metaphysicians who, from Aristotle to Descartes, Locke or Hume, thought they could get out of the maze of words and reach a proper foundation in relying on intuitions, *sense data* or ultimate first principles, as the 1868 papers of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* were to show, whereas the pragmatic maxim formulated a few years later in 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear' was to provide the criteria for a correct analysis of *meaning* and the right method to follow so as to fix true beliefs (Tiercelin 2023, 193).

However, for Peirce, things were crystal-clear and involved no repudiation of metaphysics. Pragmatism was but a *means*, not an *end*, which, "all rubbish being swept away", was to erect a "scientific realist metaphysics", i.e., a way of handling "a series of problems capable of investigation by the observational methods of the true sciences" (CP 5.423), although distinguishable from other "species" of prope-positivism, by "its retention of a purified philosophy", by "its full acceptance of the main body of our instinctive beliefs", and by "its strenuous insistence upon the truth of scholastic realism (or a close approximation to that)" (*ibid.*). In so doing, "instead of merely jeering at metaphysics, like other prope-positivists, whether by long drawn-out parodies or otherwise, the pragmaticist extracts from it a precious essence, which will serve to give life and light to cosmology and physics. At the same time, the moral applications of the doctrine are positive and potent; and there are many other uses of it not easily classed." (*Ibid.*).

2. Now why was Peirce's program, in terms of the *pars construens,* better equipped to answer some of the challenges I

have raised concerning the possibility of a mutual reinforcement of pragmatism and metaphysics, and, by the same token, of making sense of something like metaphysical *knowledge*?

Rorty was right, I claimed, in his diagnosis of major metaphysical vices, well identified by pragmatists, among which, to try to transcend language, to sink into nominalism, another name for reductionism, to neglect vagueness. But it is often alleged too that most pragmatists favored various forms of instrumentalism (Dewey), verificationism, operationalism and nominalism ("pragmatism is always appealing to particulars", James said; *P*, 32) instead of realism, in terms of their accounts of truth, meaning, inquiry, experience or reality (Haack 1977, 378). I would like to qualify such an analysis, but most of all, to explain briefly why, however paradoxical the alliance may seem, pragmatism, in my view, *implies* realism (Tiercelin 2017b), properly conceived, namely a realism involving some *metaphysical* commitment, and why, provided this be the case, both pragmatism *and* metaphysics have the best chance to flourish (Tiercelin 2023, 198).

First, it should be noted that, even if in their most contemporary versions, many pragmatists or neo-pragmatists (Price, Kitcher, and Putnam) are reluctant to call themselves "realists" and prefer such names as "natural realists" (Putnam) and "quasi-realists" (Price) (see Tiercelin 2013), they are not keen on describing their position as straightforwardly anti-realistic or nominalistic. Even the standard supposed – though partly justified – opposition between the "nominalist" pragmatism of James *versus* Peirce's "realist" version seems farfetched[15]. So, if the real opposition between most pragmatists does not lie in the attitude towards metaphysics – despite the differences in the metaphysical agendas – not even that much on realism itself, in what does it lie? Not so much, as Peirce noted, *between* them, as regards such points that are not, at least at first sight, specifically "pragmatist": for example, what Peirce objected to Schiller (more than to James) was the "psychologization" or "humanisation" of pragmatism, mainly because of the ruthless

[15] See Haack (1977), 392-3; Hookway (2000), 292; Seigfried (1990), 267, 399n5; Rosenthal (2000), 94; Klein (2016), 17ff.; Tiercelin (2021/2023), 498.

individualism which it induces[16], exposing us to the arbitrariness and fantasies of the "literary circles" and to "sham reasoning". So, clearly, there are differences on such (still very alive) questions as: should one view philosophy as being closer to literature rather than to science? Or, on such an issue as realism, precisely, on what it *means* and *implies*: should one have a unitary, holistic view or a rather specified one? Again, granted one adopts some *scientific* realism, what form should it take: a realism about entities? about theories? Last but not least: should one consider (or not) that scientific realism commits us, straight away, to some kind of ontology or metaphysics? And assuming that such is the case, what kind of metaphysics should one then defend?

Peirce saw what the genuine issues were: "Everybody ought to be a nominalist at first", "because it is simpler than realism, and it is true that the economy of research prescribes to try the simpler one first, and to continue in that opinion until he is driven out of it by the force majeure of irreconcilable facts." (CP 4.1) He also granted that "no realist is so foolish as to maintain that *no* universal is a fiction" (as he wrote in the *New Elements of Mathematics*, NEM IV: 343). But he took the reasons for realism to be "pretty compelling" (CP 6.605). Although he had been "blinded by nominalistic preconceptions" (CP 6.103), he had "never been able to think differently on that question of realism" (CP 1.20). He called himself a "scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe" (CP 5.470), adapting the virtues of Duns Scotus's theory to the requirements of modern science. So, for him, at least, there was "a logical affinity" (CP 2.58) between pragmatism *and* realism, and we may safely add, a logical affinity between pragmatism, realism *and* a realistic scientific metaphysics, too: "Pragmaticism could hardly have entered a head, he wrote, that was not already convinced that there are real generals" (CP 5.503; Tiercelin 2023, 198).

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16 Peirce would stand closer here to Dewey, in their common stress on the ethical and social principle of logic or on the idea of the community and the collective nature of science viewed as a place for inquiry rather than as a system or doctrine. See the altruism defended in the "Doctrine of Chances" (W3, 276-289) praised by Putnam (1987), 80ff. and (1994), 160-9. On this, Tiercelin (2005), 146ff. and 173ff.

The basic tenets of Peirce's scientific and realist metaphysics

It is impossible to detail Peirce's sophisticated scientific and scholastic realistic metaphysics, but let me just sketch some of the most fruitful insights in his views, from the common standpoint of a pragmatist *and* a metaphysician, today.

1. First of all, pragmatism was introduced by Peirce *as a principle of logic*, "a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard words and abstract conceptions" (CP 5.464). Such a therapeutic value of pragmatism is priceless as applied to metaphysics, not because metaphysics is "abstract" (it is not more "abstract" than mathematics), nor "beyond the reach of human cognition" nor "inscrutable", but because "metaphysics, even bad metaphysics really rests on observations", and "upon kinds of phenomena with which every man's experience is so saturated that he usually pays no particular attention to them" (CP 6.3). Metaphysics is unavoidable, because it is "implicit", and "accompanies all our judgements (CP 1.129; 6.2), including, of course, those of the scientists. Hence, "there is no escape from the need of a critical examination of 'first [*metaphysical*] principles'" (CP 1.129; 6.4), which, incidentally, should be distinguished from *theological* principles (Tiercelin 2020), in order for metaphysics to gain its autonomy and the conditions of its possibility *as a science* (as Peirce's inspirer, Duns Scotus, contrary to Aquinas, insisted on). This is why, too, metaphysics is "a science", and a "positive" one, whose "business is merely to study the most general features of reality and real objects", for doing metaphysics does not require any special technique; one makes hypotheses (abductions), which are then tested in light of experiences anybody can have, such as "Critical Commonsensist" experiences (Tiercelin 2015, 2016), benefitting, then, from the logician's conceptual analyses, the epistemologist's *inquiries,* led in a *fallibilist* spirit and the scientist's experimentations in the laboratory (Tiercelin 2023, 199).

Such a *logical* starting point is all the more decisive as Peirce had a special approach to logic, as many Finnish philosophers have paid extensive attention to. Just a few remarks: Peirce belonged to the *semantic* tradition in logic (Boole, Schröder, Löwenheim) as opposed to the *syntactic* trend (Russell, Frege). He insisted more upon such semantic notions as truth, validity

and satisfiability of logical formulae than on syntactic notions such as demonstrability from a set of axioms or rules of inference. His treatment of the quantifiers, together with his correct definition of validity for the sentential calculus, constitute major achievements. But more importantly, within the semantic tradition, he framed a sophisticated *semiotic* approach, placing logic within the broader context of a general theory of meaning, understanding and interpretation, a theory of how signs function, which enabled him to classify different sorts of signs in a natural way and to proceed to acute observations on the relations between logic and mathematics, logic and psychology (Tiercelin 1984, 1989a, 1991a), an approach favored so as to avoid psychologism and to take account of some facts of empirical and experimental psychology (Tiercelin 1993a, 29-41), which led to a very original analysis of the logical structure of inference (the propositional content) and its assertive force. Risto Hilpinen was one of the first philosophers to show that, in so doing, apart from the intrinsic interest we may find in Peirce's structural analysis through its logical form instead of its grammatical form, in the modern interpretation he made of subject and predicate, his insistence on the superfluous character of the copula, together with the claim that the indicative mood is no part of the logical structure of the proposition, he paved the way to the criticisms addressed by those wishing to develop a deontic logic or a logic of imperatives because of the supposed original prevalence of the categorical mode (Hilpinen 1986, 194). On the other hand, by underlining the difference between the logical form and the assertion proper, and by adding that the meaning of the proposition finally lay in the act itself, Peirce stressed the need of a close association of any theory of meaning with a correct theory of speech-acts. Again, by developing the normative character of the act of assertion, involving the responsibility of the speaker and the interpreter both engaged in a game submitted to certain rules of interpretation, to certain norms and ideals, Peirce may be considered as having anticipated Hintikka's game theoretic semantics (Hilpinen 1982). There would also be a lot to say here, on the relationships between the semantic interpretation Hintikka made of the quantifiers and Peirce's pragmatic interpretation of both subjects and predicates, particularly with regard to the vagueness of the latter. But this would lead us too far into what

is no doubt one of Peirce's most interesting views about logic, namely, another important consequence of his conception of logic as a calculus, as opposed to the conception of logic as *lingua characteristica*, that is, the project he entertained of the possibility of a non-classical or triadic logic, linked with a wider program for a logic of vagueness (Tiercelin 1986, 1989a, 1991a, 1991b, 1991d, 2019).

Now, as far as the various types of logical reasonings are concerned, let me just mention that Peirce also provided an original analysis of necessary deductive reasoning as observational or experimental, involving use of diagrams or icons, in logical as well as mathematical reasoning (Tiercelin 1993c), together with the claims that deduction proceeds by construction of diagrams which are a species of icons, and is of two fundamental kinds: theorematic, which provides new surprising results, and corollarial, which largely draws obvious consequences, what Peirce called "his first real discovery" (1994b, 1995), which Hintikka also drew much attention to. Peirce's concern with iconic procedures in reasoning was indeed related to his effort to think of formal logic within a semiotic which remains sensitive to the semantic (symbolic and iconic) aspects of logic. But what is interesting is not so much his entertaining the possibility of an iconic logic, as Hintikka has shown (1980), as of having stressed the necessity of associating symbolic and iconic procedures, as can be seen through Peirce's efforts towards a graphical or algebraical presentation of formal logic. Such a wide-ranging definition of logic led Peirce to think he could conduct a "logical analysis of the products of thought", especially a thought-sign theory which could be extended to other kinds of intelligence than *human* intelligence (namely logical machines) (Tiercelin 1984), a sound account of intentionality and of the various kinds of signs involved in reasonings, themselves of various kinds (deductive, inductive, abductive) and which also entailed a normative conception of logic[17]. Peirce was no doubt on the tracks of a new formal model of the mind, which turned out to be very fruitful in contemporary discussions[18]. The list of Peirce's achievements in logic is amazing: his views on abduction, his

[17] For details, see Tiercelin (1989a), (1991a), (1993a), (1995).
[18] For details, see Tiercelin (1993a), (1994a), (1997), (2006b), (2017a).

definition of knowledge and inquiry partly in terms, like Hintikka, of a process of questions and answers (Tiercelin 2008). Thanks to his pioneering readings of the Scholastics (Paul of Venice, Ockham, and the Speculative Grammar of the modists), he also saw the fruitfulness of Scotus's treatment of modalities, thanks to which on can leave the statistic and determinist Aristotelian model by taking account, through the *consequentia simplex de inesse,* of the factor of time (*hic et nunc*) in modality[19]. The originality on these topics of Duns Scotus who breaks with the principle of plenitude and introduces a new definition of possibility and contingence has been noted by Hintikka (1981) and examined in detail by Knuuttila (1993). Such are just a few items analyzed by Peirce, and further developed for their own purposes, by the great contemporary philosophers from Finland. Last but not least, it should be noted that for Peirce, logic was crucial for metaphysics, since, just as for Aristotle or Kant, it is not only a tool for conceptual clarifications: it is in charge of drawing the right list of categories, with the help, in a further phase, of phenomenological (or what Peirce calls phaneroscopic) observations.

2. As classical and recent pragmatists and metaphysicians also came to realize, "realism" is indeed a concept requiring clarification. Peirce's lesson is huge. In search of a far-reaching solution to the classical and medieval problem of universals, he was convinced that "the most deep-rooted and crude misunderstanding [lay] in believing that the problem of universals [had] anything to do with "Platonic ideas" (CP 8.17; 1.27n1), in opposing *metaphysical realism* (or Platonism) and nominalism, or in wondering whether there *existed* universals apart from our ideas or words, while it lay in the "*fundamentum universalitatis*" (CP 6.37; 6.361), since "the real is that which is not whatever we may happen to think it, but is unaffected by what we may think of it." (CP 8.12). Peirce characterized his position in metaphysics as a "scholastic realism of a somewhat extreme stripe" (CP 5.470) and called himself "an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going much further in the direction of scholastic realism" (CP 5.77n). For such a *scholastic realist* – the sound realistic option – no universal or singular entities should be seen as *utterly* independent of

[19] See Tiercelin (1985), 244 n90, (1994a), (1999).

thought and signification: "The real is that which *signifies* something real" (CP 5.320).Thus we cannot get out of language and representation, and dream of reaching simple, ultimate elements. As early as 1868, Peirce had violently criticized any appeal to intuitions, sense-data, or foundationalisms of all kinds[20].

As a consequence, any genuine realism should be viewed, first, as *semantic*. Peirce approved the medievals, both realists and nominalists, for stressing the impossible relation of correspondence between words and things[21]. To identify being with intelligibility and predicability, means that naïve realism, according to which reality would be utterly independent of mind, is absurd. Just as any metaphysical or Platonic kind of realism (compare this with Putnam's criticism and first defense of internal realism and conceptual relativity in 1981[22]). We have a great lesson here, in terms of the metaphysical method: as metaphysicians keep saying today, we should always start by securing the *semantic level* and the meaning of our property attributions, in particular if we look for real *properties*, which are not given simply by the *meaning* of our predicates, and defend, as I think we should, the reality of *dispositional* properties, which was also part of Peirce's aim in formulating the pragmatic maxim. Indeed, any correct account of the role and nature of dispositions should begin with a semantic analysis of dispositional *predicates*, as such a strong defender of dispositions as D.H. Mellor, for example, reminded us in his paper "A Defense of Dispositions" (1974), reprinted in Raimo Tuomela's anthology, *Dispositions* (1978), and should explain why the reduction of dispositional ascriptions to conditionals does not seem to work (due, e.g., to finkish or antidote cases), or why reduction sentences may not tell us 'all' that dispositional predicates mean. As Peirce insisted on, a disposition is, by essence, irreducibly general and indeterminate, and cannot be reduced to the mere conjunction of its occurrences.

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20 On this, see Tiercelin (1986), (1992), and in the same volume, Haack (1992), 22-23.

21 See Tiercelin (1993a), (1999), (2006b), in particular.

22 For a detailed analyzed (and evaluation) of Putnam's and Peirce's respective versions, see Tiercelin (2002a), in particular, chaps. 1 and 2.

3. But we have here a third great lesson for contemporary metaphysics. For now we have to prove that the logical principles are not only "regulatively valid" but may be taken as "truths of being" (CP 1.487). No "linguistic turn" without an "experientialist turn", so to speak. The discoveries of science, only, can tell whether there are *real laws* and not mere accidental uniformities. Pragmatism, Peirce claims, yields the acceptable connection: "The question of realism and nominalism… means the question how far real facts are analogous to logical relations, and why" (CP 4.68). Following the Scotistic inheritance and adapting it to the requirements of modern science, it can be shown that "science has always been at heart realistic and always must be" (CP 1.20). Hence, scholastic realism turns into a piece of *scientific metaphysics* (Haack 1992, 24). It operates like a high-level *abductive* hypothesis, as scientific realists often claim today, and Ilkka Niiniluoto would probably concur with Peirce and me on this: it is not a pure *a priori* choice or a matter of taste; rather, it is "required to explain how science is possible" (CP 1.20; 5.423), for science seeks to *explain* and not merely d*escribe* natural phenomena, which it can do only, obeying the "no miracles argument", if there are *real laws* to be discovered; which, in turn, requires that there be real kinds of things (or universals) in the world (CP 4.1) (Haack 1992, 25). In pragmatist terms, it involves the evolution of the pragmatic maxim meant in 1878 to give the grounds of the method to be followed in *science* in order to determine the truth of a given proposition, from an indicative (and material or Philonian) interpretation of the conditional (with its operational and verificationist accents) to a subjunctive reading, expressing a law of nature "as real and as having a kind of *esse in futuro*" (CP 5.48), thus forbidding the reduction of any statement of the maxim to singular or discrete events (nominalism). Universals are not mere creations of the mind, but real *active operative principles in nature*, tendencies, *dispositions* to behave, habits, "*would be*" (CP 8.208), describable in general terms (Tiercelin 1986, 1992). Peirce's scientific realism is assumed by *dispositional realism*[23].

4. However in order to reach intelligibility, a fourth step is needed. *Scientific realism* must take a *metaphysical* turn and

[23] For more details, see Tiercelin (1986), (1992), (2017b), (2023), 199-200.

assume real *metaphysical possibilia*. Realism well-conceived involves an irreducible indeterminacy, at both ends, of the knowing *as inquiry* process, under both forms of vagueness and generality: our tendency to generalize and to take habits is real, but vagueness too is real, *namely* the element of possibility, spontaneity or randomness which lies at the bottom of habit and cannot be reified (Peirce's name for tychism, *namely* the view that "absolute chance is a factor of the universe" (6.201). Hence, any sound realism must be defined as an anti-reductionist realism of the indeterminate on the three logical, epistemological *and* ontological levels (CP 5.312; 6.348; 5.425). The type of entities Peirce had in mind when he referred to real "*possibilia*", "*would-be*", or "dispositions", were crucially linked to his habitual or "dispositional" conception of essence, the needed adaptation, he thought, of Scotistic ideas to modern science. As I have shown in detail, this provides us with all the ingredients for a nice program, along dispositional realistic lines, within a pragmaticist framework[24].

The possibility of metaphysical knowledge: Peirce's legacy

How and why does such a reciprocal relation between Peirce's pragmaticism and metaphysics help us to face the Integration Challenge, to resist deflationist positivistic or Heideggerian tendencies, as well as Humean, Kantian or Lewisian forms of skepticism, and to fill the gap between our epistemology and our metaphysics?

From the *epistemological side* of the challenge, the fruitful analyses of the pragmatists, first of all of Peirce, then of such philosophers as Ramsey, Isaac Levi, Putnam and of some of the Finnish colleagues I have mentioned previously, about such crucial concepts as "science", "knowledge", inquiry, the distinction between "scientific" and "scientistic", the focus on fallibilism, on the various modes of logic, inference, probability, truth, belief, and, more generally, the types of beliefs,

[24] See in particular Tiercelin (2011a/2023), chapter 4; Tiercelin (2023), 200. In that sense, Peirce's metaphysics (despite many links with Aristotle, Tiercelin 2004b) cannot be viewed as following the neo-Aristotelian inspiration which often guides several contemporary Finnish metaphysicians (see for ex. Tahko 2011). A theme I cannot develop within the scope of this paper.

"truths" and justifications we are dealing with in metaphysics, are a great contribution. Are they beliefs whose truth stems from common sense? Scientifically established truths, contrary to the "manifest image" reflected by the world? Or beliefs of a really different nature? What reasons, what justifications are there for keeping such beliefs, for favoring such and such theory of truth, for judging the knowledge of the things that it reveals as merely conceivable, or possible, or even necessary? Are our metaphysical *doubts* mere *paper* doubts, nonsensical or justified?[25]

From the *metaphysical* side, the pragmatist lesson is also priceless: metaphysical knowledge is possible, provided we are not obsessed by the search for eternal, universal, overarching truths, but seek to understand our relationship with the *real* – which can only be done by starting off from where we are, and not from "nowhere" through the following steps (Tiercelin 2011b): first, in the "therapeutic" phase, adopt a formal logical and aprioristic framework of conceptual analysis, examine the conditions of possibility – in terms of truth and meaning – of the concepts we use, so as to make the necessary modal distinctions and proceed to the continuous critical massaging of our folk (or "commonsensical") intuitions (as recommended by Frank Jackson 1998); second, metaphysics being in continuity with science, reflect on the way in which our categories and judgments constitute a genuine *knowledge*, within the framework of a basically pragmatist, realistic and fallibilist strategy, in which knowledge is not so much viewed *as inquiry* as integrating some of its aspects, and as aiming at the fixation of true beliefs (Tiercelin 2005/2016, conclusion): hence, trust the *a posteriori* results of science, so as to avoid any "armchair" metaphysics, without indulging into a full-blown naturalized or scientistic metaphysics; determine also whether and why, for example, scientific theories are true, or can be viewed as *justified true beliefs*. But never forget, as E.J. Lowe recommended, that, even if metaphysics cannot determine what is actual without the help of empirical research, so that a delimitation of the space of possibilities is required, "metaphysical possibility is an inescapable determinant of actuality": "Empirical

[25] Tiercelin (2005/2016), conclusion, (2008), (2011b), (2014). See Tiercelin (2023), 200.

science at most tells us what *is* the case, not what *must* or *may* be (but happens not to be) the case. Metaphysics deals in *possibilities*. And only if we can delimit the scope of the possible, can we hope to determine empirically what is actual. This is why empirical science is dependent upon metaphysics and cannot usurp the latter's proper role."[26] It is a lesson we have also learned from the emphasis some great Finnish philosophers have put on modalities. Third, determine whether, and in what sense, the categories of our thinking and our language are not mere "functions of judgment", as Kant believed, but the mirror, well and truly, of the categories of *reality*. And finally, examine the type of *reality* such theories are talking about, the nature of the actual (i.e., categorical or dispositional) properties constituting it, the causal and nomic relations between them, and what is necessary to guarantee the unity, in short, "the cement" of things[27]. Now, we start to understand why such a metaphysical and realistic commitment is not only possible but desirable: indeed, if the founder of pragmatism thought the problem of universals was "as pressing today as ever it was" (something Russell praised him to have seen), and constituted a real alternative (see W2: 486-487), it was because, finally, for a pragmatist, ethics is primary[28]; and if ethics, from a pragmatist standpoint, is also mostly viewed as an *education* of our moral capacities and dispositions which have more to do with moral *perceptions* than with either some *a priori* faculty, moral sense, or normative prescriptions we should follow (Tiercelin 2005a/2016, 204ff), then there is an obligation for the pragmatist, namely, to find a solid basis for a correct account of how our *perceptions* relate us to the *real* world. And this may explain why, from the beginning, Peirce thought the only way to have one's ideas clear about this was to try and find out a correct account of *reality* itself (which incidentally was the motivation for his search into truth, and not the other way round) and to opt for a *realist* position in what he thought was the major point that had to be settled, if one wanted to make any

[26] Lowe (1998), 5, 9 and 16. See Tiercelin (2023), 200-201.
[27] Tiercelin (2011a/2023), (2011b). Tiercelin (2023), 202.
[28] This is a theme I have analyzed in several places. See Tiercelin (1993a), (1994c), (1997), (2002b), (2014), (2015).

progress at all (and not a "pseudo-problem", as Putnam 2004 came to think)[29].

Thanks to the pragmatists, and to Peirce in particular, we know better too why metaphysics should remain *experimental*, in touch with the laboratory, which implies the exact opposite both of a literary (or theological) attitude and of a scientistic or dogmatic stance. We should less try and reach a *systematic* or *dogmatic* metaphysics than solve special metaphysical issues and adopt a Critical Commonsensist and fallibilist position (Tiercelin 2016), even if it may bring us close, at times, to skepticism (NEM IV: 343-344; 8.43). For "it is certainly conceivable that this world which we call the real world is not perfectly real but that there are things similarly indeterminate. We cannot be sure that it is not so." (CP 4.61) However: "Every attempt to understand anything – every research – supposes, or at least hopes, that the very objects of study themselves are subject to a logic more or less identical with that which we employ" (CP 6.189). Hence, even if the path is rather narrow, it is possible to overcome metaphysical humility and to promote a reasoned form of metaphysical boldness. Provided such an undertaking is done in the spirit beautifully described by the Logician of Milford:

> My philosophy may be described as the attempt of a physicist to make such conjecture as to the constitution of the universe as the methods of science may permit, with the aid of all that has been done by previous philosophers. I shall support my propositions by such arguments as I can. Demonstrative proof is not to be thought of. The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine. The best that can be done is to supply a hypothesis, not devoid of all likelihood, in the general line of growth of scientific ideas, and capable of being verified or refuted by future observers. (1.7)

Who could dream of a better way for a pragmatist metaphysician to block moral scepticism? A wish, a hope, I am sure most of us, not only as pragmatists, but as philosophers, would all agree upon.

Collège de France

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[29] See Tiercelin (2006a), (2023), 202.

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Philosophy and Local Thinking

CORRADO CLAVERINI

1. Introduction. Can there be Finnish philosophy?

In the present, globalized age, there are a series of particularly relevant issues connected to the possibility of identifying different national philosophical traditions, each with specific characteristics. The reason is easy to guess: among other things, globalization is a process that is leading to progressive cultural homogenization and a reduction of diversity, at multiple levels, first of all the linguistic one (Eberhard, Simons and Fennig 2023). Some have even spoken of the globalization of philosophy itself (Berti 2014; Ferraris 2012; Searle 2008), as research issues and topics are increasingly interconnected and concern the whole world. While on one hand increasing international collaboration is a positive, indeed these days inescapable factor, on the other hand the progressive reduction of philosophical cultures to a single world culture is an element that has led various scholars to ponder whether a thinking that is "local," open to the other and not chauvinistic, is possible.

Nevertheless, such a possibility harbors many perils. First of all, as Friedrich Schelling quite rightly wrote in the essay *On National Differences in Philosophy*, "[t]he truly universal philosophy cannot possibly be the property of a single nation, and as long as any philosophy does not go beyond the borders of a single people one can be safe in assuming that it is not yet the true philosophy, even if it is perhaps on the way to it" (Schelling 1994, 190). Second, the notion of "local thinking" could imply nationalistic tendencies (Badiou 2012) which are ill-suited to philosophy's universalistic vocation. In short, it has to do with a question that has traversed the whole history of philosophy, the question concerning the problematic relationship between universality and particularity on one hand, and

cosmopolitanism and national sentiment on the other. This question has been tackled in Finland too, by scholars such as Tere Vadén who in a recent contribution asked: "What is 'local thinking'"? and – more precisely – "can there be Finnish philosophy"? And, provided that it can exist, we might ask, "'what is Finnish philosophy'? and take the question to mean Finnish philosophy in the sense of unique and unrepeatable thought" (Vadén 2006, 219).

As we shall see, this topic has also been dealt with, *mutatis mutandis*, by many other authors from different philosophical cultures. The aim of this paper is to analyze the concept of "local thinking" and to show how it enables us to think of philosophical universality in a concrete manner, that is, not as "universalism of the *Logos*" (Diagne 2019, 20) which implies the erasure of all peculiarities, but as a universalism that we could define as "of complexity" or "of differences," in a similar sense to that of the "lateral universal" spoken of by Maurice Merleau-Ponty.[1]

2. Adjectival or non-adjectival philosophy?

In Italy, there has been a particularly lively debate on the existence of a specific Italian philosophy, with distinct and somehow unique features if compared to other traditions of thought. There are some – such as Benedetto Croce – who upheld that "there is neither German nor Italian philosophy, but only non-adjectival philosophy, solely in whose name one should speak to Italians, Germans and every other people and individual" (Croce 1943, 313, own translation). In short, for Croce there is no reason to make a distinction between

[1] "The equipment of our social being can be dismantled and reconstructed by the voyage, as we are able to learn to speak other languages. This provides a second way to the universal: no longer the overarching universal of a strictly objective method, but a sort of lateral universal which we acquire through ethnological experience and its incessant testing of the self through the other person and the other person through the self. It is a question of constructing a general system of reference in which the point of view of the native, the point of view of the civilized man, and the mistaken views each has of the other can all find a place—that is, of constituting a more comprehensive experience which becomes in principle accessible to men of a different time and country" (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 119–120).

different national philosophical traditions, by allocating each one particular distinctive traits. And there is more: in his view, "the concept of 'national' philosophy or the 'nationality' of philosophy is (to put it bluntly) one of those which should be banished once and for all from the field of science" (Croce 1919, 5, own translation). In sum, "every genuine philosopher's soul feels communion with the philosophers of all times and peoples: at times more with some, at times more with others, but without the rhythm of this varying interest being in any way related to philosophers' purportedly greater or lesser national character" (Croce 1919, 6, own translation).

A long time before Croce, Augusto Vera and his pupil Raffaele Mariano defended – in a different theoretical picture – an in some ways similar thesis. Mariano leveled particular criticism against supporters of the national character of philosophy in the book *La philosophie contemporaine en Italie* (Mariano 1868). His position is clearly and concisely expressed in the motto "la vérité d'abord, le patriotisme après" (truth first, patriotism second) (Mariano 1968, 156). The levels of truth and nationality are irreconcilable. In other words, philosophy and politics belong to different dimensions. As already mentioned, the debate on these topics in Italy has been quite heated, with some opposing – referring to Vera and Mariano – positions of this type. One opponent was Bertrando Spaventa, who expressed himself thus:

> Besides, I am well aware that some say: 'What does Italian and non-Italian philosophy matter to us? We want the truth; and the truth has nothing to do with nationality.' Of course, truth transcends nationality; but without nationality, it is an abstraction. *Transplant* the truth as much as you will; if it has no correspondence with our national spirit, it will be truth for itself, but not for us; for us it will always be a dead thing (Spaventa 1908, 242, own translation).

So, there are two positions at play: on one hand, there are the supporters of a "non-adjectival," that is, single Philosophy – with no geographical connotation – and on the other, a knowledge which – without renouncing its universalistic vocation – does not deny its historical origin. But how can philosophy and history, universality and particularity, boundaryless thinking and "local thinking" be held together? The answer is

provided by Eugenio Garin who explains how the bond between philosophy and history is inseparable and, therefore, one can speak of that which today one would call "local thinking" without undermining the universal value of philosophical thought:

> The first difficulty that derives from the assumed antinomy between the 'universality' of philosophy and the 'particularity' of a national thought has lost a lot of its intensity as we have come to discover gradually the proper and different significance of the philosophical inquiry, and its essential connection with a specific period of time. If on one hand it may be said, to a point, that there is no *Chinese*, *Indian*, or *Greek* mathematics, but simply *mathematics*, on the other hand we have also seen an increasing evidence that philosophies, or the complex of conceptual elaborations called by that name, have a precise connection with definite historical situations, with conditions and limits actually determined or determinable. If ideas are not, and indeed they are not, born by parthenogenesis, and the philosophical discourse is always, using a Platonic expression, 'an illegitimate discourse,' the historical reality of philosophizing will always assume an implicit relation to specific situations within space-time dimensions (Garin 2008, liii).

In other words, the particular origin of an idea in no way compromises its universal validity. The bond between philosophy and history is undeniable. To sever it would be to think abstractly as if ideas were indeed born by parthenogenesis. Far from being situated, one might say, at a level *sub specie aeternitatis*, ideas are determined historically. Therefore, to speak of an Italian, French, or – like the contributions in this volume – Finnish philosophy would be to recognize the ineliminable nexus between thought and history. As rightly observed by Giovanni Gentile, "those same philosophers, whom no historian would think of denying a broad place in a universal history, Plato, for example, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, if they are to be specifically intended in their thought, when studied in their mentality which is their culture, all link back to the history of the culture of the respective countries to which they belong" (Gentile 1963, 7, own translation). Having clarified how to hold together philosophy and history, universal and "local" thinking, we now need to reckon with the forever

looming danger of the "closed, chauvinistic type of localism" (Vadén 2006, 227).

3. The danger of nationalism

Locality compatible with what Merleau-Ponty calls "lateral universal" or which I defined in the first paragraph as a "universalism of differences" is an open locality. What does this mean? It is explained well once again by Vadén in his essay on the possibility of a specific Finnish philosophy:

> Open locality needs the impurity, heterogeneity and non-foundationality of experiences, which, in its turn, means that there is no absolute hierarchy amongst experiences. In want of a better word, this view might be called democracy of experiences. … Open locality means that all experiences and all areas are questionable, can be criticized, changed, at least in principle (Vadén 2006, 230).

At a safe distance from a "closed locality" and so-called "ontological nationalism" (Lefebvre 1990, 170), "local thinking" compatible with universalism of differences is an impure type of thought that is open to contamination. Besides, as well written by Jacques Derrida, "philosophy does not have one sole memory. Under its Greek name and in its European memory, it has always been bastard, hybrid, grafted, multilinear, and polyglot" (Derrida 2002, 10). At a more general level – as one reads in the text *In Praise of the Mêlée* by Jean-Luc Nancy – "every culture is in itself 'multicultural,' not only because there is a prior acculturation or because there is no pure and simple provenance, but more importantly because the gesture of culture is itself a gesture of *mêlée*: of confrontation, transformation, deviation, development, re-composition, combination, cobbling together" (Nancy 2003, 283).

The history of philosophy is a history of encounters and clashes, a not always symmetrical and pacific dialogue between traditions of thought. The same Finnish philosophy "has not, in the main, been developed towards uniqueness, but rather been colonized by and made one with a series of invading cultures – German, Baltic, Swedish, Russian and American" (Vadén 2006, 221). In short, the "Finnish experience, like any 'ethnic' experience, has been and is impure and

conflictual. Nevertheless, such impurity does not justify the Western destruction or colonization" (Vadén 2006, 231). This is true for a great many other philosophical cultures, so much so that some have spoken of a "*negative or entangled history of European philosophy*" (Elberfeld 2021, 14).The perspective of an "entangled" history of philosophy is one of the most interesting from which to endorse the concept of "open locality" at the global level. It can allow light to be cast both on the differences among the various philosophical traditions, each with its own specific and distinctive characteristics, and on their constant mutual hybridization, without such contaminations leading to a leveling out – which is the risk of globalization – of the manifold cultures.

4. A history of entanglements

There is nothing new in the concept of history of philosophy from a global perspective. There are research projects, still ongoing, such as the one headed by Rolf Elberfeld at the University of Hildesheim, that is creating a database of all the global histories of philosophy published to date in different languages (mainly in English and Japanese, but also in German, Russian, Spanish, Italian and French) (Elberfeld n.d.). These publications can be credited with narrating the history of thought from a non-Eurocentric point of view, including chapters on philosophical cultures traditionally considered minoritarian. Consider, for example, the text by Maija Kule, published for the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP), organizer of the World Congresses of Philosophy (Pozzo 2021; Berti 2014; Elberfeld 2009; Agazzi 2003). This history analyses a broad number of philosophical traditions, including the Finnish one, dealt with in a chapter written by Ilkka Niiniluoto (2007). Picking up topics already dealt with elsewhere (Niiniluoto 2003), the chapter does not fail to mention Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806–1881), traditionally considered Finland's "national philosopher," and his statue opposite the Bank of Finland. The other chapters cover, on one hand, philosophical thought in Canada, the Baltic states, Italy, Greece, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, China, Vietnam and Korea, and on the other, American, Czech, Croatian, Iranian and Australian philosophy.

Another interesting history of global philosophy in 11 volumes – published in Italy and edited by Mario Dal Pra – devotes much space to Indian philosophy and Chinese and East Asian philosophy. Once again, it is worth pointing out the inclusion of a chapter on Finnish philosophical culture (Pozzo 1998) and pages on many other European and non-European traditions. As said, the merit of these global histories of philosophy is that they cover inheritances of thought often left in the shade by the most fashionable historiographical trends. But it must also be said that these histories do not place enough emphasis on the hybrid nature of philosophical cultures, as if they were lacking all contact with the outside. Indeed, a truly global history of philosophy should not just cast light on the speculative contribution of each culture, but also on their constant entanglement and influence on each other. This is why some have proposed a rereading of the history of thought through the filter of the "migration of ideas" (Sweet 2012; Scazzieri and Simili 2008) and of that process – known as "translatio studiorum" – which consists of the "passage of civilization and culture from one geographic, political, and linguistic context to another, in order to prevent inheritances from going astray" (Gregory 2012, 6). Among the perspectives to mention that fruitfully integrate a global and non-Eurocentric approach to research with the concept of "translatio studiorum" is that of Bachir Diagne, who has proposed pluralizing the history of philosophy and the migration paths of ideas, by including the African continent – and in particular Timbuktu – in the age-old process of the world circulation of knowledge:

> The history of Timbuktu ... reminds us that the *translatio studii* as the transfer and translation of Greek philosophy and sciences was not a single linear path from Athens to Rome and from Rome to Latin Christian Europe. Instead, the *translatio* also followed trajectories that led from Athens to Baghdad, to Córdoba, to Kairouan, to Fez, and to Timbuktu. So the history of Timbuktu tells us that the Sahara was not a wall separating the northern Mediterranean regions of the continent from what Hegel called 'Africa proper.' It was a space of conjunction crossed by many trans-Saharan routes, and Timbuktu was one of the main destinations. From southern Spain, the Maghreb, and the Middle East, all manner of goods, books, scholars, paper, and ideas flowed to Timbuktu. From Timbuktu to the rest of the Muslim world, goods

> and enslaved or free peoples, including scholars, students, and pilgrims, traveled. Like other places in the Sudan, Timbuktu was an intellectual center where scholars taught and wrote in Arabic and sometimes in other African languages using the Arabic script: texts on art, medicine, sciences, philosophy, theology, Sufism, jurisprudence, etc. (Diagne 2020, 256–258).

Diagne's line of research has inspired some studies on African philosophy, which, as said, is considered not a static heritage of thought, but a plural tradition which has followed multiple paths over the centuries:

> The continuation of human heritage through appropriation reveals the existence of multiple paths of philosophy. These paths also reveal that Africa has taken part in the production and circulation of knowledge, philosophy and science. It contributes to the pluralization of the history of thought in African universities in Lubumbashi, Kinshasa, Dakar, Tunis, Lagos, Brazzaville, Libreville, Addis Abeba, Nairobi, Dar Salam, Johannesburg, Lomé, Cotonou, etc., where it gives the lie to the Heideggerian ontological nationalism which posits Western exceptionalism (Banywesize Mukambilwa 2020, 12).

In short, the only way to decolonize the history of philosophy (Diagne 2018) is through its pluralization and by considering ideas "the most migratory things in the world" (Lovejoy 1940, 4). This way of analyzing philosophical thought in Africa can also be fruitfully applied to other traditions. Indeed, by conceiving of space as a "contact zone" (Pratt 1992), that is, as an area that is "open, multiple and relational, unfinished and always becoming" (Massey 2005, 59), and rereading the global history of cultures through the lens of "translatio studiorum," we can speak of "local thinking" with reference to philosophies from all over the world and not only, as Vadén does, to the Finnish strain.

5. Conclusion

To go back to the initial question, one can conclude by affirming that Finnish philosophy not only exists, but that it has its own history and distinct features that make it a unique tradition. Indeed, it is no coincidence that some global histories of philosophy dedicate specific chapters to Finnish philosophy,

as we have seen. All of this slots into the increasingly widespread need for "new narratives" (Mercer 2020; Shapiro 2016) that can give a more accurate report of the history of philosophy through a global, non-Eurocentric perspective (Graneß and Elberfeld 2021; Elberfeld 2020; Elberfeld 2017) that is more inclusive and open to traditions wrongly deemed "minoritarian" or "provincial." Against such a background, the concept of "open locality" and "universalism of differences" can be held together in a direction that Enrique Dussel also suggests following in the educational field and, in particular, when planning university courses:

> We must lay the pedagogical foundations by educating future generations in multiple philosophical traditions. For example, in the first semester in the history of philosophy in our universities at the undergraduate level, we should begin with the study of the 'First Great Philosophers of Humanity' – the thinkers who developed the original categories of philosophical thinking in Egypt (Africa), Mesopotamia (including the prophets of Israel), Greece, India, China, Meso-America or the Incas. In the second semester we should continue with study of the 'Great Ontologies,' including Taoism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, the Greeks (such as Plato, Aristotle and up to Plotinus), the Romans, etc. A third course should explore later stages of philosophical development in China (beginning with the founding of the Han Empire), later examples of Buddhist and Indian philosophy, Byzantine Christian philosophy, Arab philosophy, the medieval European philosophy and so on. *This is how a new generation can begin to think philosophically from within a global mindset*. The same approach should be reflected in the courses specializing in ethics, politics, ontology, anthropology and even logic (should not we have some notion of Buddhist logic as well?) (Dussel 2009, 511).

There is more: according to Dussel, an inter-philosophical dialogue "oriented towards a *pluriversal future global philosophy*" (Dussel 2009, 514) is needed today more than ever. In short, a perspective is needed that allows "local thinking" to be held together with the universalistic vocation of philosophy in the sense – it is worth repeating – of Merleau-Ponty's "lateral universal" or, if one so prefers, of "*trans*-modern *pluriversality*" (Dussel 2012, 50). Only in this context can we – indeed should

we – speak of a specifically Finnish philosophy or of any other form of local knowledge.

The University of Salento
Translated from the Italian by Karen Whittle

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Early Finnish Philosophy

Logic in the Age of Stagnation

TUOMO AHO

As we all know, the Finnish university was founded in Turku in 1640. Then there were eleven professors, and two of them were philosophers – theoretical and practical. Already from the first statutes onwards it has always been the case that logic, or alternatively dialectic, has officially belonged under the professorship of theoretical philosophy.

Let us first recall the typical form of an academic publication in those days. It was a dissertation essay published in the name of a respondent, but usually written by the praeses, that is, the professor. The respondent had to defend it in a public examination, showing that he had understood the subject well, was able to answer questions and objections, and could discuss in Latin. Sometimes the respondent had really written the text, but this can be decided only by close analysis, if at all. Even complete textbooks could appear in this framework as long series of dissertations.

The first period of Finnish philosophy coincides more or less with the seventeenth century. This period contains three undoubtedly competent professors: Nicolaus Nycopensis, Andreas Thuronius, and Jacobus Flachsenius. They all happened to be especially interested in logic and wanted to study it systematically. Roughly speaking, Nycopensis was a Ramist, whereas Thuronius and Flachsenius returned to the neo-Aristotelian style.[1] Logic was then an obligatory and big part of studies, and it remained always as a part of lecture programs. Something had survived from the medieval curriculum where good logic was seen as the foundation of all learning – even if the level of logic was now hopelessly inferior compared to late

[1] For some explanations of this important distinction, see Lounela 1978, ch. 1.3, Capozzi & Romaglia 2009, 82–85.

Middle Ages. The professors in Turku shared this view, and Thuronius and Flachsenius even wrote huge textbooks, where they wished to achieve a comprehensive and conservative presentation of the whole field of logic, as it was seen in Lutheran universities.

There was nothing genuinely original in their works, and they borrowed much directly from well-known German logicians like Timpler, Theodoricus and Scheibler. In any case, Turku was then well comparable to any minor German Protestant university. The main products of this first period are the systematic textbooks of Thuronius and Flachsenius plus also the logical section in the encyclopaedic volume of bishop Johan Gezelius senior. In 1679, Flachsenius moved to the theological faculty, and his successor Simon Tålpo was apparently not so interested in logic. His chief achievement was a shorter and more elementary textbook abridged from the works of his predecessors, with biblical passages added as illustrative examples.

There exists even a monograph about this first period of logic: *Die Logik im XVII. Jahrhundert in Finnland* by Jaakko Lounela. This book is somewhat old-fashioned but contains a lot of information.[2] But as far as I know, there is nothing similar about the following period. So, I will now attempt to say something about that era. I am going to call it "the age of stagnation in logic"; the reasons will probably appear.

After Tålpo, the first comparatively successful period of logic withered away. His successor Gabriel Juslenius, who was officially professor in 1702–1713, wrote nothing about logic, even if his erudite *De distinctione* (1705) might be placed into the "philosophy of logic".[3] Soon a decisive turn in the whole Swedish society came because of external reasons. King Charles was involved in the Great Northern War, which was disastrous. The whole of Finland was occupied by Russian troops in 1713. Academic staff fled to Sweden and all education was

[2] Lounela's special merit is his careful examination of the sources of passages in Finnish books. Naturally I cannot now attempt any similar large-scale projects in this short paper.

[3] A striking feature in this work is Juslenius's numerous references to scholastics. In this respect he was the last for centuries.

stopped. When peace at last came and the university could reopen after nine years, everything had changed in the kingdom. The country was no longer an absolute monarchy, but it was governed by four estates under the leadership of nobility. Bureaucracy and politics, especially the battle between the two parties, the Hats and the Caps, was felt everywhere, even in academy. The church was no longer as orthodoxly monolithic as before, though it was jealous of its cultural leadership. Moreover, the eighteenth century is often called "the age of utility". It means that diverse things were introduced as somehow useful, though it was often more like ideological pathos without actual basis.

All these phenomena had their influence in the Academy of Turku, which had now completely new staff, new students and new textbooks. Also, a new attitude concerning the nature of studies and sciences and their mutual order manifested itself.[4] Philosophy still remained an esteemed subject, but *logic* in particular was regarded as a less important part of it, something that belonged to the whole as a necessary requisite but did not offer anything particularly interesting to consider. It was no longer the foundation of sciences but rather a formal device of expression. So, we can also see that the teaching of logic diminished clearly during the eighteenth century; there were no longer any detailed two-year courses but only a superficial introductory course. Yet it is worth mentioning that in Turku logic was never completely abolished, as it was at Uppsala for a while. There were some logical lectures, students wrote pro exercitio -exams about logic, and occasionally professors discussed logical subjects in their dissertations.

I try to say something about the contents of these dissertations. (No logical textbooks were published anymore.)

But perhaps it is simplest to begin just by listing the professors.

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[4] The situation in the revived Academy of Turku is best described in Klinge 1987.

Professors of theoretical philosophy[5]

1722–1735 Johan Haartman (1682–1737)

1735–1737 Johan Wallenius (1698–1746)

1738–1744 Johan Welin (1705–1744)

(1738–1755 ass. prof. Gabriel Heinricius (1710–1785))

1746–1767 Carl Mesterton (1715–1773)

1767–1770 Jacob Haartman (1717–1788)

1770–1779 Wilhelm Nääf (1720–1783)

1779–1804 Olof Schalberg (1733–1804)

1805–1812 Anders Johan Lagus (1775–1831)

(1802–1809 doc. Gabriel Israel Hartman (1776–1809))

1814–1821 Gabriel Palander (1774–1821)

We can next attempt to survey the logical works of these philosophers. The first professor of theoretical philosophy at the new Academy of Turku was Johan *Haartman*. He was definitely not a logician, but as a serious and many-sided philosopher he was interested also in logic. Thus, two of his dissertations are about logic. The first of them (Haartman 1724) gives somewhat vague support to a correspondence-theoretic definition of truth. He calls it "conformity" and lists a number of earlier philosophers to support it. Obviously, he has a strong conviction here, though hardly any novel ideas. According to him, the noble purpose of thought is truth, and the method to proceed towards truth is logic. Conversely, the good, or *finis*, of logic is truth. Hereby Haartman adopts a realist view logic. In his *Convictio logica* (1734) he points out that logical errors are often results of obscure or incorrect language. If we eliminate all such faults stemming from language, logical results will improve, and we are going to see that the classical logic is ultimately very good. Haartman mentions also Wolff's logical

[5] The philosophical careers of Johan Haartman, Wallenius, Mesterton, Jacob Haartman and Nääf were all cut short because they got better posts in the theological faculty.

works. This is the first appearance of Wolffian logic in Finland, though Haartman does not enter into it more thoroughly.

Interestingly, Haartman refers frequently to older sixteenth century logicians, like Schegk. Afterwards, such references disappear completely. Haartman also likes to quote Roman authors, especially Cicero, but even Lactantius and company. He was clearly a learned and capable person who was also competent and diligent as a teacher, even if he had no special ambitions in logic.

After a while, Johan *Welin* became a professor. But he was on leave and absent abroad almost the whole of his term, until he died accidentally in a fire at Paris in 1744.[6] So his promising career was interrupted in that way, though he was evidently an ingenious and careful philosopher. Welin did not teach logic, and only one of his treatises is actually logical, *De nexu et connubio logicae cum mathesi*. It has an interesting background. Some Germans, like Andreas Rüdiger, had claimed that mathematical and logical reasoning are radically different: mathematical notions are based on some ideas of magnitude, and such ideas must be ultimately sensible. Thus, Rüdiger anticipates Kant's notorious doctrines. Christian Wolff had opposed him, with arguments which are basically Leibnizian: mathematical thought can use sensible ideas, but they are heuristic – the actual proof itself must be purely deductive.[7] Welin agrees with "celeberrimus Wolffius", arguing that all analytic truths "can be acquired from definitions". Strictly speaking, his treatise is not original, but it proceeds very clearly and reasonably, even adding some clarifying applications of his own. Moreover, this dissertation is remarkable because of its subject. Similar questions reappeared only in the age of modern logic in the twentieth century.

Already the only logical work of Johan *Wallenius*, *De definitione*, was nothing but a list of some of Wolff's central concepts, and thereafter Welin rooted Wolffianism to Finland. He gave philosophy here its special Wolffian label, though he got no opportunity to develop it further. It was also Welin's merit that Gabriel *Heinricius* became a docent whose speciality was to

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[6] Because of his adventurous life, also a detailed monograph has been devoted to Welin (Siukonen 2006).

[7] Concerning this debate, see Capozzi & Roncaglia 2009, 124–128.

lecture elementary courses in logic. They were praised as good, and probably they were the route by which Wolffian logic first fastened its position at the Academy of Turku. Heinricius wrote also the first Finnish dissertations about probability and inductive inference (Heinricius 1746).

Welin's successor as professor was Carl *Mesterton*. He is known as the central figure of Finnish Wolffianism. Mesterton stayed in his office for twenty years, and certainly he was qualified for it, but according to Rein (1908, 184) he was a dry and uninspiring teacher. He borrowed most of his lectures directly from German Wolffian textbooks of which there was a good supply then. He was never particularly interested in logic. One of his small writings (Mesterton 1763) was indeed called logical, but actually it included not so much logic as a set of ontological axioms. Among dissertations there is, however, one which is connected to logic: *De notione existentiae* (1749). It expounds basic definitions, following closely German sources.

Thereafter philosophy followed faithfully the line of Wolff and Mesterton, though without a slightest original idea. So, we see that logic was in a very bad shape in those days. (However, it must still be observed that logic was never officially suppressed – it only did not interest anyone.) This was unfortunately a period when also all other branches of philosophy declined in Turku as well. One person who helped in the survival of philosophy was Henrik *Hassel* (1700–1776), who served as a professor of eloquence (that is, Latin) for nearly fifty years. He was a popular teacher who often lectured also about more or less philosophical classical subjects, with Cicero as his favourite. He differs from many of his colleagues in that he did not like any speculative systems, like Mesterton's Wolffianism.

None of Hassel's numerous dissertations are about logic, except the early *De criterio veritatis* (1736), if it is not by the respondent. There he defends the correspondence-theoretical definition of truth as "consensus". However, his teaching can have had some influence in logic. As he opposed systematics in general, so he disapproved classical logic as well. For already in his youth, when he was studying at Uppsala, he had come to the conclusion that classical logic was complicated and full of useless obscurities. In its stead, he discovered the Port-

Royal logic and recommended it as a commonsensical modern way to get rid of subtleties (though it was already almost a hundred years old). It is not known whether this initiative had any actual impact in Finland.

I would say that the absolute *bottom* of Finnish logic is situated in the forty years 1760–1800. Then there was little philosophy altogether, and logic in particular was neglected. Heinricius had retired and Mesterton did not care about logic, but the next professors did not make the matter at least any better. First, Jacob *Haartman* (a son of Johan Haartman) was a highly unpopular person who never produced anything philosophical; thus, he moved soon to theology and became a troublesome bishop and thereby the Chancellor of the university.

The next professor, Wilhelm *Nääf* from Sweden was, according to Rein (1908, 195), famous for his intrigues and quarrels. He took hardly any care of his philosophical teaching, where he concentrated only on certain small parts of the Leibniz-Wolffian doctrine. His dissertations were few and superficial, and only one of them touches logic, the Wolffian mereology. And then follows the weakest of all, the Swedish Olof *Schalberg*. Already his nomination was generally considered a scandal.[8] Yet he sat on his chair for whole twenty-five years and could, in that time, compose only a couple of wholly insignificant dissertations which had nothing to do with logic.

Finally, a completely new fashion arrived from Germany via Sweden. The philosophical atmosphere changed at the end of the century; the new currents were unfavourable towards traditional ways of thinking and the focus of philosophical problems turned definitely to a new direction. Finally, Kantian issues made the old-style philosophising look generally antiquated, and authors could no longer be content with their old authorities and conventional traditions. (In Finland this turn coincided with a fundamental political change, when the Swedish reign was replaced by autonomy under Russia.) Anders Johan *Lagus* was the first Finnish author who took personally part in the post-Kantian discussions. His active contribution in

[8] The foremost Finnish scholar, Porthan, declared publicly his murderous opinion concerning Schalberg's abilities. As regards the performance of Haartman, Nääf, and Schalberg, see also Heikel 1894, 179–182 and 201–204.

his lectures and studies can well have had a decisive importance in protecting philosophy in Turku from utter decay. Even the number of philosophy students grew rapidly in those times. However, Lagus himself had, in the first place, a strong ethical mission: he is the only professor who has ever moved from theoretical to practical philosophy. Thus, it is also natural that he did not write any logical works of his own, although he did give a course about logic following J. G. Kiesewetter's Kantian textbook. Its abridged edition was even translated into Swedish in Turku in 1806.[9]

Now, it is perhaps surprising that I do not discuss Lagus's docent, Gabriel Israel *Hartman* – though he is often considered the most original and gifted philosopher of the whole era in Turku. The reason is simply that he concentrated his efforts so strongly on epistemic questions. None of his works can be called directly logical. Among dissertations there was something about methods of acquiring knowledge, but his main ambitions can all be seen in the book *Kunskapslära* (Theory of Knowledge), which remained unfinished. (Hartman was the first who wrote in Swedish.) His aim was to sketch a large-scale realist critique of the central doctrines of Kant and/or Swedish idealists like Höijer. Hartman, too, died in the middle of his career – we do not know if he would possibly have contributed something in the field of logic.

So, we end the list with Gabriel *Palander*, the first professor in the Grand Duchy under Russia. He is nowadays almost forgotten from history books, but I find him a very interesting character. He was our first mathematically competent philosopher, and he had first been teaching mathematics at the university and proved some new results in calculus. Now, a couple of his philosophical dissertations are about the basic logical properties of judgments. They are always written in a very clear and exact style, evidently with great care. For example, one study (1813) is a concise exposition about analytic and synthetic methods, which was to become the subject for a book

[9] *Lärobok i Logiken*, translated by J. W. Tuderus, Frenckell, Åbo. This booklet was then printed several times because it was used at schools. It is the first logic book in our national languages.

by Jaakko Hintikka and Unto Remes in 1972.[10] There he first observes how ambiguous the term "method" is and continues with a careful enquiry concerning the notions "abstraction", "combination" and "construction". This is the way that leads to a characterisation of the inverse processes of "analysis" and "synthesis".

Palander (1815) is perhaps still better. There he uses a few modern German sources but works independently. This study is about the classical notion of "quality" of judgments, the dichotomy between affirmation and negation, which had appeared in all traditional textbooks. Palander begins by saying that this distinction concerns the whole judgment or its copula: there is another distinction between positive and negative predicates, and that produces Kant's "infinite" judgments. With these suppositions he derives the ordinary logical squares (with and without negative predicates). He considers also the behaviour of negation in complex sentences. At the end, he takes a lot of trouble in order to deduce laws for negating disjunctions and conjunctions. As examples of negating, he derives counterparts for De Morgan's laws, but the proofs become unfortunately awkward because he is using only the exclusive *aut*-disjuction.

Palander was obviously a learned and prudent person; his works are of a high technical standard, and he was acquainted with many logical works, though his favourite textbook was Kiesewetter's logic. Palander's academic career was only short, and his logical works seemed probably somewhat untypical or exceptional already when they were published; at least there were no comparable publications. The overall cultural atmosphere had begun to change before his death in 1821.

Younger generation within the small, educated circles in Turku desired something more modern and inspiring. This is why there arose a great interest towards German and Swedish romantic and speculative currents in philosophy and literature. In this upheaval, many earlier sources began to look uninteresting or unimportant. For example, the following professor (1823–1830) Fredrik *Bergbom* was fascinated in the

[10] In fact, Palander ends his essay with exactly the same passage of Pappus from which his modern followers begin their investigation in *The Method of Analysis* (1972).

first place by Schelling.[11] It can be no surprise that logic was not a very popular subject in such an atmosphere, and it seems that the new age understood itself as a fundamental reform because of which many earlier traditional tasks were soon almost forgotten or at least bypassed.

We could place a symbolic external sign of the change of ages at the removal of the University to Helsinki in 1828.The rule of systematic idealism had then already arisen, and the new professor Johan Jakob *Tengström* was the leading person in the introduction of overwhelming Hegelianism, which would remain the dominant current in Finland for a considerable time, partly owing to Snellman's national authority. Of course, Hegelians and their sympathisers certainly did speak a lot about logic, but the manner in which systematic idealist philosophers understood "logic" was very different from ours. It is questionable whether those enquiries can be called logical in our sense at all; at least their proceedings and discoveries do not belong to the scope of logic as we usually understand it. So, I would prefer to regard the "age of idealism" as another period in the history of logic, following after the "age of stagnation", which lasted here approximately for the eighteenth century.

To sum up, this eighteenth century seems to have been a rather weak time in Finnish logic. I try to list a few striking features in the logic of this period.

First, Aristotle does not figure at all. Palander quotes him in one footnote, but otherwise he is a complete stranger. Apparently, these philosophers were simply not very familiar with Aristotle's own works, which are certainly too demanding for amateurs, and contemporary literature used merely other, newer sources.

Secondly, there is nothing about syllogisms. Only Welin speaks about the first figure (but not about the others, 1735 § 8), and Palander uses the word. But the syllogistic theory appears nowhere. After all, it may have been too sophisticated a theory for these authors; *Prior Analytics* is incomprehensible without foreknowledge. Here we can clearly see how gravely logic had decayed from the previous century.

[11] See the detailed exposition in Sarjala 2020.

Thirdly, logic consisted almost entirely of the parts which were called the "doctrine of concept" and the "doctrine of judgment" in traditional textbooks, whereas there was hardly anything about the third section, the systematic "doctrine of inference". Welin and Palander (1815, § 3, 4) seem to have really had some insight about this requirement, but even they made no attempt to get further with it.

And fourthly, these logicians very seldom state any explicit logical laws or principles at all. This circumstance, after all, is typical for the early modern logic: exact and general results are hardly found anywhere. And because no precise rules or theorems are announced, we can easily understand also the consequence: these works included very few examples or problems – in fact it is hard to find any use for logic at all.

So: such is the general picture of logic in this age. It seems to have been largely an age of stagnation. But it must be remembered that the same was equally the case in many other universities all over Europe as well, except for some special cases. If I were required to select two recommendable works from this period, perhaps I would mention Welin's dissertation and Palander's *De divisione judiciorum ex respectu qualitatis*. Even these treatises are of course very small and modest, but they show some undeniable original thought and effort with real logical issues.

University of Helsinki

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Snellman's Philosophical Action

JUHA HIMANKA

Researchers' achievements are typically measured based on their publications, wherein they advance their field of study and contribute to its knowledge base. In the case of philosophy, however, this perspective can also be questioned: One may expect that philosophers act according to their ideas. This was evident with philosophers of Antiquity, as illustrated, for example, by Diogenes Laertius in his history of philosophy which consists largely of anecdotes about lives of eminent philosophers (Laertius 2013). In later histories of philosophy, the emphasis has shifted towards elucidating philosophers' thoughts and publications, but philosophers remain no less subject to the expectations of acting in accordance with their ideas. Perhaps the most famous such demand was articulated by Karl Marx: "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it" (Marx 1845).

Many well-known philosophers of the modern era, however, have failed to live up to their ideas. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Emile* is a classic work of educational philosophy, yet he himself left all his five children to an orphanage in Paris (Rousseau 2000, 348). Immanuel Kant, a central figure in Western ethical thought, was unquestionably a racist (Mills 2017, 91–112). Charles Peirce, who founded pragmatism, did not do particularly well in practical terms of his life. Martin Heidegger turned the usual Aristotle interpretation around by prioritizing practical concerns over theoretical wisdom but acted stupidly and unethically in his engagement with the Nazi party. This is not to say that philosophers are particularly bad at acting according to their own views, but philosophy is a field of study where one *could* expect the researcher to live according to her teachings. In this study, I present one example of a philosopher, J. V. Snellman (1806–1881), living according to his

ideas even when he knew that this would ruin his academic career.

According to G. W. F. Hegel, history is essentially a struggle for recognition. In this kind of a struggle, we want others to recognize us as what we want to be, but the others refuse to do that. As we will see, when Snellman was defending his ideas of the university, he entered into such a struggle with the rector of his university. Snellman himself was a Hegelian philosopher, but it was not his aim to exemplify how history proceeds according to Hegel in this case. Nevertheless, his and his opponents' actions illustrate well how a struggle for recognition takes place. Although Snellman finally had to leave the university, the struggle was also an important learning experience for him.[1] This learning experience is well in line with the Hegelian idea of learning from failure, and in this study, I will try to show that, just like Snellman did, we too might have something to learn from the case.

Snellman was a Hegelian philosopher who acted in defense of his own views. This activity is, therefore, an interesting theme also in the context of Hegel's theory of action. Hegel's theory of action, in turn, can be seen as opening a perspective on his thought as a whole (Taylor 2010). The theory has been interpreted in various ways (Laitinen & Sandis 2010), and I will not delve into this field of research in its entirety here. Instead, I will adopt a phenomenological perspective and prioritize the description of events and Snellman's own interpretation of them. This approach honors the principles of phenomenology (Husserl 1960, 13; Husserl 1983, 44–45), which dictate that research should begin with evidence — how phenomena appear — and only subsequently move to theories. Thus, I will first elucidate Snellman's actions and events, and only finally will I address Hegel's theory of action in this context.

Snellman's Hegelian Background

Snellman was a Hegelian philosopher. One may approach Hegel's philosophy through his major works, *Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes)*, originally titled *Science of the Experience of Consciousness (Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des*

[1] As we will see, Snellman later returned to the Imperial Alexander University and finally even became a professor.

Bewußtseins), which deals with the elucidation of experience within a historical context, and *Science of Logic*, which is speculative, i.e., not based on experience. Harmonizing these two perspectives is a central question in Hegel scholarship. In this study, I will proceed from the point of view of experience in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* begins with sense certainty, the certainty that I am sure of the reality that I am perceiving now (Hegel 1977, 58–66). Here in front of me there is a teacup. From Hegel's dialectical point of view the cup, however, is a cup only because it is not something else; it is a cup because it is not a pitcher or a tree. The cup is also here and now because it is not there and then. It follows dialectically that the point of view of sense certainty opens up to more general views, and the task of *Phenomenology of Spirit* is to explicate this process until it finally returns to the beginning, sense certainty, but it now has all the logical and historical aspects that determinate it. In Hegel's terms, sense certainty is now concrete instead of the abstract position of the beginning. The first major transition in this dialectical process takes the perceiver (or the reader) from *consciousness* to *self-consciousness*. Up to this point, the examination has taken place from the perspective of the individual, that is, consciousness. Now, the examination shifts to self-consciousness, where consciousness encounters not only material objects but also the self-consciousness of another.

Hegel's examination of the encounter of consciousnesses begins with the famous master-slave dialectic. In this dialectic, one consciousness, that of the master, subjugates another by defying death, while the other, that of the slave, values its life to the extent that it submits to the command of the other. This initial level encounter evolves into higher-level modes of mutual communication as the work progresses. The work explicates the Western cultural and social history. From the perspective of self-consciousness onwards, it includes social aspects of reality, expressed by the word *Geist* of the title. Hegel does not always explicitly refer to sources, but in this work he draws from Plato's early dialogues and works of later authors and scholars, such as Cervantes's *Don Quixote*, Newton's physics, and Diderot's *Rameau's Nephew*. The progression is often insightful, such as Newton's placement within the whole

where theology and physics intersect. And indeed, Newton wrote significantly more about theology than physics.

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, self-consciousness is driven by desire. For the purposes of this study, the most essential object of desire is recognition. Self-consciousness desires another self-consciousness to recognize it as it wishes to be. Another key factor for this examination is the concept of *spirit* that appears in the book's title. For Hegel, spirit means "'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'" (Hegel 1977, 110; Tesla & Ruggio 2016). I experience myself as a fly fisherman, a Finn, an adult, a supporter of democracy, etc., I am we. At the same time, I am also the I who constitutes this we. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* explores various communities, spirits, in terms of their manifestation (phenomenology), progressing from primitive forms towards more advanced ones. Among the more advanced forms, we find, for example, the community of researchers.

The presentation in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* aims to be comprehensive. It is, however, evident that Hegel did not really reach a universal or absolute view. His history is written mainly from a Western perspective. Another obvious issue indeed is the absence of examination of the university community. There really is very little examination of the university community in Hegel's works more broadly. The only explicit mentions of these issues in his writings are a speech given as a rector of a gymnasium and a couple of letters to the ministry of education (Hegel 1949, 246–263, 301–317). This absence may be considered somewhat strange or unfortunate, considering that his academic career falls at a crucial juncture in the formation of university ideals (Manninen & Wahlberg 1994). Thus, there is a gap in Hegel's system that needs to be filled. Snellman can be seen as filling this gap with his study *On Academic Studies* (*Om det akademiska studium*) (Himanka 2012).

Snellman's View of the University Community

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* examines various communities from a historical perspective, starting from a simple power relationship, the master-slave relationship. Snellman's study *On Academic Studies* explores the academic community by comparing it to the lower level of public learning community, i.e., the school. The difference between these two communities is

described in Hegelian terms in relation to self-consciousness. The goal of the school is to educate individuals into self-consciousness: "The school is an institution where the individual is educated into self-consciousness, into a thinking and willing subject." (Snellman 1992, 460.) In contrast, Snellman describes the university as follows: "[T]he university is an institution where the thinking and willing subject is educated into knowledge and morality, into the reconciliation of self-consciousness and tradition." (Snellman 1992, 460.)

The spirit of the school and the university is different. In the former, the teacher is an authority whose knowledge the pupils have confidence in. They are not expected to question the teacher's knowledge or assess its correctness themselves. In the university, the setup differs significantly from this. Unlike a pupil, a student does not accept the knowledge offered by the professor as it is, but is expected to independently evaluate the validity of that knowledge. Students, unlike pupils, independently ponder the knowledge offered to them, but this does not mean that they think arbitrarily. Their task as self-consciousness is to reconcile tradition, i.e., the offered knowledge, by independently evaluating its validity. Knowledge, in this strong sense, actually means to Snellman precisely the independent apprehension of tradition. Independent thinking about tradition leads to conviction, which, according to Snellman, is a prerequisite for ethical action. (Snellman 1992.)

Snellman's perspective emphasizes that a student's independence extends beyond knowledge to encompass action as well. Unlike in school, in the university community learners, students included, are autonomous actors within the community. During his own student years, Snellman was an active participant in the university's Ostrobothnian Student Nation and he regarded such independent student communities as an essential part of the university (Manninen 1992a), even after he became a university teacher.

Snellman's above mentioned ideas regarding the university community do not fundamentally differ from, for instance, the thoughts presented by Schelling in his lectures on the *Method of Academic Studies* in 1802 (Schelling 1859), several decades earlier. These lectures, in turn, were a central reference point for Humboldt as he formulated the concept for the new

University of Berlin in 1809 (Himanka 2012, 2015). Even Hegel's limited examinations of the university community, which Snellman is unlikely to have been familiar with, align well with Snellman's thoughts (Hegel 1949). However, Snellman did not merely present ideas about the university community; he also acted in accordance with his views.

Snellman's Actions

For Snellman, it is essential for the university community that students, too, are free to realize their ideas; they also belong within the realm of academic freedom. From this standpoint, it is not surprising that Snellman announced on 23 November 1837, that he would give lectures on academic freedom. However, the university rector prohibited Snellman from lecturing on such a sensitive topic. The rector's decision is, in fact, understandable. Finland's position as a Grand Duchy of Russia was politically delicate, and there were concerns that the students might cause difficulties for Finland's position. It had been less than 20 years since the nationalist student Karl Ludwig Sand had assassinated August von Kotzebue, whom he suspected of being a Russian agent, in Mannheim. Additionally, the Russian Crown Prince was the Chancellor of the Imperial Alexander University, although the office was actually managed by deputy chancellors. Thus, the rector had his reasons to prohibit Snellman from lecturing on such a topic (Klinge 1967, 59–63; Lahtinen 2006, 83-84; Rein 1928, 113–114; Savolainen 2006, 190–197).

From Snellman's perspective, the rector's decision was against the principles of the university community and violated academic freedom. Snellman had the title of docent, which, in theory, granted him the freedom to teach. However, this right applied only to paid teaching, and Snellman wanted to offer his lectures for free. Nevertheless, Snellman did not accept the rector's decision and appealed to the university council. This marked the beginning of a highly publicized and long dispute between lecturer Snellman and the university leadership.[2]

[2] The documents related to the dispute are available online: https://snellman.kootutteokset.fi

In essence, the dispute unfolded as follows: Snellman initially sought to announce his lectures on academic freedom, but Rector Pipping prohibited this. Snellman appealed this decision to the university council, which, as expected, did not accede to his demand. He then submitted a new complaint to the council. When this also yielded no result, he sought permission to print the minutes of the preceding council meeting. Permission was not granted. The university's deputy chancellor, General Alexander Amatus Thesleff, warned Snellman that his actions could lead to deportation to Siberia. However, this did not dissuade Snellman. Thesleff also contacted the highest authorities of Finland in St. Petersburg. Minister-Secretary of the State (*ministerivaltiosihteeri*, *ministerstatssekreterare*) Robert Henrik Rehbinder wrote a letter to the university council, condemning Snellman's actions. Nonetheless, Snellman remained undeterred and began preparing for the publication of his intended lectures. However, it soon became apparent that the publication would not be allowed.

In the next phase of the dispute, Snellman was given the opportunity to demonstrate his obedience, and he was appointed curator of the Ostrobothnian Student Nation. According to Snellman's own view, students should be free to govern their own organizations, and for this reason, he refused to accept the appointment. However, Snellman not only declined the position but also criticized the council for misunderstanding the essence of the university, equating it with the school. The university eventually took the matter to an open court, and Snellman was fined on June 1, 1839 (Savolainen 2006, 190, 197). He left the university and moved to Stockholm. There, he published his views on the university, namely the text *On Academic Studies*.

The dispute between Snellman and the university leadership lasted for one and a half years, and it is not entirely clear who was ultimately right in terms of regulations and law. It remains uncertain whether Snellman ultimately had the right to give his lectures, even though he, as a docent, had the right to teach, because he wanted to give his lectures for free. It is also unclear whether the university leadership had the right to appoint Snellman as the curator of the Ostrobothnian Student Nation (Klinge 1967, 58). In historical writings, the dispute has been viewed from different and contrasting perspectives. In

Thiodolf Rein's biography of Snellman, Snellman is seen as a hero who sacrificed his academic career to defend his view of the university (Rein 1928). On the other hand, in Matti Klinge's history of the Student Union, Snellman is interpreted as a troublemaker who wanted to jeopardize Finland's position as an autonomous part of Russia (Klinge 1967). (Himanka 2008, 2012.)

In fact, the dispute between Snellman and the university leadership is an excellent illustration of how Hegel's view of the struggle for recognition operates in practice. Rector Pipping and Count Rehbinder understood the university as an institution where the rest of the organization obeyed the directives of the leadership. Pipping understood the university to be a similar community similar to the family of that time, where authority resided with the father of the family. Snellman, on the other hand, perceived the university as a community of selves where everyone, including students, were free to act but also bore responsibility for their actions. In the dispute, neither party was willing to recognize the other's view, and thus the disagreement turned into a struggle for recognition. After Snellman's departure, Pipping and Rehbinder attempted to reform the university's regulations according to their views, but the reforms did not progress in the council, and the attempt ended with Rehbinder's death in March 1841. Snellman moved from Stockholm to Germany and continued his work there. He eventually obtained a professorship at the Imperial Alexander University of Finland in 1856 and soon afterwards pursued a significant career in politics.

Snellman Supplements Hegel

The well-documented dispute between Snellman and the university leadership thus serves as an excellent illustration of Hegel's view of history as a struggle for recognition. It is through this kind of struggles that often turn to battles and wars that history, according to Hegel, mainly develops further. Snellman's essay O*n Academic Studies* can be read as a supplement to Hegel's review of different kinds of communities in that it considers the university community or the spirit of the academic community that is left out of *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

However, in this study, Snellman emerges as even more thorough than Hegel. The central theme of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is experience. Roughly speaking, experience, for Hegel, entails the repeating transition of what is *in itself* (*an sich*, like material things) to what is *for itself* (*für sich*, like consciousness) as the subject of the dialectical process develops from consciousness to self-consciousness and spirit (*der Geist*) where that what is in and for itself is also for itself (*an und für sich für sich*). Furthermore, experience, in Hegel's view, also inherently involves failure (Tengelyi 2004). This meaning can be found even in everyday language. When a job advertisement seeks an experienced forklift driver, it means that the driver has failed several times in operating a forklift and has thus become experienced. She has learned how to use the machine by learning from mistakes. In this respect *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not only a study of how different kinds of communities appear but also a study of how we can learn from experience. And Snellman did learn a lot from his experience of the dispute.

From the dialectical framework of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Snellman's learning can be understood in the following way: First he had a view of the ideal university. The main source for that was probably Henrik Steffens' *Die Gegenwärtigen Zeit* (Manninen 1992b; Steffens 1817), a book that culminates in the position of the university as an entity that guides the nation. This is the level of *in itself* (*an sich*). When Snellman then got involved in politics around the issue he entered into the level of *for itself* (*für sich*) as he himself now participated in the action and was not just an objective bystander. The object of the study was no longer a mere object but Snellman as a subject got involved. When Snellman then combined his views of the university with what he had experienced, he formed the views presented in *On Academic Studies*. That is the level of *in itself and for itself*. The final level of *Phenomenology, in and for itself for itself* would be reached when these views are examined in relation to other relevant studies on the topic and this done at the level community (spirit/*Geist*), at the level of *we* instead of *I*.

In his dispute with the university leadership, Snellman failed to achieve his goal, but on the other hand, he grew as a thinker through this experience. Compared to his previous works, *On Academic Studies* is a much more mature text. His

earlier texts often feel like Hegel pastiches, but now Snellman has his own, distinct voice, and like a true philosophical classic, the text operates on multiple levels. The most interesting aspect of the text is, however, to read it in the context of the actions that Snellman took before the publication.

Snellman and Hegel's Theory of Action

I have now elucidated Snellman's actions and his reflections on them. This approach aligns with the phenomenological principle of beginning with phenomena and their manifestations. In addition to describing phenomena, research requires highlighting their general and essential features and relating these to previous studies—in this case, interpretations of Hegel's theory of action. Hegel's theory of action examines actions within their social context: "actions only make sense *as* actions within specific social context" (Deligiorgi 2010). Previously, I highlighted the role of recognition as a central background for the actions of Snellman and the university leadership. For Snellman, his view on conviction was also crucial. These elements are central to Francesca Menegoni's interpretation of Hegel's theory of ethics (Menegoni 2010, 2016; cf. Hegel 1977, 266–409).

According to Menegoni's interpretation of Hegel, our decisions to act follow from conviction rather than will: "Without personal conviction, there cannot be either decision or action" (Menegoni 2016). For an action to be real, it must be exposed to public scrutiny. The individual must bring forth their conviction in the deed, that is, "it is necessary for the 'I' to declare itself." (Menegoni 2016). According to Menegoni, the theory of action fundamentally revolves around the individual's conviction and its communal recognition or lack thereof (Menegoni 2010). Snellman's actions and his reflections on them correspond well with Menegoni's view: it was precisely about Snellman's actions based on conviction and their recognition.

Conclusion

In his later years Snellman reached a position as a highly respected statesman, and his thoughts have strongly influenced the formation of the independent state of Finland. His idea of a university community has also influenced the formation of

the Finnish higher education system (Lahtinen 2006, 84). Lately university politics have in Finland as well as elsewhere often prioritized economic growth over educating people who can think and act themselves and also know what they are doing (cf. MacIntyre 2009). In Snellman's vision it is rather the university community that should consider autonomously where society and nation should be heading (cf. Steffens 1817). *On Academic Studies* is still a relevant text in considering what kind of community the university should be, and it is perhaps sometimes worth considering whether we, the members of university communities, should follow Snellman's example and also act on behalf of the university as an autonomous community of selves.

The encounter of personal convictions with interpersonal recognition is an important theme in ethics (Menegoni 2010). For Hegel ethics demands that the conviction should be stated publicly; the conviction is to be declared, and this is an act. Snellman's action follows this ethical framework, and he opens his conviction to public judgement of recognition and non-recognition. Snellman's action and his reflection on it therefore give us also evidence (in a phenomenological sense) of how Hegel's ethical theory works in real life.

University of Lapland

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Confusions and Conflicts between Philosophy and Psychology in Finland from the Late 19th Century to the 1910s

JUHANI IHANUS

The article delves into the interplay between philosophical and psychological discourses in Finland during the 1910s, tracing their roots back to the preceding history of the late 19th century and turn-of-the-century philosophy and psychology. The conflict between the vitalist-intuitionist approach, championed by Henri Bergson's philosophy and echoed in William James's later writings, and the empirical and experimental psychological approach, spearheaded in Finland by Hjalmar Neiglick (1860–1889) and continued by Eino Kaila (1890–1958), reverberated throughout Finnish philosophy and psychology. However, this disciplinary conflict led to confusion regarding the objectives of psychological research.

