

PUBLICATIONS OF LUTHER-AGRICOLA-SOCIETY B 20

**WILLIAM OCKHAM'S
THEORY OF
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS**

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HELSINKI 1991

ISBN 951-9047-27-1

ISSN 0357-3095

Vammala 1991, Vammalan Kirjapaino Oy

*To my parents,
Annikki and Voitto Kuovi*

PREFACE

My acquaintance with the Venerable Inceptor began in 1982, when I started working on a master's thesis on the subject "William Ockham's Theory of Ethics". My now being able, nine years later, to publish the present study has been made possible through the assistance of many people.

I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to Simo Knuuttila, my tutor and mentor, for the constant encouragement, advice, and criticism that he has provided me with during my odyssey. I am also grateful to Heikki Kirjavainen and Gyula Klima, who have scrutinized a draft of this book and made many valuable suggestions, and to Douglas Langston, Risto Saarinen, Reijo Työrinoja and Mikko Yrjönsuuri, who in different ways have furthered the progress of my study. I have had the pleasure of consulting with Virginia Nikkilä, who has taken great pains to make my English more readable. I also wish to thank all my colleagues and friends working in the Department of Systematic Theology in Helsinki.

My work has been financially supported by the Academy of Finland, the Finnish Cultural Fund, the Emil Aaltonen Foundation, the Jenny and Antti Wihuri Fund and the University of Helsinki. All of them have my gratitude.

I want to remember and thank my friends and relatives, especially my brother and his family. I have dedicated this book to my parents, who have given me so much. I owe more than words can say to my husband, Toivo, who entered my life at the proper time and place.

Helsinki April 1991

Taina Holopainen

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
I SOULS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS	3
A Psychological Concepts concerning Souls	3
1 The Multiplicity of Forms in Man	3
2 Qualities of the Sensitive Soul	8
3 Faculties of the Intellective Soul	16
B The Activity of the Will	20
1 The Common Division of Acts	20
2 The Will and the Intellect	22
3 Habits in the Will	26
4 Passions in the Will	31
5 The Will and Sensitive Passions	35
II PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE	39
A Speculative and Practical Knowledge	39
1 The Difference between Speculative and Practical Knowledge	39
2 The Directiveness of Practical Science	50
B Praxis and Practical Knowledge	61
1 The Different Views of Praxis	61
2 Praxis and the Practical Intellect	67
III THEORY OF ETHICS	73
A The Term 'Virtuous' and Its Uses.	73
1 The Concept of Virtuous Act of Will	73
2 Virtuous Exterior Act	82
3 Virtuous Habit and Virtuous Person	85
4 Denominative Predication and the Uses of the Term 'Virtuous'.	91
B Acts of Will and Moral Goodness	110
1 The Primacy of Interior Acts	110
2 Right Reason and a Virtuous Act	115
3 Purpose and a Virtuous Act	130
4 Divine Command Ethics	133
SUMMARY	150
ABBREVIATIONS	152
BIBLIOGRAPHY	153

INTRODUCTION

My aim in this study is to analyse the structure of William Ockham's theory of ethics. To attempt such an analysis is a worthwhile project only on the assumption that Ockham did have a theory of ethics. Even though it is true that Ockham did not offer a theory of ethics in the sense that he would have presented his ethical views all together in some of his writings, the assumption seems to be justified. As Lucan Freppert has pointed out, "Ockham has written more on ethics than is perhaps generally realized."¹ From what Ockham has written in different connections, it is possible to construct a theory of ethics. If the construction reflects what Ockham himself would have accepted, it can be called his theory of ethics.

The analysis of Ockham's theory of ethics that I will present is based principally on Ockham's theological works.² Of these, the *Commentary on the Sentences*, *Quaestiones variae* and *Quodlibeta septem* include discussions important to the study. References are also made to Ockham's philosophical works - for example, to his *Summa logicae*.

Ockham's ethics is recently discussed by Lucan Freppert, whose doctoral dissertation *The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham* (St. Bonaventure University, 1961) was published under the same title in 1988.³ It is the most detailed study on Ockham's

¹ See Lucan Freppert, *The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham*, 1988, 8.

² William Ockham, *Opera Philosophica et Theologica*. Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae, St. Bonaventure, N. Y.; *Opera Philosophica* 1-7 (1974-1986), *Opera Theologica* 1-10 (1967-1986).

On Ockham's life and works, see Bohner 1944, 1-15; Moody 1967, 306; Adams 1987, xv-xvii; Courtenay 1990, 327-337.

³ In her preface to Freppert's work, Marilyn McCord Adams writes: "Freppert's analysis of the texts was thorough and philosophically rigorous. Without agreeing to every detail, I found Freppert's work far and away the best piece on Ockham's ethics to date."

ethics since Anita Garvens's article of 1934.⁴ In my study, Ockham's conception of practical knowledge and the influence of his logic on moral philosophical and moral theological concepts are new themes or themes not given enough attention earlier.

This study consists of three chapters. The first one deals with the meanings of psychological concepts used by Ockham. The chapter gives a general idea of Ockham's philosophical anthropology. In the second chapter, I discuss Ockham's conception of practical knowledge. The aim of the chapter is to elucidate Ockham's conception of moral knowledge which directs action. I first discuss the difference between theoretical and practical knowledge. The important theme in this connection is the discussion concerning the end of knowledge and within it Ockham's criticism of the teleological view. Then I consider the directiveness of practical knowledge. The central theme in it is Ockham's distinction between dictative and ostensive practical knowledge. The last discussion of the chapter deals with Ockham's conception of praxis. The third chapter consists basically of a semantic and a material part. In the first part, I analyse the uses of the term 'virtuous'. Ockham's conception of denominative predication seems to have applications to several uses of the term. In the second part, I first discuss how Ockham applies the rule concerning the use of the term 'virtuous' in connection with moral election. Then I discuss the nature of Ockham's ethics as a "Divine Command" theory. The crucial themes under discussion are the status of a necessarily virtuous act of will and the relationship between right reason and divine will.

⁴ Anita Garvens, "Die Grundlagen der Ethik Wilhelms von Ockham", *FS* 21 (1934), 243-273, 360-408.

I SOULS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS

A Psychological Concepts concerning Souls

In the first part (A) of this chapter I shall delineate those psychological concepts which are necessary for understanding Ockham's thought in the area of ethics. The subjects to be considered are the sensitive soul and the intellective soul and their qualities and faculties. Prior to this, it will be useful to deal briefly with Ockham's conception of the multiplicity of forms in man. I shall discuss the real distinction between the two forms, the sensitive soul and the intellective soul, the real difference between the sensitive soul and the form of corporeity, and the theory of the intellective soul as the form of a body.

1 *The Multiplicity of Forms in Man*

Ockham was one of those who thought that there are several substantial forms in man.¹ The body of man is perishable, and it has a perishable form, the form of corporeity. The intellective soul and the sensitive soul are the two other forms in man. The intellective soul as an imperishable form does not inform the matter of the perishable body immediately, but by the mediation of the sensitive soul.² In *Quodlibet* two, question 10, Ockham discusses the

¹ Adams 1987, 647: "Aquinas's 'unitarian' contention - that it is at worst impossible and at best superfluous to assume a plurality of substantial form in a single composite substance - was definitely a minority report. Most before and many after him maintained, on the contrary, that both philosophy and theology require there to be many substantial forms, at least in living composite substances."

² II *Sent.*, q. 18, 407, 9-18: "...in homine praeter animam intellectivam est ponere unam aliam formam, scilicet sensitivam, super quam potest agens creatum corrumpendo et producendo. Et ideo non sequitur quod homo esset incorruptibilis sicut caelum. Sed si intellectiva informaret immediate ipsam materiam primam, si materia illa non posset recipere ab agente creato aliquid repugnans ipsi intellectivae, tunc illud compositum non posset corrumpi ab agente creato. Et

question of whether there is a real difference between these two souls. According to him, this real distinction is not provable by means of propositions evidently known. However, Ockham introduces three different proofs of it.³ These proofs also shed light on the nature of the sensitive soul.

The first proof is as follows. It is obvious that contrary acts exist simultaneously in a man; examples are the act of desiring something and the act of renouncing this very same thing. Because of this contrariety, these acts cannot be acts of the same form. Thus, they must belong to different subjects.⁴ In addition, Ockham calls attention to the fact that a man can simultaneously have two acts of desiring one and the same thing. These acts (with their common object) cannot be the acts of the same form. Thus, one of them is the elected act of willing, and the other is the sensitive act of desiring. In this case, a man freely wants the very same thing that his sensitive appetite naturally desires. The subjects of these acts must be different from each other. The will as a subject of its acts belongs to the intellective soul; the sensitive appetite as a subject of its acts belongs to the sensitive soul.⁵

tunc esset incorruptibile sicut modo est caelum, tamen cum hoc stat quod potest corrumpi ab agente increato, puta a Deo."

See also *Quodl.* II, q. 10 and q. 11; Copleston 1963, 97-98; Adams 1987, 664.

³ Adams discusses these proofs under "Arguments from Appetites", "Arguments from Cognition", and "An Argument from the Manner of Inherence" (see Adams 1987, 656-661).

⁴ *Quodl.* II, q. 10, 157, 11-19: "Ad istam quaestionem dico quod sic. Sed difficile est hoc probare, quia ex propositionibus per se notis probari non potest. Probo tamen quod distinguuntur realiter primo sic: impossibile est quod in eodem subiecto sint simul contraria; sed actus appetendi aliquid et actus renuendi idem in eodem subiecto sunt contraria; igitur si sint simul in rerum natura, non sunt in eodem subiecto; sed manifestum est quod sunt simul in homine, quia illud idem quod homo appetit per appetitum sensitivum, renuit per appetitum intellectivum."

⁵ *Quodl.* II, q. 10, 158, 32-40: "Praeterea eadem forma substantialis non potest simul et semel habere duos actus appetendi respectu eiusdem obiecti; sed in homine frequenter sunt simul actus volendi aliquid obiectum et actus appetendi idem appetitu sensitivo; igitur isti actus non sunt in eodem subiecto. Praeterea eadem forma numero non elicit simul et semel unum actum appetendi aliquid naturaliter et alium libere; sed homo libere vult aliquid et appetitus sensitivus naturaliter appetit illud; igitur etc."

In the second proof, Ockham insists that the sensitive soul or sense power (included in the sensitive soul) is the only possible candidate for the subject of sensations. The sensations cannot be in the intellectual soul; if they were, every apprehension of the sensitive soul would subjectively be the act of the intellect. Ockham regards this as an absurd view.⁶

According to the third proof, there must be a real distinction between the two souls because of the different properties of the souls: the sensitive soul is extended and material; the intellectual soul is wholly in the whole and wholly in every part of man because it is unextended and spiritual.⁷

In *Quodlibet* two, question 11, Ockham discusses the real difference between the sensitive soul and the form of corporeity. According to him, the sensitive soul is distinct from the form of corporeity. Still, to prove this is as difficult as to prove the real distinction between the intellectual and sensitive soul. Ockham is, however, willing to give some special reasons for this distinction. They are aimed at showing that it is more in accordance with the faith of the Church to make a distinction between these forms than to treat them as undistinguishable.⁸ Ockham's main idea seems to be as

⁶ *Quodl.* II, q. 10, 158, 42-53: "Secundo sic arguo: sensationes sunt subiective in anima sensitiva mediate vel immediate; et non sunt subiective in anima intellectiva; igitur distinguuntur. Maior patet, quia nihil aliud potest assignari subiectum sensationum nisi anima sensitiva vel potentia; et si potentia sit accidens animae, erit subiective in anima sensitiva. Minor probatur, quia aliter omnis apprehensio animae sensitivae esset intellectio, quia esset subiective in anima intellectiva. Similiter tunc anima separata posset sentire, quia ex quo sensatio est subiective in anima intellectiva et Deus potest conservare omne accidens in suo subiecto sine quocumque alio, per consequens posset conservare sensationem in anima separata; quod est absurdum."

⁷ *Quodl.* II, q. 10, 159, 62-65: "Tertio arguo sic: eadem forma numero non est extensa et non extensa, materialis et immaterialis; sed anima sensitiva in homine est extensa et materialis, anima intellectiva non, quia est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte; igitur etc."

⁸ *Quodl.* II, q. 11, 162, 12-13: "Ad istam quaestionem dico quod sic, quamvis per rationem sit difficile hoc probare." *Ibid.*, 163, 49 - 164, 58: "Secundo arguo de homine specialiter, quia si corporeitas in homine non differret ab anima sensitiva, tunc corpus Christi in sepulcro numquam fuisset pars essentialis naturae humanae in Christo, nec fuisset idem corpus vivum et mortuum, nec

follows. When a man dies, all his sensations disappear at the same time. (Sensations, of course, have to do with the sensitive soul.) However, he does not lose the form of his body at once, although this should happen if there were no distinction between the sensitive soul and the form of corporeity.

The possibility of proving that the intellective soul is the form of a body is discussed in *Quodlibet* one, question 10. According to one opinion, a person experiences acts of the intellect as his own acts; their efficient cause is the intellective soul as the form of a body. The opposite view claims that the intellective soul as an imperishable form cannot be the form of a perishable body.⁹ Concerning the former opinion, Ockham notes that understanding can be said to be the action of the intellective soul, although this soul would not be the form of a body. Thus, this opinion does not compel us to regard the intellective soul as the form of a body.¹⁰ Have we now come near to adopting the latter view? No, according to Ockham, and he explains this denial as follows.

We cannot know by reason or by experience that the intellective soul exists in us as an imperishable and spiritual form which is wholly in the whole body and wholly in its every part. Furthermore, we cannot evidently know that we have the ability to think through this kind of substance; and we cannot know that this

fuisset deitas unita illi corpori in sepulcro, nisi per novam assumptionem, quod videtur absurdum. Similiter tunc non essent eadem corpora sanctorum viva et mortua; et per consequens non essent adoranda sicut corpora sanctorum, quia illa corpora numquam habuerunt. Igitur magis concordat cum fide Ecclesiae ponere distinctionem inter illas formas quam unitatem."

⁹ *Quodl.* I, q. 10, 62, 4-12.

¹⁰ *Quodl.* I, q. 10, 62, 14-16, 63, 22-37: "In ista quaestione sunt duae difficultates: una, utrum possemus intelligere per animam intellectivam quamvis non esset forma corporis... Quantum ad primam difficultatem, videtur quod sic... Igitur non obstante quod anima solum sit motor corporis et nullo modo forma, adhuc possumus dici intelligere per animam intellectivam."

According to Ockham, from the fact that we experience acts of the intellect, we can think no more than that the subject of those acts exists in us like a mover, not like form: "Et forte si experiremur illam intellectionem esse in nobis, non possemus plus concludere nisi quod eius subiectum est in nobis sicut motor, non autem sicut forma" (*Quodl.* I, q. 10, 65, 94-97).

kind of substance would be the form of a body.¹¹ Instead of knowing¹² these things, we merely believe them to be true.¹³ Thus, Ockham believes that the intellective soul as an imperishable form is the form of a (perishable) body.¹⁴

¹¹ *Quodl.* I, q. 10, 62, 14-20, 63, 39-44: "In ista quaestione sunt duae difficultates: una...alia, an possit evidenter sciri per rationem vel per experientiam quod intelligamus, accipiendo 'intelligere' pro aliquo actu proprio substantiae immateriali cuiusmodi ponitur anima intellectiva, quae est ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis, quae est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte. ... Quantum ad secundam difficultatem, dico quod intelligendo per 'animam intellectivam' formam immaterialem, incorruptibilem quae tota est in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte, nec potest evidenter sciri per rationem vel per experientiam quod talis forma sit in nobis, nec quod intelligere tali substantiae proprium sit in nobis, nec quod talis anima sit forma corporis..."

See also *Quodl.* I, q. 10, 64, 48-57.

¹² Ockham distinguishes four different uses of the term 'knowledge' ('*scientia*'). All these uses, except the first, concern knowledge in the sense of knowing evidently. The first use pertains to being sure about something. For example, we know that Rome is a large city although we have not seen it; or we know without doubt - although not evidently - that certain persons are our parents: "...scientia uno modo est certa notitia alicuius veri; et sic sciuntur aliqua per fidem tantum. Sicut dicimus nos scire quod Roma est magna civitas, quam tamen non vidimus; et similiter dico quod scio istum esse patrem meum et istam esse matrem meam, et sic de aliis quae non sunt evidenter nota; quia tamen eis sine omni dubitatione adhaeremus et sunt vera, dicimus scire illa" (*Exp. Phys., Prolog.*, 5, 29-34). In this sense, we in fact only believe something to be true; but because we believe *without doubt*, we say that we know.

We secondly say that we know evident propositions on the basis of intuitive cognition. These propositions can be necessary statements but also contingent truths. According to this use, I can say that I know that a wall is white on the basis of seeing the whiteness inhering in the wall (see *Exp. Phys., Prolog.*, 6, 35-42).

Thirdly, 'knowledge' is used so that we do not know any contingent truths but only necessary truths (see *Exp. Phys., Prolog.*, 6, 43-45).

Lastly, knowledge is evident knowledge about a proposition which can be derived from necessary premises by means of syllogistical reasoning and which concerns necessary truth. Knowledge in this sense is distinguished from the knowing of principles and from wisdom (see *Exp. Phys., Prolog.*, 6, 46-50). A demonstrative conclusion is what is primarily meant by knowledge. A conclusion is demonstrable either with the help of premises known in themselves (*per se nota*) or with the help of premises known from experience (*per experientiam*). The principles known in themselves are known on the basis of knowing the terms; they cannot be demonstrated "a priori" or "a posteriori" (see *I Sent., Prolog.*, q. 2, 83, 22-25; *SL III-2, cap.* 41, 583, 14-18; on the knowing of premises and conclusions, see Webering 1953, 69-79).

¹³ *Quodl.* I, q. 10, 64, 46-47: "...sed ista tria solum credimus."

¹⁴ It is worth noting that Ockham, after all, does not exclude the possibility of proving that the intellective soul is the form of a body (see *Quodl.* I, q. 10, 64,

The multiplicity of forms in man, however, does not remove the unity of human existence. The form of corporeity, the intellectualive soul, and the sensitive soul are different kinds of forms in man; but they are essential parts of his unity.¹⁵

2 *Qualities of the Sensitive Soul*

In this section, I shall discuss three kinds of qualities of the sensitive soul: powers (*potentiae sensitivae*), passions (*passiones*), and habits (*habitus*).

The third book of the *Commentary on the Sentences*, question four, deals with the following topic: Are the sensitive powers distinct from the sensitive soul and from each other? Ockham starts by drawing a distinction between two ways of understanding the power of the soul. First, it can mean all that is necessary for any vital act by being its partial cause. In the second sense, it means that part of the active soul which is a partial principle of an action.¹⁶

In the first sense of power, the sensitive powers are distinct from the soul and from each other, too. The distinction is obvious on the ground that the accidental dispositions necessarily needed for seeing are really distinct from those dispositions necessarily needed for hearing. The distinction is real because one can lose

58-66). In this case, it would be demonstratively known which is the strictest sense of knowledge, see *Exp. Phys., Prol.*, 6, 46-50. Ockham thinks that it is reasonable to consider the intellectualive soul the form of a body. If we accept the view that the intellectualive soul exists in us as a spiritual and imperishable form through which we think, it is more reasonable to regard the intellectualive soul as the form of a body than to regard it merely as a mover of a body (see *Quodl.* I, q. 10, 64, 67 - 65, 77).

¹⁵ *Quodl.* II, q. 10, 161, 111-119: "...non est ens completum existens per se in genere, sed est natum esse pars essentialis alicuius existentis per se in genere. ... Ad principale dico quod hominis est tantum unum esse totale, sed plura sunt esse partialia."

¹⁶ III *Sent.*, q. 4, 135, 2-6: "Ad questionem dico quod potentia animae potest dupliciter accipi: uno modo pro omni necessario requisito ad quemcumque actum vitalem tanquam causa partialis; alio modo pro illo praecise quod se tenet a parte animae elicentis tanquam principium partiale."

dispositions pertaining to one sense while sustaining dispositions pertaining to other sense. If one loses dispositions necessary for a certain act, this act, of course, can no longer be elicited.¹⁷

In the second sense of power, the sensitive powers are not distinguished from each other or from the sensitive soul. Following his principle of parsimony¹⁸, Ockham says that all sensitive activities can be brought about by the activity of one and the same sensitive soul.¹⁹ Seeing and hearing pertain to the powers which are parts of the sensitive form. Thus, that part which forms the sense of sight is the power to see, that part which forms the sense of hearing is the power to hear, and so on.²⁰ Sensitive powers are

¹⁷ III *Sent.*, q. 4, 135, 7 - 136, 3.

¹⁸ According to Ockham's principle of parsimony (Ockham's Razor), "a plurality should never be posited without necessity" (*pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate*), or it could be expressed by saying that many explanations are needless if one can get by with fewer (*frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora*). By using this principle, Ockham follows the tradition of Franciscan Scholasticism: Philotheus Boehner has found the first formulation of the principle in the *Commentary on the Sentences* written by Odo of Rigaud, the teacher of Bonaventure (see Miethke 1969, 238-239; on Ockham's use of the Razor, see Maurer 1978, 427-431).

Ockham thinks that the principle can be found in Aristotle: "Hic Philosophus infert quod melius est ponere principia finita sicut fecit Empedocles qui posuit sex principia, scilicet quattuor elementa et litem et amicitiam, quam ponere infinita principia sicut posuit Anaxagoras, et hoc quia aequae possunt omnia salvari per finita sicut per infinita, et pluralitas numquam est ponenda sine necessitate. Ideo sunt ponenda finita, non infinita" (*Exp. Phys.*, lib. I, cap. 11, § 9, 118). "Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora, ergo frustra fit per infinita quod potest fieri per finita; sed omnia quae possunt salvari per principia infinita, possunt salvari per principia finita, sicut Empedocles qui posuit principia finita, salvavit omnia apparentia et manifesta quae Anaxagoras salvavit per principia infinita; ergo principia sunt finita, non infinita" (*Exp. Phys.*, lib. I, cap. 13, § 4, 133-134).

¹⁹ III *Sent.*, q. 4,, 136, 16-21: "Secundo modo non distinguuntur realiter, sicut res et essentiae distinctae, nec inter se nec ab anima sensitiva. Quod probatur, quia frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora. Sed per unam animam sensitivam quae se tenet a parte principii elicientis indistinctam possunt elici omnes operationes sensitivae, ergo frustra ponuntur plures formae."

²⁰ III *Sent.*, q. 4, 136, 22 - 137, 11: "Intelligendum tamen quod licet in animali sit tantum una forma sensitiva quae elicit omnes istas operationes, tamen ipsa forma non est indivisibilis sed divisibilis in partes eiusdem rationis, quia forma sensitiva in quolibet animali - sicut pono - extenditur ad extensionem quantitatis in materia...ita quod pars illa formae sensitivae perficiens organum visus est potentia visiva, eo modo quo nunc loquimur de potentia, et alia pars eiusdem

then considered parts of the sensitive form. However, this consideration actually allows - as Ockham admits - that sensitive powers in some way (*aliquo modo*) are distinguished from each other. Namely, we can think about their distinction in the same way as we think about a distinction between different parts of the same form: one part of the form can be destroyed; the other part can still remain.²¹

The sensitive appetite (*appetitus sensitivus*) or the appetitive power (*potentia appetitiva*) represents a kind of "desire focus" in the sensitive soul; it is a subject of its passions.²² According to Ockham, all the passions of the sensitive appetite are acts.²³ There are only powers, habits, and passions in the soul; since passions are not powers or habits, they have to be acts. There are, for example, passions or acts like joy (*gaudium*), pain (*dolor*), hope (*spes*), fear (*timor*), and love (*amor*).²⁴ Ockham also quotes

rationis perficiens organum auditus est potentia auditiva, et sic deinceps."

Notice, however, that Ockham deals with tactile sense in a different way. It is in its wholeness the sensitive form (see III *Sent.*, q. 4, 139, 4-15).

²¹ III *Sent.*, q. 4, 137, 11-17: "Et ideo non obstante quod in uno animali sit tantum una forma sensitiva, cum hoc tamen stat quod potentiae sensitivae aliquo modo distinguuntur ab invicem sicut partes eiusdem formae quae sunt eiusdem rationis. Et ista distinctio est realis, quia potest una pars formae quae dicitur una potentia totaliter destrui, et alia pars quae dicitur alia potentia potest manere."

²² III *Sent.*, q. 12, 400, 11-15: "Item, quod per 'passiones' intelligit actum patet per exempla sua. ... Et omnes isti sunt actus potentiae appetitivae. Igitur etc." *Quodl.* II, q. 15, 179, 15-18: "Item Philosophus, ubi prius, dicit sic: 'Dico autem passionem...'; et omnes isti sunt actus appetitus; igitur etc."

²³ Passion in its proper sense can be understood in two ways. In the broad sense (*large*), it signifies any act in the sensitive appetite; in the strict sense (*stricte*), it means an intense act of the sensitive appetite impelling a man toward external acts: "Sciendum tamen quod passio tripliciter accipitur. Uno modo proprie, et sic accipitur pro ipso actu elicito a potentia appetitiva sensitiva... Primo modo accipiendo passionem potest adhuc accipi large, et sic accipitur pro omni actu appetitus sensitivi. Alio modo stricte, et sic accipitur pro actu intenso et vehemente, vehementer impellente ad actum exteriorem" (III *Sent.*, q. 12, 401, 8-10, 402, 1-4). See also Etkorn 1990, 265-287.

²⁴ *Quodl.* II, q. 15, 178, 9 - 179, 14: "...in appetitu sensitivo passio et actus non differunt. Quod probatur, quia secundum Philosophum, II *Ethicorum*, in anima non sunt nisi potentia, habitus et passionem; sed passionem non sunt potentiae nec

Aristotle's list of passions in *Nicomachean Ethics* II, 5: lust (*concupiscentia*), anger (*ira*), fear (*timor*), courage (*audacia*), envy (*invidia*), joy (*gaudium*), friendship (*amicitia*), hate (*odium*), longing (*desiderium*), zeal (*zelum*), and justice (*iustitia*).²⁵

Ockham presents the following proof concerning the view that passions are acts. Every passion is either pleasure or pain or something which precedes either pleasure or pain. A passion cannot be pleasure or pain because these come after passions, according to Aristotle. Thus, a passion is something preceding pleasure and pain. Since action is the only quality which precedes pleasure and pain, passions must be acts. In the proper sense of the term 'passion', passions are acts, and pleasure and pain are not passions.²⁶ Ockham

habitus; igitur sunt actus. Item istae ponuntur passiones: gaudium, dolor, spes, timor et amor; sed amor est actus, et timor; igitur etc."

²⁵ *Quodl* II, q. 15, 179, 15-18: "Item Philosophus, ubi prius, dicit sic: 'Dico autem passiones quemadmodum concupiscentiam, iram, timorem, audaciam, invidiam, gaudium, amicitiam, odium, desiderium, zelum, iustitiam'; et omnes isti sunt actus appetitus; igitur etc." III *Sent.*, q. 12, 400, 11-15: "Item, quod per 'passiones' intelligit actum patet per exempla sua. Ait (Aristoteles) enim: 'Dico autem passiones quidem concupiscentiam, iram, timorem, audaciam, invidiam, gaudium, amicitiam, odium, desiderium, zelum, iustitiam.' Et omnes isti sunt actus potentiae appetitivae. Igitur etc."

The last passion to which Ockham refers on Aristotle's list is not 'justice' but 'pity' (*miseriordia*) (see Aristotle, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, transl. J. A. K. Thomson, 1976, 98). Etzkorn presents Aristotle's list of passions as follows: "Ockham likewise appears to accept without comment the list of passions found in Aristotle: concupiscence, anger, fear, boldness, envy, joy, friendliness, hate, desire, zeal, mercy - although Ockham's translation of Aristotle lists the last-mentioned passion as 'justice'. As far as I know, Ockham makes no critical assessment of this list as to its completeness and/or redundancy. In brief, he seems to show no interest in this problem" (Etzkorn 1990, 270).

²⁶ III *Sent.*, q. 12, 400, 20 - 401, 7: "Ideo dico cum Philosopho quod in anima non sunt nisi tantum passiones, potentiae et habitus, et quod passiones sunt ipsimet actus partis sensitivae, et per passionem Philosophus intelligit actum. Probat, quia omnis passio vel est delectatio vel tristitia vel aliquid praeivum alteri eorum. Sed non est delectatio nec tristitia. Nam secundum Philosophum, delectatio et tristitia consequuntur passionem; igitur non sunt ipsa passio. Igitur est aliquid praeivum delectationi et tristitiae. Sed nihil est praeivum istis nisi actus. Igitur passio proprie est actus, et sic intelligit Philosophus. Nec est differentia aliqua inter actum et passionem proprie loquendo de passione."

admits, however, that "less properly speaking, 'passion' can signify the pleasure or pain itself."²⁷

Pain (*dolor*) and pleasure (*delectatio*) seem to be sensitive passions in a special way; they are acts which follow immediately after sensitive apprehension (*apprehensio sensitiva*). In addition, there are no other acts connected with them. Ockham gives reasons why not even avoiding and desiring can exist simultaneously with the passions of pain or pleasure in regard to the same object. Avoiding and desiring precede pain and pleasure; the former are directed towards the absent, whereas pain and pleasure always have a relation to the present.²⁸ In other words, man first desires what he lacks; and he does not have pleasure from the thing desired until he has got it. In the same way, man first avoids something; if, however, he could not avoid its coming into being, it can cause him pain.²⁹

It is useful to say something in general about habits before considering Ockham's conception of sensitive habits, their origin, and their task in the sensitive soul. According to Ockham, we can have awareness of habits from experience; I can say that I have got a habit when I recognize in myself an acquired ability to bring about activities or to bring them about easily; this ability is based

²⁷ Etzkorn 1990, 270. *Exp. Praedic. Aristot.*, cap. 14, 278, 41-42: "Aliquando autem accipitur passio pro delectatione vel tristitia." III *Sent.*, q. 12, 401, 20-22: "Alio modo accipitur passio improprie pro delectatione vel tristitia consequente passionem primo modo dictam. Sed sic accipere est improprie accipere."

²⁸ *Quodl.* III, q. 17, 268, 14 - 269, 27: "...appetitus sensitivus non habet simul actus distinctos a dolore sensus et delectatione, sed isti actus immediate sequuntur apprehensionem sensitivam, quia nec per experientiam, nec per rationem potest probari quod sit ibi talis multitudo actuum; quia si aliqui actus simul essent cum istis, illi essent actus desiderandi et fugiendi, quia alii non apparent in appetitu sensitivo praevisi dolori et delectationi. Sed isti non manent cum eis, quia istud est generaliter verum, quod dolor sensus et delectatio numquam sunt respectu rei absentis sed respectu rei praesentialiter habitae; actus autem desiderandi et fugiendi in appetitu sensitivo sunt semper respectu absentium; igitur isti actus non manent simul cum dolore et delectatione sensus respectu eiusdem obiecti, licet respectu diversorum possunt forte."

²⁹ Ockham discusses two ways of speaking about pain ("dolor est duplex"), see *Quodl.* III, q. 17, 269-270.

on my often repeated acts.³⁰ Habits can be classified into four groups; each of them is connected with some faculty of the soul. Intellective habits (*in intellectu*) and moral habits (*in voluntate*) subsist in the intellective soul. In the sensitive soul, there are habits (*in potentia sensitiva apprehensiva*) which are connected with interior sense apprehension (*phantasia*) and habits (*in appetitu sensitivo*) connected with sensitive appetites.³¹ Habits have a role to play in the intellective and in the sensitive soul, both in connection with knowing (intellective knowledge/ sensitive apprehension) and in connection with desiring (intellective desiring/ sensitive desiring).

Concerning all these habits, it is true to say that the habit comes into being from repeated acts similar to each other.³² We can say that the act is the cause of the habit because we have the habit as a consequence of the acts. There seems to be no reason to deny this causality.³³

As has been stated, passions in the sensitive appetite are acts. These passions can cause habits in the sensitive soul. Ockham explains why it is necessary to postulate habits in natural powers (for example, in the sensitive appetite):

...this kind of power is in itself indifferent to many acts; sometimes it is directed towards one of them determinately so that it cannot be directed towards the opposite one or towards other acts, except through the order of the will that is a superior power; sometimes it is not directed determinately. Thus, it is necessarily so that the acts leave behind them

³⁰ *Quodl.* III, q. 20; on general notions of habit, see Fuchs 1952, 1-17.

³¹ *Quodl.* III, q. 20, 282, 19 - 284, 79; *III Sent.*, q. 12, 356, 11 - 358, 14.

³² Notice also that Ockham speaks of bodily habits (*habitus in corpore*); this kind of habit is a readiness for an action and it has been acquired by means of repeated practice (see *Quodl.* III, q. 20, 281, 10 - 282, 17).

³³ *III Sent.*, q. 12, 9-15: "...actus est causa efficiens respectu habitus. Quod probatur, quia illud ad cuius esse sequitur aliud, illud debet poni causa eius nisi evidenter appareat quod sit ab eo neganda causalitas. Sed posito actu frequenter elicitio, ponitur habitus, et non potest poni naturaliter sine actu. Et non est causa quare activitas debet negari ab actu. Igitur est causa effectiva habitus."

However, Ockham presents three different reasons for denying that the act is the cause of the habit. These reasons, according to Ockham, are not good ones; about this critique of Ockham, see *III Sent.*, q. 12, 397, 15 - 398, 10. See also *III Sent.*, q. 7, 197, 2-9; *Quodl.* III, q. 21, 285, 8-9, 286, 40 - 287, 52.

something in the (natural) power which makes it inclined to similar acts and not to contrary acts (III *Sent.*, q. 11, 356, 16-22).³⁴

A habit in the sensitive appetite inclines one to act; thus, it explains a person's action that is orientated towards sensitive pleasure. Ockham describes harmful influence of the sensitive habit as follows. Due to his sensitive habit, a person can have acts producing sensitive pleasure in regard to some object in such a way that he is not able to form a contrary action - except in the case where the will prevents the sensitive appetite. However, Ockham also seems to be ready to admit the need for sensitive habits; man being in an exceptional state of mind (not using his reason) can have an advantage in possessing a habit which directs him to a right action. This habit has been acquired earlier and has been left behind by the acts based on the use of reason.³⁵ We can, then,

³⁴ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 356, 16-22: "Quia talis potentia de se est indifferens ad multos actus in quorum unum aliquando fertur determinate, ita quod non potest in oppositum nec in alterum nisi per imperium voluntatis quae est potentia superior, et aliquando non sic fertur determinate. Igitur necessario oportet quod in tali potentia derelinquatur aliquid ex actibus inclinans ad actus consimiles et non ad contrarios."

Compare with *Quodl.* III, q. 20, 282, 19-23 where Ockham presents another kind of view concerning the necessity to postulate a habit in the sensitive appetite: "...one cannot prove in a sufficient way that some habit should be postulated in the sensitive appetite; since all that which we experience in ourselves after many acts of the sensitive appetite, we can at any time experience after a change occurring in our body without assuming multiplicity of acts in the sensitive appetite..." Fuchs pays attention to the point that the change in Ockham's view did not affect his view of inclinations: "...Ockham had serious doubts concerning the necessity of postulating sense appetitive habits during the period of his career when the *Quodlibeta* were composed, whereas in his *Commentary* he clearly admitted their existence. The question may be asked, how does this change of opinion with regard to habit affect his views with respect to the psychological reactions referred to as the inclinations of habits. ... The answer is that it does not affect them at all. Whatever the explanatory theory, the facts of observation remain the same. Whereas in the earlier explanation the inclinations were said to be the result of habits, in the later they are considered the result or effect of physiological conditions" (Fuchs 1952, 62, 64, see also 55-58).

³⁵ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 356, 22 - 357, 12: "Exemplum: potest enim homo in appetitu sensitivo frequenter elicere actus circa aliquod obiectum cum delectatione, ita quod nisi refrenetur per voluntatem non potest in actum contrarium, non plus quam brutum in delectatione sua sensibili. Sicut furiosus habens habitum adquisitum prius quando habuit usum rationis circa aliquod obiectum delectabile, et hoc in parte sensitiva, nisi sit aliqua tristitia fortior vincens, oportet eum,

refer to the existence of a sensitive habit both in the negative and in the positive sense.³⁶

As we have seen, sensitive passions - because they are acts - can cause sensitive habits. However, we should not be led to think that any kinds of passions in the sensitive soul could be causes of sensitive habits; nor should we think that sensitive habits have an influence on any kind of passions. If I can think that I am more inclined to some act after having had many of them than before actualizing them, I can also think that this act can cause a habit. Through this 'method' we can find that at least imaginary acts (*phantasia*) and interior acts of sensitive desire are acts which can cause a habit. It is characteristic of the habit in the sensitive appetite that it makes one more inclined to the act after many repeated acts.³⁷ (Sensitive habits, again, can cause passions only in the sensitive soul and not in the faculties of the intellective soul.³⁸)

Ockham first states that the origin of a sensitive habit can be based both on intuitive and abstractive sensitive cognition.³⁹

existentem in furia et non habentem usum rationis, necessario ferri in illud in quod prius non oportuit eum ferri propter imperium voluntatis. Igitur necesse est in tali potentia sic necessitata ad actum postquam primo non fuit necessitata ponere habitum inclinatem qui prius non ponebatur."

³⁶ In the *Commentary*, Ockham refers to sensitive habits positively. Later, in the *Quodlibeta*, he took the view that there is no necessity to postulate a habit in the sensitive appetite. These two different views of Ockham reveal the difference in emphasis. In his *Commentary*, Ockham is clearly more willing to admit that habits can exist in the sensitive appetite in a useful way; they can also incline one to a right action.

³⁷ III *Sent.*, q. 12, 409, 16 - 410, 9: "Si quaeras cuius sensus appetitus est generativus illorum habituum, respondeo: phantasiae et sensus interioris, non exterioris. Cuius ratio est, quia in illo appetitu tantum ponuntur isti habitus qui magis inclinatur post actum elicatum quam ante. Sed huiusmodi est appetitus phantasiae sive sequens phantasiam. Nam apprehenso obiecto per phantasiam et elicitu actu appetendi, frequenter in appetitu sequente phantasiam - sive obiectum existat sive non, sive sit praesens sive non - magis inclinatur talis appetitus ad actum consimilem quam ante actum. Et per consequens, in appetitu sequente phantasiam oportet ponere talem habitum generatum ex actibus, et hoc circa obiectum cuiuslibet sensus quatenus phantasiatur."

³⁸ III *Sent.*, q. 12, 402, 10-14, 408, 14-19.

³⁹ III *Sent.*, q. 12, 401, 8-19: "Sciendum tamen quod passio tripliciter accipitur. Uno modo proprie, et sic accipitur pro ipso actu elicitu a potentia appetitiva sensitiva, qui actus causatur effective ab apprehensione sive cognitione sensitiva,

However, he seems to arrive at the result that only abstractive sensitive cognition is a cause of a passion of the sensitive appetite and along with it one cause of a habit produced by this passion.⁴⁰

3 *Faculties of the Intellectual Soul*

The faculties of the intellectual soul are intellect and will. There is no real difference between them nor between them and the essence of the intellectual soul.⁴¹ This soul can be in action and its powers can be perfect without created objects outside the soul. This is based on God's power to create the intellectual soul without making anything else; it is also in His power to make the created soul know and will without other objects.⁴² This independent existence of the soul is in accordance with Ockham's view of the intellectual soul as an imperishable form. Namely, if the existence of the intellectual soul depended on the existence of some object,

intuitiva vel abstractiva, sicut a causa partiali una, et a potentia appetitiva sicut ab alia causa partiali. Et nota hic quod talis habitus potest generari in appetitu sensitivo cuiuslibet sensus interioris et exterioris, et tunc ipsa apprehensio sive cognitio sensitiva - sive sit intuitiva sive abstractiva - erit causa efficiens partialis respectu primi actus elicit ab appetitu sensitivo et non sensibile extra. Et ille primus actus appetitus vocatur a Philosopho passio et est generativus habitus in tali appetitu modo praedicto."

On intuitive and abstractive cognition in Ockham, see *II Sent.*, q. 13, 256-267; see also Adams 1970, 389-398; Boehner 1958b, 268-300; Boehner 1958a, 156-174, here 159-160; Kirjavainen 1990, 196-209; White 1990, 351-363; Miethke 1969, 163-166.

⁴⁰ *III Sent.*, q. 12, 410, 9-18: "Sed ex hoc quod aliquis semel appetit aliquod visibile apprehensum a visu, non sentit se magis inclinatum ad appetendum illud visibile alias apprehensum quam primo apprehensum, sicut quilibet experitur in se. Ideo in tali appetitu non generatur qualitas sive habitus ex actibus; et sicut non in uno, ita nec in alio. Et ex hoc apparet quod actus appetitus sensitivi causatur mediante cognitione sensitiva abstractiva non intuitiva, licet forte non sit in appetitu intellectivo. Et hoc dico quando actus appetitus sensitivi praesupponit apprehensionem."

⁴¹ *II Sent.*, q. 20, 435, 5-8: "...potentiae animae...scilicet intellectus et voluntas - non loquendo de potentiis sensitivis nunc... - sunt idem realiter inter se et cum essentia animae."

⁴² *II Sent.*, q. 20, 432, 10-12: "Sed potentiae animae possunt esse perfectae et nullum obiectum [esse], quia Deus potest facere animam intellectivam non faciendo aliquod obiectum in mundo."

the soul could exist at one time (when an object exists) and not exist at another time (when an object does not exist). But we cannot say this if we consider the intellective soul an imperishable form.

The faculties of the intellective soul can be understood in two ways: the intellect and will can be distinguished from each other or they can be left undistinguished. These considerations depend on the sense in which the notion of power is applied to them.⁴³ Thus, there are two essential questions to be answered. The first one is: What is the basis for distinguishing the powers, the intellect and will, from each other? The second is: Of what use is it to leave them undistinguished? In order to answer, we must look briefly into the difference between absolute and connotative terms.

Ockham divides terms into absolute and connotative.⁴⁴ A connotative term - unlike an absolute term -

is one that signifies something primarily and something secondarily. This kind of name properly has a nominal definition, and one part of the definition must frequently be in the nominative case, and another part in the oblique case. ... Thus, if you ask what this name 'white' signifies, you answer that it signifies the same as this whole expression 'something informed by whiteness', or 'something which has whiteness'. It is clear that the one part of this expression is in the nominative case and the other part is in the oblique case (*SL I, cap. 10, 36, 38-47*).⁴⁵

A connotative term has a nominal definition. Such a definition does not answer the question of what something is but rather the question of what a term means.⁴⁶ Ockham gives in one place the

⁴³ *II Sent.*, q. 20, 435-436.

⁴⁴ *SL I, cap. 10; Quodl. V, q. 25*; see also Spade 1975, 55-76.

⁴⁵ *SL I, cap. 10, 36, 38-47*: "Nomen autem connotativum est illud quod significat aliquid primario et aliquid secundario. Et tale nomen proprie habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, et frequenter oportet ponere unum illius definitionis in recto et aliud in obliquo. ... Unde si quaeras, quid significat hoc nomen 'album', dices quod illud idem quod ista oratio tota 'aliquid informatum albedine' vel 'aliquid habens albedinem'. Et patet quod una pars orationis istius ponitur in recto et alia in obliquo."

⁴⁶ *SL I, cap. 26, 88, 113-116*: "Definitio autem exprimens quid nominis est oratio explicite declarans quid per unam dictionem importatur, sicut aliquis volens docere alium quid significat hoc nomen 'album' dicit quod significat idem quod haec oratio 'aliquid habens albedinem'."

following list of connotative terms: 'true', 'good', 'one', 'power', 'act', 'intellect', 'intelligible', 'will', 'able to be willed'.⁴⁷

Absolute terms do not signify⁴⁸ one thing primarily and another secondarily. Instead, these terms signify all that they signify in the same way - primarily. Furthermore, absolute terms do not signify something which is in the nominative case and some other thing which is in the oblique case. The absolute name means some being directly; for example, 'animal' signifies every ox, or - just as well - every man, and so on. Therefore, it does not have a definition which would give the meaning of the term in the proper sense - i.e., in the sense of the nominal definition.⁴⁹ The following names are examples of absolute terms: 'man', 'animal', 'star', 'stone', 'tree', 'fire', 'earth', 'water', 'sky', 'whiteness', 'blackness', 'heat', 'sweetness', 'smell', 'taste'.⁵⁰

The intellect and the will are distinguished from each other in a real way when treated as powers of which their nominal definitions are total descriptions. The nominal definition of the intellect describes the intellect as follows: "The intellect is the substance of the soul which has the ability to think." Correspondingly, the nominal definition of the will runs as follows: "The will is the

⁴⁷ *SL I, cap. 10, 38, 81-83.*

⁴⁸ On the term 'signify', see *SL I, cap. 33, 95, 2 - 96, 31*; see also Loux 1974, 2, 6-7.

⁴⁹ *SL I, cap. 10, 35, 6 - 36, 20*: "Nomina mere absoluta sunt illa quae non significant aliquid principaliter et aliud vel idem secundario, sed quidquid significatur per illud nomen, aequè primo significatur, sicut patet de hoc nomine 'animal' quod non significat nisi boves, asinos et homines, et sic de aliis animalibus, et non significat unum primo et aliud secundario, ita quod oporteat aliquid significari in recto et aliud in obliquo... talia nomina non habent definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, quia proprie loquendo unius nominis habentis definitionem exprimentem quid nominis est una definitio explicans quid nominis, sic scilicet quod talis nominis non sunt diversae orationes exprimentes quid nominis habentes partes distinctas, quarum aliqua significat aliquid quod non eodem modo importatur per aliquam partem alterius orationis."

Compare with Loux, *Ockham*, 69-70.

⁵⁰ *SL I, cap. 10, 36, 34-37.*

substance of the soul which has the ability to will."⁵¹ The connotative terms 'will' and 'intellect' have the same primary signification (*significatum*), viz., the intellective soul (*anima intellectiva*). However, they connote different things: the intellect connotes the act of understanding, and the will connotes the act of willing.

We can notice that the nominal definition of the will includes elements which the nominal definition of the intellect does not include, and *vice versa*. This is the basis for distinguishing the powers from each other. The descriptions differ in a real way from each other both on the verbal level and on the conceptual level. They also differ in reality, at least partially; although the substance which has ability to think and to will is the same, the acts of the intellect and the acts of the will are still distinct in reality.⁵²

The intellect and the will are not distinguished from each other when treated as powers which name the intellective soul. One and the same substance of the soul can have two different names depending on acts produced by the soul. When the intellective soul produces the act of understanding, it is called the intellect; when it produces the act of willing, it is called the will.⁵³

⁵¹ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 435, 8-15: "Sed distingo de potentia animae: nam potentia uno modo accipitur pro tota descriptione exprimente quid nominis, alio modo... Primo modo loquendo de intellectu et voluntate, dico quod distinguuntur, nam descriptio exprimens quid nominis intellectus est ista quod 'intellectus est substantia animae potens intelligere'. Descriptio voluntatis est quod est 'substantia animae potens velle'." *SL I*, cap. 10, 38, 83-86: "Unde de intellectu est sciendum quod habet quid nominis istud 'intellectus est anima potens intelligere', ita quod anima significatur per rectum et actus intelligendi per aliam partem."

⁵² II *Sent.*, q. 20, 435, 15-21: "Nunc autem istae descriptiones possunt accipi pro vocibus vel conceptibus vel pro rebus. Primo modo distinguuntur realiter sicut voces distinguuntur realiter. Secundo modo distinguuntur ratione sicut conceptus. Tertio modo distinguuntur realiter, saltem partialiter, quia licet eadem sit substantia numero quae potest intelligere et velle, tamen intelligere et velle sunt actus distincti realiter."

⁵³ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 435, 8-11: "Sed distingo de potentia animae: nam potentia...alio modo accipitur pro illo quod denominatur ab illo nomine vel conceptu." *Ibid.*, 436, 5-12: "Sed loquendo de intellectu et voluntate secundo modo, sic intellectus non plus distinguitur a voluntate quam ab intellectu vel

According to Ockham, we can distinguish the intellect and the will if we want to pay attention to the different acts the powers connote. We can leave them undistinguished if we want to emphasize the same primary signification (*significatum*) they have; they both signify the intellectual soul which is the substance called either the will or the intellect. The soul is called the will when it is under consideration in terms of the willing; correspondingly, it is called the intellect when it is under consideration in terms of understanding. One can also consider this as an application of the principle of parsimony.

B The Activity of the Will

1 *The Common Division of Acts*

Generally speaking, acts can be divided into exterior and interior acts. Exterior acts are material actions; as such they are visible, whereas interior acts occurring in the soul are not. There is a certain relation between the exterior and the interior acts. One can frequently (or always) say that a person has intended to do something before he has done it.¹ The person's interior act is his intention to perform the exterior act.

quam Deus a Deo vel Sortes a Sorte, quia nec distinguitur a voluntate nec re nec ratione. Sed sic est una substantia animae potens habere distinctos actus, respectu quorum potest habere diversas denominationes. Quia ut elicit vel elicere potest actum intelligendi dicitur intellectus; ut actum volendi voluntas." *Ibid.*, 436, 19-22: "Quod autem intellectus et voluntas accipiendo pro illo quod denominatur ab istis conceptibus vel nominibus, sint penitus indistinctum, probatur. Tum quia frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora."

¹ *Quodl.* I, q. 20, 105, 135-136: "...actus interior semper vel frequenter intenditur quando elicitur actus exterior." IV *Sent.*, q. 16, 358, 13-20: "Respondeo quod duplex est actio conveniens homini, scilicet exterior et interior. Tunc ad hoc quod voluntas agat actum exteriorem mediate vel immediate, magis unum quam eius oppositum - ut ambulare vel non ambulare, comedere magis quam non comedere - oportet quod determinetur ad unum istorum per aliud a se, puta per electionem sive volitionem efficacem qua vult unum esse et non aliud. Et sic intelligit Philosophus quando dicit quod determinatur per prohaeresim et electionem."

It is possible to classify the interior acts of the soul as follows. Acts of the sensitive appetite are acts of the sensitive soul, or acts of the sensitive part, as Ockham also calls them.² Different sensations are also acts of the sensitive soul; thus, they are sensitive acts of the powers in the sensitive soul.³ Acts of will and acts of intellect are, for their part, acts of the intellective soul, since the will and the intellect represent the powers in the intellective soul. "Interior acts are of two kinds: either they are immediately under the control of the will, therefore immediately free acts; or they are only mediately free by virtue of a relation to the immediately free acts."⁴ When Ockham speaks of acts which are immediately in the power of the will, he refers to such acts of will, or acts elicited by the will which are intentions, or acts of *willing* the goal (*volitio*).⁵

All acts of all powers - acts of will and intellect in the intellective soul and acts of the sensitive powers in the sensitive soul - are, by species, qualities. In this sense, there is no difference between the powers.⁶ However, there is a real distinction between the sensitive powers and the intellective powers. The distinction is obvious because someone can have all of the sensitive acts (different sensations) without any act of will or any act of intellect.⁷ Concerning the interrelation between different acts and different powers, we can generally find that "sometimes

² III *Sent.*, q. 11, 389, 9-13: "...tam actus partis sensitivae quam intellectus quam voluntatis potest dici... Nec hoc est plus inconveniens de actu intellectus quam appetitus sensitivi vel voluntatis..."

³ III *Sent.*, q. 4, 135; II *Sent.*, q. 20, 445-446.

⁴ Freppert 1988, 35-36, see also 36-37, 47-49.

⁵ IV *Sent.*, q. 16, 358, 21 - 359, 10; III *Sent.*, q. 7, 210, 17 - 211, 20.

⁶ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 429, 8-10: "...actus omnium potentiarum sunt in genere qualitatis. Igitur non est distinctio potentiarum."

⁷ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 445, 25 - 446, 6: "Eodem modo potest probari distinctio omnium sensuum et etiam distinctio sensus et intellectus et voluntatis. Potest enim cognoscens sic disponi quod potest habere omnes actus sensitivos, et tamen nullum actum intellectus nec voluntatis, puta si sit furiosus, ideo necessario sequitur ex istis actibus quod potentiae sensitivae distinguuntur realiter ab intellectu et voluntate."

from the difference in the operations one can infer that the powers are different, sometimes one cannot."⁸

The soul dominates the body as far as exterior acts which are totally in the power of the will are concerned. Eating, drinking and walking function as examples of these kinds of exterior acts. The body is, thus, the servant of the soul in regard to the actions mentioned above.⁹

The classification of human acts can be presented as follows:

1 THE BODY AND EXTERIOR ACTS

2 THE SOUL AND INTERIOR ACTS:

2.1 The Sensitive Soul

- a) acts of sensitive appetite (passions)
- b) acts of sensitive powers (sensations)

2.2 The Intellective Soul

- a) acts of will (elections)
- b) acts of intellect (cognition)

2 *The Will and the Intellect*

The substance of the intellective soul can have different acts. In accordance with its acts, this substance is called either the will or the intellect.¹⁰ So to consider the activity of the will it is necessary to investigate the relationship between the will and the intellect. It is useful to begin this by considering two questions concerning the intellect. The first concerns the numerical unity of the intellect in different individuals. The second concerns the

⁸ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 444, 15-16: "...aliquando ex distinctione operationum potest inferri distinctio potentiarum et aliquando non."

⁹ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 368, 6-12: "Sed anima dominatur corpori quantum ad operationes exteriores, puta comedere, bibere, ambulare, quae totaliter sunt in potestate voluntatis, quia in potestate voluntatis est comedere vel non comedere, et sic de aliis. Et respectu talium operationum est corpus sicut servus animae, quia quantum ad tales operationes corpus totaliter est in potestate animae."

¹⁰ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 436, 8-12; *ibid.*, 435, 20-21.

distinction between the passive and the active intellect. As we shall see, these considerations, for Ockham, also concern the intellectual soul with respect to its power to will.

According to Ockham, one can evidently prove that the intellect is not numerically one in all men. It is impossible that the same man both knows and does not know at one and the same time, or that he both loves and hates at one and the same time. But it is knowable by experience that the intellect in one man knows something and in another man does not know it, and the will in one man loves something and in another man hates it.¹¹ Notice that both kinds of the activities of the intellectual soul (acts of will and intellect) have been included in the proof.

Ockham follows his principle of parsimony and does not indicate any special interest in distinguishing the active and passive intellect from each other:

...plurality should not be postulated without necessity, therefore the actual intellect and the possible intellect are the same in every way, really and rationally (II *Sent.*, q. 20, 442, 23-24).¹²

However, the terms 'active' and 'passive intellect' connote different things. The former connotes an act of intellect caused actively by the soul. The latter connotes an act of intellect received by the soul. The two concepts concerning the act of intellect are, thus, distinguishable from each other. However, from this we cannot infer that there are two acts of intellect really distinct from each other.¹³

¹¹ *Quodl.* I, q. 11, 67, 23-32: "...potest evidenter probari quod non est unus intellectus numero in omnibus, quia impossibile est quod idem simul et semel sit sciens et ignorans idem, diligens et odiens idem, gaudens et dolens de eodem, assentiens et dissentiens respectu eiusdem, et sic de aliis. Sed intellectus in uno homine est sciens aliquid et intellectus in alio est ignorans illud ignorantia dispositionis. Voluntas in uno diligit aliquid et voluntas alterius odit illud, etc., sicut omnia ista per experientiam patent. Igitur impossibile est quod sit idem intellectus in duobus illis."

¹² II *Sent.*, q. 20, 442, 23-24: "...pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate, ideo intellectus agens et possibilis sunt idem omnino re et ratione."

¹³ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 442, 25 - 443, 3: "Tamen ista nomina vel conceptus bene connotant diversa, quia agens significat animam connotando intellectionem procedentem ab anima active; possibilis autem significat eandem animam

It is interesting to note that according to Ockham, the intellect and the will are fully passive in regard to the acts of enjoying God and having a vision of God. God alone causes these acts without the influence of the intellect and the will. The intellect and the will are passive, not for the reason that they could not be active but because these acts are so noble.¹⁴

The relationship between the intellect and the will can further be examined from the following point of view: the terms 'intellect' and 'will' both signify primarily one and the same substance of the soul. Ockham "defends" this view by considering some points which, according to him, do not provide reasons for distinguishing the intellect and the will from each other. One of them concerns acts produced by the intellect and will. The intellect and the will do not differ from each other on the grounds of the different acts they produce. If we accepted the distinction on the basis of the different acts, we should also accept the following conclusion: there are as many distinct powers of the intellect as there are acts of intellect; but it is easy to see that this does not hold.¹⁵ Thus,

connotando intellectionem receptam in anima. Sed idem omnino est efficiens et recipiens intellectionem."

¹⁴ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 443, 10-17: "Cum igitur respectu actus beatifici, puta tam visionis divinae quam fruitionis, Deus sit causa totalis, et intellectus et voluntas se habent pure passive respectu illorum actuum, sicut supra dictum est de obstinatione angelorum, sequitur quod respectu illius visionis intellectus agens non habet aliquam activitatem. Et hoc est propter nobilitatem actus, non quia idem non potest esse activum et passivum respectu eiusdem."

Ockham also gives the following reason why the will is not active in regard to the act of enjoying God: "Patet idem de fruitione quod illa sit totaliter a Deo, quia si voluntas esset activa respectu illius actus, tunc ille actus esset in potestate voluntatis, et tunc posset fieri misera in patria, sicut sibi placeret, quod videtur absurdum. Sed primus motor, ex quo simpliciter primus est, non sic dependet ab aliquo alio motore. Igitur si moveretur ad volitionem, posset fieri miser, quod reputat Philosophus absurdum" (IV *Sent.*, q. 15, 336, 11-17).

¹⁵ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 436, 19 - 437, 3: "Quod autem intellectus et voluntas, accipiendo pro illo quod denominatur ab istis conceptibus vel nominibus, sint penitus indistinctum, probatur. Tum quia frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora. Tum quia si distinguuntur, aut hoc erit ratione aut ex natura rei. Non primo modo, quia talis distinctio causatur per actum intellectus. Sed istae potentiae praecedunt omnem actum intellectus. Nec secundo modo, quia si sic, aut ista distinctio esset ponenda propter diversitatem actuum aut propter

from the existence of different acts we cannot infer that there is a numerical correspondence between powers and acts.¹⁶

Finally, we can consider the relationship between the intellect and the will by comparing them to each other in the qualitative sense. On the one hand, the will is nobler than the intellect; on the other hand, the intellect is more primary than the will. The will is nobler than the intellect, since the act of loving connoted by the term 'will' is nobler than the act of understanding connoted by the term 'intellect'. But we can also say that the intellect is more primary than the will, since the act of intellect is a partial and efficient cause of the willing. The act of intellect can naturally exist without the act of will, but not *vice versa*. You cannot love something if you do not first know it; still, you can know something without loving it. The knowing forms the first activity of the intellectual soul.¹⁷ Although the intellect can be said to be more primary than the will, this does not mean perfection in the intellect and imperfection in the will.¹⁸

It is clear that these comparisons collapse if these terms are considered in view of the same primary *significatum*, i.e., the intellectual soul, regardless of their *connotata*. Namely, the will is

diversum modum principiandi et oppositum. Non propter primum, quia tunc tot essent potentiae intellectivae distinctae quot essent actus intelligendi distincti."

¹⁶ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 429, 3-6: "...propter diversitatem actuum non oportet ponere distinctionem in potentiis, et tot potentias quot actus. Aliter enim essent tot potentiae intellectivae quot actus intelligendi."