The contributions of Henning Söderhjelm (1888–1967) and Eino Kaila are scrutinized as illustrative of the ambivalence surrounding the disciplinary identities and methods of psychology. After having worked at Alfred Lehmann's psychophysical laboratory in Copenhagen during 1911 and 1912, Söderhjelm presented his academic dissertation in 1913 on instincts and their connections to human affects. Yet, his conception of psychology remained unclear and became expressed more journalistically than scientifically. Meanwhile, his academic competitor, the young Eino Kaila, actively engaged with various streams of philosophy and psychology. Initially drawn to the ideas of Bergson and James, Kaila gradually recognized the conflict between the intuitive tenets of vitalist life philosophy and the demands of rigorous experimental psychology.

Kaila launched his scientific and academic career with his 1916 thesis on motivation and decision-making, labeled as

"experimental-psychological research". Influenced by the Wundtian tradition, which prioritized sensations, elements, and associations, as well as by the studies on volitional choices by the Würzburg school, Kaila emphasized a mechanistic and elementalist approach to studying psychic processes during this phase of his career. Professor Arvi Grotenfelt favored Kaila over Söderhjelm, appointing Kaila as docent of psychology and kickstarting his academic trajectory. While Söderhjelm penned general articles on psychology during the 1910s and shared the outcomes of his further experiments at Lehmann's laboratory, his lack of academic backing led him to pursue a career as a writer-journalist and translator.

Psychology between Philosophy and the Natural Sciences

Starting from the mid-19th century, alongside speculative and idealistic philosophy, natural philosophical and more empirically grounded and scientific approaches began to emerge. These approaches, including mechanistic, physiological, and positivist conceptions, challenged idealistic, mystical, pantheist, or vitalist ideas. They emphasized logical conclusions, rationality, and the replacement of the soul (or spirit) to advance empirical investigations into human consciousness, unconsciousness, and physiological functions. This period saw the rise of exact quantitative experimental methods and the formulation of psychophysical laws. The first psychological laboratories were established in the 1870s, notably initiated by Wilhelm Wundt in Germany and William James in the United States.

Research conducted in Wundt's psychological laboratory, and subsequently in many others, initially focused on sensations, sensory perceptions, association tests, psychophysics, and reaction time tests. The foundation for experimental psychology had been laid by British empiricism, association psychology, and German physiological research on the senses and the nervous system. Over time, this expanded to encompass attention, memory, learning, thinking, decision-making, and emotions. Psychological laboratories became integral to the scientific institution, fostering social interaction, shared

experience, knowledge construction, and discussions regarding research methods and theoretical perspectives.

The location of psychology in the tension field between philosophy and the natural sciences had already been noted by Kant, who recognized introspection as a method of knowledge but denied "empirical psychology" ("*empirische Seelenlehre*") the status of a natural science due to its lack of proper means for quantifying its subject matter (Kant 1786/1910, 468–469). At the same time, Kant left psychology somewhat adrift from philosophy because it did not address the premises or principles of knowledge. Wundt attempted to reconcile this dilemma by advancing experimental (measurable) introspection in the laboratory, departing from armchair introspection. Initially, he hoped that psychology would be connected to and nourished by philosophy, but he was forced to admit that most of his psychology students gravitated toward the natural sciences (Danziger 1990, 41). In his later years, Wundt tried to establish *Völkerpsychologie* as a humanist and cultural field of knowledge, distinct from natural science psychology, but this "second psychology" project failed to gain mainstream academic support.

For pioneering psychologists aiming to construct a modern and independent empirical science, psychology served as a foundation for philosophy and the human sciences interested in understanding the human mind and behavior. Martin Kusch (1995/2005) describes the "psychologism" dispute in Germany from the 1880s to the 1920s, where many of Wundt's and Lotze's students embraced psychologism and saw experimental psychology as fundamental to the renewal of philosophy. This shift led to new experimental psychologists assuming chairs in philosophy, triggering opposition from "pure philosophers" such as neo-Kantians, phenomenologists, and life philosophers.

The Context of Finnish Philosophy and Psychology at the Turn of the 19th Century

In Finland, Hegelianism, an idealistic system philosophy, continued to dominate academic philosophy following the contributions of Snellman and his disciples. Wilhelm Bolin was the first Finnish advocate of naturalistic and deterministic

conceptions, briefly touching upon experimental psychology and psychophysics, although these topics did not have a central position in his philosophical works. Professors Th. Rein and Arvi Grotenfelt represented transitional figures within the field of philosophy. They acknowledged, to some extent, the paradigmatic shift but struggled to let go of their idealistic roots. Figures like Hjalmar Neiglick, Edward Westermarck, and later Rolf Lagerborg belonged to the naturalistic, antimetaphysical, anticlerical, and cosmopolitan trends of the 1880s, moving away from exclusive German influences toward French and British ones.

At the turn of the 19th century, positivist and antimetaphysical philosophy and psychology faced challenges from value-centered philosophical currents, such as William James's pragmatism and philosophies of life[1], such as Henri Bergson's intuitionism. These currents, distancing themselves from relativism, mechanism, positivism, and psychologism, emphasized human creative values and life experiences over exact science, empiricism, naturalism, and rationalism (Heidegren 2004, 34). Heidegren notes a successive modernization in all Nordic professorships of philosophy between 1860 and 1915. In 1870, all Nordic professors of philosophy were entrenched in idealistic system philosophy; by 1890, two out of ten professors represented value-centered idealism, and two leaned toward positivism. By 1910, most philosophy professors in the region identified with value idealism or positivism, with few others transitioning away from idealistic system philosophy. (Ibid., 509.)

In Finland, the status of psychology within academia garnered scattered comments and proposals. As early as 1886, Arvi Grotenfelt remarked, "Psychology as a whole will therefore separate itself from philosophy to become more fully an independent science. And experimental psychology, in particular, investigates and determines the 'details', akin to the

[1] Georg Simmel had started to use the term *Lebensphilosophie* referring to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson. Other authors, such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Ludwig Klages, and José Ortega y Gasset, can be added to this current. Based on humanist and secular values, *Lebensphilosophie* can be seen as the first "modern" philosophical movement in the Western tradition (Beiser 2023).

natural sciences." (Grotenfelt 1886, 454.) Ten years later, at the meeting of the Philosophical Society (21 November 1896), Edward Westermarck observed that "empirical psychology" and "social studies" ("samhällsläran") had remained "under the guardianship ["förmynderskap"] of philosophy" for such a long time that "they have not reached the level of development to become recognized as independent, the recognition that nowadays cannot any longer be allowed to wait" (Manninen & Niiniluoto 1996, 284). He even proposed starting academic philosophical studies with psychology and social studies. Eino Kaila continued this discussion by suggesting, at the meeting of the Philosophical Society (28 November 1919), the division of the chair of theoretical philosophy into "epistemological" and "psychological" "series". He also stressed the importance for philosophy students to engage with "exact natural science" rather than "ancient conceptual analysis". (Ibid., 466.)

Visits to Wilhelm Wundt's Laboratory by Finnish Scholars

As a professor of philosophy, Th. Rein demonstrated his familiarity with psychological issues through various articles. For instance, he discussed studying memory through introspection rather than natural science observation (Rein 1868) and explored Fechner's psychophysical law (Rein 1876). He had visited Wundt's Leipzig quarters at an early phase in 1878 and listened to Wundt's "vividly and energetically held lectures" (Rein 1918, 287).

In the early 1880s, several other Finnish scholars followed suit. Individuals such as Jarl Hagelstam, Maximus Widekind af Schultén, and Robert Tigerstedt from the medical field, along with educationalist Waldemar Ruin and writers Petrus Nordmann and Arvid Järnefelt, attended Wundt's lectures. The earliest Finnish connection to Wilhelm Wundt can be traced back to physiologist Konrad Hällstén, who studied at the University of Heidelberg from 1869 to 1870, where Wundt served as assistant professor and Hermann von Helmholtz as professor of physiology. It was at Heidelberg that Wundt delivered the first-ever course in scientific (physiological) psychology in 1862 (published in Wundt 1863). In 1875, Wundt received a room and some equipment for his psychology

laboratory in Leipzig, and by 1879, he had his first psychology laboratory students. His larger Institute for Experimental Laboratory gained official recognition in 1884.

Thus, Rein's visit to Wundt's lectures coincided with the emergence of independent psychology. During his tenure as a philosophy professor (1875–1917) in Leipzig, Wundt supervised students from various countries and edited the series *Philosophische Studien*[2] (founded in 1881, published from 1883 to 1903) and *Psychologische Studien* (1906–1918). For instance, when Neiglick and Grotenfelt attended Wundt's seminar for experimental psychology in 1885–1886, notable figures such as James McKeen Cattell, later the first professor of psychology in the United States, Harry Kirke Wolfe, another early American psychologist, and Alfred Lehmann were among the 16 students listed. Wundt later regarded Lehmann, McKeen Cattell, and Emil Kraepelin as esteemed colleagues (Wundt 1920, 312).

While Rein expressed doubts about experimental psychology's new method and physiological perspectives, he acknowledged the contributions of Wundt and Fechner. However, the limitations of the experimental method in self-observation and the limited value of physiological knowledge for the psychological study of the "soul" were stressed by Rein whose argumentation was typical of the idealistic philosophers under the influence of *Geisteswissenschaften*. Nevertheless, he supported his students Neiglick's and Grotenfelt's studies in Wundt's experimental laboratory in 1885–1886.

Pioneering Work of Hjalmar Neiglick

Hjalmar Neiglick's international or cosmopolitan outlook extended beyond the traditional German connection to embrace French naturalism and positivism. In the fall of 1885, he visited Stockholm and Copenhagen before arriving in Leipzig in October–November 1885, where he was acquainted with Wundt and other scholars, including sociologist Émile Durkheim and Wundt's Danish assistant Alfred Lehmann. Arvi Grotenfelt, another Finnish scholar, also studied at Wundt's laboratory during this time, attending lectures and participating in local philosophical society meetings. Neiglick collaborated with

[2] Hjalmar Neiglick's (1887a) doctoral dissertation was reprinted in this series (Neiglick 1888), followed by Wundt's (1888) comment.

Lehmann on experiments regarding the perception of light intensity, testing the validity of the Weber–Fechner law published in Fechner's *Elemente des Psychophysik* (1860).

In 1886, Neiglick continued his studies in Leipzig for ten months and concluded the experiments with Lehmann in Copenhagen later that year. Lehmann had just established the first laboratory of psychophysics in the Nordic countries at the University of Copenhagen in 1886, advocating for psychology's "complete emancipation from philosophy" (Pind 2019) and supporting practical psychology (psychotechnics). This view conflicted with the perspectives of Danish philosophy professors Harald Høffding and Kristian Kroman, who, despite representing philosophical psychology's positivist turn, were not oriented toward experimentation (Pind 2009). Lehmann was appointed professor of psychology at the University of Copenhagen as late as 1919. In Sweden, the first laboratory of experimental psychology was founded in 1902 by docent Sydney Alrutz at Uppsala University, although philosophers, influenced by traditional Boströmian idealism, initially opposed the idea (Nilsson 1978; 1987, 62–63).

In late 1886, Neiglick returned to Finland and completed his thesis on the psychophysics of the light perception, *Zur Psychophysik des Lichtsinns* (1887a; reprinted in 1888 in Wundt's *Philosophische Studien*), which became his main publication. He died of typhus and sudden meningitis in November 1889, at the young age of 29.[3]

In his thesis, Neiglick argued that Weber's (and Fechner's law) was a specific case of the contrast phenomenon (Neiglick 1887a, 73; see also Neiglick 1887b, 344–345; Mustelin 1966, 180–183). Rein served as Neiglick's opponent during the public defense of the thesis on February 2, 1887, in Helsinki. Neiglick's subject was unfamiliar to the Finnish academic community, Rein made only some minor remarks, acknowledged his outstanding work as a psychophysicist, and accepted his thesis.

In August 1888, Neiglick was appointed docent of experimental psychology at the Imperial Alexander University of Finland and soon became acting professor of philosophy while Rein served as the university's rector. During the 1887–1888

[3] On Neiglick's life and literary production, see W. Söderhjelm 1916; von Wright 1946; Mustelin 1966; von Fieandt 1987.

term, Neiglick lectured on the psychology of perceptions and ideas. Wundt himself praised Neiglick as "a young ambitious researcher who had completed this research with such praiseworthy diligence" (Wundt 1888, 116). In his last psychological article, Neiglick concluded that experimental psychology required additional perspectives, such as research on psychopathology, hypnosis, child and animal psychology, social groups, and the cultural history of the human psyche (Neiglick 1887b, 349).

Arvi Grotenfelt's Psychological Contributions

Following his studies under Wundt in Leipzig, Arvi Grotenfelt authored a series of articles on experimental psychology, covering various areas such as Weber's and Fechner's laws, Ebbinghaus's memory research, mental chronometric studies, and the application of experimental methods to studying aesthetic emotions (Grotenfelt 1886; 1887). While Grotenfelt did not oppose experimental methods, he highlighted their limitations in capturing the "deepest nature of soul life" (Grotenfelt 1887, 5), rejecting naturalistic, mechanistic, and materialistic views of the soul (ibid., 67–68). Grotenfelt emphasized that "experimental psychology was no *philosophy* and did not claim to be that" (Grotenfelt 1886, 453). He never conducted experimental studies and leaned on his uncle Th. Rein's Lotzean philosophy.

Grotenfelt's thesis on Weber's law and its psychological, physiological, and psychophysical interpretations was purely theoretical. His rigorous philosophical style and arguments aimed to refute the quantification of psychic phenomena and the measurement of the soul. He concluded that Weber's original law, which posited proportional relationships among just-noticeable differences in sense-perceptual intensities stood valid (Grotenfelt 1888, chapter 7). Thus, Grotenfelt rejected Fechner's law and upheld Weber's original law as purely psychological.

In his thesis, Grotenfelt acknowledged the relevance of psychophysical parallelism and correlations. By maintaining a separation between psychological and physiological concepts, he believed it was possible to study psychic processes

independently while still recognizing the importance of physiological processes in understanding psychic phenomena (1888).

Grotenfelt was appointed docent of psychology in January 1889 and later became a professor of philosophy in 1905 (renamed professor of theoretical philosophy from 1906 to 1929) in Helsinki. While not highly active in psychology, he occasionally commented on the Wundtian tradition, Rein's psychological work, experimental pedagogy, and even specific areas of "psychical research" (later parapsychology; see Aho 1993), hypnosis, and suggestion. He delivered lectures on psychology intermittently in 1905–1906, 1908, 1925–1926 and 1928–1929, but his primary focus remained on the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history.

As a professor, Grotenfelt was responsible for the field of psychology, too, and he recognized the utility of academic teaching in psychology not only for philosophy and pedagogy but also for theology and law. However, the irregularity of such teaching led to stagnation in academic psychology in Finland throughout the 1920s. Although examination requirements in philosophy included works by Wundt, Külpe, Ebbinghaus, and James, more recent orientations and research fields were lacking. In the 1910s and 1920s, figures like Zachris Castrén, Edward Westermarck, Rolf Lagerborg, Gunnar Landtman, Rafael Karsten, Hans Ruin, and the emerging talent Eino Kaila delivered lectures on psychological topics.

Finnish Psychology in the 1910s: Bergsonism and Henning Söderhjelm's Thesis

In the 1910s, neo-Kantianism did not hold much sway in Finnish philosophy, with Henri Bergson and William James gaining prominence instead (von Wright 1979, xii–xiii; Nygård 2011, 249, n. 3). Journalist, writer, and literary critic Henning Söderhjelm observed that Bergson's and James's ideas represented "a reaction against all atheism, all materialism, all worship of blind natural laws […] against the 'latest results of science'" (Söderhjelm 1919, 77). These portal figures were discontent with the negative values and concepts of life prevailing in society and the overly rational approach of science,

advocating for a reinterpretation and reevaluation of these concepts.

For a short while in the 1910s, especially Bergson's ideas sparked debates in Finland (on the Bergson debates in Finland, see Nygård 2011). Eino Kaila, Hans Ruin and Henning Söderhjelm expressed moderate support for Bergson's philosophy, while Rolf Lagerborg, aligned with the Durkheimian camp, opposed to Bergson's ideas and leaned toward Harald Høffding's views on Bergson.[4] Lagerborg and Høffding cautioned against Bergson's trendy intuitionism and vitalism, warning that these concepts could be co-opted to support metaphysical and religious agendas, as some Christian circles in Finland seemed to do (Lagerborg 1914). Meanwhile, Hans Ruin, Henning Söderhjelm, and later Erik Ahlman, J. E. Salomaa and Sven Krohn championed a value-centered life philosophy and phenomenological approaches in Finland. After his initial interest in Bergson and James, Kaila continued the empirical tradition already initiated by Neiglick.

Henning Söderhjelm's interest in psychology was piqued during his studies in Lausanne in 1906–1907. He spent time in Copenhagen at Alfred Lehmann's laboratory during the spring terms of 1911 and 1912, participating as a subject in Lehmann's experiments, which led to him experiencing symptoms of claustrophobia for many years (Söderhjelm 1962, 68, 72–74, 77). Lehmann suggested the topic for Söderhjelm's dissertation *Instinkterna och det mänskliga känslolivet* (Söderhjelm 1913a), which examined various authors' conceptions of instincts and their relationship to human emotions, including Darwin, Wundt, Westermarck, James, McDougall, and Marshall. Söderhjelm concluded that instinct-based affects were extended due to the influence of human intellect on instinctual impulses and actions, suggesting that social, aesthetic, moral, and even religious emotions encompassed instinctual affects. While not highly original in its cataloging various conceptions,

[4] Høffding's history of philosophy (1907/1910) was the first work translated into Finnish that introduced Bergson, not solely in a critical tone. In his lectures given at the University of Helsinki in 1911, Høffding (1911a; 1911b) presented the principle of personality in philosophy and its psychological and ethical extensions and referred only shortly to Bergson and James.

Söderhjelm's theoretical work touched on issues that are still explored in affective neuroscience, tracing the neuroevolutionary origins of human emotions.

In a letter to Rolf Lagerborg (RLBS) on January 26, 1926, Söderhjelm fondly recalled Lehmann's influence, describing him as "my good mister and master" who "energetically emphasizes that in the transformation of the drives ["drifter"] to affects there was a stage where the self ["jaget"] came into play". Such affective states as "exaltation, infatuation, a flush of emotion" could thus, at least partly, be connected with "the expansion of the self, the change of the self-imagination". In his memoir, Söderhjelm gives a vivid picture of Lehmann and his cramped yet intellectually stimulating laboratory environment:

> His laboratory, with its many devices, was housed in a couple of cramped rooms in a very old farmhouse at Studiestraede and a whole new world for me to get to know. He was not an ordinary person either. Tall and lean and with a wide full beard, he looked ascetic and grim, but to his students, he was friendly and helpful, and when he relaxed in a comfortable chair with an old-fashioned long pipe in his mouth, he was quietly humorous and convivial. There were not many psychology students, and most of them were prospective public school teachers who would have a supplementary degree in psychology. He held his lectures at a table in the laboratory, around which his audience had plenty of room, and in addition, we were used as subjects in the series of experiments he was conducting. These were of great interest to him and some of them were very complicated. I wanted to learn as much as possible and had time at my disposal, so I was frequently used as a guinea pig. In this way, I came to know and appreciate him well. (Söderhjelm 1962, 72–73.)

Henning Söderhjelm defended his academic dissertation on instincts and their relations to human affects on March 19, 1913, at the Imperial Alexander University of Finland (Söderhjelm 1913a). Lehmann had read the manuscript and offered encouraging feedback with only minor changes to the manuscript. Grotenfelt, his opponent in Helsinki, expressed more skepticism about Söderhjelm's thesis. Lehmann had suggested that Söderhjelm should defend his thesis in Copenhagen to receive his docent title there, but this turned out

impractical due to Danish translation requirements. Grotenfelt's mostly negative critique of Söderhjelm's thesis highlighted differing perspectives within the academic community (Söderhjelm 1962, 79–80).

Later, Söderhjelm summarized his conception of the situation of psychology, on the brink of World War I:

> We can say that, until this day, psychology has only been able to make our general picture of the soul messier and more complex. Nevertheless, this is only natural, because the picture of the soul that corresponds with the practical needs of everyday life does not correspond with reality. For this reason, psychology must first be broken into pieces before we can start building a new psychology. (Söderhjelm 1914, 582.)

Söderhjelm's remark about the state of confusion reflected the prevailing assumption that psychology primarily concerned the study of the "soul". However, the proponents of empirical psychology in Finland, led by Neiglick (1887a; 1887b), had already sought to direct the focus of psychological inquiry to psychic phenomena and their quantification, without delving into metaphysical debates about the materiality or immateriality of the "soul". This approach aimed to usher in a "new psychology", devoid of the traditional concept of the "soul".

Finnish Psychology in the 1910s: Eino Kaila's Early Psychological Contributions

Before his prominent role in Finnish philosophy and psychology, young Eino Kaila navigated between science and the arts, engaging in literature and theater reviews from 1907 to 1917, and even working as a dramaturge at the Finnish National Theatre from 1919 to 1921. Concurrently, he actively explored various currents of philosophy and psychology, discussing them in his articles. Kaila delved into the works of Bergson, Darwin, Høffding, James, and Janet, presenting, in his first lecture, his insights at the Philosophical Society in November 1910, where he introduced Hugo Münsterberg's *Philosophie der Werte* (1908). During his time in Paris in the spring term of 1911, Kaila attended Bergson's lectures on personality theory, initially drawn to Bergson's emphasis on the active, creative, dynamic, and holistic aspects of psychic processes, which

resisted both dogmatic idealism and dogmatic naturalism. Kaila's initial enthusiasm was reflected in his writings. (Kaila 1911a; 1911b; 1913a. On Kaila's relation to Bergson, see Nygård 2011, 93–99.)

Kaila also reviewed William James's translated work *Sielutiede ja kasvatus* (1913b; *Talks to teachers on psychology*, 1899), lauding it as "perhaps the most excellent overview of contemporary psychology" and its author as "the greatest psychologist of all time" (Kaila 1913b, 265–266; on James, pragmatism, and religion, see also Kaila 1912; 1914; 1915c; Pihlström 2011). The conflict between the vitalist-poetic-intuitive approach and the strict scientific approach became more intense in Kaila's thinking. Already in 1911, when reviewing Rudolf Eucken's *Elämän tarkoitus ja arvo* (1910; *Der Sinn und Wert des Lebens*, 1908), Kaila expressed, poetically, the triumphal march of the natural sciences: "[…] the iron web of nature's events has tightened ever closer to even the depths of the individual soul life. […] ever more bridges to the serene eternity have turned out to be the deceptive color play of the spheres." (Kaila 1911c, 101.) Kaila's initial enthusiasm for Bergson, "a follower of the ancient mystics" (Kaila 1916b), and James waned as he gravitated toward more empirical research. By the 1910s, he embraced experimental psychological research combined with association psychology, later adopting the doctrines of Gestalt psychology in the 1920s.

In his early articles, Kaila briefly mentioned "depth psychology" and the unconscious, drawing from Morton Prince's case history and Janet's theories about the "subconscious" and "dissociation" (Kaila 1915a; cf. Ihanus 1994, 54–55). Kaila did not find any coherent explanations in this area. In his review of Rolf Lagerborg's *Den platoniska kärleken* (Platonic love), Kaila also critiques Freudian "sexual monomania" and the at times "brutal" undervaluation of "the conscious side of our being" (Kaila 1915b, p. 432; cf. Ihanus 1994, 56).

Kaila's pivotal scientific and academic career began with his thesis *Über die Motivation und die Entscheidung* (1916, On motivation and decision), an "experimental-psychological research", closely related to Ach's, Michotte's and Prüm's experimental studies on volitional choices (Ach 1905; 1910a; Michotte & Prüm 1910) and to the Wundtian tradition, later termed "content psychology", which focused on introspection,

sensation, and association (Boring 1957, 385). Kaila drew significant inspiration from the Würzburg school, particularly from Ach whose work he often refers to.[5] In his thesis, Kaila attempted to emulate the research design of Michotte and Prüm (1910). Subjects, including Kaila himself, were placed in simple decision-making scenarios involving mental arithmetic tasks, primarily with fractions. They decided whether to attempt solving the task or not, with the option to decline if they found it too challenging. This part of the research addressed the volitional act. After completing each task, subjects reported their conscious conception ("*Bewusstheit*") of the task and their experience ("*Erlebniss*") of its possible solution (Kaila 1916, 12–14).

From his research, Kaila postulated two laws of the will ("*Willensgesetze*"): 1) When valuable content of consciousness does not appear spontaneously, a volitional act is required to reproduce it (ibid., 63–64). 2) When internal mental movement does not lead to the desired goal, individual consciousness is directed by the will through focused attention, known as "decision" ("*Entschluss*") (ibid., 120–122). This act is also linked to the question of how the subjects reached a "total conception" ("*Gesamtauffassung*") in the decision-making situation (cf. von Wright 1979, xviii).

Kaila's thesis rejected the theory of "imageless thought" prevalent in thought psychology and emphasized reproduction tendencies and causal connections in thinking. For Kaila, detecting causal factors meant the "dynamic analysis" of thinking, whereas the examination of the specific elements of consciousness meant "phenomenological analysis" (Kaila 1916, 40). Kaila's position aligned with additive element psychology, emphasizing association and reproduction as sufficient explanations for mental events and volitional acts,

[5] Kaila also mentions K. Bühler, A. Messer and H. J. Watt as representatives of the Würzburg school but not O. Külpe, who was the founder of that school. According to Boring (1957, 405), Ach had introduced to psychology the following concepts: "systematic experimental introspection", "determining tendency" and "consciousness" ("Bewusstheit"). Ach (1910b, 24) situated experimental psychology as the mediator between the natural sciences and *Geisteswissenschaften*, not as a natural science as such but using natural science methods to determine the laws of the spiritual and mental processes.

including conflicting motives. While Ach saw "determining tendencies" (Ach 1905) as the highest aim-directed associative tendencies, Kaila considered Ach's concept "descriptive" rather than an explanatory "functional concept" (Kaila 1916, 43).

In his presentation at the Philosophical Society on November 10, 1916, Kaila highlighted three shortcomings of the thought-psychological method employed by the Würzburg School: 1) Subjects were not asked to depict their states of consciousness but only to tell what their experiences meant to them; 2) the method ignored the influence of habits and training on thought processes; 3) there was no differentiation between "logical clarity" and "psychological clarity", leading to the misconception that logically clear thinking equated to psychological clarity. (Manninen & Niiniluoto 1996, 441–442.)

Kaila's thesis primarily adhered to a strict mechanistic and elementalist approach, with few deviations or digressions. While he briefly entertained the idea of the intentionality of thinking and the biological basis of volitional acts, he quickly moved on. For instance, he pondered the existence of a "spontaneously effective, teleological force" like "reason" ("Verstand"), which would contrast with mere mechanical association effects (Kaila 1916, 74). However, he ultimately rejected this assumption, arguing that such constructs as "reason" did not advance scientific psychology. Kaila acknowledged that association and reproduction might not suffice as explanatory principles in the future, but he advocated for caution in "fabricating" new explanatory frameworks (ibid., 133).

While Kaila's mechanistic explanations were influenced by the empiricist and positivist foundations of the natural sciences, he did not directly make any reference to natural science research in his thesis. The only aspect that slightly touches upon biology is the issue of the instinctual background of volitional acts, but this is discussed only superficially. Kaila suggests that volitional acts may be instinctually driven, but he acknowledges that instincts and innate teleological dispositions of the nervous system remain causally inexplicable (ibid., 65). He implies cryptically that human values may also have a biological basis due to the incomprehensible order of nature, asserting that "all healthy psychic life is dominated by values" (ibid., 93).

Henning Söderhjelm presented Kaila's thesis at a meeting of the Philosophical Society on October 20, 1916, critiquing it for having too few test subjects and for focusing solely on an intellectual approach to motivation and decision making. Söderhjelm, on the other hand, emphasized three main elements in human motivation and decision-making: aspiration, emotion, and attention. (Manninen & Niiniluoto 1996, 439.) Arvi Grotenfelt remarked on the dubious divergence of results between the two representatives of experimental psychology, suggesting that Kaila's thesis "primarily teaches pure theory" rather than providing a straightforward analysis, especially regarding "the physiological connections and nerve processes underlying psychic life" (ibid., 440–441).

In his work *Sielunelämä biologisena ilmiönä* (1920; Soul life as a biological phenomenon), Kaila challenges vitalism in both biology and psychology, aiming to demonstrate that the "mechanistic principle" governs all psychic processes. Simultaneously, Kaila critiques reductionist views in the natural sciences, suggesting that psychological laws represent specialized versions of biological laws, manifested mentally through association and reproduction and mirroring fundamental physiological principles. (Kaila 1920, 36, 48, 50, 90ff .)

Grotenfelt favored Kaila over the other candidate, Henning Söderhjelm, appointing Kaila as docent of psychology but not Söderhjelm. Söderhjelm revisited Wundt's laboratory in the spring term of 1913 and conducted further experiments at Lehmann's laboratory in Copenhagen later that year (Söderhjelm 1962, 83–85). He wrote journalistic articles on psychological topics[6] and published results from his experiments in *Psyke* (Söderhjelm 1915e; 1915f), along with a brief work on individuality (Söderhjelm 1916a) and an attempt at interpreting the Finnish Civil War of 1918 (Söderhjelm 1918)[7]. In contrast to

[6] Söderhjelm's mostly journalistic articles on psychological issues, see Söderhjelm 1913b (an introduction to experimental psychology); 1915c (a short overview of the Danish psychologist and precursor of Gestalt psychology Edgar Rubin and his work on figure–ground organization); 1915d (on the psychology of witnessing); 1917 (on the concept of "interest").

[7] Söderhjelm's work (1918) was also published in Finnish, English (in two editions), German, and French; see also Pietikäinen 2022. Pietikäinen calls Söderhjelm's work "crowd-psychological", but it does not contain any psychological references while another contemporary work on the Finnish

Kaila, Söderhjelm did not receive significant academic support and pursued a career as a writer, journalist, and translator, dabbling in detective novels and literary criticism.

Kaila earned the title of docent of psychology at the University of Helsinki in 1919. Before transitioning to the new University of Turku in 1922, Kaila authored his only clinical paper on the splitting of ideation flow in association anomalies of schizophrenic patients (Kaila 1918a). During this period, he also ventured into perception psychology, investigating the perception of optical figures, "Gestalts", formed through "ideatory coordinations" of elements (1918b). Not yet fully embracing Gestalt psychology, Kaila viewed "meaningful psychic mechanisms" as associative mechanisms (ibid., 35). Another early article on perception psychology explored the depth localization of double images (Kaila 1919).

Grotenfelt highly valued Kaila's role as a docent at the University of Helsinki, as Kaila was the sole instructor offering guidance in experimental psychology. In 1922, Kaila relocated to the University of Turku, where he served as the philosophy chair from 1921 to 1930. There, he established the first Finnish academic psychological laboratory in 1922. Concurrently, the first Finnish (and Nordic) psychological laboratory in the realm of "practical" or applied psychology was founded in 1922—the Psychotechnical Laboratory of the State Railways, led by Ester Hjelt, one the pioneers of applied psychology, alongside Anitra Karsten (on Ester Hjelt and Anitra Karsten, see Ihanus 2010) and Aksel Rafael Rosenqvist.

During the 1920s, Kaila shifted away from mentalistic and mechanistic element psychology and association psychology, moving closer to the natural sciences and Gestalt psychology. Kaila believed Gestalt psychology offered a solution to the epistemological problem surrounding the laws of psychic phenomena. After his 1934 book on personality psychology, Kaila did not release any full-scale psychological works. Nonetheless, even in his later literary endeavors, traces of "synthetic philosophy", antireductionism, and holism regarding the wonders of nature remained prominent.

Civil War (Ringbom 1918) had some minor references to mass psychology and psychoanalysis and its conception of the dualism of the drives (see Ihanus 1994, 59–61).

Postscript: "Modern Psychology" Expanding

In 1913, Henning Söderhjelm acknowledged that certain areas such as the psychic life of early childhood, animal psychology, and *Völkerpsychologie* were beyond the grasp of experimental methods or introspection. However, he believed that experimental research could be organized in other areas of psychology. He even considered psychoanalysis a form of experiment, albeit primarily applied to pathological issues and lacking the rigorous control required for psychological experiments (Söderhjelm 1913b, 151–153). By 1915, when discussing "modern psychology", Söderhjelm highlighted new domains where psychology had found application: pedagogy, aesthetics, religion, sexuality, criminology, technology, and industry (Söderhjelm 1915g, 255). Yet, he lamented the state of psychology as a science, describing it as "in a rather sad position", "uncompleted and half-completed". He observed that it consisted of a "large collection of approaches" and "countless attacks on the 'big problems'" without yielding any definitive results (ibid., 255). Despite the methodological challenges, diverse theories drawing from physiology, biology, and philosophy, as well as the complex nature of psychological research phenomena, Söderhjelm defended the use of experimental methods. He asserted that these methods could transform psychology from a "more or less chaotic jumble" into a "purposeful and methodologically sound science" (ibid., 262).

Thus, Söderhjelm advocated for meticulous psychological experiments, statistical methods (citing Pearson, Spearman, the correlation coefficient, and big data), and a theoretical understanding of psychology, even in pedagogy (Söderhjelm 1915a, 268–269). He acknowledged the objections raised by many against "rationalism", "positivism", and the intellectual "dissection" of the "soul life" and all its "hidden treasures", which were often subjected to categorization, numerical expression, and presentation in tables and columns (ibid., 271). Nonetheless, the widespread adoption of experimental methods led to rapid advancements in psychology, affirming the validity of this approach. With great enthusiasm, Söderhjelm outlined the path ahead:

> Finally, exact research does not at all miss its enchantment, which need not be worth less than the enchantment of the intuitive flash

> when an idea suddenly flames up. The life of the soul is chaos to which we, through our experiments, give shape. As we laboriously make our way through the labyrinths, we can feel the same joy as the sculptor, when he gives the clay life, or the gardener, when he cuts and trims a wild hedge. (Ibid., 271.)

In the 1910s, personality psychology had not yet emerged as a distinct field within psychology. Henning Söderhjelm's booklet, *Individualiteten ur psykologisk synpunkt* (1916a; Individuality from the psychological point of view), provocatively exposed the uncertain status of the concepts "individuality" and "personality" in the works of renowned psychological researchers such as Kraepelin, Stern, and Meumann. Söderhjelm aimed to highlight the ambiguity surrounding these concepts within psychology, refraining from proposing solutions. He criticized both differential psychology and experimental pedagogy for relying on vague theories regarding the "essence" of individuality, extending his critique beyond experimental pedagogy to encompass the broader field of applied psychology (Söderhjelm 1916a; see also Söderhjelm 1916b).

Aksel Rafael Rosenqvist countered Söderhjelm's pessimistic conclusions, advocating for research into individual differences and variations in abilities and dispositions for practical pedagogical, educational, and social purposes (Rosenqvist 1917, 327–328). However, it wasn't until the 1930s that personality psychology became established as a distinct field within psychology, with Eino Kaila making pioneering contributions, albeit unrecognized at the time, even on an international scale.

Reflecting, in the 1960s, on his career, Söderhjelm recalled an encounter with Wundt at his institute in 1913:

> When the venerable Wundt opened the term [spring 1913] at his institute with a lengthy address, he emphasized that all research works conducted there must be published in the institute's journal. [...] Following this opening ceremony, Wundt was rarely seen at the institute, and when I paid an obligatory visit to his home […] he dismissed the somewhat vague work plans I presented. I was advised to discuss them with the acting professor, who oversaw the laboratory. He [Wundt] held a kind of an honorary position with the title of Geheimrath and was addressed as Excellenz. (Söderhjelm 1962, 83.)

Söderhjelm characterized the atmosphere at Leipzig University during that period as marked by evident xenophobia, staunch nationalism, and fierce competition for academic positions, a description not too dissimilar from contemporary times.

University of Helsinki

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RLBS Rolf Lagerborg's correspondence. Åbo Akademi University Library, Manuscript Collections. Turku, Finland.

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Edward Westermarck

Edward Westermarck's "Rehabilitation" after the Turn of the Millennium

OLLI LAGERSPETZ[1]

Introduction

In the first years of the twentieth century, the social sciences were still looking for a separate identity apart from philosophy. This was true in Finland, but also internationally. Edward Westermarck (1862–1939) was a Finnish philosopher, but he made an international career and became one of the leading lights of the emerging discipline of social anthropology. He started many of the research and teaching practices that today define it as an academic field. Westermarck and his students largely dominated Finnish social science during the interwar period.

In his obituary of Westermarck in 1945, Claude Lévi-Strauss praised him as the last of a generation of giants (Lévi-Strauss 1982). This recognition also implied criticism, because it meant that Westermarck's scientific approach belonged to the past. The years after the Second World War saw a relative decline of interest in Westermarck. Those who discussed him mainly associated him with outdated Evolutionist ideas (Pipping 1984). After the turn of the millennium, new work on Westermarck has appeared again at a vigorous pace. The present essay is a brief outline of this reassessment. *Several* "Westermarcks", even opposed "Westermarcks" have emerged. Such situations are hardly unusual in the history of scholarship.

[1] https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0317-2268

Westermarck: Aspects of His Career

Some features of Edward Westermarck's biography will help us understand the different strands of his work. He worked continuously on moral philosophy, but his general views did not undergo great changes after their first full-scale publication in 1906. On the other hand, in social anthropology, he not only reacted to new developments but also contributed to them in a significant way. A chief factor driving the change was the development of field research practices. Social anthropology was a very different kind of enterprise in the 1920s from what it had been in 1891, the year Westermarck published his first major work.

The book that initially made Westermarck famous was his comparative monograph on marriage and sexuality, *The History of Human Marriage* (Westermarck 1891). The following years, spent alternately in Britain, Finland and Morocco, saw the publication of his second large-scale synthesis, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (Westermarck 1906, 1908). Westermarck's two early monographs were almost complete armchair products, based on historical sources and contemporary travelogues. In 1898, Westermarck started his own anthropological fieldwork in Morocco. This commitment lasted to the end of his life. Initially, he was just looking for material for his general theory dealing with the influence of religion on morality. However, he soon learned to appreciate Moroccan popular religion as a subject in its own right. The monograph *Ritual and Belief in Morocco* (I–II, 1926) was a comprehensive presentation of his findings.

In London, Westermarck taught at London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), starting in 1904. LSE was initially one of the few places in Britain where the social sciences received serious attention (Leach 1983, 4–6, 11; Dahrendorf 1995, 97–101). Once there, Westermarck became the teacher of an entire generation of anthropologists. The closest of these disciples was undoubtedly Bronisław Malinowski. Westermarck and Malinowski later conducted their seminars together. As social anthropology expanded in the 1920s and '30s, their shared students secured teaching positions in Britain and the Commonwealth. In historical presentations, they usually count as Malinowski's students. However, they should be

included in the assessment of Westermarck's intellectual legacy.[2]

Politically, Westermarck was bourgeois liberal. He gave public support to causes such as freedom of religion, female suffrage and sexual rights. In his student years, he had imbibed lasting influences from the modernising ideologies that swept Europe in the 1880s (Heidegren 2006, Dahlberg 2021). While in London, Westermarck established contacts with British intellectuals, mainly of Liberal persuasion (Lagerspetz & Suolinna 2014, 22–26). After 1899, he mobilised international support for the Finnish constitution against Russian government encroachments (Rantanen 2014). At home, he supported Swedish language rights against Finnish ethnic nationalism. He believed that autonomous cultural institutions were the best way to safeguard language rights. This contributed to his decision to leave Helsinki and move to the newly established Åbo Akademi University in 1918 (Lagerspetz & Suolinna 2014, 71–73).

Relative Oblivion and Revival

There is an element of hagiography in the current Finnish Westermarck revival. Presentations often include the lament that Westermarck, once an internationally famous scholar, is no longer receiving the attention he so evidently deserves (cf. Roos 2008, Pipatti 2023).[3] However, the authors are aware that Westermarck never completely faded into oblivion, at least not in Finland. Westermarck has constantly enjoyed the solid reputation of a *nationally* important "Great Man".

The two decades after Westermarck's death saw the publication of memoirs and appraisals of Westermarck by his Finnish students. They remain the main source of biographical work today (Lagerborg 1951, Lagerborg 1953, Hirn 1947, Numelin 1947). *Westermarck Society*, founded initially in 1940 to

[2] At LSE, Westermarck held a Chair in "Sociology", not "Social Anthropology". This is a contributing reason to his relative invisibility in presentations of the development of social anthropology (David Shankland, Westermarck Webinar, Åbo Akademi University Library, 23 November 2023).

[3] Thus, according to Roos (2008, 135), "Nowadays Westermarck is practically forgotten outside of Finland".

commemorate the great scholar, later became the chief professional society of Finnish sociologists. In Finnish academic life, Westermarck's former students remained in positions of influence up to the 1950s. Nevertheless, with the emergence of a new generation of social scientists, there was a general reshuffling of priorities. The focus of social science shifted from premodern cultures to industrial societies and their social problems. Westermarck did not conduct research on industrial society, even if he was an active contributor to social debate (e.g. Westermarck 1936; see Timosaari 2017).

The first reappraisals of Westermarck in Finland came in the 1970s, coinciding with revived interest in anthropology. In 1971, a teaching position was created in Helsinki for Arne Runeberg (1912–1979). Runeberg was a student of Westermarck's disciples Gunnar Landtman and Rafael Karsten and sometimes described as "the last Westermarckian" (Saarniemi 2003). In 1973, the authoritative volume on the history of Finnish sociology included a long chapter on social anthropology and ethnography, chiefly dealing with Westermarck and his disciples (second edition: Alapuro, Alestalo & Haavio-Mannila, eds. 1992, 44–76). In philosophy, the *Acta Philosophica Fennica* volume of 1982, with Timothy Stroup as the editor, became a standard reference for those who work on Westermarck (Stroup, ed. 1982). Stroup, while researching for his doctoral thesis (Stroup 1982), made use of Westermarck's papers in the Åbo Akademi University library. His thesis remains a valuable treatment of Westermarck's ethical theory. At Åbo, there was also Knut Pipping, sociologist and Westermarck's relative who published small-scale studies on his grand uncle (1976, 1984). In psychology, Juhani Ihanus published a book-length study in 1990 (Ihanus 1990; Ihanus 1999; see also Ihanus 2014, Ihanus 2017). The focus of that well-documented work was on Westermarck's disciplinary and methodological positions between biology, sociology/anthropology and psychology, including his (strained) relation with the psychoanalytic movement. In 1998, Mikko Salmela published his book on Finnish philosophers of culture. The section on Westermarck includes 87 pages (Salmela 1998, 23–110), focusing on Westermarck's ethics and his biography.

After the turn of the millennium, the Finnish Westermarck revival has been ongoing. Two interdisciplinary research

projects have focused on Westermarck with Olli Lagerspetz (2008–2012) and Petteri Pietikäinen (2014–2018) as the Principal Investigators (see Lagerspetz & al., eds. 2017 and Pipatti & Pietikäinen, eds. 2021). Westermarck's archives belong to the national UNESCO Memory of the World register since 2021. A major digitisation initiative is currently under way, promising to make more of the collection widely accessible.

Outside Finland, one milestone was the conference at the University of Rabat, Morocco, with the theme *Westermarck et la Société Marocaine* in May 1992 (Bourquia & Al Harras, eds. 1993). In December 2011, a symposium was held at the University of London in connection with the setting up of a memorial plaque on the University Senate House (Shankland, ed. 2014).

Main Strands of the Current Revival

In a rough first outline, current reassessment efforts include four main areas, obviously with overlaps: (1) Westermarck's *biography* and his role in Finnish intellectual life; (2) Westermarck's contribution to *social anthropology*; (3) Westermarck's *theory of morality*, especially (4) his *evolutionary theory of incest*.

(1) No full *biography* of Westermarck is yet in existence, apart from his own memoirs (1929) and Rolf Lagerborg's indispensable supplementary book (1951). Understandably, Finnish authors are responsible for most of the recent work. That work includes Niina Timosaari's (2017) book on Westermarck's liberal activities. Julia Dahlberg (2021) has described the cultural milieu of Edward Westermarck's early years, which she has also discussed in her biography of Edward Westermarck's sister Helena (2018). Olli Lagerspetz and Kirsti Suolinna have investigated Edward Westermarck's intellectual networks in Finland and Great Britain (Lagerspetz & Suolinna 2014, Lagerspetz & Suolinna 2022). Otto Pipatti (2023) has published an overview of Westermarck's sociological "school" in Finland. Biographies or monographs, mostly in Finnish or Swedish, are available of several of Westermarck's Finnish students.[4]

(2) In earlier presentations of the *history of social anthropology*, Westermarck's student Malinowski usually receives the credit

[4] For details, see the bibliography of Pipatti 2023.

for developing modern fieldwork practices. Today, Westermarck's crucial contribution is increasingly recognised (see below for detail).

(3) Westermarck's *theory of morality* combined ethical relativism with a theory of moral emotions. Philosophers usually treat relativism as the obvious thing to avoid; Westermarck was one of the few philosophers who presented a detailed case *in favour of* it (for a modern response to Westermarck, see Cook 1999). His central thesis concerned the ultimate meaning of moral predicates (Westermarck 1932, 117–147). On this point, Westermarck engaged in polemic with G. E. Moore's intuitionism (Kronqvist 2017b). Westermarck argued that moral judgments are expressive of responses, mainly related to retribution (see Hultberg 2012, 187–322). "At bottom", they are not descriptions of subject-independent reality, and hence have no validity beyond the emotional tendencies they express. However, we *tend to* generalise them and give them objective status. Moral judgments go beyond mere reactions because they claim disinterestedness and, consequently, impartiality and the expectation that they are generally shared (Westermarck 1906, I: 104–105). Responses interact with cognitive elements and give rise to ideas of a moral law. In effect, Westermarck proposed a theory of institutionalisation, where widely shared emotions crystallise in customs, law and religion (Fletcher 1982).

The emphasis on instinctive response rather than reasoning as the source of moral motivation is also central in current Neo-Sentimentalist ethical theory. Neo-sentimentalist philosopher Jesse Prinz acknowledges Westermarck as a predecessor, but does not follow his theory closely and does not discuss it beyond this general recognition (Kronqvist 2017a, 143). In sum, perhaps the philosophically most interesting idea in Westermarck's ethics is the suggestion that, in the analysis of moral judgments, the best model is reaction, not the descriptive sentence. It appears to me that this philosophical interest has not yet reached its full potential.

Westermarck's theory of the *origin* of morality relied on his reading of British Empiricists, especially Adam Smith, combined with Darwin's idea of natural selection (Pipatti 2019). While Westermarck rejected rationally grounded normative ethics, he assumed a shared nature that we have in common

with other humans and, in some key respects, also with other animals (Tuomivaara 2019). Some contemporary readers of Westermarck (Durkheim 1907; Briffault 1927) indeed saw his idea of a human nature as his sneaky attempt to reintroduce universality through the back door, and even to prop up conventional morality and monogamy. In fact, Westermarck's ideas of human nature have later come in handy for "Alt-Right" thinkers such as Larry Arnhart, and neoliberal conservatives, including Francis Fukuyama (Lepistö 2017).

(4) In international debate, the most visible effort (partially) to resurrect Westermarck's moral theory is taking place in Evolutionary Psychology and Sociobiology (see below for detail).

To sum up this first overview, current "rehabilitations" of Westermarck involve separate and indeed opposed strains of thought. Stroup's work (1982) apparently remains the only modern, book-length *philosophical* exploration of Westermarck's ethics. The next two sections present the main two internationally visible rehabilitation attempts: the reassessment of his contribution to social anthropology and, secondly, the construal of Westermarck as "the first sociobiologist".

Reassessment of the Paradigm Shift in Social Anthropology

As David Shankland has quipped, most presentations divide the history of social anthropology into *AM* and *PM* – that is, Ante-Malinowski and Post-Malinowski (2014, 19). Victorian anthropology started as an armchair exercise, epitomised by Evolutionists like E. B. Tylor and J. G. Frazer. Supposedly, a sudden revolution took place after the Great War, when Malinowski returned from his research trip in the Antipodes to introduce modern fieldwork methods and Functionalism. It fell on Westermarck in this periodization to stand with Tylor and Frazer as one of the Victorians.

In fact, Westermarck contributed in many ways to the sea change that undoubtedly took place in the interwar period. Two aspects of his work are relevant here: firstly, his role as developer of social anthropological practices; secondly, the commonalities between Westermarck and Malinowski in terms of theory and method.

(1) Westermarck perfected his fieldwork methods in Morocco from 1898 onwards. He would stay in the target society for a considerable period and acquire a network of local informants (*Sîdi* 'Abd-es-Salam El-Baqqali being the most important one). His reports on customs and folklore would rely on direct information from locals, never on hearsay from neighbouring communities or from Europeans. Westermarck also insisted on the importance of learning the local languages, while others were still relying on interpreters and Pidgin English (Pipping 1976). These practices are now standard in the anthropological profession.

In Morocco itself, according to Rahma Bourquia[5], ethnographers and linguists recognise his work as a "treasury" of material not available in other sources, domestic or European. His work compares favourably with contemporary works by other foreigners, which are more superficial and tend to deal in Orientalist stereotypes. Westermarck also left a wealth of photographs from his field trips, some of which resurfaced in the 1990s (Suolinna, af Hällström & Lahtinen, eds. 2000).

In some respects, Westermarck's field reporting is nevertheless old-fashioned in comparison with Malinowski. He provides little information on his individual informants. He presents his findings thematically, looking for specific customs, their history, spread and variations. He never focuses on the local communities as such, their economies and internal dynamics. Unlike Malinowski, Westermarck did not primarily look on customs and beliefs as mutually dependent elements of "the organic whole" of communal life (Westermarck 1929, 298–299; Westermarck 2014, 193; Shankland 2019, 54). For instance, Westermarck's comprehensive descriptions of "holiness" or blessing (*baraka*) in Morocco would permit an analysis of its role in the political dynamics of Moroccan society, but Westermarck never connected those dots (see Lagerspetz & Suolinna 2017).

An issue that loomed large on the anthropological debate was the opposition between comparative syntheses and in-depth studies focusing on *one* community. In early anthropology, the object of study was, in principle, all of humanity. Such

[5] Westermarck Webinar, Åbo Akademi University Library, 23 November 2023.

comparative syntheses relied on second-hand material that was often of low quality. The idea that anthropology needed to gain depth through investigations of individual localities gained traction when actual field studies became available. Westermarck's British colleague A. C. Haddon was among those who raised this point early on. In a letter to Westermarck in 1908, Haddon included a summary of what was needed: geographically limited, but intensive studies. He contrasted such studies with random accounts by travellers (Haddon to Westermarck 20.7.1908; ÅAB: EW). At the time, Westermarck had already spent years in Morocco and fully agreed on the need of intensive field studies. Westermarck's idea was that local studies would later serve as material for large-scale syntheses.

In effect, the synthetic ideal lost much of its appeal, as the field study became the favoured format of anthropological research. The format as such naturally directs one's focus towards the internal dynamics of particular societies. The need of at least some form of functional approach is more or less implicit. Westermarck, too, contributed to this shift of focus, in practice if not in theory. If his early comparative monographs appeared old-fashioned already in the 1920s, it was partly his own doing.

(2) Evolutionism was at first the central frame of reference for social anthropology, but during the interwar period, it gradually lost ground to Functionalism. The Evolutionists' main purpose was to clarify the "origins" of social institutions. However, Westermarck's notion of origin was already ambiguous in a way it was not for earlier Evolutionists. Frazer had understood the "origin" of a social phenomenon simply as its historical or prehistoric past. For Westermarck, "origin" meant *also*, and *primarily*, the psychological forces that uphold an institution at present (Westermarck 2014, 191, 196). It seems that, at the time he wrote his early monographs, he did not feel the need to stress the distinction. *The History of Human Marriage* engages the question of origins in two ways. The study of *historical* origins confirms that monogamy is the dominant form of human sexuality; the study of *emotional* origins explains why this is the case.

Westermarck's most explicit treatment of the different meanings of "origin" came in his last major public lecture, the

Huxley Memorial Lecture of 1936 with the title, "Methods in Social Anthropology" (Westermarck 2014). While preparing the lecture, he had "a long talk" with Malinowski (Westermarck to Malinowski 16.6.1936, Yale: BM; cf. Malinowski to Westermarck 19.6.1936, ÅAB: EW; Lagerspetz & Suolinna 2022). Already in 1928, at Westermarck's and Malinowski's joint seminar on the incest prohibition, Malinowski had stated his view that "origins" should really mean "function" or "survival value" (Malinowski, "Notes ...", LSE: BM). In his Huxley lecture, Westermarck was critical of both Freudians and structural functionalists like Radcliffe-Brown. In contrast, he had only praise for Malinowski, whose method he described as "functional" (Westermarck 2014, 193, 194, 201).

Malinowski's theory of the incest prohibition (Malinowski 1927, 251) was different from Westermarck's, but it built on Westermarck's idea that we should not look at its past, but at present biological, emotional and social conditions. It capitalises on Westermarck's understanding of the family as the crucial interface between biology and social life. A central idea here was that of *social institutions*, which Malinowski got from Westermarck's lecture course as a student (Young 2004, 172; Shankland 2019, 59). Both understood that the relation between institutions and individual psychology was a two-way affair, but unlike Malinowski, Westermarck mainly focused on how emotions "give rise to" institutions rather than the other way around.

An important source of the Malinowski myth was Malinowski himself, who liked to present himself as the initiator of a completely novel "New Anthropology". This was despite the fact that Malinowski, still in 1937, described Westermarck as his "most important scientific influence" (Malinowski 1937, quoted in Firth 1960, 5). It appears that both thinkers learned from each other.

Westermarck as "the First Sociobiologist"

The internationally most visible attempt to revive Westermarck has focused on an argument he presented in *The History of Human Marriage* (Westermarck 1891, 342–352). According to many authors, Westermarck was offering a blueprint for a future evolutionary science of human behaviour. Finnish

authors who have highlighted Westermarck as a precursor of evolutionary psychology include Jan Antfolk in psychology (Antfolk 2014; Antfolk & Wolf 2017) and, in social science, Ullica Segerstråle (2017), J. P. Roos (2008), and Heikki Sarmaja (2020). This other revival deals almost exclusively with Westermarck's theory of incest. The interest here is not just historical, but modern researchers hope to use it as the paradigm for further work.

According to Westermarck's well-known theory, the idea of incestuous relations evokes a genetically determined aversion or disgust in humans. Close proximity during early childhood activates sexual avoidance between people who have grown up together. This is known as "the Westermarck effect". There is evolutionary sense in this, because humans typically grow up together with siblings, and sex between siblings carries risks of deformations and hereditary diseases in the offspring. Westermarck's theory also includes the further, separate claim that cultural exogamy rules are "based" on the instinctive aversion. As, among others, Antfolk (2014) points out, the theory thus consists of several, logically independent items.

Many researchers treat the Westermarck effect as confirmed, while some have voiced doubts (Cofnas 2020). American anthropologist Arthur P. Wolf (1932–2015) spent a lifetime looking for an empirical confirmation of the Westermarck effect (Wolf 1995). His work, from the late fifties onwards, was based on demographic material and fieldwork in Taiwan, focusing on pre-arranged marriages between people who were raised together. Such marriages resulted in fewer children and more divorces than the mainstream, which is consistent with the Westermarck hypothesis. For his part, Wolf considered the matter settled – the only reasons for resistance being religious and political prejudices and the fear that research money would go to biological anthropology instead of social science (Wolf 2014, 101). Thus, in 2014, he explicitly connected Westermarck's theory of incest with the politically sensitive debate on the roles of "nature vs. nurture" in human behaviour.

Edward O. Wilson has constantly seen the incest taboo as a paradigm case of how "[t]he genes hold culture on a leash" (Wilson 1978, 167). Ullica Segerstråle (2017) has traced Wilson's increasing acknowledgement of Westermarck; here we follow her presentation. In his famous *Sociobiology* (1975),

Wilson did not mention Westermarck. He nevertheless included references to Wolf and unmistakably Westermarckian ideas. In 1978, Wilson's book *On Human Nature* referred to Westermarck directly (1978, 229, note 36). Finally, in his *Consilience*, Wilson fully acknowledged his source (Wilson 1998, 190). For Wilson, Westermarck's hypothesis was a paradigm case of the thesis that cultural universals are typically "adaptive", i.e., outcomes of natural selection mechanisms. In an attempted paraphrase of Westermarck, he stated that "people avoid incest because of a hereditary epigenetic rule of human nature that they have translated into taboos" (1998, 193). Later, Wilson gave Westermarck still further recognition (Wilson 2012). As Segerstråle puts it, "[o]ver time, it appears that Westermarck's thesis has become a keystone in Wilson's own creative theory construction", "a model for a naturalistic explanation of human behaviour" (Segerstrale 2017, 100, 103).

After the turn of the millennium, Evolutionary Psychologists (e.g., Lieberman, Tooby & Cosmides 2003) have similarly treated Westermarck as the prototype for the idea that morality can be explained in terms of the individual's evolutionary fitness. The cornerstone of this new science is that moral beliefs and social organisation depend on a genetically determined, universal human nature. Natural selection gives rise to human psychology, which in turn is translated into moral norms.

A problem here is that there is no clear description of the process of translation. For instance, why are *some* psychological propensities translated but not others? In a recent paper, Cofnas (2020, 47) considers the universal human tendency to favour family members above other people. This tendency carries an obvious evolutionary advantage. Many norms of family life endorse family solidarity, and one might want to describe those norms as "translations" from genetically determined tendencies. On the other hand, most or all societies have explicit rules against nepotism. Cofnas points out that the psychological tendency towards nepotism is *not* endorsed as a moral norm but is, on the contrary, condemned in many contexts. Perhaps one might want to respond that the moral norm *against* nepotism is *also*, in an "indirect" way, a translation from the tendency *towards* nepotism. The norm developed because people recognised the *need* to counteract a universal tendency. But then, what is left of the explanatory value if the

theory allows for two opposite "translations" of the same innate tendency? Apparently, we need to look for the dynamics of social life to see why some human tendencies are perceived as destructive and worth opposing.

The relation between natural propensities and social norms remains unclear also in Wolf's findings. After all, partners in prearranged marriages did marry, they got children, and the *norm* was that they should. This highlights the fact that instincts do not *determine* the development of social norms. Westermarck understood this; he indeed spent most of his energies tracing *variations* between normative ideas. Thus, even assuming the truth of Westermarck's theory of the genetic basis of incest aversion, an explanatory gap, of which he was aware, would remain between individual psychology and the functioning of social institutions. The last item of his incest theory, "the assumption of social extension of individual aversion" (Antfolk & Wolf 2017, 79–83), remains its weakest link.

A further question is whether Westermarck's theory would be useful in explaining other social institutions besides the incest taboo. To be sure, *if* you look for genetic explanations of human behaviour in terms of evolutionary fitness, the incest taboo looks like the first place to look. *Mate selection* has, more than any other behaviour trait, a direct causal relation with the qualities of the offspring. Westermarck himself never tried to document selective pressure as the explanation of any other form of human behaviour. He pointed out in his 1936 lecture:

> [S]ocial institutions are to a very large extent primarily based on instincts. But apart from its role in the production of instincts, the principle of natural selection does not render us much help in our search for social origins (Westermarck 2014, 180).

Thus, his overall inclination is to think of natural selection as a very general background of human psychology. The human tendency towards reciprocity and retribution has carried an evolutionary advantage, and this is a cornerstone of Westermarck's theory of morality. Nevertheless, natural selection fades into the background if we are to explain specific cases of cultural development. In Westermarck's theory of institutionalisation, emotions did not directly translate into moral precepts, but they went through the filters of society and its

institutions. "Society is the school where we learn to distinguish between right and wrong" (Westermarck 1932, 50).

The authors discussed in this section explicitly connect their interpretation of Westermarck to current hot issues concerning the methods and status of the social sciences. Many of them argue that social scientists today, hooked on "social constructivism", ignore the role of "human nature", rooted in genetics and biological evolution. On their reading, Westermarck presented an alternative course for social science, one that was sadly abandoned and is only now re-emerging. At the same time, they need to ignore crucial elements of Westermarck's full-fledged theory.

Reviving a Thinker: Conclusions

Westermarck's legacy has invited a remarkable variety of revivals, and there is room for more. Supporters of both radical and conservative politics enlist Westermarck on their side. His moral relativism and well-documented liberal leanings contrast with the possible conservative implications of his theory of human nature. Westermarck's relation to modern social science is, similarly, a matter of disagreement.

The two most visible attempts at "rehabilitation" focus on quite different aspects of Westermarck's heritage. To put this in simple terms, they resurrect two different Westermarcks: The Westermarck of 1926 – the year of *Ritual and Belief in Morocco* – and the Westermarck of 1891 – the year of *The History of Human Marriage*.

In 1926, Westermarck comes across as *continuous* with modern research, including fieldwork practices. By highlighting his role as the developer of social anthropology as we today know it, we find that his legacy is still present to a higher degree than has been visible. If, instead, we focus on 1891 and *The History of Human Marriage*, which was not based on fieldwork, Westermarck comes across as a misunderstood pioneer, *discontinuous* with later social science. The latter form of Westermarck revival explicitly repudiates the current, supposedly nihilistic, state of the anthropological sciences in favour of a science of human nature firmly anchored in biology. It is, however, a very selective application of Westermarck's work.

The wider question here, which I leave open, is: What does it mean to "resurrect" a thinker? In intellectual history, one could write studies of the "resurrections" of almost all great thinkers – Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Descartes, Kant, Marx, etc. – where everyone resurrects their own version, either as a straw man or as a pioneer. The resurrected versions are never quite the same as the original.

Åbo Akademi University

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Westermarck on Demarcating the Moral from the Nonmoral

JANI SINOKKI

For a reason, Edward Westermarck's (1862–1939) moral subjectivism can be considered the place of origin of the *error theory of morality* that was later carefully articulated and defended by John Mackie (Pietarinen 2015, 158–59; Mackie 1977). According to Westermarck, although people believe and behave as if their moral convictions are objective or true independently of their beliefs, desires, and emotions, there is no such objective morality. Instead, through what Westermarck calls *objectivization*, we come to project our emotional states of approving and disapproving certain actions onto those actions as if the moral goodness or badness resided in such actions independently of ourselves and our emotions.

Given that there is no objective morality, truths of which are independent of human moral cognition, and given the obvious fact that people behave as if moral judgments are objective (not to mention the philosophers who devise theories trying to justify moral judgments objectively; see Westermarck 1932, chaps. 1–2), a conceptual problem arises. We speak of morality and express moral value judgments, but how does this category of statements and judgments differ from judgments about nonmoral things? One possibility for a subjectivist, such as Westermarck, would be to argue for *simple* or *plain* emotivism (or emotionism, see, e.g., Prinz 2007), a view according to which our moral statements express only our emotions or dispositions to feel them in certain ways under certain circumstances. This is not Westermarck's view, although many critics mistakenly attributed it to him (for a thorough discussion, see Stroup 1982, 199ff; see also 1984). In fact, Westermarck believes that despite the subjectivity of morals, the domain of morality can be clearly demarcated from the nonmoral. Furthermore, he

believes that his complex emotionism grounded in an evolutionary explanation of morality has conceptual resources to draw a clear line between the categories of moral and nonmoral.

In this paper, I wish first to problematize Westermarck's claim and argue that his conceptual resources do not demarcate moral from nonmoral in the ordinary sense. However, I will point out that this problem can be considered mostly verbal. Westermarck's general position amounts to the view that morality is more like some other cases of normativity we usually do not consider moral at all. The complex psychological explanation he offers for morality seems to apply to all normative thinking and behavior, and as such, seems to merit more discussion. Though I will not discuss the matter in this paper, Westermarck's view has resources to avoid certain rather well-known problems ailing similar emotionist, evolutionary views about morality (see, e.g., Joyce 2009). However, I will indicate some interesting issues not altogether irrelevant for these questions, and not yet properly examined, as I describe Westermarck's general views below. In this, I will focus only on selected issues and omit discussion on many issues important for understanding Westermarck's moral philosophy.

Westermarck on the Emotional Basis of Morality

Westermarck operates in an evolutionary framework.[1] Our moral emotions and moral cognition are the results of "mental constitution which have been acquired by means of natural selection" (Westermarck 1906, 41). Our complex moral emotions have developed through ordinary evolutionary processes because they have "a tendency to promote the interests of the individuals who feel them" (ibid., 108). Further, for Westermarck, the basis of all emotions lies in pain and pleasure, the former of which we avoid and the latter of which we

[1] The intellectual development of Westermarck's views has been documented extensively, e.g., by Stroup (1982, 11–154) and Pipatti (2019, chap. 2). In this paper, I will focus on Westermarck's "mature" views, as expressed in The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas (1906) and Ethical Relativity (1932). The latter reproduces the views presented in the former, often in verbatim. Westermarck's final work Christianity and Morals (1939) closely follows the views presented in the earlier works mentioned.

seek (see, e.g., Pipatti 2019, chap. 3). From this, it follows that emotions are, for Westermarck, essentially conative states tied intimately to our motivation. Pain and pleasure, both actual and merely anticipated or imagined, incline us to action.

Westermarck focuses extensively on a special class of emotions he calls *retributive emotions* (Westermarck 1906, chap. 2; 1932, chap. 3). These emotions are intrinsically action prompts to reciprocate. They are aroused by things done unto us (or others we care about) and prompt us to respond in kind, both positively and negatively. Although Stroup (1982, 176) thinks the terminology is misleading (at least for modern English speakers), Westermarck clearly sticks close to the original Latin meaning of *retribuere*, which is simply to pay back. Paying back a compliment is often considered a positive act, paying back a loan neutral (i.e., doing one's duty does not merit praise), and paying back for an insult or a harm (revenge) is usually considered negative. However, in Westermarck's sense, all are forms of retribution.

The view that some of our emotions are hard-wired modes of conduct of paying kindness back with kindness and harmful actions by avenging them is a crucial insight of Westermarck. Postulating such intrinsically reciprocal (social) emotions makes both altruism and vengefulness natural parts of the human condition, thus resolving the traditional problem of the emergence of altruism in the course of evolution before it even gets going (Gustafsson 2016; Lagerspetz 2017, 6–7). Moreover, the retributive nature of certain emotions evinces that emotions, for Westermarck, are primarily *action prompts*.

The view of emotions as intrinsic action prompts is important in its own right and contrasts interestingly with other views of emotions. In the context of the present discussion, however, it suffices to point out that Westermarck's view is not committed to deterministic behaviorism in a way that often occurs with similar but more mechanistic evolutionary views of sensations. First, according to Westermarck, "all higher emotions are determined by cognitions" (Westermarck 1906, 10). "Higher" can be understood here, inside a naturalistic framework, roughly as the evolutionary complexity required for an emotion to emerge in an organism. For instance, emotions depending on the evolution of sociality, such as resentment, are "higher" than more basic or primitive stimulus reactions to the

immediate environment, such as fear. Westermarck means both that our cognitions affect how emotions arise in a context (e.g., what we believe is going on affects how we emotionally respond) and that we have cognitive control over whether we engage in the action prompted by the emotion (we usually can restrain our inclinations and subject our emotions to rational scrutiny). Second, many retributive emotions depend on our attitude or "affection" toward others, which is not merely something that happens to us, for "we take an active part in its production" (Westermarck 1906, 110). As the degree of affection – whether or not others and their wellbeing matter to us – grounds our retributive emotions, we are not mere bystanders in the production of sympathy or lack thereof.

Despite emotions being intrinsic action prompts, morality is not a matter of blind impulse for Westermarck but rather something we can—and should (see ibid., 20)—subject to rational scrutiny and choose to follow on the basis of reasons. This point is in line with ethical individualism and offers an interesting way to affirm personal responsibility in an emotivist framework.

Objectivization

According to Westermarck, moral concepts are generalizations over tendencies of objects (mainly acts) to cause certain emotions in us. It is mostly this aspect in Westermarck's view that has been grossly misinterpreted by many philosophical commentators (see Stroup 1982, 199ff; 1984). For instance, Richard Brandt states, "To say that an action is reprehensible, according to Westermarck, is essentially to say: 'I have a tendency to feel moral disapproval toward the agents of all acts like this one'" (Brandt 1959, 166 quoted in Stroup 1984, 577). Westermarck never held such a position Brandt attributes to him (a position we can label *simple* or *plain emotivism*) but instead focused on our tendency to objectivize our emotions.

However, as we objectivize our emotions, we are essentially confusing those emotions with the dispositional qualities of objects that are responsible for arousing such emotions. Moral concepts—such as good and bad, duty, obligation, and merit—are, for Westermarck, generalizations over such dispositions:

> Whilst not affirming the actual existence of any specific emotion in the mind of the person judging or of anybody else, the predicate of a moral judgment attributes to the subject a tendency to arouse an emotion. The moral concepts, then, are essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral emotions. (ODMI, 4–5.)

Westermarck states that, in his view, a moral judgment is not about the emotion but about a dispositional property in the action to arouse an emotional response in us. The mistake Brandt, among many others, makes is one of confusing the reference to a dispositional property of an object with a reference to a disposition to feel in a certain way.

Here, Westermarck is with the sentimentalist tradition that dissected the many ways in which we project our experiential states onto the external reality. Hume stated it to be a "common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion" (Hume 2007, 112; 1.3.14). Our experiences become objectivized through our confusion of those experiences with the dispositions in objects to arouse such experiential responses in our minds. The same applies to moral experiences as well:

> By calling an object warm or pleasant, a person asserts that it is apt to produce in him a sensation of heat or a feeling of pleasure. Similarly, to name an act good or bad, ultimately implies that it is apt to give rise to an emotion of approval or disapproval in him who pronounces the judgment. Whilst not affirming the actual existence of any specific emotion in the mind of the person judging or of anybody else, the predicate of a moral judgment attributes to the subject a tendency to arouse an emotion. (Westermarck 1906, 4.)

The basic mechanism of objectivization relevant to moral judgments is this. First, an act arouses in us an emotion of approval or disapproval. Then, our tendency to confuse our experiences with the properties that cause them forges a constant connection between the emotion and its external cause. Third, we generalize over the external causes while confounding them with our emotional responses. As a result, an action that (for instance) has the propensity to arouse negative emotions in us is

labeled "bad", as if all along the experiential negative quality was an objective feature of the action type in question.

Retributive Emotions

Moral emotions are a special class of retributive emotions that arise from human actions directed at us. Objectivization is a necessary feature of moral emotions and concepts. However, many other things, such as beauty or sensory experiences, are habitually objectivized as well.

Westermarck divides retributive emotions into two categories: *resentment* and *retributive kindly emotions* (Westermarck 1906, 21; 1932, 63). The former class of emotions has a negative valence (i.e., experiencing them is painful), and the latter has a positive valence (i.e., they are pleasurable). Both of these categories comprise both moral and nonmoral emotions. Anger and revenge are instances of nonmoral resentment, while nonmoral retributive kindly emotion, including gratitude, are instances of positive emotions. The moral counterparts in the categories are labeled moral disapproval and moral approval, respectively. (Ibid.) In what follows, I will mostly focus on the negative retributive emotions falling under the head of *resentment* because they not only occupy considerably more space in Westermarck's discussion than their positive counterpart but are also viewed by him as a more important class of moral emotions (see Stroup 1982, 162).

The basic mechanism by which retributive emotions turn into moral emotions is through socialization. The basic affection exhibited by all gregarious animals to family or close relatives (e.g., to our offspring) is extended, through increased social interaction, to encompass others as well. As socialization increases, we come to care for the interests and well-being of others as well. When we witness an action, say, violence toward someone, that arouses resentment in us, we come to objectivize the negative emotion as a general trait of the type of action in question. However, because of our affection—the fact that others and their wellbeing matter to us—we can feel similar emotions of indignation when the victim of violence is someone else than ourselves. In Westermarck's view, such social feelings were once in our evolutionary history the basis of

the first tribal customs. The birth of such tribal customs also marks the emergence of morality.

Disinterestedness and Impartiality

That the birth of morality coincides with the invention of the first tribal custom relates to the special characteristics of moral emotions and concepts. Namely, there are two further but related components that distinguish moral emotions from nonmoral emotions: *disinterestedness* and *impartiality*.[2] The resentment felt when a violation of a tribal custom, or any moral principle, is perceived as taking place differs from the resentment one feels when something harmful is done to oneself. The emotion in the first case is felt disinterestedly. Although Westermarck is less than precise regarding this terminology (see Stroup 1982, 165–66), disinterestedness signifies "not being related to one's own interests." However, the emotion has another further characteristic: that it is felt impartially. Impartiality is another side of the same coin as disinterestedness. This feeling arises merely from perceived violation, regardless of who is the perpetrator; it is independent of the agents in question (Westermarck 1932, 93). One plausible way to think about the relation between disinterestedness and impartiality is to think of them as two steps on the same track to the (purported) universality of morality. Disinterestedness marks an abstraction that sets aside any features that depend on my interests in the matter at hand. Impartiality signals a further abstraction, one that does away with references to any particular person or an agent. In this regard, it should be noted that impartiality does not need to be actual or real. The mere appearance of impartiality is sufficient: "it is not necessary that the moral emotion should be really impartial. It is sufficient

[2] To be accurate, in The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, Westermarck ascribes a third feature, generality, as a distinct feature of moral emotions. However, this notion is omitted from his later works (for discussion, see Stroup 1982, 165, 170–71; Pipatti 2019, 44). I proceed here with the simplifying assumption that impartiality subsumes also generality, as impartiality involves intellectual abstraction and seems more crucial to our tendency to objectivize moral emotion. I thank the anonymous referee for pointing out the need for this clarification.

that it is tacitly assumed to be so, nay, even that it is not knowingly partial" (Westermarck 1906, 104).

Unlike some commentators appear to think (e.g., Stroup 1982, 164–73), I do not believe that the distinction between disinterestedness and impartiality is intended to be merely conceptual. If it were, disinterestedness would be redundant because impartiality contains disinterestedness as its subclass (Westermarck 1932, 92–93). But there is a reason why Westermarck emphasizes both notions, related to the general features of this evolutionary moral psychology. As we saw above, affection is a central ingredient for explaining how socially crucial retributive emotions emerge in the course of evolution. Disinterestedness—removing myself or my personal interests out of the equation—is a feature that can be explained by affection (Westermarck 1932, 95–96). Affection to others, for Westermarck, marks an interest in their wellbeing, and thus any sympathetic feeling—for example, being pained by the sight of one's loved one's pain—is for Westermarck a disinterested retributive emotion (Westermarck 1932, 98). As affection means that the interests of the other matter to us for their own sake, and not for any self-interested reasons, the central importance of affection suffices to make all sympathetic emotions arising because of affection, by definition, disinterested.

Affection is a primitive sentiment, a disposition human-animals share with many nonhuman animals, especially mammals, whose offspring often require nurturing for a long time after birth. If this holds true, then many social, nurturing animals besides humans are also disposed to have emotions that are disinterested. Mere disinterestedness cannot suffice for morality because morality involves a stronger "flavour of generality" (Westermarck 1906, 104) than merely affection-related emotions that are felt for the sake of others' wellbeing. Impartiality, a general independence of any particular individual involved, is also at stake. Such impartiality, which abstracts all particularities away from a singular case, say, of A taking B's property and generating the moral concept of *theft*, requires cognition as well. Therefore, when someone first declared that so-and-so is a rule of conduct and the rest of the group came to penalize its violation by showing "disapproval called forth by its transgression" (Westermarck 1932, 111), they pronounced the first proper social, moral norm (Westermarck

1906, 117; 1932, 109). The emotion aroused by a perceived violation of such a norm—which norm could not exist without generality only our intellects can bring about—and can be experienced even if no one is injured or wronged is an impartially felt emotion (Westermarck 1932, 107–8). Such moral emotions are essentially social or "public emotions" (Westermarck 1906, 123).

This is an aspect of Westermarck's theory that seems to deserve more attention than it has yet received. As I see, Westermarck's reliance on two different concepts, disinterestedness and impartiality, reflects how his theory of morality is built on top of the general foundation of emotions. On the one hand, morality requires affection, and the retributive emotions intimately related to it. On the other hand, morality depends on a sufficient level of cognition that enables generalizations on the basis of those emotions. His view is two-pronged in an interesting way that is not easily accommodable in terms of the traditional distinction between cognitive and noncognitive theories of emotion or morality. In addition, if my interpretation here is correct even in the outlines, as I think it must be, Westermarck's view definitely is not simple emotivism of any kind. More importantly, it cannot easily be classified on either side of the cognitive vs. noncognitive distinction either.

Demarcating Morality

There are two distinct problems with the way Westermarck thinks his theory is able to demarcate the sphere of morality from nonmorality. First, his project risks being conceptually circular so that defining the domain of morality is actually dependent on a prior grasp of the distinction. Second, while the previous problem might not be too important given Westermarck's general empirically oriented approach, he clearly states that his notions of objectivization, disinterestedness, and impartiality are sufficient to demarcate the moral from nonmoral. This claim does not seem to be tenable on closer scrutiny.

The problem of circularity arises when we consider that moral emotions, for Westermarck, are emotions that are related to moral concepts in the *right* way. But as moral concepts are essentially differentiated from nonmoral concepts by

appeal to those emotions, the circle is evident. We need to be able to distinguish relevant *moral* concepts—such as good, bad, right, wrong, duty, obligation, and merit—from nonmoral ones to determine which emotions count as moral emotions. But those very emotions are supposedly the very thing by reference to which we distinguish moral concepts from nonmoral ones.