¹⁷ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 441, 10 - 442, 2: "Sed accipiendo utrumque quantum ad totum significatum quid nominis eorum, sic potest concedi quod voluntas est nobilior intellectu, quia actus diligendi qui connotatur per voluntatem est nobilior actu intelligendi qui connotatur per intellectum. Isto etiam secundo modo potest concedi quod intellectus est prior voluntate, quia actus intelligendi qui connotatur per intellectum est prior actu volendi qui connotatur per voluntatem, quia actus intelligendi est causa efficiens partialis respectu actus volendi, et potest esse naturaliter sine actu volendi sed non e converso."

See Leff 1975, 540.

¹⁸ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 442, 2-3: "Sed ista prioritas non infert perfectionem in illo quod est prius nec imperfectionem in posteriori."

nobler than the intellect no more than the will is nobler than the will.¹⁹

The activity of the intellect is not elective, unlike the activity of the will. The intellect gives information about what can or is to be done; the will freely decides what to do. Ockham makes sure that there is no such connection between the intellect and the will that would force the will to follow the judgment of the intellect. If the will could not deviate from the judgment of the intellect, it would not be possible to sin.²⁰ Leff emphasizes the role of the intellectual soul in Ockham's thought as follows: "Through its powers of knowing and willing the intellectual soul is the most perfect part of man and the source...of all his actions, natural, virtuous, vicious, meritorious, and sinful."²¹ The freedom of the will, however, remains the factor that defines the relationship between the intellect and the will.

3 *Habits in the Will*

According to Ockham, 'habit' can be understood in the broad sense (*large*) and in the strict sense (*stricte*). In the former sense, 'habit' refers to some corporal quality which exists after an act. There need not be a correspondence between habits and acts, and habits need not be immediately caused by acts.²² In the latter sense, 'habit' refers to habits in the will. These habits are immediately caused by the acts. There is a correspondence between the distinction of acts and the distinction of habits. In other

¹⁹ II *Sent.*, q. 20, 441, 6-10: "Ad aliud dico quod accipiendo voluntatem pro illo quod denominatur a tali nomine vel conceptu, quod est principium elicitive actus volendi et intellectionis similiter, sic voluntas non est nobilior intellectu, non plus quam voluntas est nobilior voluntate, quia idem omnino sunt."

²⁰ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 355, 15-17: "...non est talis connexio inter intellectum et voluntatem quin voluntas possit in oppositum iudicati ab intellectu; aliter non posset peccare."

²¹ Leff 1975, 547.

²² *Quodl.* II, q. 18, 189, 11-25, 190, 28-29.

words, acts of the one species cause a habit of the same kind (and *vice versa*); acts of the other species cause a habit of another kind (and *vice versa*) etc.²³

Ockham's view is clear; acts of will cause habits in the will. Generally speaking, it is also clear that the effective cause of the act can be habitual; in this case, the act is dependent on the habit, i.e., the habit inclines one to act. According to Ockham, we can know from experience that a habit has this kind of nature of being a cause.²⁴ In order to determine the role of habits in the will, we have to answer the following question: On what grounds do we postulate a quality (*habitus*) of the will as a habitual effective cause of the act? First however, it is useful to consider on what grounds, generally speaking, we postulate a quality (*habitus*) of the soul or of the body as a habitual effective cause of the act.

Habitus is postulated in the soul or in the body primarily because *habitus* inclines one to act (*propter inclinationem*).²⁵ In

²³ *Quodl.* II, q. 18, 190, 26-40: "Aliter accipitur 'habitus' stricte pro habitu immediate generato ex actu, qui habitus aliter generari non potest. Habitus accepti...secundo modo, sunt in voluntate. ...dico quod quaestio non est de habitu primo modo accepto, sed secundo modo. Et quantum ad istum intellectum dico quod tanta est distinctio actuum quanta habituum et e converso. Quod probro, tum quia distincti habitus specie sunt a distinctis actibus specie, quod non esset nisi esset aequalis distinctio illorum; tum quia e converso distincti actus specie causant distinctos habitus specie, quod patet ex hoc quod habitus generatus ex istis actibus non inclinat immediate nisi ad consimiles actus et non ad alios; et alius habitus generatus ex aliis actibus inclinat ad alios actus; igitur etc."

See also Fuchs 1952, 11-13.

²⁴ *Quodl.* III, q. 21, 285, 8-19; *Quodl.* I, q. 18, 93, 11 - 94, 20; III *Sent.*, q. 7, 200, 11-16.

²⁵ 'Inclination' or 'appetite' can be understood in two ways, in the broad sense and in the strict sense. Ockham considers it in the latter sense (see *Quodl.* III, q. 22, 290, 33-45); thus, inclination is understood to be caused by a habit and to be some kind of attempt and effort to act. Ockham thinks that an act does not (necessarily) presuppose inclination in order to come into being; the act can be born without it, too (see *Quodl.* III, q. 22, 289, 10-13). Ockham gives reasons for his view that inclination is something in addition to a habit and distinct from an act: "Assumptum probro, nam habitus aliquando inclinat, aliquando non inclinat intellectum; nam dormiendo non experitur aliquis se inclinatum ad intelligendum, sed statim cum vigilat, experitur se inclinatum. Cum igitur transit talis de contradictorio in contradictorium, aliquid est in intellectu quando vigilat quod non est in eo quando dormit; hoc non potest esse nisi actus, quia habitus idem est in dormiente et vigilante" (*Quodl.* III, q. 22, 289, 14-20). According to

addition to this primary basis, there are the following secondary grounds to postulate *habitus* as a habitual effective cause of the act: a certain easiness in acting (*propter facilitatem*) and promptitude (*propter promptitudinem*). They are secondary because they follow from the first mentioned.²⁶ When Ockham presents these three reasons for postulating a habit as a habitual effective cause of the act, he seems to interpret habit as a power which is understood in a certain way:

...in one way, power is understood to be a form which indifferently brings about many acts, and in this way, the intellect and the will are powers. In another way, it is understood to be a producer of one certain act, and in this way a habit can be called a power, and in the same way, an object (III *Sent.*, q. 7, 204, 19 - 205, 1).²⁷

A person can act so that his action originates from a habit; and he can notice that he fulfils those conditions required in order to have a habit: (1) "ut ad operandum (magis) inclinetur" (*propter inclinationem*), (2a) "ut facilliter operetur" (*propter facilitatem*), (2b) "ut prompte operetur" (*propter promptitudinem*).²⁸ A person is

the reasoning, a habit sometimes inclines the intellect to an act (a habit causes inclination), and sometimes it does not. Namely, a person does not experience in himself an inclination to think when he sleeps; but he experiences this kind of inclination once he is awake. Thus, he has something in his intellect when he is awake that he does not have when he sleeps. This cannot be any other than inclination (in the meaning of an act), since the habit is the same during sleep and while awake.

²⁶ III *Sent.*, q. 7, 217, 3-10: "...non requiritur [habitus] propter facilitatem sive promptitudinem tamquam principium activum tantum, sed propter inclinationem dicitur proprie principium activum. Et ex hoc sequitur facilitas et promptitudo quod magis inclinatur nunc quam prius, ita quod ponitur propter inclinationem, facilitatem et promptitudinem, sed principaliter propter inclinationem, secundario propter alia duo. Sed tantum ponitur principium activum propter inclinationem."

Fuchs 1952, 69, footnote 57: "*Promptitudo*, which does not appear in other pertinent passages, is used here, we believe, as a synonym of *facillitas*."

²⁷ III *Sent.*, q. 7, 204, 19 - 205, 1: "...potentia uno modo accipitur pro forma elicitiva multorum actuum indifferenter, et sic intellectus est potentia, vel voluntas. Alio modo pro aliquo elicitivo unius actus determinate, et sic habitus potest dici potentia et obiectum similiter."

²⁸ III *Sent.*, q. 7, 196, 4-8: "...activitas non attribuitur habitui nisi propter quatuor condiciones convenientes habenti habitum. Quarum prima est ut delectabiliter operetur; secunda ut facilliter operetur; tertia ut prompte operetur; quarta ut ad operandum magis inclinetur..." Ockham gives unqualified approval to the second, third, and fourth reason, although he emphasizes that of these the

inclined to the action influenced by a habit (the primary basis). From this, it follows: the more a person puts into practice the action influenced by a habit, the easier the action is for him (the secondary basis).²⁹

What is the role of habits in the will? Generally speaking, it is worth noting that Ockham regards the postulating of habits in the will to be more problematic than in the other powers. For example, Ockham denies that we could offer the same reason for postulating a habit in the sensitive appetite and in the will:

In the free power, however, a habit cannot be postulated for that reason; since no matter how much the will would incline to some object, it has, however, the ability to elicit a contrary act because of its freedom (III *Sent.*, q. 11, 357, 16-18).³⁰

Furthermore, the necessity of postulating habits in the will is not as obvious as is the necessity of postulating intellective habits in the intellect. An act of will necessarily presupposes the actual knowledge of an object, whereas an act of intellect can exist without a present object. Thus, an act of will always requires the actual presentation of its object on many repeated occasions, while an act of intellect can very well exist on later occasions without

fourth reason (*propter inclinationem*) is properly said to be the active principle (see III *Sent.*, q. 7, 216, 11 - 217, 10).

²⁹ Ockham also considers the question whether *habitus* can be postulated as a quality of the soul or of the body on the grounds of pleasure which is connected with action. According to Ockham, the aspect of pleasure cannot form the basis for postulating a habit: it can be that a person, due to his habit, is inclined to such an action that he also enjoys it; however, it can similarly be that a person, because of his habit, is inclined to such an action that causes sadness. And after all, it is possible that the action remains both without pleasure and without sadness; the action in question could still come from a habit: "...habitus non est tantum ponendus propter delectationem; sed aliquando requiritur habitus ut actus sit...aliquando requiritur, ut actus sit intensior; aliquando, ut actus facilius eliciatur...aliquis habitus delectabiliter inclinatur ad actum, puta habitus diligendi; et aliquis habitus inclinatur tristabiliter, puta habitus odiendi; et hoc secundum quod actus elicitum sunt delectabiles vel tristabiles" (*Quodl.* III, q. 21, 287, 65 - 288, 73); see also III *Sent.*, q. 7, 216, 11 - 217, 2.

³⁰ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 357, 16-18: "In potentia autem libera non potest poni habitus propter istam causam, quia quantumcumque inclinatur in aliquod obiectum, potest tamen de se propter suam libertatem in actum oppositum."

See also III *Sent.*, q. 11, 356, 16-22.

the actual presence of its object. Therefore, even if it is necessary to postulate a habit in the intellect, we have no similar reason to do so with regard to the will.³¹ Lastly, in order to explain the need of habits in the will, one cannot refer to the fact that the will is at some time inclined to a virtuous act less than at another time. This is easily explained by referring to the fact that the sensitive passions and habits can have an influence on the will.³²

Ockham has not said anything which would prevent one from presuming that there can be virtues, or virtuous habits in the will.³³ He admits that it is even reasonable to postulate such habits and discusses critically three possible arguments to the contrary.³⁴ After having taken great pains to show that there are no good reasons for the view that no habits of the will are needed, Ockham is ready to give his own reasons for postulating habits of the will. I quote three slightly different formulations of the argument:

Therefore, a habit can be postulated in the will because anyone experiences in himself that after many acts of will in regard to some object he is more easily and more intensively inclined to bring about the

³¹ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 364, 12-19: "Et eodem modo est de voluntate: si posset elicere actum suum sine ostensione obiecti per intellectum post primam ostensionem, tunc apparet eadem necessitas ponendi habitum in intellectu et voluntate. Sed voluntas ita indiget ostensione obiecti in tertio vel quarto actu, et sic deinceps sicut in primo, quia numquam potest actualiter aliquid velle vel nolle nisi actualiter cognitum. Ideo non apparet eadem necessitas ponendi habitum in intellectu et voluntate."

³² III *Sent.*, q. 11, 364, 19 - 365, 2: "Nec oportet ponere habitum virtuosum in voluntate quia voluntas aliquando difficilius inclinatur ad actum virtuosum quam alias, quia hoc potest accidere propter passiones existentes in parte sensitiva et habitus existentes ibi."

³³ Virtue as a virtuous habit of the will and only of the will is such that suffices to bring about a praiseworthy act through cognition and a power, and in no way brings about a blameworthy act: "...habitus virtuosus' dupliciter accipitur: uno modo, pro aliquo habitu qui mediante cognitione et potentia cuius est habitus, sufficit ad elicendum actum laudabilem, et qui nullo modo est elicivus actus vituperabilis... Habitus virtuosus primo modo non est in aliquo alio a voluntate..." (*Quodl.* II, q. 16, 182, 9-16).

³⁴ *Quodl.* III, q. 20, 284, 58-63: "...maior difficultas est de voluntate, quia voluntas non potest aliquid velle nisi cognitum nec sine cognitione, et actum ita perfectum potest elicere in prima cognitione sicut post multos actus elicitos; et ideo difficile est probare necessitatem ponendi habitum in voluntate. Potest tamen sustineri rationabiliter et persuaderi..."

See also III *Sent.*, q. 11, 355, 1 - 356, 9.

same kind of act after many acts than he was before. Thus, although the will could bring about an act contrary to this inclination on the basis of its freedom, it would be difficult, however, and accompanied by sadness (III *Sent.*, q. 11, 357, 19 - 358, 2).³⁵

Therefore, I say that a habit has to be postulated in the will because the act is more perfect, and the inclination greater, and it is easier to bring about the act, other things remaining the same (III *Sent.*, q. 11, 365, 3-5).³⁶

...the will sets about acting more easily after many acts than earlier, and is more inclined to the act; and the will can bring about a more intensive act after many acts than earlier, other things remaining the same in the sensitive part (*Quodl.* III, q. 20, 284, 63-66).³⁷

Ockham thinks that it is an empirical fact that repeated similar acts of the will make the act of that type easier and more intensive.³⁸

4 *Passions in the Will*

According to Ockham, all passions in the sensitive appetite are acts. In *Quodlibet* two, question 15, Ockham discusses various arguments in favour of distinguishing acts of the soul and passions from each other. According to one of them, if there is no such difference, passions can also exist in the will, but this is contrary to the common belief that passions only exist in the sensitive

³⁵ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 357, 19 - 358, 2 "Ideo potest poni ibi (scil. in voluntate) habitus, quia quilibet experitur in seipso quod post multos actus elicitos in voluntate circa aliquod obiectum, facilius et intensius inclinatur ad elicendum actus consimiles modo post multos tales actus quam prius. Ita quod licet voluntas possit elicere actum contrarium illi inclinationi propter libertatem suam, tamen hoc erit cum tristitia et difficultate..."

³⁶ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 365, 3-5: "Ideo dico quod habitus est ponendus in voluntate propter maiorem perfectionem actus et maiorem inclinationem et facilitatem ad elicendum actum, ceteris paribus."

³⁷ *Quodl.* III, q. 20, 284, 63-66: "Potest tamen sustineri rationabiliter et persuaderi; tum quia facilius exit in actum post multos actus quam ante, et magis inclinatur ad actum; et actum intensiorem potest voluntas elicere post multos actus quam ante ceteris paribus in parte sensitiva."

³⁸ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 358, 10-13: "Et propter istam inclinationem faciliorem in actum intensiorem cum delectatione, videtur quod necessarium est ponere habitum in voluntate, et non propter libertatem aliquam..."

appetite.³⁹ Ockham is not content with the common belief concerning passions. For some special reason, he seems to think that it is necessary to postulate distinct passions in the will and to consider them separately.

Before considering the passions of the will, Ockham explains what he means by passion:

...passion is some form which is distinct from cognition and subjectively exists in the appetite power and requires actual cognition in order to exist (*Quodl.* II, q. 17, 186, 13-15).⁴⁰

On the basis of the definition, an actual cognition is not a passion; the same holds for vegetative operations, intellective habits, and habits of the will. Acts of the sensitive appetite, acts of the will, and pleasure (*delectatio*) and sadness (*tristitia*) in the will belong to passions. They are passions because they (a) are forms distinct from cognition, (b) are objectively in the appetitive powers (*in potentiis appetitivis*), (c) can mediately or immediately be directed by right reason, and (d) require actual cognition in order to exist.⁴¹ An act of will fulfils the conditions (a-d); generally speaking, then, all acts of will are passions.

Ockham considers six passions of the will classified in three pairs:

...there are passions in the will because there are love and hope, and fear and joy in the will; these are generally regarded as passions. In the

³⁹ *Quodl.* II, q. 15, 178, 9-10: "...dico quod in appetitu sensitivo passio et actus non differunt." *Ibid.*, 179, 22, 180, 36-38: "Sed contra hoc arguitur multipliciter: primo... Item tunc passiones possent poni in voluntate, sicut actus boni et mali ponuntur in voluntate; quod est contra omnes, quia ab omnibus ponuntur solum in appetitu sensitivo."

⁴⁰ *Quodl.* II, q. 17, 186, 13-15: "...passio est forma aliqua distincta a cognitione, existens subiective in potentia appetitiva, requirens cognitionem actualem ad suum esse existere."

⁴¹ *Quodl.* II, q. 17, 186, 15 - 187, 25: "Per primum excluditur cognitio actualis, quia illa non est passio; per secundum, habitus omnes intellectuales et operationes vegetativae; per tertium excluduntur habitus in voluntate, quia possunt esse sine actuali cognitione, sicut patet in dormiente. Ex isto sequitur quod tam actus appetitus sensitivi, et breviter omnes, quam actus voluntatis quam etiam delectatio et tristitia quae sunt in voluntate, sunt passiones; quia omnia ista sunt formae distinctae a cognitione, et sunt subiective in potentiis appetitivis, et sunt regulabiles recta ratione mediate vel immediate, et requirunt actualem cognitionem ad suam existentiam."

same way, there are pleasure and sadness in the will; these are also passions (*Quodl.* II, q. 17, 187, 27-30).⁴²

The passions of the will are (1) love and hope (*amor et spes*), (2) fear and joy (*timor et gaudium*), and (3) pleasure and sadness (*delectatio* and *tristitia*). Love and hope are not distinguished from acts; they are acts immediately elicited by the will and the habits of the will. Pleasure and sadness are distinguished from acts because acts of will can exist without them. Ockham does not mention anything about fear and joy, but it seems obvious that he regards them as acts.⁴³

Pleasure and sadness⁴⁴ naturally require acts, that is to say, they are caused and maintained by the acts. Thus, they are passions without being acts. Ockham gives examples of in what way an act of will can exist without pleasure or without sadness. The first example: a demon who most intensively loves itself does not, however, feel any pleasure. The second example: a good angel does

⁴² *Quodl.* II, q. 17, 187, 27-30: "...passiones sunt in voluntate, quia amor et spes, timor et gaudium sunt in voluntate, quae tamen communiter ponuntur passiones. Similiter delectatio et tristitia sunt in voluntate, quae etiam sunt passiones; igitur etc."

⁴³ *Quodl.* II, q. 17, 187, 31-37: "...quaedam passiones voluntatis non distinguuntur ab actibus, et quaedam distinguuntur. Amor enim et spes non distinguuntur ab actibus, quod patet per inseparabilitatem illorum ab actibus, sed sunt actus immediate eliciti a voluntate et ab habitibus voluntatis. Sed delectatio et tristitia distinguuntur ab actibus, quod patet ex hoc quod actus voluntatis possunt remanere sine delectatione et tristitia..."

⁴⁴ It is perhaps interesting to note that Ockham does not use the term 'pain' (*dolor*) but the term 'sadness' (*tristitia*) when he refers to the passion of the will. Ockham may also refer to a passion of the sensitive appetite by using the term '*tristitia*' (see *Quodl.* III, q. 17, 271, 85 - 272, 93). However, Ockham mainly uses the term '*dolor*' when he refers to the passion of the sensitive appetite. As far as the passion of pleasure (*delectatio*) is concerned, Ockham does not make any terminological difference between the passion of the will and the passion of the sensitive appetite (see *Quodl.* III, q. 17, 268, 12-16).

Pleasure and sadness in the will are related to acts of intellect and to acts of willing or not-willing. Pleasure and sadness in the sensitive appetite are related to that act of apprehension by which one apprehends the object of the willing; or they are related to desiring or avoiding or both (see *Quodl.* III, q. 17, 271, 85 - 272, 93).

not want a man to sin but he sins in spite of it. The damned has no pleasure and the angel has no sadness.⁴⁵

According to Ockham, when Aristotle says that we are not praised or blamed on account of our passions, he means certain passions in the sensitive appetite.⁴⁶ The passions in question are such that they are not in the power of the will. They are so-called surreptitious passions (*actus surrepticii*) of the sensitive appetite.⁴⁷ Passions like these (which are peculiar to children and irresponsible people) are fear (*timere*), anger (*irasci*), pain (*dolere*), and joy (*gaudere*).

The passions of joy, hope, fear, and love in the will have counterparts in the sensitive appetite.⁴⁸ Joy and fear as sensitive passions belong to the so-called surreptitious passions, whereas love and hope are not the same kinds of passions.⁴⁹ Ockham does not see any problem in admitting that the so-called surreptitious passions of the sensitive appetite remain beyond the control of the

⁴⁵ *Quodl.* II, q. 17, 187, 36 - 188, 45: "...actus voluntatis possunt remanere sine delectatione et tristitia, sicut patet de daemone qui intensissime diligit se et tamen in hoc nullo modo delectatur. Similiter angelus bonus habet nolle respectu alicuius quod evenit; sicut nollet hominem peccare ad cuius custodiam deputatur, et tamen homo peccat mortaliter; sed ex hoc nullo modo tristatur, quia sicut in damnato nulla est delectatio, ita in beato nulla est tristitia. Sed delectatio et tristitia non possunt esse sine actibus naturaliter, quia ab illis causantur et conservantur; igitur istae formae sunt passiones et non actus."

⁴⁶ *Quodl.* II, q. 17, 188, 47-50: "Sed contra praedicta, quia secundum Philosophum, propter passiones non laudamur nec vituperamur; sed propter omnem formam existentem in voluntate laudamur et vituperamur; igitur etc."

⁴⁷ *Quodl.* II, q. 17, 188, 52-62: "Respondeo quod Philosophus intelligit de passionibus sensitivis quae non sunt in potestate nostra, cuiusmodi sunt actus appetitus sensitivi surrepticii; puta timere, irasci, quibus statim homo capitur facta apprehensione obiectorum, nec sunt in potestate sua; sicut est etiam dolere, gaudere, quae conveniunt pueris et fatuis, qui non habent usum rationis. Ideo propter talia nec laudamur nec vituperamur. Tales autem actus surrepticii non sunt in voluntate, quia omnes actus qui sunt in voluntate, sunt in potestate voluntatis. Ad argumentum principale, nego assumptum, quia passiones aliquae sunt in voluntate."

⁴⁸ *Quodl.* II, q. 15, 178, 9 - 179, 14.

⁴⁹ Compare with *Quodl.* II, q. 17, 188, 52-60.

will. The passions of the will are definitely in the power of the will.⁵⁰

5 *The Will and Sensitive Passions*

According to Ockham, sensitive passions as acts are laudable or blameworthy, provided that they are under the control of the will.⁵¹ Otherwise they are not laudable or blameworthy.⁵² This being the case, sensitive passions are subordinate to the will and its acts as far as their moral status is concerned. The whole issue of the relation between the will and the sensitive passions is complicated. Two questions are relevant here. The first is: What is the causal relation between an act of will and a passion of the sensitive appetite? And the second one is: In what way do sensitive passions affect the will?

Concerning the causal relation, an act of will may be a partial effective cause of a passion of the sensitive appetite, but not *vice*

⁵⁰ It is interesting to compare the passions of joy and fear in the sensitive appetite with the corresponding passions in the will. Ockham seems to think of these passions as follows. It is very clear that joy and fear from among the sensitive passions can remain beyond the control of the will; in the same manner, it is very clear that joy and fear as passions of the will are to the last degree under the control of the will.

⁵¹ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 367, 15-20: "Ad aliud dico quod in quacumque potentia ponitur passio quae dicitur laudabilis vel vituperabilis, in eadem debet poni habitus virtuosus. Sed in parte sensitiva non ponitur talis passio, quia solum dicitur laudabilis vel vituperabilis propter electionem voluntatis propter finem bonum vel malum. Et ita dicitur talis denominatione extrinseca."

See also Fuchs 1952, 91-92; Freppert 1988, 49. Notice that Ockham uses the expressions "in potestate nostra" and "in potestate voluntatis" as synonymous, see *Quodl.* II, q. 17, 188, 52-62.

⁵² III *Sent.*, q. 12, 412, 5-6: "...passiones se habent indifferenter ad laudem et vituperium, nec determinant sibi laudem vel vituperium." *Quodl.* II, q. 15, 181, 63-70: "...propter passiones moderatas vel immoderatas laudamur et vituperamur, quando sunt in potestate nostra. Unde tales actus sive passiones non determinant sibi laudem vel vituperium, ita quod convenient eis intrinsece; sed solum quadam denominatione extrinseca per conformitatem ad volitionem virtuosam vel vitiosam dicitur talis passio laudabilis quando elicitur secundum debitas circumstantias, et vituperabilis quando elicitur secundum circumstantias indebitas." See also III *Sent.*, q. 12, 412, 4 - 413, 9.

versa.⁵³ Some acts of will (and along with them some habits of the will) are directed to passions of the sensitive appetite.⁵⁴ For example, when a person wants to have the desire to eat in accordance with all required circumstances, his act of will (wanting) is directed to the passion (desiring). The passion in question has its origin only in the sensitive part of the soul. In a case like this, the habit of the will is directed to the passions in the sensitive part as if they were its general objects, and also as if these passions were dictated and caused by the habits of the will. The act of will is the immediate cause of the apprehension that precedes the passion; thus, it is the mediate cause of the passion by being the cause of the cause.⁵⁵

As for the second question, one way to consider the influence of the sensitive passions on the inclination or non-inclination of the will is to clarify the relation between an act of will and the passions of pain and pleasure in the sensitive appetite. Generally speaking, Ockham admits the influence of these passions on the will: the will is more inclined to such willing that causes pleasure, and it is reluctant to such that causes pain (why it is like this is not so

⁵³ III *Sent.*, q. 12, 416, 3-9: "...actus virtutis in voluntate est causa partialis passionis in appetitu sensitivo - actus dico imperativus quatenus ad eius imperium potest talis passio elici. Sed actus ille in appetitu sensitivo - sive passio quae est obiectum virtutis commune, sive recta ratio, sive locus sive tempus sive finis sive quaecumque circumstantia [quae] est obiectum parziale actus virtuosus in voluntate - non est causa efficiens illius actus."

⁵⁴ III *Sent.*, q. 12, 411, 5-7: "Sed aliter est de actibus voluntatis generativis virtutum, quia illorum actuum aliqui habent actus appetitus sensitivi pro obiectis communibus..."

⁵⁵ III *Sent.*, q. 12, 411, 10-22: "Exemplum: possum enim non tantum velle secundum circumstantias debitas comedere, sed possum velle secundum circumstantias debitas habere appetitum comedendi. In prima volitione est actus potentiae executivae obiectum commune; in secunda, actus appetitus sensitivi. Et ex hoc patet quod istae passionis non sunt actus eliciti a voluntate nec ab habitu existente in voluntate, sed tantum in parte sensitiva. Unde habitus in voluntate respicit ipsas passionis in parte sensitiva tamquam obiecta communia, et etiam tamquam actus imperatos et causatos ab ipsis habitibus mediante actu voluntatis elicito et imperato. Vel forte ipse actus voluntatis est causa mediata respectu illarum passionum, quia est causa causae. Est enim causa immediata partialis apprehensionis precedentis talem actum qui vocatur passio."

See also Fuchs 1952, 92-93.

easy to explain, however). The cause of the inclination cannot be dictative knowledge (*cognitio dictativa*). And it cannot be pleasure alone, not even very intensive pleasure, since the will - because of its freedom - is always able to elicit an act that is opposed to an inclination.⁵⁶ According to Ockham, pleasure in the sensitive appetite is an immediate and partial effective cause of the inclination in the will - it is a cause together with the will itself and the knowing of an object. In the same way, pain in the sensitive appetite is a partial effective cause of the non-inclination in the will.⁵⁷ Pleasure as a partial cause explains why a certain act of will comes into being easily. Similarly, pain as a partial cause explains why something is not easily willed. These partial causes are not necessary to acts of the will as such, but the absence of them explains why the will is not as easily inclined or not inclined in regard to some object.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ *Quaest. variae, q. 8, art. II, 446, 828 - 447, 845*: "...difficile est dare causam quare voluntas plus inclinatur ad volendum illud quod causat delectationem in appetitu sensitivo, et ad nolendum illud obiectum quod causat dolorem in appetitu sensitivo. Quia nec cognitio dictativa potest esse causa illius inclinationis... Nec actus nec delectatio appetitus sensitivi potest sic inclinare voluntatem, quia quantumcumque delectatio sit intensa in appetitu sensitivo, potest voluntas ex liberate sua velle contrarium. Et ideo non apparet, ut videtur, aliqua causa illius inclinationis voluntatis - naturalis dico - nisi quia natura rei talis est, et hoc innotescit nobis per experientiam."

⁵⁷ *Quaest. variae, q. 8, art. II, 447, 846-854*: "Secundo dico quod potest reddi aliqua causa quare causatur actus volendi respectu obiecti quod causat delectationem in appetitu sensitivo et actus nolendi respectu obiecti quod causat dolorem in eodem. Quia potest dici quod actus appetitus sensitivi - sive melius ipsa delectatio in appetitu sensitivo - est causa effectiva partialis immediate concurrrens cum voluntate et cognitione talis obiecti ad causandum talem volitionem. Et similiter dolor est causa effectiva partialis ad causandum actum nolendi respectu talis obiecti."

⁵⁸ *Quaest. variae, q. 8, art. II, 447, 854 - 448, 864*: "Et ideo, posita delectatione in appetitu sensitivo, potest faciliter actus volendi causari in voluntate respectu illius obiecti. Et ipsa non posita, non potest ita faciliter talis actus causari quia tunc deficit una causa partialis requisita ad elicendum talem actum faciliter, vel saltem intense. Et eodem modo, posito dolore in appetitu sensitivo, potest faciliter causari actus nolendi respectu talis obiecti in voluntate et non actus volendi. Quia dolor est causa effectiva partialis immediate causans^a cum voluntate et aliis actum nolendi, et non est causa ad causandum actum volendi. Et ipso dolore deficiente, non potest talis actus nolendi ita faciliter causari."

The influence of the sensitive passion on the will presupposes the consent of the will. When the will does not consent, the sensitive habit is subject to this not-willing (*est sub actu contrario*) and then does not influence the will.⁵⁹ Ultimately, the only cause of the inclinations and non-inclinations in the will is the will itself, as it is also in the power of the will not to bring about any act of will.⁶⁰ The will can govern the sensitive passions by consenting or not consenting to them.⁶¹

⁵⁹ *Quodl.* III, q. 22, 291, 54-61: "...habitus et passiones proprie loquendo non inclinat voluntatem nisi quando voluntas consentit eis mediante volitione; et ita, si voluntas nolit illas passiones et nolit elicere actum secundum habitum, tunc non inclinabunt voluntatem. Et ista inclinatio quam homo difficulter vincit, quia cum difficultate potest non consentire talibus passionibus. Ad argumentum principale dico quod habitus non inclinat potentiam quando est sub actu contrario."

⁶⁰ *Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. II, 448, 868-874: "Sed istis non obstantibus, non redditur causa quare voluntas plus vel minus inclinatur, positis talibus passionibus in appetitu sensitivo. Quia quantumcumque ponatur delectatio vehemens in appetitu sensitivo et cognitio dictativa in intellectu et alia concurrentia ad actum, adhuc est in potestate voluntatis elicere actum volendi respectu illius objecti, vel nolendi, vel nullum actum elicere."

Ockham defends the view that the will, ultimately, is able to overcome sensitive passions, although *cum difficultate* (see *Quodl.* III, q. 22, 291, 54-61). However, he admits that some sensitive desire could effect an inclination (*primus motus*) of the will to this desire so that the will cannot resist it. In this case, the will cannot be regarded as responsible for the inclination because it is not in the power of the will (see III *Sent.*, q. 7, 211, 21 - 212, 12). In other words, the *primus motus* in the will cannot be regarded as a consent to the sensitive passion because the will does not have an alternative not to consent to it. How does Ockham get rid of this contradiction? He seems to reason as follows. Before the situation of having some *primus motus* in the will, there has been the situation of a real choice: either to avoid or not to avoid such a situation where the desiring of some bad thing will become actual. Thus, we turn back to Ockham's view: ultimately, the only cause of inclinations in the will is the will itself. (See also the following texts: *Quaest. variae*, q. 6, art. IX, 262, 248-263, 259; *ibid.*, art. X, 274, 46-50; *ibid.*, art. IX, 270, 422 - 271, 432.) In any case, the will is one immediate partial cause of sense apprehension; hence, the will is also the mediate cause explaining why the sensitive passion can effect the inclination (*primus motus*) in the will so that the will cannot prevent it.

⁶¹ Ockham does not seem to emphasize the point that certain sensitive passions are not in fact in the power of the will. The passions of fear, anger, pain and joy - when they are so-called surreptitious passions - remain beyond the control of the will, and they are peculiar to children and irresponsible people. From an ethical aspect, these passions appear to be unproblematic in the sense that they are the passions of such people who cannot be regarded as fully responsible for their action (see *Quodl.* II, q. 17, 188, 52-62).

II PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE

A Speculative and Practical Knowledge

In the Prologue to the first book of the *Commentary on the Sentences* Ockham discusses the concept of praxis (q. 10) and the difference between practical and theoretical knowledge (q. 11). Both themes are relevant to the nature of moral knowledge. In this part (II A) I shall investigate Ockham's conception of practical knowledge; the next part (II B) will treat the object of practical knowledge, that is, praxis or action.

1 *The Difference between Speculative and Practical Knowledge*

Ockham begins his discussion of the difference between speculative and practical knowledge by asking whether they should be distinguished from each other on the grounds of their ends or on the grounds of their objects. First, he makes some critical remarks on Henry of Ghent's conception, and here he also touches on the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge based on their ends.

Henry of Ghent drew a distinction between the end of knowledge and the end of a knower: the end of knowledge is that towards which knowledge in itself is directed; the end of a knower is that towards which a knower himself directs the knowledge.¹ Furthermore, the end of knowledge can be of two kinds: (1) the end which is in itself and primary; (2) the end which is accidental and secondary: "finis scientiae est duplex, scilicet per se et per accidens, principalis et secundarius" (I *Sent.*, *Prolog.*, q. 11, 303, 6-7). The end of knowledge *per se* is that towards which knowledge, by its nature, is directed. The end of knowledge *per accidens* is not that

¹ I *Sent.*, *Prolog.*, q. 11, 303, 5-6: "Finis scientiae est ille ad quem ordinatur scientia, finis scientis est ille ad quem sciens ordinat scientiam."

towards which knowledge is directed *per se* but that for which purpose a knower wants to know.² We can easily see that Henry of Ghent identifies the end of a knower with the accidental end of knowledge. This end does not offer a basis for drawing a distinction between speculative and practical knowledge. On the contrary, the distinction between the two is based on the *per se* end of knowledge:

...knowledge is said to be speculative or practical on the basis of its proper (*per se*) and primary (*principalis*) end, and not on the basis of its non-primary end. For the kind of knowledge which of itself is directed to the cognition of truth is speculative, but that which is directed towards realizing something good is practical knowledge. (I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 11, 303, 12-16).³

Henry of Ghent regards knowledge as some kind of independent entity having an end of its own. As every effect has a cause of its own, so has knowledge by its nature to have a final cause.⁴ Thus, speculative knowledge must concern the truth (knowledge is the end *per se* of speculative knowledge). Correspondingly, practical knowledge must concern the good (good action is the end *per se* of practical knowledge).

Ockham does not totally reject Henry of Ghent's conception; Ockham also thinks that reflection should be the end of speculative knowledge, and operating (well) the end of practical knowledge:

The other end of knowledge is that which, according to right reason, the agent acting freely should aim at. And in this way, the end of practical knowledge is an act, or acting; and the end of speculative knowledge is reflecting. For in view of rationality, a learner should aim, for the most part or always, at those ends. If, however, he does not in fact do so,

² I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 11, 303, 8-10: "Finis per se scientiae est ad quem ex natura sua habet ordinari. Finis per accidens scientiae, sive non principalis, est ille ad quem non ordinatur per se, sed potest ordinari ex intentione scientis."

³ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 11, 303, 12-16: "...sed a fine scientiae per se et principali et non a fine non principali dicitur scientia speculativa vel practica, quia illa scientia quae ex se ordinatur ad cognitionem veri est speculativa, illa autem quae ordinatur ad operationem boni est practica."

⁴ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 11, 303, 20 - 304, 3: "...unusquisque effectus distinguitur per suam causam nobiliorem. Sed inter omnes causas causa finalis est nobilissima, cum sit causa causarum, secundum Avicennam. Igitur notitia practica habet distingui ab alia penes finem suum."

they are not final causes, for these kinds of knowledge are in no way dependent on them, but other intentions are, then, final causes (I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 11, 308, 19-26).⁵

According to right reason, speculative and practical knowledge are, thus, distinguishable from each other on the grounds of the final cause of knowledge:

One must, however, know that when the end is understood to be what it should be according to right reason, - in the way explained - they are distinguished on the grounds of their ends proper because the end of the one is different from that of the other. And this is how Aristotle understands this in book III of *On the Soul*, in book II of the *Metaphysics*, and at every place where he says that they are distinguished on the grounds of their ends. However, as is said, these are not always final causes, properly speaking (I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 11, 311, 19 - 312, 3).⁶

Ockham does not show much sympathy towards Henry's view, however. Ockham thinks that the end of a knower (*finis scientis*) and the end of knowledge (*finis scientiae*) must be one and the same, as in general the end of an agent (*finis agentis*) and the end of his action (*finis actionis suae*) are the same.⁷ The identity between the end of knowledge and the end of a knower makes Henry of Ghent's distinction between the two different ends of knowledge (*per se, per accidens*) irrelevant: if one accepts that the end of an action is always what is intended by the agent, one must

⁵ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 11, 308, 19-26: "Alius est finis scientiae qui secundum rectam rationem deberet intendi ab agente quod libere agit. Et isto modo finis scientiae practicae est opus vel operari, et finis speculativae est considerare, quia rationabiliter addiscens vel in maiori parte vel semper deberet istos fines intendere. Si tamen de facto non faciat, non erunt causae finales, quia ipsae scientiae in nullo dependebunt ab eis, sed alia intenta erunt causae finales."

⁶ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 11, 311, 19 - 312, 3: "Verumtamen sciendum quod accipiendo finem pro illo qui secundum rectam rationem deberet esse finis, - modo exposito -, sic distinguuntur per fines tamquam per aliqua propria, quia alius est finis unius et alterius. Et isto modo intelligit Philosophus III *De anima* et II *Metaphysicae*, et ubique ubi dicit eas distingui per fines. Tamen, sicut dictum est, istae non sunt semper causae finales proprie dictae."

⁷ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 11, 304, 15-21: "Contra istam opinionem ostendo quod practica non distinguitur a speculativa fine, id est per causam finalem, ita scilicet quod habeat distinctam causam finalem a causa finali speculativae, sed idem simpliciter potest esse causa finalis utriusque. Hoc probabo primo sic: idem est finis scientiae et scientis; sed idem potest esse finis scientis propter quem acquirit scientiam tam speculativam quam practicam; igitur etc." See also *ibid.*, 304, 21 - 305, 4.

also accept that the end of knowledge is of this kind, provided that one understands knowledge to be action. The intention of an agent, then, is the only end and final cause of the act of knowing.⁸

Ockham's additional remarks emphasize the same thing: the only end of knowledge is what an agent himself intends.⁹ The end of a knower is the essential cause of knowledge:

...that on which a thing is essentially dependent, so that without it the thing would not have a real existence, seems to be the essential cause of that thing. But knowledge itself is really and essentially dependent on the end of a knower because there would absolutely be no knowledge without it (*I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 305, 17-20*).¹⁰

Ockham uses an example which he thinks sheds more light on the nature of the final cause of knowledge.¹¹ Intended profit may be the final cause of knowledge because one can obtain knowledge for that reason. Still, profit is not the final cause of a knower: if it were the final cause, it would also be the essential cause; but it cannot be the essential cause because the existence of a knower is in no way dependent on it; thus, profit is not the final cause of a knower. With the help of this example, Ockham wants to stress that 'the end of a knower' means the end which the person who wants to know puts to himself.

⁸ Notice that there is no intrinsic finality in nature according to Ockham. Clark 1978, 145: "According to many Scholastics, a nature must express an intrinsic orientation or finality since pointless activity is, literally, inconceivable. But Ockham rejects the universal application of this principle of finality. Strictly speaking, only the free and conscious agent acts for the sake of an end. The physical universe behaves predictably and mechanistically but nature does not make plans. It is the nature of fire and not its motive to produce heat." See also *Quodl. II, q. 2, 115, 90 - 116, 97*.

⁹ *I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 305, 7 - 306, 5*; see also *ibid.*, 306, 7-22, 307, 1-10.

¹⁰ *I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 305, 17-20*: "...illud a quo res dependet essentialiter, ita quod sine illo res non haberet esse reale, videtur esse causa essentialis illius rei. Sed a fine scientis dependet ipsa scientia realiter et essentialiter, quia sine illo simpliciter non foret."

¹¹ *I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 307, 19 - 308, 3*: "Similiter, ipsum lucrum vel aliquid tale est causa finalis aliquo modo ipsius scientiae, quia est per quod respondetur ad questionem factam [per] 'propter quid'. Si enim aliquis quaerat 'quare iste addiscit' vel 'quare scientia producitur', convenienter respondetur 'propter lucrum per ipsam adquirendum'. Et tamen illud lucrum non est causa finalis ipsius scientis, quia ipse sciens non dependet ab eo essentialiter, sed tantum est desideratum et concupitum a sciente, propter quod agit ad acquirendum scientiam."

The final cause of knowledge is aimed at (*intentum*) and desired (*amatum*) by a knower. The reason why a person knows something is that he wants to know - either for the sake of knowing itself (*finis amatus amore amicitiae*) or for the sake of some other thing which is attainable through knowing (*finis amatus amore concupiscentiae*).¹²

If we concede that speculative and practical knowledge are distinguished from each other on the grounds of their ends, without qualifications, we deny that the end of knowledge is created by an agent himself and that the agent's intention, or reason for willing to know, can be almost anything. Thus, according to Ockham, the end does not distinguish, without qualifications, speculative knowledge from practical. However, Ockham accepts - as was shown above - the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge on the grounds of their ends in a *qualified* sense: the final cause of knowledge *according to right reason* is what distinguishes speculative from practical knowledge; the end of speculative knowledge is truth, and the end of practical knowledge is acting well.¹³ Ockham takes it for granted that the qualification "according to right reason" is to be understood in a deontological way: the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge based on the ends is a distinction that reveals how things should be, according to right reason. Ockham does not think that how things should be can be determined by how they are:

I respond to all authorities that they proceed from the end which according to right reason, at least in most cases, should be aimed at, if

¹² I *Sent., Prol.*, q. 11, 308, 4-8: "...sicut in agentibus naturaliter illud est causa finalis quod intenditur a natura, ita in voluntariis illud est causa finalis quod intenditur a voluntate; sed lucrum vel aliquid tale est intentum a voluntate propter quod producitur scientia; ergo illud vere erit causa finalis."

Quaest. variae, q. 4, 150, 1085-1091: "...duplex est finis: quidam amatus amore concupiscentiae, et quidam amore amicitiae. Finis autem amatus amore amicitiae perfectior est, vel simpliciter vel in acceptatione voluntatis, quam finis amatus amore concupiscentiae. Exemplum: amo proximum propter Deum. Hic proximus amatur amore concupiscentiae et Deus amore amicitiae, et Deus est perfectior proximo."

¹³ I *Sent., Prol.*, q. 11, 303, 17-19; *ibid.*, 308, 19-26; *ibid.*, 311, 19 - 312, 3.

everything would be in the right order; and that is why they think that knowledge due to its nature can be directed to this kind of end. However if no one actually intends this, it is truly and properly no final cause (*I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 309, 11-16*).¹⁴

When authorities criticized by Ockham talk about how things should be, they assume this has a foundation in the nature of things. Ockham does not accept this course of thinking. Giving up the teleological approach to norms, Ockham draws a sharp distinction between how things are and how they should be. His remarks on postulating natural ends of action show similarities to what has been called Hume's Law, that one should not derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.

On the grounds of their subjects, speculative and practical knowledge do not necessarily differ from each other in any mentioned way. Ockham indicates the difference between the subject and object in the following way:

...there is a difference between the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge, because the subject of knowledge is the subject of the conclusion, but the object of knowledge is that which is known and that which completes the act of knowing. But the conclusion known itself is just such a thing. And thus, the subject is a part of the object; and if it were the object, it would not be more than a partial object (*I Sent., Prol., q. 9, 266, 17-22*).¹⁵

Thus, the subject of knowledge is the subject of the conclusion, and the object of knowledge is the conclusion itself. The subject of knowledge is that of which one has knowledge; the object of knowledge is what one knows about the subject.

¹⁴ *I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 309, 11-16*: "Ad omnes auctoritates respondeo quod procedunt de fine qui secundum rectam rationem - saltem ut in pluribus - deberet intendi si omnia essent convenienter ordinata, et ideo quasi ex natura sua habet quod sit ordinabilis ad talem finem. Si tamen non actualiter intendatur non est vere et proprie causa finalis."

See also *II Sent., q. 4, 74, 15 - 75, 3*.

¹⁵ *I Sent., Prol., q. 9, 266, 17-22*: "...differentia est inter subiectum scientiae et obiectum scientiae, quia subiectum scientiae est subiectum conclusionis, sed obiectum scientiae est illud quod scitur et terminat actum sciendi. Huiusmodi autem est ipsa conclusio scita. Et ita subiectum est pars obiecti; et si sit obiectum, non est nisi obiectum partiale."

See also *Exp. Phys., Prol., 8, 70 - 9, 79*.

The subject of speculative and practical knowledge can be the same. This means that speculative and practical knowledge are not distinguished from each other as though the subject would be something proper to them (*tamquam per aliqua sibi propria*). We are able to have practical knowledge of those passions of the subject which are in our power and speculative knowledge of those ones which are not in our power. For example, we have speculative knowledge *simpliciter* of the passions of the subject 'earth' (the earth is round, capable of freezing, and so on). Practical knowledge, for example our knowledge of agriculture, can deal with this same subject 'earth'. Natural being (*ens naturale*) is the subject both of speculative knowledge and of practical knowledge because it is the matter of artificial forms (*materia formarum artificialium*). Likewise, there can be both speculative and practical knowledge of a man, of an intellectual soul, and of many other things.¹⁶

Many of the practical conclusions are derived from speculative principles. In these cases, the subject of practical knowledge - i.e., the subject of the conclusion - is the same subject that occurs as a subject in the speculative principle. For example, a farmer makes a practical conclusion from the speculative principle 'the earth is hard'; the conclusion made is about what one should do in order to make it suitable for agriculture. Ockham remarks that speculative principles are practical in the sense that any speculative principle could in some way or other be connected with praxis. However, the status of these principles as speculative presupposes that the manner of speaking about speculative principles is maintained.¹⁷ We also have practical sciences that are subordinate to speculative sciences (for example music in relation to arithmetic). This being the case, it has to be possible to derive practical conclusions from speculative principles.¹⁸

¹⁶ I *Sent.*, *Prolog.*, q. 11, 313, 4 - 314, 2.

¹⁷ See also Freppert 1988, 29-30.

¹⁸ I *Sent.*, *Prolog.*, q. 11, 314, 5 - 315, 2. *Summ. phil. natur., praeambula*, 150, 326-334: "Et si dicas quod conclusiones et principia scientiae subalternatae

Always and in every case, speculative and practical knowledge are distinguished from each other on the grounds of their conclusions or of their objects because there is something in the conclusion of practical knowledge in itself which distinguishes it from the conclusion of speculative knowledge. The content of speculative knowledge (which is disclosed in the conclusion) is qualitatively different from the content of practical knowledge. Ockham explains in the following way what he means by the distinction based on the conclusions:

...these kinds of knowledge are distinguished on the grounds of their conclusions proper; viz., so that the conclusion known by practical knowledge is necessarily different from the conclusion known by speculative knowledge. This is clear because in the conclusion known by speculative knowledge nothing is said about what we can do and there is no reference to what we can do because speculative knowledge does not concern our operations. But in the conclusion known by practical knowledge something is said about what we can do and there is some reference to what we can do because practical knowledge concerns our acts, i.e., those [conclusions] that signify our acts. Thus, the conclusion known by the one science is different from that known by the other (I *Sent., Prol., q. 11, 315, 3-13*).¹⁹

The conclusions of speculative and practical knowledge are qualitatively different from each other because the former do not concern our acts, whereas the latter do. Although Ockham first accounts for the difference by saying that our acts are the content of practical knowledge, whereas speculative knowledge has no object

dependent ex principiis scientiae subalternantis, sed ex principiis speculativis non eliciuntur nisi conclusiones speculativae, igitur notitia practica non potest esse subalternata notitiae speculativae, dico quod frequenter conclusio practica dependet ex principio speculativo. Unde frequenter una praemissarum in syllogismo practico est pure speculativa, sed semper aliqua praemissarum est practica. Sicut hic est syllogismus practicus 'parentes sunt honorandi, isti sunt parentes, igitur isti sunt honorandi', et tamen minor est speculativa; et sic de multis aliis."

¹⁹ I *Sent., Prol., q. 11, 315, 3-13*: "...istae notitiae distinguuntur per conclusiones scitas tamquam per propria sibi, ita scilicet quod necessario est alia conclusio scita notitia practica et alia scita notitia speculativa, patet: quia in illa conclusione quae scitur notitia speculativa nihil ponitur operabile a nobis, nec aliquid importans operabile a nobis, cum notitia speculativa non sit de operibus nostris. In illa autem conclusione quae scitur notitia practica ponitur aliquid operabile a nobis vel aliquid importans operabile a nobis, cum notitia practica sit de operibus nostris, hoc est de his quae significant opera nostra. Igitur alia est conclusio scita una scientia et alia."

of this kind, something more is implied here. Knowledge, in order to be practical, must fulfil certain further conditions:

...because practical knowledge directs praxis, it must be so that practical knowledge always has praxis or that which signifies praxis or something we can do at least as its partial object. And because practical knowledge is in regard to some complex (proposition), it must be so that this knowledge directs operation more than noncomplex knowledge of any of the terms of this complex. When this is the case, knowledge is practical, and not in any other case (*I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 315, 13-19*).²⁰

Practical knowledge is directive (*directiva*) in regard to praxis, and it is complex knowledge.²¹ The nature of the object (or, equivalently, of the conclusion) of knowledge, as practical, presupposes firstly that the conclusion, which directs praxis, somehow has praxis at least as its partial object. Secondly, the nature of the conclusion, as practical, presupposes that the conclusion, being a proposition, directs more than any of the terms of this proposition.

The nature of practical knowledge as more directive than speculative knowledge belongs to the distinction drawn between them:

All such knowledge is practical which has as its total or partial object praxis itself or something produced by praxis..., and which directs operation, either by way of dictating or only by way of showing, more than noncomplex knowledge concerning praxis, because it is on this basis that one distinguishes speculative knowledge from practical (*I Sent., Prol., q. 12, 338, 2-8*).²²

²⁰ *I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 315, 13-19*: "...cum notitia practica sit directiva alicuius praxis, oportet quod semper notitia practica habeat praxim vel significans praxim vel aliquid operabile a nobis pro obiecto saltem partiali. Et cum notitia practica sit respectu alicuius complexi, oportet quod illa notitia sit magis directiva operis quam notitia incomplexa cuiuscumque termini illius complexi. Et quando sic est, tunc est notitia practica, aliter non."

²¹ Freppert also seems to refer to this complex nature of practical knowledge when he says that "prudence is complex knowledge, that is, knowledge of propositions" (see Freppert 1988, 21).

²² *I Sent., Prol., q. 12, 338, 2-8*: "Et omnis notitia quae habet pro obiecto totali vel partiali ipsam praxim vel operatum per praxim...quod de novo habet esse per ipsam praxim quae est magis directiva operis sive dictative sive ostensive solum quam sit notitia incomplexa praxis vel operati per praxim, est practica, quia per hoc distinguitur notitia speculativa a practica, sicut declaratum est."

Ockham explains the directiveness of speculative knowledge as follows:

...we are able to have speculative knowledge of our acts, i.e., of the terms or propositions which indicate our acts, because many of our acts can be known; and this knowledge does not direct more than noncomplex knowledge. As I know that love is a quality and that it depends on God, and in this way, I also know other things; for these kinds of knowledge do not direct more than the noncomplex knowing of love. And in this way, one can include the work *De anima* in speculative knowledge, although for a large part it concerns our acts (*I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 315, 20 - 316, 2*).²³

The example of speculative knowledge (love is a quality...) concerns praxis in the sense that it explains love, and love, being the act of the will, is praxis. This kind of speculative knowledge, Ockham seems to think, does not have practical dimensions any more than does noncomplex knowledge of love.

When practical knowledge is considered to be not only directive but also more directive than noncomplex knowledge, one must give to speculative knowledge the status of being less directive knowledge. Does this mean that speculative knowledge is directive, or does it mean that it is not directive at all? In some places, Ockham thinks that the "directiveness" of speculative knowledge is based on the fact that speculative and practical knowledge can have a common subject. The subject of the conclusion known by practical knowledge may be the same subject that forms, together with some predicate, a premise required for the conclusion. This means that the speculative principle can be one of the required premises in the practical syllogism:

...frequently, a practical conclusion depends on a speculative principle. Frequently, thus, one of the premises of the practical syllogism is purely speculative, but the other premise is always practical. For instance, the minor premise is speculative in this example of the practical syllogism: 'parents are to be honoured; these are the parents; so, these are to be

²³ *I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 315, 20 - 316, 2*: "...de operibus nostris, hoc est de terminis vel complexis importantibus opera nostra, potest esse scientia speculativa, quia de operibus nostris possunt aliqua sciri, et illa notitia non magis dirigit quam notitia incomplexa. Sicut si sciam quod dilectio est qualitas, quod est a Deo dependens, et sic de aliis; istae enim notitiae non magis dirigunt quam notitia incomplexa dilectionis. Et isto modo potest liber *De anima* contineri sub scientia speculativa, quamvis quantum ad magnam partem sit de operibus nostris."

honoured'; and this also concerns many other practical syllogisms (*Summ. phil. natur., praeambula*, 150, 330-334).²⁴

The directiveness of speculative knowledge is, then, to be understood so that the conclusion known by practical knowledge depends on the speculative principle. The speculative principle is not directive in any other way than in connection with the practical syllogism, namely, when it expresses speculative knowledge in one of the required premises. The conclusions of practical knowledge, as distinct from those of theoretical knowledge, are directly directive with respect to human action:

It also follows that logic, rhetoric, and grammar are really practical sciences, and not speculative ones because they really direct the intellect in its operations that are in its power through the will, as logic directs the intellect in syllogizing, reasoning, and so forth (*I Sent., Prol.*, q. 11, 316, 3-7).²⁵

When Ockham has presented the criteria of practical knowledge and the consequences following from them, he has given to practical knowledge a status according to which it directs operation more than speculative and noncomplex knowledge. Practical knowledge, which concerns our action, is more directive than speculative knowledge, which does not have acts as its object in the sense that it would be interested in how to act. It may be that Ockham considered theoretical knowledge and noncomplex knowledge in some sense intellectually directive as such and not only in connection with practical principles, but in any case practical knowledge is more directive.

²⁴ *Summ. phil. natur., praeambula*, 150, 330-334: "...frequenter conclusio practica dependet ex principio speculativo. Unde frequenter una praemissarum in syllogismo practico est pure speculativa, sed semper aliqua praemissarum est practica. Sicut hic est syllogismus practicus 'parentes sunt honorandi, isti sunt parentes, igitur isti sunt honorandi' et tamen minor est speculativa; et sic de multis aliis."

²⁵ *I Sent., Prol.*, q. 11, 316, 3-7: "Aliud sequitur quod logica, rhetorica et grammatica sunt vere notitiae practicae et non speculativae, quia vere dirigunt intellectum in operationibus suis quae sunt mediante voluntate in sua potestate, sicut logica dirigit intellectum in syllogizando, discurrendo, et sic de aliis."

2 The Directiveness of Practical Science

The practical sciences that Ockham mentions are ethics, grammar, logic, rhetoric, and mechanical arts. They all are practical because their purpose is - in some way or another - to direct human action through practical knowledge.²⁶ Ockham makes a distinction between two kinds of practical knowledge: (1) dictative (*dictativa*) and (2) ostensive (*ostensiva*). The distinction between the two is important from the point of view of the history of philosophy; in this section, I wish to show that it corresponds closely to an important Kantian distinction, the distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperative.

According to Ockham, practical knowledge, ostensive as well as dictative, is directive in regard to human action. I will first deal with practical knowledge which is ostensively directive.

Practical knowledge that is not dictative is ostensive and dictative knowledge is knowledge that dictates that something has to be done or not done; for example, logic, grammar, and rhetoric mentioned above are not practical in this way.²⁷ In ostensively directive knowledge, practical knowledge only shows how to do something:

The second kind of practical knowledge is only ostensive because it does not dictate to avoid or to pursue something, but it only indicates how something can be done; by virtue of this knowledge, if the intellect dictates that it has to be done and the will wills, it is possible to act, at once, rightly. Like the art of building a house indicates that a house is built of wood, of stones, and of this kind of foundation, and of these kinds of walls, and of this kind of roof, and so on, and it does not dictate that the house has to be built or when it has to be built; but it

²⁶ See *Summ. phil. natur., praeambula*, 149, 298-314.

²⁷ I *Sent., Prolog.*, q. 11, 316, 8-12: "Potest tamen distingui de practica, quia quaedam est dictativa et quaedam tantum ostensiva. Prima est illa qua determinate dicitur aliquid esse faciendum vel non faciendum; et sic loquitur Philosophus VI *Ethicorum* et III *De anima*. Et isto modo nec logica nec grammatica nec rhetorica est practica..." I *Sent., Prolog.*, q. 12, 338, 2-8: "Et omnis notitia quae habet pro objecto totali vel partiali ipsam praxim vel operatum per praxim...quod de novo habet esse per ipsam praxim quae est magis directiva operis sive dictative sive ostensive solum quam sit notitia incomplexa praxis vel operati per praxim, est practica, quia per hoc distinguitur notitia speculativa a practica, sicut declaratum est."

belongs to prudence to dictate when it has to be built, or that one has to act in one way or another (I *Sent.*, *Prolog.*, q. 11, 316, 17-25).²⁸

Ostensive practical knowledge seems to contain instructions for such a right action that leads to the desired goal. Ostensive knowledge, as such, does not lead to praxis; but when somebody has it at his disposal, he also has a prerequisite for the right way of acting, provided that the intellect dictates and the will wills to act accordingly. When ostensive knowledge is linked to the dictate of the intellect in which the intellect shows that some goal has to be aimed at, and to the willing of the goal shown by the intellect, it works like a set of instructions for use. In other words, the right action, according to these instructions, can immediately take place. Thus, this pre-designed pattern of action eliminates the need to deliberate the means of obtaining the goal (*consilium intellectus*). However, if the action does not follow immediately, it is due to other possible points which are relevant in regard to the action and which are objects of prudence. (For example, it belongs to prudence to dictate the point of time to build a house.) Ostensive knowledge is, then, prepared and already deliberated knowledge (instruction) concerning the right or best way of obtaining the goal.