On its own, the problem of circularity is not too pressing for Westermarck. He could easily be content in giving a description of the relevant emotions and concepts and accept that our labeling them as moral is a matter of convention. However, although Westermarck is hostile toward the assumption of objective morality, he is not hostile against morality itself. In fact, his view in many ways presupposes that morality is an independent realm of human thought and behavior and one that has much value to us. That is, despite his extensive criticism of objectivist normative ethics, Westermarck is definitely not an eliminativist about morality. He wants to explain moral behavior not as an illusion but as a product of evolution. For this reason, it is important that his resources delineate morality independently of our ordinary concepts, conventions, and moral theories.

In light of the above discussion, it is not surprising that Westermarck is adamant that the sphere of morality is distinct from other similar phenomena precisely in terms of his three central notions: objectivization, disinterestedness, and impartiality. As objectivization is the widest notion, and by Westermarck's own admission is present in many other instances of nonmoral emotions and judgments, such as those related to beauty or sensory experiences, I will focus here mostly on the latter two notions.

The second problem arises because Westermarck claims that disinterestedness and impartiality are characteristics that distinguish moral emotions and concepts from nonmoral emotions:

> Disinterestedness, however, is not the only characteristic by which moral indignation and approval are distinguished from other, non-moral, kinds of resentment or retributive kindly emotion. It is, indeed, itself a form of a more comprehensive quality which characterises moral emotions—apparent impartiality. (Westermarck 1906, 103; see also 1932, 12).

While Westermarck thinks he has found two features that are the distinguishing marks of moral emotions and concepts, there are in fact counterexamples. Take any activity that has a normative dimension, constituted by rules, but that is not considered moral normativity, like playing chess (or speaking a language). Many of the above considerations about the emergence of morality apply to the emergence of normativity involved in games with rules, for mostly the same reasons that apply to moral normativity as well. The rules of a game compare easily to the first tribal customs: when someone suggests that they compete to achieve an aim while following certain rules, those rules are considered obligating for those engaging in that activity. Unless you follow the rules of chess, you are not playing chess, period.

Westermarck's criteria seem to apply here as well. The rules of a game are not dependent on the players' own interests, so they are disinterested.[3] The rules also apply equally to anyone desiring to play chess, so they are also impartial. Westermarck's conditions for morality seem to be satisfied by games as an activity. Let us then turn to see if the emotions aroused by such games satisfy them as well.

Now consider next someone who inadvertently breaks those rules, say, while learning to play chess. Such violations of the normative rules of a game can, and often do, arouse some emotion in us. It could even be that our ability to detect violations of such norms depends on such emotional impulses, which guide us to focus on what is going on (see, e.g., Damasio 1994). If such emotions exist, as I think they must, then they also satisfy the conditions of disinterestedness and impartiality. Westermarck's view thus falsely labels such emotions and concepts generalized on the basis of them as moral emotions and concepts, which is not correct.

Morality vs. Normativity

What kind of mistake is Westermarck, then, guilty of? I would suggest that the main mistake is merely verbal—Westermarck's view does not lead so much to a mistaken demarcation of moral from nonmoral than mislabels the sphere it

[3] Unless one is playing Calvinball, that is.
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calvin_and_Hobbes .

delineates. Westermarck worked in the late 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century, which explains why he does not pay much attention to other kinds of normativity than moral normativity. His hostility toward normative ethics reflects the ethos of his era shared by positivists and later by behaviorists. He did not know of the discussions about rule following Wittgenstein (1963/2009) or the reinvigoration of normative political theorizing by Rawls (1971/2006). Thus, it might not be too anachronistic to understand Westermarck's attempt as succeeding in delineating a wider domain than that which we call morality, simply that of *normativity*.

When something has normativity (in the relevant sense; there are other senses as well), it "entails that some action, attitude or mental state of some other kind is justified, an action one ought to do or a state one ought to be in" (Darwall 2001). Rules of game are normative in the required sense: playing chess requires committing oneself to the rules, which then entails that certain moves are allowed, others are forbidden, and that some moves are better than others given the aim of achieving a chess mate. While we would not call violations of rules of chess moral transgressions, we must still label them normative.

I wish to take up an objection someone might raise against my interpretation at this stage. Maybe the unintentional violation of a norm arouses merely surprise, because the violation conflicts with our expectations. Surprise is an odd emotion to begin with; unlike other emotions, it does not have a stable valence: surprises can be negative, positive, or possibly even neutral (Deonna and Teroni 2012, 15). Additionally, surprise is not like the emotions of moral disapproval or approval. The objection, then, is that my description above is not the only possible one in terms of our emotional response to witnessing someone breaking a rule unintentionally. Given that in such cases in which a violation is clearly unintentional (like when a chess learner moves a pawn backward), we often tend not to feel anything too negative, my suggestion might not be the most plausible one either.

To meet this objection, we need to note that while surprise, no doubt, is often an accompanying emotion to others when we witness a deviation from an expected norm, ordinary surprise cannot do the work it must do were the objection to

succeed. Surprise signals unexpectedness, a violation of our habitual predictions. However, it cannot account for the normative dimension involved in the phenomenon in question. The expectations involved in the perception of a violation of a norm are more complex than in ordinary surprise; they must relate to a prediction of a special kind, one that involves the norm itself. Surprise generally is not like this but relates to a lack of more personal foresight.

I think Westermarck is correct in thinking that the features of objectivization, disinterestedness, and impartiality capture well the features of normative thought. Thus, the emotions aroused by perceived violations of those norms will also have to depend on these features, so either surprise will not do, or it will itself be of the normative kind related to the three features in the required way.

Despite the terminological confusion, Westermarck's view captures something essential for our normative thinking. We endorse many norms of daily life only implicitly, but their violation is apt to produce an emotion of indignation in us. This instinctive emotional response often has a definite moralistic flavor. Consider some other definitely nonmoral activities that involve norms, the transgression of which causes indignation in some of us. The cases I have in mind range from road rage (i.e., outrage stemming from perceiving other drivers driving in the way they are "not supposed to") to opinions about the way a roll of toilet paper should be put on a toilet roll holder (a matter about which some seem to have quite strong opinions). An interesting case is the seriousness with which some people view linguistic norms. Careless use of language (say, someone using "medias" to unintentionally construct a double plural, because Latin "media" is already a plural) arouses in some a burst of emotional indignation they can hardly conceal, which often bars on ridiculous. In the face of such cases (and for occasionally witnessing similar indignation in myself over similar clearly insignificant matters), Westermarck's delineation seems to accurately capture the sphere of such normative emotional responses.

As a final note, we should remember that Westermarck's relativism is based on the fact that while some moral norms are almost universally accepted (such as the murder taboo), others allow much more variation due to their dependence on highly

variable human emotional responses. In this light, we could say that Westermarck's view does not confuse moral normativity with other kinds of normativity but rather aims to establish that all moral normativity is, at the bottom, of the same kind as the normativity involved in other rule-involving social interactions. Such relativism, of course, is notorious for giving rise to problems to which only objectivism seems able to offer proper answers (see, e.g., Korsgaard 1996).

However, and notably, Westermarck's own ethical worries do not seem to lie within the theoretical problems any metaethical relativism creates, such as making it virtually impossible to condemn in absolute terms even most egregious cases of abuse and dehumanization (e.g., Prinz 2007; Joyce 2009). Rather, he is worried that too many of our actual moral practices are akin to the zeal some have toward grammatical matters and that this is very harmful for those implicated by such moral convictions: "Could it be brought home to people that there is no absolute standard in morality, they would perhaps be somewhat more tolerant in their judgments, and more apt to listen to the voice of reason" (Westermarck 1906, 20). In light of the preceding discussion, Westermarck's point seems highly commendable.[4]

University of Turku

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[4] I would like to thank the audiences at the conference celebrating the 150th anniversary of the Philosophical Society of Finland held in Helsinki, October 2023, and University of Turku Philosophers Club, September 2023, for their comments and discussions on presentations that eventually grew into this paper. I owe thanks to Olli Lagerspetz, Arto Laitinen, and Teemu Toppinen for very helpful discussions on topics related to this paper. I thank the anonymous referees and editors of the volume at hand for perceptive comments and suggestions.

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Eino Kaila

Eino Kaila's Lectures on the History of Philosophy

ILKKA NIINILUOTO

The Finnish philosopher Eino Kaila (1890-1958) is best known for his systematic studies in logical empiricism (including probability logic, critical realism, and laws as invariances) and experimental psychology (including Gestalt and personality psychology). His works on the history of philosophy are less known, even though he had a keen interest in the dynamics of intellectual history. As professor of theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki in 1930-48, Kaila was a legendary and dramatic teacher with large multidisciplinary audiences. Besides logical empiricism, he lectured regularly about an historical introduction to philosophy. His lecture course on the history of philosophy from the autumn of 1939 to the spring of 1941 (interrupted by the Winter War) was recorded by shorthand and then transcribed by three of his students. The two volumes cover the periods from Plato to Galilei and from Descartes to Kant. So far, this material has been studied only by Ilkka Patoluoto in an essay in 1989. This paper gives a survey of the transcribed lectures, which provide documentation and evidence about Kaila's interpretation of some great thinkers and his views on the historical interaction between science and philosophical investigation.

Kaila's Career

Eino Kaila's career was a decisive turning point of Finnish philosophy.[1] After serving in 1922–1930 as the first professor of

[1] For surveys of Kaila's career and work, see von Wright (1979) and Niiniluoto (2017). See also the essays in Niiniluoto, Sintonen & von Wright (1992) and Niiniluoto & Pihlström (2012).

philosophy at the new Finnish University of Turku, he was appointed in 1930 as the professor of theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki, where his predecessors Johan Vilhelm Snellman, Thiodolf Rein, and Arvi Grotenfelt had represented the tradition of German idealism (Hegel, Lotze, and Neo-Kantianism).[2] During his professorship in Helsinki in 1930–1948 Kaila became the leading philosopher in Finland; he was also the President of the Philosophical Society of Finland in 1936–1952. In 1948 Kaila was elected to be one of the first ten members of the Academy of Finland.

Kaila was a dramatic personality with restless search, passionate seriousness, and complete devotion in all his activities. His fame as a charismatic lecturer reflected his artistic orientation: in the 1910s he worked part time as a literary and theatre critic and a dramaturge of the Finnish National Theatre. But his main scholarly ambition was in theoretical philosophy, i.e. philosophy of science and experimental, Gestalt and personality psychology.[3] Kaila's early articles on Mach, James, Haeckel, Höffding, and Bergson were not historical studies but rather critical dialogues with contemporary thinkers. He translated books by Schopenhauer and Hume, and later published in Finnish shorter historical essays on Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Snellman, and Renan.[4] His 1940 monograph on the three hundred years of the University of Helsinki (published in Finnish, German, and French) outlines the development of this academic institution in the context of the history of ideas.

But, above all, Kaila wished to be systematic philosopher. Already in 1920, he defended against Mach's phenomenalism the realist interpretation of scientific theories which postulate theoretical entities (like atoms). After 1923 he sought contact with the representatives of the new exact philosophy, first

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[2] See Manninen et al. (2021). In Helsinki, psychology was included in theoretical philosophy until 1948. In practical philosophy, the school of the moral philosopher and sociologist Edward Westermarck was influential in the first half of the 20th century. Kaila's main rival in 1930, J. E. Salomaa, was primarily continuing the traditional approach to the history of philosophy.

[3] Kaila's doctoral dissertation in 1916 dealt with motivation and decision making, and his main contribution to psychology was the book *Persoonallisuus* (1934).

[4] For Kaila's bibliography, see Manninen & Niiniluoto (2007), 150–158.

Hans Reichenbach and then Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap. Even though Kaila was not a formal logician, he was impressed by the use of novel logical methods as a tool of philosophy.[5] In his 1926 monograph on probability logic, *Wahrscheinlichkeitslogik*, Kaila called his position "logical empiricism", in contrast to older psychological empiricism. He visited the Vienna Circle in 1929 and published in 1930 the first philosophical critique of the phenomenalistic constitution system of Carnap's *Aufbau*.[6] Kaila spent the spring terms of 1932 and 1934 in Vienna, developing and defending his own version of logical empiricism.

As the new professor of theoretical philosophy in Helsinki, Kaila quickly introduced logical empiricism in the curriculum, and educated the next generation of professors of philosophy (G. H. von Wright, Oiva Ketonen, and Erik Stenius) and psychology (Kai von Fieandt, Arvo Lehtovaara).[7] His widely read monograph *Inhimillinen tieto*, published in Finnish and Swedish in 1939, summarized the four main theses of logical empiricism: the denial of the synthetic a priori, testability, translatability, and logical behaviorism.[8] The key concept of invariance or regularity is taken from Kaila's 1936 monograph *Über das System der Wirklichkeitsbegriffe*, where three levels of reality (phenomenal, physical, physico-scientific) are distinguished by their increasing "degree of invariance".[9] The book on human knowledge also included a suggestive account of the historical transition from the Aristotelian to the Galilean conception of knowledge.[10]

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[5] For Kaila's 1930 statement on the new method of philosophy, see Kaila (2003).

[6] See Kaila (1979), Essay 1.

[7] For Kaila's influence on analytic philosophy in Finland, see Haaparanta and Niiniluoto (2003).

[8] For the English translation, see Kaila (2014). Kaila himself did not publish philosophical works in English during his lifetime. His four important German monographs were translated into English in the volume *Reality and Experience* (1979).

[9] For English translation, see Kaila (1979), Essay 2.

[10] In an essay review of Kaila (2014), Nemeth (2016) praises Kaila's way of embedding logical empiricism into the history of epistemology. She suggests that the received view of logical empiricism would have changed, if a translation of Kaila's historically sensitive book had appeared in due time.

As an Academician in 1948–1958, Kaila had a highly esteemed position in Finland, but he was isolated from the new English-speaking analytic philosophy, with its emphasis on the philosophy of language. Already in his 1929 book on "the contemporary world outlook", *Nykyinen maailmankäsitys*, Kaila had stressed the common origin of philosophy and science in the need to understand reality, which means that "philosophy is the alpha and omega of scientific thinking"; he further argued that philosophy is strictly against metaphysics,[11] and to construct a world view one has to study the best scientific theories about time and space, matter, life, and soul. In the 1950s, Kaila's main effort was in his synthetic unitary philosophy of nature, based on the interpretation of the quantum theory and other holistic "field theories", but this gigantic project was interrupted by his death in 1958 at the age of 68.

Kaila's Lectures

Professor Kaila attracted students from all fields to his lectures in Helsinki. The students were grateful for the opportunity to follow a new mainstream intellectual movement, but Kaila's success was also due to his personal style and dramatic performance as a teacher. Therefore, it is interesting to note that during the years 1931–1948 Kaila lectured on logic, epistemology, and psychology, but he also regularly gave courses related to the history of philosophy:

- 1933–34 historical introduction to philosophy
- 1935–36 history of the problem of knowledge
- 1937–38 history of philosophy
- 1939–41 history of philosophy
- 1942–43 historical introduction to philosophy
- 1944–45 historical introduction to philosophy
- 1945–46 historical introduction to philosophy

[11] Kaila (1934) stated that religions and metaphysical systems are "wishful dreams" and "mental insurance institutions".

- 1946–47 historical introduction to philosophy.

The official teaching load was four double hours per week. For some of these lectures, Kaila made handwritten or typed notes for himself, but he always spoke freely and walked back and forth in front of his audience. But despite his exceptional fame as a legendary teacher, there is no filmed or taped material on Kaila's lectures or speeches.[12]

However, luckily a unique source for one of his lecture series is available for readers and scholars.[13] Kaila announced courses on psychology and the history of philosophy for the academic year 1939–1940, but they were interrupted by the Winter War which lasted from the 30th of November 1939 to the 13th of March in 1940. Kaila started his lectures on the history of philosophy in early September 1939, but had to end them on the 28th of September. Probably he repeated these first lectures in early September 1940, continuing with new themes with Socrates on the 26th of September in 1940. The second part of the course, starting from Descartes, was then given in the spring of 1941. The oral lectures in 1939 – 1941 were recorded by shorthand and then transcribed by three of his students: Pentti Sariola, Pentti Väistö, and Veikko Salonen.[14] The typed

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[12] The University of Helsinki awarded its best teacher in 1990–2012 with an annual Eino Kaila Prize. Respect for philosophers can be seen in the fact that the annual award for public information is called the Snellman Prize.

[13] As far as I know, only one exemplar of this typed "book" with green covers has remained in Kaila's library. Its photocopy is preserved in the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archive in Helsinki.

[14] The personal history of the three students is slightly enigmatic. The handwritten text on the first page tells that Pentti Sariola "fell as a hero on 27.12.45". But as Finland was not in war any more at the end of 1945, I believe that this is a misprint. Instead, Pentti Sariola (1918–1941) enrolled in Helsinki as a student of philosophy in 1937, moved later to the University of Technology, and fell as a hero on the 27th of November 1941. Pentti Väistö finished a MA degree and moved to dentistry. Veikko Salonen (1919–1992) published in 1944 a paper on "reduction principles" (dispositional concepts) in the yearbook *Ajatus*, and it was reviewed in the *Journal of Symbolic Logic* in December 1945 by G. H. von Wright. Surprisingly, on the 8th of August 1945, only four weeks after Kaila had received the lecture notes from Veikko Salonen, Kaila wrote a letter to von Wright telling him that Salonen is "not undangerous" due to his paranoid "delusion of persecution" directed against himself and von Wright (Österman 2020, 196). (I am

copy was given to his professor by Veikko Salonen on the 9th of July 1945. The two volumes cover the periods from pre-Socratics and Plato to Galileo (Part I, 317 pages) and from Descartes to Kant (Part II, 257 pages). This carefully prepared source reports his lectures, sentence by sentence, word by word, showing his tone and dramatic effects. So far, this material has been studied only by Ilkka Patoluoto (1946–1989) in an essay on Eino Kaila's view on the growth of knowledge in 1989. In the next two sections, I will go through the main ideas of Kaila's lecture course, and then conclude with an evaluation.

How to Present the History of Philosophy?

Kaila starts by expressing his dissatisfaction with traditional textbook versions of the history of philosophy, which present doctrines "without organic unity and progress" (I, 1).[15] The history of philosophy is "the top of an intellectual tree" rooted in social, religious, scientific, and economic conditions, but such presentation of the development of world views would be a too mighty task (I, 2).[16] Kaila's approach in the lectures follows what Richard Rorty (1984) calls "rational reconstruction": dead philosophers are treated as conversational partners, as colleagues with whom one can exchange views, so that one is able to engage in a philosophical dialogue with past masters. This is shown by the fact that Kaila gives special attention to problems that occupied him in his own systematic

grateful for this observation to Bernt Österman.) As Kaila was a professional psychologist, whose brother Martti was professor of psychiatry, he would not make such an evaluation without some reason. Perhaps he had in mind the murder of Moritz Schlick in Vienna in 1936 by a mentally disturbed student. Be this as it may, Veikko Salonen published his dissertation *Über die Reduzierbarkeit der Realbegriffe* in Turku in 1951, defended his doctoral thesis in 1952, and became a beloved long-time rector of an adult education center in Toijala. His brother Armas Salonen was a renowned professor of oriental studies and assyriology in Helsinki.

[15] Thus, Kaila is against what Rorty (1984) calls "doxography".

[16] However, Kaila's (1940) monograph on the 300 years of the University of Helsinki belongs to such "history of ideas".

writings.[17] At the same time, Kaila is practicing "historical reconstruction", as his presentation is based on a careful reading of original texts and their tacit presuppositions.[18]

Kaila's book *Persoonallisuus* (1934) formulated an account of dynamic psychology, which explains human behavior by animal, mental, and deep-mental needs. For some reason, in these historical lectures he does not develop this kind of psychology of philosophy e.g. by showing how classical metaphysics functions as "mental insurance". He is keener to apply his dynamic psychology to the common origin of philosophy and science, viz. the need to understand[19] the world, to master intellectually its variety by invariances (I, 2-4). From this perspective, the main theme of Kaila's lectures is the growth of knowledge about reality by means of the interplay of philosophy and science.

Patoluoto (1989) compares Kaila's view on the growth of knowledge to Karl Popper's (1963) schema **P1 → TT → EE → P2**, where P1 is the initial problem, TT is a tentative theory, EE is error elimination, and P2 is the new problem situation. Indeed, Kaila describes the interplay of "ascending" rationalists and "descending" empiricists by this kind of pattern. Patoluoto also suggests some modifications of Popper's schema, where the initial problem is followed by several tentative theories and the task is to choose the best of them by empirical tests. It is significant for Kaila that the new emerging problems are deeper than the old ones, as they have gone through the "purgatory of criticism", so that philosophy overall is not a "graveyard of old systems" but a progressive cognitive activity. Kaila also points out that sometimes criticism shows that the original problems were based on mistaken presuppositions and misplaced questions (I, 6).

According to Kaila, the great rationalists are optimistic about "the postulate of rationality": the world, or at least the true reality behind appearances, is grasped by reason. Kaila

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[17] A fine example of rational reconstruction is the dialogue between Goethe and Newton that Kaila published in 1945.

[18] Kaila could thus agree with Simo Knuuttila (1946–2022) that hermeneutic understanding in the historiography of philosophy is "a kind of hybrid of rational and historical reconstruction" (Knuuttila 2023, 19).

[19] Kaila's Finnish word *käsittää* for understanding has a similar tactile connotation as the German term *begreifen* and the English term *grasp*.

expresses his appreciation of them by stating that, despite their errors, they at least know where the aim of philosophy is (I, 7). The empiricists in turn critique the rationalists by demanding that speculative theories should be generated and testable by sense experience (I, 12). This schema has repeated itself several times in the history of philosophy. Rationalists include Parmenides, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel, while empiricism is advocated by Aristotle, skepticism, the British empirical school, critical philosophy (Kant), and positivism. Philosophical progress needs both (I, 14). Kaila describes this fundamental battle in philosophy metaphorically by comparing the rationalists to boldly high-flying eagles and the empiricists to the owl of Minerva.[20]

For Kaila, it is important to distinguish between the origin and the criterion of human knowledge. For the rationalists, the origin and criterion of knowledge is reason, while for the empiricists, the origin and criterion of knowledge is experience. Aristotle was a psychological empiricist, since the axioms of science are reached by induction (*epagoge*) from sense experience, but he was also the first logical empiricist, since the validity of knowledge is decided by experience (I, 171).[21] The alternative, where the origin is reason and the criterion is experience, is supported by logical empiricists, advocated by the skeptics in the Hellenistic period (I, 233). It was attempted by Kant, but he failed (I, 16), but achieved by Galileo, who combined Plato and Aristotle by stating that "the ways of proof and discovery are different" (I, 306).

As Kaila was known as a logical empiricist, who had a critical view of metaphysics, it is remarkable how he shows his admiration of "Plato divinus" in the relation to more sober Aristotle, and how he is able to empathically understand the metaphysical thinking of Spinoza and Leibniz. But similar impressive explanations are given about Newton's philosophy

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[20] Patoluoto (1989), 341. According to Hegel's Preface to *The Philosophy of Right*, the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the coming of the dusk.

[21] Aristotle's explanatory knowledge-why is based on scientific syllogisms, but Kaila does not note Aristotle's failure to systematically distinguish logical and natural necessities (see Hintikka 1972).

of nature, Berkeley's route from nominalism to immaterialism, and Kant's motivation for his transcendental idealism.

Kaila's evaluation of the importance of philosophers is reflected in the number of pages devoted to them: Kant clearly leads with 103 pages, followed by Plato (67), Aristotle (65), Leibniz (45), Hume (40), Galileo (30), Berkeley (25), Locke (20), Newton (19), Descartes (15), and Spinoza (9). The Hellenistic period comprises 32 pages, but Medieval philosophers only 5 pages and the Enlightenment thinkers Voltaire and Rousseau only few words. Patoluoto thinks that the "great heroes" of this story are Plato and Leibniz, but at one point Kaila expresses his inclination to think that Galileo is "the number one among modern geniuses" (I, 285). Kaila concentrates on theoretical philosophy, but Kant's ethics is treated with 10 pages. The lecture notes end with Kant's critique of practical reason, but in his publications (and perhaps in other lecture series) Kaila did discuss some 19th century philosophers like Hegel, Snellman, Mill, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche.

The Progress of Philosophy

Kaila's detailed story of the progress of philosophy starts with Ionian natural philosophers, who sought the *arkhe* (origin, element) of reality. They gave various answers to the demand of understanding the variety of nature by something permanent or invariant.[22] He is especially interested in the attempts to show that changing qualities may emerge from stable quantities (Pythagoras), elements (Empedocles), "seeds" (Anaxagoras), or atoms (Democritus) – this relation of qualities and quantities was a persistent theme in Kaila's own studies ever since his 1928 monograph on synthetic philosophy of nature.

The assumption that we have knowledge only about invariances, about what remains constant, was the source of Plato's ideas and Aristotle's essences. As explained already in *Inhimillinen tieto* (1939), the main difference between Aristotle and Galileo is that the former restricted his attention to substantial invariances, while the latter recognized relational invariances, expressible by dynamical laws. Indeed, a changing phenomenon may involve something permanent (e.g. the acceleration is

[22] An excellent account of pre-Socratic philosophy as a search of invariances was given by Kaila's student Erik Stenius in *Tankens gryning* (1953).

constant in free fall). The idea of relational and functional invariances was grasped by Leibniz too.[23]

Kaila's view about the close interaction between philosophy and science is seen in the fact that his lectures give a lot of attention to progress in science. He deals with the rise of mathematics among Pythagoreans and ancient astronomy and defends the role of truth in the Copernican revolution (against the conventionalism of Duhem and Poincaré). He praises Galileo's and Newton's mechanics for their concentration to how-questions instead of what- and why-questions. He allows space for explaining to his students the basic notions of differential calculus, the definition of the length of a curve, and the rise of non-Euclidean geometries.

Special topics in Kaila's lectures may be illustrated by some examples. Kaila defends an ontological account of Plato's ideas against their neo-Kantian interpretation by Paul Natorp as forms of a priori principles, even though the treatment of the general as a thing leads to "terrible difficulties" (I, 98). A long discussion is devoted to Aristotle's theory of *epagoge* (induction), continued by an account of Bacon's induction. In discussing Aristotle's conception of infinity, Kaila considers at length Brouwer's finitism (I, 180). Spinoza gets credit for the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism and for his inclination to reject naïve realism, but his axiomatic system of ethics conflates causality and logical consequence (II, 26). Leibniz is praised for his invariance criterion of reality (*successus predicandi*): the real is identified with the regular or what guarantees successful predictions (II, 66). Despite his rationalism, Leibniz understood the significance of probability and formulated the cornerstone of logical empiricism: the principle of "observability" or testability (II, 71). Hume's merit is his distinction and treatment of three problems of causality, but his epistemology is restricted to psychological empiricism (II, 140).[24] Kaila follows Reichenbach in arguing that Kant failed to distinguish axiomatic geometry and applied geometry (II, 225), and the thesis about synthetic a priori judgments contradicts logical empiricism (II,

[23] Kaila's treatment was influenced by Ernst Cassirer's distinction between substance and function concepts.

[24] Kaila's chapter on Hume is largely based on his introduction to his own translation of Hume's *Enquiry* in 1938.

199). Interestingly Kaila states that Kant distinguished the phenomenal ϕ-world and the physical f-world (II, 174), but failed to acknowledge that we know just as much about things as we do about appearances, viz. their shared structure (II, 232).

The debate between phenomenalism and realism was one of Kaila's main concerns during his long career as a philosopher of science. In his evaluation of Berkeley, who treated things as complexes of sense-qualities, Kaila wishes to distinguish sets and mereological sums. In the discussion of realism, which asserts the existence of mind-independent physical things, Kaila emphasizes the type-theoretical difference between things and their properties, or between phenomenal and physical objects. Referring to his 1936 monograph, where things are defined as invariances, Kaila concludes with Carnap that the debate is meaningless, since the two claims have the same "real content": stating that a thing is mind-independent does not add any observational consequences to its existence as a complex of sensations (II, 134). It is interesting to see this formulation in a lecture in the spring of 1941, since the same topic was discussed in Kaila's monograph *Über den physikalischen Realitätsbegriff* later in the same year. There Kaila reconfirms his view that Planck's talk of the "real external world" should be understood as "the higher invariances of experience". But still there is something to be said in favor of realism:

> The controversy between Mach and Planck about phenomenalist and realist physics, if the formulations used by either side are taken *literally*, was a fight about a pseudoproblem; to the extent, however, that the controversy had content, it was rather the realist than the phenomenalist who was right.[25]

In his writings in the 1950s, Kaila gave up the thesis of translatability and returned to a position which is close to his early critical realism against Mach's phenomenalism.[26]

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[25] See Kaila (1979), 156.

[26] See the posthumous "The Conceptual and Perceptual Components of Everyday Experience" (Kaila, 1979, Essay 4). Cf. Niiniluoto (1992). Kaila's realism is further expressed in his 1958 essay on the special theory of relativity or "Einstein-Minkowski invariance theory" (see Slavov 2022).

Evaluation

The major theme of Kaila's lectures is the interplay between science and philosophy. The Popper-type model for the growth of knowledge includes the moment where philosophical theories are subjected to the criticism of empirical evidence. For example, Kaila criticizes Aristotle and Leibniz for restricting logic to one-place predicates (II, 51), and Hume for using associative psychology without conceptualization or Gestalt-aspects (II, 155). Kaila argues that Democritus' theory of atoms is falsifiable (I, 81). But, more generally, can philosophical views be tested by experience in the same way as scientific hypotheses? And how to solve the problem of reflexivity: what is the real content of logical empiricism?[27]

Kaila demands at least that a philosophical doctrine should be compatible with the best scientific theories so far. In his discussion of J. V. Snellman, Kaila also acknowledged that metaphysics can sometimes anticipate scientific theories: the philosophy of nature by some 19th century German idealists points to the same direction as holistic field-theories in the 20th century.[28] This example is not covered in these lectures which end the history of philosophy with Kant.

Kaila's lectures evidently tell a lot about the history of philosophy but as much about Kaila himself. They provide a valuable additional source for Kaila-studies. But in conclusion, one may ask why Kaila did not publish these lectures. There may be several reasons. One is that he wished to maintain his profile as a systematic philosopher. Another is the demanding effort to check the text and add the relevant references.[29] But, most importantly, Kaila kept revising his views constantly, and when he received in 1945 the lectures from 1939–1941 he had already developed his position and opened new problem areas.

University of Helsinki

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[27] These questions can also be directed to Charles Peirce who thought that metaphysics is a branch of empirical scientific knowledge (see Short 2022).
[28] See Kaila's (1940a) address at the jubilee of the 300th anniversary of the University of Helsinki.
[29] According to Oiva Ketonen's (1992) testimony, Kaila was concerned with "the requirements set by the new method for the historiography of philosophy".

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Eino Kaila's Quasi-realism

TEEMU TOPPINEN

Eino Kaila's metaethics has been a cause for puzzlement for the historians of Finnish philosophy. Kaila seems to explicitly advocate a straightforward form of *non-cognitivism*. According to this kind of view, ethical judgments (e.g., judgments regarding what is good or worth pursuing, what there is reason to do, or what is right or wrong) do not function to represent or to describe the ways the world is. Instead, they express our desire-like attitudes or sentiments. On the non-cognitivist view, ethical judgments have a non-representational or a non-descriptive meaning of some kind. Consequently, non-cognitivism is often taken to state that ethical judgments are not capable of being true or false. That Kaila would have subscribed to a non-cognitivist view is unsurprising, given his logical empiricist leanings and influences (see, e.g., Manninen 2012, Niiniluoto 2012). Yet some elements of Kaila's views may seem to be in tension with his non-cognitivism. In particular, Kaila seems to have been committed to the truth of some ethical claims concerning, for instance, the absolute value of what he calls the 'spiritual' or 'deep-mental' life. How can we square his having had such commitments with his endorsement of a non-cognitivist interpretation of ethical judgments? We may distinguish between three puzzles. First, there is *the psychological puzzle* regarding how Kaila could have accepted both non-cognitivism and the absolute value of, for instance, the spiritual life. Second, *the puzzle of truth* arises because Kaila seems to be committed both to non-cognitivism and to the truth of various ethical claims. And third, *the puzzle of objectivity* concerns how to understand, in the context of Kaila's non-cognitivism, the idea that certain things would have objective value, or be valuable independently of our attitudes toward such things.

Due to these sorts of puzzles, it has been suggested that Kaila's views contain various tensions: that he perhaps would have been forced – despite his passionate endorsement of the absolute value of certain ideals – to adopt merely subjective criteria for ethical judgments (e.g., Salmela 1998, Niiniluoto 2012), or that he would have had tendencies to metaphysical and religious ways of thinking that were "in tension with his logical empiricism" (Pihlström 2012, 197). Or even that his mature view would have been to reject non-cognitivism (Salmela 2012). But I do not think that Kaila's views are quite as complicated, or that they would have significantly changed over time in the relevant respects. I argue, instead, that the three puzzles mentioned above can all be solved in a way that is entirely compatible with a straightforwardly non-cognitivist reading of Kaila's views. What emerges is an interpretation of Kaila, according to which he understood the attractions of non-cognitivism quite well. There are elements in Kaila's writings that anticipate the *quasi-realist* idea that a non-cognitivist understanding of the meaning of ethical judgments is fully compatible with there being objective ethical truths.

1. Metaethics, non-cognitivism, and quasi-realism

It is helpful to start with a brief characterization of *metaethics*, and before we do this, we should say a few words about *ethics* itself.

While the question of how to best characterize ethics is by no means easy to answer, we tend to have a fairly good grasp of which sorts of questions are broadly ethical. Ethics, we might say, is the project of trying to answer questions such as the following: What is good? How should we live? *Why* are the good things good? Why, for instance, is it good that we have knowledge? And *why* should we do the things that we should do? Why, for example, should we cut down on our greenhouse gas emissions? Answering ethical questions is, at least in part, a matter of *taking stances* toward things, creatures, actions, policies, and institutions. We could perhaps say that ethical questions are, at least in part, *practical* questions regarding how to act, or feel, or be.

Metaethics, by contrast, does not address such practical questions. Instead, metaethics is an attempt to answer various

theoretical questions in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and so on, insofar as these relate to ethics. Metaethics is the project of trying to answer questions such as: What are ethical questions about? What kind of properties are ethical properties (e.g., the property of being wrong)? What do words such as 'good', 'reason', and 'ought' mean? What is it in virtue of which they mean what they mean? Why are ethical judgments so closely related to motivation and action?[1]

With this characterization of metaethics, we now are in a better position to seek a good understanding of non-cognitivism. In the past decades, it has been common to operate with what might be called the "old-school" distinction:

> COGNITIVISM$_{o\text{-}s}$. Ethical sentences (e.g., "Bombing civilians is wrong") express beliefs and are truth-apt.
>
> NON-COGNITIVISM$_{o\text{-}s}$. Ethical sentences (e.g., "Bombing civilians is wrong") express sentiments or desire-like states of mind rather than beliefs and are not truth-apt.

Beliefs and desire-like states of mind, in the relevant sense, may be distinguished in terms of their different *directions of fit* (e.g., Smith 1987). Very roughly: It is essential to beliefs that their job is to match the way the world is. They have a mind-to-world direction of fit. By contrast, it is essential to desire-like states that their function is rather to cause the world to match them. They have a world-to-mind direction of fit. It is natural to think that sentences that express beliefs are truth apt, or can be true or false, whereas sentences that express desire-like states cannot be evaluated in terms of truth and falsity.

This is, of course, *a* way of drawing a distinction between different views in metaethics. But not a very helpful one. This is so because only very few metaethicists would accept NON-COGNITIVISM$_{o\text{-}s}$. This is true especially in relation to contempo-

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[1] For good introductions to metaethics, see Miller 2013, van Roojen 2015, and Chrisman 2023. It is difficult to try to characterize metaethics in any other way than by giving a list of representative questions. But here is one decent attempt at a more concise characterization: "Metaethics is that theoretical activity which aims to explain how actual ethical thought and talk – and what (if anything) that thought and talk is distinctively about – fits into reality" (McPherson & Plunkett 2018, 3).

rary metaethics. The contemporary representatives of what might be called the non-cognitivist tradition do not deny that ethical sentences are truth-apt, or apt for evaluation in terms of truth and falsity (see, e.g., Blackburn 1998, Gibbard 2003, Ridge 2014). But perhaps surprisingly, this is also true of some of the central earlier figures in the tradition (e.g., C. L. Stevenson – see Toppinen forthcoming). The representatives of the non-cognitivist tradition are mainly interested in the *explanation* of the meaning of ethical language. Ethical sentences, they think, have a kind of meaning that is *interestingly different* from the meaning of the sentences the job of which is to represent the world. But ethical sentences might still be true or false, in a perfectly good sense of these words. A better distinction is, then, something like the following:

> COGNITIVISM. The meaning of ethical sentences is explained by what they are about.
>
> NON-COGNITIVISM. The meaning of ethical sentences is explained by what kind of states of mind they express, or by their characteristic effects, or by what speech-acts they are suited to perform.

Non-cognitivists advance a non-representational or a non-descriptive explanation of the meaning of ethical language. This type of explanation allows us to sidestep some of the central problems in metaethics. For example, questions regarding what kind of properties ethical terms represent do not arise, in the same way, if ethical sentences do not really function to represent ethical properties. The non-cognitivist explanation may also help us to explain the practicality of ethical judgment. If ethical sentences express desire-like states of mind, it makes sense that they are closely connected to motivation and action. These are the kind of ideas that motivate non-cognitivist views. While it is understandable that such views have been connected to the idea that ethical sentences cannot be true or false, this latter idea is not essential (see also, e.g., Dreier 2004, Schroeder 2024).

With a better understanding of the non-cognitivist position, we may now characterize quasi-realism as the view that (a) non-cognitivism is true, but that (b) there nevertheless are truths about ethics – e.g., about what is right and what is wrong – where these truths are also suitably *objective* in that

they obtain independently of facts about what we actually happen to care about.

2. The psychological puzzle

Kaila's non-cognitivism receives a clear expression in his article "Reaalitiedon logiikkaa" ("On the Logic of Factual Knowledge"[2]) from 1942. Here, the non-cognitivist proposal is articulated in the context of a general critique of metaphysics. Just like in the writings of a more famous non-cognitivist, A. J. Ayer (1946), ethical sentences are not the main concern, but rather come up as a problem. Ethical sentences constitute a challenge for both of these logical empiricists because these sentences seem to tell us something about the reality, and yet by the logical empiricists' lights the sentences in question plausibly cannot do so. Roughly, for these philosophers, a sentence is strictly speaking meaningful just in case its truth is either analytic (the sentence is true or false in virtue of its meaning) or in principle empirically verifiable. Ethical sentences such as 'Eating meat is wrong' plausibly are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable. This led Ayer (1946, 107) to famously conclude that there are no ethical propositions:

> The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, "You stole that money," in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks."

In a similar vein, according to Kaila's *Principle of Testability*, any sentence that concerns reality has a *real content*, that is, a set of empirically testable consequences (Kaila 1939, 1942; see also Niiniluoto 2012). Ethical sentences do not fit the bill. And neither are they analytic. And so, they turn out to be strictly speaking meaningless alongside the claims of metaphysics and religion.

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[2] The translation of the title of this paper as well as of the quotations from it come from Salmela 2012.

Just like Ayer, Kaila does not say much on how, exactly, to understand the meaning of ethical sentences. But what he says looks straightforwardly non-cognitivist. He suggests that the "basic concepts" of value theory "express our evaluative sentiments" and notes that in politics people use sentences that appear to have real content, but are in fact just "propaganda," or "incentives, suggestions, imperatives, signals in one way or another (instead of symbols)" (Kaila 1942, 270). On Kaila's view, ethical claims that appear to represent the way the world is do not actually do so. Instead, their meaning consists in the fact that they serve to give expression to our sentiments, desires, wishes, and so on. The same is true, in his view, of the empirically unverifiable metaphysical claims.

The puzzles that I want to focus on arise when we combine Kaila's non-cognitivism with what he says about the value and meaning of life. Kaila's perhaps most detailed discussion of these issues can be found in his book *Syvähenkinen elämä* (*The Depths of Spiritual Life* or *Deep-Mental Life*[3]; Kaila 1943). The book is written as a set of dialogues. The issues that are of interest in the present context are mostly discussed between two characters, Aristofilos and Eubulos. Aristofilos gets to paint, in broad and poetic strokes, a "metaphysical" picture of what really matters. And what really matters, fundamentally, on Aristofilos' view is the *spiritual* or the *deep-mental* life.[4] Very roughly, a life has the property of being spiritual, in this sense, to the extent that it manifests, as Salmela (2012, 214) puts it, the kind of "comprehensiveness and perseverance" that "brings along a phenomenal depth to the experiences of an individual subject." A good picture of a relevantly spiritual life, according to Aristofilos, is offered by some of the classical music (a piano sonata by Beethoven or a fugue by Bach might do) (Kaila 1943, 165–167). This kind of spirituality, Kaila (1943, 255) proposes, is experienced as an absolutely valuable end to which all others are subservient. According to him, it contains "all the value that the best kind of life can possess" (Kaila 1946, 412). The

[3] These are the translations offered by Salmela (2012) and Pihlström (2012), respectively.

[4] Salmela (2012) uses the former, Niiniluoto (2012) and Pihlström (2012) the latter, as a translation for the relevant expression, 'syvähenkinen'.

spiritual life is envisioned as ideal, then, not just by Aristofilos, but also by Kaila himself.[5]

But how does all this fit with Kaila's non-cognitivist account of ethical judgments, according to which such judgments are strictly speaking nonsensical expressions of sentiments? The first puzzle, or the psychological puzzle, is articulated by Salmela (2012, 218–219):

> As a logical empiricist, [Kaila] offers an emotivist account of the noncognitive and non-representative character of moral and other value judgments. This account provides him a reason to reject normative ethics from legitimate "scientific" philosophy. An implication of this position is, however, that we must give an emotivist reading to Kaila's own moral and other normative judgments as well. Such position is of course logically possible; its problems are of a psychological sort. […] On the one hand, Kaila's logical empiricism committed him to a noncognitive analysis of moral language. Yet on the other hand, he presented strong claims about the absolute and intrinsic value of spiritual life. […] these two perspectives are not incompatible if we interpret Kaila's normative judgments as expressive and rhetorical. Nevertheless, they are in tension at least psychologically […].

But what, exactly, does this alleged psychological tension amount to? Salmela illustrates this tension by referring to famous remarks by Russell. Russell was an early advocate of the non-cognitivist position (see Pigden 2003), but he felt some uneasiness with the view (Russell 1946, 724):

> Suppose, for example, that some one were to advocate the introduction of bull-fighting in this country. In opposing the proposal, I should *feel*, not only that I was expressing my desires, but that my desires in the matter are *right*, whatever that may mean. As a matter of argument, I can, I think, show that I am not guilty of any inconsistency in holding to the [non-cognitivist view] and at the same time expressing strong ethical preferences. But in feeling

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[5] It should be noted that some of Kaila's articulations of this ideal, or of things in this neighborhood, are deeply sexist. In a dialogue between Agaton and Teofilus (Kaila 1943, 63–64), the value and meaning of life is identified with the 'moral jewel' called 'miehuus,' the literal translation of which would be 'manhood' or 'manliness.' A very charitable translation might use something like 'bravery' or 'heroism.'

> I am not satisfied. I can only say that, while my own opinions as to ethics do not satisfy me, other people's satisfy me still less.

Now, it is perhaps worth noting that even if there is, in some instances, some psychological tension between non-cognitivism and strong views, this hardly gives us materials for a good objection to non-cognitivism. Also, even if Kaila would have had relevantly Russellian feelings, he might not have felt any pressure to revise his non-cognitivist views. The alternatives might have felt even less satisfying to him.

In any case, Kaila seems to have been quite happy with the way in which he combines the *explanatory perspective* of non-cognitivism and the *ethical perspective* supportive of the spiritual life. Much of *Syvähenkinen elämä* is devoted to the exploration of this exact issue – the compatibility between the two perspectives. The articulation of this compatibility is the job of Eubulos, whose approach nicely exemplifies what is sometimes called the *non-cognitivist sidestep*.[6] Non-cognitivism, as an account of the meaning of ethical language, is entirely silent about questions concerning what is valuable or about what it is to be valuable. Such questions are, from the non-cognitivist viewpoint, ethical, practical questions regarding how to live. A non-cognitivist may of course address such ethical questions. But non-cognitivism *itself*, which is a view about the meaning of ethical language, is entirely silent on them. So, when a non-cognitivist hears a metaphysical-sounding claim about what is valuable, or about what it is to be valuable, they either address it as an ethical, practical, question (non-cognitivism being irrelevant here), or they take the non-cognitivist sidestep and address, instead, the question regarding what it means to *accept* such a claim. They will want to clearly separate between the ethical questions regarding how to live and the theoretical question regarding the meaning of ethical judgment.

Now, this is precisely what Eubulos does. Having heard Aristofilos outline his "metaphysical" ideas about the spiritual life, Eubulos suggests that he *fully agrees* with the main gist of Aristofilos' claims. But Eubulos suggests that the ethical claims

[6] See Dreier 2015. To be entirely accurate, Dreier writes about the *expressivist* sidestep, but the idea is the same.

that he agrees with can be explained as imperatival in nature, rather than as descriptions of the world:

> In my view, your active pantheism, your beautiful declaration of the one and shared, infinite and eternal Self *is* "*true*". For what does this declaration mean? It means: "Be compassionate, but fight inexorably for what you know is right! […] Don't abhor death, for its immensity is just an illusion, even if a biologically necessary one. This all seems right to me. In this way, I am ready to accept your view of life, not as a theory, for as such I find it meaningless, but as a practice.

Kaila's account of the nature and meaning of ethical thought and talk in *Syvähenkinen elämä* matches perfectly, then, the remarks on ethical language in "Reaalitiedon logiikkaa." In my view, the main point of the book *Syvähenkinen elämä* largely just is to illustrate, in some detail, how ethical, religious, and metaphysical language can be vindicated despite the fact that they do not serve to represent or describe the world.

3. The puzzle of truth

The quotation from Eubulos, suggesting an imperatival reading of Aristofilos' views, leads us naturally to the puzzle of truth. Eubulos says that he accepts Aristofilos' views as "*true*". But how can we make sense of the idea that ethical claims could be true, given a non-cognitivist account of their meaning? And why does Kaila put the predicate 'true' in quotes?

As explained in the previous section, contemporary non-cognitivists standardly accept that ethical claims can be true or false. They usually adopt some kind of broadly *minimalist* account of truth (see Dreier 2004; Schroeder 2024, Ch. 8). Consider the claim that it is wrong to bomb civilians (at least barring some very special circumstances – let's simplify and ignore this complication). Even if non-cognitivism is true, we might accept this. Suppose, now, that you do accept this: it *is* wrong to bomb civilians. This is not in any way in conflict with non-cognitivism. Whether it is wrong to bomb civilians is, according to non-cognitivism, a matter of how to live, and it is entirely compatible with non-cognitivism that not bombing civilians is the way to go. Now, given minimalism about truth, there is nothing more than this, really, to its being true that it

is wrong to bomb civilians. And so, as you accept that bombing civilians is wrong (we are supposing this), you will also accept that it is true that it is wrong to bomb civilians. You will then accept that there is at least one ethical claim that is true. Note that the claim is not that you're accepting that it is wrong to bomb civilians makes it true that it is wrong to bomb civilians, or that the claim would be merely *true for you*, or anything like that. The claim is just that given that its being true that bombing civilians is wrong just amounts to bombing civilians being wrong, there seems to be no obstacle to accepting both non-cognitivism and that some ethical claims are true. Or this is, roughly, what many contemporary non-cognitivists would suggest.

Kaila, though, does not adopt this kind of minimalist approach. As is well-known, he appeals instead to a distinction between truth, proper, or theoretical truth, and what he calls practical truth or "truth" (using quotes). Kaila (1943, 189) writes:

> A tree is known by its fruit. Those worldviews are good whose fruit is good. […] A worldview is "true," that is: acceptable, insofar as adopting it in practice leads to acceptable results. But this "practical truth" is of course something quite different from truth in the proper theoretical sense.

In other words, Kaila here adopts a pragmatist notion of truth, but strictly restricts its application to the realms of the ethical, the religious, and the metaphysical (Kaila 1943, 189; cf. Pihlström 2012).

Salmela (2012, 220–223) suggests that this notion of truth does not allow for the kind of justification for ethical judgments that Kaila's judgments about the value of the spiritual life appear to require. His worry seems to be one of circularity. Given the practical notion of truth, Kaila must justify any claim of the form "*x* is valuable" (for instance) by appealing to the idea that accepting the relevant claim has valuable results. And presumably Kaila must understand valuable results in terms of his own value theory, which states that what is fundamentally valuable is the spiritual life. But if we now put ourselves in Kaila's shoes and try to justify a fundamental ethical claim such as the claim that the spiritual life is valuable, we end up

in a circle: we end up justifying the claim that the spiritual life is valuable by appealing to the value of the spiritual life.

This worry about Kaila's appeal to the idea of practical truth seems misguided, however. Kaila is free to define this kind of notion of practical truth, and in applying this notion he of course will have to appeal to his own ethical views, in order to evaluate which results are valuable and which are not. The separate problem of how to justify the fundamental ethical judgments would seem to arise regardless of whether we operate with Kaila's notion of practical truth. One possibility would be to say that it is simply self-evident that the spiritual life is valuable, or that this claim requires no justification. But we need not take any stance on this issue here. It is true that Kaila does not define the notion of practical truth in non-ethical terms. But this, too, looks entirely unobjectionable. Kaila's account of practical truth is not meant to be ethically neutral.

I do not see, then, why the appeal to the idea of practical truth would prevent Kaila from offering a satisfactory account of the justification of ethical judgments. However, I will note that it nevertheless is a bad idea to try to account for the sense in which ethical sentences can be true and false in terms of Kaila's notion of practical truth. This is so because in ethics, just as in other areas of inquiry, we want to distinguish between the claims that are true or correct, and the views that it is good to accept. Consider, for example, a scenario in which an evil demon has arranged it so that our accepting that bombing civilians is wrong has really bad results. It seems that under such circumstances, too, bombing civilians remains wrong. And so, it seems that under such circumstances, too, the judgment that it is wrong to bomb civilians is true or correct. Yet, under these circumstances, this judgment is not true in the practical sense. The practical notion of truth does not, then, track our intuitive judgments about truth in ethics. Kaila might have agreed. His view might have been that this is so, but that we simply cannot do justice to our intuitive judgments about truth in ethics in a satisfying manner. However, as explained above, other non-cognitivists have thought that we can do better by appealing to a suitably minimalist notion of truth.

All that said, Kaila's proposal about truth-talk in ethics, while problematic, remains entirely compatible with his acceptance of both non-cognitivism and the absolute value of the

spiritual life. Or at least the worries concerning circular justification do not suggest otherwise. Yet one might have lingering concerns about the compatibility of Kaila's non-cognitivism with the idea that the spiritual life has *objective* value.

4. The puzzle of objectivity

Kaila's metaethics has often been understood to have subjectivist or relativist consequences. On Kaila's (1943, 189) view, those worldviews are acceptable "whose fruit is good." However, Ilkka Niiniluoto (2012, 84) suggests, "Kaila's emotivism does not allow objective criteria for good results, but evaluation has to be emotional – those fruits are good, which feel good." If Niiniluoto is correct, then, on Kaila's view, evaluation of ethical judgments is a completely relative matter, in the end: those judgments are acceptable, whose fruit is good; and those fruits are good, which feel good.[7]

However, I do not think that this was Kaila's view. He does not say that those results are good, which feel good. Here merely says something to the effect that we *think* that those results are good, which feel good. This claim he may combine, for instance, with the claim that those results are good that manifest spiritual depth of a certain kind. Kailla really seems to hold that some ethical judgments – judgments about the absolute value of the spiritual life, for example – are objectively rather than merely subjectively "true." Plausibly, Kaila would have held that a life that has spiritual depth would have been valuable even if we had not felt that such life is valuable.

That this combination of views is entirely consistent is something that non-cognitivists have often attempted to explain (see, e.g., Stevenson 1961, Blackburn 1998, Schroeder 2024, Ch. 8). The basic idea is that from a non-cognitivist viewpoint, a subjectivist or a relativist judgment to the effect that ethical truths (or "truths") depend on our feelings or attitudes must be interpreted as an *ethical* judgment and can be rejected as such. Consider, for example, the following sentence:

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[7] The subjectivist or relativist interpretation of Kaila (or at least of his views in the early 1940s) is shared by Salmela (2003), whose work Niiniluoto, too, refers to.

> MIND-DEPENDENCE. If we had not disapproved of bombing civilians, then bombing civilians would not have been wrong.

Let us now assume, for a moment, that non-cognitivism is true. Given this assumption, how should we understand the meaning of MIND-DEPENDENCE? On the non-cognitivist view, we should understand the meaning of this claim in terms of what kind of states of mind it expresses. Now, it is plausible that this claim expresses, roughly, an ethical stance that is conditional in a certain kind of way. Mind-dependence plausibly expresses something like a *preparedness to condition one's disapproval of bombing civilians on whether we in fact disapprove of doing so*. This kind of conditional stance does not look ethically acceptable. My stance toward bombing civilians, for instance, is opposed to this kind of stance. It is not conditional in this way. When I consider a possible scenario in which we fail to disapprove of bombing civilians, my stance toward bombing civilians in such a scenario still is one of opposition. The facts about disapproval are not ethically relevant. Given the non-cognitivist view, I can express my stance, which is in this respect unconditional, with the sentence:

> MIND-INDEPENDENCE. If we had not disapproved of bombing civilians, bombing civilians would still have been wrong.

This glosses over a lot of detail (and I am not under any illusion that it would be easy to provide all the relevant details). But the basic idea seems fairly clear, and also quite plausible. *If* non-cognitivism is true, then claims such as MIND-DEPENDENCE and MIND-INDEPENDENCE are to be understood as ethical claims the truth (or "truth") of which is a practical issue that is to be decided via ethical inquiry. Understood in this way, MIND-INDEPENDENCE is entirely compatible with non-cognitivism. And so, it cannot be right that non-cognitivism would entail the subjectivist or relativist view that those fruit are good, which feel good. Given non-cognitivism, the view that those fruit are good, which feel good, is an ethical view. And it is consistent with non-cognitivism, and very plausible, that this kind of ethical view is to be rejected.

This is just to say that Kaila would have been in a position to make use of what are now standard quasi-realist maneuvers in making sense of the possibility of ethical claims being

objectively true. But interestingly, Kaila himself appears to offer an early instance of this very move. In the paper "Reaalitiedon logiikkaa," he discusses – without mentioning him by name – Erik Ahlman's (1938, 34) statement that "the fact that I *feel* that a thing is valuable or unvaluable does not imply that it really *is* valuable or unvaluable." Interpreting Ahlman's statement as a metaphysical claim, Kaila uses it as an example of a statement that fails the Principle of Testability and has no 'real content.'[8] But Kaila (1942, 271) then goes on to give a non-cognitivist interpretation of the statement:

> In many individuals, "the deep-mental needs" determine, with an unassailable force, certain "beliefs," which then are dressed in the form of expressions that appear like sentences with real content. For example, a respect toward "the majesty of the deep-mental values" requires, for many individuals, a "belief" such that, *no matter what one's experiences are like*, these values somehow survive, and that when one experiences these values, one is "a part" of an imperishable, timeless, and super-sensible "reality of values." […] A "belief" the "validity" of which is independent of experience (of the past, the present, and the future), is a symptom of spiritual needs and a certain kind of signal (for the believer themselves as well as for others), but it is not a symbol that would represent any reality.

It is worth emphasizing that this appears to be a very early formulation of what is now a standard quasi-realist move in metaethics. (It is the earliest instance of this kind of maneuver that I am aware of.) It seems, then, that Kaila's position was not just compatible with certain quasi-realist ideas, but that Kaila himself also pursued a kind of a quasi-realist view. This also provides a solution to the puzzle of objectivity – the challenge of making sense of Kaila's endorsement of both non-cognitivism and of the objective value of a life that manifests a certain kind of spiritual depth.[9]

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[8] I am not sure that this is the correct reading of Ahlman who seems to have held a kind of a non-cognitivist view himself (see also Salmela 2003). But the discussion of Ahlman's views is outside the scope of this paper.

[9] Kaila (1943, 1948) also discusses the Golden Rule, of which he gives many (clearly non-equivalent) formulations, for instance: "Equally to equals," "Love your neighbor as yourself," and "Always act in a way in which you

5. Coda

I have suggested that Kaila can be interpreted as being entirely consistent in his endorsement of both non-cognitivism and of the idea that there are objective ethical truths. If this kind of interpretation of Kaila's views is correct, he can be seen as having anticipated, in some important ways, the view that later came to be known as quasi-realism (e.g., Blackburn 1984, 1998; Gibbard 2003). Or so I have proposed. Some might worry that this kind of interpretation of Kaila's writings might be anachronistic, especially given that Kaila's remarks on the relevant topics are not very substantial. But I do not see any reason to be worried about this. Things would be different, if Kaila had simply said one thing (the endorsement of non-cognitivism) in one place, and another thing (the endorsement of objective values) in another. We might then be concerned about the possibility that he simply was not being entirely consistent across the entirety of his oeuvre. However, Kaila did not simply say one thing in one place, and another thing in another. Instead, he explicitly makes just the right quasi-realist moves. In *Syvähenkinen elämä*, Eubulos who endorses non-cognitivism really *accepts* Aristofilos' ideas about the objectivity of value. He just takes the non-cognitivist side-step and focuses on *explaining* what we are up to when we ascribe objective value to

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would will that everyone else acts under the circumstances." He suggests that "insofar as our sense of morals and justice has some objective foundation, this foundation lies" in this principle. Kaila's thought appears to be that this rule is objective, not just in the sense of being valid regardless of our actual attitudes, but also in the sense of being an inescapable feature of any ethical system. But this doesn't constitute any problem for a straightforwardly non-cognitivist interpretation of Kaila. He grants that this rule is only a very formal rule and that judging who our neighbors or equals are is a matter of expressing feelings or attitudes. In his view, there still is no "theoretical, objective, scientific justification and proof for any morality or justice." The idea seems to be just that some kind of universalizability requirement or supervenience commitment is constitutive of ethical judgment. Roughly: if we treat two creatures ethically differently (one as our "neighbor," the other not), we must accept that they also differ, in some way, in their descriptive features. This is fully compatible with a straightforwardly non-cognitivist view and, indeed, something that non-cognitivists may be in an especially good position to explain (see, e.g., Venesmaa 2021).

something. So, Kaila clearly understood that non-cognitivism is the project of explaining our ethical judgments rather than a way of *challenging* or *being skeptical* about them (see section 2, above). Kaila also sketches a non-cognitivism-friendly account of truth in ethics (see section 3) and gives an early articulation of the idea that there is a non-cognitivist-friendly way of understanding claims about ethical truths being mind-independent (see section 4). So, he does not merely accept two claims that can be interpreted as being consistent in the light of the more recent quasi-realist philosophizing. Instead, he himself attempts to explain why these two claims are compatible. Furthermore, the building blocks that he uses in constructing this explanation (the non-cognitivist side-step, a non-cognitivist-friendly account of ethical truth, the non-cognitivist construal of claims regarding mind-independence) look familiar. It is for these reasons, then, that the interpretation of Kaila as a sort of a *proto-quasi-realist* seems to be well-justified.[10]

Tampere University

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[10] I am grateful to the two reviewers and the audience at the *Perspectives on the History of Philosophy in Finland* conference for helpful comments.

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On Eino Kaila's Views on Art and Aesthetics

OIVA KUISMA

Eino Kaila (1890–1958) is best known for his work in psychology, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. He discussed these topics actively from the 1910s up to the 1950s, publishing studies in the German language for the international scholarly audience. For the Nordic audience, he published slightly more popular expositions in Finnish and Swedish. Although Kaila's academic publications do not suggest a systematic interest in aesthetics or art theory, as a person he was deeply interested in art and aesthetic values. His wife Anna (married 1916) was a painter, so it is quite possible that various technical and theoretical issues of art were discussed in their daily life.

Kaila's interest in art is shown, for example, by the fact that in his earlier years, in the 1910s, he, along with philosophical and scientific publications, also reviewed literary and dramatic pieces of art in Finnish newspapers and periodicals. In his academic publications, Kaila's interest in aesthetics pops up here and there in various contexts but not as an issue that he treated systematically. In passing, he (Kaila 1939, 16; 2014, 5) once mentions that it might be an interesting idea to discuss phenomena of aesthetic life from the standpoint of his notion of invariance (regularity, lawfulness). In the case of art, the notion of invariance would help explore matters such as style, unity, balance, and beauty. Kaila's interest in field theoretical and Gestalt-theoretical approaches would have suited this project well, but he did not carry it out.[1] Fortunately, however, he

[1] Kaila's teaching and writings dealing with Gestalt theory obviously influenced Honkavaara's doctoral thesis (1949) in the psychology of art.

discusses artistic and aesthetic issues quite extensively in his book *Syvähenkinen elämä* from 1943.[2]

Even if Kaila has received much attention in studies surveying 20th-century philosophy in Finland,[3] his aesthetic thought has not been studied systematically. The aesthetic ideas brought forward by Kaila in his *Syvähenkinen elämä* have been discussed (in Finnish) by Laurila (1944), Kinnunen (1990, 97–102), Huhtanen (2008), and others, but there is still room for more thoroughgoing studies. This paper will offer an overview of Kaila's aesthetic thought, starting from his art-critical writings and then continuing through the domain of psychology to the edges of philosophical aesthetics.[4] At the outset, we may say that even if Kaila did not construct an explicit aesthetic theory, he clearly had some kind of view or vision of art and aesthetics. Traces of this vision can be seen here and there in Kaila's writings.

Art Criticism

In the 1910s, Kaila worked on his doctoral thesis in psychology (licentiate 1916, doctor 1919), but along with this, he published art-critical reviews in Finnish newspapers and periodicals, showing a particular interest in theatre and literature. In his art-critical practice, Kaila did not follow or apply straightforwardly any particular given art theory (imitation, expressionism, formalism, etc.) but, instead, analysed and evaluated works of art from a standpoint which focuses on the aesthetic merits of artworks without religious, moral, political, or other prejudices. Kaila (1911/1990, 59–60) explains that even if countless authors have started their careers with "sentimental, social, or patriotic" outbursts, works with enduring value have most often been produced by aesthetic motivation. Thus, aesthetic and artistic merits are the appropriate standard in evaluating works of art. Kaila's sensitivity to artistic and aesthetic

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[2] In the 1950s, Kaila had in mind an ambitious project of outlining his holistic world view in book format, but because of his death in 1958 this project was left unfinished. Cf. von Wright (1979, xxxviii).

[3] E.g., von Wright (1979); Niiniluoto et al. (1992); Niiniluoto & Pihlström (2012); Manninen et al. (2021, 319–329; 341–343; 347–353).

[4] In an earlier publication (Kuisma 2006, 176–179) I briefly sketched Kaila's contribution to aesthetic thought.

phenomena explains, at least partly, his interest in art criticism. In fact, he was not only interested in producing art criticism but also in producing art. He wrote some poetic verses and acted (1919–1921) as a dramaturge of the National Theatre (von Wright 1979, xvi), but he did not proceed further in the field of art.

Closely reading Kaila's reviews of literary works of art, one can see that there is variation in the depth and richness of his reviews, which, of course, is understandable in the newspaper review format (his regular forum was the newspaper *Uusi Suometar*). In the best cases, however, he does not stop at the obligatory content description but proceeds to comparative evaluations in terms of the artist's development as well as their contribution to national or world literature.[5] Kaila (1911), for example, boldly predicts that Juhani Aho's *Juha* will find a place in world literature.[6] More generally, he (Kaila 1913) claims that we can now expect from national literature what we have expected from great European literature. Further, noting Kaila's expertise in psychology and philosophy, it is not surprising that he makes observations of psychological and philosophical features latently or expressly present in works of literature.[7] Finally, in some cases, his talent for belletristic expression enhances the force of his critical argument or, at least, this stylistic feature draws attention to itself.[8]

Along with his art-critical reviews, in the 1910s, Kaila actively reviewed publications in philosophy and the sciences but, with one exception to be discussed below, not publications in aesthetics, even if systematic expositions of aesthetics were

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[5] For example, Kaila (1911) evaluates Juhani Aho's development as an author; Kaila (1911) and Kaila (1913) offer remarks on the quality of Finnish literature compared with European and world literature; Kaila (1916a) evaluates Abbé Prévost's contribution to realism in literature.

[6] Kaila's prediction has come true, at least, in the sense that Juhani Aho's novels, including *Juha*, have been noted in Merriam-Webster's *Encyclopedia of Literature* (1995, 22–23). Kaila (1916c) also saw talent in F. E. Sillanpää's early novel *Elämä ja aurinko*. Later, Sillanpää won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1939.

[7] See e.g., Kaila's (1916c) analysis of F. E. Sillanpää's *Elämä ja aurinko*.

[8] See e.g., Kaila (1911) and Kaila (1913). Kaila also exhibited and developed his literary talent as a translator, translating not only scientific and philosophical texts but also fiction.

published by the most important representatives of early 20th-century Finnish aesthetics, Yrjö Hirn (*Det estetiska lifvet*, 1913; Finnish tr. 1914) and K. S. Laurila (*Johdatus estetiikkaan* I, 1911; *Johdatus estetiikkaan* II 1918–1919). Nor does Kaila discuss their views in his other publications. Once, when Laurila, at a meeting of the Philosophical Society of Finland (3.12.1915), had given a speech on subjectivistic and objectivistic stances in aesthetics, Kaila commented, wishing for an experimental method in aesthetics. In response, Laurila remarked that the experimental method had been in use in aesthetics for some time but, thus far, without significant results. (Manninen and Niiniluoto 1996, 428–429.) In 1930, Kaila contributed to Yrjö Hirn's 60th birthday *Festschrift* with an article discussing the methodological similarities and differences between the humanities and the natural sciences. Kaila does not refer to Hirn in this article, even if Hirn's publications take a stance on this issue in a way that largely concurs with Kaila's position, i.e., the unity of sciences.[9] Kaila's books such as *Persoonallisuus* (1934) and *Syvähenkinen elämä* (1943) would have allowed noting Hirn's views on several occasions, but that happens only in passing in the context of *Persoonallisuus*, where human sociability, not aesthetics, is at issue.[10] In sum, Kaila did not seek dialogue with Hirn or other aestheticians.[11] One cannot say whether he intentionally declined to engage in dialogue with aestheticians or not, but one can say that this fits in with the tenor of the Vienna Circle, with which he was linked.[12] Members of and around this group are known for their work in philosophy, mathematics, logic, and scientific methodology, but aesthetics was not their prime topic of interest.[13]

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[9] Cf. Hirn (1900, 5) and (1913, 19).

[10] Kaila (*Persoonallisuus* 1934/1982, 365) refers to Hirn's *Valtameren saari* (1928), where Hirn surveys the topic of people living in isolation, i.e., the theme of Robinson Crusoe.

[11] von Wright (1979, xiv–xv) describes Kaila (his own teacher) as a person with "many admirers but only few intimate friends". von Wright himself was one of those rare intimate friends, as the recently published exchange of their letters – "*Skriv så ofta du kan*" (2020) – reveals.

[12] *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis* (p. 48). See also Kaila (1990, 536).

[13] Undoubtedly, Wittgenstein had a great influence on aesthetics from the mid-20th century onward, but in the *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung*

As mentioned above, there is one exception to Kaila's disinclination to discuss the views of aestheticians and philosophers of art, namely his review of L. Onerva's Finnish translation of Hippolyte Taine's *Philosophie de l'art*, in Finnish, *Taiteen filosofia*. Taine's work was originally published in 1865, L. Onerva's translation in 1915, and Kaila's review in 1916 in the journal *Aika*. In his review, titled "Taidefilosofista kirjallisuutta" ("Art philosophical literature"), Kaila discusses Taine's theory of art, which was based on empirically motivated scientific ideals (positivism) and at the same time on a distance-taking from metaphysical speculations typical of early 19th century thinkers such as Hegel and Schelling. Considering Kaila's interest in empirical psychology and his philosophical work, one might expect that he would have hailed Taine's empirically motivated approach as a welcome method in aesthetics and art studies. Kaila undoubtedly sees positive potential in Taine's approach but, nonetheless, he is not thoroughly satisfied. He criticises Taine's practice of explaining art and products of culture too naturalistically and deterministically. In Taine's famous view, the state and development of art is the function of three basic notions: (la) *race*, (le) *milieu*, and (le) *moment* or, in English, race (nation), environment, and age (Kaila 1916b, 223; cf. Taine 1866, 173). These three factors form the ground from which the products of culture can be explained to grow like plants in soil. In Kaila's judgement, Taine's *Philosophy of Art* is excellent from the standpoint of the history of art, but he cannot accept its theory as the whole and final truth about art; in particular because Taine underestimates the role of the great geniuses of art. In his "rage of explanation" ("selittämisraivossaan"), Taine has overestimated the explanatory potential of naturalism (1916b, 224). There are

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manifesto of the Vienna Circle (1929) he is not listed as a member nor as a *nahestehender Autor* (like Kaila; p. 48; 50) of the group but more generally as one of the leading figures of the scientific world view beside Einstein and Russell. The list of publications provided by the Vienna Circle manifesto includes one title on aesthetics by Schlick (p. 42): *Das Grundproblem der Ästhetik in entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung* (Hirn's contribution to evolutionary aesthetics is noted in this article). This, however, and Schlick's other publications have not been given a visible role in the historiography of 20th-century aesthetics. Cf. also Carnap (1931, esp. 237–241). Carnap defines art (and metaphysics) to be an expression of the *Lebensgefühl*.

geniuses of art who do not grow like plants according to definite laws and opportunities of nature but arrive unexpectedly and remain beyond the reach of mechanistic explanation.

Psychology and Aesthetics

Above, it was mentioned that Kaila had suggested that an empirical approach should be applied to the study of aesthetics. This suggestion came from the year 1915 when Kaila was conducting empirical research for his doctoral thesis *Über die Motivation und die Entscheidung* (cf. p. 13).[14] Later, in the early 1930s, he conducted research work in Vienna, where, as already mentioned, he had contacts with the members of the Vienna Circle. Regarding Kaila's empirical research work, we can simply ask whether it extended to the domain of aesthetics. The short answer is that it did not, in the sense that Kaila would have explicitly surveyed aesthetic phenomena and would have produced results to be noted in the field of aesthetics. Publications based on Kaila's empirical surveys contain occasional references to aesthetic matters, but they are not the proper subject of research.[15] In this regard, his systematic treatises on psychology are slightly more generous, even if aesthetics is not dealt with explicitly in them.

Kaila's most important systematic works in psychology are *Sielunelämä biologisena ilmiönä* ("The soul as a biological phenomenon"; 1920), *Sielunelämän rakenne* ("The structure of the soul"; 1923), and especially *Persoonallisuus* ("The psychology of personality"; 1934).[16] Here and there, these books offer remarks on matters relevant to aesthetics.

In *Sielunelämä biologisena ilmiönä* Kaila discusses the relation of organic life to its inorganic physico-chemical basis as an issue of controversy between two main parties – the spokespeople of mechanistic explanation in the first place and the

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[14] For a brief review of the contents of Kaila's dissertation, see Manninen et al. (2021, 348–351).

[15] For example, Kaila (1921, 234) offers a passing observation on the aesthetic experience of colours; Kaila (1932, 63–114) discusses imitation from the standpoint of child behaviour but not from the standpoint of art.

[16] Worth mention is also *Hahmoprobleemasta* ("On Gestalt problems"; 1945), which offers a summary (over 80 pages) of Kaila's lectures in theoretical psychology in the spring term of 1944.

spokespeople of vitalism in the second. Largely, Kaila speaks for a unitary view of sciences, criticising vitalism for introducing unnecessary factors to scientific discussion. On the other hand, he cannot accept a too simplistic reduction of organic phenomena to physico-chemical laws (cf. Kaila, 1920, 137–139). In the course of his argument, Kaila (1920, 70–72) briefly crosses into the domain of aesthetics in referring to artistic and scientific creativity as a phenomenon posing a practically insurmountable problem to mechanistic explanation. A work of literary art such as Goethe's *Faust* could be analysed into a practically infinitely long chain of decision-makings between particular words, phrases, sentences, and episodes to reach a perfect plot, but an artistic genius may produce such a work in a reasonable time of incubation and actualisation. This line of explication echoes Kaila's criticism of Taine, as related above.

In *Sielunelämän rakenne*, Kaila offers a solid exposition (almost 600 pages) of contemporary psychology and his own view of it. In general, he sees the human soul as a dynamic structure, paying particular attention to the stream of consciousness. Consciousness is not like a space where atomic thoughts and emotions move randomly but is a whole structured by intentionality (he refers to Brentano and Husserl, p. 413). In chapter 6 of *Sielunelämän rakenne*, Kaila's topic is thinking, and as part of his exposition, he once again offers some comments on the problem of artistic and scientific creativity (Kaila 1923, 487–511). He refers to the view, inspired especially by Schopenhauer and Freud, that there are subconscious factors in the human soul which may show their influence not only in mental disorders but also in creative activities. From this basis, it has been concluded that the deep roots of creativity are something totally mysterious, and creativity is the privilege of geniuses. In contrast to this view, Kaila argues that the subconscious factors are not totally beyond explication, since they have a basis in intentional habituation. Human habits, abilities, and crafts are learned dispositions that usually contribute unconsciously but intentionally to both routine and special activities. To illustrate the role of subconscious intentionality, Kaila (1923, 504–505) refers to artists and authors who have narrated that their creative moments have often been preceded by a seemingly fruitless phase of uncertainty, stress, and exertion. If the result of such stress is an invention

or resolution in terms of art, there is no need to say that it has arisen from a disorderly angst, but that it has arisen from an intentionally determined exertion. On this line, Kaila (1923, 511) argues that creative thinking, having both conscious and subconscious elements, is part of the common structure of the intentional activity of the human mind.

Kaila's *Persoonallisuus* has been deemed his greatest literary achievement (von Wright 1979, xxi), in which he offers an admirable exposition of biological, psychological, and philosophical erudition in a rhetorically effective and persuasive style. In this book, Kaila anchors human nature in a biological basis, but at the same time, he shows considerate understanding towards metaphysical and religious convictions. While religious and metaphysical systems do not qualify as sources of truth, they can qualify themselves as sources of ethical and social values. To illuminate his view, Kaila introduces the notion of "syvähenkinen elämä" or "deeply spiritual life", which is also relevant to aesthetic thought.

Kaila's notion of deeply spiritual life links aesthetic values with religious values. This is a very old view since, through romanticism and neo-classicism, it extends its roots, at least, to the age of Ancient Greece, where aesthetic and religious values formed a functional unity in poetry, sculpture, and architecture. But despite these old roots and their later applications, the main tendency of the early 20th century was the separation of art from religion, and aesthetic values from religious values. From this point of view, Kaila's project to draw aesthetic and religious values near each other may seem somewhat surprising.

In Kaila's view, "deep spirituality" signifies profundity especially in terms of emotions. To clarify gradually deepening stages of emotional experience, Kaila offers an illustration from the sphere of music: at the level of sense-perception, we may catch the harmony caused by tuning forks; military and folk music may arise more vital emotions; Italian opera music rings in still deeper emotions; finally, the deepest emotions can be experienced while attending to the compositions of Bach or Beethoven. (Kaila 1982, 131; cf. also 343.) It is worth noting that Kaila's scale is not an ascending scale rising to more and more ethereal, immaterial heights of spirit but descends to the depths of emotion. Regarding the religious dimension of

emotional experience, he says that the object of deep emotion is felt to be holy, arousing submissive and devout respect (Kaila 1982, 223; 342). Thus, in the end, emotional depth and evaluative height concur. Values, for their part, have their basis in (partly subconscious) animal drives. Explicitly applying Hegel, Kaila claims "that the 'cunning' of the deeply spiritual life is in that it allows the animal nature of humanity to serve its own ends" (Kaila 1982, 350).[17]

Deeply Spiritual Aesthetics

Above, it was noted that Kaila did not enter into dialogue with (Finnish) aestheticians,[18] even if he obviously would have had something to contribute to aesthetic theory-building, especially regarding the theory of evolution and his expertise in psychology. But instead of having a real dialogue with real persons, he used a fictive dialogue format to explicate his ideas on aesthetic issues in *Syvähenkinen elämä. Keskusteluja viimeisistä kysymyksistä*.[19] The interlocutors of the dialogues refer to philosophers such as Plato, Hume, Hegel, and Snellman, but not with the intent of discussing their aesthetic theories. There is one general reference to art scholars and their theories of disinterestedness and aesthetic attitude (Kaila 1943, 50–51), but these theoretical principles were so common in the early 20th century that merely on this basis, it would be futile to speculate, to whom Kaila was referring, if at all to anyone more specifically. In English, the title of Kaila's book would be something like *Deeply spiritual life. Dialogues concerning ultimate issues*.[20] In what follows, this work is called as the *Dialogues*

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[17] For Hegel's notion of the "Cunning of Reason" (List der Vernunft), see *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (p. 49).

[18] In 1935, Kaila was involved in the evaluation of Eino Krohn's doctoral thesis in aesthetics. His judgement, reflecting contemporary controversies in Finnish philosophy, was extremely critical. See Huuhtanen (1979, 230–236).

[19] In 1944, Kaila published a Swedish version of the Dialogues under the title *Tankens oro. Tre samtal om de yttersta tingen*, which is partly identical with the Finnish version, partly not.

[20] Kaila (1946) offers a summary of the notion of deeply spiritual life. For the reception of Kaila's *Syvähenkinen elämä*, see Laurila (1944); Haavio (1960); Niiniluoto (1986); Salmela (1998, 149–167).

concerning ultimate issues or, for the sake of brevity, simply, Kaila's *Dialogues*.