The pattern of action that Ockham has in mind when speaking about ostensive knowledge is briefly the following: a person who wills (*volitio*) some goal knows (*notitia ostensiva*), without the need to deliberate, the best means of obtaining the goal and elects this means (*electio*). This pattern can be stated in the form of a practical syllogism. The following text gives a good example of this:

...if somebody wants to get well effectively and knows that he cannot get well without drinking a bitter potion, the will is necessitated to want a bitter potion. And it is not in his power not to want *simpliciter* this potion, in this case, although he could contingently want a bitter potion

²⁸ I *Sent.*, *Prolog.*, q. 11, 316, 17-25: "Secunda notitia practica est tantum ostensiva, quia non dictat aliquid fugiendum aut prosequendum, sed tantum ostendit opus quomodo fieri potest; virtute cuius notitiae, si intellectus dictet illud esse faciendum et voluntas velit, statim potest recte operari. Sicut ars aedificatoria ostendit quod domus componitur ex lignis et lapidibus et ex fundamento tali et talibus parietibus et tali tecto, et sic de aliis, et non dictat quod domus est facienda nec quando est facienda, sed ad prudentiam pertinet dictare quod tali tempore est facienda, vel sic est agendum vel sic."

by giving up the effective willing (*Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. IX, 259, 168-173*).²⁹

On the basis of the example, the practical syllogism looks like this:

The 1st premise: a person wants to get well (a wants that p)

The 2nd premise: the person knows that he will not get well without drinking a bitter potion (a knows that no p without q)

The conclusion: the person wants the potion (a wants that q)

In the practical syllogism, the content of the second premise can be called a technical norm; it indicates the means that is necessary for obtaining the goal. Ockham thinks that if one wants the goal, one necessarily wants the means without which it is impossible to obtain the goal (provided that he also knows or at least believes that it is *sine qua non*). A person could, it is true, give up the willing of the necessary means. But this would, then, only be another way to say that he does not really want the goal either. If a person does not want the goal, then he of course is not compelled to want the means by his knowing that obtaining the goal implies the use of a certain means. But otherwise, he cannot but want the means, too. In this technical sense, the second premise contains a norm.

We can notice that ostensibly directive practical knowledge also concerns technical norms:

²⁹ *Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. IX, 259, 168-173*: "Sicut si quis vult sanari efficaciter et scit sanitatem consequi non posse sine potione amara, necessitatur voluntas ad volendum potionem amaram. Nec est in eius potestate illam potionem simpliciter non velle, stante praedicto casu, licet possit contingenter velle potionem amaram cessante volitione efficaci."

Compare with *I Sent., d. 1, q. 6, 494, 17-25*: "...ponatur quod aliquis velit efficaciter sanitatem sed ignoret an potio amara sit necessario requisita ad sanitatem consequendam vel non; hoc posito ille poterit libere velle habere potionem amaram et non velle. Ipso autem incipiente credere quod nullo modo poterit habere sanitatem sine potione amara - stante illa credulitate et volitione efficaci priori sanitatis - necessario sequetur volitio potionis amarae, et ita necessario sicut ad praesentiam ignis sequitur calor in ligno."

On the efficacious will, see Knuuttila 1981, 240-245. On Ockham's distinction between effective and conditional volition, see Saarinen 1990, *ad loc.*

The other practical knowledge is merely ostensive because it does not dictate avoiding or aiming for something, but only indicates a possible way of doing something (I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 11, 316, 17-19).³⁰

According to the example that Ockham gives in this context, the art of building is knowledge of how to build a house. In this case, the pattern of action would be of the following kind: (1) the intellect gives a dictate (the house has to be built); (2) the person begins to will this goal (*volitio*) and knows the way of acting (means) without which the goal is not realized (in other words, the phase of the deliberation is replaced, for this part, by ostensive knowledge which is already at the person's disposal); (3) the will necessarily elects (*electio*) the means because it knows it is the only way of obtaining the wanted goal. The example can be presented in the form of a practical syllogism:

The 1st premise: a person wants to build a house (*volitio*)

The 2nd premise: the person knows that there will be no house without his acting in a certain way (*notitia ostensiva*)

The conclusion: the person wants to act in a certain way, in the way the ostensive knowledge shows (*electio*)

In the second premise, ostensive knowledge works as a technical norm, and as such it is an instruction. Or we can say that knowledge as ostensive is practical and as such directs the action.

It is not difficult to notice the connection between ostensive knowledge and hypothetical imperatives in the Kantian sense. According to Kant, a person who wills the goal also wills the means which is necessary for obtaining it, insofar as it is in his power.³¹ This is an analytical proposition; it is not a prescription, but it can be formulated, according to Donagan, in such a way that it will

³⁰ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 11, 316, 17-19: "Secunda notitia practica est tantum ostensiva, quia non dictat aliquid fugiendum aut prosequendum, sed tantum ostendit opus quomodo fieri potest."

³¹ Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, hrsg. Wilhelm Weischedel, 1975, 46: "Wer den Zweck will, will (so fern die Vernunft auf seine Handlungen entscheidenden Einfluß hat) auch das dazu unentbehrlich notwendige Mittel, das in seiner Gewalt ist."

On the connection between ostensive knowledge and hypothetical imperatives, see Knuuttila 1991.

become a prescription dictated by practical reason: whoever wills the goal must also will the necessary means for obtaining this goal, insofar as it is in his power; or he has to give up the willing of the goal, in which case he is not compelled by the knowledge of the means.³² In other words, the analytical proposition seems to be a prescription when it is formulated, as by Donagan, in the form of a disjunctive norm: elect the means which is necessary for obtaining the goal or give up the goal. The principle for the action, like a hypothetical imperative, is absolutely binding if a person refuses to reject the goal. But because it is also possible for a person to reject the goal, the principle for the action remains hypothetical in regard to its contents. It is interesting to compare Ockham's view of ostensive knowledge with Donagan's construction. Ockham seems to regard the hypothetical norm as dictative specifically in the sense of a disjunctive norm: when q is the necessary condition for p, you must will q or not will p.³³ We can, then, observe that Ockham's view of ostensively directive practical knowledge, in the sense of a technical norm, has its counterpart in Kant's conception of the hypothetical imperatives. Besides this, Ockham's view of the hypothetical norm, in the sense of a disjunctive norm, seems to have its counterpart in Donagan's way of interpreting the hypothetical imperative as a prescription.

It is also easy to notice that Ockham's definition of dictatively directive practical knowledge is in the formal sense similar to a categorical imperative.³⁴ Ockham's examples of practical knowledge are in the form of dictates to do or not to do something: "God has

³² See Donagan 1977, 212-213.

³³ *Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. IX, 259, 168-173*: "Sicut si quis vult sanari efficaciter et scit sanitatem consequi non posse sine potione amara, necessitatur voluntas ad volendum potionem amaram. Nec est in eius potestate illam potionem simpliciter non velle, stante praedicto casu, licet possit contingenter velle potionem amaram cessante volitione efficaci."

See also *I Sent., d. 1, q. 6, 494, 17-25*.

³⁴ *I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 316, 8-10*: "Potest tamen distingui de practica, quia quaedam est dictativa et quaedam tantum ostensiva. Prima est illa qua determinate dicitur aliquid esse faciendum vel non faciendum."

See Knuuttila 1991.

to be loved"; "the sabbath has to be kept"; "one has to pray in a certain place, at a certain time"; "God has to be obeyed"; "one should not commit adultery"; "parents have to be honored".³⁵

The distinction between dictative and ostensive practical knowledge can be applied to the distinction between the directiveness of ethics (*prudentia et moralis philosophia*) and the directiveness of other practical sciences (*grammatica, logica, rhetorica, artes mechanicae*).³⁶ That is to say, ethics diverges from the other practical sciences; ethics as a practical science directs

³⁵ I *Sent., Prolog.*, q. 12, 338, 12-14: "...et aliquae veritates sunt practicae, sicut 'Deus est diligendus ex toto corde' etc., 'sabbatum est sanctificandum', 'orandum est pro loco et tempore' et huiusmodi." I *Sent., Prolog.*, q. 12, 367, 15-19: "Et ideo notitia qua cognoscitur quod Deo est obediendum, Deus est diligendus, est notitia practica; similiter illa est practica qua cognoscitur quod non est moechandum, quod parentes sunt honorandi propter Deum, et sic de aliis."

³⁶ *Summ. phil. natur., praecambula*, 149, 298-314: "...grammatica, logica et rhetorica sunt vere scientiae practicae, ita vere sicut artes mechanicae sunt practicae. Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod duplex est notitia practica: una dictativa, quae scilicet dictat aliquid esse agendum vel dimittendum; et sic prudentia et moralis philosophia est practica. Alia est notitia practica tantum ostensiva, quae scilicet ostendit et docet qualiter res fieri potest vel debet fieri si aliquis velit facere eam; non tamen dictat eam esse faciendam. Et sic artes mechanicae sunt practicae: numquam enim ars aedificatoria dictat quod modo est faciendum, sed hoc pertinet ad prudentiam vel ad moralem philosophiam; sed tantum docet quod si aliquis vult aedificare debet ex talibus et taliter debet aedificare. Et isto secundo modo accipiendi notitiam practicae, logica, grammatica et rhetorica sunt notitiae practicae, non primo modo. Numquam enim logica docet quod est syllogizandum, sed docet quod si quis velit syllogizare debet primo praemittere maiorem, secundo minorem debitam, et tertio conclusionem. Et sic est proportionaliter de grammatica et rhetorica."

I *Sent., d.* 35, q. 6, 509, 19 - 510, 5: "...logica, rhetorica, grammatica et artes mechanicae sunt simpliciter practicae, et tamen non sunt dictativae. Sed dictamen de exercitio istarum notitiarum practicarum non pertinet ad istas artes, sed ad prudentiam pertinet. Quod autem ad prudentiam pertineat patet. Quia omnis actus imperatus qui virtuose elici potest ad prudentiam pertinet; sed omnis talis actus potest elici virtuose, patet inductive; igitur etc."

III *Sent., q.* 12, 420, 3-10: "Sed quae est tunc differentia inter artem et prudentiam? Respondeo: prudentia dictat de aliquo operabili a nobis, sed ars non. Sed quomodo est ars practica? Dico quod est practica quia dirigit in praxi vel in aliquo operabili a nobis, licet non dictet de praxi elicienda. Exemplum: ars faciendi domum non dictat quod domus sit facienda, sed quod domus debet componi ex lignis et lapidibus sic vel sic dispositis. Et ita dirigit quatenus, si domus fiat, dirigit facientem ut sic vel sic faciat."

human action dictatively.³⁷ Ethics, then, like the categorical imperative, directs human action without conditions.

One must consider ethics (*moralis philosophia*) a practical science in the sense of moral doctrine (*moralis doctrina*). Ockham says that moral doctrine has several parts, one positive and another non-positive. In saying so he seems to have in mind the division between positive and non-positive moral knowledge both of which are included in moral doctrine (or in ethics) and can be taught.

The positive part of moral doctrine is the part which contains human and divine laws. These laws, which are given by a superior having the due authority, make it obligatory to pursue or avoid those things that would not be good or bad unless they had been ordered or forbidden by the superior giving the laws.³⁸ Positive moral knowledge is not demonstrative because it is sustained by positive orders and not by principles evidently known.³⁹

The non-positive part of moral doctrine is the part which directs human action independently of any precept of a superior. It contains two kinds of evidently known principles, namely, principles that are evidently known in themselves (*per se*) and principles that are evidently known by experience (*per experientiam*).⁴⁰ The

³⁷ On the practical sciences falling into two general classes, see also Panaccio 1990, 618-621; Freppert 1988, 22-24. On ethics as a practical science, Freppert writes as follows: "Moral science is one of the practical sciences. Its knowledge is practical, directive and dictative, knowledge" (Freppert 1988, 28).

³⁸ *Quodl.* II, q. 14, 177, 18-23: "...moralis doctrina habet plures partes, quarum una est positiva, alia non positiva. Scientia moralis positiva est illa quae continet leges humanas et divinas, quae obligant ad prosequendum vel fugiendum illa quae nec sunt bona nec mala nisi quia sunt prohibita vel imperata a superiore, cuius est leges statuere."

³⁹ *Quodl.* II, q. 14, 177, 30-34: "...moralis scientia positiva, cuiusmodi est scientia iuristarum, non est scientia demonstrativa, quamvis sit a scientia demonstrativa ut in pluribus regulata; quia rationes iuristarum fundantur super leges humanae positivas, quae non accipiunt propositiones evidenter notas."

See also Miethke 1969, 326-327.

⁴⁰ *Quodl.* II, q. 14, 177, 24-28: "Scientia moralis non positiva est illa quae sine omni praecepto superioris dirigit actus humanos; sicut principia per se nota vel nota per experientiam sic dirigunt, sicut quod omne honestum est faciendum, et omne inhonestum est fugiendum, et huiusmodi, de quibus loquitur Aristoteles in

following are examples of principles known in themselves: 'the will is obliged to conform to the right reason'; 'one has to avoid all blamable evil'⁴¹; 'a benefactor has to be rewarded by doing good to him'⁴²; 'good is to be done to anyone in extreme need so that he will not perish'⁴³ and so on. These principles are evident through the knowledge of the terms of the principles themselves.⁴⁴ The obtaining of this kind of moral knowledge can be independent of personal moral behavior of the student who studies ethics.⁴⁵ According to Ockham, however, it is hard for a student of ethics to obtain knowledge concerning certain moral principles without experience.⁴⁶ The following is an example of a principle known

moralis philosophia."

Compare with *Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. X, 281, 220 - 282, 227*: "...scientia moralis accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo accipitur pro omni notitia scientifica quae evidenter haberi potest per doctrinam. Et haec procedit ex principiis per se notis... Alio modo accipitur pro notitia scientifica evidenti quae solum habetur et haberi potest per experientiam et nullo modo evidenter per doctrinam."

See also Freppert 1988, 18-19.

⁴¹ *Quodl. II, q. 14, 177, 39 - 178, 41*: "...multa sunt principia per se nota in morali philosophia; puta quod voluntas debet se conformare rectae rationi, omne malum vituperabile est fugiendum, et huiusmodi."

⁴² *Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. X, 281, 220-225*: "...scientia moralis accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo accipitur pro omni notitia scientifica quae evidenter haberi potest per doctrinam. Et haec procedit ex principiis per se notis ut hic: 'omne benefactori est beneficiendum; sed quilibet liberans aliquem a morte est benefactor; igitur omni tali est beneficiendum'."

See also *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. II, 330, 6-12*.

⁴³ *Quaest. variae, q. 8, art. II, 423, 309-311*: "...ponatur aliquis habens istam rationem universalem rectam 'omni indigenti extrema necessitate est beneficiendum ne pereat' quae est evidens ex notitia terminorum."

See also Miethke 1969, 327.

⁴⁴ *I Sent., Prol., q. 1, 6, 15-17*: "...propositio per se nota est illa quae scitur evidenter ex quacumque notitia terminorum ipsius propositionis, sive abstractiva sive intuitiva."

See also Freppert 1988, 17.

⁴⁵ *I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 320, 1-4*: "...in practicis aliquando sunt principia per se nota, et aliquando tantum nota per experientiam. De primis et de conclusionibus sequentibus ex illis habet artifex notitiam evidentem, et similiter studens in morali philosophia sine exercitio."

⁴⁶ *I Sent., Prol., q. 11, 320, 14-21*: "Et ideo dico quod si aliquis studens in morali philosophia sine omni actu prudentiae vel morali posset acquirere notitiam omnium propositionum universalium quas acquirit alius exercitatus, quod ita perfectum habitum et ita perfecte directivum haberet ipse sicut alius. Sed de

evidently by experience: 'one must conciliate an irate person by using kind words'.⁴⁷ The non-positive part of moral doctrine is a demonstrative science, for in it conclusions are deduced by syllogistic reasoning from premises that are evidently known either *per se* or *per experientiam*.⁴⁸

Ockham discusses how moral knowledge (*scientia moralis*) is distinguished from prudence (*prudentia*). In order to explain this he first presents two ways of understanding *scientia moralis*:

...moral knowledge is conceived of in two ways. In one way, it is conceived of as whatever scientific knowledge one is able to have evidently by teaching. This knowledge comes from principles known in themselves, for example as follows: 'one has to do good to every benefactor; everyone who rescues the other from death is a benefactor; thus, one has to do good to everyone like him' (*Quaest. variae*, q. 6, art. X, 281, 220-225).⁴⁹

In one way, moral knowledge is then evident scientific knowledge coming from the principles known in themselves (*per se nota*). On the other hand, moral knowledge can be treated as evident scientific

facto vel hoc non est possibile, vel cum maxima difficultate. Et propter istam rationem, sicut patebit in tertio, non potest prudentia separari in acquisitione ipsius a virtute morali."

⁴⁷ *Quaest. variae*, q. 6, art. X, 281, 225 - 282, 232: "Alio modo [scientia moralis] accipitur pro notitia scientifica evidenti quae solum habetur et haberi potest per experientiam et nullo modo evidenter per doctrinam. Verbi gratia, haec 'quilibet iracundus ex tali occasione est per pulchra verba leniendus et mitigandus' non potest evidenter sciri nisi per experientiam, ex hoc scilicet quod homo habet per experientiam notitiam evidentem de multis propositionibus singularibus, puta quod iste sit mitigandus et ille et sic de singulis." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. II, 330, 9-13: "...notitia evidens propositionis universalis quae solum evidenter cognoscitur per experientiam, quae notitia etiam est scientia moralis...exemplum...'quilibet iracundus per pulchra verba est leniendus'."

⁴⁸ *Quodl.* II, q. 14, 177, 35-38: "Sed disciplina moralis non positiva est scientia demonstrativa. Probo, quia notitia deducens conclusiones syllogistice ex principiis per se notis vel per experientiam scitis est demonstrativa; huiusmodi est disciplina moralis, igitur etc."

⁴⁹ *Quaest. variae*, q. 6, art. X, 281, 220-225: "...scientia moralis accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo accipitur pro omni notitia scientifica quae evidenter haberi potest per doctrinam. Et haec procedit ex principiis per se notis ut hic: 'omni benefactori est benefaciendum; sed quilibet liberans aliquem a morte est benefactor; igitur omni tali est benefaciendum'."

knowledge of which one must say that it is only known from experience (*per experientiam*):

In another way, moral knowledge is conceived of as evident scientific knowledge that one is not able to have evidently by teaching, but only by experience. For example, 'whoever is irate for such a reason has to be conciliated by means of kind words' can be known evidently only by experience; namely, because a person has evident knowledge of many singular propositions based on experience, for example that this person should be conciliated and also that person and so on (*Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. X, 281, 225 - 282, 232*).⁵⁰

Ockham says that *scientia moralis* in the first sense is distinguished from *prudencia* because prudence in either of its two possible interpretations can be acquired only by experience.⁵¹ On these two possible interpretations of *prudencia*, Ockham writes as follows:

Likewise, prudence is conceived of in two ways. In its proper sense it means the evident knowing of some singular proposition which one can only have by experience. The proposition, 'this person has to be conciliated by means of kind words', is an example of this kind of evident knowledge. The proposition is evident by virtue of the following contingent proposition known by experience: 'this person is conciliated in that way'. In another way, prudence is generally conceived of as the knowing of some universal practical proposition which is evidently known only from experience; e.g., 'every irate person, has to be conciliated in this way' (*Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. X, 282, 233-241*).⁵²

Prudence can be treated either as a concrete instruction in some particular case coming only from experience or as the knowing of universal moral principles only through experience. In the latter sense it is identified with moral knowledge (*scientia moralis*) which

⁵⁰ *Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. X, 281, 225 - 282, 232*: "Alio modo [scientia moralis] accipitur pro notitia scientifica evidenti quae solum habetur et haberi potest per experientiam et nullo modo evidenter per doctrinam. Verbi gratia, haec 'quilibet iracundus ex tali occasione est per pulchra verba leniendus et mitigandus' non potest evidenter sciri nisi per experientiam, ex hoc scilicet quod homo habet per experientiam notitiam evidentem de multis propositionibus singularibus, puta quod iste sit mitigandus et ille et sic de singulis."

⁵¹ *Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. X, 282, 242-246*.

⁵² *Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. X, 282, 233-241*: "Similiter prudentia accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo proprie pro notitia evidenti alicuius propositionis singularis quae solum habetur mediante experientia. Verbi gratia, notitia haec evidens 'iste est mitigandus per pulchra verba' quae est evidens virtute huius contingentis 'ille mitigatur per talem viam' et hoc cognoscitur per experientiam. Alio modo accipitur communiter pro notitia evidenti alicuius universalis practicae quae solum evidenter cognoscitur per experientiam, ut quod omnis iracundus est sic leniendus."

one can only have by experience.⁵³ However, Ockham also discusses in more detail four different ways of understanding *prudentia*.⁵⁴ Of these ways, the first is so wide that prudence can also be identified with moral knowledge (*scientia moralis*) acquired from self-evident principles (*ex principiis per se notis*). Perhaps Ockham would still prefer the use of the term '*scientia moralis*' to the use of the term '*prudentia*' when referring to evident scientific knowledge of universal propositions acquired either from principles known *per se* or known *per experientiam*.⁵⁵

The normative character of practical knowledge can be seen in the conclusion made by the deliberative intellect; this conclusion concerns the means that leads to the goal in the best way (*sententia/ dictamen*). The normative character can also be seen in the practical principle concerning the goal (*dictamen*); in this principle, the practical intellect shows that some goal has to be aimed at. Practical knowledge - ostensive as well as dictative - always has a normative character. In fact, Ockham explicitly expresses this normative character of practical knowledge when he

⁵³ *Quaest. variae*, q. 6, art. X, 282, 246-248.

⁵⁴ *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. II, 330, 2-14: "...prudentia accipitur quadrupliciter: uno modo, accipitur pro omni notitia directiva respectu cuiuscumque agibilis mediate vel immediate, sicut accipit Augustinus prudentiam, I *De libero arbitrio*. Et isto modo tam notitia evidens alicuius universalis propositionis quae evidenter cognoscitur per doctrinam, quia procedit ex propositionibus per se notis, quae notitia scientifica proprie est scientia moralis, quam notitia evidens propositionis universalis quae solum evidenter cognoscitur per experientiam, quae notitia etiam est scientia moralis, est prudentia. Exemplum primi: 'omni benefactori est benefaciendum'; exemplum secundi: 'quilibet iracundus per pulchra verba est leniendus'. Alio modo..."

On these uses of the term 'prudence', see also Freppert 1988, 20-22; concerning the first mentioned and widest way of using the term, Freppert writes on page 21: "So prudence taken in this wide sense is not distinct from the knowledge contained in moral science."

⁵⁵ Compare with I *Sent., Prol.*, q. 12, 348, 8-9: "Sed primus habitus pertinet ad aliquem illorum habituum, scilicet vel ad scientiam, si sub scientia ibi comprehendatur tam speculativa quam practica, vel ad prudentiam, si sub scientia non comprehendatur nisi scientia speculativa."

says that any action (*praxis*) could be the object of some dictate (*dictamen*).⁵⁶

The normative character of practical knowledge, as we have seen, is precisely what accounts for the difference between practical and speculative knowledge.⁵⁷ For it is quite clear that Ockham refers to the normative character of practical knowledge when he talks about practical knowledge as being more directive (*magis directiva*). This "more-directiveness" concerns both dictative and ostensive practical knowledge.⁵⁸ Thus, this normative character, or more-directiveness, is a distinctive feature of practical knowledge attaching both to ostensive and to dictative practical knowledge.

B Praxis and Practical Knowledge

1 *The Different Views of Praxis*

Ockham's conception of practical science is linked to his view of the object of practical knowledge, viz., praxis or action. In this part (II B) I wish to present Ockham's view of praxis.

At the beginning of the question concerning praxis, Ockham describes Robertus Cowton's and Duns Scotus's ideas of it. He also makes some critical remarks about them. According to Ockham, Cowton describes praxis in the following way: Praxis is the activity of the sensitive soul in conformity with a moral virtue. As such, it

⁵⁶ I *Sent., Prol., q.* 10, 293, 20-24: "...quantumcumque de omni praxi posset esse aliquod dictamen verum quod debet elici vel non elici, et ita aliquo modo sibi conformatur, tamen aliqua est praxis mala quae nullo modo potest conformiter elici rationi rectae, quia nulla ratio recta potest dictare eam eliciendam..."

⁵⁷ I *Sent., Prol., q.* 11, 322, 8-10: "...non est simile de principiis respectu conclusionum speculabilium et de fine respectu conclusionum practicarum..."

⁵⁸ I *Sent., Prol., q.* 12, 338, 2-8: "Et omnis notitia quae habet pro obiecto totali vel partiali ipsam praxim vel operatum per praxim...quae est magis directiva operis sive dictative sive ostensive solum quam sit notitia incomplexa praxis vel operati per praxim, est practica, quia per hoc distinguitur notitia speculativa a practica, sicut declaratum est."

is the object of the practical intellect, and election precedes it.¹ Ockham finds Cowton's idea of praxis too narrow, since he believes that all action which is the object of practical knowledge is praxis; practical knowledge also concerns interior action, the acts of the intellect and will. Ockham refers to the distinction made in book VI of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in order to confirm his own point of view; here Aristotle says that theoretical knowledge is said to concern things beyond our power, practical knowledge things within our power.²

Scotus characterizes praxis by three conditions: (1) praxis is not the act of the intellect but of some other power; (2) praxis, by nature, is preceded by the act of the intellect; (3) it is characteristic of praxis to be right while being in conformity with right reason.³

Ockham thinks, as does Scotus, that the willing of the goal (*dilectio finis*) as well as the election of the means (*electio*) are praxes.⁴ Still, Ockham does not accept Scotus's idea of praxis in every respect. Concerning the first condition on praxis (made by Scotus), Ockham reminds us that the action of the intellect can also be praxis by nature. He supports this with three remarks. The first is that speculation and an act of the intellect by being in our power are actions of which we can have practical knowledge; therefore they are praxes. The second is that an act of the intellect - e.g., study - can be elected by us; every action which follows from election is praxis. Thirdly, Ockham explains that an

¹ *I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 277, 5 - 278, 7.*

² *I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 279, 4-20.*

³ Duns Scotus, *Ord., Prol., p. 5, q. 2, 155, 2-5*: "Dico igitur primo quod praxis ad quam cognitio practica extenditur est actus alterius potentiae quam intellectus, naturaliter posterior intellectione, natus elici conformiter intellectioni rectae ad hoc ut sit rectus."

Ockham presents Scotus's view of praxis in *I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 280, 2 - 281, 6*. On Scotus's view, see also Kent 1984, 40-41.

⁴ *I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 283, 8-11*: "Praeterea, arguo, sicut ipse arguit ad probandum quod dilectio finis sit praxis: quia 'illa operatio est vere praxis ad quam inclinatur virtus appetitiva, quia quaelibet talis virtus est habitus electivus, II *Ethicorum*, et electio est praxis', secundum istum."

act of the intellect which directs another act (through an act of the will) is a practical act (*actus practicus*); the act directed can also be an act of the intellect (*actus directus*) and as such it is praxis.⁵

The second condition on praxis (made by Scotus) leaves open, according to Ockham, two interpretations. On the one hand, Scotus is wrong if he means that praxis has to be able to be in conformity with the act of the intellect preceding it. Namely, it is possible that pure noncomplex knowing precedes it. On the other hand, Scotus is right if he intends to say that praxis presupposes some kind of act of the intellect, since it is obvious that all acts of the will are preceded by some act of the intellect.⁶

Ockham criticizes the third condition on praxis (made by Scotus) by referring to action that really is praxis but is in no way in conformity with right reason.⁷

⁵ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 281, 8 - 282, 3: "Primo, contra primam condicionem ostendo quod intellectio potest esse praxis, sicut argutum est contra primam opinionem, sic: omnis operatio de qua sicut de obiecto est notitia practica est praxis, quia secundum istum Doctorem notitia practica dicitur in extensione ad praxim. Sed de speculatione et actu intelligendi est notitia practica, quia de operibus nostris est notitia practica, et hoc est intelligendum de operibus quae sunt in potestate nostra. Ergo ipsa intellectio, cum sit opus existens in potestate nostra, est praxis. Praeterea, omnis operatio sequens electionem est praxis. Sed actus intelligendi sequitur electionem et consilium; potest enim aliquis consiliari an debeat studere vel non, et postea eligere studere. Ergo istud studium sequens consilium et electionem est vere praxis. Praeterea, omnis actus intellectus qui est directivus alterius actus mediante actu voluntatis est actus practicus, et actus directus est praxis; sed unus actus intellectus vere dirigit alium actum mediante actu voluntatis; ergo primus dirigens vere erit practicus, et alius directus vere erit praxis."

See also Freppert 1988, 25-26.

⁶ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 285, 4-10: "Contra secundam condicionem: si intelligat quod est posterior intellectione cui potest conformari, sic non est vera, quia sola notitia incompleta sufficit ad praxim secundum principia istius Doctoris, et secundum veritatem. Si tamen intelligat quod praesupponitur aliqua intellectio, verum dicit, quia nunquam est aliquis actus praxis nisi sit actus elicitus voluntatis vel imperatus, et quaelibet talis praesupponit aliquam intellectionem." *Ibid.*, 301, 7-10: "...omnem praxim praecedit aliqua intellectio, sicut omnem actum voluntatis praecedit aliqua intellectio; non tamen requiritur intellectio dictativa nec aliqua intellectio complexa prior."