Kaila's *Dialogues* was published in 1943, and its first section, titled "Puolesta ja vastaan" ("For and against"), was represented originally as a radio broadcast series in 1942–1943, i.e., in the middle of the war years and, more exactly, in the years when Finland's alliance with Germany was gradually realised to be leading to an unknown gloomy future.[21] This historical situation quite obviously was one good reason for Kaila to take up ultimate issues for a closer inspection. The second dialogue of Kaila's book, titled "Tieto ja usko" ("Knowledge and faith"), also offers a determination of the place and time for the second session: Zell am See, Hohe Tauern, in July 1939; that is, a small town in Austria, where Kaila had travelled with his wife. This basis in Kaila's personal life history allows readers to connect straightforward parts of the *Dialogues* to Kaila's own experiences and opinions.[22] In fact, in the second edition of the *Dialogues* from 1954, Kaila, in the new preface, makes it clear that the tenor of the argument of the *Dialogues* reflects his own thinking from different points of view.

Although the first dialogue (Kaila 1943, 5; 10; 26; etc.) contains references to the ongoing war, Kaila does not enter into war or political demagogy but takes up issues dealing with the value of human life more generally. In particular, he pays attention to aesthetic and religious values, which he also discusses in the second dialogue, i.e., in the Alps before the start of the war. Regarding the term "aesthetic", it is stated by one of the interlocutors, Aristofilos, a representative of art, that aesthetic has a bad ring. In Aristofilos' view, aesthetic applies to things and phenomena which are not true and real but mere play. On this account, the attribute "religious" (and "metaphysical") is introduced to give deeper significance to the experience of great art and the beauty of nature. (Kaila 1943, 90–

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[21] Niiniluoto (1986, 26) mentions that Kaila's diary shows that from 1942 onwards he had become conscious of the possibility of Germany's defeat in the war.

[22] Regarding Kaila's personal history, he himself refers on some occasions to his youthful monistic experience, which revealed the guidelines of his scientific work for the rest of life. Kaila (1944, 104–105; 1953/1992, 505; 523–524; 1979b, 436–437). Cf. Niiniluoto (1986, 14–16).

91.) But as will become evident in the sequel, Kaila did not mean by "religiousness" adherence to dogmatic religion.

In general, Kaila's attitude toward matters of religious faith is positive in *Syvähenkinen elämä*. Although religious and metaphysical worldviews are not testable in terms of theoretical truth, they are testable by their practical consequences. If metaphysical worldviews get people to behave humanely towards other people, such views are valuable in a practical sense. (Kaila 1943, 180–185.) Moreover, metaphysically and religiously aesthetic worldviews may offer a more concrete grasp of reality than theoretically abstract scientific theories.

Scientifically descriptive and subjectively experience-based world views are compared, for example, in the following words uttered by Aristofilos, a representative of art:

> Science offers us only the skeleton of reality, its general system of structure, but it says nothing of its content. [---] Reality is different. It is – I say it again and again – myth and magic, enchantment, and charm. One can use an even stronger expression about it. It is ecstasy. It is intoxication and exultation. (Kaila 1943, 113.)

In other words, the scientific view interprets the world in the language of descriptive sentences and abstract (mathematical) symbolism, while the subjectivistic (artistic) point of view emphasises how we experience the charm of reality.

In one of the chapters of the first dialogue, titled "Syystauluja" ("Autumnal paintings"), the metaphor of the Divine Creator is drawn to make understandable the beauty appearing in nature: beautiful scenes of nature are like paintings made by God himself (Kaila 1943, 44). Despite the religious terminology, it is argued in the dialogue that the metaphorical paintings of nature are, in fact, created by an aesthetically attuned, disinterested subject of perception (Kaila 1943, 46–51). This view fits well with the then-common theories of *Einfühlung*, which claim that in terms of emotion, we project our own feelings to the object of perception.[23] For example, an autumnal

[23] Discussing the interpretation of facial expression in his lectures on psychology, Kaila pointed to shortcomings in Theodor Lipps' famous version of the theory of *Einfühlung* (Kaila 1945, 48). It should, however, be noted that the human face differs from mountains, woods, etc., for the simple reason that humans really have feelings no matter whether other people

landscape can be felt as sad-looking, but literally taken, no landscape is sad. Falling leaves and incessant rain may induce us to feel sad, which we then (poetically) project onto nature. In Kaila's *Persoonallisuus*, this projection, or experienced environment, is explained to functionally reflect human habitus and needs. He illustrates this with a quote (in English) from Byron: "To me high mountains are a feeling". (Kaila 1982, 137.)[24]

A year after the publication of Kaila's book, Kaarle Sanfrid Laurila, professor of the philosophy of art, published a pamphlet against Kaila titled *Keskustelua elämän suurista kysymyksistä*, ("Discussing the great issues of life", 1944), in which he, among other matters, paid attention to features echoing the influence of the *Einfühlung* theory in Kaila's book. As a representative of emotionalistic aesthetics, Laurila saw explanatory potential in the notion of *Einfühlung* but criticised Kaila for crossing the domain of *Einfühlung* and turning to pantheism, in which nature is seen as a divine being or as a manifestation of the world spirit (Laurila 1944, 40–43). Laurila, a conscientious Lutheran Christian, could not accept such explications and rejected them as mere fairy tales (Laurila 1944, 42–43). Through Aristofilos, representative of art in the dialogues, Kaila indeed declares that great art reveals to us the "world soul" (Kaila 1943, 100), that great art is always religious (religious in a non-dogmatic sense) and that merely "aesthetic" art is art without deeper significance (Kaila 1943, 95). Further, Eubulos, representing scientific thinking in the dialogues, confesses that Aristofilos' religious stance is near to him (Kaila 1943, 166; 187). Thus, Laurila's criticism has some points, but, on the other hand, he does not pay sufficient attention to the ontological presuppositions behind Kaila's religiously sounding words and expressions. Despite the religious-sounding terminology, Kaila was committed to a biologically grounded view of human life and experience, a view which also determined his notion of the deeply spiritual life.

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through *Einfühlung* project onto them correct or incorrect feelings and emotions.

[24] The poetic, or aesthetic, projection of feelings should not be confused with primitive animism. Kaila (1982, 132–134) severely criticises a certain interpretation of animism.

Without making it explicitly known, Kaila in the *Dialogues* applies his own theory of the psychology of needs and drives as expounded in the *Persoonallisuus* to explain what he means by a deeply spiritual life. Through the interlocutor called Teofilus, representing scientific thinking, he explains that emotionally moving landscapes, paintings by nature, so to speak, are not created by a conscious mind but come up from the depths of the mind (Kaila 1943, 47). The depths of mind or spirit are constituted of drives, needs, and passions, which are the driving forces of human action, life, and thinking. To explicate the function of these internal forces, Kaila – through the other interlocutor, Agaton – appeals to Plato's dialogue *Phaedrus* (246a–249d), in which Plato delineates an image of a reason driving two horses, of which the first represents the higher ambitions and the other the lower passions (Kaila 1943, 49–50). Kaila returns to this image in the second dialogue, claiming that Plato's image of the horses driven by the mind, or spirit, is the truest picture of the deeply spiritual life available (Kaila 1943, 157–158). Plato's intention was to emphasise the importance of rational self-discipline. Kaila was not against this pursuit, even though he saw the situation more dynamically. In his view, biologically grounded drives are the necessary basis upon which higher intellectual pursuits are built. Drives and needs are psychic factors which encourage or force humans to find satisfaction for themselves. And when humans seek satisfaction for their needs, they, in Kaila's view, develop their scientific, religious, artistic, and aesthetic capacities.

Concluding Remarks

From his years as a student and young scholar in the 1910s onwards, Kaila showed interest in art, reviewing works of literature and theatre in newspapers and periodicals. However, he did not publish any systematic exposition of his aesthetic views, even if he saw aesthetic value not only in art and nature but also in scientific theories (cf. Kaila 1927). In his psychological and philosophical publications in the 1930s–1940s, he introduced the notion of *syvähenkinen elämä*, or the deeply spiritual life, using it in the title of one of his most important books, *Syvähenkinen elämä. Keskusteluja viimeisistä kysymyksistä* (1943). He applied this notion to explicate, among other

matters, the relationship of aesthetic values with religious values, which, in the end, are functionally grounded in the biological nature of humanity. Kaila refers to the image of two horses in the service of reason in Plato's *Phaedrus*. The horses, of which one drives to personal pleasure and the other to social ambition, have the vectorial power to draw human creative capacities to the heights of scientific and artistic genius. Regarding great art, Kaila explains that it is not only aesthetic but also religious, in a non-dogmatic sense (Kaila 1943, 95). In other words, religiousness gives art deeper seriousness, addressing not only our capacities of sense-perception and imagination but, more deeply, also our capacities of emotional and cognitive reception.

University of Helsinki

Acknowledgement

The author thanks the two anonymous referees for their critically constructive comments.

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Aristofilos, Eubulos or both? The Disquietude of Eino Kaila's Thought[1]

BERNT ÖSTERMAN

1. Introduction

In 1943 the Finnish philosopher and psychologist Eino Kaila published a collection of philosophical dialogues with the title "*Syvähenkinen elämä. Keskusteluja viimeisistä kysymyksistä*", which may be translated as "The Deep-mental life. Dialogues about ultimate questions".[2] The first part of the book is a series of five dialogues between the characters Agaton and Teofilus called "*Puolesta ja vastaan*" ("For and Against"). These are dialogues that had been performed on Finnish radio in the autumn of 1942 and the spring of 1943 with Wilho Ilmari as Agaton and Eino Kaipainen as Teofilus. The second part has the title "*Tieto ja usko*" ("Knowledge and Faith"). It consists of two dialogues between a new pair of characters, Aristofilos and Eubulos. These are much longer than the radio dialogues and were written specifically for the book.

Dialogues may be written for various reasons. Consequently, we may certainly not assume that one of the characters in a written dialogue may always be taken as the voice of the author. However, when the writer is a philosopher, readers may be tempted to interpret one of the participants as his or her alter ego. Readers of Kaila's book have certainly been inclined to ask which one (or which ones) of the four

[1] I want to thank Anssi Korhonen and Lassi Jakola for their comments on an earlier version of my article and two anonymous referees, whose suggestions have contributed to its final form. I also want to thank Julian Remes and Niklas Krogerus for reading *Tankens oro* with me in our ongoing reading circle.

[2] For a comment on the translation, see section 2.

characters—Agaton, Teofilus, Aristofilos or Eubulos—represent(s) Kaila. Although the five dialogues between Agaton and Teofilus are both well-written and philosophically interesting, it is the two dialogues between the metaphysically oriented painter Aristofilos and the scientifically minded philosopher Eubulos that have been seen as the most important. In my paper I will focus on these dialogues and on the question of how the characters relate to the author. Is Kaila Aristofilos or Eubulos? The question may seem trivial: of course, he is the philosopher Eubulos! However, it may not be as easy as it seems. Aristofilos may be a painter but there can be no doubt that he also has a gift for theorizing about philosophical matters. In fact, some of Kaila's own statements about his affinities to the two characters suggest that *both* characters form parts of his personality, but why and how? In my paper I will suggest that the presence of a religious-metaphysical inclination in Kaila's personality should be seriously considered. However, there can be no doubt that Eubulos represents his *ideal* self. In this way the dialogues between Aristofilos and Eubulos also acquire a self-therapeutic dimension as Kaila explores and, eventually, quiets a haunting side of himself.

I will begin with a specification of what Kaila meant by using the term "*syvähenkinen*" and consider how it should be translated. Next, I will present the content of the two dialogues between Aristofilos and Eubulos in *Syvähenkinen elämä* and the third dialogue that was added later in the Swedish edition *Tankens oro*. Finally, I will turn to the question of the place of the dialogues in the life of Eino Kaila.

2. Kaila's explication of "*syvähenkinen*"

It seems to be a wide-spread belief that Kaila invented the term "*syvähenkinen*".[3] In fact, it was not an uncommon term and was found in Finnish journals and newspapers long before Kaila

[3] See e.g., Liivola (2005, 18) where this is explicitly claimed. See also Hintikka 1992, 156, in which "*syvähenkinen*" is described as a neologism. In fact, I haven't found a single article about Kaila in which the ordinary use of "*syvähenkinen*" has been mentioned.

began to use it.[4] Thus, even though nowadays it is all but impossible to use the term outside of a discussion relating to Kaila, there certainly was a time when one could. "*Syvähenkinen*" (sometimes spelled "*sywähenkinen*") is often used to characterize persons (O. A. K. 1902, 57 and Blomstedt 1933, 274) or speeches (Merola 1928, 43) but is also frequently used as a qualification of literature (A. S–n. 1922) and music (D. K. 1915). The context is sometimes religious (Merola 1928) but by no means always. The meaning of the ordinary use of "*syvähenkinen*" would seem to be something like *spiritual* or *deep*, which is close to Kaila's use of the term. Thus, it seems clear that Kaila did not invent the term "*syvähenkinen*". Rather, he was *explicating* a term of ordinary language by giving it a specification within the framework of his theory of personality. What he did was to interpret "*syvähenkinen*" as a deep dimension of the mental process, which can be taken as suggested by the combination of "*syvä*" (deep) and "*henkinen*" (the mental). Even though "spiritual" occasionally also has been suggested as a translation of Kaila's notion (Pihlström 2012, 204 and Salmela 2012, 214), I will use the construction "deep-mental" to highlight the technical dimension of Kaila's term.[5]

In his major work on psychology, *Persoonallisuus* (Personality, orig. publ. 1934), Kaila defines the deep-mental as follows:

> As deep-mental we call the level of human mental life, in which the deep dimension of emotional life is the greatest; where the object of emotion arouses the kind of submissive awe that includes "reverence", which experiences its object as "holy". (Kaila 1982, 223)[6]

It may sound as if Kaila is talking about having religious faith. However, his concept of deep-mental life is intended to cover much more. Among his examples, not only such phenomena as being in love and listening to the music of Beethoven or Bach but also engaging deeply in philosophy or science can be

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[4] A search on the term "*syvähenk**" among the digitized serial publications of the National Library of Finland reveals hundreds of instances of usage during the late 19th century and early 20th century.

[5] "Deep-mental" has also been used in Niiniluoto 2012, 83.

[6] Translations of citations originally in Finnish or Swedish have been made by the author.

found. Kaila suggests that the deep-mental dimension can be thought of as a *religiousness* stripped of all teachings (Kaila 1982, 131, 223). In the dialogues there can be no doubt that Kaila views both his characters, Aristofilos and Eubulos, as persons leading deep-mental lives. However, as the example of being in love already suggests, the deep-mental is not a phenomenon reserved for artists, philosophers or holy men. To lead a life where "nothing is sacred" may even be seen as abnormal (Kaila 1982, 223). As such, the "deep-mental" is an integral part of Kaila's psychodynamic theory, according to which human behaviour may be understood as driven by three basic kinds of needs, the *animal*, the *mental* and the *deep-mental*. Animal needs are needs such as hunger and sexuality. An example of a mental need is the need to make the world intelligible. The deep-mental relates to the emotional depth that, for instance, a theoretical interest may acquire by reaching the level of a reverence for truth and objectivity. In these cases, Kaila would also speak of specific needs (as for objectivity) (Kaila 1982, 12, 170, 340). It should be noted that Kaila does not say that deep-mental needs may replace other needs or that they always would be the strongest; in fact, he suggests that they often are weak. According to Kaila, human motivation is always highly complex. However, the "enchantment" of the deep-mental still contains the highest value a human life may have (Kaila 1982, 223, 341).

3. In the mountains and the Finnish archipelago

In the first five “radio dialogues" between the salesman Agaton and the philosopher Teofilus, there is a clear division of labour. Even though Agaton shows a considerable interest in discussing philosophical matters, there can be no doubt that Teofilus is the leading theoretician. Not only does he help Agaton to articulate his philosophical intuitions but he often also un-socratically offers his solutions to the questions that are raised. The two concluding dialogues between Aristofilos and Eubulos are very different. For here, it is Aristofilos, the artist and the budding system builder, who takes the lead, confessing that, in his youth he had also entertained the idea of becoming a philosopher (Kaila 1943, 110). Eubulos, the

philosopher, is mainly there as a critical voice (but this will all change in the third dialogue).

At the beginning of the first dialogue, Aristofilos and Eubulos meet in Zell am See, a small town on Lake Zell south of Salzburg, in the vicinity of the Hohe Tauern mountains. The time is July 1939. This is also the place where Aristofilos and Eubulos first met some twenty years earlier. It never becomes clear precisely how old the two persons are; the reader only learns that they are "on the brink of old age" (Kaila 1943, 88). Aristofilos has returned to the mountains with a keen memory of his youthful experience of their majesty. He describes his excursions in the mountains "as walking through a cathedral". "You know this feeling of eternity that reigns there?" he asks (Kaila 1943, 89). Aristofilos also describes it as "experiencing the 'world-spirit' itself". However, Eubulos cannot accept this as it stands but suggests that Aristofilos is speaking metaphorically. For, surely, what he is speaking about are *aesthetic* experiences? The suggestion appears to annoy Aristofilos, who thinks that "the purely aesthetical" is just a game, which lacks "the touch of reality". Neither does he want to call his experiences *religious.* It is only a question about having a *certain kind* of experience: as experiencing the mountain landscape as an expression of a soul, like the experience of a human face (Kaila 1943, 90–92).

However, the experiences Aristofilos describes are remembered rather than actual. This is how it *used* to be when he, still in his twenties, was walking in the mountains. Now when he has returned, he finds difficulties in re-living what he remembers. Frankly, it is like something had fallen apart inside of himself: "as if only the shell was left of life and the core was missing" (Kaila 1943, 102, 115). The predicament also affects his artistic work. As a painter, Aristofilos has always felt that through his works, he has been able to get in touch with the "core of reality", or "the world spirit" (Kaila 1943, 100). However, now that he is ageing, Aristofilos appears to have lost his connection with the "enchanted" reality. What remain are only "aesthetic impressions", leaving his "innermost" being cold (Kaila 1943, 114–115). However, there is still something in Aristofilos that cannot accept his predicament: "No, there has to be some hidden secret to all this, and I *have* to know what it is", he tells Eubulos, at the end of the first dialogue. "The one

who seeks, finds", Eubulos, somewhat cryptically, responds (Kaila 1943, 118–119).

The second dialogue between Aristofilos and Eubulos takes place four years later, in July 1943. At this time, they meet in the Finnish archipelago during a sunny summer day. It is a time when the Continuation war against the Eastern neighbour has been going on for some years. However, the war is only mentioned in passing as a hardly noticeable commotion in the distance: "We are here like two wise men from Greece on an isolated rocky islet", Aristofilos notes (Kaila 1943, 120–121). During the time that they have been separated, Aristofilos has done a lot of thinking about "the hidden secret of it all". He is now prepared to present his theory. Its main ingredient is the postulation of a force Aristofilos chooses to call "Life", with a capital 'L' (Kaila 1943, 129). It is a force that is present in every form of life. Thus, one can say that the life in the living is "one and the same". Aristofilos now thinks of the world as consisting of metaphorical *holes* through which Life penetrates. However, if it basically is the *same* Life we see everywhere, why are forms of life so different? Aristofilos explains it as the result of an interaction between the material world and Life. Using his metaphor, he suggests that the "holes" are of different sizes and shapes. *This* is what determines the qualities of a given form of life (Kaila 1943, 135–136). In Aristofilos' theory the natural laws still have their place but there remains an influence from "elsewhere" that cannot be predicted or explained (Kaila 1943, 128). This is the workings of *Life*, which he only can describe as an infinite and eternal "Me". Aristofilos finds a beautiful simile for his world theory in the surrounding archipelago: people are like creatures living in a two-dimensional surface-world in which there are traces of movements in the depths that remain beyond their reach.

However, Eubulos is not that convinced of Aristofilos' reasoning. He begins by explaining what he meant when, at the end of the first meeting, he quoted the biblical "The one who seeks, finds". For is not this, precisely, what has happened with Aristofilos? The wishes of Aristofilos have come true, which is nothing more than a psychological reaction of a person in distress, to be compared with the appearance of a stigma in a holy man (Kaila 1943, 168, 171). According to Eubulos, the crisis Aristofilos experienced four years earlier has been

resolved by utilizing his "higher" inner resources. The theory he has constructed is only a *sign* of this inner change, not the *cause* of it. In this sense, it can only be viewed as the result of what Eubulos calls "emotional thinking". Aristofilos' theory about Life is only what *seems intelligible* in the light of his renewed sense of life (Kaila 1943, 173–174, 177, 181). The link between the emotional dimension and the world theory is, by no means, unique to Aristofilos. According to Eubulos, what has been said about Aristofilos' philosophy goes for *all* metaphysical systems and religious conversions (Kaila 1943, 182).

If Aristofilos' worldview is emotionally grounded, it may also be expected that it does not stand up to scientific scrutiny. Eubulos, for instance, points out that Aristofilos' theory is not *testable*, since it has no clear empirical consequences (Kaila 1943, 180). However, Eubulos does not want to deny that Aristofilos' theory, as well as any metaphysical or religious system, may have a pragmatic meaning, i.e. some favourable ethical consequences. The same is true for any metaphysical or religious system (Kaila 1943, 181). At the end of the second dialogue, Eubulos tells Aristofilos that he hopes they soon will meet again to continue their discussion (Kaila 1943, 187).

4. The third dialogue: a night of heavy bombing

Eino Kaila was, indeed, not ready with his dialogues about ultimate matters. Already in the following year, 1944, he published a book in Swedish in which he reused the two dialogues between Aristofilos and Eubulos. The new book was called "*Tankens oro*" (The disquietude of thought). However, *Tankens oro* is *not* a mere translation of *Syvähenkinen elämä*. In addition to the slightly modified versions of the already existing two dialogues, Kaila included a third dialogue between Aristofilos and Eubulos, which would appear in Finnish only 40 years later in Heikki Nyman's translation (Kaila 1986).

The third dialogue takes place in February 1944. It is a night of intensive bombing of Helsinki. Aristofilos and Eubulos are sitting in an air-raid shelter.[7] The chairs are uncomfortable, and the room is damp and cold. Eubulos observes that the bombing appears to be quite heavy so why not use the time for

[7] The setting is derived from Kaila's own experience of being in an air-raid shelter on the night of the bombing (Österman 2020b, 86).

philosophizing? Aristofilos agrees (Kaila 1944, 103). An important theme at the beginning of the dialogue is Aristofilos' decision to put his world view to the test by volunteering as a paramedic in the ongoing war, which was introduced at the end of the second dialogue of *Tankens oro* but is absent from the original Finnish version. The crucial question was whether he, under all circumstances, would be able to maintain a *confident* life attitude (Kaila 1944, 98). The outcome of the test has been negative; what Aristofilos has experienced has totally shaken him. He now seems to question the whole idea of *having* a view of life (in the sense of a *Weltanschaung*): "It is anyway impossible to grasp reality with our feeling", he exclaims (Kaila 1944, 108). However, Aristofilos still thinks that his theory works as a *theoretical* world explanation (Kaila 1944, 108). Since their last meeting, Aristofilos has somehow also found time to study some modern physics. Now he connects his "theory of holes" with the peculiarities of quantum mechanics. His example is the radioactive decay of an atom. A radioactive atom is like "a hole in the surface of space", through which an influence from "the other side" is streaming into the human world: "behind all this is a cosmic creative force, which you may call God", Aristofilos contends (Kaila 1944, 120, 127).[8]

Eubulos' response takes the form of a lengthy exposition of his own philosophical results, where the conception of *the field* plays a central role. Its immediate use is to offer an alternative causal explanation of microphysical events, which does not rely on the otherworldly (Kaila 1944, 130). However, it soon becomes clear that the idea of the field is by no means restricted to microphysics. It can be used to understand not only perceptual phenomena but also features of what Eubulos calls "the social field" including ethics (Kaila 1944, 134–138, 190). Aristofilos carefully listens to Eubulos' account of his ideas and soon forgets about the bombs that are falling over Helsinki (Kaila 1944, 159). Now it is Aristofilos who takes the Socratic stance, by advancing criticism that aims at the core of Eubulos' thinking. How fruitful can it be to generalize from principles

[8] Incidentally, 35 years later one of Kaila's students, the professor of theoretical physics K. V. Laurikainen, defended a view of the possibility of divine interaction with the world at the level of micro-physics that is very similar to Aristofilos' (Laurikainen 1979, 35).

that belong to physics, Aristofilos asks (Kaila 1944, 160). Eubulos offers further clarification. He concludes by suggesting that there is at least one thing he and Aristofilos may agree on: the ultimate purpose of everything is to be found in the *ascent of value*; "This is my 'religion'", Eubulos says:

> In the end, it would seem to be the same as yours. I suppose it is only, so to say, our professional viewpoints that differ. Let everyone stick to his last. Strict science should develop towards even greater purity, clarity and beauty. In that I sense, more clearly than in anything else, the divine. But you, my brother, shall go back to your canvas and give up the speculations. The most beautiful and impressive preaching you can give humanity, you offer in the form of a picture, in which the myth and magic of nature waft in the air and the great mystery is revealed in colour and form. Let us not go against "The will of God", which is that science becomes ever more purified science and art ever more purified art. (Kaila 1944, 193–194)

5. Taming the metaphysician

Syvähenkinen elämä attracted a lot of attention when it was published; the Swedish sequel garnered much less. The book was generally well received, although many reviewers had to struggle with Kaila's intentions and the question of his relationship with his characters.[9] The readers who identified Kaila with Aristofilos were in the minority but belonged to the most vocal critics. K S Laurila, a professor of art history, gave vent to his criticism in the form of a small book that was published in 1944. In his book Laurila, a devoted Christian, rejected the views of Aristofilos, which he also believed were the views of Kaila (Laurila 1944, 53). However, the third dialogue would, once and for all, seem to solve the case. For, with a basic knowledge of Kaila's philosophy, it is obvious that what Eubulos so eloquently and in considerable detail is presenting to Aristofilos in the air-raid shelter is Kaila's *own* field theory. Consequently, we also know that Eubulos is the voice of Kaila, but that notion still does not explain the point of the dialogues.

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[9] Thus, for instance, in his review, Yrjö Alanen remarks that "the dialogical form of the work is an obstacle to knowing what the author himself has wanted to say", Alanen 1943, 331.

Why did Kaila create a dialogue in which his alter ego, Eubolos, was confronted with Aristofilos, an artist with an unmistakable metaphysical inclination?

The title of the original book suggests that Kaila wanted to provide examples of the various forms a deep-mental life may take. Aristofilos and Eubulos are certainly persons who both manifest the kind of "religiousness" Kaila had in mind (as do Agaton and Teofilus). Clearly, however, this cannot be the whole point. If Kaila's only purpose were to botanize in the garden of the deep-mental, why choose the form of the dialogue and the form of the *argument*? For however cordial the exchange between the interlocutors may seem, it still seems essential for Eubulos to *defeat* Aristofilos (the cobbler should stick to his last!).

In the preface to the second printing of the original book in Finnish from 1954 (in which the third dialogue was still not included), Kaila offers some support for the idea that the purpose of the dialogues is to offer a *critique of metaphysics*. Was Kaila still annoyed by Laurila's critique? He begins by rejecting the identification of Aristofilos' views with his own, explaining that his purpose has been to illustrate the psychological sources of world views like the one defended by Aristofilos. According to Kaila, world views of this kind are devoid of all theoretical content. They may only have a pragmatic value, as influences on conduct (as Eubulos says). So far, it seems that Kaila, indeed, was performing a critique of metaphysics in *Syvähenkinen elämä*. Still, there are some features of the 1954 Preface that are difficult to assess. Critiques of metaphysics and religion advanced by philosophers in an analytic and empiricist tradition have often been quite harsh; Ingemar Hedenius' famous attack on Christianity is an outstanding example (Hedenius 1949). Kaila, however, is conspicuously sympathetic to Aristofilos: "But, of course, Aristofilos with his anxieties and struggles has been close to the author", he contends. And why would a critique of metaphysics by a logical empiricist be born out of a "hard internal pressure", as Kaila writes about the background of *Syvähenkinen elämä* (Kaila 1954, 6)?

The Preface to the second edition of the book was written at a time when the first publication was already "far behind" (Kaila 1954, 6). It would also seem that Kaila's connection with the character Aristofilos had become weaker than it had

originally been. Ten years earlier, in the Preface to *Tankens oro*, a much stronger tie is suggested. "Our life is essentially a monologue", Kaila writes. However, when we examine the monologue more closely, we notice that it is more like a dialogue or even a polylogue:

> For our so-called personality, which is expressed by the monologue of our life, is not, by far, an absolute unity. On the contrary, it consists, so to say, of partial selves in communication with one another, all of which, under certain periods, may advance a claim to be our "real self". (Kaila 1944, 5.)

Now it would seem that also Aristofilos represents Kaila, or as Ilkka Niiniluoto has put it: "the participants of the dialogues are not Eino Kaila and some 'external' opponent of his but two arguing 'partial selves' that belong to his own person and thinking" (Niiniluoto 1986, 14). However, it does not seem right to say that the opponents are on equal footing. For, clearly, Kaila, in the shape of Eubulos, *is* performing a critique of Aristofilos' metaphysics, and it does seem essential that Aristofilos is defeated, however softly. Granted this, it is by no means clear in what way Aristofilos also would represent a part of Kaila. Let us move to this question.

We may start by noting that there are some biographical parallels between Aristofilos and Kaila. It is well known that also Kaila had a strong artistic side. Before becoming a professor of philosophy at Turun yliopisto (University of Turku) in 1921 he had, for two years, been employed as a dramaturge at the Finnish National Theatre. In his twenties he was also active as a literature and theatre critic and also wrote some poetry himself (von Wright 1979, xvi; Niiniluoto 1990b, 16–17).[10] Thus, it may not seem surprising that there are some affinities between the experiences ascribed to Aristofilos in the dialogues and Kaila's own way of experiencing the world (Österman 2020b, 84–87). The setting of the first dialogue, Zell am See, is derived from a car journey Kaila made in the summer of 1939. Kaila had been walking in the mountains and his impressions have been carefully described in a travelogue published in the Finnish newspaper *Uusi Suomi* in August 1939. Kaila's experience is very similar to that of Aristofilos: "It is

[10] For Kaila's poetry, see Kaila 1990c.

like walking in a cathedral but not one that is made by man" (Kaila 1939). Naturally, it is possible to interpret this only as a way of putting words to a "deep-mental experience", without any metaphysical implications. Occasionally, Kaila has also referred to similar experiences as starting points of his *scientifically* minded enquiries such as when in his teens he found the roots of his monistic world view in a sudden insight of the world as "all-unity" during a beautiful summer day in a rowboat on a lake (von Wright 1993a, 62–63). However, in the second of the dialogues Eubulos/Kaila reveals that he also feels an affinity to the *beliefs* of Aristofilos, which seems to be much stronger than a mere sympathy between two men who both lead a devotional life: "If I became 'a believer', as you now have become [...], my belief would be like yours" (Kaila 1943, 166). But if Kaila could see something of himself in Aristofilos' metaphysics, we may also want to ask if he ever felt the *temptation* to wander along the path of Aristofilos? The cited passage from the Preface of *Tankens oro* suggests that he did. For what could Kaila mean with the statement that all the "partial selves" might, occasionally, *raise a claim* to be "the real self", if not that this was what his "Aristofilos side" was doing during the time when Kaila wrote the dialogues?

During the wartime Kaila was often very depressed. In his fragmentary diaries from the time, there is an entry in the context of a discussion of religious conversion that explicitly links his depression with a religious inclination: "When it comes to myself, it is obvious that my 'religiousness' is a symptom of depression; it disappears when I am euphoric (as now)" (Niiniluoto 1986, 22, 26). Am I saying that the purpose of the dialogues simply was to give vent to Kaila's religious inclinations through the character of Aristofilos? Not exactly. Rather, I would suggest that he wanted to convince himself of the *futility* of following his metaphysical urges. One could also call it a project of *regaining a rational composure*. The result was, to be sure, a critique of metaphysics but of a uniquely personal kind. For Kaila also had to *construct* the metaphysics he wanted to

defeat. What Eubulos rejects is, as he says, his *own* metaphysics or, more precisely, the metaphysics he *cannot allow himself*.[11]

Still, it may be asked why "Kaila's metaphysics", as advanced by Aristofilos, took the shape it did? Clearly, there is a resemblance between Aristofilos' notion of Life and Henri Bergson's idea of a 'vital force', the "*élan vital*". Indeed, in his early twenties Kaila had been impressed by Bergson (Salmela 1998, 117; Kaila 1990a), although he soon came to dismiss his vitalism as "speculative" (Kaila 1990b, 131, 133). The affinity between Aristofilos and Bergson (and another vitalist, Hans Driesch) is also noted by Eubulos (Kaila 1944, 50–51). However, the metaphysics attributed to Aristofilos is not a mere replication of the views of Bergson. This becomes evident in the third dialogue, where Aristofilos has begun to identify his theory of "holes" with the "openings" provided by the randomness of events at the physical micro level.[12] Thus, Kaila has added elements of quantum theory—one of his own scientific passions—to Aristofilos' world theory. In this sense, we may say that Kaila has managed his "self-therapy" thoroughly.

6. Conclusion: Let the cobbler stick to his last

As we have seen, the conclusion of the third dialogue is that everyone should stick to his last. Aristofilos should go back to his painting and let scientifically minded people like Eubulos take care of philosophy. Only as an artist can Aristofilos make a real contribution to humanity "in the form of a picture, in which the myth and magic of nature wafts in the air". Likewise, the metaphysician in Kaila must concede his defeat, with a possible outlet in literary artistry as Kaila already was doing in giving the world these brilliant three dialogues.

A final question: Did Kaila stick to his last, *as a philosopher*? The perhaps most prominent feature shared by Aristofilos and

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[11] "Therefore, I only, so to say, have to close my eyes [...], to agree with almost everything you have said. But that I am not allowed to do and cannot do", Eubulos says about Aristofilos' metaphysics (Kaila 1943, 166).

[12] It may be added that Henri Bergson advanced his theory of the life force in the book *Évolution créatrice*, which was published 1907, 20 years before Erwin Schrödinger's work on wave mechanics and Werner Heisenberg's discovery of the uncertainty principle.

Kaila is the urge to discover the "deepest secrets" of nature.[13] At the time of the dialogues Kaila was trying to develop a universal field theory, which later took the direction of a never completed attempt to construct a theory of *terminal causality*. This he understood as a holistic process conditioned by the end-state, which would form an explanation model for modern physics, as well as biology and psychology (Salmela 1998, 128–129). However, unlike Aristofilos, Kaila did not invoke "otherworldly" elements in his philosophy of nature, but it would seem to amount to much more than a mere summary of the world view implicated by the sciences.

University of Helsinki

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[13] Jaakko Hintikka has referred to the urge as "Kaila's *hubris*", see Hintikka 1992, 153–154.

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Georg Henrik von Wright

Georg Henrik von Wright and Austrian Philosophy – Personal and Intellectual Encounters with Family Resemblances[1]

FRIEDRICH STADLER

In memoriam Juha Manninen

(Nov 24th, 1945 – Dec 13th, 2023)

Prologue

The aim of my article is to portray five less known episodes of Georg Henrik von Wright's personal and philosophical contacts with Austrian philosophy that go beyond his well-known Wittgenstein connection, which therefore is not at the center of this article.[2]

My first intellectual contact with von Wright was as a student of philosophy in Salzburg in the 1970s, when I read his influential book *Erklären und Verstehen* (1974) (*Explanation and Understanding* 1971). After that he impressed me with his opening speech at the 2nd International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg am Wechsel in Lower Austria in 1977, where he addressed his edition of Wittgenstein's *Vermischte Bemerkungen* (1977) (*Culture and Value,* 1980/1998), and I regret not having had an opportunity to meet him personally at the time. During my stay as a Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for

[1] The sixth Georg Henrik von Wright Lecture held at House of Sciences and Letters on Oct 20th, 2023.

[2] This article is mainly based on my public Georg Henrik von Wright Lecture 2023. Accordingly, I kept the personal and sometimes colloquial style for a wider academic audience, not primarily for the community of von Wright experts.

Advanced Studies in 2007/8, I was able to consult von Wright's correspondence with Wittgenstein's other literary executors Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees, at the National Library, which gave me some insights into this fascinating editorial history.

As a result of my Helsinki stay, the volume *The Vienna Circle in the Nordic Countries. Networks and Transformations of Logical Empiricism* (Manninen/Stadler 2010) appeared. It included the seminal article of Juha Manninen "Between the Vienna Circle and Ludwig Wittgenstein," which discusses the influence of Eino Kaila and Ludwig Wittgenstein on von Wright. The importance of Kaila as a bridge between Helsinki and Vienna and as a philosophical mediator was monumental. (Niiniluoto 2017; Wallgren 2023.)

I have a long-standing interest in the philosophical axis between Vienna and Helsinki. In the following I want to focus on some specific underexposed events of von Wright's intellectual biography that will elucidate his "Austrian" connections both in terms of his philosophical style and life-long personal relationships. In doing so, I will argue that von Wright can be characterized as a representative of what my late friend Rudolf Haller convincingly characterized as "typical Austrian philosophy", which can be characterized as scientific philosophy committed to an exact methodology with a focus on (formal) logic, language and empiricism in the tradition of Bolzano, Brentano, Mach, the Vienna Circle, with Wittgenstein and Popper at the margins (*Grazer Philosophische Studien* 99/2022). This, in turn, raises the question whether – or to what extent – von Wright can be considered as a pioneer and representative of analytic philosophy – which is an interesting analogy to the discussion of the case of Wittgenstein (e.g., Klagge 2023). That will be the gist of my paper. Let me throw a look at the five episodes between 1937 and 1998 which document the importance of von Wright's Austrian connections, as a completion to the well-known research on von Wright. (Niiniluoto / Vilkko 2005, Meggle / Vilkko 2016, De Pellegrin 2009.)

Prehistory – The Decisive Year 1929: The Vienna Circle Goes Public and Viennese Philosophy in Helsinki

In 1929, the Vienna Circle around its founder Moritz Schlick made its first public appearance with the publication of the famous manifesto *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis / The Scientific World-Conception. The Vienna Circle* (1929/2010). This booklet included Eino Kaila (1890-1958) under the label of closely connected authors. He had visited Vienna for the first time in the same year and thereafter became intensively involved with the new doctrines of Logical Empiricism, as he himself had appropriately called this new movement. (Niiniluoto et al. 1992, Niiniluoto/Pihlström 2012, Manninen et al. 2014.)

As a student of Kaila from 1934, von Wright was reading Ernst Mach and Wilhelm Jerusalem, who both had introduced empiricist and pragmatist philosophy in Vienna as an alternative to metaphysical transcendental idealism. (von Wright 1989, 4f.; on "Finnish Versions of Pragmatist Humanism", see Pihlström 2023, 147-166).

I think, it is no coincidence, then, that many years later von Wright wrote a well-informed introduction to the English translation of Robert Musil's dissertation on Mach entitled *Beitrag zur Beurteilung der Lehren Machs*, 1908 (*On Mach's Theories*, 1982): In his introduction he referred to Carl Stumpf and the Gestalt-psychology and to Musil's participation in the Richard von Mises Circle in Berlin, and he compares Musil with the later Wittgenstein, thinking of "a great kinship between these two most remarkable men" (von Wright 1982, 9). For von Wright, Mach, together with Nietzsche, was the main influence for Musil's interest in philosophy. (Ibid., 14.)

Musil later became famous not as a philosopher but as the author, above all, of his unfinished novel *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften / Man Without Qualities* (1930/33). Besides his participation in the discussion circle around the Viennese mathematician Richard von Mises during his Berlin phase, he followed the writings of the Vienna Circle intensively during his time in Vienna in the 1930s until his emigration to Switzerland in 1938.

Von Wright's dealing with Mach and Musil seems to me symptomatic of his lifelong interest in Viennese modernism,

which overlapped with his Wittgenstein themes. Here it is also reasonable to assume that Kaila's and von Wright's interest in pragmatism was influenced by Mach *and* Jerusalem, in addition to William James (Pihlström 2023, 147-166).

The mastery of the German language by the members of the scientific communities in Finland and Scandinavia before World War II was the prerequisite for robust interactions with Central European and Austrian philosophers. The Schlick Circle in Vienna and the Kaila Circle in Helsinki (with Max Söderman and von Wright) worked parallel to each other and exchanged with each other until the outbreak of the World War II. For example, the reading of Carnap, Hempel, Frank, von Mises, Popper, and Reichenbach alongside the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and other articles in the journal *Erkenntnis* provided an important field of reference for Finnish philosophy, too. The extensive correspondence between Kaila and members of the Vienna Circle is an impressive testimony for the vibrant feature of this relationship. This is nicely documented in Carnap's diaries, which cover also the late personal encounter of Carnap and von Wright in Los Angeles dealing with readings and controversial discussions on induction and probability, after Carnap had read von Wright's *The Logical Problem of Induction* (1941) already some years later. During this interaction in L.A. and Stanford in the 1960s, Carnap recommended von Wright for a chair in practical philosophy at the UCLA (Damböck 2022 and in https://valep.vc.univie.ac.at/files/Tagebuecher/).

Episode 1 – Vienna 1937: From the Kaila Circle to the Vienna Circle

After completing his studies with Kaila, von Wright traveled with his friend Göran Schildt to Italy in 1937. On his way he stopped in Vienna for the first time to meet his friend Max Söderman, who introduced him to Gödel. It is worth mentioning that the latter wrote a rare recommendation letter for Söderman (von Wright to Kaila, 7/II 1938, in Österman 2020).

When he visited Vienna for the first time, the Vienna Circle had effectively collapsed. After a brief civil war in Austria in February 1934 which ended with the victory of a rightwing authoritarian regime, the Social Democrat Otto Neurath, and

others, emigrated for political reasons, and Moritz Schlick was murdered at the University of Vienna in June 1936. The still remaining figures, like Heinrich Gomperz, Kurt Gödel, Edgar Zilsel, and especially Viktor Kraft represented the remnants of the Circle, with whom he thought to study for a doctorate. Looking back von Wright observed: "Considering the education I had had in Helsingfors, the natural place for me to go was Vienna", even if, by that time the Vienna Circle was "*rapidly dispersing.*" (von Wright 1989, 9f.) And the Nazi occupation and annexation of Austria in 1938 – a preface to the outbreak of World War II in 1939 -- "put an end to my dreams of studying in Vienna." (Ibid.)

This episode is important for two reasons. First, the war was the reason for von Wright's decision to study Cambridge in England as of 1939. Second, it is noteworthy that von Wright refreshed his relationship with Viktor Kraft and to Austria after World War II, when he visited Vienna again in 1952. Kraft had wanted to revive the traditions of the Vienna Circle at the university by establishing the so-called "Third Vienna Circle". This ambitious attempt failed because of the hostile circumstances at the University of Vienna. Also, von Wright described the atmosphere as desolate:

> My postwar impressions have been of an arid parochialism, of a place where not even memories are any longer alive. I spent a fairly long time in Austria in 1952. Kraft was then about to retire. I attended a couple of his postgraduate seminars (Privatissima), which, as he himself remarked at our final meeting on June 27, had been the last link at the university level with the former Wiener Kreis. Now it was all finished. (von Wright 1989, 10.)

On the one hand, this episode from 1937 shows the crucial turning point for von Wright to go to Cambridge in 1939 in view of his focus on induction and probability rather than on the issues being discussed by the Vienna Circle before the outbreak of World War II. At the same time, it confirms a remarkable continuity to the postwar period, when he should meet Kraft again in Vienna. This is evidenced by the correspondence between Kraft and von Wright, which is characterized by

mutual esteem.[3] The fact that Wittgenstein once came to Kraft's circle upon the suggestion of Elizabeth Anscombe and the invitation of Paul Feyerabend is an amusing footnote to these encounters and will be described below. In 1937 it was by no means clear to von Wright that he would meet Wittgenstein in Cambridge, who lived a nomadic life and commuted between these two worlds. Wittgenstein himself philosophized and wrote in German until the end of his life, whereas for von Wright the switch to the English-speaking scientific community in 1939 was momentous.

In any case, von Wright wrote a book on Logical Empiricism in Swedish (1943) inspired by Wittgenstein, which can be read as an alternative option to A.J. Ayer's influential monograph *Language, Truth, and Logic* (1936) and as a textbook for Northern European universities. He regarded the book as "a farewell to the philosophy of my student years" (von Wright 1989,11). In the abstract published in English, he described this monograph as an introduction especially for students (von Wright 1944, 25f.):

> This volume is intended as an introduction, primarily for students without a deeper knowledge of philosophy and symbolic logic. Chapter I deals with some predecessor phenomena of the new movement—Mach's treatment of the psycho-physic problem, Poincaré's conventionalistic conception of natural laws, Peirce's pragmatistic doctrine of meaning and truth, and the rise of modern symbolic logic out of Boolean algebra and Frege's attempt to deduce the system of mathematics from logical principles. The second chapter is devoted to a presentation of Wittgenstein's system, which in the opinion of the author is to be considered as a milestone in the development of human thought, chiefly on account of the clear conception of philosophy as an activity the purpose of which is to clarify the use (or logical grammar) of language. On the basis of the theory of truth-functions a survey is given of Wittgenstein's doctrine of meaning and of his idea that the truths of logic and mathematics are tautologies. An attempt is further made to elucidate in modern terms the view

[3] By the way, an illustrating parallel action is the case of the Norwegian Arne Naess. He finished his dissertation *Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten* (1936) still in Vienna with participations in the Schlick Circle before returning to Oslo. (Naess 1993; Stadler 2010a, 11-32).

taken in the Tractatus that syntactical propositions are "meaningless."

In the third chapter the philosophic contributions of the Vienna Circle are examined. The author dwells in particular upon Schlick's theory of sense data ("Konstatierungen") as the irrevocable criteria of material truth and Carnap's logical constitution of the world on a phenomenalistic (ego-psychic) basis. The neopositivist criticism of metaphysics and the unitary conception of science are also mentioned.

The later development of the theory of meaning and material truth (Popper, Carnap, Neurath) is related in the fourth chapter, which further discusses physicalism and phenomenalism as alternative ways of constituting the system of empirical knowledge. According to the author the choice between the two methods of constitution is to be regarded as merely conventional.

Chapter V makes the idea of regarding languages as calculi and the difference between semantic and formal systems familiar to the reader. Formal proofs and meta-proofs are illustrated by elementary examples. Hilbert's idea of building up a metamathematical system with finite means is confronted with the results of Gödel.

The last chapter gives a brief survey of the present state of research along the lines of logical empiricism in various countries and a summary of the most important achievements of the new movement. Finally the author makes some critical remarks on the doctrine of Carnap and others that philosophy is logical syntax and on the formalistic conception of logic and language as opposed to the view taken by Wittgenstein and his adherents.

This document is instructive in that it reflects von Wright's profound knowledge of the development of the Vienna Circle and Wittgenstein, which, in addition to the unresolved debate over foundations, also addresses philosophical pluralism between unified science and the "semantic turn." In doing so, it overcomes the one-sided focus on the meaning criterion of A.J. Ayer's influential book, *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936). Had von Wright's book been published in English at the time (which is not the case till now), it would have countered many

of the clichés about Logical Empiricism and the Vienna Circle also propagated by Ayer.

The first trip to Vienna in 1937 and his later encounter with Wittgenstein were incentives for this study. The meetings with Kraft and Gödel undoubtedly contributed to a better understanding of the new Viennese philosophy (Lethen 2021, 19f., 73ff.), in addition to the considerable influence of Kaila, as evidenced well in his elucidating correspondence (1937-1958) with his teacher. (Österman 2020.)

A new phase in von Wright's development began with the continuation of his studies in Cambridge in 1939 in the context of "Oxbridge philosophy" and his personal meetings with Wittgenstein - and with Friedrich Waismann, too, who also represented Viennese philosophy in exile under changed conditions. In his autobiography, von Wright vividly recalls his first conversations with Wittgenstein in Cambridge ("the strongest impression any man ever made on me", von Wright 1989, 10), which ultimately led, with Wittgenstein's consent, to his acceptance of Wittgenstein's professorship in 1948 and his appointment as an executor of Wittgenstein's literary estate together with Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees in 1951.

The correspondence between Wittgenstein and von Wright is a rare document of the mutual appreciation that existed between them, and this despite of differences in philosophical positions. (Wittgenstein-von Wright 1983). I am familiar with only one other example of a relationship comparable to Wittgenstein and von Wright's: the personal and philosophical relationship between Wittgenstein and Schlick.

Von Wright worked on his dissertation after returning to Finland during a short peace time between the Winter War and the Continuation War before his wartime service. It was published under the title *The Logical Problem of Induction* in 1941 and afterwards – according to von Wright's memories - the Kaila circle was discussing Carnap's *Introduction to Semantics* (1942) and *Formalization of Logic* (1943). Von Wright's professional career advanced as a Docent (1943-1946) and subsequently as a Professor at the University of Helsinki.[4]

[4] His most talented student Jaakko Hintikka was to distinguish himself by continuing also the reception of Viennese philosophy until the end of his life. (Auxier/Hahn 2006).

As the successor to Wittgenstein's chair at Cambridge (1948-1951), von Wright became acquainted with Wittgenstein's late philosophy, prior to the posthumous publication of the *Philosophical Investigations* in 1953. This formative phase of his life was the subject of a centenary symposium on "Von Wright and Wittgenstein in Cambridge" in 2016, which took place in the von Wrights' Strathaird house, where Wittgenstein had lived shortly before his death.

Episode 2: First Return to Vienna 1952

In October 1949, von Wright refreshed his relationship with Viktor Kraft (see episode 1) by sending him some of his offprints He also announced that Elizabeth Anscombe would be coming to Vienna for a longer stay in 1950, and recommended her as an "extraordinarily gifted and witty person". (von Wright to Kraft, October 30, 1949.)

Upon the invitation of Wittgenstein's sister Margaret Stonborough, von Wright returned to Vienna in 1952, one year after Wittgenstein's death. There he met with Elizabeth Anscombe, who was improving her German and working on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. He met with Viktor Kraft and participated in his discussion circle. Furthermore, this was his first contact with the young Paul Feyerabend, who had just completed his dissertation *Zur Theorie der Basissätze* (On the Theory of Basic Propositions, 1951) advised by Kraft and had published a review of his *Essay in Modal Logic* (1951). This meeting was followed by another one a year later in Oxford at Anscombe's home, where Feyerabend proposed the concept of incommensurability challenging Wittgenstein's intentions. (Feyerabend 1995, 92ff.). And with reference to von Wright's pioneering biographical sketch of Wittgenstein (1954) Feyerabend offered to its author his own translation from Swedish into German, which did not materialize after all. (Feyerabend to von Wright, March 3, 1955).[5] This was not surprising given the fact that Feyerabend wrote one of the first reviews of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* in German, which was

[5] A German translation by Arvid Sjögren appeared in1961 in Norman Malcom, *Ludwig Wittgenstein – Ein Erinnerungsbuch*, Oldenburg, Munich and Vienna, 7-23.

translated by Anscombe into English later on (Feyerabend 1955).

In the context of this episode von Wright gave an impressive account of the end of the Vienna Circle upon the occasion of his participation in the Kraft seminar during his 1952 visit – a variation and confirmation of the above quoted recollection (von Wright, "Wienin piiri – henkilökohtaisia muistoja", in: I. Niiniluoto / H.J. Koskinen, eds., *Wienin piiri*. Helsinki 2002, 201f., quoted after Manninen 2020, 66f.):

> I contacted him and he kindly invited me to his research seminar called 'privatissimum'. I participated in a couple of meetings. I met in them among others Paul Feyerabend who then accompanied me in Vienna ... I remember especially the last meeting of Kraft's privatissimum. The topic was the difference between a regularity and natural law. When the end of the session was nearing, Kraft delivered a small oration. He said that the meeting this evening could be seen as the absolutely last meeting of the Vienna Circle. ... I did not have the opportunity to get acquainted with the Vienna Circle during its time of flourishing, but in a sense I participated, if it is right to say so, in its funeral. Kraft's speech was deeply moving me.

After von Wright's stay in Vienna in 1952, he and Kraft kept in sporadic touch for the next years until the late 1960s. In 1967, Kraft asked him about the reception of the Schlick Circle in Finland when preparing the publication of the 2nd edition of his own book on the Vienna Circle, and von Wright responded quickly. Finally, the two met again in person in Vienna on the occasion of the large XIV International Congress of Philosophy in September 1968, to which I will refer in more detail below.

Viktor Kraft, who was dismissed from the university during the Nazi era because of his Jewish wife and was appointed full professor for two years after the war in 1950-52, was the only member of the Vienna Circle (along with Bela Juhos) to survive the Second World War in "internal emigration." During this time, the Swedish journal *Theoria*, edited by Åke Petzäll, remained the only organ in which he could publish, and von Wright and other Northern European philosophers also contributed to it. This Nordic network thus formed an important forum for the interaction and transformation of scientific philosophy, which had shifted from Continental Europe to the

Anglo-American world as a result of the reign of National Socialism, followed by exile and forced migration. (Strang 2020; von Boguslawski 2011.)

As his intellectual legacy, Kraft had published his book *The Vienna Circle* (*Der Wiener Kreis*), in 1950, in which he presented the most important people and themes in a very balanced manner. He himself did not overemphasize his position of critical realism or constructive empiricism and his (cognitivist) ethics, as it did not enjoy majority support in the Vienna Circle. This neutrality was probably also due to the fact, that, in a kind of *dèja vu*, he had been threatened again by the murderer of Moritz Schlick, who was released from prison in the meantime. Through the English translation of his book in 1953 by the American philosopher Arthur Pap, who participated in the continuing informal Kraft Circle as a guest professor in 1953/54, a neutral image of Logical Empiricism prevailed in England and the USA similar to the above mentioned book of Ayer (1936) that facilitated the reception of the shortcoming "received view" of the Vienna Circle (Pap 1955), which became manifest with Quine's criticism in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951).

In any case, Kraft reached out to von Wright again in 1967 when he was preparing the second edition of his book on the Vienna Circle for relevant information about the impact and development of scientific philosophy in Finland and Scandinavia in his introduction. Herein Kraft described the impact of the Vienna Circle abroad as follows:

> The Vienna Circle has found a very remarkable continuation of its work in Finland, through Kaila, who, like Ayer, had himself for a time participated in the evenings of the Vienna Circle in Vienna, and through G.H.v.Wright, who was his student and then his colleague at the University of Helsinki and is at present a professor in Cambridge. (Kraft 1950/1968, 7.)

And in a new appendix on the influence of the Vienna Circle he explained, in addition:

> Neo-empiricism has also had a great influence in Scandinavia. Almost all Scandinavian philosophers of the present day have studied it and learned from it in logical and critical respects. As a result, the level of philosophy in Scandinavia is particularly high.

> But neo-empiricism is not represented here as a special school. People have gone through it and taken their own paths. The situation is similar in Finland. Through Kaila, the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle has gained great influence in this country. Wright, Ketonen, Stenius were his pupils. The earlier and later philosophy of Wittgenstein was also absorbed, through Stenius and Wright. But the Finnish philosophers did not stop there either, but moved into the wider field of analytical philosophy. Logic, especially modal logic and its applications, was greatly promoted in Finland by Wright and his student Hintikka. ... (Ibid., 181 f., transl. F.S.)

Von Wright's Vienna contacts in the 1950s with his correspondence can be supplemented by additional personal acquaintances.[6]

Episode 3: The Second Return to Vienna 1968 – Logic of Norms and Modal Logic

There is a remarkable prehistory of this 1968 episode: In 1953, the famous author of the Federal Constitution of the Austrian Republic and founder of pure theory of law, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), undertook a lecture tour in Northern Europe, which brought him also to Helsinki at the invitation of the political scientist Lolo Krusius-Ahrnberg. He met von Wright and discussed the logic of norms with him.[7] In Geneva, Kelsen had already organized a seminar on von Wright's deontic logic in 1952, arguing for a general logic of norms and rejecting a specific logic of law (personal message from Thomas Olechowski, 12.7.2023). As a result of this event the Kelsen

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[6] E.g., with the school teacher Ludwig Hänsel (1886-1959), who had maintained a close friendship with Wittgenstein since his war captivity in Monte Cassino in 1919, which is described in detail in the documentary book on their relation (Hänsel 1994). In addition, another important acquaintance emerged with the architect Paul Engelmann, who had built the Wittgenstein Haus in Vienna together with Ludwig for his sister Margarethe Stonborough. (Engelmann 1967).

[7] Regrettably, I did not succeed to get an access to von Wright's later autobiography in Swedish and Finnish (von Wright 2002/2002), where his encounter with Kelsen is described (I am grateful to one reviewer for this information).

biographer reports on this visit (Olechowski 2020, 832f., transl. F.S.):

> In March 1953, Kelsen travelled to Scandinavia and gave a lecture on the concept of justice, first, on 16 March, in Copenhagen, and on 21 March also in Helsinki; the lecture text was later also published in Danish and Finnish. Here, too, Kelsen was able to make a number of new contacts, including a meeting in Helsinki with Otto Brusiin, the founder of modern Finnish legal philosophy, who immediately made him an honorary member of a circle for legal theory that he had founded. It was here that he met Georg Henrik von Wright in person, …

Surprisingly, this remarkable exchange of ideas has not found further reciprocal expression, although this journey is well documented in historiography (Frändberg 1978). Here, the strong presence of conceptual legal positivism in Finland is emphasized, so that Kelsen had already been known since the 1930s. At the personal meeting between von Wright and Kelsen, who then appreciated von Wright's deontic logic, the possibility of logical relations between legal norms was discussed. (Bindreiter 2016, 104). In the 1950s, an analytic version of legal theory emerged in Finland, philosophically based on Eino Kaila:

> Applied to legal theory, this idea means that the research interest was directed towards the language and concepts of jurisprudence. The school of later analytical legal theory that emerged afterwards in the 1960s and 1970s, in turn, drew its approaches mainly from the philosophy of the so-called common language. On this basis, juridical decision-making and argumentation have become central objects of research. (Laakso 1983, 21.)

In this context, von Wright's "analytic hermeneutics" had developed, which dealt with problems of juridical decision-making and argumentation using the juridical language of practice. This is associated with Aulis Aarnio, who preferred Wittgenstein's late philosophy and the analytic-hermeneutic tradition. It is therefore no coincidence that von Wright was involved in several publications as co-editor and author of volumes on the philosophy of law, which can also be regarded as variations on Kelsen's pure theory of law (e.g., von Wright 1984).

Von Wright had also published on Kelsen's political philosophy in *Finsk Tidskrift* (151/1952), where he reviewed Jan-Magnus Jansson's dissertation on Kelsen's theory of the state (1950). The few references to the personal encounter between von Wright and Kelsen show an interaction that was followed by modifications of his deontic logic and action theory (1968). He presented this research for the first time in Vienna at the big 14th International Congress of Philosophy in 1968, which became a dramatic event one week after the suppression of the "Prague Spring" amidst the Cold War between East and West. Many dissidents had in fact decided to stay in Vienna, or to travel on to the Western world, while the ideological debate on communism and Marxism-Leninism raged in Vienna (then, a Chinese delegation remained excluded from the beginning) - and no renaissance of any kind took place with reference to the Vienna Circle, including Wittgenstein, as can be seen from the program overview.[8]

The big 1968 Congress of Philosophy in Vienna was organized under the auspices of the Republic of Austria by two philosophy professors from the University of Vienna, Leo Gabriel and Erich Heintel, both of whom in their youths had been vehement opponents of the Vienna Circle and analytic philosophy – Gabriel as a Roman Catholic during Austrofascism and Heintel as a member of the NSDAP – and in the course of their professional careers at the university successfully prevented the rehabilitation or return of the representatives of logical empiricism to Vienna. The gigantic program of the 1968 Congress reflected this ongoing marginalization. Although the Brentano School, Wittgenstein, and the Vienna Circle were included in the program as second-level colloquia, the former members of the Vienna Circle -- such as Kraft or Juhos – were marginalized in these meetings, like the emigrated proponents at the

[8] In this context the Vienna Circle members Felix Kaufmann and Rose Rand are to be mentioned here, too. The first one as a mediator between Kelsen, Husserl, the Austrian School, and the Vienna Circle, to whom von Wright referred as an inspiration for his later *Explanation and Understanding* (von Wright 1989, 47). The second one, who provided the only protocols of the Schlick Circle and pioneered on Polish philosophy and deontic logic antecedent to von Wright with an article which was published in Kelsen's journal (Rand 1939).

periphery with the notable exceptions of Karl Popper, who lectured "On the Theory of the Objective Mind" in a plenary session, and the prominent visitor of the former Vienna Circle, A.J. Ayer, with his contribution on "Philosophy and Scientific Method". (*Akten* 1968.)

Max Black, Viktor Kraft, and von Wright organized the Colloquium III on "Wittgenstein, the 'Vienna Circle' and Analytic Philosophy", in which only three papers (by David Keyt, Boguslav Wolniewicz and Brian McGuinness) were presented. Jaakko Hintikka, A.N. Prior and Ota Weinberger organized Colloquium IV on deontic logic and its significance for ethics and law (with papers by von Wright, A.R. Anderson, G. Kalinowski, A.N. Prior, Ota Weinberger, B. Baumrin and F. Loeser). However, the conference Proceedings only contain a selection of these talks.

This was the conflict-laden environment in which von Wright presented his logic of norms ending up with a crucial question (von Wright 1968, 304):

> Deontic Logic, in its modern form, was born in the early 1950ies. Before it was born, its very possibility was often doubted - for philosophical rather than formal logical reasons. It can hardly be denied that, at least as a formal discipline, deontic logic has turned out to be both possible and interesting. But it must be admitted that deontic logic nevertheless continues to be problematic. One of the open questions about it is, whether it has a fruitful application to ethics or to legal theory or to the social scientist's study of norms. Some regard deontic logic as being full of promise in these regards. But the hopes have not so far been to any great extent fulfilled - and this has made others doubt whether the hopes have not been exaggerated, to say the least. … The philosophical difficulty at the root of the question of the applicability of deontic logic is, I think, of an ontological nature. What is a norm? ...

Unfortunately, we know nothing about the immediate reception and discussion of the paper by von Wright, who changed his views on the logic of norms during his intellectual development. (Meggle 1999). In the same section of the congress, the Prague philosopher Ota Weinberger (1919-2009) spoke in German on "Logic of Norms and Legal Theory", wherein he sees the emergence of logic of norms inspired by the problem

of legal theory so that "the logical skeleton of legal thinking is supplied by the logic of norms." (Weinberger 1968, 303, transl. F.S.)

This conference turned out to be a momentous event in two widely different respects: first, Weinberger seized this opportunity to escape Communist Czechoslovakia after the suppression of the "Prague Spring", and second, it marked the beginning of a life-long scholarly discussion about the logic of norms and legal theory that developed between him and von Wright, which was characterized by *both* agreement *and* differences.

After his escape from Pague in 1968, Ota Weinberger, who was a Holocaust survivor, started his second academic career in Austria at the University of Graz at the Department of Philosophy of Law, where he was to engage critically with Kelsen and von Wright. Above all, his book *Alternative Handlungstheorie. Gleichzeitig eine Auseinandersetzung mit Georg Henrik von Wrights praktischer Philosophie* (*Alternative Theory of Action: Simultaneously a Critique of Georg Henrik von Wright's Practical Philosophy*, 1996) contests von Wright's philosophical position, only to end with a homage of him. In it, he refers to his German publications *Normen, Werte und Handlungen* (1994) and to the anthology *Erkenntnis als Lebensform* (translation of *The Tree of Knowledge*, 1995). Weinberger's motivation for publishing his book is revealing:

> G.H. von Wright has played a very significant role in my life and thinking, although I can neither count myself among his students nor among his companions. I owe a great deal of inspiration to von Wright, as does probably everyone interested in logical analysis in practical philosophy, … (Weinberger 1996, 9, transl. F.S.).

And he continued:

> When I gave this book the title 'Alternative Theory of Action', I wanted to express that I represent neither a behaviourist-causalist approach to action theory nor an intentionalist and transformational-logical view in the sense of G.H. von Wright. In my conception, this theory of action attains a central position in practical philosophy together with the conception of institutions as a 'social framework for action', thus addressing the social and political context. (Weinberger 1996, 13, transl. F.S.)

Weinberger's critical and constructive engagement with von Wright can be read as an inspirational dialogue with intense interaction. It is remarkable how strongly the encounter of the two shaped this research even if von Wright himself did not refer to it directly in his autobiography. (Aarnio et al. 1993; Krawietz et al. 2000.)[9]

Episode 4: The Third Return in 1977 to the Austrian Wittgenstein Community

A renaissance of scientific and analytical philosophy outside the universities took place in Austria under the auspices of International Wittgenstein Symposia in Kirchberg in Lower Austria, which were inaugurated in 1976 by the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society and have been held annually to date, with some exceptions due to the pandemic. Von Wright had cultivated more or less good professional and philosophical contacts with the pioneers of this international symposium: Rudolf Haller, a professor of philosophy in Graz; Adolf Hübner, a veterinarian in Kirchberg; Elisabeth and Werner Leinfellner, Austrian emigres at the University of Nebraska, and Paul Weingartner, a professor of philosophy in Salzburg. (Stadler/Windholz 2017.)

Of these, the encounter with Rudolf Haller was the most intensive and productive. Haller is responsible for the foundational work on the contested theory that there is what he called a "typical Austrian philosophy" covering analytic philosophy and logical empiricism. (Haller 1979.)

As a reminder, in 1977 Wittgenstein's *Vermischte Bemerkungen* was published by the German Suhrkamp Verlag, after von Wright – supported by Heikki Nyman – had been asked by the other executors of Wittgenstein's literary estate to take over the editorship. (Österman 2023b). This was a collection of aphorisms and comments that were scattered

[9] I want to add here that one of my philosophy teachers in Salzburg, the renowned Bolzano expert Edgar Morscher, who died unexpectedly in 2023, also dealt with von Wright's logic of norms and corresponded with him. This reflects the strong reception of his deontic logic in Austria, especially in Graz and Salzburg, which accompanied his well-known Wittgenstein research and plays an essential and independent role. (Morscher 2001).

throughout Wittgenstein's estate and were not directly classified as philosophical. In the end, von Wright chose to organize Wittgenstein's personal remarks in chronological order without commentary, which resulted in more than half of them falling into the period after the completion of the *Philosophical Investigations* some years before Wittgenstein's death.

The second German edition of 1978 was enriched by additional material from a notebook dated 1944. I have greatly appreciated this collection, as it provided trenchant insights into Wittgenstein's *oeuvre*, especially regarding his world views in the cultural context of his time.

Von Wright's opening lecture "Wittgenstein in Relation to his Times" at the Second Wittgenstein Symposium, entitled "Wittgenstein and his Influence on Contemporary Philosophy", appeared in the Symposia Proceedings 1978 - and later revised in his book *Wittgenstein* (von Wright 1982) – and it can be read as an English introduction to the then published *Vermischte Bemerkungen* which he, as the editor, describes as

> a collection of remarks on philosophy, on architecture, literature and music, on history and contemporary society, and on religion. The remarks were written at various times of Wittgenstein's life but for the most part towards the end of it. It is, I think, a beautiful collection and I wish that everyone interested in Wittgenstein and in the kind of spiritual endeavour that philosophy is would read it again and again. Although by no means an autobiography, it tells us more than any other written source about Wittgenstein's intellectual character and view of life, also about how he regarded his relationship with his time. It will be an indispensable source for any future attempt at assessing Wittgenstein and his achievement as 'intellectual phenomenon'. (Von Wright 1978, 73.)

And von Wright concludes by suggesting that philosophy for Wittgenstein is a historically conditioned enterprise, thus embedded in the social context:

> His conception of philosophy is intimately allied to a 'form of contemplation' of contemporary civilization. This much we must concede. But whether this had to be the Spenglerian form of seeing our times as a dissolution of traditions in art, religion, science, and philosophy which has constituted the relative unity of the historical phenomenon of Western Culture is, of course, another

> matter. Whatever the answer, the question deserves to be thought about and belongs in a so far almost unexplored problem area which Wittgenstein bequeathed to philosophy. (Ibid., 78.)

I myself took part in this symposium, but I do not remember the discussion that followed. Unfortunately, I also did not come into personal contact with von Wright after his talk, as was the case with A.J. Ayer and Karl Menger in an interview a year later. Without doubt, this lecture struck a nerve and filled a gap in Wittgenstein research, as already expressed in previous Wittgenstein research. Namely, as an enrichment to the worldview, which, contrary to the professing, was related to his philosophy, as a convergence with his *Weltanschauung*, if one takes into account the cultural skepticism and criticism of Western civilization including technological progress.

The list of lectures at this symposium is like a *Who's Who* of analytic philosophy and philosophy of science: we see Max Black, Erik Stenius, Elizabeth Anscombe, Wolfgang Stegmüller, Georg Kreisel, Norman Malcolm and Brian McGuinness. Von Wright was in contact with all of these or later came into conversation with them from a personal and philosophical point of view. The extensive correspondence 1965-2002 with Brian McGuinness alone is itself a piece of Wittgenstein research and awaits detailed investigation. In addition, this applies also to Allan Janik, the third eminent Wittgenstein scholar still living in Austria (as becomes manifest also from their correspondence with 40 letters from 1966 to 1999).

A good example for this research desideratum is the mathematician Georg Kreisel (then at Stanford), who also delivered a lecture on Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics in Kirchberg 1977 entitled "Zu Wittgensteins Gesprächen und Vorlesungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik" (Kreisel 1978). Kreisel (1923-2015), born in Graz, was sent by his Jewish family to England before the *Anschluss* in 1938. There he studied mathematics at Trinity College and distinguished himself as an expert on formal logic and mathematics in connection with Gödel and Wittgenstein, whom he had met personally as a student in Cambridge. His adventurous life took him via the University of Reading (1949-1954) to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton (1955-57), to the Sorbonne (1960-64), then to Stanford with a professorship in mathematics and philosophy. In 1985 he moved to Salzburg, where he spent his

retirement at the Research Centre of Paul Weingartner until his unexpected death. His book project there on Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics remained unfinished, which can be seen from his scientific archives now located at the University of Konstanz. His extensive research focused mainly on symbolic logic, proof theory, and philosophy of mathematics. (Odifreddi 1996.)

From 1948 to 1994 Kreisel corresponded intensively with von Wright (93 letters), the contents of which still await precise analysis. In his Kirchberg lecture 1977, Kreisel provided a summary of his publications on Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics (Kreisel 1978, also his contribution in *Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of von Wright*, *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 28/1976, 166-187), as well as on his conversations with Wittgenstein in 1942 and 1943 as personal impressions. According to him, these were quite relaxed in contrast to his lectures and notes. Wittgenstein, in turn, appreciated Kreisel as the "most able philosopher" who was also a mathematician. (Monk 1991, 498.)

In this context I want to focus on Rudolf Haller (1929-2014), a professor of philosophy at the University of Graz, who played a very important role in the restoration of Austrian philosophy that had been displaced by National Socialism and forgotten after the Second World War. Haller came into close contact with von Wright for the first time in 1972, and he cultivated this relationship with an extensive correspondence consisting of some 70 letters in the course of the next twenty years.

At the end of December 1973, for example, von Wright invited his colleague from Graz to attend the symposium in September 1975 marking of the centennial anniversary of the establishment of the Philosophical Society of Finland. Subsequent correspondence in the seventies initially addressed efforts to save the house that Wittgenstein had designed with Paul Engelman for his sister, Margarethe Stonborough, located in the Kundmanngasse in Vienna's 3rd district, that was built in a minimalist style reminiscent of Adolf Loos. (Engelmann 1967). The so-called "Wittgenstein House" was being threatened by demolition, and it could only be saved thanks to a public campaign by architects, who managed to have it listed as a historically protected monument. There originally were

plans to have the Republic of Austria and the City of Vienna purchase the house and convert it into a research center for Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. However, they never came to fruition, and it was finally saved by the People's Republic of Bulgaria which purchased it as a site for the Bulgarian Cultural Institute, which owns it to this day and uses it for events.

Further exchanges between von Wright and Haller dealt with Austrian and Finnish philosophy. From 1982 onwards the international project of a complete edition of the Wittgenstein *Nachlass* stood on the agenda. This editorial work was primarily managed by Michael Nedo in Cambridge, which was a source of ongoing tensions between von Wright, Anscombe and Rhees and the editor as well as issues related to the funding for the (still running) Wittgenstein's *Wiener Ausgabe* / Vienna Edition, edited by Michael Nedo since 1994. (On the complex and conflicting editorial history Hintikka 1991; Erbacher 2023.)

As the centenary of Wittgenstein's birth approached, Haller invited von Wright to participate in the International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg: a big event that was being planned for 1989. However, von Wright did not participate and justified his absence by referring to the conflicts he was having with the other executors. He said that he wanted to withdraw from the "Wittgenstein business" (and from contacts with Nedo), and he subsequently turned to Haller for advice and support in the conflicts that accompanied publications in the following years. (Haller/Brandl 1990; Bezzel/Kosuth 1989.)

The long history of the edition of Wittgenstein's works was a long history of conflicts among the three executors of his literary estate and the editors of the volumes: conflicts that were informed by divergent personal opinions, different scholarly agendas and dispositions, and legal vagaries. If and to what extent the publication of the substantial *oeuvre* of Wittgenstein's writings to date corresponds to Wittgenstein's admittedly general last will is – at the end of the day – an ongoing discussion. (Wallgren 2023, 336f.)

Episode 5: Closing the Austrian Circle – Honorary Doctorate in Innsbruck 1998

However, von Wright's (unfulfilled) desire to get out of what he called the "Wittgenstein business" in the late 1980s was not the end of his "Austrian connection". The publication of Wittgenstein's letters and correspondence with his family, which is in the possession of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society, came onto the agenda in the 1990s, and it would occupy von Wright in the last decade of his life. During a private trip to Austria in 1993, he met with Walter Methlagl, the director of the Brenner Archive at the University of Innsbruck, in connection with the planned edition, which von Wright was pleased to see in the works.

The first edition of the family letters entitled *Wittgenstein. Familienbriefe* appeared with the Viennese publisher Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky (McGuinness, Ascher, Pfersmann 1996) and an expanded new edition came on the market in 2018 (McGuinness/Schweitzer 2018): *Wittgenstein. A Family in Letters* was the new title of the book, with a long introduction by Brian McGuinness. Most of these letters come from the Wittgenstein Collection of the Brenner Archive and the Manuscript Collection of the Austrian National Library, whose extensive Wittgenstein collection was declared a UNESCO World Documentary Heritage Site in 2017.

Von Wright's Innsbruck contacts had a remarkable pre-history in the person of Wolfgang Stegmüller (1923-1991), the pioneer of German analytic philosophy of science. Stegmüller had studied economics at the University of Innsbruck during the Second World War and earned his doctorate in philosophy there in 1947. Through the Austrian College / Forum Alpbach – an informal "summer school" established after World War II to help rejuvenate intellectual life in post-war Austria -- Stegmüller came into contact with Karl Popper, who introduced him to the Vienna Circle and to analytic philosophy. (Stadler 2010.)

The publication of the first edition of Stegmüller's *Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie* (1952) -- *Main Currents in Contemporary German, British and American Philosophy,* translated by Albert Blumberg (1969) – documented his turn towards anti-metaphysical philosophy and the philosophy of

language from Carnap to Wittgenstein. The 5th enlarged edition of 1975 included a long chapter on "Hermeneutics and Philosophy of Science: Explanation and Understanding according to Georg Henrik von Wright" (Stegmüller 1975, 103-147), in which he appreciated von Wright's intention to bridge the gap between these two poles of the philosophy of humanities and science (Kusch 2003).

Despite his growing international reputation, Stegmüller's academic career in Austria was blocked twice -- first in 1956 in Innsbruck and then afterwards in Vienna. So, he was forced to "emigrate", and he started his successful career with an appointment in Munich in 1958. Stegmüller was particularly interested in the modern philosophy of science, which brought him into contact with philosophers who had emigrated, and he became an integral figure for philosophy of science in the Federal Republic of Germany. (Benetka 2000.)

What is particularly noteworthy about Stegmüller is his reception of von Wright's philosophy. The regular contact he and von Wright cultivated throughout the years started in 1959. And Stegmüller paid increasing attention to von Wright and Finnish philosophy in the subsequent editions of his *Hauptströmungen,* which became a standard work for philosophy of science in the German-speaking world.

The fact that von Wright was awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of Innsbruck in 1998 can be seen as an acknowledgement of his special and longstanding relationships to Austria, especially with Allan Janik, the co-author of the famous book *Wittgenstein's Vienna*. (Janik/Toulmin 1973). The Faculty of Philosophy advanced the idea of recognizing von Wright in this manner, and the professor of philosophy Gerhard Frey, who saw himself as a representative of "scientific philosophy" in the spirt of the Vienna Circle, was a driving force behind it providing a short and strong recommendation for this award (Frey 1998). He incidentally also managed the estate of Viktor Kraft -- one of the last representatives of the Vienna Circle with whom von Wright had cultivated contacts earlier, as we have described above.

Reinhard Kleinknecht, a professor of philosophy, held the *laudatio* for von Wright in his presence, by acknowledging him a distinguished philosopher and as a representative of Logical Empiricism and Analytic Philosophy. After describing his

biography as a journey from Helsinki via Vienna to Cambridge and back to Helsinki, Kleinknecht emphasized von Wright's recent and close cooperation with the Brenner Archive in Innsbruck, before enumerating von Wright's many accomplishments: beginning with his independent philosophical path in ethics, deontic logic and modal logic, continuing with his achievements in truth theory, logic of action and time, intentionality, causality, teleology, and scientific explanation, and ending with the cultural pessimism and doubts about scientific rationality in his later works. The praise ended up by summarizing the wide range of influence von Wright had exercised during his distinguished career: "*You have made significant contributions to the progress of philosophy, you have increased philosophical knowledge through your discoveries and you have prompted many others to continue working on this. For this we thank you.*" (Kleinknecht 1998, 21, transl. F.S.)

Conclusion

So much for the award at the University of Innsbruck, which was the only Austrian university to honor him – late – but explicitly as a distinguished philosopher who had worked in a philosophical tradition that Austrians with a similar philosophical temper consider Austrian.

The honorary doctorate in Innsbruck also symbolically closed a wide circle. Von Wright received it in 1998: 61 years after he travelled to Vienna for the first time in 1937, as a student full of great expectations and hopes. His career began with the Vienna Circle in many respects. It led to Wittgenstein's Cambridge and then on to Helsinki. From there von Wright came back to Austria, again and again over the years, with important contacts in Vienna, in Graz and finally in Innsbruck.

Of course, the Austrian connection was only a part of von Wright's rich intellectual life and multifaceted biography. However, as I have attempted to show, it was a significant and not an accidental one. Von Wright readily acknowledged the formative influence Kaila exercised from his position – on the fringes of the Vienna Circle –, as well as the decisive influence of Wittgenstein, who thought and wrote in German throughout his life, identified with his Viennese roots, and visited also

the Kraft Circle in Vienna shortly before his death in 1951 (for a detailed account see Stadler 2010c).

Von Wright readily acknowledged his intellectual kinship with Wittgenstein several times, and it is both interesting and appropriate that Wittgenstein himself in his *Philosophical Investigations* provided a metaphor which may characterize von Wright's relationship to Wittgenstein and Austrian philosophy, too:

> … we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. ... I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblances'; for the various resemblances between the members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. (PI § 66, 67.)

Wittgenstein and von Wright participated together, so to speak, in a philosophical language, in the true sense of the word. Von Wright once in his last years confessed: "*Ich fühle mich in der deutschen Sprache zuhause*" ("I feel at home in the German language"). (Pichler 2016, 153.)

It is also symptomatic that Wittgenstein and von Wright shared a certain cultural pessimism and lamented the demise of the culture that the Austrian author Stefan Zweig called *Die Welt von Gestern* (The World of Yesterday). In this context von Wright can be considered a "'Central European' Finn." (Österman 2023, 53). In any case, Wittgenstein and von Wright were early convinced Europeans – and admired "Kakanien" (Musil) as a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual empire (von Wright 1993b).

Returning to my initial thesis we may ask if Georg Henrik von Wright can be characterized in the context of what Rudolf Haller called "Austrian philosophy" (Haller 1979; Stadler 2022). In this regard I would like to suggest that there certainly are enough "family resemblances" with this specific Austrian philosophy (covering inter alia Mach, Musil, Wittgenstein, and the Vienna Circle) to warrant doing so.

And this despite the fact, that von Wright in his last years had tried to bridge the gap between analytic and continental philosophy as becomes manifest in his (self-)critical lecture on analytic philosophy in 1991 – by the way, with reference to the

Vienna Circle member and "Wittgensteinian" Friedrich Waismann in exile (von Wright 1993a, 4):

> Behind these words lies a view according to which there is a clear and sharp difference between philosophy on the one hand and science on the other. It is a view which Wittgenstein had expressed in the Tractatus, and to which he stuck throughout the changes which his philosophy later underwent. This conception has also from the beginning stamped my way of thinking about philosophy. The same, however, is by no means the case with all those who call themselves analytic philosophers – whether in the past or at the present time. Among philosophers of this denomination both types of intellectual attitude, as distinguished by Waismann, have been represented – sometimes in open opposition to one another, sometimes in a non-reflective alliance. For this reason, analytic philosophy has, almost from the beginning, been loaded with latent contradictions which in the end had to become manifest, thus destroying the unity of the movement (von Wright 1993a, 26).

University of Vienna

Acknowledgements

Thanks go to Peter Goller (Innsbruck), Valter Holmström (Helsinki), Allan Janik (Innsbruck), Lonnie Johnson (Wien), Martin Kusch (Wien), Tim Lethen (Helsinki), Marko Oja (Helsinki), Bernt Österman (Helsinki), Kjell Petersen (Helsinki), Michael Schorner (Innsbruck), Serena Stadler (Berlin), Thomas Wallgren (Helsinki), Paul Weingartner (Salzburg) for their kind help and support.

In addition, I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their useful recommendations and corrections.

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Wittgenstein in Finland

LARS HERTZBERG

The Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, in particular when it comes to the philosophy practised in the English-speaking world and in the Nordic countries. He grew up in Vienna, but did most of his academic work in Cambridge, writing in German, teaching in English. He published only one major work during his life-time, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, which appeared in 1921, but he left a large literary heritage at his death in 1951. This included a work which was considered nearly finished, the *Philosophische Untersuchungen* (*Philosophical Investigations*), and which was brought out posthumously in 1953. A large number of publications from his *Nachlass* followed. Wittgenstein's influence was twofold: his early work contributed to the shaping of the philosophical movement known as logical positivism (or logical empiricism), while the later work helped to form what is variously known as linguistic philosophy or ordinary language philosophy. In either case, it has been a matter of debate to what extent these two movements have stayed true to the heritage from Wittgenstein's thinking. What characterized Wittgenstein's later work was the idea that philosophy is an attempt to dissolve philosophical bewilderment rather than advance theories, and that it is carried out by attending to the actual use of words in particular contexts, in contradistinction to the formal view of language characteristic of traditional analytic philosophy. This has brought about a gradually widening gap between two philosophical traditions; we might call them the formal and the linguistic tradition of analytic philosophy.

Wittgenstein and von Wright

Finland is one of the countries in which the impact of Wittgenstein's philosophy has been the strongest.[1] The main mediator of this influence was Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). von Wright first met Wittgenstein when he visited Cambridge after graduating from the University of Helsinki in 1939. He was 22 at the time. He had studied Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* with his teacher, Eino Kaila, but neither of them knew that Wittgenstein was in Cambridge. After a minor contre-temps, von Wright having attended one of Wittgenstein's lectures near the end of term, the two struck up a life-long friendship.

In 1948 von Wright succeeded Wittgenstein in his Cambridge chair. However, in 1951 he gave it up and moved to Finland, where he held the Swedish-language chair of philosophy at the University of Helsinki until 1961; in that year, he was appointed a member of the Academy of Finland.

In his will, Wittgenstein designated von Wright alongside Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees as executor of matters concerning his literary *Nachlass.* This meant that, following Wittgenstein's death in 1951, the three of them together undertook the organizing, selecting and editing of Wittgenstein's unpublished writings. The task turned out to be much more extensive and gave rise to many more difficult decisions than the trio had imagined. The work which began with the publishing of the *Philosophische Untersuchungen* was not completed during the life-time of the three executors. The efforts and tribulations of the three editors has been examined in a recent work edited by Thomas Wallgren, called *The Creation of Wittgenstein.*

In this editorial task which could well have filled up a person's life-time on its own, von Wright was at first assisted by Tauno Nyberg, then by André Maury (of whom more later), and last by Heikki Nyman. In addition to assisting von Wright in his editorial work, Nyman performed the huge task of translating most of Wittgenstein's published work into Finnish. In consequence, for a long time Finnish, alongside English, was probably the language into which the largest portion of Wittgenstein's work had been translated.

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[1] For an annotated bibliography of publications on Wittgenstein by Finnish philosophers, see Uschanov 2007, accessed on 7 February, 2024.

Side by side with the editing, von Wright wrote a number of exegetical commentaries on Wittgenstein's writings, and he constructed a useful numbering system (not unlike that created for composers like Bach or Mozart) in order to facilitate an overview of Wittgenstein's manuscripts and typescripts (von Wright s.a.). von Wright also wrote a biographical sketch of Wittgenstein's life which was published together with the memoir written by Norman Malcolm, von Wright's friend and a fellow student of Wittgenstein's (von Wright 1984).

Furthermore, von Wright left behind an institutional memory at the University of Helsinki, in the form of The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives, under the directorship of Thomas Wallgren and curated by Bernt Österman. These archives contain 'all the Ludwig Wittgenstein materials collected by … von Wright, who [himself] described his archive as "probably the most comprehensive and well-organized Wittgenstein archive in the world"… Furthermore, [the archive] holds an extensive Wittgenstein and von Wright library.'[2] The archive is an invaluable resource for Wittgenstein research.

Apart from his editorial work which could be said to have been in direct service to making Wittgenstein's work available to the philosophical world, we may consider the bearing the influence of Wittgenstein came to have on von Wright's own original contributions to philosophy. This issue has its own complexity. As early as the 1940's, von Wright himself expressed what is sometimes called a powerful 'anxiety of influence'. In fact, he did manage to keep an ostensible distance from Wittgensteinian *forms of expression*: Joachim Schulte, a well-known Wittgenstein scholar and a friend of von Wright, wrote, in his essay 'The Reception of Wittgenstein's Philosophy in Finland':

> [von Wright] succeeded in what few people strongly influenced by Wittgenstein managed to achieve and what Wittgenstein himself would have appreciated most – he kept an independent mind, he never became a Wittgensteinian philosopher, and he was never tempted to become a philosopher of that kind. (Schulte 2003, 391.)

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[2] https://www.helsinki.fi/en/projects/von-wright-and-wittgenstein-archives. Accessed on 11 February 2024.

As we shall see, that claim may be in need of some modification.

A large part of von Wright's most original contributions to philosophy – say, his work on modal and deontic logic - concerned themes and made use of methods that did not have any notable relation to Wittgenstein's thinking. However, in other respects, Wittgenstein's view of philosophy had an undeniable impact on von Wright's outlook, even if he rarely makes this explicit. Concerning his over-all view of philosophy, this influence was expressed in von Wright's conviction that the methods of philosophy should be held clearly separate from those of the empirical sciences.

Lassi Jakola is someone who has done extensive research on this subject (Jakola 2023 and forthcoming). On Jakola's account, the Wittgensteinian influence made itself felt in different ways in different periods. In his early work, *The Logical Problem of Induction*, written during Wittgenstein's life-time, the influence of Wittgenstein's attitude to philosophy can be discerned above all in von Wright's view of the aim of his work, rather than in the details of his presentation: instead of providing his own theory of induction, von Wright wanted to show that the problem of justifying inductive reasoning is a pseudo-problem - indeed, involves a contradiction; just as Wittgenstein thought it the task of philosophy to show that the problems of philosophy arise through a misunderstanding of our forms of expression, rather than to provide substantial theories or doctrines about various areas of thought. Other aspects of Wittgenstein's influence can be discerned in other works. Thus, *The Varieties of Goodness* (which appeared in 1963) follows Wittgenstein's example of providing a descriptive account of the uses of words and the interrelations between them. In von Wright's case, the description concerned uses of the word 'good'. It is true that Wittgenstein wrote little about value expressions – rather, in his early work, he tended to regard ethics as lying beyond the scope of philosophical inquiry. Yet Jakola is right in pointing out that the book is very much written in a Wittgensteinian spirit.

Again, in von Wright's work on the philosophy of action, from the 1970's onwards, Wittgenstein's influence is seen in his insistence that what makes an action intelligible is the context of life in which it is performed rather than its causal

antecedents. Jonas Ahlskog, on his part, has made a study of von Wright's philosophy of action and concluded that von Wright's thinking on the subject as it developed moved ever closer to Wittgenstein's outlook (Ahlskog 2023 and forthcoming).

Furthermore, in von Wright's very late work on the philosophy of mind (von Wright 1998), Jakola points out, the *methodology* is clearly inspired by Wittgenstein. von Wright is resisting the idea of reducing psychological descriptions to neurological ones; rather, his interest is in laying clear the conceptual relations and the intertwinement between the different levels on which we speak of the lives of human beings – mental, behavioural and neural.

As time went on, Wittgenstein's thinking came to have an ever deepening impact on the way von Wright regarded the problems of philosophy. In his intellectual autobiography he wrote:

> What I refer to as influence had been latently there ever since my first acquaintance, in 1947, with the thoughts of the *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, and had been gradually built up during the twenty years and more of my work as one of the editors of Wittgenstein's posthumous works. But it seems that not until I had worked my way independently to the neighborhood of Wittgenstein's thinking could I be aware of and consciously try to exploit this influence. (von Wright 1989, 40–41.)

In other words, von Wright had to make Wittgenstein's thinking his own before he could fully integrate it in his work.

The Wittgenstein-von Wright relation also had a further dimension. I am thinking here of some of von Wright's culture-critical writings, especially during the 1970's and 1980's. In some of his essays on the condition of our times, his thinking was not so much *influenced by* Wittgenstein; rather he could be said to have been thinking '*with* Wittgenstein', at least *as von Wright read him*. In this connection, what came to play an important role was a collection of remarks from Wittgenstein's notebooks that von Wright had brought together, and that was published under the title *Vermischte Bemerkungen / Culture and Value*. These remarks are selected on the ground that they can be separated from the surrounding philosophical discussion. They range over a variety of topics: Wittgenstein's self-

reflection, religion, music, psychoanalysis, history, current events. Some remarks are of philosophical interest, others have mainly biographical import. An underlying tone is that of cultural pessimism. It appears that von Wright, who had at this time come to engage in a critique of the *Zeitgeist*, came to see in Wittgenstein's remarks a kindred spirit. He now launched a reading of Wittgenstein in which philosophical critique and cultural reflection were combined.

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Apart from the seminal role of von Wright, the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking has mainly centred around two philosophy departments, that of the University of Helsinki and that of Åbo Akademi in Turku. In these departments interest in Wittgenstein has partly taken different forms. I will deal with each of these in turn, starting with the Wittgenstein reception in Helsinki.

Wittgenstein in Helsinki

Independently of von Wright, two other prominent philosophers at Helsinki made internationally noted contributions to the study of Wittgenstein's philosophy: Erik Stenius (1911-1990) and Jaakko Hintikka (1929-2015). In 1960, Erik Stenius published the book *Wittgenstein's* Tractatus: *A Critical Exposition of its Main Lines of Thought.* Stenius started his academic career as a mathematician; from there, he gradually moved over to the philosophy of mathematics and symbolic logic. He became professor of philosophy at Åbo Akademi, where he wrote the work on the *Tractatus.* After von Wright was appointed a member of the Academy of Finland in 1961, Stenius succeeded him in the Swedish-language chair in Helsinki.

Stenius's reading of the *Tractatus* is original. Stenius describes his method as follows:

> I may well give a better idea of Wittgenstein's thought if I indicate a line of thought which has strong similarities to his and which I can appreciate, than if I try in an external fashion to formulate exactly something that I may conclude he meant, but with which I have less intellectual sympathy (1960, x).

Stenius had, on his own, formulated the thought that a proposition, like a picture, is able to represent a state of affairs

through their sharing a common structure. He used the term 'isomorphism', borrowed from set theory, to describe this relation between the proposition and what it represents. Reading the *Tractatus* it occurred to him that the so-called picture theory of the *Tractatus* was analogous with his own concept of an isomorphic representation. Thus, he found that this concept could be used as a frame of reference for his reading of the *Tractatus*.

The *Tractatus*, in its compression, is notoriously a hard work to read. Stenius's method of reading was felt by many to be fruitful. His was a philosopher's rather than a historian's reading. Incredibly, his book was one of the very first commentaries on the *Tractatus*, even though almost 40 years had passed since Wittgenstein's book originally appeared. Towards the end of the 1960's the name Erik Stenius was almost a 'household word' among analytical philosophers all over the world; through his critical exposition Stenius helped set afoot a discussion that has gradually helped readers to navigate the Tractarian sea. This does not mean, however, that even today consensus has been reached concerning all the main interpretative issues.

While Stenius adopted the picture account of propositions (sentences), he rejected Wittgenstein's requirement that all meaningful propositions must either be elementary propositions or truth-functions of elementary propositions that are logically independent of one another, the so-called logical atomism requirement. In other words, Stenius argued that the notion that the meaning of a proposition is determined by its structure does not presuppose that there is one and only one way of analysing that structure. In so doing, he got rid of the problem presented by the fact that it appears impossible to give an actual example of an elementary proposition in Wittgenstein's sense. Stenius preferred to speak of 'semantical elementary' propositions, propositions whose overt structure is simple: that is, propositions in which a single predicate (property or relation) is attributed to an object or a range of objects. Furthermore, Stenius claimed that in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein mistakenly treated predicates as objects on a level with the other objects which constitute a state of affairs. This interpretative claim gave rise to controversy.

Stenius was skeptical of Wittgenstein's oft-quoted claim that there are matters that cannot be said but can only be shown. He regarded that as an expression of intellectual resignation. Stenius ends by suggesting that there is a clear affinity between the *Tractatus* and Kant's conception of experience. He would return to issues connected with the *Tractatus* in several articles. Unlike many other commentators, he argued that Wittgenstein rightly retained the picture account of propositions in his later thought (see e.g. Stenius 1989b). He strongly rejected Wittgenstein's view according to which the problems of philosophy arise from a misunderstanding of the use of words (Stenius 1972, Postscript). (For an overview of Stenius's philosophy, see Hertzberg forthcoming.)

Jaakko Hintikka, like Stenius, encountered Wittgenstein, as it were, sideways, by discovering the way Wittgenstein touched his own concerns. Hintikka had been a student of von Wright's, but (even though he had a brief encounter with Wittgenstein in Cambridge) his interest in Wittgenstein as an object of study arose much later. Hintikka, first and foremost, was a logician, though with an interest in the ways symbolic logic could be used to illuminate issues in philosophy. He is mainly known for his work on epistemic and modal logic and possible worlds semantics. He was a highly versatile and productive writer, and he also wrote about Aristotle, Descartes, Husserl and others. He left an important mark on Finnish philosophy by rearing a whole generation of philosophers who came to do important work, primarily in logic and the philosophy of science.

Hintikka was appointed professor of practical philosophy in Helsinki in 1959 at the age of 30. Later he was also professor at Stanford and at other American universities. Hintikka wrote an article on Wittgenstein and solipsism in 1958, but he only began to engage more deeply with Wittgenstein's philosophy in the 1970's. From 1980 onwards he co-wrote many of his texts on Wittgenstein with his wife Merrill B. Hintikka, above all the monograph *Investigating Wittgenstein* from 1986. A central claim in the Hintikka's reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy is that in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein had espoused a phenomenological conception of language, in the sense that the simple objects to which elementary sentences refer are mental contents or sense data, whereas in 1929, on his return to philosophy,

Wittgenstein, according to Hintikka, rejected this conception, arguing instead that language is physicalistic, that is, it consists of propositions referring to objects in public space. Hintikka gave a special twist to Wittgenstein's notion of language-games, arguing that they form the link between language and reality – whereas Wittgenstein has generally been taken to argue that language can be regarded as *consisting in* various language-games. Hintikka's idea was to connect Wittgensteinian language-games with the game-theoretical semantics that he had constructed. On the whole, Hintikka took the position that Wittgenstein's later thought did not constitute as radical a break with the analytic mainstream as has generally been assumed.

Investigating Wittgenstein gave rise to a lively debate, and it was translated into German, French, Italian and Portuguese. The Hintikkas' reading of Wittgenstein was felt to deviate markedly from most contemporary views. The concerns attributed to Wittgenstein were formulated in a technical terminology that felt alien to many readers of Wittgenstein.

Hintikka continued to concern himself with Wittgenstein's philosophy for the rest of his life.

von Wright, Stenius and Hintikka were the first generation of philosophers to convey Wittgensteinian impulses to Helsinki. They were followed by younger philosophers, many of whom were focused on the study of the *Tractatus.* The first of them was Stenius's student André Maury, who wrote a dissertation on *The Concepts of Sinn and Gegenstand in Wittgenstein's* Tractatus in 1977.

Stenius held the Swedish philosophy chair at the University of Helsinki. There were three Finnish professorships at the department, one in theoretical philosophy and two in practical philosophy. The holders of these positions did not show a marked interest in the philosophy of Wittgenstein in the 1970's and 80's. However, Heikki Kannisto, who was an assistant teacher in theoretical philosophy, came to discover Wittgenstein primarily through the writings of von Wright. His doctoral dissertation *Thoughts and Their Subject: A Study of Wittgenstein's* Tractatus was presented in 1986. Kannisto like Stenius emphasized the Kantian aspects of Wittgenstein's early work. He was a well-liked teacher and evoked an interest in Wittgenstein's philosophy, both early and late, among his

students. One of them was Hanne Appelqvist, who has published widely on various aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy, in particular on art and music from a Wittgensteinian point of view. She too emphasizes the Kantian aspect of Wittgenstein.

Another Helsinki philosopher who came to discover Wittgenstein, partly through Kannisto's influence, is Oskari Kuusela. He did his doctorate at Oxford, at first with Gordon Baker and after Baker's death with Peter Hacker. His book *The Struggle against Dogmatism* (2008), which grew out of his dissertation, is an inquiry into the nature of philosophy. Wittgenstein famously maintained that there can be no theses or theories in philosophy. Kuusela is trying to clarify what is involved in taking this claim seriously. Kuusela, who is associate professor of philosophy at the University of East Anglia, has continued to publish extensively on philosophical method and on moral philosophy in a Wittgensteinian spirit.

Even though von Wright left his teaching position in 1961, he continued to exert an influence on younger philosophers in Helsinki. In 1999, Alberto Emiliani presented a dissertation entitled *The Forms of Sense: A Study of Wittgenstein's* Tractatus. Emiliani lives in Italy, but he has continued to form a part of the intellectual milieu at Helsinki, holding a docentship at the philosophy department. His later writings concern the philosophy of language and action.

Thomas Wallgren was inspired by von Wright's culture-critical reading of Wittgenstein. Out of this grew his wide-ranging book *Transformative Philosophy* (2006), in which he argues for a view of Wittgenstein as an enlightenment thinker. In 2019 Wallgren was appointed to the Swedish-language philosophy chair at Helsinki. One of his students, Nora Hämäläinen, has done moral philosophy in a spirit partly inspired by Wittgenstein, focusing on the concept of moral change.

Another philosopher who was a student at Helsinki but who also received impulses from Åbo Akademi is Simo Säätelä. He did a doctorate on Wittgensteinian aesthetics in Uppsala in 1998, and has done work on aesthetics and the philosophy of mathematics. He is currently professor of philosophy at the University of Bergen, and is connected with the Bergen Wittgenstein Archive. He is also editor-in-chief of the journal *Nordic Wittgenstein Review.*

Wittgensteinian lines of thought also made themselves felt in other departments at the university. In the Faculty of Law, Professor Aulis Aarnio carried out research inspired by Wittgensteinian philosophy of action (e.g. Aarnio 1977); he also inspired a younger generation of philosophers of law in a Wittgensteinian spirit. In 1984 Reijo Työrinoja published a dissertation on the later Wittgenstein's conception of religious statements and concepts, called *Uskon kielioppi* [*The grammar of faith*]. Timo Koistinen's work in theology is also concerned with the Wittgensteinian tradition in the philosophy of religion (2014).

Wittgenstein in Turku

Erik Stenius wrote his book on the *Tractatus* during his time at Åbo Akademi in Turku. Since then, for some 20 years, little attention had been given to Wittgenstein's philosophy at that university. I brought an interest in Wittgenstein to Åbo Akademi when I started teaching there in 1978. I had done my master's degree at Helsinki, as a student of Erik Stenius, and then gone to Cornell University in the US to do a doctorate. My supervisor was Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein's student, friend and biographer. I also received important impressions from a young teacher, Bruce Goldberg. It was during my stay at Cornell that my interest in Wittgenstein, especially the *Philosophical Investigations*, began to take shape. My dissertation, which dealt with the philosophy of action, was inspired by Wittgensteinian lines of thought. Apart from Malcolm and Goldberg, an important influence in my work has been the British philosopher Peter Winch. Excepting a spell at the University of Arizona, I taught at the University of Helsinki from 1970 to 1976.

In a number of essays, I have concerned myself with issues in the philosophy of mind and language and in moral philosophy. I have written some pieces of Wittgensteinian exegesis, among them a long essay on criteria and practices in Wittgenstein's philosophy, but the main emphasis has lain on the inquiry into philosophical problems using methods inspired by Wittgenstein.

In my work I have been critical of a form of *apriorism* which I find to be prevalent within contemporary analytic philosophy (i.e. the tendency to make general claims without looking

into the details of particular uses of language). This includes the inclination to assume that the meanings of words are fixed by identifying them with objects, states or processes which are regarded as their referents. My aim has been to overcome intellectual temptations in philosophy by drawing attention to the particular role of words and utterances in specific contexts of human conversation, thus heeding Wittgenstein's observation 'Only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning'.

I have translated some Wittgenstein texts into Swedish: *Über Gewissheit* and *Vermischte Bemerkungen,* as well as, recently, *Philosophische Untersuchungen* together with Martin Gustafsson.

I went on teaching at Åbo Akademi until 2007. Martin Gustafsson, the current professor, succeeded me in the philosophy chair. He did his doctorate at Uppsala in 2000 with the dissertation *Entangled Sense.* This was a critique of the conception of rules of language held by many readers of Wittgenstein. His supervisor was Sören Stenlund, who had developed his own conception of philosophy largely under the inspiration of Wittgenstein early and late, and who is perhaps the most original contributor to the Wittgenstein tradition in the Nordic countries. Gustafsson has also done studies at the University of Chicago. Apart from Stenlund, important influences on Gustafsson's work were the American philosophers Stanley Cavell and Cora Diamond, as well as Wittgenstein's student Elizabeth Anscombe, all of them prominent expounders and appliers of Wittgensteinian thought. He has also concerned himself with the philosophy of J. L. Austin. He has continued publishing on the philosophy of language and its interface with action, and is currently doing work on passivity (non-doing) in the philosophy of action, as well as on the paradox of analysis.

My student Olli Lagerspetz holds a lecturership in philosophy at Åbo. His doctoral dissertation, submitted in 1996, later developed into a book, had the title *Trust: The Tacit Demand.* He has continued to write about trust and other topics in a Wittgensteinian tradition. His research interests can be captured under the title 'philosophical anthropology'. Lagerspetz wrote a book in Swedish about the concept of *dirt*; this has since been translated into Finnish, German, English, Estonian

and Chinese (Lagerspetz 2018). He has also written about colour, and on the philosophy of social science, some of this together with Jonas Ahlskog. Another of my students, Camilla Kronqvist, wrote a dissertation with the title *What We Talk about when We Talk about Love*, submitted in 2008. She now has a teaching assistantship at the department, and writes on moral philosophy and gender issues along lines suggested by Wittgenstein. The other teaching assistant, Hugo Strandberg, did a doctorate in theology at the University of Uppsala. He discovered Wittgenstein through literature while at high school. Strandberg moved to Åbo in 2006. He has written books on the philosophy of religion, on the concept of responsibility, on self-deception and on forgiveness (Strandberg 2021), applying Wittgensteinian methods in his work. Wittgenstein's philosophy also came to have an impact on research carried out in systematic theology, especially by Professor Emeritus Tage Kurtén.

The philosophy department at Åbo Akademi took several initiatives in launching forms of Nordic co-operation in Wittgenstein research, such as founding the *Nordic Wittgenstein Society* in 2009 and in starting the journal *Nordic Wittgenstein Review.* Yrsa Neuman, who did a doctorate at Åbo in 2015, had an active role in these connections.

Conclusion

Wittgenstein's influence on philosophy in Finland presents a multi-faceted picture. There is some variation in the focus of interest: in Helsinki, initial interest was largely in the *Tractatus*, though it gradually became broadened. In Åbo attention was directed almost exclusively on Wittgenstein's later work. Another difference is that between research aimed at expounding Wittgenstein's own writings, and research in which Wittgensteinian concerns and methods are brought to bear on various philosophical problems. I think it can be said that the latter form of interest has gradually been gaining scope. To many of us, Wittgenstein is not just a historical character, but someone who pointed out new ways for philosophy to develop.

Åbo Akademi University

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The Metaphilosophy of Action Explanation: Exploring G. H. von Wright's Later View of Philosophical Inquiry

JONAS AHLSKOG

Introduction

This article explores Georg Henrik von Wright's (1916–2003) view of philosophical inquiry by way of his later philosophy of action. Previous research on von Wright's philosophy of action has primarily focused on his canonical book *Explanation and Understanding* (1971, henceforth EU; cf. Kusch 2003; Hannula 2022). As a result, von Wright's later philosophy of action remains, with some notable exceptions, a comparatively underexplored part of his philosophical oeuvre (Martin 1990; 1999; Stoutland 1998; Kusch 2003; Meggle 2017; Ahlskog 2023). His later work, this article contends, demonstrates von Wright as a philosopher in his own right who develops Wittgensteinian ideas for responding to the rise of causalism from the mid-1970s onwards.

The article highlights two different strands in von Wright's response to causalism, both of which relate to Wittgensteinian views of philosophical inquiry. First, von Wright consistently argued that philosophy is not one of the sciences but conceptual inquiry. The task of the philosopher is to elucidate what one is looking for when looking for reasons for action. In contrast, causalists viewed philosophy as a branch of the sciences with the ontological task of determining what kind of item in the world a reason for action is. Second, von Wright's later response to causalism turns away from logical constructivism—a philosophical method von Wright himself identified as a non-Wittgensteinian element in his philosophy. Instead, von Wright provides a perspicuous representation of everyday

practices of understanding action in response to reasons. In conclusion, von Wright's later response to causalism provides an important pathway for tracing the development of Wittgensteinian themes in von Wright's work.

The Wittgensteinian Separatism of von Wright's Philosophy of Action

To say that von Wright was influenced by Wittgenstein is uncontroversial. Von Wright himself acknowledges and analyses his philosophical debts to Wittgenstein. In addition, von Wright's role as a literary executor and creator of Wittgenstein has been researched diligently in recent scholarship (Wallgren 2023). There are also important studies that show the ways in which the influence from Wittgenstein increased over time. The main source of this influence was certainly von Wright's work with Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* (Jakola forthcoming; Österman 2018). Von Wright himself explicitly acknowledges this fact (1989a, 40–41).

The present article focuses only on one specific aspect of the increased influence from Wittgenstein. This aspect is the metaphilosophical dimension of von Wright's response to causalism in his later philosophy of action. The term "later" denotes von Wright's philosophy of action after 1976, when he rejected his previous "intentionalist position." (von Wright 1989a, 54) In EU, von Wright focused on action explanation construed as a practical syllogism based on the intentions and beliefs of the agent. The later von Wright, however, develops a more wide-ranging social concept of action explanation in which to understand and explain individual action is to connect it in the understanding with the reasons for its performance—this provides what von Wright calls an *understanding explanation* of the action (1981; 1985; 1997).

For explicating the development of von Wright's view of philosophical inquiry, one must first get in view the challenge in response to which von Wright develops his later philosophy of action. Principally, what von Wright responded to—although he seldom cites his opponents explicitly—was Donald Davidson's so-called Master Argument against anti-causalism in the philosophy of action. Davidson's argument was, very briefly, that only causalism can make sense of an agent's acting

for a reason. One may well *justify* an act by citing reasons that the agent had, even if he did not act because of them, but one cannot *explain* the action unless the agent acted for the cited reasons (Davidson 1963, 69). So, contrary to what anti-causalists like von Wright allegedly assumed, action explanation must move beyond mere justification. For Davidson this move meant that the "because" of action explanation *must* be causal. An agent acts because of certain reasons, that is beliefs and desires (or pro attitudes for Davidson), only if those reasons *cause* the agent's behavior.

What Davidson's own position ultimately comes down to is debatable (Glock 2014). The causalist consensus after Davidson, however, became that only a causal theory of action can distinguish between *efficacious* and *existing* reasons (D'Oro & Sandis 2013, 21–28). This causal theory of action, in turn, required an account of how the apparently different substances of mind and matter can causally interact. Thus, in the last instance, only by way of an ontological theory about how different properties in the world relate to each other will it be possible to do justice to the distinction between acting *for* a reason, as opposed to acting *and* having reasons. Consequently, the question of what it means to explain actions by invoking reasons becomes reducible to a general inquiry about the causal efficacy of mind over matter (and vice versa). For to speak of reasons as causes, for the causalist, is ultimately to "talk of brain states, events and process as causes of action." (Alvarez 2007, 106; cf. Stoutland 1998, 48–49) It is against this kind of causalist position, which reduces reasons to (material) causes, that von Wright responds in his later philosophy of action.

One (almost) constant Wittgensteinian element in von Wright's philosophy is clearly articulated in his later response to causalism. According to von Wright, his first meeting with Wittgenstein in 1939 made a profound impact on his view of philosophy (Österman 2018, 177). This meant that von Wright abandoned his original view of philosophy as continuous with science—a view inspired by parts of the Vienna Circle and his teacher Eino Kaila. Instead, von Wright moved toward a view in which the domain of philosophical inquiry, as conceptual analysis, is to be clearly demarcated from the empirical sciences. Von Wright repeatedly endorsed this idea, citing it as a

view of philosophy that Wittgenstein held both in the *Tractatus* (4.111) and later (von Wright 1989a, 44; 1995, 3). Emphatically, von Wright writes that his "conviction" is that "philosophy is not one of the sciences, that its method is logical analysis, and that its primary concern is to clarify meaning." (1989a, 45.)

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this conviction for von Wright's work. Not only did he frequently describe the division between science and philosophy as an important Wittgensteinian element in his own philosophy—von Wright also viewed the division as a watershed for the entire tradition of analytic philosophy. On the one hand, there were those who tended to a "separatist" view of the relation between philosophy and science, on the other there were those with a "unitary view" of the relation in question (von Wright 2000, 283; 1999, 43). Within the latter camp, von Wright placed philosophers such as Russell, Quine and Chomsky; within the former camp he placed Moritz Schlick, Wittgenstein, and undoubtedly himself (von Wright 2000, 283–285; 1989a, 43–45, 53).

The distinction between science and philosophy was equally important for von Wright's relation to the post-Wittgensteinian tradition. Significantly, he views the ordinary language philosophy of J. L. Austin as belonging to the unitary view, prompting an "attitude of assimilation" of science and philosophy rather than their separation. Austin's vision of a comprehensive science of language is described by von Wright as "a chimera if it is also thought to comprehend everything distinctly 'philosophical' about language." (2000, 283) Austin's linguistic phenomenology was a "far cry" from Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy, von Wright contends, and ordinary language philosophy of the 1950s in Oxford left him "completely cool." (1989a, 45, 41.)

Responding to Causalism

If philosophy is not science but conceptual analysis, what does conceptual analysis mean in von Wright's later response to causalism? First, it meant that the problem of efficacious reasons requires not ontological theories but conceptual analysis of the idea of an understanding explanation. Second, in contrast with his earlier focus on the practical syllogism, the later

von Wright did not view conceptual analysis as simply the explication of an idealized logic of action. In the spirit of the later Wittgenstein, von Wright's investigations now start from considerations and examples about how one would ordinarily go about when determining why an action was performed. As von Wright writes, a clear understanding of the philosophical problem about action explanation demands that "both question and answer [of why an action was performed] is taken in an entirely 'unsophisticated' sense, in the way they commonly occur in everyday communication among people." (1979, 107.)

Keeping with this contention, von Wright (1981, 58) offers the following example for approaching the problem about efficacious reasons:

> The reason given in justification of an action can be there, exist as a matter of objective fact, and yet not be the reason why the action was undertaken. For example: I pay a visit of condolence to Mrs A. who lost her husband. Why? It is customary to do such a thing when one is a close acquaintance of the family. The custom justifies my action. But it need not be the reason why I paid the visit. Perhaps the reason was that I had *selfish* designs on the rich and beautiful widow.

Considering this example, von Wright directs his attention at the heart of the causalist challenge and asks: when is a justification an explanation? The answer is, he says, obvious: "When the reason *R* given in justification of the action not only was there but moved the agent to action. When it is true to say of the agent that he did it *because of R*." (1981, 59.) But when is this true? For causalists—referred to merely as "some philosophers" by von Wright—the answer is that the statement is true when *R* is, somehow, correlated with a nomic cause of the action. This answer will, von Wright argues, not help us to solve the problem. For what one is interested in when settling doubts about efficacious reasons is not what goes on in the agent's brain, but rather how the action in question relates to the "motivational background" of the agent (von Wright 1980a, 65; 1997, 5). The philosophical task at hand is to clarify what one is looking for when one is looking for efficacious reasons of action. Von Wright (1981, 64; cf. 1985, 140–41) writes:

> How would one try to settle doubts [about efficacious reasons]? Certainly *not* normally by examining his neural system. (In exceptional cases of a pathological nature a neurological examination may be relevant.) What one would do is to examine the agent's motivation in a *wider setting* either of his life history or of the present circumstances or both. We should press him further questions, call in "witnesses", study records of his past […] The "coherence" of the picture we form ourselves of him "requires" this interpretation of his action.

Importantly, this implies that the problem at issue does not have the character that causalists had assumed. As von Wright argues, the relevant procedure for establishing determinants of action is in fact quite the reverse of the process of isolating causal links. He writes: "Instead of isolation we look for wider contexts, a field of connected facts, a 'narration' about the agent – things that make it feasible to link *this* action to *that* determinant." (1979, 117; cf. von Wright 1981, 62.) In sum, von Wright's answer to the causalist challenge was to *deflate* the entire problem of efficacious reasons—there is simply no such thing as *the* tie between reason and action. The efficacious reasons for an action "are precisely those in whose light we understand the action." (von Wright 1997, 11.)

Appealing directly to Wittgenstein's later philosophy, von Wright argues that the analysis of efficacious reasons is not about a hidden realm of mental causation but about the actual and everyday criteria we use for ascribing reasons to a person for a particular action. As Wittgenstein argued, such criteria are publicly available and in action explanation they are constituted by the motivational background of the action. This includes social institutions, practices and rules, what the agent says about his own reasons for action, along with what an observer may infer from his previous and subsequent behavior (von Wright 1997, 9–10; 1985, 147). There are, von Wright writes, no truths to be had about efficacious reasons "independently of how one attempts to explain the motivations for [the agent's] actions." (1997, 19) In other words, the task of the philosopher is to provide an *übersichtliche Darstellung* (perspicuous representation) of our ordinary practices of understanding action in response to reasons (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §122).

Turning Away from Logical Constructivism

The development of von Wright's view of philosophy is clearly revealed when placed in comparison with his earlier work on action explanation. His landmark book, EU, was very impressive in scope. Von Wright did not only advance a penetrating argument concerning philosophical issues about causality, intentionality and teleology—he articulates also the different explanatory logics of the human and the natural sciences by way of an examination of the history of Western scientific thought. According to von Wright, there are distinct logical forms of explanation in the human sciences and the natural sciences respectively. The distinction between these forms, in turn, relates to conceptual differences between the frameworks of Aristotelian teleology and Galilean causal explanation.

The central argument of EU is—like in his later work—that the explanation of human action is not reducible to causal explanation. Human actions must be understood intentionally, as the product of the beliefs and desires of the agent. According to EU, to explain intentional action *is* to render explicit the practical syllogism from which the action in question follows as the logical conclusion. In generalized terms: an agent did what he did because he desired a certain goal and believed that certain means were necessary and/or sufficient for achieving that goal. According to von Wright, explicating the logical form of intentional action has far-reaching implications for the philosophy of science. While the causal and nomological framework fits the natural sciences, history and the social sciences need a framework of their own which is just as coherent and rigorous as the framework of the natural sciences. The most ambitious assertion of EU is that the practical syllogism constitutes *the* paradigmatic explanatory form of the human sciences. Von Wright (1971, 27) writes:

> The practical syllogism provides the sciences of man with something long missing from their methodology: an explanation model in its own right […] what the subsumption theoretic model is to causal explanation and explanation in the natural sciences, the practical syllogism is to teleological explanation and explanation in history and the social sciences.

This grand claim came under heavy fire very soon from both supporters and critics. The main argument against von Wright was that the practical syllogism is too narrow for serving as the paradigmatic explanatory framework for the human sciences. Understanding complex social and historical processes is not reducible to explanations of individual action based on the beliefs and desires of the agent, nor is the individual action that interests historians and social scientists always of the goal-directed kind that von Wright's practical syllogism favors (cf. Kusch 2003, 331–338). In his later work, von Wright agreed with his critics and accordingly abandoned not only his grand claim for the practical syllogism but also the idea that intentional action explanation was the conceptual core of the human sciences (von Wright 1989b, 814; 1981, 128).

Importantly, the account von Wright developed in response to the critique—essentially his idea of understanding explanations—was different not only in content but also in form. In EU, a central philosophical role was given to idealized models and forms of inference, sometimes also explicated by formalization. This style of doing philosophy is, of course, not peculiar to EU. As von Wright writes concerning his own relation to Wittgenstein: "I have tended to a 'logical constructivism', which was – always, I think – uncongenial to Wittgenstein. The result of my efforts was the creation of various 'logics': deontic and epistemic logic, the logic of action and of change, etc." (2001, 179) This is certainly true, but equally true is the fact that von Wright's logical constructivism changes form and becomes less pregnant in his later philosophy of action. Indeed, von Wright himself is aware of this fact when, in relation to the logical constructivism of EU, he writes that "[t]oo late to leave an imprint on *Explanation and Understanding* came the strong influence of Wittgenstein's last writings, those published under the title 'Über Gewissheit'." (1989a, 40) This influence involved a turning towards the social dimension of action explanation, which, concurrently, involved moving away from the explication of idealized logics and forms of inference. One clear expression of this is von Wright's argument about the sufficiency of external reasons for action explanation.

The Language of Action and Conceptual Intuitions

The later von Wright rejects the "intentionalist view" in which only internal determinants (beliefs and desires) can serve as the efficacious reasons for action (1976; 1979, 112; 1980a, 40; 1998, 95). Instead, he argues that external reasons (challenges, institutions, rules, customs) are sometimes sufficient for an understanding explanation of action (von Wright 1980a, 40; 1989a, 41; 1989b, 842). So, if you ask me to open the window, then a sufficient explanation of this action will be simply to say that you asked me to do it. Given the presence of external reasons for action, there is no need to refer to the agent's own beliefs and desires for action explanation. As von Wright points out, we may simply say that "this is the way one usually acts when there is no reason to do otherwise." (1994, 192)

Von Wright contends that the philosophy of action has "suffered under a tendency to look for the 'forces' which move us to action exclusively in the 'inner life' life of agents." (1998, 95) Reasons are "in" the agent not in the sense of inner mental states, or neural processes, but rather as social facts *in* the logical space of reasons of the agent (cf. 1985, 147; 1997, 6). Against causalism, the later von Wright argued that the relation between determinant and action is neither a species of causal relations nor of logical entailment relations, but a *sui generis* relation of "adequacy" between the action as fact and reasons as facts, and the latter may be either internal or external, which are both included in what von Wright calls the "motivational background." (1980a, 65; 1997, 5) This relation of adequacy is one in which reasons stand as the "sufficient grounds" for the action (von Wright 1976, 41). Consequently, the truth of an understanding explanation is assessed in terms coherence, which means that an ascription of reasons for action is to be called "better, more correct or more true" if it "matches a more comprehensive assortment of facts concerning [the agent's] life and character." (1997, 17; cf. 1979, 117; 1981, 64–66; 1985, 143–144; cf. Martin 1990, 220)

Von Wright's turn towards coherence is not a complete rejection of his earlier endorsement of the idea of logical relations between reason and action. Instead, the later von Wright emphasizes that the identification of logical entailment relations already presupposes that we are, in fact, able to understand

the agent's ways of reasoning, the perceived situation, and thereby what *counts for the agent* as legitimate reasons and conduct. Importantly, this shift of emphasis is displayed also in the fact that the later von Wright tends to relate action explanation to language rather than to logic. Von Wright (1980b, 11) writes:

> Just as we cannot understand speech without mastering the rules of linguistic practice, we cannot grasp the significance of or the reasons for most human actions without knowing the conventions and regulations, say, for greeting people, honouring the dead, driving and parking cars, getting commodities against payment, transacting one's daily business in the role of official, employer or employee, teacher or student, child or parent, etc., etc.

This emphasis on the social dimension of action reduces the practical syllogism to merely a conceptual tool for illustrating formal structures of an idealized situation of decision-making. Basic to both causal connections and logical entailment relations is a holistic account of the social and institutional background which has "to be assumed if certain things [the agent] did or which happened to him shall count as reasons for subsequent action." (1985, 147) In sharp contrast with the universality of explanation by way of a practical syllogism, the later von Wright claims that: "To explain action is a facet of understanding the agent as a *person*. The same holds for the imputation of actions to him, and for the attribution to him of reasons for action." (1985, 147) The very idea of private action would be as problematic as Wittgenstein showed to be the case for private language (von Wright 1989a, 41).

Von Wright's turn towards the social dimension of action explanation connects closely with developments in his view of philosophical inquiry. Importantly, von Wright argued that the philosophy of action must "terminate in a philosophy of society." (1989a, 41) As a result, the later von Wright doubts that the tools of formal logic will have any significant role to play in the philosophy of action. The reason being that such tools are "'atomistic' in character", which fits poorly with the "holistic" and "global" structures needed in a philosophy of the social (von Wright 1989a, 41). At about the same time when his later philosophy of action was developing, von Wright writes that he was moving away from "philosophy viewed as

reconstruction of logical structures" towards an idea of philosophy as "explication of conceptual intuitions." (1989a, 49) Arguably, von Wright's choice of the term "intuition" is somewhat unfortunate. While the concept of intuition comes with psychologistic connotations, suggesting something inner to be consulted, von Wright's philosophy was, in fact, moving in the very opposite direction. As I have argued, what doing philosophy about action meant for the later von Wright was an explication of the social dimension of action by attending to our ordinary practices of understanding action in the light of reasons.

Does the appeal to ordinary practices entail that von Wright was moving closer to what he described as the un-Wittgensteinian linguistic phenomenology of Austin? No. This is clear from what von Wright means by "explication of conceptual intuitions." The task of the philosopher is not merely to describe linguistic usage. In many cases, von Wright argues, there is simply no (relevant) ordinary usage to consult—which is certainly the case for the conceptual distinction between reasons and causes. Consequently, for doing philosophy, one is necessarily dependent on "filling out gaps" in existing usage (von Wright 1989a, 49). Von Wright is here very close to Wittgenstein's concept of perspicuous representations. Especially in the sense that the latter also emphasizes the need for inventing basic forms of language, such as language games or life forms (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §122).

Von Wright was moving away from the idea that philosophy is about discovering logical structures, either hidden or at the surface of language, and, instead, towards the idea of conceptual explication as invention or creation (von Wright 1989a, 49). The philosopher's task is, therefore, not tantamount to fine-tuned descriptions of ordinary language use. To do philosophy is essentially about the articulation of "conceptual presuppositions" that are not obvious in everyday speech, and often such presuppositions can only be seen in retrospect (von Wright 1989a, 52). Without the explication of conceptual presuppositions there is, for von Wright, nothing philosophical about our descriptions of words in the context of their ordinary usage. As he writes: "Linguistic phenomenology is something in its own right, just as logic is. When we have separated it out

from philosophy, philosophy is still there in *its* own right." (von Wright 1989a, 46)

Von Wright's explication of conceptual intuitions is well exemplified in his work on understanding explanations. First, the very concept of understanding explanation is a term of art for denoting a specific conceptual framework for understanding action—a framework that he contrasts with medical and sociological explanations (von Wright 1997, 2). Second, although von Wright eschews the logical constructivism of EU, his explication of understanding explications is still essentially the articulation of a conceptual schema. Instead of the practical syllogism, von Wright's argument about understanding explanations articulates a situation-response schema as the conceptual core of reasoned action. To understand action in relation to reasons involves tracing intelligible connections between the agent's motivational background, the (perceived) situation of the agent and the action. Something *is* a reason for an action (or omission) if the action can be taken to be an "appropriate reaction, or correct response or 'answer'" to the reason (von Wright 1997, 3). In Wittgensteinian terms, von Wright provides a perspicuous representation of action explanation by way of understanding explanations as a language game that clarifies the conceptual relation between reason and action.

Von Wright wrote often about the negative goal of Wittgenstein's work in philosophy, as the destroyer of *Luftgebäude*. This was not, however, how von Wright seems to have understood his own philosophy. While von Wright undoubtedly shared the idea that clearing up linguistic confusion dissolves philosophical problems (2001, 179), he also reserves a role for the positive contribution of philosophy. In relation to explications of conceptual intuitions, von Wright emphasizes that a "well-argued contribution to philosophy is an element in a dialogue." (1989a, 52) This means that one philosopher's work on conceptual explication may result in a "basic position" which other philosophers cannot by-pass if they are to be "*au niveau* with developments." (1989a, 52) This dialogical nature of philosophy, von Wright argues, permits one to speak of progress in philosophy, even if there is no way to settle disagreements. Von Wright's own work on action explanation is a case in point. By explicating the conceptual schema of understanding explanations, von Wright provided future philosophers

with a basic position that they cannot ignore—if they want to be *au niveau* with developments.

Åbo Akademi University

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A Rational Conversion towards the Reasonable? G. H. von Wright, Theoretical Science, and Society

MARKUS WECKSTRÖM

An age or a culture is characterized less by the extent of its knowledge than by the nature of the questions it puts forward.
François Jacob

1. Introduction

The fundamental scientific search for truth could perhaps be said to affect human societies in two distinguishable ways. On the one hand, scientific discoveries tend to enlarge the range of things that *can* be done beyond previous limits of imagination. Maxwell's equations implied radio waves, theoretical nuclear physics rendered the atomic bomb conceivable, and formal studies of neural networks preceded the birth of artificial intelligence. On the other hand, science may also affect people's views concerning what *ought* to be done, especially if 'ought' is understood in Gibbard's (2003) sense as pertaining to the question of "what to do".[1] For instance, the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions challenged Church's authority in telling us what to do with our lives; human-induced global warming was initially an unorthodox abstract idea, before becoming not only an established fact but also one of the most pressing imperatives of all nations; likewise, prevailing scientific views of, say, schizophrenia or animal cognition might importantly affect attitudes and moral responsibilities towards schizophrenics and non-human animals. Thus, from both categories,

[1] "Questions of what we ought to do are questions of what to do. Finish your deliberation, conclude what to do, and you've concluded what you ought to do" (Gibbard 2003, 19).

profound effects upon the social fabric can be found. Schematically their distinction could be put like this: beginning from the "same" theoretical problem "What there *is* in the world?", the practical follow-up is sometimes "What, then, *can* be done?", and sometimes "What, then, *ought* to be done?", as illustrated in Figure 1 below.



Figure 1.

Now, I propose that the diagram of Fig. 1 may be utilized for analysing Georg Henrik von Wright's *pessimism* and *hope*. By the former I refer to his view that modern scientific rationality, instead of serving as a self-evident ticket to human flourishing and solved problems, might be deeply entangled in the very generation of issues such as overconsumption, environmental destruction, societal alienation, and highly technologized arms race (von Wright 1993, 1987). In terms of Fig. 1, this reflects the character of science as effective in *changing* the external conditions of human life by means of prediction, control, and unexpected technologies ('is?' – 'can?'). By the latter, his hope, I mean the vision that science could change in this respect internally, through the processing of a "crisis of intelligibility" (see Pylkkänen 2017), and essentially without compromising on the root ideals of enlightenment humanism (Niiniluoto 2020). In von Wright's own words, science may become "not less rational, but maybe more reasonable from the point of view of what is good for man" (1993, 192). In Fig. 1, this relates to the capability of science to yield suggestions of how to *adjust* human life itself in relation to its natural conditions ('is?' – 'ought?'). But then a more difficult question arises: How to imagine a reorientation towards the latter mode as occurring *internally* in science – that is, not at the expense of, but rather *because* of the ongoing strive towards better truth?

Von Wright himself (1993, 1987) saw emerging opportunities for this in attempts (and perhaps a need) to formulate holistic scientific theories and concepts in fields such as quantum physics (most notably David Bohm's quantum theory; see Pylkkänen 2017), ecology and biology more generally, and general system theory à la Ludwig von Bertalanffy. In the present chapter, my aim is to continue this thought via an analysis of a transition from *simplicity* to *complexity*, as these notions were developed by the theoretical biologist Robert Rosen (1991). Since space is here very limited, what follows is only a sketch of an argument, to be elaborated in full elsewhere. Yet, I hope it to stimulate some further discussion on von Wright's more optimistic vision, which I regard as a viable option not of decaying but of growing urgency.

2. The modern image of science

Von Wright's (1993, 1987) outlook on science builds upon a distinction between the *rational* and *reasonable* aspects of the human intellect. The former has to do with "formal correctness of reasoning, efficiency of means to an end, the confirmation and testing of beliefs", etc.; the latter is rather "concerned with the right way of living, with that what is thought good or bad for man" (1993, 173). Intuitively, rationality relates to *knowledge* and reasonability to *wisdom*, and at this general level, both seem to require understanding of how things are in the world – for, it is in this real world that one may act rationally and live wisely. However, modern science does not, in von Wright's view, relate to the two aspects equally: while being the "ultimate achievement" (*ibid*., 172) of the rational, it has in some deep ways become detached from the reasonable.

But in what ways? To fix ideas, let us consider two examples. Firstly, to abstractly conceive of, and to concretely build, an atomic bomb requires highly sophisticated scientific rationality, but that rationality in itself, and the process of developing it, appears to be in no way related to the question of whether building the bomb is a reasonable thing to do. In a sense, the discovery that physics of the world permits such a bomb to be built answers a question which was not even asked. Secondly, a certain conception of science might suggest that, say, the task of ecology is to describe states of affairs obtaining

in ecosystems, and to anticipate their possible futures, but definitely *not* to characterize some such states of affairs as "desirable", or as "healthy", "pathological", etc., in some metaphorical sense. Such characterizations, in this line of thought, can only depend on human values. There is a problem in this, however, since we humans are hardly "free" in choosing what to value: for instance, natural facts make it quite inconsistent to care about human food supply but not about pollinators and their habitats. Nevertheless, the conception of science being depicted would prefer to keep things separate: ecological reasoning provides *specific* descriptions of how things are (e.g. that pollinators play a role in maintaining food supply), and another faculty of reasoning decides what to value and why, especially *in general*.

Thus, extracting a pattern out of these examples, I propose the following as an idealized (and non-exhaustive) "legitimation basis" of modern (pure rather than applied) science:

> We expect science to open new dimensions of technological opportunities, which cannot be conceived of *a priori* ($\mathcal{L}_1$)
>
> We expect science to reveal empirical factual knowledge of the world, which might importantly relate to things we care about ($\mathcal{L}_2$)

These, I suggest, may be associated with von Wright's idea of "merely" rational science, because both $\mathcal{L}_1$ and $\mathcal{L}_2$ presuppose that we humans ultimately know what is best for us, and science is expected to provide means-knowledge suitable for approaching it. Neither encourages to ask, in a more fundamental sense, from the *world* what to care about, and how to live wisely. In what follows, I try to generate a little more nuanced understanding of $\mathcal{L}_1$ and $\mathcal{L}_2$, and then at the end of the chapter I shall augment the list with a third formulation, which I think has more to do with the reasonable.

According to von Wright's diagnosis, the modern form of rationality is an outgrowth of the modern *image* of science, which took its basic shape in the hands of Francis Bacon, Galileo Galilei, and René Descartes. It associates scientific knowledge with the following three traits:

i) Reification: "Nature is object, man is subject and agent".

ii) Reductionistic methodology: "natural processes can be 'analysed' into component parts, from the properties of which one can then 'synthesize' the properties of the whole".

iii) Experimentation as the "systematic search for causes through the reproduction and suppression of which we can control their effects" (von Wright 1993, 177).

The *kind* of knowledge that follows, says von Wright, indicates that "the laws of nature may be 'iron' and 'inexorable'" but, as such, they "give no guidance for the good or right life" (*ibid*.). Such knowledge may be applied for manipulation, prediction, and control ($\mathcal{L}_1$), and it may be factually important to know ($\mathcal{L}_2$).

But it is in order to ask how legitimate the traits (i–iii) are as a basis for *science* – that is, to what extent do they allow the "capturing" of natural phenomena? Perhaps the first conceptually deep troubles arose due to the early 20th century quantum revolution, because quantum measurement, entanglement, uncertainty, non-commuting observables, etc. challenge at least naïve interpretations of each trait. It could also be said that these troubles have not, perhaps, been fully solved to date (*ibid*., see also Pylkkänen 2017). However, just when such troubles appeared in physics, the three traits acquired, it could be said, a new life in biology, which especially via the birth of molecular biology became an especially reifying, reductionistic, and experimental science. Curiously, today it is being argued that biology might be undergoing a transition "from the century of the genome to the century of the organism" (Soto et al. 2016), and inspecting the motivations behind such proposals, it turns out that the perceived difficulties are often quite directly related to the very traits (i–iii). Therefore, it might be that these biological difficulties have surprisingly much in common with the troubles that arose in physics a century ago – perhaps not phenomenally, but as issues pertaining to *the acquisition of knowledge* of natural systems; hence to the modern image of science.

For now, this is all I have to say about von Wright's account. Next, I shall introduce Rosen's proposal that the foundations of modern theoretical science were laid upon an absolute *separation* between system *states* and dynamical *laws*. This state-

law separation characterizes simplicity in Rosen's sense, and, intuitively, technological devices are controllable systems of state transitions – for instance, first the world was conceptualized in terms of quantum states and quantum laws, and then quantum computers, as artificial realizations of quantum state spaces (see below), appeared. Thus, the state-law separation provides another frame for analysing the nature, legitimation, and practical influence of modern theoretical science, and it parallels von Wright's account. But most importantly, Rosen argues that the formal state-law separation itself rests upon a tacit *hypothesis* about the material world, which is sometimes, but not always, valid. Hence, the revising of that hypothesis I shall propose as a conceivable example of an internal event in science, which could be expected to have the kinds of consequences anticipated by von Wright.

3. On states and laws

The state-law separation is a widespread, if rarely explicitly recognized, frame of formal reasoning in science. In physics, it is most directly manifest in the concept of a *state space*: presuming such a space is to suppose a set of states, which change, and a set of (inferential) rules of state transitions, which do not change. This strategy of doing "physics in a box" has been criticized e.g. due to its inability to approach questions of the form "Why these laws?" (Smolin 2013). In biology, the state-law separation appears in more subtle, but equally influential ways. For instance, the "scientific" status of biology was, in the past century, often seen as resting upon the "blindness" of mutation and selection: the "state" of an allele pool changes firstly because of context-independent, non-biological "law" of mutation, and secondly because of the blind statistical "law" of selection. Thus, this might seem to align with the idea that while being alive, and doing biological things, organisms could "at the same time" be in physical states, undergoing physical sequences of state transitions – hence, inside the "box". Be that as it may, Rosen's analysis approaches, in a sense, the issue from a direction opposite to the usual: it asks what is being supposed, from a formal point of view, if it is supposed that a natural system is "in" a state, upon which a separate rule of state transition may act. Due to the historical

origins of the state-law analysis, the argument arises in the original context of Newtonian particle mechanics. But I suggest thinking of it epistemologically – i.e. as an attempt to articulate, perhaps somewhat metaphorically, circumstances under which we can fix an observable *and* fix a syntactic scheme of making inferences about it. The discussion to follow is partly a repetition of what I say elsewhere in a biologically more nuanced context (forthcoming), and a formally more accurate presentation can be found from the original texts (Rosen 1991). Therefore, what appears below is a brief summary, but one new example will be provided.

Thus, let us step into Newton's shoes, who was working primarily with astronomical data. To him, the most basic observable to be considered was the *position* of a moving mass-point, such as a planet – the position of a "particle". A formal image of this is the variable x. Hence, Newton's most basic question was: If a particle is now here, where will it be next?

In his data, Newton had chronicles of observations of such positions, but as the readers of Hume might have guessed, an answer to his question could in no way be entailed from this data alone. However, Newton realized that there might be other, additional observables available. In particular, given a position x, one can conceive of the *rate of change* of position, which is called velocity, and labelled conventionally as x'. And just as position can change, so can velocity: thus, one can conceive of the rate of change of velocity, or of the rate of change of the rate of change of position – this is acceleration, labelled as x''. And since also acceleration can change, one can conceive of x''', and of x'''', and so on *ad infinitum*.

By this move, the simple position-coordinate transmutes into an infinite set of values pertaining to all possible "rates of change", and this might not seem very promising at first. However, on the positive side, there appears to be an explicit mathematical theorem which binds all of them nicely together. It is Taylor's Theorem:

$$x(t+h) = x(t) + hx'(t) + \frac{h^2}{2!}x''(t) + \frac{h^3}{3!}x'''(t) + \frac{h^4}{4!}x''''(t) + \cdots$$

What the theorem says is that if the value of x is known at moment t, and so is the value of its rate of change x' at that same

moment, and also the rate of change of that, x'', and so on, *then* the value of x at the next moment $t + h$ is entailed. Or, in physical interpretation, if we know the position of a particle now, and its velocity, acceleration, acceleration of acceleration, etc., *then* we can specify its next location. Consequently, if the presently infinite set of values $x, x', x'', x''', ...$ (each to be evaluated specifically at each point) is regarded as the state-description of the particle, then the theorem itself becomes the "law" of state transition. But from a physical point of view, this is still nonsense – after all, our object of study is the simplest natural system imaginable (an isolate, structureless particle), and the above reasoning suggests that what is needed for its description is an infinity of observables.[2]

Therefore, Rosen claims that the state-law separation was established in particle mechanics via collapsing the above *mathematical* infinity by invoking a particular *physical* hypothesis (Newton's own famous words notwithstanding). It arises in two steps. Firstly, Newton's First Law tells us that a particle occupying an otherwise empty universe cannot accelerate by itself – thus, if it indeed cannot, and if the universe indeed is empty, *then* we can put $x''(t) \equiv 0$. This yields a solvable differential equation, hence states and laws, but in the more revealing language of Taylor's Theorem, it makes all terms higher than velocity to drop away from explicit consideration. Thus, position and velocity alone suffice for entailing the next position. Next, Newton's Second Law mandates that if the universe happens to be non-empty, then *everything* the rest of the universe can do to the particle is to affect its acceleration. This is how the notion of environment-induced *force* is introduced, by coupling it to acceleration via the expression $x''(t) = F/m$. Thus again, a solvable differential equation and hence states and laws appear, and from the point of view of Taylor's Theorem, all terms higher than acceleration drop away from explicit interest. By investigating changes in acceleration one can define a force field (in the standard case supposed unchanging), and then, by knowing the particle's current position, current

[2] In mathematics, the underlying function is usually given, and Taylor's Theorem is used for approximating its value at a point; here the aim is to go the other way around, from points to a function (Rosen 1991).

velocity, and the force field, all positions past and future become entailed.

Of course there is much more to it, but this is already sufficient for stating, in words, the core hypothesis underlying the state-law separation. It is this: the *environment* of the studied system is presumed to be either empty (First Law), or else to interact with the system only via direct and immediate impact upon the concerned observables (Second Law). When valid, this is a powerful hypothesis, as experience with planets on their trajectories, falling stones, controlled laboratory conditions, etc., exemplify – in such instances, the system-environment relation *is like that*. But to get an idea of the possible limitations of the hypothesis, let us next consider a target variable which is still simple and "physical", while the environment is of a rather different sort.

Thus, suppose we are no longer interested in the position of a celestial body, but would like to study temperature T measured somewhere on Earth; say at Mauna Loa. As before, we want to measure and chronicle T and anticipate its future. How will T change? Again, a mere chronicle would lead us nowhere, so we may first consider the "velocity" of temperature; that is, T' as the rate of change of temperature.[3] Now, since thermal energy comes from sources and disappears into sinks, we must, in order to determine the immediate rate of change of temperature, specify inward and outward radiation, fluxes to and from nearby regions, etc. This is relatively straightforward. Next: What is the rate of change of these sources and sinks? More laborious, but still doable: we know about seasonal changes in inward radiation; that greenhouse gases and albedo affect outward radiation; that ocean circulation and winds affect fluxes to and from nearby regions, etc. This sort of information will be included in our T''. All right, but what about the dynamics of these; is there something to affect them and to be included in our T'''? Well, yes, e.g. carbon dioxide levels will be affected, amongst other things, by primary production, agriculture, and the burning of fossil fuels. And T''''? Primary production, agriculture, and the burning of fossil fuels will be affected, amongst many other things, by political

[3] I shall use this notation, for illustration, without supposing that the "derivatives" exist in the mathematical sense.

decisions. T'''''? Political decisions will be affected, amongst many other things, by public discontent. T''''''? Public discontent will be affected, amongst many other things, by temperature T.

Thus the Earth-system, of which T is an observable, is a *complex system* in Rosen's sense. One diagnostic (there are several) of this is that there is no definite point at which the infinity of Taylor's Theorem breaks off, as to yield an absolute separation between the present state, the next state, and a fixed rule relating the two. This does not kill science – it is certainly possible to systematically identify and investigate causal relations, or entailments, but e.g. T itself must be allowed to be considered both as something *entailed* and as something that *entails*. Indeed, we must acknowledge both that T responds to factors that are not T (e.g. increase of CO_2), *and* that T plays a role in the entailment of e.g. primary production and public discontent, which on their part play roles in entailing T and CO_2. In this basic sense the relevant causality is *in the system*, in the actual relations comprising it, and not in any algorithmic, externalizable scheme of context-independent state transitions. Also, while it is possible to generate fine *models* at basically any recognizable "informational layer" of complex system dynamics, such models cannot, in general and without distortion, be replaced by straightforward *values* (e.g. 43°C affects public discontent differently if there happens to be, say, an ongoing war). And lastly, here the higher-order terms, which drop away from the Newtonian analysis, can in the long run be absolutely crucial for overall system behaviour. This is exemplified e.g. by the systematic role our *culture*, with its side-effects, has played in the determination of T. Consequently, detailed focus on the most reductionistic units may not only make the analysis unnecessarily complicated, but also yield erroneous and irrelevant conclusions.

(Alternatively, all this could be investigated in a "materially" much more restricted case, and within a single discipline (biology), by replacing the Earth-system by an organism, and T by any observable whose explicit next value one might hope to entail (blood pressure, some mRNA concentration, etc.). It seems to me that similar conclusions would follow.)

Now, the reader might be wondering what is the point here – is it not a truism that real-world events are not so easily

tractable? Perhaps, but the point is conceptual: it is to regard the difference between simple state-law systems and complex systems as *qualitative*. That is, instead of there being a quantitative "threshold" of complexity, a system is simple if, and only if, it satisfies certain restrictive conditions (in particular the hypothesis stated above, or its variant). Yet, a complex system can be *approximated* as a simple system – for instance, T may be simulated *as if* all higher-order terms were zero. For a limited interval of time, this may mimic the real target system, and permit the making of good inferences based on available information. Over larger scales – the actually complex situation – the mimic may even contradict the behaviours of the real system. Therefore, a tacit supposition that fundamentally, or in general, or in principle, the system would be "in" a particular state, strictly separate from a fixed, algorithmic rule of state transitions, becomes doubtful. In fact, it starts to appear as an *artifact* of extrapolating methods and intuitions from simple to complex.

But this sounds familiar: once there was the extrapolation of low-velocity-intuitions to the realm of high velocities (ignorance of relativity), and likewise the extrapolation of intuitions about macroscopic phenomena to the microscopic realm (ignorance of quantum effects). Accordingly, I shall, in what follows, refer to the Newtonian state-law hypothesis by the expression $\varrho \to 0$. Here ϱ refers to the independent significance of the "rates of change" $x^{(i)}$ in Taylor's Theorem, after some definite, obviously finite i (for Newton, $i = 2$). This permits to propose a distinction between those (simple) natural systems, as targets of scientific investigation, for which $\varrho \to 0$ is a fair approximation, and those (complex) natural systems for which it is not. As such, the expression also indicates the possible analogy (from an epistemological point of view) to the tacit classical hypotheses presuming velocities to be low ($^{v}/_{c} \to 0$), and quantum effects to be ignorable ($\hbar \to 0$).

4. Image of science revisited

Interesting avenues would, I think, open by employing the elaborated state-law framework for reconsidering each of the traits (i–iii) in von Wright's account of the modern image of science, and also for re-interpreting his notion of the crisis of

intelligibility, but I shall omit such explorations here. Instead, I attempt a more direct re-entry to the initial can-ought considerations with the help of Table 1.

Observation (facts)	**Planet on a stable trajectory (A)**	**Common aspen *Populus tremula* interacting with many species in a boreal forest (B)**
Formal image	"particle" in a system of co-ordinates	keystone species
Formal inference	If now here, then next there	The fate of the aspen affects the whole ecosystem
Model transfer		
a. direct	a. falling stones	a. starfish, beaver
b. with modification	b. electron in a two-slit experiment	b. keystone sector in an economy
Practical application	Moon rockets, quantum computers	Conservation plans, political decisions
Practical principles	Predictability, controllability, manipulability	Interdependences in complex organizations

Table 1.

Table 1 presents two "lines" of research, A and B, originating from observations of different sorts of natural phenomena. Line A conceptualizes a planet as a mass-point, makes successful inferences about its trajectory, applies basically the same formalism for reasoning about falling stones, and with modification for reasoning about the double-slit experiment ("state" becomes the wavefunction; "law" becomes the Schrödinger equation). These formalisms can then be applied e.g. in the construction of moon rockets and quantum computers, and they add to the "general logic" of predictability, controllability, and manipulability. Line B, on its part, conceptualizes common aspen as a keystone species, infers successfully that the fate of the ecosystem depends much on the fate of the aspen, applies basically the same reasoning to starfish and beaver in their respective ecosystems, and with modifications for reasoning about keystone sectors in economies. It also makes practical suggestions relevant for conservation plans and political decisions, and adds to the "general logic" of

interdependences in complex organizations. Line A, which builds on state-law reasoning, has evidently close ties to the can-box of Fig. 1. Line B, apparently, rather to the ought: "Thou shalt not disturb keystone species". But what are we to make of such an assertion?

The perceived *relation* between A and B reflects, I propose, the stance we adopt (knowingly or not) on $\varrho \to 0$. For, if the hypothesis is taken as "in principle" universally valid (for clarity, let us think of this naively), then it appears that "fundamentally" also the aspen must be in a physical state, associated with an unchanging, physical (read: non-biological) rule of state transition. Consequently, B-type phenomena will be seen as specific instances of A-type phenomena: states and laws plus contingent boundary conditions. On the other hand, if $\varrho \to 0$ is regarded as a hypothesis valid only under specific circumstances, then reasoning may go the other way around. Then A-type phenomena could be seen as specific instances of B-type phenomena, in the sense that starting from a generally complex formal framework, and imposing sufficiently restrictive conditions of constraint, simple state-law dynamics may be obtained. In the possibly analogous quantum case, an equivalent of the first option was initially presumed (the quantum as a special case of the Newtonian), but an equivalent of the latter turned out to work (the Newtonian as a special case of the quantum).

But what is really at issue here is the apparently *normative* aspect of a scientific concept such as that of keystone species. It somehow inherently suggests that many other species *need* the aspen; that its thriving *matters* for them, and for us. Of course, since the concept is biological, the situation must, partly at least, be attributed to evolution. Yet, at least two contrasting interpretations remain available, again, I propose, depending on the status of $\varrho \to 0$. Presume it valid: then evolution explains the *appearance* of something being important for something else. What there "really is" are blind mechanisms (i.e. state-transition sequences) and blind selection. Presume it not valid: then evolution explains why something *does* matter for something else, in a sense. For, without $\varrho \to 0$ a universal notion of a blind mechanism becomes vague (cf. epicycles), and, therefore, causal relations and regularities must be accounted for *in situ*, within the relevant larger

organization in which they appear. Then, to the extent that evolution is a process of mutual adaptation and adjustment, it could be thought that an evolved relation exists *because* it matters, in a sense. Perturb such a relation, and you will, as a rule of thumb, perturb the larger system in which it has evolved.

Could we not, then, say that the aspen both is a keystone species and ought to be a keystone species; correspondingly, that the heart does pump blood and ought to pump blood? It seems to me that the answer might be yes – in a sense. Note, however, that we are not *deriving* ought from a *fact*; rather, we are extracting a *suggestion* out of a *model*. In Gibbard's parlance: if the heart is not pumping properly, and there is a way to heal it, then healing the heart is "the thing to do". Why? In *general* not because of specific facts of a specific heart, neither because of specific intrinsic values of a specific agent, but rather because of the basic biology of the organism (the heart's "ecosystem"). Similarly, preventing unnecessary harm from being done to keystone species is reasonable in general. Perhaps, in one case, disturbing keystone species would deteriorate food supply; in another, release the control of a pathogen; in yet another, diminish the amount of carbon stored into biomass. Or perhaps all of these would happen. Hence, even without any considerations from the points of view of non-human species (today, though, many would not simply omit them), there are good reasons to adopt "Thou shalt not disturb keystone species" as an often wise principle. It is wise because it reflects one generalizable aspect of how things hang together in this world, and because we are an integral part of that hanging.

Now, in von Wright's (1985, 277) view, "the *contents* of norms … may be said to describe an ideal world" (emphasis added). The above account of complexity, on its part, suggests that it may often make sense to say that science of complex organized systems, with evolutionary histories, describes relations, interdependencies, and conditions which matter for the existence of those systems – thus, a world which is "ideal" to them at least in the weak sense that they have in various ways become adapted to it (and only to it). Consequently, the step from *this* science to e.g. those things which von Wright (1963, 1985) calls *technical norms* – say, "If you wish to maintain ecological stability, you should not disturb keystone species" – seems short and natural. Again, this is not to derive ought from

is; amongst other things, technical norms are not automatically prescriptive. Nonetheless, the crucial point is that *if* such technical norms are interpreted as means-end relations, here theoretical science is essential for comprehending *both* the rationality of the "means", *and* the possible reasonability of the "end". For instance, whether 'ecological stability' is something that in some sense exists, and whether and how it affects human and non-human life, are problems for science. This can be contrasted with the situation in which science does yield rational means for realizing moon rockets, quantum computers, atomic bombs, AI, etc., while the reasonability of the end-situation is quite unrelated to the (pure) science in question, and will often be really assessed and become assessable only afterwards. Hence, insofar as there seems to be a conceivable difference between the (theoretical) *sciences* effective in suggesting either novel technical norms or novel technological opportunities, there appears to be a conceivable difference in the respective modes of science-society interaction as well.

Lastly, I want to emphasize that in both categories, there *is* novelty involved – the concept of keystone species, for instance, is fully a product of theoretical-empirical science. Initially it was, from the point of view of conservation and ecosystem organization, about as surprising as the existence of radio waves was from the point of view of communication technologies. As such, it was not just a new piece in our explanation of the world; rather it was a lesson learned *from* the world in free, curiosity-driven research.

5. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, I would like to associate von Wright's hope with the following, third way of legitimating (theoretical) science:

> We expect science to open new dimensions of practical wisdom, which cannot be conceived of *a priori* ($\mathcal{L}_3$)

Science thus legitimated of course *is* not ethics, just as state-law science legitimated by $\mathcal{L}_1$ is not technology. But it is worth acknowledging that conceptualizations of complex organizations tend to be immediately relevant for the question of what we ought to do. In particular, if theoretical science refuses to

suppose universal validity of $\varrho \to 0$, then foundational questions about complex systems cannot, in my view, chase "hidden" state-law dynamics of the most reductionistic units of analysis, but should rather aim at describing, in inferentially coherent languages, for instance the heart *as* a component of a living organism, the aspen *as* a key player of an ecosystem, and *Homo sapiens as* an integral part of the Earth-system. And precisely these sorts of descriptions, it seems to me, are the ones that constitute the rational basis for caring about the heart, about the aspen, and about our role in the determination of T.

Therefore, I regard it as a fully plausible idea that if science became more focused on complexity *qua* complexity, it would deliver its discoveries not so much via state-law models, which tend to be directly applicable for control and technological realization, but rather via models of relational organization. And at least one type of practical import of such models, which rarely accompanies state-law reasoning, is principled and perhaps more coherent view of what to care about, and how to adjust human life accordingly.

University of Helsinki

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Widening the Horizon of Finnish Philosophy in the 20th Century

Archival Excavations: The Söderman Affair[1]

ANSSI KORHONEN

Introduction

This paper is based on archival work that I did a few years ago on Max Söderman (1914—1947), an enigmatic figure from the earliest phase of modern Finnish philosophy. Söderman was a pupil of Eino Kaila in the 1930s and belonged to the generation of Finnish philosophers who, following Kaila's lead, turned to scientific philosophy and logical empiricism for their inspiration. In doing so, they shunned the still prevalent trends in Finnish philosophy of the time: history of philosophy, neo-Kantianism and empirical research, such as sociology and anthropology, disguised as "practical philosophy". Söderman was knowledgeable about the phenomenological tradition as well: Brentano, Husserl and Max Scheler in particular.

If the name of Söderman is at all familiar, the reason is most likely that Georg Henrik von Wright has written about him on a few occasions. In his autobiography, *Mitt liv som jag minns det* ('My life as I remember it'), von Wright paints a vivid picture of his friend, a brilliantly talented philosopher and artistically very sensitive young man, whose career took a tragic turn after a promising start and who died at the age of only thirty-two.[2]

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[1] I am grateful to Tuomo Aho, Martin Ellfolk, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Thomas Wallgren, Fredrik Westerlund and Bernt Österman for discussions, suggestions and concrete help. Comments from two referees were very helpful in preparing the final version. All translations are mine; the Swedish, German and Finnish originals have been omitted for reasons of space. Research for this paper was supported by a grant from Finnish Cultural Foundation (Suomen Kulttuurirahasto).

[2] von Wright (2001, 60—61); see also von Wright (1949), (2002).

Söderman may well be called a mysterious figure; hence the second part of the title: "the Söderman affair". The mystery has chiefly to do with his *Nachlass*. After graduation in 1935, he went on to live and work in Central Europe—Prague, Vienna and Münster—where he stayed until the outbreak of war in the fall of 1939. The plan was to write a dissertation on the logical theories of Bernard Bolzano (1781—1848), a topic suggested to him by Kaila. Bolzano, "the Bohemian Leibniz", was a brilliant mathematician, the inventor of logical semantics and a forefather of analytic philosophy, whose extensive *Nachlass*, for the most part untouched at the time, had been divided between Prague and Vienna. The plan, however, never materialized, and no known manuscript-material survives, although it must have existed in abundance. After Söderman's death, von Wright searched his friend's papers but could not find anything. His literary remains are, as von Wright puts it, an "unsolved mystery".[3] Von Wright's own conclusion was that all manuscripts had been destroyed, although possibly not by Söderman himself.