⁷ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 285, 11-21: "Contra tertiam condicionem: aliqua operatio est praxis quae nullo modo forte potest elici conformiter rationi rectae, sicut illa quae elicitur conformiter oppositae rationi rectae necessariae. Unde sicut est aliquod dictamen de necessario, ita est aliquod de suo opposito quod est

Ockham formulates his own view of praxis while criticizing Cowton's and Scotus's ideas. According to Ockham, there is, in any case, general agreement on the course of an action in spite of the different views of praxis. Thus one can give the following description of this course: The act of the intellect shows a goal and means to obtain it; the will wills this goal (*volitio*), and the intellect deliberates the means to obtain the goal (*consilium*); after deliberating, the intellect dictates or can dictate to elect from among the means some definite one (*sententia*); the will elects or can elect in accordance with the dictates of the intellect (*electio*); thence, the action elected in accordance with the dictate of the intellect follows, provided that nothing interferes.⁸

Ockham gives an example of the course of an action through which a goal is obtained. (1) The intellect shows the sick person that health has to be aimed at (*sanitas est adquirenda*). This is a practical principle (*principium practicum*), and as such it is a dictate concerning the goal (*dictamen*). Thence, (2) the willing (*volitio in voluntate*) to get well (*qua desiderat sanitatem*) follows. However, the willing of the goal dictated by the intellect does not necessarily follow. (The will is free in electing its goals.) (3) The intellect deliberates the best means to obtain this goal (*consilium intellectus*). After deliberating, (4) one knows through the judgment of the intellect (*sententia*) or dictate (*dictamen*) exactly how to obtain the goal. After (5) the election of the will (*electio voluntatis*) the

impossibile, et illi potest elici conformiter aliqua praxis, et tamen non potest elici conformiter rationi rectae nec ad hoc ut sit rectus nec ad hoc ut non sit rectus. Confirmatur: quia qua ratione actus elicited conformiter rationi rectae est praxis, eadem ratione actus elicited conformiter rationi falsae erit praxis. Igitur non omnis praxis est nata elici conformiter rationi rectae."

⁸ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 285, 23 - 286, 10: "Ideo ad istam quaestionem dico quod difficultas magis consistit in nomine quam in re. Omnes enim vel fere omnes ponunt ista: quod est ibi intellectio ostendens finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, et quod est ibi volitio finis, et etiam consilium de his quae sunt ad finem. Post quod consilium vel inquisitionem sequitur vel sequi potest sententia qua dictatur de his quae sunt ad finem. Et post istam sententiam qua dictatur quod unum est eligendum et aliud non, sequitur vel sequi potest electio qua dictatum vel sententiatum esse eligendum praeponitur illi quod non est sic sententiatum esse eligendum. Post autem istam electionem sequitur illud quod est sic dictatum et sententiatum, si non sit aliquod impedimentum."

action follows accordingly (6), provided that nothing interferes.⁹ We can see from this example that the dictate in the description of the action concerns both the goal and the best means to obtain it. The activity of the will (the 2nd and the 5th stages in the description) is preceded by the activity of the intellect (the 1st and the 4th stages in the description). In the second stage the will begins to will the goal shown by the intellect, i.e., to follow the practical principle shown by the intellect. In the fifth stage the election of the will (*electio*) is the expression of the factual willing coming after deliberating.

Consideration of the relation between the practical knowledge and praxis gives us two relevant definitions of praxis. In the stricter sense (*strictius*), praxis means an action within our power. In the strictest sense (*strictissime*), praxis means an action in accordance with the dictate of the reason and the election of the will.¹⁰ In the former sense, praxis is the object of the practical

⁹ I *Sent., Prol.*, q. 10, 286, 10 - 287, 2: "Verbi gratia, alicui infirmo ostenditur per intellectum quod sanitas est acquirenda, et habet tunc intellectus unum principium practicum respectu finis quo dictat quod sanitas est acquirenda. Post istud autem dictamen sequitur volitio in voluntate qua desiderat sanitatem, quamvis forte non necessario. Istam autem volitionem sequitur consilium intellectus vel inquisitio qua inquit per quid potest melius attingere istam sanitatem, utrum scilicet per ambulationem vel per potionem vel cocturam vel aliquam aliam viam. Et post istud consilium vel inquisitionem sequitur sententia qua determinate sententiatur quod sanitas melius attingitur per istam viam determinate vel per aliam determinate. Et istam sententiam vel dictamen sequitur electio voluntatis vel sequi potest qua determinate vult ambulare vel accipere potionem, et sic de aliis. Postea autem sequitur - si non sit impedimentum - determinate vel ipsa ambulatio vel aliquid aliud."

¹⁰ I *Sent., Prol.*, q. 10, 288, 22 - 289, 12: "Tertio modo accipitur praxis strictius. Et praxis isto modo dicta idem est quod operatio existens in nostra potestate. Hoc patet, quia omnis operatio existens in nostra potestate est opus virtutis vel vitii, quia omnis talis operatio potest esse virtuosa vel vitiosa. Sed praxis est opus virtutis et vitii. Ergo etc. ... Quarto accipitur strictissime pro operatione conformiter elicitam rationis et electionis voluntatis. Et isto modo praxis est semper conformiter elicitam intellectui consiliativo, et per consequens est conformiter elicitam electioni voluntatis, quia secundum Philosophum 'consiliabile et eligibile idem'."

Ockham makes use of the four ways to understand praxis presented by Eustratius, the commentator on Aristotle. In the large sense (*large*), praxis is the activity (*operatio*) or effect (*energia*) of any power, natural or free. In the strict sense (*stricte*), praxis is thought to be any activity of a conscious being, to the extent that it is conscious. These two above-mentioned ways have no

intellect; in the latter sense, it is the object of the deliberative intellect. This being the case, Ockham first discusses the difference between a practical and deliberative intellect and thereafter the question of what action we call praxis in the stricter and in the strictest senses.¹¹

The practical intellect works with a goal and a means: it shows the practical principle, i.e., it shows that one should aim at the goal. Besides this, after deliberating, it finds the best means to obtain the goal; this best way is expressed by the definite practical conclusion.¹² To know the practical principle and practical conclusion is to know what one should aim at and do for the sake of the goal.¹³

The deliberative intellect works with practical conclusions only: the intellect deliberates the best means to obtain the goal shown and wanted. After deliberating, it comes to the practical conclusion, saying one must use some definite means to obtain the goal.¹⁴

relevance to the discussion of theoretical and practical knowledge (see *I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 287, 12 - 288, 21; 290, 3-6*). But the third (*strictius*) and the fourth (*strictissime*) ways are relevant to the matter (see *I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 290, 6-9*).

¹¹ *I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 290, 6-14*: "Sed tertio modo et quarto loquuntur doctores de praxi, quia ad praxim tertio modo dictam, saltem aliquam, extenditur intellectus practicus, respectu autem praxis quarto modo dictae semper est intellectus consiliativus. Et ideo ad solutionem istius quaestionis primo videndum est qualiter distinguitur intellectus practicus et intellectus consiliativus. Secundo videndum est quae operatio est praxis tertio modo dicta. Tertio, quae operatio est praxis ultimo modo dicta."

¹² *I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 290, 15-22*: "...intellectus practicus est respectu principiorum practicorum et etiam respectu conclusionum practicarum. Et ideo intellectus practicus est respectu finis, quando scilicet de aliquo fine iudicatur quod est appetendus vel prosequendus. Et hoc est intelligendum quia est respectu unius complexi quod affirmat aliquem finem esse appetendum, et istud est primum principium practicum in operando."

¹³ *I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 291, 6-10*: "Et intellectus practicus est respectu principiorum practicorum sumptorum a fine; et non tantum est respectu principiorum sed etiam respectu conclusionum, quia omnis veritas confesse se habens appetitui recto est practica, et per consequens notitia illius veritatis est practica."

¹⁴ *I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 291, 10-16*: "Sed intellectus consiliativus est tantum respectu conclusionum practicarum. Dictato enim per intellectum - sine omni consilio praevio - aliquem finem esse appetendum, et voluntate appetente illum finem, intellectus consiliatur per quod medium illum finem melius potest

The theoretical, practical, and deliberative intellect, Ockham emphasizes, are only different names for one and the same intellect. They are connotative terms, each having a nominal definition of its own. The theoretical intellect, by definition, is said to be able to comprehend things not in our power. In the same way, the practical intellect is said to be able to comprehend or have knowledge of things in our power.¹⁵ It is clear that both the activity of the practical and the activity of the deliberative intellect are activities of one and the same intellect. The remaining difference is that 'practical intellect' can be used in the broader sense of the concept, so it also allows a more comprehensive description of the activity of the intellect.¹⁶

2 Praxis and the Practical Intellect

From the standpoint of the activity of the practical intellect, praxis is under consideration in the stricter sense of praxis (*sensu strictiori*). All action which is in our power and within knowledge of the practical intellect is, then, called praxis:

attingere, et habita investigatione concludit tandem quod per talem medium determinatum est finis attingendus.

¹⁵ I *Sent.*, *Prol.* q. 10, 291, 24 - 292, 11: "Et ita patet quod respectu quorumcumque est intellectus consiliativus respectu eorundem est intellectus practicus. Unde sciendum est quod idem intellectus numero est practicus et speculativus et consiliativus. Tamen isti termini distinguuntur et habent distinctas definitiones exprimentes quid nominis eorum. Et ita est intelligendum dictum auctorum quando distinguunt inter intellectum speculativum et practicum, quia habent distinctas definitiones exprimentes quid nominis eorum. Unde si definiatur intellectus speculativus, hoc est iste terminus 'intellectus speculativus', debet sic dici: intellectus speculativus est intellectus potens considerare illa quae non sunt in potestate nostra. Intellectus practicus sic: intellectus practicus est intellectus potens considerare vel habere scientiam illorum quae sunt in potestate nostra. Et sic de aliis."

¹⁶ The use of the term 'deliberative intellect' means that we confine ourselves to the following view: deliberation concerns only means: "Dictato enim per intellectum - sine omni consilio praevio - aliquem finem esse appetendum... intellectus consiliatur per quod medium illum finem melius potest attingere..." (see I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 291, 10-16).

...all action which is in our power is praxis. Since both knowing and willing, as well as some exterior acts, are in our power, it follows that any of these can truly be called praxis. Primarily however, the act of the will is called praxis, because it is that which is primarily in our power, and every other action is in our power only through it; for that reason no other action is primarily called praxis (I *Sent.*, *Prolog.*, q. 10, 292, 13-19).¹⁷

Because all action called praxis is in the power of the will through the act of the will, the willing of the goal (*volitio*) and the election of the means (*electio*) are primarily called praxis.¹⁸ In this consideration (*praxis sensu strictiori*) practical knowledge does not concern only praxis after election, for in every case *volitio* and *electio* are - as was said above - primarily praxis; it is irrelevant whether there is any action after election or not.¹⁹

The description of action (when praxis is taken in the stricter sense) includes both the description of the virtuous and of the vicious action:

...virtuous praxis is action in the power of the will, and it is right by being in conformity with right reason. The first condition is clear because no action which is not in the power of the will is virtuous;

¹⁷ I *Sent.*, *Prolog.*, q. 10, 292, 13-19: "...omnis operatio quae est in potestate nostra est praxis. Et ideo cum tam cognitio quam volitio quam alii actus exteriores sint in potestate nostra, sequitur quod quilibet istorum vere poterit dici praxis. Tamen praxis primo dicitur de actu voluntatis, cum ipsa sit primo in potestate nostra, et nulla alia sit in potestate nostra nisi mediante ea, et ideo nulla alia dicitur praxis primo."

¹⁸ When Freppert discusses Ockham's view of praxis, he speaks generally of an act of the will or volition which is primarily called praxis: "It should be noted that primarily praxis is an act of the will itself. For primarily volition falls under the power of the will, and, in fact, no other act which we perform falls under the power of the will except mediately through an act of volition" (Freppert 1988, 26). In his discussion Freppert also rightly notices that "praxis, of course, can exist without any operation on the part of the sensitive faculties", but then he incorrectly identifies moral virtue with praxis and refers to a place where Ockham does not properly present his own view (see Freppert 1988, 25). In the beginning of the question, Ockham presents the view according to which it is not so that operation of the sensitive power is the only operation called praxis: "Ad oppositum: Virtus moralis non acquiritur sine praxi; sed virtus moralis potest esse in voluntate sine operatione potentiae sensitivae; igitur praxis potest esse sine omni operatione potentiae sensitivae" (I *Sent.*, *Prolog.*, q. 10, 276, 22 - 277, 1-3).

¹⁹ I *Sent.*, *Prolog.*, q. 10, 302, 3-7: "Sed praxis tertio modo dicta, respectu cuius dicitur notitia practica, non sequitur semper electionem, sed ipsamet electio et volitio praecedens est praxis, cum sit opus nostrum de quo est notitia practica."

rather, it is natural. The second condition is clear because there is, according to Aristotle, no right election and no right action without right reason; for there is no more reason for one action than for another. But vicious praxis is action in the power of the will, and it is wrong by being contrary to right reason or in conformity with erroneous and wrong reason. The first condition is clear because otherwise the will would not be imputable. For that which is not in the power of the will is in no way imputable to the will. The second condition is clear because every bad action elicited can be ordered not to be elicited (*I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 293, 3-16*).²⁰

On the grounds of these descriptions, praxis - in order to be virtuous or vicious - has to fulfil two conditions of which the first is common to virtuous and vicious praxis: Praxis has to be in the power of the will. The second condition qualifies virtuous praxis by saying that it is an action in conformity with right reason, and it qualifies vicious praxis by saying that it is an action contrary to right reason (or in conformity with erroneous reason). Of various acts, those of the will (*volitio* and *electio*) are primarily virtuous or vicious because they are above all in the power of the will.

Ockham calls attention to three points that are consequences of his view of praxis. The first is that not all practical knowledge is such that one should conform to it. For there can be such a bad action that there can be no right reason for it. No one's right reason can dictate that one should hate an enemy against God's precept, for example.²¹

²⁰ *I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 293, 3-16*: "...praxis virtuosa est operatio existens in potestate voluntatis, nata elici conformiter rationi rectae ad hoc quod sit recta. Prima conditio patet, quia nulla operatio quae non est existens in potestate voluntatis est virtuosa sed magis naturalis. Secunda conditio patet, quia secundum Philosophum VI *Ethicorum* electio recta - et per consequens nec aliqua operatio recta - non est sine recta ratione, quia non est maior ratio de una operatione quam de alia. Praxis autem vitiosa est operatio existens in potestate voluntatis, nata elici difformiter rationi rectae vel conformiter rationi erroneae et falsae. Prima conditio patet, quia aliter non esset imputabilis, quia illud quod non est in potestate voluntatis nullo modo est imputabile. Secunda conditio patet, quia omne malum elicited potest esse dictatum non esse elicendum."

²¹ *I Sent., Prol., q. 10, 293, 17-26*: "Ex istis sequuntur aliquae conclusiones. Una, quod non respectu cuiuslibet praxis est scientia practica cui notitia debeat conformari, vel magis proprie, cui sit nata elici conformiter ad hoc quod sit recta. Et hoc quia quantumcumque de omni praxi posset esse aliquod dictamen verum quod debet elici vel non elici, et ita aliquo modo sibi conformatur, tamen aliqua est praxis mala quae nullo modo potest conformiter elici rationi rectae,

The second point is that practical knowledge, which has praxis as its object, is not always dictative by nature:

The second consequence which follows is that there is some praxis not in conformity with, and not contrary to, right reason, as is such praxis that is elicited on the grounds of the object shown by the intellect alone, without any true or false dictate (I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 294, 1-4).²²

Ockham's third point is that the subject of the action called praxis must be the created will itself. For instance, this holds for a meritorious act:

The third consequence which follows is that a mere act is not called praxis formally and precisely, but it is the act with the connotation of the will which effectively and freely produces the act that is called praxis - for instance, a meritorious act. And it follows from this that the same action, which is the same either specifically or maybe even numerically, can first be praxis and later cease to be praxis. For if the will freely and contingently brings about some action, it is, then, said to be praxis; and if God later continued this same action, without the will causing or conserving it, it would not, then, be called praxis, because it would not be in the power of the will (I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 294, 5-14).²³

This third remark implies that God alone cannot be the total cause of an action that is relevant in the moral sense.²⁴ Ockham's conception of the freedom of the will demands that the created will is the subject of the acts which belong to morality.

Praxis in the strictest sense (*sensu strictissimo*) is conceived to be the action that is an object of the deliberative intellect:

quia nulla ratio recta potest dictare eam eliciendam, sicut nulla ratio recta potest dictare quod inimicus est odiendus contra divinum praeceptum."

²² I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 294, 1-4: "Alia conclusio sequitur, quod est aliqua praxis quae nec conformiter nec difformiter est elicita rationi rectae, sicut illa quae elicitur posita sola ostensione obiecti per intellectum, sine omni dictamine vero vel falso."

²³ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 294, 5-14: "Tertia conclusio sequitur, quod praxis non dicit formaliter praecise aliquem actum, sed dicit actum connotando voluntatem a qua effective et libere producat, sicut est de actu meritorio. Et ex hoc sequitur quod eadem operatio specie, vel forte numero, potest esse primo praxis et postea non praxis. Quia si voluntas libere et contingenter aliquam operationem eliciat, tunc illa operatio dicitur praxis; et si post Deum illam eandem continuaret sine omni causatione vel conservatione voluntatis respectu illius, tunc vere diceretur non praxis, quia non esset in sua potestate."

²⁴ See also Freppert 1988, 27.

...praxis in the last of the senses to be considered is every operation which is in the power of the will and deliberated by the intellect and to which the election of the will is related. In this way one can say that the action of the will and the operation of the intellect as well as exterior operation is or is able to be praxis (I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 294, 15-20).²⁵

This is the strictest way to consider praxis because only action coming after election is regarded as praxis. Praxis in the strictest sense is not only operation of the sensitive power:

As far as the principal argument is concerned, it is clear that in the fourth way only the operation coming after the election is praxis. However, it is not only the operation of the inferior power that follows the election but also the operation of the intellect - though there is another act of the intellect which precedes it - and the operation of the will follows it as well (I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 301, 18 - 302, 2).²⁶

It is common to both ways of considering praxis (the stricter and the strictest) that praxis is the operation which is in the power of the will. To consider praxis as an object of the deliberative intellect (praxis *sensu strictissimo*) is to say that the action must always be the operation elected and deliberated over in order to be praxis. Thus, there is no impediment to looking at the deliberation which comes after the election as praxis (see I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 301, 19 - 302, 3). On the other hand, one cannot call an exterior, spontaneous operation, ordered by the will but not deliberated beforehand, praxis in this sense. This is how things are when the action ordered by the will is considered a goal as such. There is, now, no means which the intellect, after deliberating, could show to be the action which leads to the goal (see I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 295, 14-20).

It is worth noting that Ockham divides praxis into virtuous and vicious in connection with praxis in the stricter sense (*sensu*

²⁵ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 294, 15-20: "...praxis ultimo modo dicta est omnis operatio existens in potestate voluntatis, consiliata ab intellectu, respectu cuius est electio voluntatis. Et isto modo praxis dicitur vel potest dici tam de actione voluntatis quam de operatione intellectus quam etiam de operatione exteriori."

²⁶ I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 301, 18 - 302, 2: "Ad argumentum principale patet quod sola operatio sequens electionem est praxis quarto modo dicta. Sed non sola operatio potentiae inferioris sequitur electionem, sed ipsam sequitur tam intellectio - quamvis una alia praecedat - quam etiam operatio voluntatis."

strictioni). From this point of view, it is clear that Ockham thinks that praxis in the strictest sense is too narrow a way to consider praxis. It leaves out the willing of the goal; however, this act of will as an interior act is primarily virtuous or vicious praxis.

III THEORY OF ETHICS

A The Term 'Virtuous' and Its Uses

'Virtuous' is a connotative term, according to Ockham.¹ A connotative term - unlike an absolute term - primarily signifies something and secondarily signifies or connotes something else. Connotative names have a nominal definition.² Ockham uses the connotative term 'virtuous' in many different connections. The same term is predicated of various things (an act of will, an exterior act, an act of intellect, an act of sensitive appetite, a habit, a person) with partially different meanings. Whenever the term 'virtuous' is truly predicated of the items mentioned above, the term has to connote something that is actually present.³

1 *The Concept of Virtuous Act of Will*

Ockham says that the term 'virtuous' is properly used in connection with acts.⁴ According to him, the term 'virtuous' (and 'meritorious',

¹ *Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. I, 417, 200 - 418, 202.

² *SL I*, cap. 10, 36, 38 - 47.

³ In *III Sent.*, q. 7, 215, 10-21 Ockham explains in what way connotative terms can be divided into two different classes: "Et est sciendum hic quod aliquando vox vel conceptus significat aliquid principaliter et connotat aliud, ita quod principale significatum illius nominis vel conceptus capit denominationem illius conceptus significantis, sive connotatum existat sive non; aliquando non denominatur nisi connotatum existat. Exemplum primi: Deus est bonus. Bonitas significat Deum connotando actum volendi, et Deus dicitur bonus sive sit actus volendi sive non, immo, si nullus actus volendi posset esse. Exemplum secundi: paternitas, negando relationem, significat patrem connotando filium. Et homo non denominatur pater realiter nisi quando actu existit filius, et sic est generaliter in istis conceptibus ubi ab aliis ponuntur relationes, sicut simile, etc." The term 'virtuous' belongs to the connotative names of the second class (see *Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. I, 417, 200 - 418, 203).

⁴ *III Sent.*, q. 11, 359, 10-12: "...habitus non dicitur virtuosus nisi quadam denominatione extrinseca, quatenus scilicet inclinat ad actum virtuosum qui proprie est virtuosus."

too⁵) primarily signifies an act and connotes the activity of will and the activity of prudence:

...virtuous and meritorious are connotative names and signify an act itself, not in an absolute way but connoting the activity of will and prudence; and when one of these connotata is lacking, then the act is not called virtuous (*Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. I, 417, 200 - 418, 203).⁶

In the context of the above quotation, Ockham discusses acts of will. When he says that acts of will are acts which primarily are virtuous acts, one may wonder what it means that 'virtuous', when predicated of them, connotes the activity of will. It seems that by "the activity of will" and "the activity of prudence" Ockham refers here in a general way to his view that a virtuous act must be an act which is free and consciously chosen in accordance with right reason. In this section, I shall discuss the structure of a virtuous act of the will.

According to Ockham, only people acting freely and consciously act in a virtuous way.⁷ Therefore, if acts of the will are to be called virtuous, they must be free. A free potency is defined as follows:

...I call a free potency that by which we can indifferently and contingently determine various things so that we can cause or not cause the same effect, when things outside this potency do not change (*Quodl.* I, q. 16, 87, 12-15).⁸

Ockham did not believe that the freedom of the will can be proved,

⁵ On the relationship between the terms 'virtuous' and 'meritorious', see Freppert 1988, 79-80.

⁶ *Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. I, 417, 200 - 418, 203: "...virtuosum et meritorium sunt nomina connotativa et significant ipsum actum non absolute, sed connotando cum hoc activitatem voluntatis et prudentiae, et quando deficit aliquod connotatum non dicitur talis actus virtuosus."

⁷ *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. III, 362, 500-501: "...nullus virtuose agit nisi scienter agat et ex libertate."

See also Freppert 1988, 33, 53.

⁸ *Quodl.* I, q. 16, 87, 12-15: "...voco libertatem potestatem qua possum indifferenter et contingenter diversa ponere, ita quod possum eundem effectum causare et non causare, nulla diversitate existente alibi extra illam potentiam."

See also *Quodl.* I, q. 17, 90, 12-13; *I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 6, 501, 1-24; *I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, 378, 8-10; *Exp. Phys.*, lib. VII, cap. 1, 598, 87-97; Freppert 1988, 33-34.

but it must be taken for granted when calling something virtuous.⁹ To say that the act of will is in the power of the will is to say that it cannot be impeded by any created thing distinct from the will itself.¹⁰ It can be impeded by divine power, however, which is a necessary partial cause of any act of will.¹¹ God's activity is therefore a part of a virtuous act, too, but this is irrelevant with respect to the moral status of the act. For one thing, Ockham thinks that God's action is not to be considered morally good or bad in the same sense as human acts:

But God is not under the obligation of causing any act; therefore, He can cause any absolute act and an act opposite to it without any guilt. Just as He can totally cause the act of loving without moral goodness or badness, since moral goodness and badness connote that an agent is obliged to this act or to the act opposite to it, in the same way, God can totally cause the act of hating God without any moral badness for the very same reason that God is not under the obligation of causing any act (II *Sent.*, q. 15, 353, 11-18).¹²

As far as moral goodness or badness of an act connotes that an agent is obliged to its commission or omission, divine action is

⁹ *Quodl.* I, q. 16, 87, 18 - 88, 35.

¹⁰ III *Sent.*, q. 7, 206, 4-13: "Et quando dicitur quod actus voluntatis est in potestate voluntatis, si intelligitur sic quod non possit impedi, hoc nullus christianus debet concedere; licet Philosophus habeat eam concedere qui non ponit Deum immediate aliquid causare in istis inferioribus. ... Sed tamen actus voluntatis sic est in potestate voluntatis quod per nullum creatum potest actus suos simpliciter impedi." "

¹¹ III *Sent.*, q. 7, 206, 8-11: "Sed christianus, qui habet ponere quod Deus concurrat in omni actione immediate, habet ponere quod Deo non coagente cum voluntate, voluntas nullum actum elicit, quia deficit causa partialis necessario requisita." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. III, 363, 515-518: "...ad actum virtuosum necessario requiritur activitas actus prudentiae et activitas voluntatis, ita quod illae duae causae sunt causae partiales cum Deo respectu actus virtuosus."

See also Freppert 1988, 37-38, 129.

¹² II *Sent.*, q. 15, 353, 11-18: "Sed Deus ad nullum actum causandum obligatur, ideo quemlibet actum absolutum potest sine omni malo culpae causare et eius oppositum. Et ideo sicut potest causare totaliter actum diligendi sine bonitate vel malitia morali, quia bonitas moralis vel malitia connotant quod agens obligatur ad illum actum vel eius oppositum, ita potest causare totaliter actum odiendi Deum sine omni malitia morali propter eandem causam, quia Deus ad nullum actum causandum obligatur."

outside the area of morality.¹³ Secondly, that part of an act which is caused by divine agency is not free. It is beyond human control. If the whole act of will is caused by God, then God is the subject of the act and it cannot be called a moral act:

...some act in will would be indifferent, if it were totally caused by God, since in this case it would not be called morally good or bad because these names connote the activity of will as a meritorious act (III *Sent.*, q. 11, 389, 6-9).¹⁴

Ockham thinks that God's activity with respect to voluntary human action consists in sustaining the free will which is obligated to make the right choice, but which can act wrongly.¹⁵ It is worth noting that in Ockham's view a person would not use moral language properly if he said that an act is good merely because it is in accord with right reason; he would not, because moral terms include a reference to the freedom of the act.¹⁶

¹³ II *Sent.*, q. 15, 353, 15-16: "...bonitas moralis vel malitia connotant quod agens obligatur ad illum actum vel eius oppositum..."

See also *Exp. Phys.*, lib. II, cap. 8, 320, 144 - 321, 149; Miethke 1969, 301-302; Freppert 1988, 132-133.

¹⁴ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 389, 6-9: "...aliquis actus sit indifferens in voluntate si causetur totaliter a Deo, quia tunc nec dicitur bonus moraliter nec malus, quia ista nomina connotant activitatem voluntatis sicut meritorius actus."

Compare with I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 10, 294, 9-14: "Quia si voluntas libere et contingenter aliquam operationem eliciat, tunc illa operatio dicitur praxis; et si post Deum illam eandem continuaret sine omni causatione vel conservatione voluntatis respectu illius, tunc vere diceretur non praxis, quia non esset in sua potestate."

See also *Quodl.* III, q. 14, 254, 19-20; III *Sent.*, q. 11, 389, 21-22; Freppert 1988, 42, 153.

¹⁵ *Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. II, 435, 584-593: "Ex hoc potest patere, - secundum illam viam quae ponit quod Deus est causa immediata cuiuslibet actus nostri volendo illum actum esse -, quomodo nos in actu aliquo peccamus, licet Deus velit illum actum esse immediate ab eo partialiter concurrente voluntate. Quia licet voluntas creata velit idem quod Deus vult, - quia Deus vult illum actum esse, aliter non fieret -, tamen [Deus] non peccat, sed voluntas nostra peccat [quando obligatur ad oppositum], quia voluntas divina non tenetur velle oppositum eo quod ad nihil obligatur. Sed voluntas creata tenetur velle oppositum quia tenetur velle quod Deus vult eam velle."

¹⁶ Compare with III *Sent.*, q. 11, 389, 18-22: "...ex hoc quod praecise est conformis rationi rectae non est virtuosus, quia si Deus faceret in voluntate mea actum conformem rationi rectae, voluntate nihil agente, non esset ille actus meritorius nec virtuosus. Et ideo requiritur ad bonitatem actus quod sit in potestate voluntatis habentis illum actum." See also Freppert 1988, 61.

The act's being in conformity with right reason is the second notion which belongs to the connotation of the term 'virtuous'.¹⁷ To will in conformity with right reason is to will what is dictated by the right reason just because it is so dictated.¹⁸ The dictate of the right reason is a partial cause of the virtuous act of will. The will, which in itself is free to act both rightly and wrongly, needs guidance coming from right reason.¹⁹

According to Ockham, the term '*morale*' can be used largely and strictly. In a large sense, it refers to all voluntary human action, and in a strict sense it refers to those acts which are in the power of the will and are in accord with the natural dictate of reason and with other circumstances. All acts of will are moral acts in the large sense of 'moral act', of course. Of these, acts of choosing something in conformity with right reason are virtuous acts.²⁰

17 *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 394, 440-443*: "...stante ordinatione quae nunc est, nullus actus est perfecte virtuosus nisi eliciatur conformiter rectae rationi actualiter inhaerenti. Ideo dico quod recta ratio est obiectum actus virtuosus..." *Ibid.*, 400, 570-575: "Igitur oportet necessario quod actus qui est intrinsece et necessario virtuosus, sic quod non potest fieri indifferens vel vitiosus, quod habeat non tantum alias circumstantias sed etiam rationem rectam pro obiecto; et ille solus est sic virtuosus, et quilibet alius solum contingenter et extrinsece." III *Sent.*, q. 12, 422, 15-21: "...de ratione actus virtuosus est quod eliciatur conformiter rationi rectae et respectu obiecti convenientis, et quod habens talem actum sit sciens. Unde dicit Philosophus, II *Ethicorum*, primo, quid sit sciens, deinde quid sit eligens. Unde si omnes circumstantiae requisitae ad actum virtuosum ponantur praeter rectam rationem, non erit ille actus perfecte virtuosus." *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. III, 362, 498-501*: "Et si quaeras utrum post generationem virtutis possit elici actus virtuosus sine actu prudentiae: respondeo quod non, quia nullus virtuose agit nisi scienter agat et ex libertate."