Now, if this apparently non-existent manuscript material were all there is to his *Nachlass*, the Söderman mystery could be dealt with very briefly. But there is more to it than that; hence the first part of the title: "archival excavations". There are two substantial collections of material. First, *The Georg Henrik von Wright Collection of the National Library of Finland* includes most of Söderman's extant correspondence, and consists of some 120 letters and postcards. The majority of this correspondence, however, is not with von Wright but with another close friend, Kaj Saxén (1911—1980).[4] Saxén acted as Söderman's chargé d'affaires, taking care of all kinds of practicalities, while Söderman was away in Central Europe. But Saxén was philosophically literate as well, as he had been a student of Kaila's and was still a member of the Philosophical Club, a discussion group that Kaila had built around himself. Söderman, therefore, kept his friend informed about his own philosophical activities, and it is mostly thanks to these letters that we can form a fairly comprehensive picture of Söderman's

[3] von Wright (2001, 61).

[4] After Saxén's death, Söderman's letters to him were donated to von Wright by his widow Camilla Saxén.

European years in the 1930s. Second, *Åbo Akademi University Library* preserves a small collection of material that was discovered as recently as 2015.[5] It consists of some 30 letters plus a number of other personal documents. They include the theses that Söderman wrote as an undergraduate in Helsinki, among them a lengthy piece on Scheler.[6] Furthermore, during my excavations, I succeeded in locating a few previously unknown items; here mention should be made of Söderman's grant applications to the University of Helsinki and records relating to them, which are kept in *Arkki*, the Archives and Registry of the University. Finally, some material relating to Söderman's life has already appeared in printed form.[7] Unfortunately, the new material does not resolve the mystery of the missing manuscripts, either, but from the existing part of the *Nachlass* we can still piece together a reasonably comprehensive picture of Söderman's short life.

This takes us to the second part of the Söderman affair: this is the man himself. The picture that emerges from the archival material is rather intriguing. The correspondence shows that Bolzano-studies constituted only a part of Söderman's philosophical activities in Central Europe. He seems to have been quick to adapt and make himself an active member of the philosophical community, wherever he settled. In Prague, he had regular discussions with Hans Kelsen, the famous jurist and legal and political philosopher, who encouraged him to take up the logical study of norms, another largely neglected area at the time. And in Vienna, Söderman was in contact with the remaining circle of logical empiricists as well as with Kurt Gödel.

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[5] The precise provenance of this material, which was discovered during a cleanup and removal, is unknown (personal information by Martin Ellfolk, Åbo Akademis Bibliotek).

[6] Max Söderman: *Max Schelers filosofi*; typed manuscript, 93 pages. The manuscript is undated, but was written probably sometime in the early 1935 as a *laudatur* thesis for Eino Kaila.

[7] The published material includes von Wright's correspondence with Kaila (Österman (ed.), 2020) and with Göran Schildt (Kruskopf (ed.), 2008). In both correspondences, Söderman's name occurs several times in the early letters. There are also a few occurrences of Söderman's name (usually misspelled as 'Södermann') in Kurt Gödel's recently published notebooks from the years 1937 and 1938 (Lethen 2021).

For the purposes of this paper, I have compiled a description of Söderman's life into a separate itemized minibiography. This is found at the end of the paper. In addition, I have highlighted a few salient facts about him. In most cases, unfortunately, this is all that can be done. Yet, although information about the man and his work is mostly anecdotal, this gap in the history of the early history of modern Finnish philosophy deserves to be filled, if only to satisfy our curiosity.

Söderman and von Wright

According to von Wright, Söderman was "next to Kaila the greatest personal influence" on him during his years as a student.[8] Their correspondence is not very extensive, and most of the letters date from the final year of Söderman's life when he was teaching philosophy at the Åbo Akademi University on von Wright's initiative. There are only a handful of letters and postcards from the pre-war years, all of them by Söderman. They show that von Wright was the more active of the two correspondents. Unfortunately, he had not yet acquired the commendable habit of making copies of sent letters, and none of his pre-war letters to Söderman survive. Söderman's early letters and postcards to von Wright number less than ten, and their pre-war correspondence ends in the summer of 1938.

One might expect that two intimate friends who are young and aspiring philosophers would use their correspondence as a means for free exchange of philosophical ideas. This, however, is not the case here. Söderman, indeed, had something like Plato's attitude towards written word, which he found a poor substitute for genuine philosophical dialogue. There are frequent references in his letters (also to Saxén) to such dialogues, which the philosophical friends conducted *in extenso* whenever they were in Helsinki. von Wright would later write about Söderman: "from reading his letters, I can still revive some of the thrill of night-long conversations with him on a limitless variety of subjects."[9]

For the most part, Söderman's letters to von Wright are not really philosophical at all but psychological or even 'psychoanalytic', and presumably composed at the spur of the

[8] Von Wright (1989, 54fn2).
[9] Von Wright (1989, 54fn2).

moment. In one letter, Söderman writes that he must not lose one of the rare moments when he believes he can write to his friend, although the impulse may yield results that are surprising even for the author himself.[10]

Philosophically, however, there is one early letter by Söderman to von Wright that stands out. Written in January 1938, it purports to be a reflection on von Wright's philosophical personality in 'objective' rather than 'subjective' terms. von Wright's letter has not survived, but clearly he had asked for his friend's opinion on the topic that he had gotten from Kaila for dissertation: the contrast between the Aristotelian and Galilean traditions in the philosophy of science.[11]

In his reply, Söderman first conjectures that it is his friend's orientation towards "universalism" that partly explains why von Wright has chosen a "quasi-historical theme".[12] Söderman then poses – to himself, rather than to his friend – a pregnant question: *Is this "quasi-historical" phase really necessary for von Wright's philosophical development?* As regards his own self, Söderman explains, he once answered this question 'yes'; history for him had meant "an eye and touch contact with a living system". In considering von Wright's case, however, he is inclined towards the opposite answer; a quasi-historical theme such as the one that von Wright was now conceiving was, frankly speaking, a failure to follow his true philosophical inclinations:

> You have the rare ability to see a problem directly as a structure of data and combinatory possibilities, without first considering in a living object first steps and approximate realisations. […] There are few sciences today exhibiting the same splendid activity as the logistically inspired philosophy. We ("Humanity"!) can't afford to let anyone of the few persons who are in a position to lead pure philosophy further and who do not need any extrinsic auxiliary constructions to dedicate their time to such enterprises.[13]

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[10] [MS: GHvW; 20.1.1938].

[11] See von Wright (1989, 9—10).

[12] von Wright has described the "universalist", historically oriented and aesthetic *Weltanschauung* of his youth in his "Intellectual autobiography"; see von Wright (1989, 7—8, 18—19). For discussion, see Österman (2019).

[13] [MS: GHvW; 20.1.1938].

Söderman supports this conclusion by explaining how von Wright's *pro gradu* thesis had struck him. The thesis, inspired by Popper's recent work, was entitled "The problem of demarcation of empirical propositions: Studies in modern theory of knowledge".[14] Despite its title, the work contains a substantial chapter on historical matters. Starting from the ancients and describing how the demarcation problem has been conceived through history, von Wright seeks to show how the great philosophers had in their most fruitful thoughts anticipated the "new method", that is, exact theory of knowledge or "logistic". Clearly, this line of thought was inspired by Kaila, whose slightly later book *Inhimillinen tieto* (*Human Knowledge*) would contain a similar but more comprehensive thesis about the gradual emergence of the logical empiricist conception of empirical knowledge in the evolution of scientific knowledge, a thesis that relied heavily on an alleged contrast between the Aristotelian and Galilean conceptions of knowledge.[15] Söderman does not question the value of the historical part of von Wright's thesis as such.[16] His impression is nevertheless that it "has neither thematic nor harmonic but only ornamental significance" in the thesis as a whole and its author's likely train of thought; this formulation is inspired by a comparison to some of Bach's Partitas and the variations in their Sarabande movements (the comparison is typical of Söderman's mindsetting).

The simile here is original, the thesis less so; that history of philosophy is of no importance to philosophy proper was logical empiricist mainstream – Kaila was, indeed, an interesting exception in this respect. What is striking, though, is the tone of the passage. Looking at the final sentence of the previous quotation, it would be tempting to see in it a fairly straightforward advice to his friend to change the topic of his prospective

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[14] Georg Henrik von Wright: "De empiriska satsernas avgränsningsproblem: Undersökningar i modärn kunskapsteori". The work is preserved in *The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives*, University of Helsinki.

[15] Kaila (1939/[2014], Part I.)

[16] But he did find the distinction that von Wright relied on less inspiring; it was, he thought, "neither unstudied nor particularly subtle" [MS: GHvW; 23.1.1938].

dissertation. Söderman, however, at once distances himself from such a reading:

> But this is no serious argument: you can dispense with this "we" in the name of the higher, more evident demand to realize, in multiplicity and unity, your multi-dimensional personality. The above sermon is to be taken less as an advice than as a psychological trial balloon.

Of course, von Wright *did* end up changing his dissertation plan, returning eventually to the concept of probability, which he had studied in his master's thesis, and the problem of induction.[17] Perhaps the trial balloon launched by his friend contributed something to this change of mind.

Apart from a letter written in February 1940, in which Söderman tells about hardships and illness during military service, their correspondence resumed only in the autumn of 1946. Among his many duties, von Wright was now acting as Professor at the Åbo Akademi University, while Söderman had been invited there at von Wright's initiative to take up the teaching load.[18] There were many practicalities to attend to, and when letters had to be exchanged, they were mostly businesslike.

The later letters do reveal an interesting detail, indeed, a new element in the Söderman affair. It appears that in the spring of 1947, Söderman was working on a manuscript on the logic of norms, which he had promised to von Wright. In May, however, he wrote:

> The reason why I didn't fulfill my promise to send You the manuscript was because when I typed it up, I thought I saw a lot of gaping holes in the reasoning and was, besides, severely

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[17] von Wright (1941).

[18] Söderman lectured four hours a week. During the autumn term, he lectured on elementary logic and on selected questions in practical philosophy; in the spring term, he continued the course on logic and lectured on the history of philosophy from Galileo on (*Årskrift utgiven av Åbo Akademi* 31, 1946/47 (1949), 108—109). Teaching philosophy in a very small university, however, wasn't always easy: "Wednesday's lecture: not a soul. What is one to do?" [MS: GHvW; 26.9.1946].

> distressed by influenza as well as my lectures. Now that the last two irritants are gone, the logic of norms seems much clearer.[19]

von Wright had applied mild pressure on his friend, hoping that the said manuscript could form a basis for a dissertation and that Söderman would be ready to defend a dissertation "in the foreseeable future, for example within the next academic year".[20] It may even be that when, after Söderman's death, von Wright searched for his papers, it was above all this fresh material that he was looking for.[21] In a letter dated June 12, 1947, which turned out to be the last in their correspondence, von Wright expresses a hope that sometime during the coming fall semester they could discuss problems of mutual interest, "also the logic of norms, a topic on the choice of which I congratulate you".[22] Perhaps the topic had already come up at some earlier point. If so, maybe these conversations, if they ever took place, contributed something to von Wright's later discovery of deontic logic. This, however, is just a comforting thought.

The bulk of this last letter, which was penned in Dartmoor, Devon, where von Wright was having a few days' rest after a heavy lecture tour in England, is about his impressions of philosophical life in the country and, above all, about the paralyzing effect that the renewing of contact with Wittgenstein and his philosophy had on him. This, however, is another story and doesn't belong here.[23]

Söderman in Vienna

The spring and summer of 1937, which he spent in Vienna, were the highpoint of Söderman's *Wanderungsjahre*. A second visit extended from December 1937 until February 1938, and he left the city for good less than a month before the *Anschluss*. This was the time when the last remnants of the Vienna Circle

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[19] [MS: GHvW; 13.5.1947].

[20] [GHvW: MS; 1.2.1947]. This may explain an otherwise enigmatic remark in the obituary that von Wright wrote for Söderman: "In Prague, he came into contact with Hans Kelsen, who inspired him to study the philosophy of legal concepts, which became the final topic of his planned dissertation" (von Wright 1949, 70).

[21] This possibility was suggested to me by one of the referees.

[22] [GHvW: MS; 12.6.1947].

[23] See Österman (2017) for details.

were flickering out.[24] A handful of the members were still present, however, and Söderman's references to "Waismann Circle", "Zilsel Circle" and "Gödel Circle" give a reminder that the Circle's spirit was still alive. Judging by the letters, the philosophical hot topic in Vienna in 1937 was Rudolf Carnap's recently published essay *Testability and Meaning* and its implications for logical empiricism.[25] For his part, Söderman was quick to draw the consequence that Carnap's work signaled the end of "Viennese positivism" ("epistemology" or "pure psychology") and inaugurated a new phase in logical empiricism. This much is declared in a letter to Kaj Saxén in May:

> The trip to Paris will be decided within days. K. [= Kaila] has given his acceptance. It is remarkable that a Polish guest in the Gödel Circle and an undersigned would be the only ones to set out from Vienna. *Finis epistemologiae, Gloria logicae purae!* It's over with Viennese positivism, and it can be asked whether even Kaila's existential implications can prolong its existence. May Helsinki in the future become a centre for this pure logic?![26]

Here we find an interesting reference to Kaila. He would continue to defend his own version of the so-called constitution theory, trying to bypass Carnap's objections to translatability, as can be seen from Part III of his *Human Knowledge*. Söderman, apparently, was unconvinced by Kaila's efforts, thinking that they represented old-fashioned positivism, although it is now impossible to determine to what extent he had definite doubts on this point. In the same letter, he mentions Kaila's "quite harmless" objections to Carnap's essay. Typically and unfortunately, however, he does not give any details (Kaila had informed Söderman about these objections, which he had related to Carnap as well).[27]

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[24] For the dissolution of the Vienna Circle, see Stadler (2015, Ch. 10); Edmonds (2020, chapters 17—20) offers a more popular account.

[25] Carnap (1936).

[26] The Polish guest was Andrzej Mostowski, a student of Tarski's, who was visiting Vienna at the time.

[27] Of the relevant letters, only Carnap's reply to Kaila survives. "Kaila's existential implications", mentioned by Söderman, refer to Kaila's attempt to save dispositional concepts by giving them explicit definitions in second-order logic; see Kaila (1939/[2014], 160—165). For a quick overview of

The true high point of the time in Vienna, however, was not Carnap's new philosophy but acquaintance with Kurt Gödel. A relationship was established soon after Söderman's arrival, most likely on February, 28.[28] During the following months, the two seem to have met regularly, either with or without a "Circle", until late July, when Söderman set out for Paris to participate in the World Congress on Philosophy. When he returned to Vienna in December, the contact was resumed, and one of their meetings, which took place in January 1938, is recorded in Gödel's Notebooks.[29] One exciting detail about their meetings is found in a July letter to Saxén:

> At the moment I am to such an extent occupied by my work ("Bolzano: a logistic history" must be finished before departure and get Gödel's definitive acceptance) that what I write must be regarded more as a manifestation of a will to write a letter than a letter in the proper sense.[30]

The schedule turned out to be too optimistic. Nevertheless, it is quite remarkable that Gödel should have acted as an unofficial supervisor for Söderman's Bolzano-studies. No further details are preserved, however. Quite apart from this role, whatever it was, Gödel clearly made an overwhelming impression on Söderman. Here is Söderman's own testimony:

> That Vienna to me has become a great philosophical and logistic experience must be attributed almost exclusively to Gödel. A person in whom there is no room at all for diffuse reasoning, in other words, to humanistic philosophizing, who analyses every

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Kaila's views, see Manninen and Niiniluoto (2014). In a letter to von Wright, dated February 3, 1940, Söderman expresses an intention to write a review of Kaila's recently published book, the Swedish translation of which he had received as a gift from its author. This would have been an interesting piece, but no traces of it remain.

[28] [MS: KS; 28.2.1937].

[29] See Lethen (2021, 87—90). In another meeting which took place in January 1938, Rose Rand – a philosopher known for her sharp tongue – described Söderman to Gödel as "Vielleser und ein schrecklicher Mensch" ("bookworm and a horrible person"); (*ibid.* 87). The reason behind the epithet is unknown. There is one postcard from Rand to Söderman, dated 26 April, 1938. It is purely businesslike.

[30] [MS: KS; 17.7.1937].

> question down to its last consequences, is certainly a rarity, and I have met no other person who would pursue the ideal of exactness as fanatically as this amiable and modest *Dozent* of mathematics. For his sake alone, a pilgrimage to Vienna would be worthwhile.[31]

Gödel, as his *Notebooks* show, was not quite as immune to diffuse reasoning as this suggests. But what Söderman did see clearly struck a deep note of resonance; there are similar remarks elsewhere in the letters, where Söderman, always preferring pure philosophy, roundly condemns all inclinations to enter 'humanistic philosophizing'.

It is amusing to compare this portrait of Gödel to one that von Wright gave in April 1937, when he was visiting Vienna on his way to Italy. Söderman arranged a meeting with Gödel, and von Wright reported the event in a letter to Kaila. The letter, which is as much a portrait of Söderman as it is of Gödel, is too long to be included here, but here is the gist of the relevant part.[32]

Von Wright first depicts his impression of Söderman. Söderman, he tells Kaila, is possibly even more original and incisive than before, his mind possessing an overwhelming vitality. After some rather negative comments on the philosophical atmosphere in Vienna, von Wright moves on to describe the meeting with himself, Gödel and Söderman to which he had reluctantly agreed. At first their conversation was about things within formalism; according to a later recollection, the topic was Tarski's semantics.[33] Here von Wright was an outsider, but then the discussion moved on to probability, which was closer to his home ground. Now he records two features of Gödel's mind, as they struck him: Gödel's only real concern was with the technical formulation of the probability calculus and he had nothing extraordinary to offer by way of a philosophical insight ("a philosopher of the modern type, whose only real interest lies in the calculatory side of things and for whom other philosophical issues play only a minor role"). Then he describes how Söderman led the discussion to a "more lyrical

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[31] [MS: KS; 2.5.1937].

[32] For the original letter, written in Swedish, see Österman (ed.) (2020, 115—119).

[33] von Wright (2002, 200).

question": to what extent the logistic theory of knowledge could be seen as implying a determinate world view? This question was quite strange to Gödel, who appeared like a child in the ensuing conversation. Finally, von Wright sums up his impression of Gödel, emphasizing how we must acknowledge both the greatness and the limitation of the mind of this genius, and describing how the peculiar limitation comes even more clearly to light when it stands out against the "all-encompassing universality" of someone like Söderman.

On the face of it, the characteristics that the young von Wright perceived as Gödel's peculiar limitations were precisely those that Söderman found so praiseworthy; and of course, the 'dialectic' of the situation is complicated by the contrast that von Wright draws here between the universalist Söderman and the narrowly technical Gödel. Here von Wright strikes a theme that bears on his own world-view as well. The contrast between Söderman's and von Wright's personalities and their preferences is, I think, more apparent than real, but this issue cannot be discussed here; it has to do with the "universalism" which von Wright perceives in Söderman and which we saw Söderman attributing to von Wright in the January 1938 letter.

Söderman and Kelsen

Apart from Gödel, Hans Kelsen was the other great intellectual experience for Söderman. Meeting him in Prague inspired a lively description from Söderman in January 1937:

> Since my last letter […] I have made acquaintance with an intellectual celebrity of the first order – Hans Kelsen. In this case, the relationship between the man and his work is other than the usual one that motivates acquaintanceship only with the written work of the celebrity. Now one is not on a heavy neo-Kantian walk, with "Wesen und Wert der Demokratie" strolling besides; for Kelsen himself is a dazzling debater with philosophical views, interest in logistic, agility and an unusual demand for exactness. Some three-man conferences (with Reach)[34] will certainly belong

[34] Karel Reach (1900—1944?), a Czech logician who perished in the Holocaust. Reach was one of those whom Söderman praised for their exclusive commitment to pure logic.

> to the most positive personal memories from Prague. To a logistic interpretation of his *Reine Lechtslehre* Kelsen has little to object.[35]

This theme was pursued further in the autumn visit to Prague:

> […] philosophically, Prague has this time meant one thing above all: Kelsen. I have had with him a number of discussions which went very well. He has the distinctive ability to enter into logistic reasoning, and the slight Kantian accent presented difficulties only at the beginning. It would, indeed, be a task to summarize the results of these discussions, and Kelsen wants me to do it; the theme, however, is a little too delicate. For it's a matter of removing the most monstrous prejudices, not least among the logisticians (normative sentences – *sinnlos!* Carnap still maintained in Paris when I took up the matter). But maybe later – the theme is in any case too serious for a journal article.[36]

These discussions with Kelsen were mentioned in a grant application to the University of Helsinki the following February:

> In Prague, I had the opportunity to discuss these matters with Prof. Hans Kelsen, who drew my attention to the importance of the logical analysis of so-called normative sentences. Related to these discussions, I made a few sketches of a calculus, which showed that in this field, which has never been studied by logistic means, there is much to discover that is new and significant from the logistic point of view.[37]

The topic which Kelsen recommended to Söderman did not call for a journal article but an ambitious research project. It was unofficially titled *The Logistic analysis of normative systems with a special view to the pure theory of law*, and Kelsen wrote an enthusiastic letter of recommendation for it. Here is a translation of the gist of the letter:

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[35] [MS: KS; 7.1.1937].

[36] [MS: KS; 18.11.1937].

[37] Grant application to the Consistorium of the University of Helsinki, dated 24 February, 1938 (*Arkki*). Among the papers preserved in Åbo Akademi University Library, there's a notebook which contains three pages of jottings under the title 'Logik normativer Sätze'. As far as I have been able to make out, they do not permit any conclusions about what kind of development their author may have had in mind.

> I am pleased to confirm that the work planned by Mr. Söderman: "Logistic investigations into normative systems with a special regard to the Pure Theory of Law" concerns a theme the scientific development of which is of great importance. […] As regards the person of Mr. Söderman, I conducted repeated discussions with him on the theme of his work and received the impression that he – more than almost anyone else – is qualified to resolve the stated problem. He is a great philosophical talent and has a rare ability for abstract thought that does not lose its clarity even when it deviates from the field of sense perception. Above all, however, he distinguishes himself through that intellectual honesty which is the sole guarantee of true knowledge.[38]

Supported not only by Kelsen but also by Gödel,[39] Söderman was one of the two applicants to be awarded the Rosenberg three-year travel grant in April, 1938. This was the most prestigious scholarship in Finland at the time. The travel plan included extended visits to Prague, Warsaw ("the leading European research centre in logistic and its applications") as well as Cambridge (where "the non-logistic analysis of norms is actively cultivated" by the school of G. E. Moore). None of this was materialized, and the outbreak of the war put an end to Söderman's *Wanderungsjahre* and, as it would eventually turn out, to his scholarly ambitions. "It is bitterly tragic," von Wright wrote in Söderman's obituary after the war, "that he did not succeed in giving his learning, his thoughts, and his discoveries the literary form that he, for several years of effort and agony, sought but never found".[40]

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[38] Authenticated copy of a letter by Professor Hans Kelsen, 12 February, 1938 (*Arkki*).

[39] An authenticated copy Gödel's letter, dated 7 February, 1938, is preserved in *Arkki*. It is rather more tersely worded than Kelsen's, and roughly translates: "During the last Summer term, I had repeated discussions with Mr. Söderman, and would be very much in favour of a scholarship granting him the opportunity to continue his logico-epistemological studies". A draft of the original letter, which is slightly differently worded from the one translated here, is kept among the Gödel papers in Princeton and has been reprinted in Lethen (2021, 24).

[40] von Wright (1949, 71).

Max Söderman: a short biography[41]

- **Max Ferdinand Söderman** is born in Oulu, northern Finland, on 24 November, 1914
- **May 1932:** passes Matriculation Examination
- **September 1932—May 1935:** student at the University of Helsinki; graduates with major in general history and minors in theoretical philosophy, political science, sociology and political economy
- **May 1936:** his paper "Eräitä Bolzano-tutkimuksen probleemeja" ('Some Problems in the Study of Bolzano') is published in Volume 8 of *Ajatus*, the Yearbook of the Philosophical Society; this is the only scientific paper that Söderman ever publishes
- **May 1936**; attends the conferment celebrations of the University of Helsinki as the *primus magister*[42]
- **June 1936:** Participates in the *Second International Congress on the Unity of Science*, held in Copenhagen
- **October 1936:** travels to Prague to study the Bolzano-*Nachlass* with a view to writing a dissertation on Bolzano's logic
- **October 1936—February 1937:** establishes connections with several philosophers in Prague, including Walter Dubislav, Philipp Frank, Karel Reach and Eduard Winter
- **December 1936:** first meeting with Hans Kelsen, who has "recently taken interest in logistic"

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[41] The information compiled here derives from the unpublished sources at the National Library of Finland, *Arkki* – Archives and Registry of the University of Helsinki, Åbo Akademis Bibliotek, *Arkivsamlingarna*; I have also made use Söderman's obituary written by von Wright (von Wright 1949); other references to published material are given in the footnotes.

[42] During the Conferment Ceremony, it fell to Söderman to answer the primus master's question, which was presented to him by Professor Kaila: "Is it correct that that there cannot be any scientific questions that are for logical reasons unsolvable in principle?" Both Kaila's question and Söderman's intricate reply, of which the press gave a detailed summary, represent pure logical positivism (*Helsingin Sanomat*, 31.5.1936). Söderman, as one would expect, answered the question in the affirmative.

- **15 January, 1937:** reads a paper entitled "Über die Logik Bolzanos" for a "mathematical society" (*Deutsch naturwissenschaftlich-medizinischer Verein für Böhmen „Lotos" in Prag*);[43] the paper is then revised and discussed "by local experts" in Prague[44] but remains unpublished (and is presumably destroyed at some later point)
- **February 1937:** travels to Vienna, first meeting with Kurt Gödel
- **Spring 1937:** participates in the various Circles that remain active in Vienna (Gödel, Waismann, Zilsel)
- **April 1937:** von Wright visits Vienna on his way to Italy. Söderman arranges a meeting with Gödel
- **July—August 1937:** participation in the Descartes Congress in Paris, which also hosts the *Third International Congress on the Unity of Science*; meets Carnap and several Polish logicians and philosophers, including Tarski – who is "utterly sympathetic and, like all Poles, a technical genius" – and Roman Ingarden – who is the "first sensible phenomenologist" Söderman has met[45]
- **August—November 1937:** works again in Prague to finish the dissertation on Bolzano;[46] the original project has grown into two separate works: "Bolzano's predecessors" (the line from Leibniz to Bolzano *via* Lambert) and "Bolzano's Logic"; further discussions with Kelsen on the logic of norms
- **December 1937—February 1938:** an extended visit to Vienna to resolve unclarities in the Bolzano material; further "*Grundlagen* discussions" with Gödel[47]
- **February 1938:** travels to Münster to discuss "Bolzano" with Heinrich Scholz and to participate in the activities of Scholz's "Logistic Seminar" (*Logistisches Seminar*)

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[43] See *Lotos – Zeitschrift für Naturwissenschaften*, Band 85 (1937): 65.

[44] [MS: KS; 18.2.1937].

[45] [MS: KS; 14.8.1937]; [MS: GHvW; 26.8.1937].

[46] "My Bolzano goes ahead; that is, the pile of papers grows higher and has now reached the critical point when one is thinking of the moment that finishes it all off, the last stroke of the typewriter, *consummatum est!* You know what special inhibitions I've always felt before this particular moment, and now it is worse than ever. Several chapters exist in a couple of versions…" [MS: KS; 18.11.1937].

[47] [MS: EK; 23.1.1938].

- **April 1938:** receives the Rosenberg three-year travel grant from the University of Helsinki
- **October 1938:** after three months' visit to Finland, returns to Münster in order to complete the final polishing-up of "Bolzano"
- **November 1938:** last reference in the letters to "Bolzano"[48]
- **March 1939:** Oiva Ketonen, a fellow-student from Helsinki, who is studying proof theory in Göttingen with Gentzen, makes a visit to Münster and gets the impression that Söderman's dissertation "has run into some insurmountable obstacle"; Ketonen thinks the difficulty is on the mathematical side of the work[49]
- **Early August 1939:** leaves Münster and travels to Stockholm via Copenhagen
- **September—November 1939:** stays in Stockholm, drawing up new travel plans, but has by now lost contact with Kelsen ("who has gone missing") and with Gödel (who was trying to get to Princeton, when last heard of)[50]
- **24 November 1939:** returns to Helsinki, less than a week before the outbreak of the Winter War
- **January—February 1940:** has been called up and is now in military service in northern Finland but catches pneumonia and is hospitalized; is back in service after

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[48] "Bolzano has […] taken up my programme, and although that which is happening on this front is absolutely necessary, it can hardly lay claim to any general interest. It has to do with the last fixings and, above all, with the unpleasant problem which one can briefly describe as the *Grössenlehre*-complex. It seems to end with a compromise of a kind where a part that is directly connected with the rest is worked into a final chapter. In this way, to be sure, it becomes a story with "to be continued" – or as Scholz suggests, "Zusammenhang und Ausblick". The main thing is that the work becomes ready for printing without the valuable and difficult material in *Grössenlehre* being bungled by publication in a non-crystallized form." [MS: KS; 17.11.1938]. *Grössenlehre* was a long manuscript on the foundations of mathematics which Bolzano worked on during the last decade of his life. Even now it has not yet been published in full.

[49] Kruskopf (ed. 2008, 56). The previous footnote, I think, gives sufficient context for Ketonen's impression.

[50] [MS: KS; 16.11.1939].

brief convalescence until the end of the Winter War, this time in *Osasto Sisu*, a training unit for foreign volunteers, which is positioned in Lapua, southern Ostrobothnia
- **June 1941—September 1944:** the Continuation War; is no longer called up due to ill health; lives in Helsinki and works as a teacher in various schools
- **March 1944—September 1946:** in the service of the Finnish Foreign Trade Association as an editor of their weekly Newsletter
- **September 1946—May 1947:** teaches philosophy at the Åbo Akademi University, Turku, a post to which he is invited on the suggestion of von Wright, who is acting as Professor of Philosophy there
- **Spring 1947**: works on a manuscript on the logic of norms, which he has promised to von Wright; the manuscript, which is apparently intended to form a basis for a dissertation, remains uncompleted (and is presumably destroyed at some later point)
- **September 1947:** falls ill with miliary tuberculosis and dies on October 1st, after a short illness; after his friend's death, von Wright searches his papers with help from Söderman's father but they are unable to find anything

University of Helsinki

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Sigurd Frosterus's Philosophies of Technology

KIMMO SARJE

Sigurd Frosterus (1876–1956) was a distinguished intellectual in Finland during the first decades of the 20th century. He was a trained architect and a widely learned humanist, art critic, art collector and philosophical essayist.

Frosterus started his studies of art history, philosophy, and literature at the University of Helsinki in the late 19th century – with Edward Westermarck as one of his professors – and completed his academic education with professional studies in architecture at the Polytechnical Institute of Finland in Helsinki, graduating in 1902.

Frosterus published a dozen books on art, architecture, literature, and philosophy and wrote his thesis in art history about the history of colours in painting from ancient times to the Middle Ages. Frosterus's art collection is on permanent display at the Amos Rex Art Museum in Helsinki. As an architect, his major work is the Stockmann department store in Helsinki. Frosterus was one of the great actors making modern Finland (Sarje 2014, 193–218).

In his youth, during the early 20th century, Frosterus was a prominent member of the Euterpe group of young Swedish-speaking intellectuals – many of them modernists and avant-gardists in their fields – who emphasized cultural contacts across Scandinavia to Central Europe, especially France. French impressionist and post-impressionist painting were Frosterus's primary interests in art, but intellectually, German-speaking Europe and Great Britain were crucial to him. Studies and work in Henry van de Velde's studio in Weimar in 1902–03 made a profound impact on Frosterus's intellectual and artistic development.

At the time, Weimar was a sparkling centre of modern German culture and van de Velde himself one of the champions of modern European architecture. He was a professional painter, an autodidact architect and designer, a propagandist, a powerful reformer of the Art Nouveau movement towards a more rational, industrial direction. Frosterus admired him as "a prototype of a Superman" (Sarje, 2000, 29).

Van de Velde's circle in Weimar brought together painters such as Max Liebermann and Ludwig von Hofmann, dramatists like Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Gordon Craig, and cultural figures such as Count Henry Kessler. The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche also played an important social role in the town. Frosterus got to know her, as she invited the young Finnish architect to have afternoon tea at her house a couple of times (Sarje 2000, 29–31).

For Frosterus, Nietzsche was a "great personality," an "example" and a "symbol," as he acknowledges in his 1905 essay "Friedrich Nietzsche's Correspondence with Erwin Rohde" ("Friderich Nietzsches brevväxling med Erwin Rohde," Frosterus 1915b, 99). For him, Nietzscheism meant an intellectual challenge to transcend oneself and an elitist attitude, tinged with the aristocratic radicalism championed by the Danish critic Georg Brandes. The ideology was familiar within the Euterpe group (Mustelin 1963, 214–218 & 328–331; Sarje 1999).

Van de Velde also highly appreciated Frosterus's talent, education and skills, inviting him to participate in several of his projects, and finally asking him to share a company with both of their names. However, Frosterus's choice was to work independently and in Finland (Sarje 2000, 122–124).

Frosterus was not a philosopher in an academic sense, but more of a cultural analyst or critic whose ambitious aim was to understand and shape the modern world of his era and to outline its worldview or *Weltanschauung*. The essay was the form of his philosophical writing, focusing on the diagnosis of the modern (Castrén 1958, 8; Sarje 2024, 6–18). He was a rationalist and evolutionist who saw Charles Darwin's ideas as essential for understanding the development of society and culture.

As a philosopher, Frosterus can be compared to Walter Benjamin (1892–1940). Both were critical observers of modern life. Frosterus was 16 years older than Benjamin, and their worldviews differed. Frosterus was an "*homme utile*" ("useful

man"), a day person, while Benjamin was a bystander and flâneur who did not seem to adopt the ideal of being a useful citizen. He was more of a romantic, a kindred spirit of Charles Baudelaire (1821–1861), a melancholy, nocturnal person who thrived on decadence. Frosterus, without being a naive progressive, disdained decadence while believing that science and technology could build a better life.

In his thoughts, Benjamin strolled the Parisian shopping arcades of Baudelaire's day, which he saw as the predecessors of the modern department store, and let himself be carried away by the crowds in the streets. When his essay in French, "Paris, the capital of the 19th century", was published in 1939, this was all a thing of the past (Benjamin 2014, 43–61).

In 1905, Frosterus analyzed the architecture, customer flows and internal logistics, product presentation, lighting and display windows of the Wertheim department store in his essay "Berlin Rhapsody". This was a question of both present and future: the starting incantation for his Stockmann department store in Helsinki (Frosterus 1917b, 47–61).

In my study, I will examine various aspects of Frosterus's ideas of technology: the ecstasy of technology, the morphology of technology, the technology of architecture, the dreadnought and Futurism, the technology of fiction, and the critique of technology. In my view, young Frosterus was an outstanding pre-futurist writer and an independent philosopher, who later, during the First World War and between the wars, developed his thinking towards an ethically sustainable critique of the technological civilization.

The Ecstasy of Technology

"London Rhapsody," Frosterus's travel essay of 1903, focuses on technology and modern city life. He described how the new technology shaped and expressed the form of life in one of the major metropolises of Europe. He was interested in the new values of beauty created by the latest technology. Frosterus exalted the artificial iron and steel world that he faced at Victoria Station: the tracks, locomotives, smoke, steam, glass roof, noise, and busy people:

> Every minute, indeed, more frequently, the express locomotives rush with the gathering crash of a plunging avalanche –

> magnificent, sleek pedigree beasts, like thoroughbred racehorses – up to the platforms, only, in the very moment that they threaten to smash against the massive stones of the foundations, to be, as if by miracle, halted on the spot by some invisible hand. A burst of steam, then silent for a second, but in the next moment, with ear-numbing sounds, like those from a gushing, red-hot geyser, ash-white steam is forced out of the giant's mighty lungs and through the open valves, straight as an arrow, up the cold walls of the arched glass canopy (Frosterus 1994, 8).

Frosterus's sublime experience and his interpretation of it when he faced with a threatening, overwhelming phenomenon – the new British railway technology in full action – was ecstatic. He knew, of course, that the drama was human-controlled, which also provided the necessary mental distance to feel the sublime. The railway station was "a subjugated thing without a will of its own, with no soul other than man's will" (Frosterus 1994, 9).

The kind of ecstatic admiration of the new technology that Frosterus expressed in regard to the whirl of Victoria Station was typical of dozens of other modernist and avant-garde artists and writers. What made Frosterus special, besides his great style, was the timing. He was early, not only in the Finnish but also in the British context. Rick Allen, editor of *The Moving Pageant: A Literary Sourcebook on London Street-Life, 1700–1914*, included extracts from "London Rhapsody" in his book (Frosterus 1998, 209–211).

Frosterus further developed his aesthetic interpretation of the new transportation technology in his analysis of the London underground system. He admired the well-functioning hydraulic lifts, which conveyed people between street level and the underground stations. He was impressed by the wall-like doors of the lift, which opened and closed by electric means. He imagined the tunnels as "ratholes" and the trains as exciting creatures "with staring insect's eyes," and considered the vehicles "a manifestation of the most modern art". He was also fascinated by the democratic spirit of the new transportation business: one class, one ticket, and one price for everybody. He summarized:

> The new underground electric railway, like a parabola of energy …runs through London's most central parts, and is likewise, a

> work of art, monumental in its practical simplicity, splendid in its solid elegance (Frosterus 1994, 9).

Frosterus's argument was serious but also an ironic view of the Pre-Raphaelites, the major school of painting in Britain. While the Pre-Raphaelite artists loved mythology and Medieval dreams, Frosterus considered the movement escapist, anti-naturalist, and "in glaring contrast to the tempi and the 'struggle for existence' of the life in the metropolis" (Frosterus 1994, 11).

The Morphology of Technology

Frosterus was interested both in new and older technological achievements. He was an evolutionist and a morphologist who scrutinized technical changes, how new forms developed out of older ones, and how innovations reached the form balanced with their technology. That was how a technical artefact became beautiful; content and form comprised harmony. In his view, the completed form was the criterion of the beauty of the artefact, while transitional forms had lower aesthetic value.

However, as an evolutionist, Frosterus did not view the history of aesthetic forms hierarchically. Rather, he saw perfected forms as values in themselves. According to him, a Doric column did not have a lower aesthetic value than a gun barrel or an early 20th-century steam locomotive, though the column was technologically more primitive. Rather, he thought that all artefacts whose technology and form balanced, were aesthetically equivalent, whether a London Hansom cab or a Venetian gondola:

> From here up into a 'Hansom,' this too in fact a perfected poem; one's thoughts are spontaneously led to the beautiful gondolas of Venice. Glossy black surfaces without flaw or scratch, soft leather upholstery, an unrestricted view out to the sides and front – since the driver sits up on the roof above the head of the passenger – who is completely sheltered from the rain. One experiences the same sense of physical well-being when one rapidly and safely weaves one's way forward on two slender rubber wheels the height of a man through apparently impenetrable barricades of carriages as when one glides silently along the narrow, winding canals of the lagoon city (Frosterus 1994, 9).

The Technology of Architecture

For Frosterus as an architect and critic, technology was both a philosophical and a practical question. His vocation was to design rational buildings that represented the demands of the new century. That spurred to him to participate in the architectural competition for the Helsinki railway station in 1904. His entry, which he designed while working at van de Velde's studio in Weimar, was a streamlined drawing of a railway station in the rational Art Nouveau style, including locomotive-like machine-aesthetic references. However, his proposal was too radical and perhaps also too international for the jury and had no success at all. Eliel Saarinen's entry in the National Romantic style with Medieval features won the competition.

In reaction, Frosterus and his colleague Gustaf Strengell (1879–1938) wrote a manifesto entitled *Architecture: A Challenge* (*Arkitektur, en stridskrift*). They called for new technology, rationalism, internationalism, honesty, and sound realism instead of mythological and archaeological decorations in architecture. They demanded modern constructions of iron, steel, and concrete that expressed the needs of contemporary technology, citing the railway station as a particular case:

> Architectonically, station buildings play about the same role as churches did in the Middle Ages, as thermae did in Antiquity. Thus, they number among the very buildings which MUST break new ground, QUITE SIMPLY BECAUSE THE TASK EXCEEDS THE LIMITATIONS SET BY THE EXPRESSIVE POTENTIAL OF OLD STYLES (Frosterus 1983, 76).

Frosterus's and Strengell's manifesto of "iron and brain style," together with Frosterus's competition entry, had such a strong effect on Saarinen that he redesigned his project, adapting many of Frosterus's ideas. Helsinki's Central Railway Station, as we see it today, could be considered not only the masterpiece of Saarinen and his office but also of Frosterus. Further, the manifesto forced Finnish architecture to change and triggered the gradual decline of National Romanticism as the dominant current.

The Dreadnought and Futurism

Military technology was one of the foci of Frosterus's interests in the early 20th century. He wrote well-informed essays on canons, military explosives, battleships and their heavy armature, infantry firearms, torpedoes, submarines, airplanes, and zeppelins, and published the essays in his 1915 book *Modern Weapons: Their Origin and Development* (*Moderna vapen, deras uppkomst och utveckling*). The subtitle of the book may have been a homage to Edvard Westermarck, whose brand comprised the words "origin" and "development". Frosterus's essays primarily examined modern weapons from military and engineering points of view but also aesthetically and morphologically. The Deperdussin, a French airplane of the early 20th century, reminded him of "a prehistoric bird":

> The monoplane Deperdussin is exquisitely reminiscent of a living being, not to mention a heavy, squat but powerful prehistoric bird. From a torpedo-shaped trunk naturally emerge a pair of wings as well as feet with wheels; rudder tail and fins complete the lines of the body. The constructive details are plastically modelled, and unemotional, sharp angles – in exposed metal joining – have been carefully worked away. Instead of a head, the two-bladed screw propeller extends forward from the trunk; the axle is protected by a semi-spherical hood. An unequivocal expression of power and energy; still without charm and grace, yet already a tool adapted to its element (Frosterus 1915a, 192–193, trans. W. Stenger).

The French architect Le Corbusier (1887–1965) was also fascinated by the aesthetic qualities of battleships as well as airplanes or ocean liners' propellers. In illustrations of his 1924 book *Towards an Architecture* (*Vers une architecture*) and his 1925 book *The Decorative Art of Today* (*L'art décoratif d'aujourd'hui*), he showed their dynamic and functionalist forms as models for the modern design. "It is the faith acquired through experience: it is the sense of truth. Things exist because they have a reason, because they work," he declared (Le Corbusier 1924, 233; 1987, 167). However, he did not pay attention to the military capabilities and use of the weapons or to the physics and chemistry necessary to develop and produce them, as Frosterus did.

Frosterus's *Modern Weapons* of 1915 can be seen in the context of Futurism, an Avant-Garde movement that originated in Italy, though there were no references to it in the book. Two years later, in 1917, he published his book on modern painting, *The Triumph of the Rainbow Colours* (*Regnbågsfärgernas segertåg*), in which he also examined the Italian Futurist artists Giacomo Balla and Luigi Russolo as painters of speed and motion:

> ... away from both the outer sides and structure of things, some Italian futurists aim with bold hope to portray on canvas how unimaginable speeds traverse endless spaces. ... Russalo's train, rushing forward ... this version of an impression of speed presents a fuller rendering of its sensation. It provides a wide, more complex interpretation than that of a detached, momentarily held impression; a reimagination that could never be obtained on a photographic basis, an inner vision, nevertheless entirely produced through purely painterly means. ... in any case, in Russolo we catch a glimpse of unexploited possibilities (Frosterus 1917a, 169–170, trans. W. Stenger).

The culmination of Frosterus's ecstatic admiration of technology was his essay "The New Battleship" of 1907, which was an analysis of the dreadnought, the most modern war vessel of the time. The dreadnought's armature, machinery, and strategic organization relied on the newest naval military technology, and its capabilities were optimized:

> The dreadnought … represents the discarding of the final remains of romanticism from the modern machine of destruction. … The greatest possible concentration of power has constituted the bearing idea behind the dreadnought, not only with regard to armament but also in a carefully considered balance of speed and offensive and defensive capability on sufficient store of coal. And the basic idea which has hovered for generations, emerges, freed from any sentimentality, with a surprising clarity of expression, even admiration – admiration for complete work of art (Frosterus 1915b, 245–246, trans. J. Kokkonen).

The dreadnought as a work of art was Frosterus's cynical but logical judgement – in fact, an updating of the traditional issue of art. He argued that the Viking ship had unquestionably been seen for centuries as a motif of decoration and poetry. Why not the modern battleship, then? In the Finnish context, Frosterus's

essay could be considered one of the most "Futuristic" texts ever – and was published two years before Filippo Tomaso Marinetti's *Manifesto of Futurism*. Frosterus's other early essays in the ecstatic spirit of technology also radiated Futuristic enthusiasm. In his book *Philosophy of Technology* (*Tekniikan filosofia*), Ilkka Niiniluoto mentions Frosterus as well as Gustaf Strengell and Olavi Paavolainen (1903–1964) as art critics and essayists who were fascinated by modern technology and Futuristic ideas in early 20th century Finland (Niiniluoto 2021, 36).

An 1884 book by the French philosopher Jean-Marie Guyau (1854–1888), *The Problems of Contemporary Aesthetics* (*Les problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine*), seems to have been a source of inspiration for Frosterus's worship of technology. In his texts, Frosterus referred to Guyau several times in different contexts, and Strengell wrote in his 1928 article "Guyau and the Dynamic Beauty" ("Guyau och den dynamiska skönheten") about the French philosopher, van de Velde and Frosterus as proponents of dynamism. Guyau admired machines and concentration of power, which he considered beautiful. According to him, as a vitalist, life was the point of departure of art, and the pulse of modern life increased due to machines. "The machine which is most like the living being is the most beautiful," he wrote. Correspondingly he concluded that "the incompleteness of the mechanics of the machine" expressed in fact "the incompleteness of aesthetics" (Guyau 1895, 116–118, Sarje 2000, 88).

In his 1930 essay collection *The Earth Is Shrinking, the Earth Is Growing* (*Jorden krymper, jorden växer*), Frosterus continued to develop Futuristic themes by writing – albeit without the fire of youth – about global development, the Panama Canal, iron, steel, engine and steam with speed as one of his perspectives. The collection may be considered Frosterus's major work on the philosophy of technology. In the essay "The Machine" ("*Motorn*"), Frosterus argued that Cubism in art had foreseen the growing importance of speed in the modern world:

> At their best, what else did Cubist painting and sculpture provide with their expressive space mysticism besides outlined foreshadows of speed models, in which dynamic lines, pure as shooting-star trajectories, separated flat-bellied surfaces, … (Frosterus 1930, 180)

In his 1934 book *Technics and Civilization*, the American philosopher Lewis Mumford (1895–1926) juxtaposes more broadly than Frosterus abstract art such as Cubism with the technical development:

> The Cubists were perhaps the first school to overcome this association of the ugly and the mechanical: they not merely held that beauty could be produced through the machine: they even pointed to the fact that it had been produced. … They extracted from the organic environment just those elements that could be stated in abstract geometrical symbols … The aesthetic experiment occupied a place comparable to scientific experiments … Like the abstract paintings of Braque, Picasso, Léger, Kandinsky, these constructivist experiments sharpened the response to the machine as an aesthetic object. … in Brancusi's sculpture the idea of the machine is objectified and assimilated in equivalent works of art (1934, 335–337).

Atos Wirtanen (1906–1979), a left-wing journalist, politician and philosopher, drew attention to the similarities between Frosterus's and Mumford's criticism of civilization and culture (Wirtanen 1958, 13). Both were interested in aesthetic examination and criticism of technology, and their views were often quite close to each other's. Mumford was nearly 20 years younger than Frosterus. As a writer, the American was a prolific, fluent prosaist of factual texts, while Frosterus was an essayist of compact expression.

Technology of Fiction

Frosterus was also fascinated by imaginative technology, but he required that imagination be scientific and credible, rather than arbitrary. According to him, "modern fantasy" inextricably included the intellectual side of consciousness, while "prescientific fantasy" was based on a more traditional conception of the possibilities of imagination (Frosterus 1906, 32). In his opinion, in the literature of H. G. Wells (1866–1946), modern imagination achieved triumphs. Wells was one of the most significant authors for Frosterus, one whose work he followed throughout his life. Frosterus appreciated the author's scientific studies and athletic background, which were

complemented by his "self-made man" attitude and florid journalistic style.

Guyau and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), two important philosophers of the late 1800s, represented opposing points in Frosterus' literary coordinate system, between which he placed Wells. "All three stand entirely on a foundation of evolution theory; actually, they are distinguished from one another by temperament," he wrote. However, the strong sentimentality of Nietzsche and Guyau was alien to Wells (Frosterus 1906, 15 & 19).

Frosterus' first book, *H. G. Wells* from 1906, was a popular introduction to the author's oeuvre. In his view, Wells's novels of the late 1800s were based on bold biological hypotheses, as in *The War of the Worlds* (1898): "Homo sapiens has been overthrown as an animal among animals; like a rabbit, he sees hiding and running as his only salvation" (Frosterus 1906, 47). However, a sociological perspective soon began to dominate Wells's narrative. *Anticipations* (1901) and *Mankind in the Making* (1903) were sociological novels, while in *A Modern Utopia* (1905) he formulated his social programme. In terms of social technology, Wells became a source of inspiration for Frosterus and held a "central position" in his worldview (Castrén 1958, 9).

If Wells's science fiction offered opportunities to glimpse future technologies and challenges, the Danish Nobel Prize-winning writer Johannes V. Jensen (1873–1950) opened windows of imagination in his books – including his novel *Bræen* (1908) – to the technological efforts of Nordic Ice Age people, the invention – in harsh conditions – of controlled fire, the wheel, the plough, or the ship. (Frosterus 1909, 13–15) Jensen eruditely defended the view that in the emergence of key technical inventions, the hand was ahead of imagination and thought (Frosterus 1946, 86–87).

In his novel, Jensen describes how the Prometheus of the North, in the hope of fire, tirelessly gathered stones and repeatedly struck them against each other. He was convinced that fire lived inside the stone and had to be released from it. Finally, he got his hands on flintstones, which created sparks and smoke and had a strong odour. The fire caught onto the kindling, which gradually grew into a campfire when he added twigs, branches, and wood to the flames. (Jensen 1913, 101–

125; 1919, 117–145). Frosterus followed the writing of Jensen, too, throughout his life, and wrote an essay on his oeuvre (Frosterus 1946, 71–108).

In his essay "Man's Foreground and Background" ("Människans förgrund och bakgrund"), which first appeared in the magazine *Nya Argus* in 1932, Frosterus evaluated the nature and place of the human species in the universe cosmologically, from the zero point to his own time, with one of his assumptions being the "life impulse" concept from Henri Bergson's vitalist philosophy – *l'élan vital* ("*livssprånget hos Bergson*") (Frosterus 1935, 72). In Frosterus's view, the human species was entering the adult stage of its evolution, while its technological prowess and ethical awareness were out of proportion, and the probability of planetary catastrophe was increasing. In response, a premonition flickered in his mind of a logical possibility reaching further into the future than even Wells's visions, of the human species as an intermediate stage in the work of the life impulse:

> At the beginning of its journey, with eons before it, the earth-fed impulse of life cannot have expired; humankind in the current zoological form represents only a transitional phase. Toward what? (Frosterus 1935, 108).

Critique of Technology

Frosterus's interest in the technology and design of the weapons did not mean that he had militarist sympathies, rather the opposite. To convince his readers he published the article "Dreadnought Fever" ("Dreadnought-febern") in 1910 to question the extreme warmongering "as perverse romantic ecstasy". (Frosterus 1910, 125) Maybe the article was self-criticism? Anyhow it showed that Frosterus's attitude towards technology was changing critically. His view of architecture was also widening from the emphasis on new technology to historical issues, as his essay of 1914 examined the Byzantine references of Westminster Cathedral, which had recently been built in London (Frosterus 1915b, 65–81). Frosterus re-evaluated the traditional means of construction, and in his essay "Iron and Brick" ("Järnet och teglet") of 1917 argued that brick was a functional material for "the static constructions", while

iron worked best for "the moving constructions" like ships and locomotives (Frosterus 1917b, 84–85; Sarje 2000, 228). His own architectural style also changed from rational Art Nouveau towards modern classicism.

Frosterus was seriously concerned about the western technical civilization and the future of the human species. In his view, the huge progress of technology and humanity's ethical consciousness and responsibility were imbalanced, and that was a danger. Short-term utility and narrow egoism dominated the world economy and the interests of states. "A uniform, impersonal world economy strangles bigger and bigger parts of the Earth's ground," Frosterus writes in his book *The Earth Is Shrinking, the Earth Is Growing* (Frosterus 1930, 22).

In his 1934 book *Technics and Civilization*, Mumford also brought up the dual nature of technology as a source of both progress and problems and warned against an unwarranted faith in technology. In his view, "the machine is no longer the paragon of progress and the final expression of our desires." On the contrary, it can also be a violent threat, a tool of lust for power and an accelerant of our fears. Modern technology had given rise to immense forces controlled by those who in Mumford's view had questionable morals. Machines had been subjugated to serve the capitalist entrepreneur, and this, too, would undermine faith in technology. He felt that he was living through a phase in which capitalism and technology would diverge, and that a change was underway in Western countries in which "the organic has begun to dominate the machine" (Mumford 1934, 365–367). He failed, at least in his timing.

Frosterus's way of questioning the culture of the machine, the exploitation of natural resources, the disappearance of original peoples and species had similarities with Oswald Spengler's views in his book *The Decline of the West* (*Der Untergang des Abendlandes*), published in 1918–1922. Frosterus was influenced by the book, as seen in his rhetoric and a few comments (Frosterus 1935, 61 & 65). However, he had independently formed his critical view of technology. On the other hand, Mumford's criticism of technology often relied on Spengler, who had a considerable influence on his views.

Spengler's cultural critique – like that of Frosterus and Mumford – drew on the romantic streams of the Western

heritage, in their historicity, pluralism, metaphor of the organic and sense of uniqueness. So did the philosophers of the Frankfurt school in their dialectic of Enlightenment, and the Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright in his critique of science and technology. I have on other occasions recently examined the roles of Frosterus and Strengell as sources of von Wright's philosophy of culture, and therefore will not delve any deeper into that question in this paper (Sarje 2017, 403–419; 2021, 2–20).

As a critic of technology, Frosterus is still timely. In his book *Modern Weapons* from 1915, he speculated, inspired by Frederick Soddy's scientific achievements and H. G. Wells's novel *The World Set Free* from 1914, on the possibility of "the radioactive bomb," which he considered a nightmare of the future. (Frosterus 1915a, 63–64). In the novel, which Wells dedicated to Soddy's book *Interpretation of Radium* from 1909, he imagined the world during an atomic war and its desperate consequences, how metropolises from Paris to Chicago and from Berlin to Tokyo were on fire, polluted by radiation and becoming unliveable:

> With in these areas perished museums, cathedrals, palaces, libraries, galleries of masterpieces and a vast accumulation of human achievements, whose charred remains lie buried, a legacy of curious material that only future generations may hope to examine. (Wells 1914, 208; Rhodes 1988, 42–45).

Twenty years after *Modern Weapons*, in his book *The Janus Face of the Steel Age* (*Stålålderns janusansikte*), Frosterus dreamed of the enormous peaceful possibilities that nuclear energy – "mechanically manageable nuclear fission" – could offer humanity, without forgetting to warn of the risk that "the conquering species among globe's life-forms will rise against itself; a drive not felt even by predators" (Frosterus 1935, 146 & 144). In Wirtanen's view, Frosterus saw the fate of Western civilization more acutely than Spengler: "His prophecy about the danger of the annihilation of human race – referred to in the 1930s and clearly formulated in 1935 – must be considered one of the most remarkable intellectual presentations in the decades between the world wars" (Wirtanen 1960, 94).

After the tragedies of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Frosterus wrote in his 1946 book *Nordic in Major and Minor* (*Nordisk i dur*

och moll) that the human species was close to self-destruction. As a vitalist, however, he believed that the life would go on – but perhaps without humans (Frosterus 1946, 169).

University of Helsinki

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The Legacy of Leibniz's Intensional Logic

JARI PALOMÄKI

Die großen Denker studiert man nicht allein aus historischem Interesse, nicht nur, um ihre Gedanken wieder zu denken, sondern um sie weiter zu denken. Dies trifft auf eine besondere Weise für die Denkarbeit von Leibniz zu.

Raili Kauppi (1920–1995)

1. Leibniz

Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716) had a program of a universal science, *scientia universalis*, for coordinating all human knowledge as a framework within which each of the sciences would stand in relation to the other sciences. This program comprised two parts: Firstly, a universal character or notation, *characteristica universalis*, by use of which every item of information can be recorded in a simple and systematical way, and secondly, a formalized method or calculus for reasoning, *calculus ratiocinator,* by which the knowledge recorded in a computational way will reveal the logical consequences of any item and its relations with other items. This conception of a *calculus ratiocinator* led Leibniz to develop a mathematically inspired system for reasoning in a way that makes him the founder of modern symbolic logic.

Leibniz's other fascination was the oneness of all things by virtue of the universality of reason, which led him to an interest in ecumenism, *i.e.*, a religion derived from reason and hence accessible to all, Christians, and non-Christians alike. Especially, Leibniz worked on a theological system to bridge the gaps between Protestants and Catholics both for spiritual and political reasons. (See, e.g., Antognazza, 2009, 90-92, 233-247).

2. Saarnio

These two projects by Leibniz were reasons behind Uuno Saarnio (1896–1977) entering university to study philosophy and mathematics at the newly founded University of Turku in 1921. Eino Kaila (1890–1958) was the first professor of philosophy and Kalle Väisälä (1893–1968) a professor of mathematics. Saarnio was interested in theosophy, and thus knew Leibniz being an ecumenist. He also had talents for mathematics and logic and studied, e.g., Whitehead & Russell's *Principia Mathematica*. Accordingly, Saarnio's master's thesis was on Leibniz, written in Finnish, in 1926: *The Significance of Leibniz's Mathematical Innovations in his Philosophy* (unpublished).[1] In this thesis Saarnio sees Leibniz as a forefather of modern mathematical logic as well as logical empiricism, where Leibniz's *scientia generalis* is seen as a kind of "Einheitswissenschaft" in the sense of Moritz Schlick (1882–1936), to whom Saarnio in his thesis refers to.

In 1930, when Kaila was elected as the professor of theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki, Saarnio began to develop a word-theory in Leibnizian spirit, *characteristica universalis*, with linguist Aarni Penttilä (1899–1971), who had also studied philosophy, under Kaila. Saarnio and Penttilä were able to publish an article on this topic in *Erkenntnis* in 1934: "Einige grundlegende Tatsachen der Worttheorie nebst Bemerkungen über die sogenannten Unvollständige Symbole". In the following year, Saarnio published his doctoral thesis *Untersuchungen zur symbolischen Logik I*: *Kritik des Nominalismus und Grundlegung der logistischen Zeihentheorie (Symbologie)*, which was the first volume of the *Acta Philosophica Fennica,* published by the Philosophical Society of Finland. By following Kaila's advice not to include the treatment of Grelling's paradox in his thesis, Saarnio started to have an extensive correspondence on it with Kurt Grelling (1886–1942).[2]

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[1] *Leibniz'in matemaattisten keksintöjen merkityksestä hänen filosofiassaan* (1926, julkaisematon).

[2] Kurt Grelling was a member of the group which Hans Reichenbach (1891–1953) organized on scientific philosophy in Berlin that developed out of the Society for Empirical Philosophy, *Die Gesellschaft für empirische Philosophie*, which was founded on 27. February 1927 by Josef Petzoldt (1862–1929) and became known as the Berlin Group. Its core members were Kurt Grelling

In their word-theory Penttilä and Saarnio distinguished between three kinds of words: spoken, written, and thought. They called the minimal semantic units of them *phoneme*, *grapheme*, and *psycheme*, respectively. The word-theory is founded on Russell's type theory including two non-logical binary relations: a *set-membership*-relation, *i.e.*, ∈-relation, and a *signification*-relation, *i.e.*, *S*-relation. Words are the concatenations of graphemes, phonemes, or psychemes, which are physical items. Only they belong to the domain of *S*-relation, and they are called *words of type 0*, and are denoted as: *word t0*. A class of *words t0*, in turn, forms an extension of the concept 'word', *i.e.*, {*word t0*} = *word 1t*, where the word *word 1t* on the right side of the formula is a non-physical *concept 'word'*.

Next, two meanings of the word "word" are distinguished. Accordingly, we make a distinction between a "word" and a word, in which with the word "word" we mean – in this case – that physical sign of the word itself, whereas the word word signifies (*significatio*), depending on context, either a particular word (*copulatio*) or a class of words (*suppositio*). The difference between "word" and word can be now denoted type-theoretically as follows: *word 0t* = "word" and *word t0* = word. Following that kind of construction by means of an ∈-relation, and an *S*-relation, we can present the words "word" as *word 0t*, *word 1t*, *word 2t*, etc., the extension of concepts 'word', in turn, as {*word t0*}, {*word t1*}, {*word t2*}, etc., the concepts 'word': *word t0*, *word t1*, *word t2*, etc. Moreover, A *language* is an ordered sequence of words of type *0* with a syntax, that is, a *language* $=_{df}$ $[word]_s$, where a *particular language* is a subclass of language, e.g., *Latin* = $[Verbum]_{s1}$; *English* = $[word]_{s2}$; *Polish* = $[słowo]_{s3}$;

(1886–1942), Walter Dubislav (1895–1937), and Carl Gustav Hempel (1905–1997). After Uuno Saarnio got married with Charlotte "Carola" Hollberg (1897–1972) from Berlin in 1923, they made several trips to Berlin (1926, 1928, 1930, 1932, 1934, 1935, 1937) to visit, e.g., Charlotte's sister Elisabeth Lemke in Berlin. Thus, attending the group's meetings, he could be personally acquainted with several members of the Berlin Group, especially with Hans Reichenbach, Kurt Grelling, and collaborators Walter Dubislav, and Carl Hempel, but also Paul Hertz (1881–1940), Richard von Mises (1883–1953), Heinrich Scholz (1884–1956), Jørgen Jørgensen (1894–1969), Karl Dürr (1888–1970), Paul Oppenheim (1885–1977), Charles W. Morris (1901–1979) and others.

Finnish = $[sana]_{s4}$; *German* = $[Wort]_{s5}$; etc. (see Penttilä & Saarnio 1934, Saarnio 1935).

In 1944 Saarnio published a paper, "Über den Begriff des Intensionalen in der Logik," in which he studied the possibility of an intensional logic as proposed by Leibniz, comparing it with an extensional logic. In the works on logic it has been customary to distinguish between extension and intension, and also to dispute whether logic should be mainly concerned with intensions or extensions. In his *La Logique de Leibniz,* Louis Couturat (1868–1914), who stressed the fundamental importance of logic for Leibniz's philosophy, wrote that logic could only be built up from the standpoint of extension (Couturat 1901, 387), and that Leibniz, instead of trying to work on intensional logic, should have preferred to work on logic from the extensional point of view (*ibid*., 24). Further doubts about the possibility of developing of intensional logic were raised by C. I. Lewis (1883–1964): "Whoever studies Leibniz, Lambert and Castillon cannot fail to be convinced that a consistent calculus of concepts in intension is either immensely difficult or, as Couturat has said, impossible" (Lewis 1918, 14).[3]

3. Kauppi

In 1938 Raili Kauppi (1920–1995) enrolled at the University of Helsinki to study general history but soon changed to philosophy and mathematics, especially to follow Eino Kaila's lectures. In 1942 she attended the philosophy club organized at the Helsinki Public Library, where Saarnio was a director. Kauppi wrote her master's thesis on the concept of history in 1947, and then turned to intensional logic, completing her licentiate's thesis *Über die Grundbegriffe der Inhaltslogik* in 1957.

[3] There are several reasons to separate an intensional logic from an extensional logic. For instance: i) intensions determine extensions, but not conversely; ii) whether a thing belongs to a set is decided primarily by intension; iii) a concept can be used meaningfully even when there is not yet, nor ever will be, any individuals belonging to the extension of the concept in question; iv) there can be many non-identical but co-extensional concepts; v) the extension of a concept may vary according to context; and vi) it follows from Gödel's two incompleteness theorems that intensions cannot be wholly eliminated from the extensional set theory (Palomäki 1994, Palomäki & Kangassalo 2012).

However, at that time Saarnio showed her the aforementioned passage in Couturat's book, according to whom Leibniz should not have tried to develop an intensional logic, which was impossible. Kauppi thought that this could not be true, and so she began to study Leibniz's original manuscripts both in Hannover as well as in Leibniz-Forschungsstelle at the University of Münster.

As a result, Kauppi defended her dissertation *Über die Leibnizsche Logic mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Problems der Intension und der Extension* in 1960 and became the first female in Finland to doctorate in philosophy. The main outcome in her thesis was that Leibniz worked out a variety of both intensional and extensional treatments of the logic of predicates, i.e., concepts, but preferring the intensional approach (Kauppi 1960, 220, 251, 252). Furthermore, she also wanted to show in a preliminary way that it was possible to further develop an intensional logic outlined by Leibniz. Subsequently, Kauppi published her intensional concept theory in the book *Einführung in die Theorie der Begriffssysteme* in 1967. In 1969 she was appointed to a permanent position as a professor of philosophy at the University of Tampere, being the first female professor in philosophy in the Nordic countries.[4] Although Raili Kauppi retired as an *emerita* in 1985, she was still actively taking part in philosophical life in Finland, especially in Tampere. In this context, it is appropriate to gain some understanding of Kauppi's work on logic, so in the next section I will present her basic intensional concept theory and, briefly, its background.

4. Kauppi's Intensional Concept Theory

A famous logic text, the *Port Royal Logic*, composed by two leaders of the Port Royal movement Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694) and Pierre Nicole (1625–1695) in 1662, made a distinction

[4] Raili Kauppi was one among those who was interviewed for a series of ten outstanding female researchers to celebrate the 350th Anniversary of the University of Helsinki in 1990. In that interview, Kauppi emphasized that she does not see any essential difference in the thinking of men and women and remarked that she and Leibniz have had a similar problem with an intensional negation (*Naisia tutkijoina*, Raili Kauppi. Työryhmä M. Engman, A. Korppi-Tommola et al., VHS Video Cassette, 18 min, DiArt Oy, 1991).

between the comprehension, *comprehension*, and the extension, *étendue* or *extension*, of an idea. The comprehension of an idea consists of "the attributes which it includes in itself, and which cannot be taken away from it without destroying it." The extension of an idea consists of "the subjects with which that idea agrees," or which contain it. Both the comprehensions of ideas and the extensions of ideas are used in the *Port Royal Logic* in justifying the basic rules of traditional logic (Adams 1994, 58). Leibniz, in turn, distinguished these two types in terms of ideas, *secundum ideas* or *per ideas*, on one hand, and in terms of instances, *secundum individua* or *per exempla subjecta*, or individuals belonging to the terms, *per individuis terminorum*, on the other hand (*ibid*., 59). Nowadays this distinction is usually made in terms of "the intension of a concept" and "the extension of a concept."

In the *Port Royal Logic* "the extension of an idea" constituted both the species and the individuals that fall under it, whereas in Leibniz the extensional treatment is almost always in terms of individuals that fall under the idea (Kauppi 1960, 43). Nowadays "the extension of a concept" is taken to be a class (or a set) of all those individuals which fall under it. However, nowadays there are at least two different ways to interpret "the comprehension of an idea", i.e., either as "the intension of a concept" or as "the conceptual content of a concept", which, however, are to be distinguished (see Palomäki 1997).

4.1. Items Connected to a Concept

Firstly, there are some basic items connected to a concept, and one possible way to locate them is as follows: A *term* is a linguistic entity. It *denotes* things and *connotes* a concept. A concept, in turn, has an *extension* and an *intension*. The extension of a concept is a *set* (or a *class*, being more exact) of all those things that *fall under* the concept; see Diagram 1 (Palomäki 1994, 81, 82). Now, there may be many different terms which denote the same things but connote different concepts. That is, these different concepts have the same extension, but they differ in their intension, and thus being different but co-

extensional concepts.[5] By an intension of a concept we mean something which we must "understand" or "grasp" in order to use the concept in question correctly. Hence, we may say that the intension of concept is that information content of it which is required to recognize a thing belonging to the extension of the concept in question (cf. Kangassalo 1992/93, Palomäki 1994).



Diagram 1

Let $U = < V, C, F >$ be a universe of discourse, where i) V is a universe of (possible) individuals, ii) C is a universe of concepts, iii) $V \bigcap C \neq \{\ \}$, and iv) $F \subseteq V \times C$ is the "falls under" -relation. Now, if a is a concept, then for every (possible) individual i in V, either i falls under the concept a or it doesn't, *i.e.*,

(1) if $a \in C$, then $\forall i \in V$: $iFa \vee \sim iFa$.

The extension-relation E between the set A and the concept a in V is defined as follows:

(2) $E_U(A,a) =_{df} (\forall i)\ (i \in A \leftrightarrow i \in V \wedge iFa)$.

The extension of concept a may also be described as follows:

(3) $i \in E_U'(a) \leftrightarrow iFa$,

where $E_U'(a)$ is the extension of concept a in V, *i.e.*, $E_U(a) = \{i \in V \mid iFa\}$.

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[5] For example, the concepts of 'human', 'rational animal', and 'featherless bipeds with flat nails' are non-identical but co-extensional concepts, the extension of which consists of a set of human beings.

4.2 An Intensional Containment Relation

The relations between concepts enable us to make conceptual structures. The basic relation between concepts is an intensional containment-relation, and it is this intensional containment relation between concepts that we are calling the Is-IN -relation.[6] More formally, let there be given two concepts a and b. When a concept a contains intensionally a concept b, we may say that the intension of the concept a contains the intension of the concept b, or that the concept a intensionally entails the concept b, or that the intension of the concept a entails the intension of the concept b. This intensional containment-relation is denoted as follows,

(4) $a \geq b$.

It was subsequently observed by Kauppi in (1967) that

(5) $a \geq b \rightarrow (\forall i)\ (iFa \rightarrow iFb)$,

that is, that the transition from intensions to extensions reverses the containment relation, *i.e.*, the intensional containment-relation between concepts a and b is converse to the extensional set-theoretical subset-relation between the sets of their extension. Thus, by (3),

(6) $a \geq b \rightarrow E_U'(a) \subseteq E_U'(b)$,

where "$\subseteq$" is the set-theoretical subset-relation, or the extensional inclusion relation between sets. Or, if we put $A = E_U'(a)$ and $B = E_U'(b)$, we will get,

(7) $a \geq b \rightarrow A \subseteq B$.

For example, if the concept of a dog contains intensionally the concept of a quadruped, then the extension of the concept of a quadruped, *i.e.*, the set of four-footed animals like elephants, contains extensionally as a subset the extension of the concept

[6] It is important to notice that the Is-IN -relation is to be clearly distinguished from the Is-A -relation, which is usually applied, e.g., in computer science. For instance, in a sentence: "Socrates is a human", the relation between "Socrates" and "human" is an Is-A -relation, whereas in a sentence: "humanity is in Socrates", the relation between "Socrates" and "humanity" is Is-In-relation, (cf. Palomäki & Kangassalo 2012).

of a dog, *i.e.*, the set of dogs; see Diagram 2. Observe, though, that we can deduct from concepts to their extensions, *i.e.*, sets, but not conversely, because for every set there may be many different concepts whose extension that set is.



Diagram 2

4.3 An Intensional Concept Theory KC

Based on the intensional containment relation between concepts, Raili Kauppi presented her axiomatic intensional concept theory in Kauppi (1967), which is further studied in (Palomäki 1994). This axiomatic concept theory was inspired by Leibniz's logic, where the intensional containment relation between concepts formalises an "*inesse*"-relation[7] in Leibniz's logic.[8]

An intensional concept theory, denoted by *KC*, is presented in a first-order language *L* that contains individual variables *a*, *b*, *c*,..., which range over the *concepts*, and one non-logical 2-place *intensional containment relation*, denoted by "≥". I will first

[7] Literally, "*inesse*" is "being-in", and this term was used by Scholastic translators of Aristotle to render the Greek "huparchei", i.e., "belongs to" (Leibniz 1997, 18, 243).

[8] In a letter to Arnauld on 14 July 1786, Leibniz wrote: "[I]n every affirmative true proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or singular, the notion of the predicate is contained in some way in that of the subject, *praedicatum inest subjecto* [the predicate is included in the subject]. Or else I do not know what truth is" (*ibid.*, 62).

present four basic relations between concepts defined by "≥", and then, briefly, the basic axioms of the theory.[9]

Two concepts *a* and *b* are said to be *comparable*, denoted by $a \mathrm{H} b$, if there exists a concept *x* which is intensionally contained in both.

$\mathrm{Df_H}$ $\quad a \mathrm{H} b =_{\mathrm{df}} (\exists x)\,(a \geq x \wedge b \geq x).$

If two concepts *a* and *b* are not comparable, they are *incomparable*, which is denoted by $a \mathrm{I} b$.

$\mathrm{Df_I}$ $\quad a \mathrm{I} b =_{\mathrm{df}} \sim a \mathrm{H} b.$

Dually, two concepts *a* and *b* are said to be *compatible*, denoted by $a \perp b$, if there exists a concept *x* which contains intensionally both.

$\mathrm{Df_\perp}$ $\quad a \perp b =_{\mathrm{df}} (\exists x)\,(x \geq a \wedge x \geq b).$

If two concepts *a* and *b* are not compatible, they are *incompatible*, which is denoted by $a \mathrm{Y} b$.

$\mathrm{Df_Y}$ $\quad a \mathrm{Y} b =_{\mathrm{df}} \sim a \perp b.$

The two first axioms of *KC* state that the intensional containment relation is a *reflexive* and *transitive* relation.

$\mathrm{Ax_{Refl}}$ $\quad a \geq a.$

$\mathrm{Ax_{Trans}}$ $\quad a \geq b \wedge b \geq c \rightarrow a \geq c.$

Two concepts *a* and *b* are said to be *intensionally identical*, denoted by $a \approx b$, if the concept *a* intensionally contains the concept *b*, and the concept *b* intensionally contains the concept *a*.

$\mathrm{Df_\approx}$ $\quad a \approx b =_{\mathrm{df}} a \geq b \wedge b \geq a.$

The intensional identity is clearly a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation, hence an equivalence relation.

A concept *c* is called an *intensional product* of two concepts *a* and *b*, if any concept *x* is intensionally contained in *c* if and only if it is intensionally contained in both *a* and *b*. If two concepts *a* and *b* have an intensional product, it is unique up to the intensional identity and we denote it then by $a \otimes b$.

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[9] For more complete presentations of the theory, see Kauppi (1967) and Palomäki (1994).

$\mathrm{Df}_{\otimes}$ $\quad c \approx a \otimes b \ =_{\mathrm{df}} \ (\forall x)\,(c \geq x \leftrightarrow a \geq x \wedge b \geq x).$

The following axiom $\mathrm{Ax}_{\otimes}$ of *KC* states that if two concepts a and b are comparable, there exists a concept x which is their intensional product.

$\mathrm{Ax}_{\otimes}$ $\quad a \mathrm{H}\, b \rightarrow (\exists x)\,(x \approx a \otimes b).$

It is easy to show that the intensional product is idempotent, commutative, and associative.

A concept c is called an *intensional sum* of two concepts a and b, if the concept c is intensionally contained in any concept x if and only if it contains intensionally both a and b. If two concepts a and b have an intensional sum, it is unique up to the intensional identity, and we denote it then by $a \oplus b$.

$\mathrm{Df}_{\oplus}$ $\quad c \approx a \oplus b \ =_{\mathrm{df}} \ (\forall x)\,(x \geq c \leftrightarrow x \geq a \wedge x \geq b).$

The following axiom $\mathrm{Ax}_{\oplus}$ of *KC* states that if two concepts a and b are compatible, there exists a concept x which is their intensional sum.

$\mathrm{Ax}_{\oplus}$ $\quad a \perp b \rightarrow (\exists x)\,(x \approx a \oplus b).$

The intensional sum is idempotent, commutative, and associative.

The intensional product of two concepts a and b is intensionally contained in their intensional sum whenever both sides are defined.

Th 1 $\quad a \oplus b \geq a \otimes b.$

Proof: If $a \otimes b$ exists, then by $\mathrm{Df}_{\otimes}$, $a \geq a \otimes b$ and $b \geq a \otimes b$. Similarly, if $a \oplus b$ exists, then by $\mathrm{Df}_{\oplus}$, $a \oplus b \geq a$ and $a \oplus b \geq b$. Hence, by $\mathrm{Ax}_{\mathrm{Trans}}$, the theorem follows.

A concept b is an *intensional negation* of a concept a, denoted by $\neg a$, if and only if it is intensionally contained in all those concepts x, which are intensionally incompatible with the concept a. When $\neg a$ exists, it is unique up to the intensional identity.

$\mathrm{Df}_{\neg}$ $\quad b \approx \neg a \ =_{\mathrm{df}} \ (\forall x)\,(x \geq b \leftrightarrow x \ \mathrm{Y}\ a).$

The following axiom $\mathrm{Ax}_{\neg}$ of *KC* states that if there is a concept x which is incompatible with the concept a, there exists a concept y, which is the intensional negation of the concept a.

Ax$_{\neg}$ $(\exists x)\ (x\ \mathrm{Y}\ a) \rightarrow (\exists y)\ (y \approx \neg a)$.

It can be proved that a concept a contains intensionally its intensional double negation if it exists.

Th 2 $a \geq \neg\neg a$.

Proof: By Df$_{\neg}$ the equivalence (1): $b \geq \neg a \leftrightarrow b\ \mathrm{Y}\ a$ holds. By substituting $\neg a$ for b to (1), we get $\neg a \geq \neg a \leftrightarrow \neg a\ \mathrm{Y}\ a$, and so, by Ax$_{\mathrm{Refl}}$, we get (2): $\neg a\ \mathrm{Y}\ a$. Then, by substituting a for b and $\neg a$ for a to (1), we get $a \geq \neg\neg a \leftrightarrow a\ \mathrm{Y}\ \neg a$ and hence, by (2), the theorem follows.

Also, the following forms of the *De Morgan's formulas* can be proved whenever both sides are defined:

Th 3 i) $\neg a \otimes \neg b \geq \neg(a \oplus b)$,

ii) $\neg(a \otimes b) \approx \neg a \oplus \neg b$.

Proof: First we are to prove the following important lemma:

Lemma 1: $a \geq b \rightarrow \neg b \geq \neg a$.

Proof: From $a \geq b$ follows $(\forall x)\ (x\ \mathrm{Y}\ b \rightarrow x\ \mathrm{Y}\ a)$, and thus by Df$_{\neg}$ the Lemma 1 follows.

i) If $a \oplus b$ exists, then by Df$_{\oplus}$, $a \oplus b \geq a$ and $a \oplus b \geq b$. By Lemma 1 we get $\neg a \geq \neg(a \oplus b)$ and $\neg b \geq \neg(a \oplus b)$. Then, by Df$_{\otimes}$, Th 3 i) follows.

ii) This is proved in four steps as follows:

1. $\neg(a \otimes b) \geq \neg a \oplus \neg b$.

Since $a \geq a \otimes b$, it follows by Lemma 1 that $\neg(a \otimes b) \geq \neg a$. Thus, by Df$_{\oplus}$, 1 holds.

2. $\neg(\neg\neg a \otimes \neg\neg b) \geq \neg(a \otimes b)$.

Since $a \geq \neg\neg a$, by Th 2, it follows by Df$_{\otimes}$ that $a \otimes b \geq \neg\neg a \otimes \neg\neg b$. Thus, by Lemma 1, 2 holds.

3. $(\neg\neg a \otimes \neg\neg b) \geq \neg(\neg a \oplus \neg b)$.

Since $(a \oplus b) \geq a$, it follows by Lemma 1 that $\neg a \geq \neg(a \oplus b)$, and so, by Df$_{\otimes}$, it follows that $(\neg a \otimes \neg b) \geq \neg(a \oplus b)$. Thus, by substituting $\neg a$ for a and $\neg b$ for b to it, 3 holds.

4. $\neg a \oplus \neg b \geq \neg(a \otimes b)$.

Since $\neg a \oplus \neg b \geq \neg\neg(\neg a \oplus \neg b)$, by Th 2, and from 3 it follows by Lemma 1 that $\neg\neg(\neg a \oplus \neg b) \geq \neg(\neg\neg a \otimes \neg\neg b)$, and by $\mathrm{Ax}_{\mathrm{Trans}}$ we get, $\neg a \oplus \neg b \geq \neg(\neg\neg a \otimes \neg\neg b)$. Thus, by 2 and by $\mathrm{Ax}_{\mathrm{Trans}}$, 4 holds.

From 1 and 4, by $\mathrm{Df}_{\approx}$, the Th 3 ii) follows.

If a concept a is intensionally contained in every concept x, the concept a is called a *general concept,* and it is denoted by G. The general concept is unique up to the intensional identity, and it is defined as follows:

$\mathrm{Df}_G \qquad a \approx G =_{\mathrm{df}} (\forall x)\,(x \geq a)$.

The next axiom of *KC* states that there is a concept which is intensionally contained in every concept.

$\mathrm{Ax}_G \qquad (\exists x)(\forall y)\,(y \geq x)$.

When the axiom of the general concept is adopted, it follows that all concepts are to be comparable. Since the general concept is compatible with every concept, it has no intensional negation.

A *special concept* is a concept a, which is not intensionally contained in any other concept except for concepts intensionally identical to itself. Thus, there can be many special concepts.

$\mathrm{Df}_S \qquad S(a) =_{\mathrm{df}} (\forall x)\,(x \geq a \rightarrow a \geq x)$.

The last axiom of *KC* states that for any concept y there is a special concept x in which it is intensionally contained.

$\mathrm{Ax}_S \qquad (\forall y)(\exists x)\,(S(x) \wedge x \geq y)$.

Since the special concept s is either compatible or incompatible with every concept, the *law of excluded middle* holds for s so that for any concept x, which has an intensional negation, either the concept x or its intensional negation $\neg x$ is intensionally contained in it. Hence, we have

Th 4 $\qquad (\forall x)\,(S(s) \rightarrow (s \geq x \vee s \geq \neg x))$.

A special concept, which corresponds to Leibniz's complete concept of an individual, *notio completa seu perfecta substantiae singularis*, would contain one member of every pair of mutually incompatible concepts.

5. A Model of *KC* – and the Work in Progress

It was 1990 when I planned to write my doctoral thesis on Bertrand Russell's (1872–1970) concept of proposition, advised by Veikko Rantala. However, I also met professor of computer sciences, Hannu Kangassalo, who had applied Kauppi's intensional concept theory to database designing (see Kangassalo 1992/93). He introduced me to Raili Kauppi, who, in turn, gave me her book *Einführung in die Theorie der Begriffssysteme* (1967), remarking that an intensional relational theory was still a work in progress. Thus, I changed my topic from the concept of proposition to the concept of concept. I defended my thesis *From Concepts to Concept Theory: Discoveries, Connections, and Results* in 1994, trying, among other things, to find an algebraic model for Kauppi's basic intensional concept theory, *KC*. This attempt may be summarized as follows.

From the completeness theorem it is known that every consistent first-order theory has a model. Accordingly, in (Palomäki, 1994, 94-97), a model of *KC* + $\mathrm{Ax}_{\neg\neg}$ is found to be a *complete semilattice*, where every concept $a \in C$ defines a *Boolean algebra* $B_a = \langle{\downarrow}a, \otimes, \oplus, \neg, G, a\rangle$, where ${\downarrow}a$ is an ideal, known as the *principal ideal generated by* a, *i.e.*, ${\downarrow}a =_{\mathrm{df}} \{x \in C \mid a \geq x\}$, and the intensional negation of a concept $b \in {\downarrow}a$ is interpreted as a *relative complement of* a.

Let us have two concepts, 'man' and 'woman', as an example of a conceptual structure based on the intensional concept theory *KC*. The common concept which contains intensionally both the concepts of 'man' and of 'woman', and so is their intensional conceptual product, is the concept of 'human'. The concept of 'human' contains intensionally the concept of 'animal', which, in turn, contains intensionally the general concept '*G*'. Then, the concept in which both the concepts of 'man' and of 'woman' are intensionally contained is the concept of 'androgyne', which in this conceptual system is a special concept containing intensionally all these concepts. For a visual presentation of this conceptual structure, see the Diagram 3. Note that

no intensional negation of any concept appears in this example.[10]



Diagram 3

Since then, I have tried to further develop an intensional concept theory in the spirit of Leibniz, Saarnio and Kauppi, e.g., in Palomäki (1994, 2004, 2012, 2014) – and the work is still in progress. Great thinkers are always posthumously productive.

Tampere University

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to Artur Koterski for several relevant comments in this paper.

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[10] That is a very difficult problem indeed, a problem that also troubled both Leibniz and Kauppi, and which is studied more thoroughly in Palomäki (2012).

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Simo Knuuttila

Simo Knuuttila and the Academy of Finland's Centres of Excellence 2002–2013

RISTO SAARINEN

Simo Knuuttila (1946–2022) served as professor of theological ethics and philosophy of religion at the University of Helsinki from 1981 to 2014. During his long tenure, Knuuttila was very active in scientific output and various positions of trust. Knuuttila's life work has already been discussed in English by José Filipe da Silva[1] and in Finnish by Timo Koistinen, Virpi Mäkinen and Sami Pihlström in *Teologinen Aikakauskirja*, Miira Tuominen in *Niin&näin* and Ilkka Niiniluoto in the *Yearbook of the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters*.[2]

In this article, I describe two centres of excellence (CoE) of the Academy of Finland led by Simo Knuuttila, namely, History of Mind (2002–2007) and Philosophical Psychology, Morality and Politics (2008–2013). My focus is not on the leader's personality but on the description of teamwork and the research process and methods. When humanistic research occurs more and more as group work nowadays, the historian needs to describe the group dynamics afterwards. In particular, the early stages of young researchers' careers and networks can be presented in detail with the help of the Academy of Finland's project documents.

I served as a team leader in both CoEs and remain the only surviving team leader of the History of Mind project at the time of writing (2023). I also served as the secretary of the advisory board meetings of these projects for twelve years, which is why I have plenty of documentation reported to the

[1] Silva 2022.

[2] Koistinen, Mäkinen & Pihlström 2022; Niiniluoto 2023.

Academy from both CoEs. This documentation serves as the source material for the following review.[3]

The work of the CoEs is only part of Simo Knuuttila's numerous research projects. He served as an academy professor at the Academy of Finland from 1994 to 2009 and led research groups funded in various ways for almost his entire career. Knuuttila supervised dissertations on the most diverse topics in philosophy and theology. The multidimensionality of his supervision can be seen in the chronicle of Finnish philosophical dissertation projects edited by Markku Roinila.[4]

History of Mind

In the 21st century, the Academy's centres of excellence have been critical for promoting outstanding basic research in Finland. The grant has typically funded 6–10 researchers for six years. The university unit that receives the funding makes its premises available and greatly facilitates the teams' practical management and operation.

From 2000 to 2001, the Academy of Finland organised a two-phase call for new Centres of excellence. For the first round, Simo Knuuttila submitted an application for the "History of Mind" project, with the longer subtitle "Cognition, Self-Consciousness and the Passions of the Soul: Philosophy of Mind from Plato to Descartes". The project would include three teams. The team on ancient philosophy would be led by Juha Sihvola, professor of history at the University of Jyväskylä, the medieval team by Risto Saarinen, and the early modern period team by Lilli Alanen, professor of philosophy at Uppsala University. In addition, history docent Heikki Mikkeli is mentioned as a member of the project's scientific board.[5] Juha Sihvola (1957-2012) was trained in both ancient history and philosophy. He was active in Knuuttila's Aristotle translation project. Lilli Alanen (1941–2021) was a widely known Descartes specialist.

Simo Knuuttila submitted a more extensive application dated February 7, 2001, for the second application round. Its

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[3] In 2023, the English name of the Academy of Finland was changed into the Research Council of Finland.

[4] Roinila 2010.

[5] Plan of Intent 29.9. 2000. Email 15.1. 2001.

title and research teams are otherwise similar to the first round, but the subtitle continues the history of mind to Immanuel Kant. In summary, the project's goals are defined as follows:

> 1. The first comprehensive accounts of the traditions of intuitive knowledge, the psychology of reasoning, and cognitive normality. 2. The first comprehensive account of the varieties of conceptions regarding self-consciousness. 3. A new analysis of the philosophical impact of medieval Aristotelianism, fourteenth-century voluntarism and the humanist interest in ancient texts on early modern conceptions of actions and passions. 4. The first detailed analysis of philosophical discussions pertaining to various forms of mental disturbances and madness. 5. The first sourcebook on the philosophy of mind in history (basic texts in Greek, Arabic, and Latin with translations and commentaries in English).[6]

The members of the research teams are also already named in the application. Sihvola's team comprises Pauliina Remes, Miira Tuominen, and Taneli Kukkonen. Saarinen's team includes Taina Holopainen, Toivo Holopainen, Vesa Hirvonen, Pekka Kärkkäinen, and Severin Kitanov. Lilli Alanen's team members are Tuomo Aho, Timo Kaitaro, Mikko Yrjönsuuri, Timo Joutsivuo, Martina Reuter, and Heikki Mikkeli.[7]

The university promises to participate in the project with a share that covers the professors' salary costs and 50% of their working time.[8] While the promise is unrealistic, the year's working hours were not yet quantitatively calculated in 2001. More important than the percentages is the principle that the CoE is not only a means of financing young researchers but a joint undertaking that commits its own management to active, continuous work. This principle was followed in both centres of excellence.

The research plan does not aim to present a unified philosophical vision "from Plato to Kant". The plan could nevertheless be characterised as programmatic in terms of its method, in the sense that the research carried out in the unit is

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[6] Application 7.2. 2001, §40.
[7] Application 7.2. 2001, Appendix I, 3 (research plan).
[8] Application 7.2. 2001. Report 28.4. 2004, 4.

genuinely philosophical and historically sensitive. According to the summary, the project "is based on the view that the history of philosophy is both a problem-oriented part of systematic philosophy and a rather independent branch of philosophy that requires special expertise."[9]

The collaboration networks mentioned in the application are exciting milestones in internationalising Finnish research. From 1999 to 2001, Knuuttila led a network funded by the European Science Foundation that focused on the interface between the Middle Ages and early modern period; Risto Saarinen also participated in it. Knuuttila and Lilli Alanen are mentioned as invited members of the Institut International de Philosophie.[10]

Martha Craven Nussbaum, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago is mentioned first in the long list of collaborators. At the time of application, she edited the essential book *The Sleep of Reason* with Juha Sihvola. The application promises that Sihvola and Knuuttila will organise regular conferences with Nussbaum.[11] This promise has been fulfilled to a greater extent than the applicants could have imagined. Martha Nussbaum has been visiting Helsinki almost every summer for more than 20 years, in recent years, as a foreign academic of the Academy of Finland. She was still the guest of honour at the Simo Knuuttila Memorial Symposium in June 2023.

Among other collaborators, the British philosopher Richard Sorabji, Pauliina Remes's teacher in London, was an essential figure for the project. Knuuttila and Sorabji wrote two comprehensive monographs on the history of emotions.[12] This work was largely finished in 2002, but there was plenty to clarify in the history of emotional concepts. Richard Sorabji's long-term support and extensive networks were significant for the project's younger researchers.

The History of the Mind project was selected as one of the Academy of Finland's 16 new centres of excellence for 2002–2007. During the first year of its operation, the University of

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[9] Application 7.2. 2001, §40.

[10] Application 7.2. 2001, Appendix I, 9.

[11] Application 7.2. 2001, Appendix I, 9. Nussbaum & Sihvola 2002.

[12] Application 7.2. 2001. Knuuttila 2004. Sorabji 2000.

Jyväskylä became a branch office of the CoE in addition to the Department of Systematic Theology in Helsinki. The reason for this was the appointment of Juha Sihvola as professor of history in Jyväskylä. The cooperation between Helsinki theologians and Jyväskylä scholars, which started through this appointment, has continued for over 20 years. Among the original members of History of Mind, Mikko Yrjönsuuri, Taneli Kukkonen and Miira Tuominen worked later as professors in Jyväskylä.

The Academy of Finland appointed David Charles (Oxford) and Joel Biard (Tours/Paris) as international members of the project's advisory board. In the first annual meeting of this board in Helsinki on December 19, 2002, Charles and Biard evaluated the start of the project with many positive words. They urged the CoE to work even more strongly in Islamic philosophy. Biard thought the project needed to build researcher relations in the direction of France, Italy and Spain.[13]

For the second advisory board meeting on April 28, 2004, the CoE submitted a 36-page report, including an extensive list of publications and a "work in progress" catalogue. Meanwhile, Lilli Alanen's Descartes monograph and Simo Knuuttila's history of emotions had been published. Vesa Hirvonen, Taneli Kukkonen, Pekka Kärkkäinen and Miira Tuominen had defended their doctoral theses There are some additions to the list of people, for instance, Jari Kaukua and Marke Ahonen in the ancient team.[14] Kaukua, an expert in Islamic philosophy, has since advanced to become a professor at the University of Jyväskylä. Marke Ahonen is an award-winning translator and a university lecturer in Greek at the University of Helsinki. Among the original members of the ancient team, Pauliina Remes is a professor at Uppsala University today, and Miira Tuominen is a university lecturer (associate professor) in Stockholm.

Regarding ongoing work, Marke Ahonen and Vesa Hirvonen announced in 2004 that they would study the philosophical understanding of mental disorders in history. Since then, both have diligently published on the topic. The CoE also mentions that it has started work to compile historical texts into a

[13] Report 19.12. 2002. Minutes 19.12. 2002.

[14] Report 28.4. 2004, 4, 10. Alanen 2003. Knuuttila 2004.

comprehensive sourcebook.[15] This work brought together people studying the thinking of different eras. At the same time, the project was very trying, as many source texts from classical languages had to be translated into English.

This so-called *Sourcebook* project continued throughout the CoE and many years afterwards. It was finally published as a 746-page volume edited by Juha Sihvola and Simo Knuuttila in 2014.[16] The *Sourcebook* project summarises the dynamics of the centres of excellence, which is not without problems. The actual funding is aimed at supporting young researchers. On the other hand, senior researchers participate in the work within the framework of their university positions.

The primary duty of young researchers is to promote their own research work and, accordingly, their careers. This work included writing numerous chapters to the *Sourcebook*. The final responsibility of joint projects remains on the shoulders of senior researchers, and they will continue even after the funds run out. One of Simo Knuuttila's great strengths was attracting team leaders who enthusiastically agreed to such a division of labour. At the same time, these leaders were busy with their many other duties. Juha Sihvola became the director of the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies at the University of Helsinki in 2004. This was a significant recognition and asset for the CoE but also meant a new heavy workload. I was appointed professor of ecumenics during the CoE application process in 2001, and ecumenics as a discipline does not include medieval philosophy at all. Still, it was a privilege to participate.

Simo Knuuttila could half-seriously state in our scientific board that "new tasks should usually be given to those who already have a lot of them". This attitude did not mean that the contribution of younger researchers was belittled. Knuuttila strove to ensure that doctoral and postdoctoral researchers could focus on their work as peacefully as possible. The CoE's active work in conferences, researcher exchanges and joint publications meant that there was no lack of tasks for the

[15] Report 28.4. 2004, 33. Minutes 28.4. 2004. Esim. Hirvonen 2006; Ahonen 2014.

[16] Knuuttila & Sihvola 2014.

younger ones either. The young researchers also regularly applied for personal research positions from different funders.

The young researchers of Knuuttila's projects were quite successful in this work. The 2004 report mentions, for example, that Taneli Kukkonen has received a position from Victoria, Canada, and Marke Ahonen from the doctoral programme at the University of Helsinki. In the advisory board meeting minutes, Knuuttila and Saarinen mention that much of the young researchers' time is spent writing new applications. David Charles and Joel Biard note that this is a problem throughout the scientific world.[17]

For the third advisory board meeting on January 26, 2006, the project produced a new 39-page report. International conferences, publications and pending work are listed in abundance. This time, many Finnish books and classic translations are striking. Descartes' works were being translated under the direction of Mikko Yrjönsuuri. Marke Ahonen has translated Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, Jari Kaukua Seneca, Timo Nisula Augustine and Taneli Kukkonen Al-Ghazal. Juha Sihvola has published an extensive Finnish monograph, *Maailmankansalaisen etiikka* (The Ethics of a World Citizen), which sparked much public discussion.[18]

Although the Academy of Finland emphasises international basic research in its CoEs, it also wants the projects to have a societal impact. Since the History of Mind project hired experts in Latin, Greek and Arabic, it was natural that these people also showed their skills as translators. Knuuttila's long-term Aristotle translation project created a model and partly also funding channels for translating classics. As the director of the Helsinki Collegium, Juha Sihvola took an active role as a public science influencer. Simo Knuuttila was the head of the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters from 2004 to 2006.

History of Mind CoE now had a scientific secretary, Ville Päivänsalo, whose task was to lighten the scientific board's administrative burden. The advisory board liked this management model. In the January 2006 meeting of this board, Simo Knuuttila already looked further ahead. While two years were left in the six-year term of the CoE, Knuuttila already had an

[17] Report 28.4. 2004, 2, 7. Minutes 28.4. 2004.
[18] Report 26.1. 2006, 16–17. Sihvola 2004.

idea for a new term beyond 2007. The minutes of the advisory board meeting state that Knuuttila presented this idea but they do not describe its content.[19]

In 2006, Simo Knuuttila's Festschrift was also published, focusing on the philosophy of mind and edited by Vesa Hirvonen, Toivo Holopainen and Miira Tuominen.[20] Its numerous articles cover many of the subject areas of the CoE. A vital task of a Festschrift is to show that the group gathered around the leader can work without this central figure. This is especially important in Knuuttila's Festschrift, as his inexhaustible flood of ideas influenced the work of all three teams. Although Simo Knuuttila was not an authoritarian leader, he became an unmissable central figure through his wealth of ideas and activity.

The monthly afternoon seminar meeting, usually on Fridays, became central to Knuuttila's CoE work for twelve years. All groups presented their research, and Knuuttila commented on the job done. In addition, he often gave a broad presentation of his own works in progress. The sessions were stimulating but heavy. At some point, the researchers proposed that they could also serve coffee and cookies. Simo Knuuttila was not persuaded by the idea that refreshments could inspire more than philosophical ideas, but he agreed to the request. After that, the number of participants increased, and the discussions got even longer, which Knuuttila noted with satisfaction but also with a bit of sarcasm.[21]

The fourth and last meeting of the advisory board was on May 25, 2007. The CoE report was now 22 pages long and presented the harvest rather than looking to the future. Miira Tuominen's work *Apprehension and Argument* is mentioned; Pauliina Remes's *Plotinus on Self* was published in the fall of the same year.[22] The scientific board's attention was already focused on promoting the new application. The advisory

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[19] Minutes 26.1. 2006.

[20] Hirvonen, Holopainen & Tuominen 2006.

[21] The tradition of this seminar is continued until today in the "History of Philosophy Research Seminar" that the younger members of the CoE started on their own initiative.

[22] Report 25.5. 2007, 7. Tuominen 2007; Remes 2007.

board was satisfied with the work done and mainly asked about the progress of the sourcebook.[23]

The last output of the History of Mind unit for the Academy of Finland was a short self-evaluation prepared in April 2008. It emphasises the usefulness of the scientific secretary in managing the project, even though the workload of the scientific board is still heavy. The CoE status is considered to have significant added value in researchers' international networking and job search. Taneli Kukkonen's European Research Council young researcher grant in 2007 is mentioned in this context, as well as the appointment of Mikko Yrjönsuuri as a professor in Jyväskylä and Pauliina Remes as a lecturer in Uppsala.[24]

Philosophical Psychology, Morality, and Politics

The research groups interested in the 2008–2013 CoE search had to submit a Plan of Intent to the Academy of Finland in January 2006. The group led by Simo Knuuttila prepared a plan on the topic "Philosophical Psychology, Morality and Politics: Human Conduct in the History of Philosophy" There were now four teams: ancient philosophy (led by Juha Sihvola), medieval philosophy (Taneli Kukkonen and Mikko Yrjönsuuri), Renaissance and Reformation thought (Risto Saarinen) and early modern philosophy (Virpi Mäkinen).[25]

The preliminary plan states that philosophical psychology is the "fastest growing area" in the history of philosophy. This approach produces significant results, especially in the history of politics, ethics and social practices.[26] The Plan of Intent emphasises its difference in content from the History of Mind project, but it also refers to the groundwork done by the earlier CoE. In addition to Knuuttila's and Alanen's monographs, Nussbaum and Sihvola's book on sexual ethics, Jill Kraye and Saarinen's edited volume on early modern ethics, Henrik Lagerlund and Yrjönsuuri's work on emotions, and Mäkinen and

[23] Minutes 25.5. 2007.
[24] Evaluation 3.4. 2008, 3, 7.
[25] Plan of Intent 31.1. 2006, 2–3.
[26] Plan of Intent 31.1. 2006, 1.

Petter Korkman's edited volume on the history of rights are mentioned.[27]

113 applications were submitted for this first round, of which the Academy selected 44 for the second round. The final application phase was quite laborious, as the research plan was 50 pages, within which 27 questions posed by the Academy had to be answered. In addition, resumes and summaries were needed. The call published on May 17, 2006, required the applications to be submitted by June 21.[28]

Preparing such an extensive application within one month required that the ideas had already been discussed and refined. In addition, the practical writing work had to be shared. A huge part of the ideas still came from Simo Knuuttila and Virpi Mäkinen, a university lecturer in theological ethics appointed deputy director. In addition to their own team descriptions, Juha Sihvola and Risto Saarinen were responsible for writing extensive general sections.

In the research plan, the historical frame of the project reaches from antiquity to the Enlightenment. While philosophical psychology is central to interest, the project does not discuss modern psychological theories. Six main issues are defined as follows:

> 1. The ethical and political value of natural inclinations, emotions, and habits. 2. The psychology of knowledge, will, and choice in ethics and politics. 3. The psychology of gender. 4. The tradition of classical conceptions of human sociability and its fragmentation. 5. Natural law, human rights and the emergence of political individualism. 6. The psychology of happiness.[29]

Regarding the personnel, continuity and change are visible in the new list of names. The ancient philosophy team consists of Juha Sihvola, Håvard Lökke, Pauliina Remes, Miira Tuominen, Marke Ahonen, Malin Grahn, and Mika Perälä. The medieval philosophy team members are Taneli Kukkonen, Mikko Yrjönsuuri, Tomas Ekenberg, Vesa Hirvonen, Taina Holopainen, Jari Kaukua, Susanna Niiranen, Juhana Toivanen, and Ritva

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[27] Plan of Intent 31.1. 2006, 1. See above and Kraye & Saarinen 2005; Mäkinen & Korkman 2005; Lagerlund & Yrjönsuuri 2002.

[28] Kansallisen tutkimuksen 17.5. 2006.

[29] Research Plan 19.6. 2006, 2.

Palmén. The Renaissance and Reformation team includes Risto Saarinen, Pekka Kärkkäinen, Maiju Lehmijoki-Gardner, Olli-Pekka Vainio, Minna Koivuniemi, and Ilmari Karimies. Early modern team members are Virpi Mäkinen, Lilli Alanen, Markku Peltonen, Petter Korkman, Martina Reuter, Kari Saastamoinen, Sami-Juhani Savonius, Mikko Tolonen, Jussi Varkemaa, Ilse Paakkinen, and Ville Paukkonen.[30]

Various trends can be observed in this list of names. A robust intellectual history centre was being established around Markku Peltonen, a professor of history at the University of Helsinki. The philosophers of Jyväskylä belonged to the medieval team. The growing proportion of women and international staff reflected the Academy's wishes and the unit's development. While the headquarters of the entire project is again the Department of Systematic Theology at the University of Helsinki, the list of names is multidisciplinary, and theologians account for less than half of the names. A total of 35 external partners are listed.[31]

This time, an essential part of the application process was the evaluators' visit to Helsinki on October 2, 2006. External experts Julia Annas and Jack Zupko examined the project's scientific board and researchers for three hours on the Department of Systematic Theology premises. Simo Knuuttila presented the project's research ideas, Juha Sihvola the collaborators, and Risto Saarinen the research training. The detailed application process ended with a happy outcome, as we were selected to be one of 18 new CoEs from 2008–2013.[32] One of my young researchers said she would leave the project because the application process required too much tricky work.

The new project adopted the structures and working methods of the earlier CoE, with Jussi Varkemaa as the new scientific secretary. The Academy of Finland appointed Julia Annas (Arizona), Annabel Brett and John Marenbon (both Cambridge) to the advisory board. Its first meeting was held in Helsinki on September 26, 2008. The new advisory board had a very active relationship with the CoE from the beginning. John Marenbon felt that the share of Islamic philosophy should be

[30] Research Plan 19.6. 2006, 3–4.

[31] Research Plan 19.6. 2006, 32–34.

[32] Site Visit 2.10. 2006; Suomen Akatemian päätös 12.12. 2006.

strengthened. Annabel Brett considered the early modern Catholic thought, especially the Jesuits, necessary for the project. Julia Annas felt that the moral psychology of the Enlightenment, based on ancient philosophy should be made better visible.[33]

During this meeting, it was mentioned that the Philosophical Psychology project intends to write a handbook describing its field comprehensively.[34] Both History of Mind and Philosophical Psychology published international basic research promptly and in large numbers. Although detailed feedback was given in the supervision and seminars of the CoE, the project always aimed to publish without delay. The natural science units, which were the engines of the Academy's CoE programme, published a lot, and the humanities units similarly strived to demonstrate their activity with large numbers and good publishers.

For the second advisory board meeting on May 20, 2010, in Jyväskylä, the CoE brought a breathtakingly extensive list of publications. The unit had already published five monographs and seven edited volumes with international publishers. In addition, 64 international articles and 80 other publications are mentioned. There are already nine new doctoral dissertations in the unit, namely by Minna Koivuniemi, Marke Ahonen, Jussi Varkemaa, Susanna Niiranen, José Filipe da Silva, Vili Lähteenmäki, Juhana Toivanen, Mikko Tolonen, and Mika Perälä.[35] Silva (medieval philosophy) and Tolonen (digital humanities) have since become professors at the University of Helsinki.

New research environments contributed to this outcome. Sihvola, Mäkinen, and Saarinen were long-time researchers at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. This opportunity enabled the team leaders to participate even more actively in the CoE work. Markku Peltonen and Kari Saastamoinen developed intellectual history as a new trend at the Department of History. With Taneli Kukkonen and Jari Kaukua, Islamic philosophy emerged as a new research field in Finland. Pauliina Remes and Miira Tuominen wrote

[33] Minutes 26.9. 2008.
[34] Minutes 26.9. 2008.
[35] Report 20.5. 2010, 1. Minutes 20.5. 2010.

introductory monographs on Neoplatonism and ancient commentators of Plato and Aristotle.[36] Theologians Pekka Kärkkäinen, Vesa Hirvonen, and Olli-Pekka Vainio advanced to become university lecturers and published extensively on philosophy and theology of the 14th–16th centuries. For example, the book on perception jointly edited by Knuuttila and Kärkkäinen brings together the philosophy of mind and epistemology. My own monograph on the weakness of will deals with the psychology of will and choice.[37]

The team leaders also had enough energy for the Finnish societal debate. The Finnish volume on begging, *Kerjääminen eilen ja tänään*, edited by Virpi Mäkinen and Anne Birgitta Pessi, sparked a wide public debate about the phenomenon that had re-entered Finland. Juha Sihvola completed his Finnish monograph *Maailmankansalaisen uskonto* (The Religion of a World Citizen), in which philosophical and theological insights elucidate various Finnish societal and political contexts.[38]

The years 2009–2010 were the apex of Knuuttila's CoE work. The Academy's awarding of the money in two three-year periods encourages units to report particularly actively in the third year of work. The last fruits of History of Mind and the first significant results of Philosophical Psychology were both published around 2010. The expertise of the unit members grew rapidly, and their work ability was excellent. Simo Knuuttila received the Finnish Science Prize in 2011.

Dark clouds began to appear after Juha Sihvola's serious illness in 2011. Miira Tuominen, at that time a lecturer in philosophy in Jyväskylä and Academy Research Fellow, took over the duties of the ancient philosophy team leader. Around the time of the third meeting of the advisory board (February 10, 2012, in Helsinki), the project began to diverge in different directions. At first glance, the mobility of researchers during this reporting period is impressive: Malin Grahn worked in Arizona, Vili Lähteenmäki and Susanna Niiranen in Berlin, Taneli Kukkonen in Exeter and Uppsala, Ville Paukkonen and Juhana

[36] Remes 2008; Tuominen 2009.
[37] Knuuttila & Kärkkäinen 2008; Saarinen 2011.
[38] Mäkinen & Pessi 2009; Sihvola 2011.

Toivanen in Paris, Mika Perälä and Olli-Pekka Vainio in Oxford, Risto Saarinen in Leuven.[39]

However, the various projects and responsibilities of the unit's researchers began to compete for time with the CoE. In 2010, Simo Knuuttila returned to his university position from the academy professorship. Risto Saarinen and Virpi Mäkinen outlined new projects that the Academy wanted for the new CoE call starting in April 2012. Taneli Kukkonen was appointed to a new academic position in New Zealand. Thus, the scientific board could no longer work on Knuuttila's project as diligently as before.

This structural fragmentation had no negative impact on the publication report, which includes four monographs and another four anthologies from international publishers, 19 international journal articles and 64 articles in international multiauthor works. Simo Knuuttila alone reports eleven new publications. The *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Henrik Lagerlund, a close collaborator of the project, includes many entries written by the CoE researchers. *The Nature of Rights*, a volume edited by Virpi Mäkinen, articulates the position of human rights in the project.[40]

The final conference of the CoE, titled "Psychology of Morality and Politics", was held in Jyväskylä, June 24–26, 2013. At the same time, the fourth and last advisory board meeting was also held. After the death of Juha Sihvola on June 14, 2012, Simo Knuuttila had the overall responsibility for the end phase of the *Sourcebook*. In April 2013, Risto Saarinen took over from Virpi Mäkinen the task of deputy director. The Jyväskylä meeting was delighted by the news that in June 2013, the Academy of Finland awarded Saarinen and Mäkinen a new centre of excellence for 2014–2019.[41]

Mikko Yrjönsuuri and Taneli Kukkonen hosted the Jyväskylä conference, as the Helsinki scientific board members were reduced to Knuuttila and Saarinen who had been involved since 2002. The main speakers in ancient philosophy were David Charles and Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Copenhagen). Roberto Lambertini (Macerata) and Henrik Lagerlund

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[39] Report 10.2. 2012, 4.

[40] Report 10.2. 2012, Publications. Mäkinen 2010; Lagerlund 2010.

[41] Report 24.6. 2013, 2. Minutes 24.6. 2013. Saarinen 2020.

(Western Ontario) represented medieval studies. The members of the advisory board chaired the sessions.[42] In its last reports, the CoE could still report new recruitments, for example, Tuomas Vaura in the medieval team and Heikki Haara in the early modern team. Important dissertations on medieval imagination theory (Ritva Palmén) and ancient philosophical views on gender (Malin Grahn) were also completed in 2013.[43]

After its last meeting, the advisory board wrote a final report to the Academy of Finland. The board praises the extensive publishing activities of the Philosophical Psychology project and the excellent cooperation between the universities of Helsinki and Jyväskylä. Doctoral training and acquiring new funding are also mentioned positively.[44]

The end of the CoE in December 2013 marked a turning point for Simo Knuuttila. Juha Sihvola's death was a difficult personal and professional matter, as Sihvola had been an exceptionally close and loyal colleague for decades. The publication of the *Sourcebook* in 2014 was the last milestone in the long collaboration between Knuuttila and Sihvola. However, younger scholars were now capable of taking leadership positions and Knuuttila's activities with many other colleagues continued. Until his death in 2022, Knuuttila prepared the publication of the *Handbook* together with Virpi Mäkinen.[45]

Simo Knuuttila's ultimate independence from the CoEs can be seen in the fact that he gave his farewell lecture at the University of Helsinki on May 8, 2014 on a completely different topic, namely "The Origin of Religion".[46] In his retirement, Knuuttila continued to publish actively on various issues. In this sense, the CoEs of 2002–2013 were only one period in his long career.

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[42] Workshop Programme 24.–26.6. 2013.
[43] Report 24.6. 2013. Palmén 2013; Grahn 2013.
[44] Report, July 2013.
[45] Koistinen, Mäkinen & Pihlström 2022, 309, 315. The handbook, titled *Moral Philosophy in History*, is now completed and has been accepted to be published in the New Synthese Historical Library in 2024/25.
[46] Koistinen, Mäkinen & Pihlström 2022, 311.

The Philosophical Significance of the CoEs

Simo Knuuttila gradually expanded his expertise as a leading scholar of antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the 16th–18th centuries. His knowledge of antiquity and the Middle Ages developed to a comprehensive mastery with the emotion book published in 2004. It was not until the CoE years that Knuuttila focused more on the early modern period and the Enlightenment.

He carried out this dedication professionally and aimed at the cutting edge of the research. In the CoE seminars, Knuuttila was just as enthusiastic about the thinking of Descartes, Leibniz, Pufendorf and Adam Smith as he was about the questions of antiquity and the Middle Ages. His focus was often on the modern era's relationship to earlier philosophy. The results sometimes emphasise continuity and, at other times, a break between eras. Even though Knuuttila's supervisory work focused on the Middle Ages, he did not programmatically try to see the influence of the Middle Ages everywhere. Results advocating continuity or paradigm change were equally valuable, depending on the evidence.

Among the CoEs, History of Mind was more uniform in subject matter, while Philosophical Psychology was more extensive and relied more on the team leaders' expertise. Knuuttila's sovereign ability to comment on the most diverse research topics was a striking feature in both projects. In the monthly Friday seminars, this work gave the younger supervisors a model of how broadly and deeply a leader can familiarise himself with the work of younger and more senior team members.

From 1994 to 2013, Simo Knuuttila worked continuously as an academy professor and CoE director. Both positions emphasise the manager's personal creativity and heavy responsibility. Although Knuuttila was a self-directed and self-reliant researcher, he thought it necessary to discuss his ideas in the group, and he could also benefit from others' feedback. In the CoEs, he brought together leading experts from various disciplines for committed work. Intensive interaction helped both in refining ideas and in enjoying work. Being the centre of attention for a long time could still be tiring and exhausting.

In his career before the CoEs, Knuuttila created an influential picture of the philosophy of modalities and the history of emotions.[47] It isn't easy to make a similar crystallisation of the long list of publications produced during the CoEs. The consolidation of an entire profession between 2002 and 2013 is more significant than individual results. While the centre of this profession is the history of philosophy from antiquity to the Enlightenment, it also includes intellectual history practised in the history department and historical theology practised by theologians. In addition, the profession consists of various skills, most notably the research competence of old languages and the effort to disseminate results to larger audiences.

Although the advisory board's evaluations of our projects were positive, we were not blind to the fact that there always is room for improvement. Knowledge of old languages was good by Finnish standards, but it could have been even better by Oxford and Paris standards. Our expertise was sometimes patchy, and it focused on what researchers working in Finland happened to know. We tried to fulfil the advisory board's wishes to include the Mediterranean countries with their unique expertise, but we too often remained within the scope of Anglo-American academia.

The overall significance of the History of Mind CoE can be seen from the *Sourcebook*. Its fourteen text sections describe the evolution of the following topics in ancient, medieval and early modern thought:

> I The Soul as an Entity, II Sense Perception, III Common Sense, Imagination and Estimation, IV Sleep and Dreams, V Memory and Recollection, VI Intellect, Intellection and Concept Formation, VII Judgement and Reasoning, VIII Psychology of Language, IX Self-Consciousness, X Emotions, XI Will and Choice, XII Mental Disturbances, XIII Physiognomy, XIV Psychology of Gender.[48]

The *Sourcebook*'s philosophical innovation is in showing how these different themes belong together under the umbrella of the philosophy of mind. At the same time, the *Sourcebook*

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[47] Knuuttila 1993; 2004.

[48] Knuuttila & Sihvola 2014, v–viii.

includes topics that many scholars do not consider philosophical, such as dreams, physiognomy, and mental illnesses. The work shows how these topics naturally belong to the philosophy of mind. In addition to source information, the *Sourcebook* presents a wealth of literature references, often leading to special studies of the CoE.

Within the fourteen text sections, forty main chapters cover different eras, divided into subchapters. For example, Mika Perälä's main chapter on the psychology of language in antiquity and the early Middle Ages contains the following subchapters:

> 1. The Semantic Triangle: Words, Thoughts and Objects, 2. Signification by Convention and by Nature, 3. Speech and Communication as the Basis of Community, 4. Learning the Meaning of Words, 5. Grammar, 6. Congruence, 7. Metaphor, 8. Fallacies.[49]

In this way, a single main chapter leads the reader far into the realm of language theory and logic. At the same time, the subchapters maintain the connection with the overall philosophy of mind. Even a reader not primarily interested in the philosophy of mind can benefit from the extraordinary richness of the *Sourcebook*.

The delay of the *Sourcebook* project led to integrating many materials discussed in the second CoE into the *Sourcebook*. Even the subtitle of this publication is "Philosophical Psychology from Plato to Kant". While the *Sourcebook* can thus be called a presentation of individual philosophical psychology, the themes of morality and politics are not present in it to any significant degree.

Independently of this integration, the original research plan of the Philosophical Psychology CoE argues its significance by comparing its research with "contemporary systematic and historical interest". It states, for example, that the idea of the human being as a social animal coloured the philosophy of both antiquity and the Enlightenment. The project states it can "create a solid historical basis for analysing the current controversies concerning the significance of psychology and conceptions of human nature in ethical and political theories".[50]

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[49] Knuuttila & Sihvola 2014, 359–378.

[50] Research Plan 19.6. 2006, 27.

Malin Grahn's dissertation *Gender and Sexuality in Ancient Stoic Philosophy*, supervised by Miira Tuominen, exemplifies such work. The terms gender and sexuality were unknown as such in antiquity. But Grahn shows how they can be studied. The first part of the work, "Body, Nature and Community", examines the standard features of the bodies and nature of men and women and the possibilities of improvement in Stoicism. The second part deals with the equal upbringing of girls and boys in ancient literature. The third part describes the Stoic ideal of a world citizen. Although the Stoics did not create concrete equality, Grahn argues that their ideal of a world citizen is the same for women and men.[51] The dissertation is, on the one hand, a historically accurate and non-ideological textual study that is not burdened with theories taken from the present. On the other hand, the author is able, through her insightful perspectives, to shed light on questions relevant to today's psychology and equality thinking.

The deepest philosophical significance of Simo Knuuttila's CoEs lies precisely in this detailed study of primary sources. The fact that the research belongs to philosophy does not necessarily imply that it is excessively theory-oriented. It rather means consistently presenting insightful questions and, accordingly, logically exposing historical texts. Such a rational reconstruction strives to avoid anachronistic theoretical assumptions, but it must not sink into doxography, i.e., a mere description of past theories and past thinkers.

While the present paper is hardly anything more than a doxography of the work accomplished, I want to draw some attention to the administrative documentation that is nowadays required from funded projects and is available in archives. This documentation primarily serves the purpose of showing that the allocated money is spent responsibly. At the same time, the aims and policies of the scholars are spelt out extensively in the reports, and the early careers of young scholars can be followed in some detail. This is interesting for the later historians of philosophy. In the CoEs described above, we aimed to present our plans and actual work honestly and transparently.

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[51] Grahn 2013, 5.

The most important sources of the historians of philosophy are academic publications. The administrative texts can supplement them, expressing the early intentions and hypotheses of the researchers as well as their actual collaboration. In the case of Simo Knuuttila, he never required that his name would appear as a co-author in the academic publications he supervised. Additional administrative documents help see his overall contribution in detail.

University of Helsinki

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Realism and Hope: Simo Knuuttila's Presupposition Theory and Pragmatist Philosophy of Religion

SAMI PIHLSTRÖM

1. Introduction

While there is an identifiable current of pragmatist influences flowing through the Finnish philosophical tradition, few Finnish philosophers have substantially engaged in pragmatist philosophy of religion.[1] There are exceptions, though. In particular, Eino Kaila was inspired by William James in his youth, authoring a number of early essays on James, and in his mature thought Kaila acknowledged his Jamesian influences at the background of the concept of "practical testability" he employed in *Syvähenkinen elämä* (1943) and elsewhere.[2] Some later major Finnish philosophers, such as Ilkka Niiniluoto, have been sharp albeit constructive critics of both pragmatism and religion, while others influenced by pragmatism (e.g., Oiva Ketonen, whose naturalist version of pragmatism was primarily inspired by John Dewey) have preferred to mostly avoid religious and theological topics.

It may seem surprising to compare Simo Knuuttila's views in the philosophy of religion to the pragmatist tradition. Knuuttila, of course, was primarily a world-famous scholar of

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[1] Some of my own work explores this area of research: see, e.g., Pihlström 2013.

[2] For Kaila's quasi-pragmatist reflections on religion, see the dialogues in Kaila 1986 [1943]; for his early essay on James (in an English translation), see Kaila 2011 [1912]. Having analyzed the pragmatist aspects of Kaila's thought in some detail earlier (see Pihlström 2003, 2023, chapter 8), I will not focus on Kaila here.

ancient and medieval philosophy, and he had little to say about pragmatism in his published writings. However, as a professor of philosophy of religion, he was deeply interested in the nature of religious language and the doxastic or epistemic attitudes a rational person may or should attach to religious propositions, and he was well aware of the distinctively pragmatist responses to such issues in the philosophy of religion. I will argue in this paper that there is a specific sense in which Knuuttila's views do come close to a certain kind of pragmatism. What I have in mind is the idea of viewing religious or theological *realism* as a kind of pragmatic presupposition of religious language-use.

In fact, Knuuttila called his position the "presupposition view" when discussing the relation between religious and non-religious beliefs. However, what I will explore is a meta-level position that might be claimed to be presupposed not only by the "presupposition view" itself but also (as I argue in Pihlström 2024) by Knuuttila's most important preoccupation, the historiography of philosophy. This meta-level presupposition is, indeed, realism. Knuuttila's work never closely focused on the issue of realism, either, at least not in the sense in which some of his Finnish colleagues, most prominently Niiniluoto (e.g., 1999), have addressed that issue over the past decades. However, it is – or so I will suggest – illuminating to review some of his contributions not only to the history of philosophy but also to the philosophy of religion from the perspective of the realism issue.[3]

2. Varieties of realism in the philosophy of religion

Let us first take a general look at how Knuuttila understood the debate between realism and antirealism (or nonrealism, as he usually preferred to call it)[4] about religion and theology. In

[3] There is a minor thematic overlap between my discussion in this paper and in another recent essay of mine focusing on Knuuttila's views on realism in the historiography of philosophy (Pihlström 2024). For an excellent fresh analysis of Knuuttila's views on religious faith, see Koistinen 2024.

[4] Some contributors to the realism debate distinguish between antirealism and nonrealism, suggesting that nonrealism rejects the entire realism vs. antirealism controversy. A case in point would be Arthur Fine's (1996 [1986]) "natural ontological attitude", as well as Richard Rorty's (e.g., 1999)

some of his writings published in Finnish,[5] he formulated the basic alternatives in this discussion as follows (see Knuuttila 1998, 163-164):

- *Theological realism* maintains that religious language contains statements that aim at being "true descriptions of the relations between a theistically conceived God, humanity, and the world".

- A specific version of theological realism is *argumentative theological realism*: religious language expresses a "theological worldview",[6] a set of metaphysical beliefs (e.g., about the existence of God) that can be supported by rational arguments in principle acceptable by non-believers. A *weaker* version of this brand of realism says that a theological worldview is as good a metaphysical system as (for example) materialism, and one can argue for it by emphasizing its existential significance, thus defending it via some kind of practical (rather than theoretical) argument.

- *Non-argumentative theological realism* denies that a theological worldview can be adopted (or abandoned) on the basis of arguments containing non-theistic premises.

- *Theological nonrealism* differs from all these forms of realism by claiming that religious language is emotive and/or

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antirepresentationalism. In this paper, I avoid dwelling on these intricacies of the realism debate.

[5] I am largely citing Knuuttila's work in Finnish in this section and the following one, because he elaborated on his position on religious faith more in his Finnish writings than in his work written for an international audience, although he was a frequent invited speaker at philosophy of religion conferences worldwide.

[6] If theology is simply a branch of (that is, a discipline within) the humanities, it is unclear whether there *is* such a worldview. I take Knuuttila to mean "theological" here in a semi-confessional sense: a theological worldview (here) is a religious worldview (postulating, e.g., God and possibly other religious entities) enriched with theological concepts and interpretations, a kind of supernaturalist analogy to a naturalistic scientific worldview specifying the ontology of our commonsense practices of dealing with the material world.

> symbolic and does not aim at describing reality at all, at least not any metaphysically interpreted reality.

The conflict between realism and anti-/nonrealism is often regarded as a primarily *metaphysical* and/or *semantic* debate on the fundamental nature of reality and the ways in which our language-use refers (or fails to refer) to reality. Knuuttila himself phrases his account of theological realism by considering the relation between religious language and the world. Accordingly, the realism issue is usually considered more or less independent of *epistemic* questions concerning justification and argumentation. One important feature of Knuuttila's position – as the brief characterizations above indicate – is that he emphasized a close link between these two discussions, never entirely disentangling realism from epistemic considerations of the credentials of the "theological worldview" (or its alternatives) at issue, or from the question of whether such credentials should, or indeed can, be argumentatively considered.

Comparing Knuuttila's views on realism with the catalogue of realisms presented by Niiniluoto (1999), we may say that the core of the various realisms he distinguishes is the ontological thesis about the independence of reality from the human mind and language-use (or conceptualization, theories, beliefs, etc.). However, *pace* Michael Devitt's (1991) influential account, this ontological core is as such insufficient. Realism – both in, say, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of religion – needs to address semantic issues concerning the ways in which (scientific or religious) language-use can refer to the mind- and language-independent reality, as well as epistemic questions about the justifiability of the scientific and/or religious worldviews purporting to thus refer. However, it is not immediately obvious what the analogy of the theoretical entities postulated for explanatory reasons in scientific theories are in religion, or theology, insofar as religious or theological worldviews are not (at least not primarily) intended to be explanatory in the same sense as science.

Furthermore, again *pace* Devitt, it is misleading to define realism as an existence thesis; otherwise theological realism becomes indistinguishable from theism. It makes more sense to maintain that according to realism whether or not God exists is determined mind-independently. A pragmatist philosopher of religion could insist on the need to make sure that our

conceptual distinctions play a useful role in our overall theoretical framework, and here it does seem that the distinction between realism and theism is vitally needed. The realist, thus, has to acknowledge the possibility that the "theological worldview" expressed by religious believers' use of religious language might be false. This brings us to the more explicitly epistemological dimensions of Knuuttila's philosophy of religion.

3. Realism and religious hope: what does the presupposition view presuppose?

Even though Knuuttila's "presupposition theory" is not our main concern here, I cannot avoid saying a few words about it.[7] This is simply because for Knuuttila, as noted, realism in the philosophy of religion was an irreducibly epistemic issue, invoking questions about the relation between religious beliefs (or a "theological worldview") and non-religious beliefs. Along with his distinctions between the relevant forms of realism and non-/antirealism, Knuuttila (1986, 296-301) identifies some of the basic positions regarding the epistemic relations between religious and non-religious worldviews:

- The *autonomy theory*, or what is often labeled *fideism*, frequently found within the Wittgensteinian tradition in the philosophy of religion, maintains that religion is an autonomous form of life that cannot be justified or criticized from an external standpoint.[8]

- The key contrast is to the *integration theory*, a view close to *evidentialism*, according to which religion should be integrated into non-religious views about reality. Both ultimately

[7] See Eklund 2019 and Koistinen 2024 for considerably more detailed discussions.

[8] It should be noted that many so-called Wittgensteinians, most prominently D.Z. Phillips, have firmly resisted fideist interpretations of their views. See, e.g., Koistinen 2000. Even pragmatists like William James have occasionally been taken to be fideists, because they criticize standard evidentialist accounts of religious belief, but that is clearly a misinterpretation; rather, pragmatist philosophy of religion could be seen as seeking a middle path between fideism and evidentialism (see, again, Pihlström 2013).

deal with the same world and must be responsive to the same evidence.

- As distinguished from both extremes, the *presupposition theory* was (at least more or less) Knuuttila's own position (see Knuuttila 1986, 302-309): while religious language primarily seeks to provide "an adequate form to some inner life experiences", it expresses and presupposes *something* more general concerning the relations between God, humanity, and the world (ibid., 302-303). Religious faith is *not* subordinated to the "language game of evidence", but it is *not* entirely autonomous in relation to non-religious beliefs, either.

Our using religious language may thus presuppose something concerning attitudes we adopt when engaging in *other* language-games. Religious language, Knuuttila tells us, "functions on the basis of certain presuppositions formulated outside it", while not presenting statements intended to be accepted outside itself and while not elaborating on the metaphysics of the "the relations between God, humanity, and the world" it presupposes (ibid., 303). The fact that religious language-games do not present claims to be tested within an evidential language-game does not entail that religion is completely autonomous with regard to beliefs external to it (ibid., 303-304).

We should consider how this view is, and how it should be, related to the forms of theological realism and non-/antirealism distinguished above. It might simply be suggested that realism itself (as, indeed, a *very* general theory of the relations between God, humanity, and the world) is among the presuppositions of religious language-use (or religious "language-games", using a Wittgensteinian vocabulary). This would, however, immediately disqualify anti- and non-realists as potential users of religious language – or at least they would be claimed to be flatly inconsistent in their usage. Indeed, maintaining that religious language-use *simply* presupposes realism would seem to beg the question against all anti- and non-realist attempts to (re)interpret religious language and its relation to reality – including Wittgensteinian and pragmatist attempts. It seems fair to suggest that one needs to argue for the claim that religious language-use *as such* presupposes realism. A more indirect route may thus be more plausible.

As Knuuttila elaborates on his "presupposition view", defending it as a plausible middle path in the epistemology of religious faith against both the autonomy theory and the integration theory, he ends up suggesting that the presuppositions of (consistent) religious language-use are minimal: mere *hope* is sufficient as the relevant doxastic attitude (ibid., 308). An agnostic, for example, can use religious language while only hoping, instead of believing, that God exists.[9] This yields what we may find a moderate compromise position; one may coherently hope that God exists even if one fails to believe either way. That is, in order to be able to (consistently) use religious language or even to hold a theological worldview in a minimal sense, one need not believe that God exists (or, of course, that God does not exist), provided that one hopes that God exists. However, one does have to maintain that God's existence is *not impossible*; this is a presupposition of religious language-use and the kind of hope minimally sufficient for such language-use. Knuuttila says that religious language and faith only presuppose that one does not consider it "really impossible" that God might exist (ibid.). In other words, God's existence must, according to the religious language-user, be a *real possibility*, which we may interpret as (I suppose) something like metaphysical possibility.[10] More specifically, however, we are concerned with an epistemic or doxastic possibility, because the

[9] While Knuuttila (1986, 304, 307-308) suggests that an atheist cannot engage in religious language-use, the minimal presupposition of hope would seem to be available to the atheist, too (cf. Eklund 2019), unless we maintain that a genuinely religious hope is only available in the context of a proper "theological worldview" in some sense involving faith in the reality of God as the source of such hope. One could, presumably, be a *reluctant atheist*, using religious language at least partly in order to develop or maintain a sufficiently strong hope (and perhaps to eventually develop the corresponding belief) that God exists, even if one were unable to believe and unable to even be an agnostic. For example, if one were an (initial) atheist convinced by Pascal's Wager, one might start one's journey toward faith by first voluntarily adopting a mere hope which could grow into a firm belief through one's participation in religious activities.

[10] I am not planning to deal with the complex issues of modal metaphysics here, although such topics were among Knuuttila's most important historical interests. (Charles Peirce's metaphysics of real possibility would be helpful here as a pragmatist option in the metaphysics of modality.)

relevant presupposition is not that God's existence should not be impossible but that the "hopeful" religious person (or the user of religious language) should not maintain that it is.

Knuuttila takes the presupposition that God's existence is possible to entail that God is an "entity" that can be individuated independently of whether God exists or does not exist (ibid., 304, 309). Presumably this means that God is just an entity among many others, an entity that possibly exists.[11] Is God, then, simply a "thing" along with such things as stones, trees, or galaxies, existing in some specific (though not spatio-temporally identifiable) realm in the mind-independent world? Does *this* make sense for a religious believer?[12] And more importantly for us, what exactly is presupposed by *this* view that Knuuttila takes to be a presupposition of religious language-use?

As Knuuttila acknowledges, the presupposition view and the realism issue are entangled. One cannot consistently hope that God exists unless one believes God's existence to be ("really") possible, and thus one arguably has to maintain a generally realistic view according to which God, for all we know, may or may not exist, while it is not up to us, specifically not up to our use of religious language or our participation in religious practices, to determine this matter. Like any other existence questions (realistically interpreted), the answer to the question about the existence of God is "determined" or "decided" by the way the world is, that is, by whether God "in fact" does exist. In order to be able to use religious language (or, again, to hold a theological worldview), one therefore has

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[11] Could this idea even be used as a premise in the modal version of the ontological proof (*à la* Alvin Plantinga), according to which God's actual existence is entailed by God's merely possible existence, because a necessary being that is possible in the sense of existing in at least one possible world necessarily exists in all possible worlds? I will not discuss this issue here any further, as I have very little confidence in the contemporary relevance of the demonstrations of God's existence in any case. See, again, Eklund 2019.

[12] Wittgensteinian philosophers often suggest that philosophers' habit of conceiving of God as a thing is precisely what distorts religious language-use, or leads one out of religious language-games. As my aim here is not to settle such issues in the philosophy of religion, I will again set this criticism aside.

to be some kind of realist, though this presupposition is arrived at *indirectly* via the more immediate presupposition that the religious language-user must, minimally, hope God to exist.

This argument seems to rule out at least radically antirealist views on the relation between religious language and "religious reality". In order for us to be able to coherently hope that God might exist we cannot maintain that God's existence is simply created by or ontologically dependent on our language-use – or beliefs, or indeed by that hope itself. Only extreme antirealist or constructivist philosophers of religion would claim that to be the case, maintaining that as there is nothing outside the text ("*il n'ya pas de hors-texte*"), not even God exists – or fails to exist – in any extra-mental and extra-textual sense. The outcome of Knuuttila's analysis seems to be that such antirealisms, reducing God's existence (or non-existence) to what *we* do with our language, or more generally how we act within our religious practices, cannot accommodate a sufficiently robust concept of religious hope and therefore in a sense disqualify themselves as serious articulations of what it means to have a religious worldview. If hope is minimally sufficient but also necessary for religion,[13] then we must maintain at least a minimal form of realism ensuring that what we hope is not only not impossible but also not immediately secured by our so hoping. (A hope that were guaranteed to be fulfilled would hardly be a genuine hope; it would be an expectation that cannot be frustrated.) It must be possible for God to exist and to fail to exist in order for religious hope to be possible, and therefore realism can be argued to be a *pragmatic presupposition* of religious attitudes to the world.[14] It is this sense of

[13] When saying that hope is "necessary" for religion, I mean that (according to Knuuttila) the religious language-user must at least hope that God exists. The matter is more complicated, however, because believers fearing eternal punishment might even hope God *not* to exist, fearing that he does. (We might also imagine someone believing in, say, Satan's existence while hoping that God does not exist.) This, again, is one of the many complications I will simply set aside. Another topic not to be discussed here is the specific nature of religious or theological hope and its relationship to other religiously/theologically relevant attitudes, such as trust.

[14] Knuuttila's analysis of the minimal presupposition of religious language-use, here explicated in terms of realism, is comparable to Niiniluoto's (1999)

realism as a pragmatic presupposition that interestingly, even if only implicitly, links Knuuttila's views with pragmatist philosophy of religion.

There are many open questions that would have to be addressed in a more comprehensive investigation of Knuuttila's ideas. For example, it might be asked whether the argument from hope to realism could be extended to an argument claiming that the *belief* that God exists presupposes realism, or even (going beyond religious language) to the argument that having *any* doxastic attitudes presupposes realism.[15] A pragmatist might indeed suggest that our serious participation in epistemic practices presupposes some form of realism. The implications of this for interpreting Knuuttila must remain implicit here, though.

4. Knuuttila's "hope theory" and pragmatist philosophy of religion

Knuuttila occasionally considered pragmatism as a recently increasingly actively debated approach in the philosophy of religion, along with the main currents in the field, such as analytic evidentialism, Wittgenstein-inspired fideism, and reformed epistemology (see, e.g., Knuuttila 2003, 2010). Pragmatism arguably attempts to critically synthesize not only evidentialist and fideist accounts of religious belief (just as Knuuttila's own presupposition view does, though not exactly in the same terms) but also to mediate between realism and non-/antirealism, integrating these into a plausible form of pragmatic realism (see Pihlström 2013). Pragmatist philosophers, both in the philosophy of religion and more generally, thus typically suggest that the way(s) the world is – including even its being ontologically independent of our beliefs and theories – is (are) "structured" by our activities of engaging with

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discussion of the "minimal ontological assumption" of realism, viz., that there is a mind-independent world of some kind, an assumption that can be specified and further developed in terms of various more detailed forms of realism, such as scientific realism.

[15] I am here acknowledging a very important point made by one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper, without being able to respond in any detail.

the world, including both scientific and religious practices of conceptualization and inquiry.

Even the distinction between faith and hope may not be sharp, after all, given pragmatism (see Pihlström 2023, chapter 6). Consider, for example, William James's (1979 [1897]) "The Will to Believe" – but also Immanuel Kant's famous question, "what may I hope?" (succeeding the questions "what can I know?" and "what ought I to do?" on Kant's list of questions summarizing his entire project of critical philosophy).[16] Without offering any detailed interpretation of these modern classics here, we may ask whether Knuuttila's view on hope as the adequate religious attitude might be seen as an explication of the Kantian conception of legitimate hope or James's "will to believe" idea (or the "right to believe", as James also suggested it might be called) – or perhaps of both? Knuuttila avoided explicitly integrating his "hope account" of religious language-use into either Kantian or pragmatist philosophy of religion, and certainly the idea that God is simply an entity among others (whose existence is possible) is not very well at home in either of those frameworks; nevertheless, a quasi-pragmatist rearticulation of Knuuttila's position might be one way to move forward in the discussion.

In the pragmatist tradition, we actually find intriguing philosophical elaborations on the concept of hope that could be taken into consideration in this discussion. First, Charles S. Peirce argued, when developing his pragmatist theory of inquiry,[17] that we must hope that our (scientific) questions are answerable. Inquiry presupposes such hope, to the extent that Elizabeth Cooke (2006, chapter 6) even speaks of "transcendental hope" as a condition of inquiry in Peirce. Hope thus arguably plays a Kantian-like transcendental function in our thought and inquiry as a necessary condition for the possibility of asking genuine questions initiating inquiry into the way

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[16] In earlier work, I have explored the connections between Jamesian pragmatist philosophy of religion and Kant's transcendental philosophy (including Kant's views on the postulates of practical reason) in some detail (see again Pihlström 2013).

[17] The relevant essays by Peirce, such as "The Fixation of Belief" (1877) and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878), are available in Peirce 1992-98, vol. 1.

things are (ibid., 129) – including obviously any inquiry into whether God should be taken to exist. Moreover, there seems to be a sense in which such hope, again, requires realism: if our questions are answerable, then there must be something "there", in the world, that determines the correct answers. However, this realistic commitment itself is something that we are entitled to only within our practice of inquiry, as something presupposed by that practice; it is not a metaphysical truth about the world *an sich* independently of inquiry.

Secondly, for James, pragmatism was – arguably much more explicitly than it was for Peirce – a "philosophy of hope". The distinction between belief and hope was not a sharp dichotomy for him in the first place. The meaning of our beliefs about reality depends on how we view our potential future action, and this seems to presuppose a "hopeful" attitude toward the future of the world. Pragmatism, as James (1975 [1907], 62) puts it, "shifts the emphasis and looks forward into facts themselves", asking, "What is this world going to be? What is life eventually to make of itself?" Metaphysical puzzles, then, are not viewed as conflicts between complete, finished theories. Rather, they are individual human beings' attempts to come to terms with different considerations reason may offer in favor of one or another way of interpreting experience. For instance, the theory of free will (as contrasted to determinism), is, according to James, "a general cosmological theory of *promise*" and "a doctrine of *relief*" (ibid., 61). Turning toward the future is essential in evaluating such theories, and therefore hope is a decisive factor in the Jamesian pragmatic entanglement of metaphysics and ethics. James's consideration of religious metaphysics, especially the conflict of theism and materialism (see ibid., Lecture III), moves along the same lines, emphasizing hope and the religious promise of a better world.[18] Thus,

[18] James wrote: "No, the true objection to materialism is not positive but negative. It would be farcical at this day to make complaint of it for what it is, for 'grossness.' Grossness is what grossness does – we now know that. We make complaint of it, on the contrary, for what it is not – not a permanent warrant for our more ideal interests, not a fulfiller of our remotest hopes." (James 1975 [1907], Lecture III.) And further: "Materialism means simply the denial that the moral order is eternal, and the cutting off of ultimate hopes; spiritualism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order and the letting loose of hope." (Ibid.)

the religious hope Knuuttila finds necessary for our use of religious language might be articulated along these Jamesian lines.

Thirdly, neopragmatist Richard Rorty provocatively proposed "Hope in Place of Knowledge" as his "version of pragmatism".[19] However, Rorty's version of pragmatist hope (unlike James's) is *non-metaphysical* and, of course, quite explicitly *non-religious*; moreover, we can hardly say that his pragmatism accommodates any robust concept of inquiry in the sense of Peirce's. He is one of those radically pragmatist thinkers who would prefer to leave the realism issue in the records of history, suggesting that social hope today requires an anti-representationalist approach that has given up any remnant (such as realism) of the theistic idea that human beings are "answerable" to something non-human. Rorty's variant of pragmatist hope would thus presumably be less helpful in characterizing Knuuttila's theory of religious language than the classical pragmatists' ideas.

Knuuttila was no scholar of pragmatism, but his historical interests and topics could be beneficial for pragmatism scholarship, too. There are important historical background influences that need to be examined further, not only the Kantian background of pragmatism (the primacy of practical reason), which I have emphasized in some earlier work (e.g., Pihlström 2013, 2020), but also the metaphysics of modalities (e.g., Peirce's "real generals"), medieval voluntarism (as leading up to modern voluntarisms, including James's "will to believe"), and, going further back in history, the Aristotelian conception of practical reason, or *phronesis*. James (1975 [1907]) himself called pragmatism a "new name for some old ways of thinking", and Knuuttila's careful interpretations of many of these (and other) "old ways of thinking" might help us in further articulating what that "new name" designates.[20]

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[19] I am quoting the titles of chapters 2-4 in Rorty's *Philosophy and Social Hope* (1999).

[20] It should be added that while Knuuttila made no scholarly contributions to pragmatism studies, in many personal conversations he took a generally sympathetic attitude to pragmatism. One of my last discussions with him was concerned with Peirce's appropriation of Duns Scotus's and other late medieval thinkers' ideas.

What is important here is that even if developed into a pragmatist direction, the presupposition view and the conception of hope as an adequate attitude for religious language-use themselves presuppose realism at least in some form. Realism itself turns into a pragmatic background assumption not only of religious language-use itself but also of our inquiries into religion, hope, and the presupposition view – and thus of pragmatism itself. On the other hand, viewing realism as such a presupposition is already to adopt a pragmatic stance, assessing the credentials of realism not in a purely theoretical but in an at least partly practical context seeking to make sense of religious believers' doxastic practices as well as the practices of inquirers (including philosophers) seeking to understand those practices.

5. Presuppositional realism: pragmatic, transcendental, or both?

Knuuttila's "realism" concerning the history of philosophy (analyzed in Pihlström 2024) can be seen as a presupposition of rational scholarly inquiry into past thinkers' views just as realism is (as argued here) a presupposition of rational reconstructions of religious believers' language-use (e.g., in terms of hope, as Knuuttila proposes). This presuppositional status seems to be essentially similar regardless of the content of the discourse to which realism is taken to apply. Due to this pragmatic role played by realism, Knuuttila's views could be developed into the direction of a pragmatist-cum-transcendental account of realism as a necessary presupposition of (or a necessary condition for the possibility of) our practices of thought and inquiry (including both historiographical and religious or theological practices), just as his version of theological/religious realism is, more specifically, a presupposition of the "presupposition theory" needed by his view on hope as the adequate religious attitude.[21]

How, then, do the realisms at the level of theological theorization relate to realisms at the level of religious language-

[21] Nicholas Rescher's (e.g., 2000) account of the pragmatic status of (metaphysical) realism as a presupposition of inquiry is not very far from this way of thinking (see also Pihlström 2023, chapter 4).

use?[22] Knuuttila seems to have maintained – if not explicitly, at least implicitly – that realism is an ultimate presupposition of (viz., a necessary condition for the possibility of) meaningful engagement in both historical scholarship and religious language-use. Its playing this presuppositional role follows from the pragmatic necessity to acknowledge that our contributions to scholarship or language-use cannot be taken to inevitably get the reality they purport to refer to "right". Realism allows for our being (deeply) mistaken; without recognizing this we cannot inquire into the ways the world is, nor even hope those ways to be of a certain kind (or hope to be able to get them even partially right, whatever they are). In the case of historiography, this realism means that there is some (pragmatic yet objective) truth about the relevant facts of the matter concerning, for example, what a historical figure like Plato thought about a certain philosophical issue.

Finally, there is a metaphilosophical issue to be raised concerning the nature of the presuppositional role of realism.[23] Is realism (primarily, or exclusively) a *pragmatic* presupposition enabling us to engage in certain practices of inquiry or in religious language-use, or is it a *transcendental* presupposition, that is, a necessary condition for the possibility of such practices? Here it is hardly plausible to suggest that realism would be an explanatory empirical hypothesis, such as the abductive scientific realism that philosophers of science following (the early) Hilary Putnam in the 1970s formulated as an outcome of the Putnamian "no miracles" argument according to which scientific realism is the only theory that does not make the progress of science a miracle (see, again, Niiniluoto 1999). Few of us would refer to the empirical or predictive "success" of religious language-use in defending realism as its presupposition. Nevertheless, treating realism as *both* pragmatic (and thus in a broad sense empirical) *and* transcendental captures an important dimension of its being a presupposition of our

[22] I examine the "level structure" of religion- and theology-related realism questions in Pihlström 2020.

[23] We might say this question concerns the philosophy of the historiography of philosophy, insofar as we are dealing with realism as a presupposition of such historiography (cf. Pihlström 2022), or the philosophy of the philosophy of religion, in the analogous case in that field.

contingent and continuously developing practices while being at the same time a presupposition that we are necessarily, unavoidably, committed to when seeking to understand our participation in those practices "from within" them.[24] Elaborating on the relation between the pragmatic and the transcendental thus indicates the way I would propose to move on in further developing Knuuttila's presuppositional realism.[25].

University of Helsinki

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[24] While Rescher's (2000) views on realism as a pragmatic presupposition we arrive at through a transcendental argument are relevant here, I believe our conception of transcendental argumentation itself needs to be subordinated to pragmatism – and this is of utmost significance in pragmatist philosophy of religion, too (cf. Pihlström 2023).

[25] Thanks are due to two anonymous reviewers for truly helpful comments.

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Philosophy and Education

The Long History of Philosophy as a School Subject in Finland: Continuities and Controversies

TUUKKA TOMPERI

Introduction

There is a widespread and persistent misconception of philosophy being a new and young school subject in Finland. The reason for this misrepresentation is that philosophy returned in a renewed form as a compulsory high school subject only as recently as in 1994, after being an optional subject since the early 1970s and very rarely studied in the 1980s in particular. Thus, fewer and fewer people (including teachers and headmasters) remember the times preceding these decades through their own school studies. In reality, however, the historical perspective is very different. The main purpose of my article is to demonstrate that this perception of philosophy as a newcomer is thoroughly incorrect and to provide an overview of the history of teaching philosophy in the Finnish school system. In doing so, I pay particular attention to the varying and contentious interpretations of the identity of the subject. The history has both continuities and breaks, and some of the interpretations and decisions made have had long-lasting consequences for the fate of the subject. Disputes over the subject's alignment have been an enduring feature at least throughout the independent Finland's school history.

In the following, I will offer a concise excursion to the long line of teaching philosophy in the Finnish upper secondary schools (*lukio*, equivalent to other European forms of *lycée*, *gymnasium*, *bachillerato*) from the 16th century to the present, reviewing the main institutional phases and curricular changes chronologically. I will focus more on the pre-contemporary history, which is less known than the stages of the new advent

of upper secondary school philosophy since the early 1990s. I conclude with a brief overview of the major disputes on the nature of the subject in the modern period throughout the 20th century.[1]

Philosophy has been present in several guises in the Finnish school system throughout the history of the pre-university curricula. Philosophical contents, topics and textbooks were already included during the 16th, 17th and 18th century, and since the mid-19th century, philosophy figured in the earliest specified institutional curricula as a compulsory subject under such titles as 'logic', 'psychology' and 'moral lessons'. The recognizable roots of the modern subject date back to the beginning of the 20th century when the 'basics of philosophy' was instituted as a compulsory high school subject in the first core curriculum of independent Finland in 1918.

Despite the fluctuations in philosophy's history as a school subject, there are also marked continuities in its aims and contents, as well as in the problems its teaching has posed and the criticisms it has been subjected to. The most significant curricular and pedagogical problem was its subordinate relationship to the teaching of religion and psychology, which hindered its development as a subject until the 1990s. The most enduring pedagogical tension through the 20th century was the conflict between the aims and content: the ideal formative aims of developing thinking skills and encouraging students' self-reflection of their worldviews and life philosophies colliding with the reality of an academic school subject, with historically presented or otherwise content heavy textbooks and the pressure of preparing for the written matriculation examination. However, this is only one of the key issues and sources for the recurring disagreements which I summarise at the end of the article.

The First Centuries of Formal Education

If one has a basic sense of the cultural history of the systems of education and science, it would not be too difficult to infer that philosophy must have been present since the early days in that

[1] I draw from and elaborate the extensive overview of the history of Finnish upper secondary school philosophy that I presented in my research monograph (Tomperi 2017, 114-200).

part of the formal school curricula that prepares students for academic studies at the university. The medieval conception of the so-called *septem artes liberales* (*trivium*: grammar, rhetoric, dialectic or logic; *quadrivium*: arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy) gradually took diverse concrete forms in emerging early modern European national and local cultures and gave rise to different arrangements of formal schooling. Alongside the obvious foundation of Christian theology, Biblical studies and remnants of scholasticism, Classical Greek and Roman authors (especially Aristotle and Cicero) were held in high esteem within this constellation, and later it was influenced by humanistic scholars (Erasmus, Juan Luis Vives and Petrus Ramus among the most prominent of them) and rising ideas of early modern pedagogues (Jan Amos Comenius in particular). This was the case in the Kingdom of Sweden, as well, the province or eastern part of which Finland remained until 1809.[2]

Philosophy was one of the oldest subjects indicated in the Swedish (and thus Finnish) upper secondary school syllabi. However, we must recognize that this is partly a matter of definition, since we need to remember how significantly the meaning of the term 'philosophy' and its referent have changed over the centuries. Earliest instances of philosophy in school curricula of 16th through to 19th century are found under different names: 'logic', 'metaphysics', 'moral philosophy' or 'practical philosophy' (corresponding to the later 'politics', 'civics' or 'social studies'), 'moral lessons' or 'moral studies' (ethics, in Finnish of the time the obsolete 'siveysoppi', literally 'chastity teachings') and psychology (in Finnish the obsolete 'sielutiede', 'science of soul', a literal translation of the Greek *psyche* + *logos*).[3] As long as 'philosophy' served as a generic term for much of academic study and the as yet undifferentiated later empirical human and social sciences, the term itself was too broad to be used as a denomination for a single school

[2] For a general overview of educational systems in Europe, see Bowen 1975 (esp. Ch. 12–14); in Finland, see Joutsivuo 2010; Nuorteva 2001; Tähtinen & Hovi 2007. The indispensable main source on the developments of philosophy in Finnish academic and scientific history is the recently published *A History of Philosophy and Psychology in Finland, 1809–1917* by Manninen, Ihanus, Jalava & Niiniluoto (2021). I refer the reader to it in places for comparison and a broader picture.

[3] As a comprehensive historical account, see Hanho 1947 (esp. Ch. I and IV).

subject. The lists of early upper secondary school subjects show, however, that what was later to become simply philosophy or taken to be sub-fields of philosophy, figured in the syllabi in many guises.

Until the 19th century, learning reading, writing and eloquence in Latin dominated the content of formal education, alongside Biblical studies and the Greek language. To take as an example a quick snapshot from the earliest official national school regulations ('koulujärjestys') for the grammar schools ('oppikoulu'), instituted by the first Lutheran Archbishop of Sweden, Laurentius Petri, in 1571, it illustrates the difficulty of defining what 'studying philosophy' could mean at that point: "The curriculum generally emphasized strong moral guidance. Young people were required to carefully read a set of Bible verses, aphorisms and life precepts, which were considered suitable for instilling decency (*civilitas morum*), piety and chastity. With this in mind, the school regulations prescribed as textbooks *Disticha Moralia* by Cato, *Praecepta morum* by Camerarius, *De officiis* by Cicero, the Aesop's *Fables*, *De civilitate morum* and *Colloquia familiaria* by Erasmus." (Hanho 1947, 16.)[4]

The first *gymnasium* ('kymnaasi', to which I will be referring somewhat anachronistically in the following as the 'upper secondary school' for consistency) was established in 1630 by upgrading the status of the Turku cathedral school and appointing more lecturers. Ten years later it was further elevated to the first university in Finland, Academy of Turku, in 1640. At that point a new gymnasium was established in Vyborg, later to be moved to Porvoo to escape the Great Northern War (1700–1721). New school regulations for the grammar schools, *trivial schools* ('triviaalikoulu') and the new *gymnasia* were given in 1611, 1649, 1693, 1724 and 1778. However, the practical impact of the official decrees on teaching was usually very limited. One of the *gymnasium's* seven required lecturers was designated for 'history and practical philosophy', also teaching 'moral studies', and another lecturer for 'logic and physics' (or 'natural philosophy'). For instance, according to the regulations of 1724, *Logicus* and *Metaphysica*, as well as *Historica* and *Ethica*, were among the subjects in syllabi. The teaching of logic was based above all on Aristotle's philosophy, as

[4] All translations from Finnish are by the author of the article.

described in the textbooks of the period, and was accompanied to a lesser extent by the teaching of metaphysics. Upper secondary schools were also meant to teach 'practical philosophy' as civics (*disciplina civilis*), using textbooks on moral philosophy written by German scholars, such as *De officio hominis et civis* (1673) by Samuel Pufendorf, professor at Lund University (1668–1676), based on his important main work on the theory of natural law. (Hanho 1947, 215–293; Heikel 1940; Joutsivuo 2010, 116–139; Tähtinen & Hovi 2007; see also Manninen et al. 2021, 11–15.)

In order to get a more solid picture of the reality of formal education in practice and a more comparable starting point to the modern era, it is necessary to move forward to the mid-nineteenth century. In the 19th century, as the country became part of the Russian Empire since 1809, the school system expanded and its regulation became more specific. In the 1843 school regulations, provisions were made for establishing new upper secondary schools, defining their subjects, and appointing lecturers. Initially, there were upper secondary classes in six cities (Vyborg, Porvoo, Helsinki, Turku, Kuopio and Vaasa), and towards the end of the 19th century the number of upper secondary schools doubled. The division of subjects was adjusted to better align with evolving conceptions of the relationships and boundaries between academic disciplines. The list of subjects in 1843 regulations included, as a single subject, 'moral science, logic and psychology' (or 'science of soul', 'sielutiede', as mentioned above), intended especially for those aspiring to clerical or governmental careers, and taught by a lecturer in philosophy. (Hanho 1955, 55–85.)