18 *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 395, 458-459*: "...hoc est elicere conformiter rectae rationi: velle dictatum a ratione propter hoc quod est dictatum." *Quaest. variae, q. 8, art. I, 418, 206-210*: "...actum elici conformiter rationi rectae est ipsum elici secundum rectam rationem regulantem et dictantem talem actum esse eliciendum, quod quidem 'dictare' sive 'regulare' non est aliud quam speciali modo illum actum causare..."

19 *Quaest. variae, q. 8, art. I, 410, 23-25*: "Sed voluntas nostra est huiusmodi quod potest recte et non recte agere. Igitur indiget aliqua ratione recta dirigente."

See also Freppert 1988, 51.

20 *Quodl. II, q. 14, 176, 11 - 177, 16*: "Circa primum dico quod '*morale*' accipitur large pro actibus humanis qui subiacent voluntati absolute. ... Aliter accipitur magis stricte pro moribus sive actibus subiectis potestati voluntatis secundum naturale dictamen rationis et secundum alias circumstantias."

What has been said can be summarized as follows. The term 'virtuous' primarily signifies an act of will and secondarily signifies or connotes that the act in question has been elected freely and consciously because it is thought to be a right act. (Ockham thinks that a person has to believe that his moral choice is right; this is a theme I shall return to later on.) When the virtuous act is an act of will, it must be a free act of a created will and the agent must be conscious of her free election and have as the object of choice the dictate of right reason.

I have discussed above the conditions for calling an act of will virtuous, since Ockham thinks that only the acts of will can be intrinsically virtuous. Whatever else is called virtuous is called virtuous by extrinsic denomination.²¹

An act of will which is "intrinsically virtuous" is also primarily (*primo*) and essentially (*essentialiter*) virtuous. This kind of act cannot, while remaining the same act, become vicious.²² However, it is important to notice that when an act is called intrinsically virtuous in Ockham's ethics, it is taken for granted that there is an

See also Freppert 1988, 15.

²¹ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 384, 184-185*: "...actus potest dici virtuosus vel intrinsece vel extrinsece." *Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. IX, 263, 251-257*: "...solutus actus voluntatis libere elicited est virtuosus vel vitiosus, meritorius vel demeritorius, et nullus alius actus dicitur vitiosus vel virtuosus nisi quadam denominatione extrinseca, puta quatenus potest conformari illi volitioni. Et ideo quando non est aliqua volitio in homine, nullus est actus virtuosus in eo nec vitiosus essentialiter nec denominative."

See also *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 381, 105-115*; Freppert 1988, 38, 40-41, 58.

²² *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 385, 224-226*: "Et ideo actus primo intrinsece bonus non potest fieri post intrinsece malus nec indifferens nec extrinsece malus nec e contra." *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. III, 364, 541-544*: "...actus intellectus non est primo virtuosus nec est in potestate voluntatis, quia actus primo et essentialiter et intrinsece virtuosus non potest idem manens esse vitiosus; sed actus intellectus idem manens potest; igitur etc."

See also *Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. IX, 263, 251-257*; *I Sent., d. 3, q. 10, 568, 13-15*.

extrinsic element contributing to its intrinsic goodness, viz., God's precept being in power.²³

Of all acts, only the acts of will can be intrinsically virtuous (or vicious). The reason for this is that all acts except certain acts of will may, while remaining the same act, first be good and then bad, or *vice versa*.²⁴ Acts of this kind can be exterior acts, acts of sensitive appetite, acts of intellect, or acts of will.²⁵ Thus, whatever the act is, if it is not an intrinsically virtuous (or vicious) act of will, it can be virtuous (or vicious) only in an extrinsic sense. By using the expression "virtuous by extrinsic denomination", Ockham refers to such an act which is not good essentially or in itself but is good due to an intrinsically good act related to it. Acts which are not intrinsically virtuous may be virtuous or vicious depending on how they are extrinsically intended.²⁶

²³ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. II, 338, 200-205*: "...aliquis actus est intrinsece bonus moraliter, aliquis intrinsece malus et vitiosus... Exemplum primi: velle orare propter honorem Dei et quia praeceptum est a Deo secundum rectam rationem etc. Exemplum secundi: velle orare propter vanam gloriam et quia contra praeceptum Dei et contra rectam rationem."

²⁴ *Quodl. III, q. 14, 253, 14 - 254, 18*: "...omnis alius actus ab actu voluntatis, qui est in potestate voluntatis, sic est bonus quod potest esse malus, quia potest fieri cum malo fine et mala intentione. Similiter omnis alius actus potest elici naturaliter et non-libere, et nullus talis est necessario virtuosus." *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 381, 108-113*: "...solus actus voluntatis est intrinsece virtuosus vel vitiosus, et nullus alius nisi extrinseca denominatione, quia quilibet alius, - tam actus intellectus quam exterior -, potest idem manens fieri successive bona intentione et mala, et per consequens est contingenter bonus vel malus, et non necessario et intrinsece..." *III Sent., q. 11, 375, 12-13*: "...et non intrinsece. Quia sic solus actus voluntatis est bonus vel malus moraliter." *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 382, 148 - 383, 154*: "...igitur necesse est ponere quod hic producatur aliquid de novo absolutum quod est formaliter et intrinsece bonum. Tale nihil potest esse ex natura sua nisi solus actus voluntatis, licet alius actus posset dici intrinsece bonus ex causa extrinseca acceptante, quo modo Deus nunc solum acceptat actum voluntatis, quia si acceptaret actum intellectus sicut voluntatis, tunc ita posset actus intellectus dici bonus intrinsece sicut voluntatis."

²⁵ *III Sent., q. 11, 360, 5 - 361, 1; ibid., 379, 15-16; ibid., 375, 6-12; ibid., 383, 19 - 387, 7; Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. I, 328, 113-115.*

²⁶ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 381, 105-115*: "Praeterea numquam de actu non virtuoso intrinsece potest fieri virtuosus nisi per actum intrinsece virtuosum, et non solum extrinsece et contingenter, quia aliter esset processus in infinitum,

An intrinsically virtuous act is also said to be necessarily virtuous.²⁷ A necessarily virtuous act of will is an act which cannot be caused by the will without being virtuous, provided that God's law is in power. Most of the acts of will do not fulfil this condition, although they can be virtuous due to another act of will related to them. As an example of a necessarily virtuous act of will, Ockham mentions the act by which God is loved above all and for Himself. This is a necessarily virtuous act because everyone is obliged to love God above all and because this is the first of all good acts. Even this act is necessarily virtuous by a conditional necessity, however, the condition being that God's law is in

sicut patet supra; sed sicut supra dictum est, solus actus voluntatis est intrinsece virtuosus vel vitiosus, et nullus alius nisi extrinseca denominatione, quia quilibet alius, - tam actus intellectus quam exterior -, potest idem manens fieri successive bona intentione et mala, et per consequens est contingenter bonus vel malus, et non necessario et intrinsece; igitur impossibile est quod aliquis actus voluntatis non bonus fiat bonus per solum actum prudentiae."

See also *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. IV, 384, 184 - 385, 209.

²⁷ *Quodl.* III q. 16, 266, 111-115: "Ad primum istorum dico quod non sunt circumstantiae respectu actus necessario et intrinsece virtuosus, sed sunt obiecta respectu illius actus; sunt autem circumstantiae respectu cuiuscumque actus qui solum dicitur virtuosus per denominationem extrinsecam, per conformitatem ad actum necessario virtuosum..." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. IV, 393, 403-405: "...aliquis est actus voluntatis qui est intrinsece et necessario virtuosus, stante ordinatione divina quae nunc est, et nullo modo contingenter virtuosus." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. I, 327, 99 - 328, 112: "...aliquis actus est necessario et intrinsece virtuosus. Hoc probatur, quia impossibile est quod aliquis actus contingenter virtuosus, - sic scilicet quod potest indifferenter dici virtuosus vel vitiosus -, fiat determinate virtuosus propter novitatem alicuius actus non necessario virtuosus, quia per nullum actum contingenter virtuosum modo praedicto fit alius actus sive denominatur determinate virtuosus. Quia si sic, aut ille secundus actus, qui est contingenter virtuosus, erit determinate virtuosus per aliquem actum qui est necessario virtuosus, aut per actum contingenter virtuosum. Si primo modo...tunc habetur propositum... Si secundo modo, erit processus in infinitum, vel stabitur ad aliquem actum necessario virtuosum, et sic habetur propositum." *Ibid.*, 328, 124-128: "Ideo dico quod est dare aliquem actum necessario primo virtuosum...sicut velle facere aliquid quia est praeceptum divinum, est ita virtuosus quod non potest fieri vitiosus, stante praecepto divino." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. III, 364, 542-543: "...actus primo et essentialiter et intrinsece virtuosus non potest idem manens esse vitiosus..." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. IV, 385, 224-226: "...actus primo intrinsece bonus non potest fieri post intrinsece malus nec indifferens nec extrinsece malus nec e contra."

Freppert 1988, 59: "In Ockham's use of the term 'intrinsic' an act is called intrinsically good in the sense of necessity."

power.²⁸ This is the modal aspect connected with the terms 'primarily virtuous', 'essentially virtuous' and 'intrinsically virtuous' which also refer to the structure of moral theory. I shall return to this question in section III A 4, but it may be useful to delineate the main lines of the theory here.

Loving God above all means loving all that God wants to be loved.²⁹ Thus, 'loving God above all' can be read as 'willing to obey God' or 'willing to obey divine law'.³⁰ Actually, Ockham seems to think that the act of willing to fulfil divine law *qua* moral law is intrinsically virtuous. The content of this act is conjunctive: it is an act of willing to fulfil moral law and an act of willing to do a deed by which it is fulfilled. Putting this act in its formal structure:

Per eundem actum velim dictatum a ratione recta et velim rectam rationem, propter quam velim dictatum.

Generally, this describes the structure of a moral act (in the strict sense of '*morale*'): it consists of two act-parts which both take place in the same act; as an example of their belonging to the same act Ockham mentions that "per eundem actum utor creatura et diligo

²⁸ Freppert's interpretation differs from mine. According to him, the love of God above all and for Himself is a good act without the command of God; see Freppert 1988, 121-122, 147-148, 175-176. I shall return to this discussion later on. Here I just refer to what Ockham writes in *Quodl.* III, q. 14, 255, 43 - 256, 67: "Tamen aliter potest intelligi actum esse necessario virtuosum, ita scilicet quod non possit esse vitiosus stante praecepto divino; similiter non potest causari a voluntate creata nisi sit virtuosus. ...ille actus necessario virtuosus modo praedicto est actus voluntatis, quia actus quo diligitur Deus super omnia et propter se, est huiusmodi; nam iste actus sic est virtuosus quod non potest esse vitiosus, nec potest iste actus causari a voluntate creata nisi sit virtuosus; tum quia quilibet pro loco et tempore obligatur ad diligendum Deum super omnia, et per consequens iste actus non potest esse vitiosus; tum quia iste actus est primus omnium actuum bonorum."

On Ockham's conception of two kinds of necessity, see *Quodl.* VI, q. 2, 590.

²⁹ *Quodl.* III, q. 14, 257, 87-88: "...hoc est diligere Deum super omnia: diligere quidquid Deus vult diligi..."

³⁰ *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. 1, 328, 124-128: "Ideo dico quod est dare aliquem actum necessario primo virtuosum, qui est actus primo laudabilis et perfecte circumstantionatus, qui est ita virtuosus quod non potest fieri vitiosus, sicut velle facere aliquid quia est praeceptum divinum, est ita virtuosus quod non potest fieri vitiosus, stante praecepto divino."

See also III *Sent.*, q. 11, 375, 5-8; I *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 12, 367, 15-19.

Deum, propter quem diligo creaturam."³¹ Another way to describe the formal structure of a moral act is to say that it is the election of the means (*electio*) for the sake of the goal.³² This means that a person in her moral election loves the goal more than the means by which she obtains the goal.³³

Ockham seems to use the connotative term 'virtuous' so that when it signifies an act of will, it connotes that the act has been freely and consciously elected because of loving God. One part of the connotation of the term 'virtuous', then, is a reference to the intrinsically and necessarily virtuous act of willing to fulfil the precepts of God.³⁴

2 *Virtuous Exterior Act*

Although the term 'virtuous' is primarily applied to acts of will, some of which are intrinsically virtuous, it can also be predicated of exterior acts. By 'exterior acts' Ockham means the acts of the sensitive part of the soul. The moral status of these acts of the sensitive part is the same as that of indifferent acts of will and acts of intellect; they are not virtuous (or vicious) in themselves,

³¹ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 395, 462-469*: "Igitur ad hoc quod virtuose velim dictatum a ratione recta, oportet necessario quod velim rectam rationem per eundem actum, non per alium, quia si per alium, iam ille actus quo volo dictatum a ratione non esset virtuosus, quia non est virtuosus nisi propter hoc quod per illum volo dictatum a ratione propter hoc quod ratio sic dictat. Erit igitur per eundem actum, sicut per eundem actum utor creatura et diligo Deum, propter quem diligo creaturam."

³² *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 395, 459-464*: "Nunc autem est impossibile quod aliquis velit aliquid propter aliud, nisi velit illud aliud, quia si nolit vel non velit illud aliud, iam vult primum magis propter se quam propter illud aliud. Igitur ad hoc quod virtuose velim dictatum a ratione recta, oportet necessario quod velim rectam rationem per eundem actum, non per alium..."

³³ See also Freppert 1988, 66, 73, 85-86.

³⁴ See also Freppert 1988, 79.

but they can be called virtuous (or vicious) extrinsically (*denominazione extrinseca*).³⁵

Provided that there is a morally good act and an exterior act united with it, we can ask whether the exterior act itself somehow becomes morally good on account of its being in conformity with the interior act.³⁶ Ockham's answer to this question is unconditionally negative. Moral goodness, of course, cannot be the exterior act itself because the exterior act, while remaining the same act, can be good and bad.³⁷ The goodness of the interior act of will does not

³⁵ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 389, 9-12: "Et dico ultra quod tam actus partis sensitivae quam intellectus quam voluntatis potest dici indifferens modo praedicto et denominari bonus vel malus denominatione extrinseca." *Ibid.*, 360, 5 - 361, 1: "...quando aliquid manens omnino invariatur recipit oppositas denominationes, neutra denominatio est sibi intrinseca sed extrinseca; sed actus partis sensitivae est huiusmodi; igitur etc. Assumptum patet, quia aliquis potest ire ad ecclesiam ut celebret vel oret propter gloriam et laudem Dei. Iste actus ambulandi dicitur tunc virtuosus. Et potest eundem actum ambulandi omnino invariatur continuare et solum mutare actum voluntatis et intendere malum finem, puta quod vult ambulare ad ecclesiam ad celebrandum et orandum propter vanam gloriam. Tunc iste actus dicitur vitiosus idem numero non variatus in se qui prius dicitur virtuosus, ita quod capit denominationes oppositas; et non intrinsece, constat igitur extrinsece. Igitur nullus actus nec habitus partis sensitivae dicitur virtuosus vel vitiosus nisi quadam denominatione extrinseca."

See also III *Sent.*, q. 11, 375, 2-13; *Quodl.* I, q. 18, 95, 49 - 96, 65.

³⁶ *Quodl.* I, q. 20, 101, 46-49: "Est igitur iste intellectus quaestionis: quando actus interior bonus elicitur et actus exterior conformiter elicitur, utrum actus exterior per talem conformitatem ad interiorem aliquid recipit vel acquirit praeter actum."

³⁷ *Quodl.* I, q. 20, 101, 52 - 102, 63: "Et sic intelligendo quaestionem, proba quod non. Quia si sic, aut illa bonitas moralis est ipse actus aut aliquid praeter actum. Non actus, quia ille actus exterior qui nunc est bonus, idem potest esse malus; patet de actu ambulandi ad ecclesiam propter honorem Dei vel vanam gloriam; igitur illa bonitas est aliquid praeter actum. Aut igitur est subjective in actu aut non. Si non, tunc illa bonitas non potest poni nisi actus interior. Si sic, contra: non potest esse qualitas inhaerens sibi nec respectus; tum quia talis respectus non est ponendus, sicut alias patebit; tum quia si ponatur talis respectus, non potest esse nisi respectus conformitatis et dependentiae actus exterioris ad interiorem, puta quia elicitur actui interiori conformiter."

Adams and Wood 1981, 11-12: "William Ockham and his socius Adam Wodeham insist, contrary to Scotus and his followers, that external acts do not have any moral value or merit of their own, distinct from that of the internal acts from which they proceed, and hence cannot increase the agent's worthiness of praise or blame." Freppert 1988, 43-44: "When an interior good act is elicited and an exterior act is performed in conformity with this interior act, does the exterior act by its conformity with the interior act receive or acquire any morality beyond that of the interior act? ... Ockham is of the opinion that the exterior

add anything distinct from the interior act of will to the substance of an exterior act:

But if you ask what is added by the goodness or the badness of an act to the substance of the act that is called good only by extrinsic denomination, as an act of the sensitive part, and similarly, an act of will, I answer that nothing positive is added, neither absolute nor respective, which would be distinct from the act, which would exist in this act through a cause (III *Sent.*, q. 11, 388, 18 - 389, 1).³⁸

The exterior act that is not intrinsically virtuous or vicious is good in the sense of the word that all existing is good.³⁹ The goodness in this sense is, however, different from the goodness in the moral sense:

But this goodness is only a name or concept, primarily signifying an act which is not in itself either [virtuous or vicious], connoting a perfectly virtuous act of will and right reason in accordance with which it is elicited. Therefore this kind of act is denominated virtuous by extrinsic denomination (III *Sent.*, q. 11, 389, 1-5).⁴⁰

An exterior act - which is not a moral act - cannot form the criterion for the moral goodness of an act of will.⁴¹ An exterior act is called a common object because it can be the same in regard to different acts of will. And because it can be the same, it can be the object of a virtuous or vicious act of will as well as the object of an indifferent act of will. Furthermore, an act of will can be

act does not have any morality distinct from that of the interior act. The external act is called 'moral' only by extrinsic denomination."

³⁸ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 388, 18 - 389, 1: "Si autem quaeras quid addit bonitas actus vel malitia super substantiam actus qui dicitur bonus solum denominatione quadam extrinseca, puta actus partis sensitivae, et similiter actus voluntatis, dico quod nihil positivum absolutum vel respectivum distinctum ab illo actu quod habet esse in ipso actu per quamcumque causam."

³⁹ *Quodl.* I, q. 20, 106, 152-154: "...actus exterior est bonus bonitate sua propria, quae est ipse actus naturalis..."

On the two meanings of the term 'good' Ockham writes as follows: "...'bonum' accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo pro bono ut dividitur in bonum honestum, utile et delectabile. Alio modo bonum est idem quod volitum, vel accipitur pro omni eo quod est volibile" (*Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. II, 442, 743-746).

⁴⁰ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 389, 1-5: "Sed tantum est bonitas illa nomen vel conceptus connotativus, significans principaliter ipsum actum sic neutrum, connotans actum voluntatis perfecte virtuosum et rectam rationem quibus conformiter elicitor. Ideo denominatur virtuosus talis actus denominatione extrinseca."

See also Freppert 1988, 158.

⁴¹ See *Quodl.* III q. 16, 267, 129-137; see also III *Sent.*, q. 11, 383, 10-15.

called virtuous irrespective of whether an exterior act comes into being or not.⁴² Thus, an exterior act cannot form the criterion for the moral goodness of an act of will.

We could now ask whether an exterior act can have any moral significance at all. One of Ockham's examples of extrinsically virtuous exterior acts is giving alms for God's sake.⁴³ This exterior act can be called morally good because it accords with the intrinsically virtuous act of will, i.e., the exterior act is performed for the sake of loving God (*pro amore Dei*) and in conformity with right reason. Ockham, of course, does not deprecate exterior acts, but he need not emphasize their role because they are thought to follow from moral elections if nothing prevents it - people do what they want to do. In fact, Ockham cannot lay more stress on the role of exterior acts in the moral context since, according to him, the interior act of will forms the sole criterion for morally evaluating an exterior act; one cannot say anything morally significant of an exterior act as such.

3 *Virtuous Habit and Virtuous Person*

Ockham also uses the term 'virtuous' when he speaks about virtues and persons. The discussion concerning these uses will show that the concept of virtuous habit ('virtue') and the concept of virtuous person are derivative concepts and as such are not at the core of Ockham's theory of ethics.

According to Ockham, a habit of will is called virtuous because it makes one inclined to virtuous acts.⁴⁴ A virtuous habit of will

⁴² See *Quodl.* I, q. 20, 103, 97-103.

⁴³ *III Sent.*, q. 11, 362, 19, 375, 5-13.

⁴⁴ *Quodl.* III, q. 14, 257, 96-98: "...solus habitus voluntatis est intrinsece et necessario virtuosus, quia quilibet alius habitus inclinatur indifferenter ad actus laudabiles et vituperabiles." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. II, 330, 158-160: "...nullus alius habitus ab habitu voluntatis est intrinsece et perfecte virtuosus, quia quilibet alius inclinatur indifferenter ad actus laudabiles et vituperabiles."

See also Freppert 1988, 49-50.

originates from the virtuous acts of will.⁴⁵ When a person has a virtuous habit caused by the virtuous acts of will, he has a virtue; this virtue, together with cognition and potency, suffices to produce laudable acts, and it does not in any way produce a blamable act.⁴⁶

According to Ockham, a habit of sensitive appetite cannot be properly called a virtue, since a habit in the sensitive part indifferently makes one inclined both to virtuous and to vicious action. However, Ockham also says that such a habit can be called extrinsically virtuous if *de facto* it causes an inclination to an act that is properly (*proprie*) virtuous.⁴⁷ Virtuous habits (*virtus proprie*) and vicious habits do not inhere in man; they are habits just because they are produced by acts.

I shall discuss next the use of the term 'virtuous' in connection with a habit of will and a person. The concept of virtuous person does not take any central place in Ockham's ethics, and, secondly, the possession of a virtue does not guarantee that a person acts in a morally good way.

The term 'virtuous' is not predicated of a virtue when 'virtue' is understood as a term of the second intention predicable of terms of the first intention (e.g., justice is a virtue, fortitude is a virtue

⁴⁵ I *Sent.*, *Prot.*, q. 10, 299, 9-14: "...ex volitionibus quibus voluntas vult studere et intellectualiter considerare secundum debitas circumstantias generatur habitus moraliter virtuosus, subiective existens in voluntate, qui etiam non est intellectualis, quamvis ex actibus intellectus imperatis a voluntate generetur unus alius habitus intellectualis."

⁴⁶ *Quodl.* II, q. 16, 182, 9-16: "...'habitus virtuosus' dupliciter accipitur: uno modo, pro aliquo habitu qui mediante cognitione et potentia cuius est habitus, sufficit ad elicendum actum laudabilem, et qui nullo modo est elicivus actus vituperabilis; alio modo... Habitus virtuosus primo modo non est in aliquo alio a voluntate..."

⁴⁷ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 358, 18-20, 359, 9-12: "Prima est quod in appetitu sensitivo est ponendus habitus inclinans ad actum. Secunda, quod ille habitus non est proprie virtus. ... Secunda probatur, quia habitus non est magis virtuosus quam actus elicivus ab habitu. Hoc patet, quia habitus non dicitur virtuosus nisi quadam denominatione extrinseca, quatenus scilicet inclinatur ad actum virtuosum qui proprie est virtuosus." *Ibid.*, 361, 8-12: "Et ex istis patet quod idem habitus numero in parte sensitiva potest inclinare indifferenter ad actus virtuosos et vitiosos, quia de se totaliter est indifferens, nec oportet ibi ponere unum habitum inclinantem ad actus virtuosos et alium inclinantem ad vitiosos."

etc.).⁴⁸ In other words, Ockham does not share the Platonic view according to which the idea itself (the virtue) has the same property (virtuous) as those (e.g., justice, fortitude) which are participating in that idea. Virtue is not virtuous in this sense, and neither is any particular virtue *qua species* virtuous. Ockham writes:

Concrete and abstract names can be used in many ways. Sometimes the concrete name signifies or connotes or imports or expresses something for which it also suppositis and which the abstract name does not signify in any way and consequently does not supposit for in any way; examples of this are 'just' and 'justice', 'white' and 'whiteness', and so on. Namely, 'just' really suppositis for man when one says that 'the just is virtuous'; but it cannot supposit for justice, since justice, although it is a virtue, is not, however, virtuous. This name 'justice' really suppositis for a quality and not man. Therefore, it is impossible to predicate this kind of concrete name of its abstract counterpart, since concrete and abstract names of this kind always supposit for different things (*SL I, cap. 5, 16, 13 - 17, 23*).⁴⁹

It is clear from this passage that justice, for example, is not virtuous when it represents one species of virtue. However, justice

⁴⁸ See the following passages: *SL I, cap. 18, 63, 34-39*: "Large autem dicitur genus vel species omne illud per quod convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam per 'quid est' per nomen connotativum, quod non est mere absolutum. Sicut si quaeratur 'quid est album', convenienter respondetur quod est coloratum. Et tamen si quaereres quaestionem 'quid est' per pronomen demonstrativum, numquam contingit convenienter respondere per 'coloratum'." *Ibid.*, 63, 48 - 64, 51: "Patet igitur quod ad talem quaestionem 'quid est album' convenienter respondetur per 'coloratum', et propter hoc 'coloratum' potest dici genus, large sumendo genus." *SL I, cap. 12, 43, 59 - 44, 69*: "Intentio autem secunda est illa quae est signum talium intentionum primarum, cuiusmodi sunt tales intentiones 'genus', 'species' et huiusmodi. ... Similiter sic dicendo 'lapis est genus', 'animal est genus', 'color est genus', et sic de aliis, praedicatur una intentio de intentionibus, ad modum quo in talibus 'homo est nomen', 'asinus est nomen', 'albedo est nomen' praedicatur unum nomen de diversis nominibus."

⁴⁹ *SL I, cap. 5, 16, 13 - 17, 23*: "Nominum autem concretorum et abstractorum multi sunt modi. Quandoque enim concretum aliquam rem significat vel connotat sive importat seu dat intelligere, pro qua etiam supponit, quam abstractum nullo modo significat nec per consequens aliquo modo supponit pro eadem, sicut se habent 'iustus' et 'iustitia', 'album' et 'albedo' et consimilia. Nam 'iustus' vere supponit pro homine quando dicitur 'iustus est virtuosus'; non enim potest supponere pro iustitia, quia iustitia quamvis sit virtus non tamen est virtuosa. Hoc nomen vero 'iustitia' supponit pro qualitate et non pro homine. Et propter hoc accidit quod praedicatio talis concreti de abstracto est impossibilis, quia semper concretum tale et abstractum pro distinctis rebus supponunt."

can be called virtuous when it signifies a single habit of the will: the virtue of justice is the virtuous habit of the will.⁵⁰

As the example of the terms 'just' (*iustus*) and 'justice' (*iustitia*) in the quotation above shows, the term 'virtuous' can also refer to a person who has a virtue: "'Just' really supposits for man when one says that 'the just is virtuous.'" A person is called virtuous if some virtue (originated from the acts of will) disposes him to action in accord with a virtue.⁵¹ Man is virtuous when he is just; he is called just only if one can say about him that he will act justly.⁵²

According to Ockham, "no acquired habit is in itself laudable or blamable."⁵³ Since a virtue in itself is not laudable, it is not in itself virtuous.⁵⁴ Ockham's view can be understood to include two important points which he will incorporate in his concept of virtue. The first is that, from the point of view of moral action, virtues do not have value in themselves. The second is that the existence of a virtue does not belong to the criteria of the moral goodness of the act of will.

There is no virtue which should be desired merely for its own sake. Ockham would say that to desire virtue merely for its own sake is to misunderstand its use.⁵⁵ Virtue is thus correctly

⁵⁰ See *Quodl.* III, q. 18, 273, 14-18.

⁵¹ See III *Sent.*, q. 12, 417, 1-13.

⁵² *Quodl.* III, q. 18, 274, 37-38: "Nam actus iustitiae est velle tales operationes debito modo exercere." III *Sent.*, q. 11, 390, 4-6: "...voluntas denominatur bona vel mala mediante actu, et aliquando actus etiam denominantur denominatione extrinseca."

⁵³ I *Sent.*, d. 17, q. 2, 471, 9-10: "Sed nullus habitus acquisitus est de se laudabilis nec vituperabilis."

⁵⁴ Compare with III *Sent.*, q. 11, 366, 2-4: "...sed solus actus voluntatis est virtuosus. Probatur: quia solus actus voluntatis est laudabilis vel vituperabilis; igitur solus ille est virtuosus."