In the 1856 school regulations, upper secondary schools were divided into civil service *lycea* (*lyceum*, 'lyseo' had now been adopted as the main term for upper secondary) and 'general education' *lycea* for priests, teachers and aspiring administrators. Both types of *lycea* included two weekly lessons of 'psychology and logic' across all three grades. However, a change with far-reaching repercussions was made: to make room for a teacher of the new natural sciences, the post of lecturer in philosophy was abolished, and the teaching of psychology and logic was transferred to the lecturer in religion, while the lecturer in history was assigned the teaching of natural and state law, originally intended for the lecturer in

philosophy. 'Moral studies' (ethics), on the other hand, was combined with religion and church history, and later disappeared as a subject altogether, merging into religious education. (Hanho 1955, 78–79, 113, 119–124, 305–363.) The consequences of these arrangements largely persisted even through the 20th century. Teachers of religious education were responsible for teaching philosophy and psychology, and ethics was never taught as a separate subject but only as a part of religion (and later also of the parallel secular subject 'elämänkatsomustieto', 'worldview/life-view education'). Teachers of history, meanwhile, held the task of teaching social studies. These connections only unraveled very late and had a significant limiting effect on the possibilities for philosophy to develop as a fully-fledged independent school subject.[5]

Some insight into the nature of the subject in the 19th century can be gained from the decrees of the Turku Cathedral Chapter, according to which the following works were available and approved to be used in teaching logic and psychology: the Kantian German professor J. G. C. C. Kiesewetter's translated *Lärobok i logiken* (1806; 'Textbook on logic')[6], Swedish L. M. Engberg's *Försök till lärobok i psykologien* (1824; 'An attempt at a textbook on psychology') and the Hegelian F. G. Afzelius'

[5] Philosophy and psychology were not officially separated as subjects until the end of the 1970s, and teacher training for philosophy majors began only in the mid-1990s. Social studies was officially separated as a subject from history in 2003. And it wasn't until the national core curriculum of 2015 that ethics were taught in common to all upper secondary school students within the subject of philosophy. (Hämäläinen 2024 is a thorough study on the latter issue.)

[6] Kiesewetter had studied shortly in Königsberg under Immanuel Kant and participated closely in Kant's personal circle. Kiesewetter's lectures and books on Aristelian-Kantian logic were popular for decades. The shortest textbook for schools mentioned above, originally *Logik zum Gebrauch für Schulen* (1797), had been translated into Russian as well, which probably contributed to its approval as a textbook in Finland under Russian rule (Krouglov 2011). G. I. Hartman, perhaps the most advanced and original philosopher of his time at the Academy of Turku, also refers to Kiesewetter in his dissertation on the theory of knowledge, *De tribus gradibus persvasionis (des Fürwahrhaltens): credere: opinari: scire* (About the three grades of persuasion (Fürwahrhalten): believing, supposing, and knowing), Hartman (1808/2007); see also Manninen et al. 2021, 24–26.

Utkast till Läröbok i logiken för elementarundervisningen (1839; 'A draft for a textbook in logic for elementary education'), and later, Finnish Z. J. Cleve's Hegel-influenced *Försök till lärobok i psykologi* (1854; 'An attempt at a textbook on psychology'). (Hanho 1955, 265–291.) Cleve was initially the principal of Kuopio *lyceum* and later the professor of pedagogy and didactics at the University of Helsinki (former Academy of Turku), becoming one of the most influential academics and educators of the time. The Finnish translation of the mentioned work as *Sielutieteen oppikirja* (1859; 'Textbook on soul-science') was the first publication in the field in Finnish language. Through this list we can also notice the gradual transition from Kantianism to Hegelianism that took place in Finnish academic learning during the first half of the 19th century.[7]

For a large part of the 19th century, psychology and logic were seen as the core areas of philosophical research into the (natural, non-religious) forms and sources of knowledge available to the human mind and as such very close to each other. Only much later, and in parallel with the increasing criticism of psychologism, did perceptions of the scope of philosophy change, when psychology evolved into empirical research and logic became independent as a formal science. Both were still regarded at that time mainly as the study of the conditions, forms, principles and rules of human mind and thought, and thus as branches of the theory of knowledge under the general philosophical science of the mind or soul (and philosophical anthropology). Consequently, logic and psychology were often regarded as *propaedeutic* – preparatory – foundational disciplines supporting other philosophical and scientific research, and their combined significance was emphasised in many leading 19th century works and textbooks.[8]

The great long-standing debate in formal education during the 19th century concerned the balance between the old classical literary learning (Latin and Greek languages, classical authors and history) and the rising new practical and natural

[7] For a comprehensive account, see Manninen et al. 2021 (Pt. 2).

[8] On the views of Finnish professors of the time from Cleve and Snellman to Rein in this issue, see Manninen et al. 2021, 216–234. For a general overview in the history of philosophy, see e. g. Kusch 1995, 93–119; Haaparanta 2009; Vilkko 2009.

'real' sciences. The long-dominant Latin was weakened towards the end of the century, although it still remained as the major upper secondary school subject alongside mathematics as late as in the early 1880s. The amount of psychology and logic first decreased to two courses (two weekly hours) that were eventually taught in the last year of studies, and after the 1872 regulations, only one course of logic remained. When upper secondary schools were divided in 1883 into two types (or two lines, if they were available in the same institution), the new 'real' *lyceum* and the traditional classical *lyceum*, philosophy was studied only in the latter of these. It could be studied as an optional alternative to Russian language for a maximum of four courses. (Hanho 1955, 305–363; Kiuasmaa 1982, 19–26.)

Philosophy's status was not strong, but it never disappeared completely. Perhaps philosophy was able to maintain its position by sitting on two rather different chairs: it appeared as a part of classical literary education through Cicero's speeches and the humanists' treatises learned in Latin, as well as later contemplative essays and of virtuous examples and life lessons drawn from reflective literature; but on the other hand, the 'core' of modern philosophy, understood as psychology and logic of the time, was seen as a useful theoretical pre-university grounding for further studies. This, too, can be seen as an instance of ambiguities about the nature of philosophy, reflected in the controversies about philosophy as a school subject later on.

The 20th Century: Philosophy and Psychology

By the early 20th century, psychology had proved its potential for advancement as an empirical science, and logic had taken groundbreaking steps in formalisation. Now 'philosophy' as such appears as a name of the school subject in the new school regulations of 1914 as an optional subject with two courses both in the classical and the real stream of *lyceum*. Then, perhaps surprisingly, in the first school regulations and curricula in the decrees of the Senate of independent Finland in 1918, the 'Basics of Philosophy' ('Filosofian alkeet') was made a compulsory subject for all, including in the girls' lyceums, which were a part of the still largely gender-segregated upper secondary system. Philosophy was studied for two hours a week in the

last two years of secondary school, four courses in total, in all types of lyceums. The Matriculation examination was reformed during the same years, and philosophy entered the newly founded 'real' exam (essay test in humanities and natural sciences) with one question yearly. These regulations remained in effect for a long time, despite numerous proposals for reform, until 1941. (Kiuasmaa 1982, 61–69; Kaarninen & Kaarninen 2002, 60–65, 74–87.)

Now for the first time the Finnish senate (in 1916) had also confirmed written descriptions for the different subjects in the curriculum. The 'Basics of Philosophy' was specified in two short sentences: "A short course in psychology with a special focus on spiritual development and self-education. The main points of the criticism of knowledge historically illuminated."[9] The duality I mentioned above is noticeable in this description: on the one hand, the subject was still seen as character-educational and uplifting as an excursion to the philosophies of life, while on the other hand, it reflected the academically grounded themes of psychology and criticism of knowledge. We can also notice another issue that has persistently divided views on the teaching of philosophy: the historical dimension of the subject. Ottelin (1931, 29) offers a synoptic view of the developments from the perspective of intellectual and cultural history in the 19th and early 20th century:

> Neo-humanism did not consider philosophy as a separate subject, because the entire education, especially the reading of classical literature, was supposed to be permeated with humanism. The philosophical idealism soon collapsed under its excessive conceptual structures, leading to aversion towards philosophy as a whole. Additionally, knowledge began to branch into numerous scientific disciplines, making comprehensive mastery increasingly difficult. Philosophy disappeared from the curriculum of most schools, so that by the turn of the century, only a brief course in logic and psychology remained, often even less. However, the increasing fragmentation of knowledge also led to a renewed desire for connection and unity. Already before the First World War, interest in philosophy began to revive.

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[9] Curricular standards for lyceums and secondary schools established by the Senate in 1916, in *Oppikoulu-käsikirja* 1920, 420.

The first Finnish language textbook covering the entire subject, *Filosofian alkeiden oppikirja* ('Textbook for the basics of philosophy') by Paavo Virkkunen, had been published in 1915. It can be assumed that the textbook had a decisive impact on the formulation of the curriculum and the trajectory of philosophy as a subject in the early decades of the 20th century. Virkkunen was a remarkably influential figure in many respects in Finnish politics, culture and education of the time, but in this regard the most important aspect was his position as the principal of the Finnish Normal Lyceum in Helsinki (1908–1918). At that time all the Finnish speaking secondary school subject teachers were trained in this institution, and thus Virkkunen as its principal had considerable influence on the earliest developments of upper secondary teaching in independent Finland.[10] About three-quarters of the textbook deals with elementary 'science of soul', psychology. Virkkunen justifies the approach as follows:

> The vague name of 'Basics of Philosophy' and the breadth of this discipline can make one uncertain about what should be included in this course, especially considering the relatively limited time allotted for its completion. I myself have not the slightest doubt that the core of this syllabus is to be an introductory course in psychology. Only on this basis can the basic questions of philosophy be taught in schools.
>
> … The most important questions of logic, aesthetics and ethics naturally find their place within the presentation of the system of psychology. Teaching shows how philosophical questions gradually emerge from the general study of the life of the soul. After the study thus arranged, it is fitting to examine certain basic philosophical problems that now appear in their proper place, having been prepared by the preceding instruction. (Virkkunen 1938/1915, III–IV.)

Virkkunen's reasoning clearly continues to be strongly influenced by the propaedeutic view of philosophy as a preparation

[10] Paavo Virkkunen (1874–1959; formerly Snellman) was a Doctor of Theology, Lutheran priest and vicar (1918–1951), prominent politician, member of the Parliament for the Coalition Party for 30 years (and briefly the Chairman of the party), the Speaker of the Parliament for several years, and shortly the Minister of Education.

for deeper acquaintance with other academic-scientific contents, and psychology as the foundational core for other topics within philosophy. The centrality of psychology and its structuring in the textbook is clearly influenced above all by professor Thiodolf Rein's textbook on psychology (in Finnish, *Sielutieteen oppikirja*, 1884).[11] There are many similarities between Rein's book on psychology and Virkkunen's textbook. For instance, both present the triad of faculties of cognition, emotion and will, which was still the dominant conception of the dimensions of human psyche at the time, although it was already being subjected to strong criticism in the wake of empirical psychology.[12]

In a couple of decades another two textbooks were published, *Filosofian alkeiden oppikirja – oppikouluja varten* (1925; 'Textbook of the basics of philosophy – for the secondary schools') by lecturer Yrjö Ora, and the lighter and shorter *Filosofian alkeet* (1932; 'The basics of philosophy') by author, journalist and sportsman, PhD Heikki Lehmusto. Both had psychology as the main part of the content, although not quite as dominantly as in Virkkunen's book. The first half of Ora's textbook deals with the main features of psychology and the slightly shorter second half with logic, aesthetics, ethics, epistemology and metaphysics. Ora rephrases the established structural justification clearly:

> A prerequisite for assessing the validity of a philosophical worldview is a study of the possibilities and limits of human

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[11] Rein had been appointed to the position of Professor of Philosophy at the University of Helsinki in 1869, succeeding J. V. Snellman. During his long tenure, Rein had also written influential and much-used textbooks on logic (in Swedish, *Lärobok i formell logik*; in Finnish, *Muodollisen logiikan oppikirja*; both published in 1882), pioneering the formulation of new Finnish scientific terminology in psychology, logic and philosophy; see e. g. Manninen et al. 2021, 222–234.

[12] The triad 'faculties of mind/soul' also features in the works of Mikael Soininen, the most prominent Finnish educationalist and educational theorist of his time, such as his *Kasvatusopilliset luennot* (1895; 'Lectures on Educational Theory') and *Opetusoppi I* (1901; 'Didactics'), as well as in Virkkunen's own work, *Kasvatusopin luonnos* (1906; 'Sketch for an Educational Theory'). For an overview on the issue in Swedish(-Finnish) philosophy and psychology textbooks of the time, see Rydberg 2008, 31–41.

> knowledge, a question which, in turn, requires a psychological investigation into how thinking occurs in reality. And without taking into account the facts of emotional and volitional life, it is not possible to arrive at a satisfactory lifeview. Thus, psychology remains the foundation on which all philosophical thought must be built. Closely connected with it is formal logic, i.e. the doctrine of formally correct thinking. Both are called the *preparatory* (*propaedeutic*) branches of philosophy. (Ora 1925, 10–11.)

Judging from the textbooks, it appears that within upper secondary school education, views on the nature of psychology and the boundaries of philosophy were a decade or two behind the scientific changes taking place in universities. Regarding the advancements in empirical psychological research, Lehmusto's later book is even more outdated than the preceding ones by Virkkunen and Ora. School subjects are always slower to change than scientific disciplines, but in the case of philosophy this lag became a particularly significant issue and an object of criticism for decades in Finnish debates on the subject.

The next decree on the national curriculum was issued in 1941, and the division of the upper secondary school curriculum into a mathematical stream and a language stream was established. The subject was now renamed 'psychology and philosophy', in line with the prevailing practice and content, and reflecting the scientific development of psychology. In the curriculum of the last few classical lyceums, it remained a common subject for all, with two hours a week in the last two years of secondary school, as before. In all the other upper secondary schools, it was instead an optional alternative subject to biology and geography. (Kiuasmaa 1982, 324–327, 637–638, Appendices.)

The 1975 decree abolished the parallel linear system and introduced a new curriculum for all upper secondary schools. It divided subjects into compulsory subjects and optional ones, the latter including psychology and philosophy. This finally put an end to the already rare special status of philosophy in the classical lyceum curricula. The subject had to compete with physics, chemistry, geography, arts and music, among others, for the few optional weekly hours that pupils could fit into their timetable. In 1977, the Upper Secondary School Curriculum Committee proposed the formal separation of the subjects

of psychology and philosophy. The new curriculum for upper secondary schools, introduced in 1982, separated the curricula of psychology and philosophy in accordance with the proposal. However, now only psychology was made a national elective subject for all upper secondary schools and students, with 3–5 courses, while philosophy was relegated to the status of a school-specific (optionally offered) elective subject with 1–2 courses. (Kiuasmaa 1982, 455–466, 645–646.) This decision reflected the relationship between the subject areas of psychology and philosophy and the proportional difference in the weighting of the content taught.

The subject of psychology had already effectively become detached from philosophy in school well before their formal separation. As psychology had become established as an empirical science, both the original theoretical justification and the practical rationale for the close link between the disciplines disappeared. Their separation as scientific disciplines had been institutionalised in Finland when the first chair for a professor of psychology was established at the University of Jyväskylä in 1936. The professorship of psychology was separated from theoretical philosophy and established at the University of Helsinki in 1951. The first professor of the discipline at Helsinki, Kai von Fieandt (1947, 7), defined psychology in his academic textbook in no uncertain terms as a 'biological science', a "study of life governed by the central nervous system".

In secondary school textbooks, the teaching of psychology took off on its own when professor of psychology Arvo Lehtovaara's textbook on psychology, *Kokeellista menetelmää noudattava sielutieteen oppikirja* ("Psychology textbook according to the empirical method"), appeared in 1945. It was not until ten years later that professor of adult education Urpo Harva's *Suuria ajattelijoita* (1955, "Great thinkers") appeared as a new textbook for philosophy and turned out to be the book that similarly dominated philosophy teaching for the next decades. Harva's book was much more limited in content than Lehtovaara's, reflecting the difference in the number of hours taught. The immediate and sustained popularity of Lehtovaara's textbook showed how in the context of a still formally and nominally common subject, the amount of courses and proportion of content taught in psychology had become

considerably higher.[13] The increased share of psychology was also clearly reflected in the Matriculation exam. Initially, philosophy was included in the subject group Religion, Church History and Philosophy, and there was one question yearly focused on philosophy. In 1950 the subject group was divided into two parts, Religious Studies and Church History, and Psychology and Philosophy. There were now five questions for both religion and psychology, and still only one for philosophy. Psychology gradually became one of the most popular subjects in the 'real' exam, with the third highest number of answers, after history and religion, between 1971 and 1990. (Kaarninen & Kaarninen 2002, 181–183, 266–269, 314.)

Harva's textbook *Suuria ajattelijoita* was a short, essentially booklet-like cavalcade of the history of philosophy, introducing 15 philosophers from Socrates to Nietzsche, and including a very short concluding chapter on 'philosophy in this century'. This historical approach through 'great philosophers' was probably in keeping with the established way philosophy was usually taught in schools. The approach was repeatedly criticised by academic philosophers, but the criticism did not have practical effect on the teaching of the subject.[14] The debate on the backwardness of school philosophy was particularly visible in the 1960s, in the context of major Finnish school reforms. The philosopher Erkka Maula published a textbook, *Filosofian aapinen* ('Philosophy ABC', 1968), in an attempt to revise the subject to reflect the main contemporary issues in academic philosophy, and insisting on the history of philosophy to be transferred to the subject of history: "...if the subject of history continues to examine the influence of major currents of thought in the past, I believe that the teaching of philosophy in schools can present the basics of the systematics of contemporary philosophy"[15]. However, Maula's book remained very little used in upper secondary schools, so evidently the approach did not appeal to teachers.[16]

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[13] After the initial publication, there were reprints almost yearly, adding up to, for instance, 14th revised edition in 1963; see Tomperi 2017, 133.

[14] More on this debate, see Tomperi 2017 (esp. Ch. 3.3).

[15] Maula 1968, 6. See also, Maula 1965.

[16] This cannot, however, be attributed solely to its thematic non-historical approach, as it is in many ways a failure as a textbook and was also heavily criticised when it was published, see Tomperi 2017, 173–175.

A few years later, Harva published two new textbooks for the now reformed curriculum, *Maailmankatsomuksen ongelmia* (1973; 'Problems of the worldview'; 6th ed. 1980) and *Moraalin ongelmia* ('Problems of morality'; 4th ed. 1980). Judging by the number of editions, they also had a considerably large school circulation, unlike Maula's textbook. However, Harva's original and in many ways outdated *Suuria ajattelijoita* remained the most popular textbook by far and went through numerous editions (without any revisions according to the new curricula), being still read even in the late 1980s. As late as 1989 and 1995, the 15th and 16th editions of Harva's book were published.

The numerous reprints of Harva's three books suggest that philosophy was still taught in a considerable number of secondary schools up to the early 1980s. However, as philosophy became only a possible school-specific optional subject, it almost disappeared from upper secondary education during the 1980s. It was only at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s that the number of students began to increase slightly: In 1987–88 there were about 500 students studying philosophy and it was taught in about 35 upper secondary schools (out of a total of about 500 upper secondary schools), in 1989–90 there were 1742 students, and in 1992–93 philosophy was taught in about 120 upper secondary schools to more than 3500 students.[17] Then eventually, the subject of philosophy was transformed and modernised in one decisive swoop when it was made compulsory for all in the 1994 curricula, after which all the more than 35 000 students starting upper secondary school took at least the one required introductory course. From the 2015 curriculum onwards, there have been two compulsory courses of philosophy (introduction and ethics) for all.

These latest developments, however, are recent history, and thus another story, better known today than the subject's previous centuries. The main point of the article has become now clear: in one way or another, philosophy has been present in Finnish upper secondary schools without a break throughout the history of formal education. Interpretations of the nature

[17] Nordenbo 1997. The figures may not be complete and certainly not precise, but a corresponding picture emerges from the increase in the number of answers to the matriculation examination, see Elo 1994.

and function of the subject have varied, and sometimes it has been optional or taught only in some forms of upper secondary education, but at no point has it disappeared from upper secondary education completely.

Enduring Criticisms and Controversies

There is, of course, much more to be said of the subject's trajectories and challenges during the last 100 years, but I will end up characterising briefly the main topics for debate that have recurred several times along this long history. Throughout the 20th century, the subject often drew severe criticism, and most commentators, philosophers and educationalists alike, were dissatisfied with the way the subject was presented and taught in schools, albeit for different reasons. In what follows, I will not take any positions on the resolution of the controversies but will simply present the most important of them as a historical overview of the problems faced in reconstructing philosophy as a school subject.[18]

At least the following problems have been repeatedly debated since the early 20th century in discussions on philosophy's place in schools:

- Should philosophy be an independent subject or integrated to other subjects and topics?

- Should it be compulsory for all or only optional for those who are academically gifted or oriented to continue to universities?

- Should it concentrate on the disciplinary substance and contents (presented either historically or thematically) or focus on practicing the skills of philosophical thinking (and whether these can be condensed in a method or particular forms of reasoning)?

- Should it offer a synoptic picture of philosophy as a discipline or focus only on those sub-problems that are held to be the most relevant in contemporary academic philosophy and/or the most useful for students today?

- Should the history of philosophy be a part of the subject (and how essential), or should the curriculum concentrate on

[18] For a comprehensive account (including some positioning), see Tomperi 2017 (esp. Ch. 3 and 5).

contemporary philosophical problems and advances? Does the history of philosophy rather belong to the curriculum of history?

- Should it distill the contemporary academic discipline of philosophy or also draw from different other interpretations (historical, literary, artistic etc.) of what philosophy can be and has been?

- Who should be eligible to teach philosophy? Does the teaching require deep acquaintance with philosophy as a discipline or are graduates with a master's degree in other disciplines (religion, psychology, history) also capable of teaching philosophy competently?

For the most part of the 20th century, there was recurring debate on the competence of teachers of religion to teach philosophy. The controversy arose from the practical reality that, because of the structure of the profession and teaching posts and the relationship between subjects, it was religious education teachers who almost invariably taught philosophy (and psychology) until the late 1990s. The same pattern often still prevails, although since the mid-1990s it has been possible to become a subject teacher with a Major in philosophy. Without taking a position on the question as such, it is clear, however, that the independent development of philosophy as a subject in Finland was substantially hindered and curtailed by its subordination to religion and psychology as school subjects. It was only in the 1990s that the actual development of the subject didactics of philosophy began.

In Finland, psychology had an exceptionally strong position, even in international comparison, first as a subfield of philosophy and then as an independent empirical science, at a time when the relationship between the disciplines was taking shape. In the 1880s, Rein's most important students, Arvid Grotenfelt and Hjalmar Neiglick, visited Wilhelm Wundt's laboratory in Leipzig and both wrote their dissertations on experimental psychology, as did Eino Kaila, who was appointed professor of philosophy after Grotenfelt. (See e.g. Salmela 2007; Silvonen 2006; Manninen et al. 2021, 234–259.) Especially Rein's and Grotenfelt's views had a clear influence on Virkkunen's and other educationalists' understanding of the role of psychology within the subject of philosophy. Kaila, for his part, emerged as the leading figure in Finnish science and

academy, establishing the importance of psychological research. Although psychology gradually became differentiated as a scientific discipline, as a school subject it remained combined with philosophy and gained a dominant position within the common subject.

The second factor contributing to a kind of instability and lack of consolidation of philosophy as a subject stemmed from the many differences in interpretations on the nature of philosophy itself, even after psychology had already diverged onto its own path. Synthesising the disputes I listed above, one can see at least a threefold tension that persisted throughout the 20th century. The first interpretation regarded philosophy as a culturally significant subject for general education, introducing the history of Western thought by discussing prominent historical philosophers. The second interpretation saw philosophy as a progressing academic discipline, largely detached from its history. And thirdly, philosophy was seen as an explorer of questions of life, summarising, clarifying and harmonising the worldview of the individual, for which philosophical themes and reflections on wider culture (literature, history, art) were also useful. In the textbooks mentioned above, this division is evident: Harva's first book represented the historical approach, whereas Maula's book followed an academic disciplinary structure, and Harva's later books engaged in existential and moral contemplation, drawing from a variety of sources beyond the confines of academic philosophy or its history.

These oscillations, particularly in the main decades of the scientific renewal of philosophy and psychology, led to a sense of unease about the state of the subject and to proposals to remove it from schools, by both educationalists and philosophers. For instance, the textbook-author and educator Ora (1943, 60) wrote:

> The first question that arises is whether there is any subject that could be completely removed from the curriculum. I would answer for my part: there is one, namely the basics of philosophy. This subject, which I myself have taught for years, has been part of the syllabus for twenty years, but now seems ripe for removal. The results of its teaching have been severely criticised by the university, and the course is now largely obsolete. Reform of the course, on the other hand, faces great difficulties when the

> disciplines of psychology and philosophy are currently in such an unstable state as they are at present.

Ora's thoughts echo almost word for word philosopher G. H. von Wright's (1943, 269) essay on the state of school philosophy, published the same year:

> It should be pointed out, however, that a truly purposeful reorganisation of school philosophy, if it is undertaken, will face great difficulties. These are partly due to the fact that, even in university teaching, it has not been possible to meet by far all the requirements which are appropriate to the subject itself. Against this background, one could even take a strong stance against the teaching of philosophy in schools and propose the total or partial abolition of it. Such a measure would in fact be a step forward in many respects compared with the desperate situation in which philosophy is currently taught in our schools....

In that essay, already 80 years ago, von Wright (1943, 269) also succinctly encapsulated a version of the most persistent dilemma inherent in the nature of philosophy as a school subject:

> The teaching of philosophy (including psychology) in schools seeks to promote two purposes that are quite sharply distinguishable. The first is to widen the pupils' knowledge of new facts, the second is to mature their general intellectual level and sharpen their logical instincts.

This is the problem of balance between learning substantial content knowledge and practising (philosophical) thinking skills I already mentioned in the Introduction. The problem continues to stimulate the most pertinent discussions within the field of philosophy didactics today. However, the current psychological and educational understanding of the issue is more forgiving than von Wright's dilemma: by now, it is acknowledged that subject/discipline-specific thinking skills cannot be learned without a thorough understanding of the content; they cannot be separated, but the persistent challenge is to operationalise how best to put this relationship into practice. The problem is undoubtedly a perennially difficult one for the didactics of philosophy, but the guidelines von Wright (1943, 272) proposed still serve as a useful point of reference in the pursuit of this goal:

A. The teaching must be comprehensible, i.e. it must not contain anything that could only be acquired by mechanical memorization.

B. Teaching must remain as close as possible to the rest of the world of knowledge transmitted to the pupils.[19]

Tampere University

Acknowledment

Research for this article has been funded by the Kone Foundation in projects DemoKrit (201710543) and FutuPedaFilo (202108799).

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[19] However, von Wright's own proposition does not seem quite realistic, either in his time or today: he suggested that the main substance of school philosophy courses should consist of (1) formal logic, and (2) epistemology, the latter of which "should be centred around two main problems: the question of the nature of deductive, mainly mathematical, reasoning on the one hand, and the nature of inductive, or generalised, empirical knowledge on the other". In this we surely can hear echoes of his early logical empiricism and of the young philosopher's recent dissertation *The Logical Problem of Inductivism* (1941).

asteesta: uskomisesta, luulemisesta, tietämisestä. Transl. Raija Sarasti-Wilenius. Ed. Jarkko S. Tuusvuori, in *Turun Akatemian latinankielisten väitöskirjojen suomennoksia*. Tampere: Eurooppalaisen filosofian seura. *Filosofia.fi*: filosofia.fi/fi/kokoelma/turun-akatemian-latinankielisten-vaitoskirjojen-suomennoksia

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The Teaching of Logic in Finnish School Philosophy: A Historical Perspective

MIKA PERÄLÄ & EERO SALMENKIVI

The provision of Philosophy at schools is determined by the nature of the discipline, its relationship with other school subjects, and the role assigned to it within the prevailing ideals of education. According to the current *National Core Curriculum for General Upper Secondary Education* (NCC 2019), Philosophy aims to provide the conceptual basis for understanding and reviewing different conceptions of the world, society, and the human being. Philosophy should also teach general thinking and argumentation skills as well as help understand the similarities and differences between other school subjects. A study of the history of the discipline suggests that within Philosophy, logic has provided not only technical thinking skills but also the methodology required for integrating the different fields of knowledge and inquiry. Additionally, logic has offered a fitting introduction to Philosophy itself.

In this article, we focus on the history of the teaching of logic in Finnish schools. Logic has been a significant part of Philosophy since the Turku Cathedral School (1630) was established in the late 13th century. Logic was understood in the broad Aristotelian and Scholastic sense, i.e., including epistemology and methodology, until the early 20th century when professional philosophers in Finland started promoting the more narrowly conceived modern formal logic. Since formal logic, thus understood, was not an easy subject to teach, it was overshadowed by psychology that became the core of gymnasium philosophy for much of the 20th century. During the 2010s, logic returned to school philosophy with an informal approach, as one of the primary objectives of Philosophy became and even today is to provide the general argumentation skills essential for fostering critical thinking.

In what follows, we explore the content of introductory philosophy courses from medieval times to the present day and substantiate the foregoing claims about the history of the teaching of logic in Finnish schools. We do not consider ethics education, which since the mid-19th century primarily fell under the responsibility of religious instructors until it returned to Philosophy in 2014 (Hanho 1955; NCC 2015; Tomperi 2017). In referring to what is currently called General upper secondary school in English (*lukio* in Finnish), we shall apply the term 'gymnasium', which even today remains the official term in Swedish.

Logic Instruction in Trivial Schools before the Establishment of Gymnasium in the 17th Century

To contextualise the situation in Finland, we begin by outlining a brief history of philosophy education. The study of logic held a significant place in philosophy education since at least the commentators of Plato and Aristotle during the Roman Imperial era. In philosophical schools representing Platonic philosophy at that time, studies commenced with Aristotle's logical works, which were deemed to provide necessary tools for more advanced studies—these works were even referred to by the Greek term *Organon*. Progressing from logic, studies moved on to Aristotle's natural philosophy, the goal of the studies being a profound understanding of Plato's dialogues, especially the *Timaeus* and *Parmenides* (Sorabji 1990; Falcon 2016).

The progression of philosophical studies from Aristotelian to Platonic philosophy was also evident in the medieval university system. Aristotle's works were primarily studied in the lower philosophical faculty, which aimed to prepare students for theology, law, and medical studies. Basic philosophy studies in medieval universities included a thorough introduction to logic, which prominently featured dialectic, or the art of argumentation, as discussed in Aristotle's *Topics*. The importance of argumentation cannot be overstated. It was not only practised for sharpening philosophical thinking skills but was also demonstrated in public debates, disputations, as a display of scholarship even in the higher faculties of a university. (Grant 1996; Himanka 2015; Weijers, 2010.)

In the area that currently constitutes Finland and which at the time was a part of Sweden, there were no universities during the medieval period. The most significant educational institution in the Medieval times was the Turku Cathedral School that was responsible for the education of priests. The school operated in conjunction with the Turku Cathedral Chapter, possibly since its establishment in 1276 (Iisalo 1987, 11). The curriculum of the Cathedral School followed the traditional trivium, comprising grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic. Studies began with grammar, that is, the study of Latin, followed by an introduction to Latin literature and the basics of rhetoric. Dialectic was studied in the upper, fourth class. Teachers likely used Peter of Spain's *Summulae logicales* as a logic textbook, later the rhetorically oriented work *De inventione dialectica* by the Dutch humanist Rudolf Agricola. In Sweden's cathedral schools, quadrivium, comprising arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music, was taught only briefly, mainly for ecclesiastical purposes such as calculating feast days (Hanho 1947, 3–4).

The Reformation did not bring significant changes to the initial philosophy studies. The curriculum outlined in Sweden's first school ordinance from 1571 emphasised moral guidelines. Suitable textbooks mentioned included Cicero's *De officiis*, Aesop's fables, Erasmus's *De civilitate morum*, and *Colloquia familiaria* (Hanho 1947, 16). The philosophical and humanistic tradition thus provided foundations for ethics education, which, however, remained subservient to theological ethics.

From Logic to Natural Philosophy – Philosophy Education in Gymnasium in the 17th Century

In the 17th century, at the proposal of King Gustavus II Adolphus, German-style gymnasia were established in Sweden, typically offering instruction in at least Latin, Greek, theology, philosophy, physics, and mathematics. Finland's first gymnasium was founded in Turku (Åbo in Swedish) in 1630, followed by another in Vyborg in 1641 (Hanho 1947, 50, 55). When the Turku gymnasium expanded into the Turku Academy encompassing all four faculties in 1640, students no longer needed to travel abroad for academic studies. The core course of study in gymnasium and university philosophy was

logic, which according to the 1611 school ordinance, were to be based on Petrus Ramus's logic, i.e., *Dialecticae libri duo* (Frankfurt 1581), although Aristotle's works were also recommended for more advanced students. According to the 1649 school ordinance, the textbook should continue to be Ramus's logic, or alternatively, Johann Scharf's *Elementa logices* or Conrad Dietericus's *Epitome praeceptorum dialecticae*. (Hanho 1947, 275)

In the late 17th and early 18th century, Petrus Aurivillius' *Elementa logicae peripateticae*, published in 1672, with the eighth renewed edition by Jacob Boëtius in 1744, and Anders Rydelius's *Nödiga förnuftsövningar att lära känna det sundas vägar och det osundas felsteg*, published in 1718, were the required textbooks (Hanho 1947, 275–276). As the title indicates, the latter book discussed not only valid reasoning but also informal fallacies that were identified no less than eleven (see also Lagerlund 2020, 238–239). Later in the 18th century, Johannes Plenning's textbook *Logica usui juniorum in epitomen redacta* (Västerås 1739), its abridgement *Rudimenta logicae in usum tironum contracta* (Västerås 1778) and Petrus Arosenius's Swedish version *Första bokstäfverna af förnuftsläran eller slutkonsten* (Västerås 1756) proved to be enduring, as they were still used in schools in the Turku diocese in the early 19th century—although not without criticism. In a speech delivered in 1748, the rector of Pori trivial school, Johan Kraftman, criticised logic textbooks for being filled with complex and content-poor rules that confused students and did not promote the development of judgment. In Porvoo gymnasium, Plenning's logic was replaced in the 1770s by the textbook *Compendium logicae* (1754) by Nils Wallerius, Professor at Uppsala University, which was subsequently used not only in Porvoo gymnasium but also in trivial schools in the Porvoo diocese. (Hanho 1947, 275)

How were these textbooks used in teaching? Sources do not provide a direct answer to this question, but even a cursory examination reveals what aspects the authors considered important. For example, the approximately one-hundred-page overview of logic contained in the first part of Johannes Gezelius the Elder's *Encyclopaedia synoptica* (1672), reissued by Simon Tolpo as *Joh. Gezelii Synopsis logica* (Turku 1695) defines logic as the art of debating well *(ars bene disserendi*). Gezelius does not disclose his sources, but the definition appears, among other places, in Ramus's logic (Lounela, 1979, 48).

Gezelius (1672, 6) presents this definition as the internal goal of logic, while he mentions knowledge of truth (*veritatis cognitio*) as its external goal. Following the tradition of humanist rhetoric, Gezelius (1672, 20) divides logic into two dimensions: *inventio*, the invention of arguments, and *judicium*, the evaluation of arguments. An argument (*argumentum*) is characterised as a simple logical notion of arguing for or against a given claim (*ad arguendum thema affecta*). Argumentation itself is broadly interpreted as it includes as many as eight dimensions: observation (*respicere*), demonstration (*ostendere*), assertion (*declarare*), clarification (*explicare*), illumination (*illustrare*), confirmation (*confirmare*), testing (*probare*), and refutation (*refutare*). Thus understood, logic encompasses not only formally valid logical reasoning but also all thinking and investigation aimed at truth. In other words, logic also includes epistemology.

In the main, Gezelius's overview consists of definitions of key terms, the principles (*canones*) related to them, and examples from which the teacher presumably selected those suitable for teaching purposes. However, the overview is heavy and dictionary-like. A better fit for teaching purposes would for instance be the abridged version of Plenning's logic, *Rudimenta Logicae*, which is presented in a clear question-and-answer format. It is a small-sized, 60-page booklet, where logic is divided into a theoretical and a practical part. The theoretical part comprises of four chapters: ideas and terms, definition and classification, judgment and proposition, and reasoning and syllogism. The practical part consists of three chapters, the first of which concerns the nature of truth, the second certainty of truth and probability, and the third different ways to find truth. This work also introduces the basic concepts and principles as well as illuminates them with examples. Although the booklet is concise, it among other things covers conditional, disjunctive, and conjunctive propositions and syllogisms that Aristotle did not address in his logic. An example concerning disjunctive syllogism is as follows: 'The world is either eternal or created in time. But the world is created in time. Therefore, it is not eternal.' (Plenning 1778, 39; the authors' translation)

The 1724 school regulations stipulated that in larger gymnasia, theoretical philosophy should also consider the different branches of philosophy, schools of thought, and their

differences. Gezelius's overview mentions logic, metaphysics, pneumatology (or the study of the soul), and physics as the different branches of Philosophy. The fact that Gezelius only names the fields of theoretical philosophy reflects the emphasis of the works he used as sources, which apparently also reflected the emphasis of philosophy in school education. When the same school regulations mandated that the logic lecturer should also teach the basics of metaphysics (Hanho 1947, 276), it can be inferred that other fields of philosophy were not within his responsibility. Physics had already been assigned a separate lecturer position in gymnasia as part of Gustavus II Adolphus's reform efforts.

Although physics as a general natural science or natural history included, among other things, physiology and botany, its approach was highly theoretical and still based on Aristotle's physics and medieval astronomy (Hanho 1947, 53–55). After 1626, the textbook for physics was Johannes Magirus's *Physiologiae peripateticae libri sex cum commentariis*, which was based on the writings of Aristotle, Albertus Magnus, Jacobus Zabarella, and others. The 1649 school regulations prescribed Johann Scharf's *Manuale physicum ordine consueto Aristotelico conscriptum* as the physics textbook, while the 1693 regulations recommended Johannes Franckenius's *Speculum botanicum* for botany. In the 1724 regulations, it was required that the logic lecturer also teach physics. (Hanho, 1947, 280–281) The reason why physics was quite theoretical in nature can be explained by the fact that gymnasium education in these regulations was primarily intended as a foundation for clergy.

However, the surrounding society was changing, and there were increasing pressures to reform the school system for a larger societal benefit. One of the most notable critics of contemporary educational aims was Johan Browallius, who served as the Professor of Physics at the Turku Academy from 1737 and as the Bishop of the Diocese of Turku from 1749. He had been a student of Carl von Linné in Uppsala and had possibly familiarised himself with John Locke's work, *Some Thoughts concerning Education* (1693), which was translated into Swedish in 1709. Locke advocated for moral education as well as for the practical and societal benefits of general knowledge rather than solely for the pure academic scholarship. Browallius presented his criticism and new proposals in a

manuscript titled *Oförgripeliga tankar om underwisningswärket wid gymnasier och scholarne i riket*, which he anonymously submitted to the Chancellery Board responsible for censorship in late 1749. According to him, 'natural history promotes teaching itself, as nothing is easier for children to learn' (Hanho 1947, 79; the authors' translation). Furthermore, he considered natural history essential for all areas of life and beneficial even for those aspiring to become priests. He argued that by learning natural history, a priest 'acquires clear concepts that lead to true, useful philosophy, whereas what has been taught under the name of philosophy so far is something that benefits more in speech and lecture halls than in life and profession' (ibid.). The Parliamentary Board of Education considered the proposal and incorporated many of the aspects presented in it in the draft school regulations of 1760. For example, it was proposed that the teaching of logic and Hebrew should be transferred from trivial school to gymnasium, and natural history should be introduced as a new subject in both levels. However, the proposal was not approved due to the prevailing political situation in the parliament (Hanho 1947, 86–88).

Psychology Is to Be Taught alongside Logic in the 19th Century

Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy under Russia in 1809. In the early decades of the 19th century, parliamentary committees as well as some dioceses of the Lutheran Church made several proposals for the reform of the school system. The proposals primarily concerned the poor pay of teachers, the establishment of new schools, and the establishment of schooling to serve the educational needs of those aspiring for government positions or seeking careers in business. From the perspective of philosophy education, the most significant reform was the proposal made by the Second School Commission in 1826 to teach psychology alongside logic in gymnasium. The Senate approved the suggestion in the school regulations of 1843. This was a substantial reform of the entire education system, as it also mandated the establishment of girls' schools, where philosophy was not taught. Upper trivium schools and gymnasia were divided into two tracks: one, call it A-track, aimed at those aspiring for the clergy and the

other, hereafter B-track, aimed at those pursuing government positions and other professions. The tracks differed in that only A-track students studied Greek and Hebrew as well as theology in gymnasium, while only B-track students studied French, natural history, drawing, and essay writing in gymnasium. A-track students studied more Latin, while B-track students studied Russian. In both tracks, psychology and logic were studied for two hours per week in the second year of gymnasium. Latin remained central, as philosophy teachers were required to use Cicero's philosophical writings in their teaching of psychology and logic (Hanho 1955, 58–61).

With the addition of new subjects such as modern languages, as well as statistics, algebra, and chemistry, something had to be cut, among other things, metaphysics and debating sessions. Since there were so few hours allocated to philosophy, a further development in the school regulations of 1856 was that the position of gymnasium philosophy teacher was abolished, and the teaching of logic was assigned to the theology teacher. Psychology and logic were studied in both general gymnasia and in gymnasia intended for civil servants (Hanho 1955, 120–124). However, in the school regulations of 1872, only logic is mentioned, which was taught only in gymnasia teaching Latin for two hours per week. Logic was entirely absent from the new realia schools teaching modern languages. (Hanho 1955, 343.)

In the realm of logic, the textbooks initially comprised Plenning's logic, followed by F.G. Afzelius's *Utkast till lärobok i logiken för elementar-undervisningen* (Uppsala 1839, Helsinki 1856). Afzelius was a lecturer in Uppsala gymnasium. In terms of his philosophical orientation, he was a Hegelian, but this shows only occasionally in his elementary textbook, which was traditionally divided into four parts—concepts, judgement, inference, and method—and included some Kantian additions that were typical at the time, such as the distinction between content and form as well as the idea that logic differs from psychology in that it does not tell us how we think but rather how we should think, i.e., logic considers general and necessary laws of thought. Afzelius presents four laws of thought: the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, the law of sufficient reason, and the law of the excluded middle. In these respects, Afzelius's textbook can be compared to

Alexis Lindholm's more extensive, academic textbook *Lörobok i logiken* that was published three years before (Lagerlund 2020, 240–241). However, the two books differ with respect to their approach. As Afzelius tells in his introduction, he was compelled to compose the textbook because he had learned from his own experience as a teacher that Lindholm's treatise does not serve the needs of gymnasium teaching. The publication of introductory textbooks thus concurred with the advancement of the academic study of logic in Kantian and Hegelian footsteps. In 1840, a Finnish Hegelian Johan Vilhelm Snellman published his *Lärobok i logiken* which constitutes a second part of his *Philosophisk elementar-curs*. The next notable academic textbook and the first in Finnish was Thiodolf Rein's *Oppikirja muodollisessa logiikassa*, first published, also in Swedish, in 1882 with a fifth edition as late as in 1933 (with the revised title *Muodollisen logiikan oppikirja*). Even if by that time the study of formal logic had taken several new steps in Germany and England, the later editions of the book showed no sign of these developments. (Vilkko 1999.)

As regards the teaching of psychology, the textbook authored by L.M. Enberg, the rector of Stockholm gymnasium, *Försök till lärobok i psykologien* (Stockholm 1824), was used until it was superseded by Z.J. Cleve's work *Försök till lärobok i psykologi* upon its publication in Helsinki in 1854 (2nd ed. 1858). Cleve was a significant educational theorist in Finland, serving as a professor of education and pedagogy at the University of Helsinki from 1862 to 1882. He was a Hegelian and neohumanist. Cleve's Hegelianism was reflected in his divergence from Kant's tripartite division of the soul into faculties of cognition (*kunskapsförmåga*), emotion (*känsloförmåga*), and desire (*begärinsförmåga*). Instead, Cleve adopted a dualistic approach distinguishing between reason (*förnuft*) and will (*vilja*). Johan Vilhelm Snellman also adopted this dualistic view in his *Lärobok i psychologien*, which was the first part of his *Philosofisk elementar-kurs* (Stockholm 1837). However, Cleve and Snellman differed in their understanding of emotion, with Cleve suggesting it related to both reason and will, while Snellman linked it solely to the will. (Rydberg 2008, 34.)

In school education of psychology, there were thus two distinct views on the faculties of the soul. The tripartite division was based on Kant's delineation in his work *Anthropologie in*

pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798), while Hegel, followed by Snellman, settled for a dualistic approach, understanding emotion as a kind of obscure cognition, or thought. Thiodolf Rein elucidates this divergence in his textbook on psychology, *Sielutieteen oppikirja* (1884). Rein himself adhered to the Kantian perspective and criticised Johann Friedrich Herbart, for considering cognition as the sole genuine function of the soul and for regarding both emotion and will as its manifestations. This critique is noteworthy as, within the field of educational science, the Herbartianism advocated by Mikael Soininen displaced Hegelianism, represented by Snellman and Cleve, in the late 19th century Finland. However, both Soininen, in his work *Yleinen kasvatusoppi* (1900, 13–14), and Paavo Virkkunen, the principal of Helsinki Finnish Normal Lyceum, in his draft of educational science *Kasvatusopin luonnos* (1906, 21–52), adhered to Rein's tripartite division. This division was central in Virkkunen's textbook *Filosofian alkeiden oppikirja* (1915), of which two-thirds were dedicated to psychology. In the preface to the textbook, Virkkunen articulates a lucid explanation as to why, in his interpretation, psychology holds such a central position in philosophy education:

> I have not the slightest doubt that the cornerstone of this curriculum is the introductory course in psychology. Only on this basis can the fundamental questions of philosophy be taught in schools. Without possessing any knowledge of the main aspects of mental life, it is impossible for students to understand the actual problems of philosophy. If these are directly addressed, then I can conceive of nothing but the entire teaching becoming scarcely anything other than floundering in thin air. On the other hand, a suitably formed introductory course in psychology renders the best services both to young learners themselves and to the teaching subject of the fundamentals of philosophy. (Virkkunen 1915, Preface, the authors' translation.)

According to Virkkunen, then, psychology can provide students with such knowledge of the mind and its activities that is helpful not only for their study of philosophy but also for their life outside the academia.

The State of Disarray in Gymnasium Philosophy Education in the 20th Century

Virkkunen's textbook appeared just before Finland gained independence in 1917, at which time the subject covering both psychology and logic was renamed as the fundamentals of philosophy. The curriculum approved by the Senate defined the subject as follows: 'A brief course in psychology focusing on questions of mental development and self-education. Main points of knowledge criticism illuminated historically' (quoted and translated from Tomperi 2017, 120). Virkkunen (1915, 2) characterises philosophy as essentially 'a worldview and life outlook study'. Here, worldview study refers to an educational approach that synthesises various subjects and provides general knowledge. As was pointed out by Zachris Castrén, the director of the Helsinki Finnish Workers' Institute, providing such education is a demanding task because the sciences and philosophy themselves do not offer it as such (Tomperi 2017, 216).

Synthetic teaching seems to have been based on a certain conception of human beings, reality, and philosophy. Based on Kant's transcendental idealism and Mill's psychologically interpreted logic, the foundation of logic and human knowledge was often thought to lie in the structures of the mind in the 19th century (Kusch 2024). Thus, psychology offers a scientifically justified approach to philosophy. According to the Kantian faculty psychology, which divided human mental activity into cognition, emotion, and will, this structured functioning of the human mind is also a part of gymnasium students' experiential world, providing a basis for teaching philosophical questions with relative ease. From this perspective, Virkkunen's view is easy to understand.

From the perspective of Finnish gymnasium philosophy, the problem was that the philosophical and scientific thinking underlying education was breaking down at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, at the same time as independent Finland's philosophy education was being established. For example, the criticisms of psychologism by Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl undermined the credibility of such a conception in academic philosophy. (Vilkko 2002; Kusch 2024.) In philosophy, the developments of logic, logical positivism, and

phenomenology were significant novel approaches. Similarly, psychology as an empirical science quickly evolved and became independent from philosophy. (Tomperi 2017, 126–134.)

The development of philosophy and psychology in Finland was rapid. Above all, Eino Kaila, who was a significant figure in Finnish science in the early 20th century, strongly advocated empirical psychology. He also introduced ideas of logical positivism from the Vienna Circle to Finland (e.g., Kaila 1939), which rendered the contemporary gymnasium philosophy largely outdated. Finnish academic philosophers, such as Kaila and the international luminary G. H. von Wright, harshly criticised philosophy education in schools throughout the 20th century (Tomperi 2017, 143–157). von Wright wrote: 'one might even take such a strong stance regarding the teaching of philosophy in schools as to propose its complete or partial abolition. Such a measure would in fact be a step forward in many respects compared to the hopeless situation in which philosophy education in our schools currently finds itself' (von Wright 1943, 269; the authors' translation).

By the mid-20th century, gymnasium philosophy had become a divided subject. While the new empirical psychology was a promising and popular topic for teaching, it no longer served as a link to other areas of philosophy. Additionally, in the early 20th century, logic evolved into an independent field resembling mathematics, and teachers who also taught religion as their first subject rarely had good prerequisites for teaching it. Thus, what should be taught in philosophy besides psychology was becoming unclear and controversial. Even if logic together with psychology was still considered to be a propaedeutic subject to philosophy (e.g., Jerusalem 1899; Ora 1925), formal logic did not properly establish itself as part of the core curriculum. Anders Wedberg published his academic introduction to formal logic *Den nya logiken* in 1945. It took more than twenty years before the first gymnasium textbook with a chapter on formal logic was published in Finnish, Erkka Maula's *Filosofian aapinen* (1968), but this book was not extensively used. It seems that instead of formal logic, gymnasium teachers, drawing from history and religion, taught some form of history of philosophy. As early as the report of the school committee in 1932, in addition to teaching psychology, the goal was to 'to some extent introduce students to the great

philosophers and the most important philosophical trends of different eras and at the same time provide them with role models who, due to their great qualities, are suitable as their ideals' (quoted in Tomperi 2017, 149; the authors' translation). Urpo Harva's *Suuria ajattelijoita* ('*Great Thinkers*') from 1955 became the basic textbook for this peripheral part of the subject (Tomperi 2017, 158).

Philosophy and psychology were separated into independent subjects in the gymnasium curriculum reform of the early 1980s. At that time, psychology was a popular and established subject in the sciences track, while philosophy became a marginalised optional subject (Tomperi 2017, 126–134). In the matriculation examination, philosophy and psychology remained together until 1996 when philosophy became a compulsory nationwide subject again (Kaarninen & Kaarninen 2002).

The Resurgence of the Teaching of Logic and Argumentation in Gymnasium Philosophy

In this concluding section, we approach the current state of the teaching of logic and argumentation in gymnasium philosophy by considering the national core curricula from 1994, 2003, 2015, and 2019. A consideration of these documents suggests that in general, there has been a notable pedagogical change from a content-centric approach to a skills-centric approach. As a result, there is currently more room than in the past century for the teaching of logic as a skill of argumentation and debating. According to our interpretation, this means that philosophy teaching has returned to its traditional roots after a transitory affair with modern formal logic that did not manage to find a proper place in gymnasium.

We begin by noting that philosophical skills are varied, but they certainly include general thinking and argumentation skills in one form or another. In practice, giving room for these skills in the teaching of philosophy means compromises in the general educational requirements concerning the vast tradition of philosophy (Salmenkivi 2008b, 122; cf. Elo 1999, 13–14). At the curriculum level, the challenge of teaching argumentation, let alone logic, was not addressed in FCS 1994 or NCC 2003. There were no specific course objectives related to argumentation which was only mentioned as the last of six contents

in an unpopular optional course on theoretical philosophy of the latter curriculum. (NCC 2003, 178).

A wide requirement for providing both academic and general educational knowledge was emphasised in both FCS 1994 and NCC 2003. It culminated in the objective which in NCC 2003 was formulated as 'command basic general knowledge of both the history of philosophy and its current trends and be able to relate these to social and cultural phenomena' (NCC 2003, 176). This objective was abandoned in NCC 2015 to make room for thinking and argumentation skills. Philosophy thus surrendered most of its general educational aims concerning the history of philosophy to emphasise non-formal thinking and argumentation skills.

By 2015 it had become evident that in most schools the content-centric approach in philosophy instruction was superficial and did not engender interest in Philosophy. The optional courses were not taught in many schools because of a lack of students, and the popularity of taking the Philosophy test in Matriculation Examination sank quickly (Salmenkivi 2013; Perälä & Salmenkivi 2020, 93). There is nothing surprising in these developments, because most of the teachers of Philosophy had some other subject, like Religious Education or History, as their primary subject and they had taken no pedagogical courses on how to teach philosophy. The motive for the changes in the philosophy NCC 2015 was to pressurise all teachers into prioritising philosophical thinking and avoiding lecturing about the history of philosophy.

In NCC 2015, familiarity with the philosophical tradition is still present but in a significantly narrower form, according to which students are 'able to identify philosophical problems and alternative solutions to these in the tradition of philosophy and in relation to current issues' (NCC 2015, 200). Other objectives include the ability to conceptually analyse various claims and their justifications, basic skills in coherent argumentation, and the ability to conceptually structure complex issues. Developing students' thinking skills was also prioritised in the educational objectives, with efforts made to make room for it by scaling back on overly ambitious content objectives.

In NCC 2019, the fundamental nature of the educational objectives of NCC 2015 remained unchanged. By that time, it had become obvious that the popularity of Philosophy in upper

secondary school was increasing remarkably, and the new skills-centric approach chosen in 2015 was one of the reasons for this increase together with the return of ethics to Philosophy and the digitalisation of the Matriculation Examination. Thus, thinking and argumentation skills became a new entry point into Philosophy. The traditional notion of logic as the starting point of the study of philosophy was reinterpreted less formally. Furthermore, one might suggest that logic also returned to Philosophy from Mathematics. In both FCS 1994 (p. 88) and NCC 2003 (p. 127), Advanced Mathematics had an optional course titled 'Number theory and logic', while in NCC 2015 (p. 169) it was changed to 'Number theory and mathematical proofs'.

It should be noted that the skills-centric approach, like its predecessors before the 20th century, requires that students be introduced to philosophical thinking, not just to any kind of critical thinking. It is worth emphasising that Philosophy's role in providing general education has not been abandoned in NCC 2015 and NCC 2019, but it is understood in terms of skills. Thus understood, the aim of teaching is not to focus on memorising the names of philosophical classics and obscure doctrines (Salmenkivi 2008b). Instead, the goal is to initiate students to philosophising, implying that they grasp philosophical problems and solutions in meaningful contexts. This is a demanding objective for both teachers and students. To facilitate the adoption of the skills-centric approach, the National Agency for Education has published two booklets, one regarding logic and argumentation (Hakala et al. 2022a) and the other regarding ethics (Hakala et al. 2022b). Recent research on the matriculation exam results suggests that an average student has not yet achieved the objective described above regarding philosophising (Perälä & Salmenkivi 2022). Nevertheless, the identity of gymnasium philosophy recognisably consists of practising philosophy rather than solely critical thinking, which should permeate all other subjects, too.

Critical thinking skills have been at the forefront of desired general skills by both educators and employers throughout the 21st century (see, e.g., the World Economic Forum 2023). However, combining the teaching methods for critical thinking with those aiming for subject-specific knowledge has proved to be a great challenge. A UNESCO report (Goucha 2007)

recognises this challenge as an international one which clearly persists in the 21st century despite remarkable new insights, like those motivating Matthew Lipman's Philosophy for Children (Lipman 2003, Juuso & Tomperi 2008).

As we see it, the teaching of logic within Philosophy can play a significant role in addressing the challenge described above. Even if the way in which Philosophy was taught for the past century and even longer disregarded general thinking and argumentation skills, these skills had been in the kernel of gymnasium philosophy before the 20th century. The problem was that the formal logic that the Finnish academic philosophers advocated in the 20th century appeared more like Mathematics than Philosophy in the school curriculum. To teach formal logic in upper secondary education requires a considerable number of lesson hours and prestige that Mathematics is assigned in the Finnish school system, whereas Philosophy is not, at least since the early 19th century.

The unique role of Philosophy in teaching thinking and argumentation skills is related in many ways to the nature of philosophy itself. For the first, the logic of thought and good argumentation are key areas of philosophy. Additionally, the conceptual character of philosophical inquiry and its lively but contradictory tradition challenge and engender students' thinking skills. Philosophy teaches independent thinking because philosophical questions typically have multiple well argued but incompatible answers. Therefore, Philosophy teaches open-mindedness and humility in the pursuit of truth differently than any other school subject.

We conclude with a citation from F.G. Afzelius. In justifying his style of writing in between verbosity and terseness, he expresses what the teaching of philosophy at school should be:

> For it is only in this way that a teacher can become what they ought to be, not an examiner but a genuine doctor in a genuine Socratic sense who helps a student to develop and consider their thoughts. And it is only in this way that introductory teaching of philosophy can become what it truly must be, not solely empty reading out of memory, but a proper exercise in thinking so that a student, drawing on what is concisely expressed in the textbook, must advance on their own and, under the guidance of the

teacher, think for themselves as for the rest. (Afzelius, 1839, Preface; the authors' translation.)

University of Helsinki

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Pedagogical Philosophy in Finnish Schools against Indoctrination

HELI NYKÄNEN

What are Philosophy for Children and pedagogical philosophy?

Philosophy for Children (PfC or P4C) is a pedagogical approach where children, aged 6-18 years, participate in philosophical dialogue. The practice of Philosophy for Children aims at increasing children's creative and critical thinking, and it encourages children to debate and evaluate their own thoughts and what is taught. The approach sees children as capable of having a philosophical discussion and competent to abstract thinking and thinking of thinking. This article examines pedagogical philosophy that can be used in Finnish elementary schools throughout different subjects as a learning method to develop children's critical thinking and debating skills.

As a philosophical and pedagogical practice, Philosophy for Children is a fairly new movement, starting in the 1960s. The roots of the movement lie in the idea of community of inquiry model theory, a concept developed by early pragmatists C.S. Peirce and John Dewey. The educational community of inquiry is broadly defined as "a group of individuals who collaboratively engage in purposeful critical discourse and reflection to construct personal meaning and confirm mutual understanding" (Garrison 2011, 2). The focus of the concept is on the social quality and contingency of knowledge creation in sciences, contrary to the Cartesian model of science, which assumes a steady and unchanging reality that can be objectively known by rational observers. This can be considered as a parallel to Richard Rorty's distinction between systematic and edifying philosophies, where Philosophy for Children represents

the latter. The Community of Inquiry concept has been extended from science to the educational setting by Dewey (Lipman 2003, pp. 20-21) and systematically applied in educational practice by Lipman.

Philosophy for Children has received criticism, even before the movement started, ever since an influential developmental psychologist Jean Piaget (1933) argued that children were lacking intellectual abilities and were not capable of critical thinking until the age of 11 or 12. This is because children are not, according to Piaget, capable of meta-thinking, i.e., thinking of thinking. "It is clear that a 12-15-year-old child cannot formulate logic…" (Piaget, Inhelder 1966, 131). However, Piaget's theory has been questioned (see e.g. Kitchener 1990), and the critical turn in trusting in children's ability to abstract thinking among the educators happened in the 70's (Lipman 2003, 54). PfC has spread worldwide with the contribution of PfC pioneers like Matthew Lipman, who is credited for starting the PfC movement to teach children critical thinking and argumentative skills, and Gareth Matthews, whose teaching technique includes provocative stories that spark a dialogue with the children. In Finland, Tuukka Tomperi (2017, 96-97), who has introduced the term "pedagogical philosophy" (Tomperi, Juuso 2014, 95) to refer to philosophy that has been reconstructed for and applied in educational practice, can be considered as a pioneer for PfC in Finland. Pedagogical philosophy is a method (or practice) and pedagogical approach that can be used in school education to spark dialogue in the classroom. With the pedagogical philosophy approach, the children learn to defend themselves against indoctrination. The purpose of pedagogical philosophy, besides increasing critical and creative thinking and encouraging them to evaluate and debate their own thoughts, is to learn to question our beliefs about facts.

"As children we learn facts, and we take them on trust (159). The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes *after* belief (160). The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing (166).", Wittgenstein (1969, 62-63) notes in *On Certainty*.

There are multiple ways on how pedagogical philosophy can be included in education. Maughn Gregory suggests an approach that includes first reading a tale as a stimulus, then

getting questions from pupils, then starting a dialogue, evaluating the dialogue and finally philosophical practice and action. (Gregory 2008) Gregory finds questions like "What is beauty", "Can we know something with certainty", "What does it mean to be good" or "What is real" as suitable questions for children to start practicing philosophy.

Matthew Lipman suggests a reflective model of educational practice (i.e. reflective paradigm), where the pupils are considered to be part of a community of inquiry, facilitated by a teacher, with the aim to reach understanding and good judgment of the surrounding world. (Lipman 2003, 30) The pupils are encouraged to think about the world when our knowledge of the world turns out to be ambiguous and enigmatic. In contrast, the standard practice of education explains knowledge of the world as solid and non-mysterious. The attitude of the teacher in the reflective paradigm is more fallibilistic than authoritarian. The reflective paradigm in the classroom is more of a dialogue where the teacher and the students ask questions from each other, than a lecture. The aim is not to seek information but to understand the inner and inter-relations of the target of the inquiry.

Some pedagogical philosophy practitioners suggest a facilitator such as a teacher for the process. The facilitator's role is to keep the dialogue or debate in balance, so that the conversation does not end, even if the most influential debater or the majority of the participants of the conversation manage to convince everyone else and quiet the opposition down. (Tomperi 2017, Gregory 2008, Lipman 2003) And educators agree that when philosophy, or any other school subject, is taught, whether to a child or to an adult, the process is not to pour information into learners' brains, but learning is seen as an active process. In pedagogical philosophy the learner is predisposed to process philosophical questions.

What do we mean by indoctrination?

Indoctrination can be defined in many ways and for various purposes. The concept belongs to the field of philosophy of education and the discussion on the meaning of the word has been going on for decades (see e.g. Puolimatka 1996, 105). Here, the definition of indoctrination means briefly: teaching

students to accept a set of ideas and beliefs without questioning them. Indoctrination is keeping a student on purpose as a minor, where a student will never grow to the level that they can themselves evaluate the truthfulness of the content of the learning. Indoctrination is often conjoined with negative associations. In education, the concept of indoctrination refers to unethical influencing in a teaching situation. Indoctrination in society can occur in various ways, for example, indoctrinating a minority group into mainstream culture and values, a full control over media, teaching purposely selective interpretations of history, or indoctrinating religion or political ideologies. Merriam-Webster (2024) dictionary defines the verb "indoctrinate" as "to imbue with a usually partisan or sectarian opinion, point of view, or principle". When defining indoctrination there is a wide consensus on the four criteria that it concerns: content (i.e. what belief is taught), intention (what is the aim), method (how is it taught), and result (how the pupils hold the belief as a result). Here, the method of pedagogical philosophy focuses on the method that can, preferably, prevent the *result* of indoctrination.

In order to underline why indoctrination is often seen in a negative association: it can be harmful to societies and cultures in the long run due to its restriction on spreading knowledge and limitation of free thought. Indoctrination discourages people's independent thinking and critical analysis skills, and it has the effect of limiting people's abilities to critique, question and reconsider assumptions. (Taylor 2017)

Philosophy in the Finnish school system

The history of teaching philosophy in Finnish schools is long, starting in the 19th century. It was first taught together with psychology, and between 1970-1990s there was a gap period in the teaching of philosophy. Teaching philosophy as a separate subject in Finnish upper secondary schools started again in the beginning of the 90's as a voluntary subject, and then as a compulsory subject in 1994. In the beginning, the teaching of philosophy focused on ethics and history of philosophy, but it changed in 2015 when the new curriculum was introduced, and the approach in teaching philosophy was changed from the history of philosophy towards underlining the skills of critical thinking and reasoning.

Currently, at the upper secondary school level, two compulsory courses (of 4 credits) include introduction to philosophy and ethics and the two optional courses of philosophy (of 4 credits) include social philosophy and truth theories (LOPS2019, 270-272). In primary school, philosophy is not taught as a subject in Finland. However, in 2010 a group of philosophers and educationalists put forward an initiative (Tomperi 2010), to start teaching philosophy for pupils at Finnish schools. The initiative was not supported by the political majority and a common teaching of philosophy was not realized in primary schools.

The two-tier national level of administering the Finnish educational system is on the other hand the Ministry of Education that controls the education policy, funding and preparation of legislation, and the Finnish National Agency for Education that sets the national core curricula and qualification requirements as well as the minimum time allocation for lesson hours. (Oph.fi 2024) Besides the national core curriculum, the local curricula are followed on municipality and even on school level.

A similar school subject to Philosophy, Ethics or Life Stance Education (*elämänkatsomustieto* in Finnish) was added to the Finnish school system already in the 1980s in view of secular pupils to replace religion. Ethics starts in the first grade at Finnish primary school and is taught approximately one hour per week throughout the primary school, replacing religion as a subject for those who do not belong to any religious groups. What is notable is that those pupils who are registered as members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, which is currently 65,1% of the Finns (evl.fi 2024), cannot choose secular Ethics as their subject of belief. They have to choose Christian religion as a subject of belief. Other pupils, of various other religions, however can. Those children that participate in religion classes learn ethics, non-confessionally through their own religion's perspective. The curriculum of religious education also encourages critical thinking, but it is not at its core.

Pedagogical philosophy in the Finnish classroom

In Finland, philosophy is still not a separate school subject in primary schools, and pupils are not taught philosophy except briefly within the history lesson on Ancient Greece. However, even though the curriculum does not include philosophy for elementary school pupils, a teacher can include pedagogical philosophy in the teaching by engaging them in the practice of

philosophy itself. Critical thinking and reasoning can be taught through all school subjects as an educational practice and the Finnish curriculum of primary school does not contradict that. A teacher in Finland has a pedagogical and didactic freedom to use any suitable method that is in line with the objectives of the curriculum, so that the meaning of the subject's content unfolds (Tirri, Kuusisto 2019). Also, the Finnish core curriculum encourages for example transversal competence and multidisciplinary learning, which is suitable for this kind of pedagogical philosophy. However, the method of pedagogical philosophy is not taught in the class teacher training yet. "Pupils are guided to think about things from different perspectives, seek new information and based on that, examine their ways of thinking. Their questions are given space and they are encouraged to look for answers, to listen to the views of others, and at the same time to reflect on their own inner knowledge", the national curriculum states (POPS14, 20).

In Finland, Tuukka Tomperi writes that "there is no major conflict between the basics of Finnish core curriculum and basics of flexible curriculum of pedagogical philosophy" (Tomperi 2017, 245) when he talks about philosophy teaching at the high school level. Neither is there a conflict at the primary school level, since both the pedagogical freedom and the encouragement of multidisciplinary learning apply also at the elementary school level. Furthermore, Tomperi remarks that "so far all international P4C teaching material that has been translated into Finnish, have been targeted for primary school level and especially elementary school level" (Tomperi 2017, 247).

Since teaching at the elementary school level differs from teaching in middle school or upper secondary school, it is important to highlight the difference in the method. One of the oldest methods of teaching philosophy originates in Ancient Greece where the method of dialogue was born. The method of dialogue, passed down to our days, is still a very suitable method in teaching philosophy. However, it is understandable why teachers in lower grades prefer authoritarian teaching methods to keep at least a moderate silence in the classroom, as a child is distracted very easily by questions and usually desires a clear fact as an answer rather than an ambiguous piece of knowledge. Nevertheless, the Finnish educational system allows using pedagogical philosophy as a method.

As elementary school pupils may not be able to concentrate on a full lesson of dialogue, pedagogical philosophy does not need to be considered necessary as a separate session of

philosophy lesson, but it can be included in the teaching method of a teacher or as a common practice of the school. A teacher can use pedagogical philosophy in teaching throughout all school subjects and by using various methods that are already used widely in the Finnish elementary school teaching. Here are some examples of pedagogical philosophy practice that can be done with elementary school pupils. These examples are all among the recommended teaching methods and contents that are taught as part of the educational studies of the Finnish class teachers and recommended by the Finnish National Agency for Education.

1. Pupils are encouraged to ask questions.

The National Agency for Education encourages using dialogue as a learning method. The whole basis of the national core curriculum has been prepared based on the concept of learning according to which the pupil is an active participant. (POPS14, 17). The Finnish Basic Education Act (Finlex (422/2012), 4 §) states that learning environments must support individual and community growth, learning and interaction. "All community members influence the learning environment through their activities. Well-functioning learning environments promote interaction, participation and community building of knowledge." (POPS14, 31) When the atmosphere in the classroom is open for dialogue and the pupils can talk freely, without a fear that someone might belittle or laugh at them, questions arise. A child may ask "What does it mean when it rains in the heart?" or "How long do I have time to spend on this planet?" The national core curriculum states that "a teacher selects the learning method in interaction with the students". (POPS14, 32) It also states that "pupils are guided to use information independently and in interaction with others for problem solving, argumentation, reasoning and drawing conclusions, as well as inventing something new. Pupils should have the opportunity to critically analyze the learned content from different perspectives." (POPS14, 20)

2. Pupils learn critical reading and questioning propositions.

Teaching multiliteracy (*monilukutaito)* has been part of the Finnish educational system at all levels from pre-school to upper secondary school since 2004. The multiliteracy studies are included in the curriculum under Finnish language and arts' content and learning objectives. The learning of critical reading refers to skills of interpreting, producing and appreciating

different texts and is based on a broad understanding of text, whether the text is in written, audio, numeric, kinesthetic, symbolic or mixture form. (POPS14, 22)

3. Pupils learn to name and classify words, things and state of affairs.

When teaching any subject content for example languages or biology at elementary school level, the facilitator can underline and repeat the patterns when classifying words into subjects, objects, predicates, or things into categories or subcategories during various classes. The term transversal competence (*laaja-alainen osaaminen*) is used in the national core curriculum. (POPS14 20) The same concept occurs in multiple ways in the Finnish education system: the learning can be done via phenomenon learning (*ilmiöoppiminen*) or with multidisciplinary learning modulus (*monialainen oppimiskokonaisuus*) that have been used in the Finnish educational system for almost a hundred years. Integration, multidisciplinary learning entity, broad-based competence or phenomenon learning all refer to the same phenomenon to some extent. In the 1970's core curriculum it was called consolidation (*eheyttäminen*) (Komiteamietintö, 1970), and the term is still used in the core curriculum (POPS14, 31).

4. Pupils learn to understand the world through new lenses.

The Finnish educational system has been using language-aware methods (*kielitietoinen opetus*) especially for pupils with Finnish as a second language (S2) status and the method has been mentioned in the core curriculum since 2014 (POPS14, 28). The method recognizes that pupils use multiple languages in their everyday life: their own mother tongue, foreign languages, dialect and slang. Using multiple languages and translating concepts and words in the classroom and discussing the meanings of words opens up thinking. "In a language-aware community, attitudes towards languages and language communities are discussed and the central importance of language in learning, interaction and cooperation as well as in the construction of identities and socialization into society is understood". (POPS14, 28)

5. Pupils learn about the happiness of life.

Many Finnish elementary schools have introduced socio-emotional skills lessons (*tunnetaitotunnit*), either as a separate lesson or as a content to be learned during various school subjects, notably Finnish language lessons. Socio-emotional skills have been mentioned in the core curriculum since 2004. And the latest national core curriculum highlights the importance of learning socio-emotional skills as one of the core tasks of the educational system, since it is mentioned as one of the seven transversal competence areas. (POPS14, 22) "During basic education, pupils learn to know and understand the factors that promote and hinder well-being and health, as well as the importance of safety and search for related information. They get the opportunity to take responsibility for their own and joint work and develop their emotional and social skills." (POPS14, 22) Pupils learn about recognizing, understanding, expressing and regulating (if necessary) different emotions. Learning socio-emotional skills and friendship skills brings empathy, happiness, fairness, and understanding one's own and others' feelings into notion.

6. Pupils learn to discuss social institutions and social behavior.

Participation lessons (*osallisuustunnit*) is the latest addition to the Finnish elementary school curriculum. All pupils are encouraged to participate in the decision-making process in the school and to break barriers and obstacles caused by for example gender, ethnicity or language. (POPS14, 35) The lessons started first as pupil association (*oppilaskunta*) activities and have now extended to cover issues like equity, nutrition and ecology. The pupil associations have been active in Finnish schools since the 1980s, and the participation of students has been mentioned in the Finnish Basic Education Act, section 47a (Finlex, 2024, 22) in its current form since 2013. The voices of pupils, despite their age, are heard in schools when planning everyday school life. As a side note, this all was preceded by the School councils' era in 1973-1985 (Kärenlampi 1999, 79-80). During that era, the school students were given so much power that they could, when in majority representation, select the teachers to the council. The council had the power to set the school rules and even order the punishments to other

students. Later on the school councils were replaced by student unions and the era remained as "the great democracy experiment" in Finnish school history.

7. Pupils learn about aesthetics by discussing their favorite music or art pieces.

The Finnish elementary school curriculum includes arts and crafts lessons, which is not exceptional, since arts and music have been included in the curriculums since antiquity. Some of the lessons are compulsory to all, but in addition to that, more and more optional arts lessons have been added to the local curriculum based on pupils' own interest. The applicable elective school subjects may contain materials from several different subjects or broad competences and the subjects can be selected locally. (POPS14, 95) Nowadays, elementary school pupils can select for example bujo (bullet journal crafts), architecture or robotics lessons where they can discuss aesthetics and learn critical thinking.

To sum up, philosophy as a subject is not (yet) taught at the Finnish elementary schools, but the elements of pedagogical philosophy already exist in the Finnish educational system. If we look closely at the recommendations of the Finnish National Agency for Education, and if a teacher and the school implement all given recommendations, the elements to start realizing pedagogical philosophy are there.

However, practicing pedagogical philosophy in the classroom may not be trouble-free. As Matthew Lipman says, an ordinary school environment offers only a limited amount of natural stimulus for creative thinking compared to a home environment. Most teachers are aware that the constant stress of discipline and order in the classroom can be discouraging and destroy the spontaneity that they would love to cherish and cultivate (Lipman 2003, 25).

The elements of pedagogical philosophy also exist in the Finnish school books that are adapted to the national core curriculum. As an example, a 6th grade Finnish school book teaches the history of the Swedish Empire by setting a 17th century Swedish warship Vasa at its core. The school book teaches that the Vasa warship, de facto, sank on her maiden voyage on 10 August 1628 outside Stockholm, and is now placed in the Vasa Museum in Djurgården in Stockholm. However, the history does not tell, and neither does the book explain, why the boat sank. Instead, the book gives five different

theories about what might have happened and the pupils must themselves do the research and draw their own conclusion on what happened to the Vasa warship. This is how the pupils start learning history, by doing research and reasoning themselves, not by learning by heart what the history book claims.

Why should children be taught philosophical thinking and what are the dangers of pedagogical philosophy?

Children are natural born philosophers. Ever since a child learns to speak, they start asking questions. In the early years, the common question of a child is "what" and later the common questions turn into "where" and "why". The most active period of asking questions lasts usually until school age. The cognitive skills of a child grow as they learn to classify things. That is also the period when a child learns to distinguish right from wrong. Note, that this is usually before the school age.

Education is a sensitive subject and a favorite topic in the media, both in traditional and social media. Almost everyone seems to have an opinion about education, school, teaching and its content and methods either based on the experience of their children or on their own school memories. Every time something new is introduced to improve education or to change it, the critical voices are activated. Education is also politics. As mentioned earlier, the idea of a common school subject of philosophy and secular ethics for children did not get support from the political decision makers and was not enforced in Finland. According to Tuukka Tomperi (2017, 256), the suspicious opinions towards pedagogical philosophy for minors underlined the lack of rational competence of the children and youth in their criticism. Some critics think that the children and the youth lack rational competence and therefore should not be taught philosophical thinking. The question arises: why do we teach them mathematics that also requires rational competence then?

The question is whether there is something threatening about a child thinking independently, making their own conclusions or decisions. Is the threat linked to the fact that a child, when thinking on one's own, without adults' supervision, is somehow uncontrollable? Also, there is a fear that a child would think aggressively, negatively, even violently, if they were not guided by adults. This reminds of William Golding's novel from 1954, *Lord of the Flies*, where a group of school boys became savages when not guarded by adults. This thinking still lives on, supported by multiple socio-psychological

experiments that underline the fact that a child should be guided in thinking. Pedagogical philosophy is more of a method than content and most pedagogical philosophy practitioners suggest a facilitator for the practice, such as a teacher, an adult. So in that sense, the children would not be left alone to think.

As mentioned earlier, Philosophy for Children resembles more edifying philosophy than academic or systematic philosophy. However, this does not mean that a child that has been exposed to participatory philosophy in school could not do academic philosophy later on in life. As Ilkka Niiniluoto (2023, 53) noted:

> In Finland, there has been a tradition of participatory philosophy that is still alive for almost two centuries. At the same time, this tradition shows that it is unnecessary to make a sharp distinction between systematic and edifying philosophy…

Similarly, Philosophy for Children is that edifying, participatory method of philosophy that does not contradict the academic, systematic tradition.

Lastly, the majority of children will not change their core values due to school teaching, since a child learns to separate right from wrong already in the preschool age, at home. However, with philosophical education they do learn to enrich and moderate their values, beliefs and commitments. Having a dialogue in the classroom orchestrated by a teacher gives children alternative perspectives instead of one truth, and encourages them to adopt a critical approach towards various sources. The pupils learn to defend themselves against indoctrination. The task of a teacher is not to plant seeds in pupils' minds, but to water them.[1]

University of Helsinki

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[1] The idiom "planting a seed" refers to causing someone to have a certain idea. The quotation is often attributed to Plutarch, who said that "the mind is not a vessel to be filled, but a fire to be kindled".

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