⁵⁵ I *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, 390, 5-12: "Nunc autem Deo contingit abuti sed nullo modo contingit eo uti, quia nullus potest eo ordinate uti. Tamen quocumque contingit ordinate uti, contingit abuti, quia quidquid potest esse obiectum usus ordinati, potest esse obiectum abusus. Et quando dicitur quod 'virtutibus non contingit abuti', dico quod virtutibus contingit abuti sicut obiectis. Qui enim

understood used only as a medium for good action - virtues are useful from the point of view of living well.⁵⁶ They help us to elect laudable action.⁵⁷ A virtue of will is helpful in regard to virtuous action in two ways. On the one hand, a virtue calls forth virtuous passions and restrains the vicious ones. These passions are acts of sensitive appetite, and they are said to be the object of the virtuous habit of will. On the other hand, a virtue makes one inclined to will such acts which one should do. In this case, exterior acts are said to be the object of the virtuous habit of will.⁵⁸

A virtue is caused by the virtuous acts of will. It is a desired result from morally good action (a virtue as a medium). Still, Ockham does not place it among the criteria of the moral goodness of the act of will. Ockham uses the connotative term 'virtuous' so that an act of will which fulfils certain criteria is called virtuous irrespective of whether the term connotes the virtue that a person actually has or not.⁵⁹ Ockham thinks that the possession of a virtue does not guarantee that the owner of the virtue acts in accordance with that virtue. The moral virtue causes an inclination to virtuous action, but it cannot determine the will - the will as a

desideraret caritatem propter se tamquam propter finem ultimum summe amatum, abuteretur caritate, et sic de aliis virtutibus." I *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, 447, 15-18: "...illo est fruendum quod est propter se diligendum et non propter aliud. Nunc autem bona honesta, sicut virtutes et huiusmodi, non tantum propter se sunt diligenda sed etiam propter aliud, et ideo illis non est fruendum."

See also I *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, 377, 5-13.

⁵⁶ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 390, 12-14: "...omnis potentia quae circumscripta operatione cuiuslibet alterius potentiae bene potest agere et male, indiget habitu virtuoso dirigente." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. II, 331, 30-33: "Et isto modo prudentia non est una notitia tantum, sed includit tot notitias quot sunt virtutes morales requisitae ad simpliciter bene vivere, quia quaelibet virtus moralis habet propriam prudentiam et notitiam directivam."

⁵⁷ Compare with *Quodl.* II, q. 16, 182, 9-13: "...habitus virtuosus' dupliciter accipitur: uno modo, pro aliquo habitu qui mediante cognitione et potentia cuius est habitus, sufficit ad eliciendum actum laudabilem, et qui nullo modo est elicivus actus vituperabilis..."

⁵⁸ *Quodl.* II, q. 15, 181, 74-76; III *Sent.*, q. 12, 417, 7-13; *Quodl.* III, q. 18, 274, 28-41, 275, 46-51.

⁵⁹ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 366, 1-5; *ibid.*, 373, 8 - 374, 18; *ibid.*, 381, 16 - 382, 7; III *Sent.*, q. 12, 416, 10-15; *Quodl.* III, q. 20, 284, 60-62.

free power can always elicit its act against the inclination of the virtue.⁶⁰ This explains why Ockham leaves virtue out of the criteria.

According to Ockham, a virtue originates from the virtuous acts of will of which at least the first one is virtuous without being the act of a virtue in the will.⁶¹ When God created human beings, He gave them the powers of will and intellect; they form the sufficient principles for virtuous action. Since human beings have the ability to act in a morally good way, they also have the ability to acquire virtues.⁶²

What has been discussed in this section can be summarized as follows. Moral virtues are produced by virtuous acts of will; therefore, they are called virtuous habits of will. As such they make the will inclined to virtuous action but do not determine the will, which is free to act or not to act in accord with the virtue. Moral virtues, then, are useful for men, although they do not

⁶⁰ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 363, 5-14: "...quando arguit (Scotus) sic quod voluntas potest elicere actum bene et male ita quod ad neutrum determinatur, igitur indiget habitu determinante - non valet - quia sicut voluntas potest elicere primum actum suum propter libertatem suam bene et male quia propter finem laudabilem vel vituperabilem sine omni habitu praevio, quia ante primum actum voluntatis non est habitus in voluntate, ita potest elicere secundum, tertium, quartum et sic deinceps, stante eadem libertate et indeterminatione propter finem laudabilem vel vituperabilem sine omni habitu praevio." *Ibid.*, 364, 19 - 365, 2: "Nec oportet ponere habitum virtuosum in voluntate quia voluntas aliquando difficilius inclinatur ad actum virtuosum quam alias, quia hoc potest accidere propter passiones existentes in parte sensitiva et habitus existentes ibi."

See also *Quodl.* II, q. 13, 175, 196 - 176, 222; II *Sent.*, q. 15, 340, 21-23.

⁶¹ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 363, 8-14. Kent 1986, 135: "Scotus and Ockham are more concerned to establish that the will remains free *after* acquiring virtues. Because virtuous habits are generated from good choices, the will must be able to choose rightly without already having virtue. (If it could not, it would be incapable of the acts which generate virtues.) Once virtuous habits have been acquired, they still do not determine the will to like actions."

⁶² IV *Sent.*, q. 5, 51, 8-15: "Exemplum: Deus, creando hominem, dat sibi principium respectu actus sciendi et volendi, quia intellectum et voluntatem, et tamen non oportet quod det sibi habitus per quos potest faciliter in talia opera, sed sufficit quod det sibi potestatem acquirendi tales habitus. Ita in proposito, quando dat sibi principia per quae potest simpliciter in opera virtuosa et meritoria, non oportet quod det sibi omnia per quae potest in illa opera prompte et expedite, sed sufficit quod det sibi potestatem acquirendi sibi talia."

guarantee that a person act in a virtuous way. Aristotle emphasizes that a person acting virtuously should act from a fixed and permanent disposition.⁶³ Ockham does not share Aristotle's view of man who should be good (virtuous) in order to perform morally good acts.⁶⁴

4 *Denominative Predication and the Uses of the Term 'Virtuous'*

The uses of the term 'virtuous' discussed above are connected with Ockham's conception of denominative predication. I will discuss the theme in three parts. First I will make some remarks on denominative terms against the background of Ockham's basic division between absolute and connotative terms. The subsequent discussion concerns Ockham's conception of denominative predication and its applications to the different uses of the term 'virtuous'. In the last part I will reconsider the relationship between an extrinsically and intrinsically virtuous act of will.

According to Ockham, absolute names or concepts signify everything that they signify *aeque primo*. Connotative names, on the other hand, are said to signify primarily something and secondarily something else. Connotative names have nominal definitions in which, Ockham says, one name is usually put in the nominative case (*in recto*) and another in one of the oblique cases (*in obliquo*).⁶⁵ 'White' is Ockham's favourite example of a connotative term. Its nominal definition could be 'something which has whiteness'. 'Man' is an absolute name. Absolute names signify substances or qualities inhering in them. There are no

⁶³ See Aristotle, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, transl. J. A. K. Thomson, 1976, 97.

⁶⁴ Kent writes on Aristotle's conception: "In brief, one need not be virtuous to do a virtuous deed. One need only be virtuous to do a virtuous deed as the virtuous man would do it" (Kent 1984, 450).

⁶⁵ *SL I, cap. 10; Quodl. V, q. 25.*

combinations of better known terms which would serve as their nominal definitions.⁶⁶

Although Ockham thinks that in most cases the nominal definition of connotative terms contains a name in an oblique case, he also says that instead of it, there can be names in a nominative case with a negation.⁶⁷

In his exposition of Aristotle's *Sophistici elenchi*, Ockham makes a distinction between connotative terms in a wide sense and in a strict sense of the word. The former class (*large*) includes relative terms and connotative terms which are connotative in the strict sense of the word.⁶⁸ The latter class (*stricte*) includes connotative terms in the strict sense of the word, and they are divided into two

⁶⁶ *SL* III-2, *cap.* 28, 555, 6 - 556, 39: "Est autem primo sciendum quod definitionum quaedam est definitio exprimens quid nominis et quaedam est definitio exprimens quid rei. Definitio exprimens quid rei est illa definitio quae non est necessaria disputanti scienti significatum vocabuli; sicut ad hoc quod aliquis sciat quid significat hoc nomen 'homo', non est necessarium scire quod homo componitur ex tot partibus vel ex talibus partibus. ... Aliae sunt definitiones importantes quid nominis, quae non sunt nisi orationes exprimentes quid significant nomina. Et tales definitiones propriissime sunt nominum negativorum et connotativorum et respectivorum, sicut ista definitio 'habens albedinem' sive 'informatum albedine' non exprimit nisi quid significat hoc nomen 'album'. Unde ista definitio est necessaria cuilibet cum alio disputanti."

⁶⁷ *SL* III-3, *cap.* 26, 691, 40-48: "Connotativa definiuntur per sua subiecta sumpta in recto et per nomina connotatorum sumpta in obliquo, vel per verba; sicut quantitas definitur sic 'quantitas est res habens partes'. ... Privationes et negationes definiuntur per positiva eis opposita; sicut caecitas definitur per visum, non-homo per hominem, sic 'res quae non est homo'."

See also *SL* III-2, *cap.* 33, 568-570.

⁶⁸ *Exp. Elench.*, *lib.* II, *cap.* 16, 301, 59 - 302, 71: "...ad sciendum quomodo distinguuntur est sciendum quod nomen connotativum dupliciter accipitur, scilicet *large* et *stricte*. *Large* omne nomen vocatur connotativum in cuius definitione ponitur aliquid in recto et aliquid in obliquo, vel verbum vel alia pars orationis. Sicut si quaeratur quid est 'album', potest responderi quod est 'aliquid informatum albedine', - hic ponitur hoc nomen 'aliquid' in recto et hoc nomen 'albedine' in obliquo -; si quaeratur quid est 'activum', responderi potest quod est 'aliquid potens agere', - hic ponitur nomen et verbum. Et similiter potest dici de aliis. Isto modo accipiendo hunc terminum 'nomen connotativum', est in plus quam 'nomen relativum'; quia omne nomen relativum est nomen connotativum, sicut patet per praedictam descriptionem nominis connotativi, sed non omne nomen connotativum est nomen relativum, sicut patebit." *Ibid.*, 302, 95-97: Omnia autem nomina connotativa, *large* accipiendo connotativum, praeter ista quae *stricte* vocantur connotativa, sunt nomina relativa. Ex quo patet distinctio inter nomina relativa et connotativa."

groups. The first group consists of concrete names in whose nominal definitions one name is *in recto* and one name *in obliquo*, namely the abstract name which imports a thing existing in that of which the concrete name is predicated. The second group consists of names like quantity, quality, and figure, whose nominal definitions contain names *in recto* and *in obliquo*, but the name in an oblique case cannot be directly added to the connotative term.⁶⁹

The description of the first group of the class of the strictly connotative terms shows similarities to what Ockham calls Boethius's view of denominative terms. In this theory, 'just' is called a denominative term because that which is just participates in the thing called justice and it participates in the name 'just' and the name 'just' differs from the name 'justice' only by having a different ending.⁷⁰

Ockham says that the Boethian account of a denominative term defines the strictest sense of the word (*strictissime*). A denominative term in this sense has an abstract correlate which imports an accident, formally inhering in another, and a denominative term as a predicate differs from the abstract term,

⁶⁹ *Exp. Elench.*, lib. II, cap. 16, 302, 72-87: "Aliter accipitur nomen connotativum stricte, et sic nomen connotativum est aliquid in cuius definitione exprimente quid nominis ponitur aliquid in recto, et aliquid in obliquo quod est suum abstractum importans rem existentem in illo de quo praedicatur concretum. Vel ponitur aliquid aliud in obliquo quod non potest convenienter immediate addi definito. Exemplum primi: omnia talia nomina 'album', 'frigidum', 'dulce', 'sapiens', 'rationale', 'animatum' et huiusmodi, sunt nomina connotativa; quia in definitionibus eorum ponitur aliquid in recto et sua abstracta in obliquo, quae abstracta important res existentes in illis de quibus praedicantur concreta; sicut in istis 'aliquid informatum albedine', 'aliquid informatum calore', 'aliquid habens animam', 'aliquid habens rationalitatem' - ut rationalitas sit idem quod anima intellectiva. Si autem aliquando hoc non contingit, hoc est propter penuriam nominum quae nobis deficiunt. Exemplum secundi: omnia talia nomina sunt connotativa, 'quantitas', 'qualitas', 'figura', 'motus', 'tempus' et huiusmodi."

⁷⁰ *Exp. Praedic. Aristot.*, cap. 3, 144, 9 - 145, 16: "Intelligendum est, secundum Boethium, quod ad nomen denominativum tria requiruntur. Primo enim requiritur quod aliquid participet re; secundo quod nomine; tertio quod sit quaedam transfiguratio nominis, hoc est, quod sit alia terminatio nominis principalis et nominis denominativi. Verbi gratia aliquis habet iustitiam et ita participat re ipsa; et similiter participat nomine, quia vere dicitur iustus; et hic est, tertio, diversa transfiguratio et terminatio nominis. Si enim aliquid istorum deficiat, non est vere denominativum."

which could be added to it, by being in another case.⁷¹ According to Ockham, the class of denominative terms in the strictest sense of the word is included in the class of denominative terms in the strict sense of the word (*stricte*). The difference between these is that in the latter case it is not explicitly said that what is imported by the abstract term is an accident.⁷² What is said about the first group of the strictly connotative terms in the exposition of Aristotle's *Sophistici elenchi* is the same as what Ockham says here about denominative terms in the strict sense of the word.

In his *Summa logicae*, Ockham draws a distinction between two kinds of denominative terms as follows:

In the narrow sense a term is denominative if, first, it begins with the same sound as an abstract term but has a different ending and, second, it signifies some accident. Thus, 'brave' is denominative with respect to 'bravery' and 'just' is denominative with respect to 'justice'. In a broad sense a term is said to be denominative if it has the same stem as an abstract term but a different ending. In this sense it is irrelevant whether the term signifies an accident. Thus 'souled' is denominative with respect to 'soul' (*SL I, cap. 13, 47, 75-81*).⁷³

I would like to suggest that in Ockham's view the term 'virtuous' is denominative with respect to the term 'virtuositas' in the broad sense just mentioned - although, as far as I know, Ockham uses the

⁷¹ *Exp. Praedic. Aristot., cap. 3, 147, 88-93*: "Strictissime dicitur denominativum cui correspondet aliquod abstractum importans accidens formaliter inhaerens alteri, et quod differt ab abstracto solo casu. Et isto modo accipit hic forte Philosophus denominativum; similiter etiam Boethius. Unde dicit quod tria requiruntur ad denominativum, scilicet quod participet re et nomine et quod sit nominis transfiguratio."

On "denomination, connotation and Ockham's innovation in the theory of signification" see Klima 1990.

⁷² *Exp. Praedic. Aristot., cap. 3, 146, 69-70, 147, 84-87*: "Verumtamen sciendum quod denominativum multipliciter accipitur, scilicet large, stricte et strictissime. ... Secundo modo dicitur denominativum cui correspondet abstractum differens sola terminatione, importans rem in alio formaliter existentem et ab eo totaliter differentem; et isto modo dicitur materia formata a forma."

⁷³ *SL I, cap. 13, 47, 75-81*: "Terminus autem denominativus, ad praesens, dupliciter potest accipi, scilicet stricte, et sic terminus incipiens sicut abstractum incipit et non habens consimilem finem et significans accidens dicitur terminus denominativus, sicut a 'fortitudine' 'fortis', a 'iustitia' 'iustus'. Aliter dicitur large terminus habens consimile principium cum abstracto, sed non consimilem finem, sive significet accidens sive non, sicut ab 'anima' dicitur 'animatus'." (The translation is from *Loux, Ockham, 77*.)

On accident see *SL I, cap. 25*.

term '*virtuositas*' only once when discussing the opinion that the first *virtuositas* of a moral act belongs to the right reason and not to the will. In his answer, Ockham no longer uses the term '*virtuositas*' but the term '*prima bonitas*'. Ockham claims that *prima bonitas* or (*virtuositas*) is the act of will which is primarily morally good (*primo bonus moraliter*) or primarily virtuous (*virtuosus*).⁷⁴ Thus, when 'virtuous' (or 'morally good') is predicated of an act of will, the term 'virtuous' (or 'morally good') is thought to be denominative with respect to the term '*virtuositas*' (or 'moral goodness').⁷⁵

Ockham made different classifications concerning the ways of understanding denominative predication (*predicatio denominativa*).⁷⁶ A predicate in these classifications is taken to be a denominative term in the broad sense of the word: the term can be thought to have an abstract correlate which either signifies an accident or not,

⁷⁴ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 372, 16-19: "... nullus actus est virtuosus vel vitiosus nisi quia est conformis vel difformis rectae rationi. Igitur prima virtuositas actus moralis erit in ratione recta et non in voluntate, - patet." *Ibid.*, 389, 18 - 390, 4: "Ad aliud dico quod ex hoc quod praecise est conformis rationis rectae non est virtuosus, quia si Deus faceret in voluntate mea actum conformem rationi rectae, voluntate nihil agente, non esset ille actus meritorius nec virtuosus. Et ideo requiritur ad bonitatem actus quod sit in potestate voluntatis habentis illum actum. Similiter, non plus est actus virtuosus propter rectam rationem quam propter finem vel aliam circumstantiam, quia sicut recta ratio est obiectum partiale actus virtuosus vel vitiosus, ita finis et tempus aliquando. Et tamen nullus ponit quod prima bonitas actus est a fine vel a tempore, sed solum actus voluntatis qui primo est imputabilis est primo bonus vel malus moraliter."

⁷⁵ D. P. Henry says that for the later medievals each shared name, like '*virtuosus*', had an abstract correlate at least in principle (see Henry 1967, 67-68). It is plausible that '*virtuositas*' is the abstract correlate of '*virtuosus*' which Ockham had in mind.

⁷⁶ III *Sent.*, q. 10, 317, 18 - 318, 2: "...triplex est praedicatio: univoca, aequivoca et denominativa. Denominativa autem distinguitur ulterius, quia potest accipi largissime, stricte et strictissime."

I *Sent.*, d. 2, q. 9, 330, 14-25: "...Aliter accipitur praedicatio denominativa magis proprie... - Tertio modo dicitur magis proprie praedicatio denominativa... - Quarto modo dicitur praedicatio denominativa strictissime..."

Exp. Praedic. Aristot., cap. 3, 146, 45-70: "Notandum est hic quod praedicatio denominativa non est aliquid simpliciter distinctum a praedicatione univoca et aequivoca, sed quaedam est univoca et quaedam aequivoca... Verumtamen sciendum quod denominativum multipliciter accipitur, scilicet large, stricte et strictissime."

depending on the actual case. Furthermore, two basic ways of understanding denominative predication are distinguished in the classifications. In the narrow consideration of denominative predication, the thing (accident or not) signified by the abstract term inheres in the subject of which the term in its concrete form is predicated. In the broad sense of denominative predication, it is not supposed that something is inhering in the subject.⁷⁷

The broad sense of denominative predication allows a denominative term to be also a relative term.⁷⁸ It is always possible to add to the predication of a relative term such an expression which is in the oblique case and which is not the abstract correlate of the term. It is also true that a relative term has (or can be thought to have) an abstract correlate from which it differs only in its ending; in this sense a relative term fulfils the requirements for being a denominative term.

The classification presented in III *Sent.*, q. 10 is the most useful when looking for the applications of the theory of denominative predication to the uses of the term 'virtuous'. In the strictest sense (*strictissime*) a predicate term imports something - probably an accident, although Ockham does not explicitly say so - which is distinct from the subject and inheres in it. There is another case

⁷⁷ III *Sent.*, q. 10, 317, 19 - 318, 18; I *Sent.*, d. 2, q. 9, 330, 14 - 331, 3; *Exp. Praedic. Aristot.*, cap. 3, 146, 70 - 147, 90.

⁷⁸ *Exp. Praedic. Aristot.*, cap. 3, 146, 70 - 147, 75: "Large dicitur omne concretum cui correspondet aliquod abstractum, sive illud abstractum significet rem formaliter inhaerentem illi de quo vel pro quo praedicatur suum concretum sive non. Et isto modo omnia nomina relativa concreta sunt denominativa, quia vere praedicantur, et differunt sola terminatione a nominibus abstractis quae sunt nomina principalia."

All relative terms are connotative terms, but not *vice versa* (see *Quodl. V*, q. 25, 583, 12-13). The difference between connotative non relative and connotative relative terms can be described as follows: "Sed sciendum est quod talia nomina quibus convenienter potest addi casus obliquus sunt in duplici differentia. Quaedam enim sunt quibus semper, quandocumque vere praedicantur de aliquo, convenienter addi potest sibi solum suum abstractum... Sed talia, quamvis ponantur connotativa, non tamen dicuntur relativa. Alia nomina sunt quae non possunt de aliquo verificari nisi convenienter et vere possint addi eis nomina, non abstracta eorum, sed alii casus obliqui qui non sunt eorum abstracta... Et ista vocantur relativa 'secundum esse', quia scilicet impossibile est quod verificentur de aliquo nisi tunc eis convenienter possit addi casus obliquus" (*SL I*, cap. 52, 171, 10 - 172, 26). See also *Quodl. V*, q. 25, 584, 34-46.

in which a predicate term imports something distinct from the subject and the thing imported does not inhere in the subject. This is called the largest case of denominative predication (*largissime*). In this case a predicate term connotes something which has existence (*habet esse*) effectively by the subject or it primarily signifies something else, as in this: 'God is creative'. The predication can be called extrinsic because a predicate term imports something extrinsic with respect to the subject term and does not inhere in it. In the case between these two extremes, a predicate term imports the material or formal part of the subject so that the term in its concrete form is predicated of the whole subject. This predication (*stricte*) is called intrinsic, since what is imported by the predicate term belongs intrinsically and *per se* to what is imported by the subject term.⁷⁹ Essential differences are predicated in this strict sense of denominative predication. 'Rational' signifies primarily man, viz., it signifies the entirety which has as its part the intellective soul and the body. 'Rational' imports its part, viz., the intellective soul, and its abstract correlate 'rationality' also imports the intellective soul, though not in the same way.⁸⁰

The term 'virtuous' seems to be denominative in different ways depending on the subject of which it is predicated. When the term is predicated of an exterior act, the act is denominated virtuous extrinsically, i.e., the term 'virtuous' in this case connotes the

⁷⁹ III *Sent.*, q. 10, 317, 19 - 318, 18: "Denominativa autem distinguitur ulterius, quia potest accipi largissime, stricte et strictissime. Largissime accipitur quando praedicatum importat rem totaliter distinctam a subiecto et non inhaerentem sibi, sed connotat aliquid quod habet esse a subiecto effective, vel significat principaliter aliud, ut hic 'Deus est creativus'. Alio modo accipitur stricte quando praedicatum significat partem subiecti materialem vel formalem quae praedicatur de toto in concreto. Et illa est praedicatio denominativa de qua dicit Philosophus in Praedicamentis quod denominativa sunt quaecumque solo casu, id est, terminatione vocis, differunt, ut 'grammatica', 'grammaticus'. Et hoc modo dicitur homo 'rationalis', 'animatus', 'materialis', denominative. Et quod sic praedicatur denominative, praedicatur primo modo dicendi per se, quia praedicatur quod natum est praedicari et subicitur quod natum est subici, et importatum per praedicatum non est extrinsecum sed intrinsecum illi quod importatur per subiectum. Tertio modo accipitur strictissime, quando praedicatum importat aliquid realiter distinctum a subiecto et inhaerens subiecto. Exemplum 'homo est albus'."

⁸⁰ See *SL I*, cap. 26, 85, 21-39.

intrinsically virtuous act of will, which is distinct from the exterior act and with respect to which the exterior act is called virtuous. The extrinsically virtuous exterior act does not have a moral goodness of its own; it is virtuous by being produced by the interior virtuous act of will. The term 'virtuous' is thus predicated of an exterior act in accordance with denominative predication called *largissime* in III *Sent.*, q. 10. Ockham seems to use the term 'virtuous' in connection with exterior acts like a connotative relative term. As a person cannot be called a father if there is no one whose father he is, an exterior act cannot be called virtuous if there is no such virtuous interior act in virtue of which the exterior act is virtuous.⁸¹

The term 'virtuous' is primarily applied to acts and of them to acts of will. Those acts of will which are in themselves indifferent can be called virtuous by extrinsic denomination, too.⁸² When the term 'virtuous' is predicated of an indifferent act of will, it imports the intrinsically virtuous act of will which is distinct from the indifferent act of will and in virtue of which the indifferent act of will is called extrinsically virtuous. This extrinsic denomination is the same which is applied to exterior acts, i.e., the case of *largissime* in III *Sent.*, q. 10.

In some places Ockham uses this model where an indifferent act of will and an intrinsically virtuous act of will are treated as two different acts which are in relation to each other.⁸³ In addition to this approach, there is in Ockham another model where an act of will in itself indifferent and an act of will in itself virtuous are

⁸¹ III *Sent.*, q. 7, 215, 10-21: "Et est sciendum hic quod aliquando vox vel conceptus significat aliquid principaliter et connotat aliud, ita quod principale significatum illius nominis vel conceptus capit denominationem illius conceptus significantis, sive connotatum existat sive non; aliquando non denominatur nisi connotatum existat. Exemplum primi...Exemplum secundi: paternitas, negando relationem, significat patrem connotando filium. Et homo non denominatur pater realiter nisi quando actu existit filius, et sic est generaliter in istis conceptibus ubi ab aliis ponuntur relationes, sicut simile, etc."

See also *SL* I, cap. 49, 155, 29-36.

⁸² See for example III *Sent.*, q. 11, 385, 19 - 386, 11.

⁸³ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 385, 19 - 386, 11; *Quodl.* III, q. 15, 260, 67-71; *Quodl.* I, q. 18, 96, 59-65.

comprehended as one complex act of will (a conscious election of something for the sake of loving God) which is intrinsically virtuous.⁸⁴ How is the term 'virtuous' predicated of this complex act of will? Ockham says in III *Sent.*, q. 10 that when something is predicated denominatively in the strict sense, the predicate term imports the material or formal part of the subject so that the term in its concrete form is predicated of the whole subject. This could be applied to the case of the intrinsically virtuous complex act as follows. The predicate term imports the (formal) part of the act of will so that the term 'virtuous' is predicated of the whole act of will. 'Virtuous' signifies primarily the act of will which consists of two parts, and it signifies secondarily the one of these parts. As already stated (III A 1), an intrinsically virtuous act of will is an act by which God is loved above all and for Himself. This kind of act consists of two parts in the sense that the content of this act is conjunctive: it is an act of willing to fulfil a particular precept *qua* a precept of moral law and an act of willing to do a deed by which that precept is fulfilled. When 'virtuous' connotes one part of the act of will, it connotes that part of the conjunctive which can be spelt out as an act of willing to fulfil the law (given by God and known by right reason). In other words, when 'virtuous' connotes one part of the act of will, it connotes the necessarily virtuous intention which is an act of will and which is the same in every intrinsically virtuous act of will.

If what is presented above is a correct analysis of an act of will as intrinsically virtuous, it means that the act of willing to fulfil the law forms one part of a complex act which has *prima bonitas* or *virtuositas* as its essential difference. I think that the analysis is in any case elucidative because it shows nicely what is meant by an act as intrinsically virtuous in Ockham's ethics. When 'virtuous' is predicated intrinsically of an act of will, the predication is intrinsic because 'virtuous' does not import anything that the complex act of will does not also import, that is to say, the term 'virtuous' does

⁸⁴ *Quodl.* III, q. 16, 267, 129-137; *ibid.*, 265, 75-91; *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. I, 328, 124-128; *ibid.*, art. II, 338, 200-203.

not refer to any other act but just to this complex act of will of which the term is predicated. Thus, it seems that an act of willing to fulfil the law is never an act which is virtuous alone. I shall discuss this theme more later on.

'Intrinsically virtuous' is a technical expression for Ockham. He uses the term 'intrinsically' in contradistinction to the term 'extrinsically'. An act which is virtuous extrinsically is virtuous with respect to another act. An act which is virtuous intrinsically is not virtuous due to any other act but is virtuous in itself or essentially. When the term 'intrinsic' is used in this way, there seems to be no problem in calling certain acts of will intrinsically virtuous in Ockham's ethics.⁸⁵

I have argued that a complex act of will is called virtuous intrinsically with respect to its part which is the act of willing to fulfil the divine law. Now I want to consider in what way this part of a complex act is called virtuous. It does not seem to be so clear that Ockham thinks of *prima bonitas* as a kind of *res* inhering in the part of the complex act of will. Another approach to Ockham's conception of *prima bonitas* is to consider it from the point of view of relation. Accordingly, the act of willing to fulfil the law or the act of willing to obey God - being the part of some complex act of will - is the act whose *bonitas* is a relation, and more precisely, an intrinsic relation.⁸⁶ This conception is supported by Ockham's view of '*bonitas moralis*' as a connotative term. The term connotes that

⁸⁵ Adams and Wood discuss in their article the problem of calling acts intrinsically or necessarily good in Ockham's ethics. On the basis of what they say, it is obvious that the term 'intrinsically' has not been understood by them as a technical expression (see Adams and Wood 1981, 12-14, 18-29).

⁸⁶ Adams writes in her book of *William Ockham* on the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic relations: "Thus, a relation is said to be intrinsic, if it is logically impossible for the extremes to exist and the relation and/or its co-relation not to obtain. But a relation is extrinsic, if it is logically possible for the extremes to exist and the relation and its co-relation not to obtain" (Adams 1987, 217.)

an agent is obligated to some act. The connotation of the term shows that it is a relational term.⁸⁷

According to Ockham, relations are not things distinct from absolute things (substances or qualities).⁸⁸ Therefore he could have said the following of the name '*bonitas moralis*'. It is a connotative term that primarily signifies an intrinsically virtuous act of will (which is a complex act) connoting that the agent is obligated to this act.⁸⁹ Just as '*bonitas*' primarily signifies the act which is not virtuous or vicious, '*bonitas moralis*' also directly refers to an act but now to the act which is intrinsically virtuous.

If '*prima bonitas*' is taken to be a relation term, it has to signify one of the *relata* primarily and connote the other, and it must connote that the *relata* exist in a certain way.⁹⁰ Furthermore, if '*prima bonitas*' is taken to be a relation term in the sense of an intrinsic relation, the relation cannot fail to obtain given the existence of their *relata*.⁹¹ The moral goodness of a virtuous act

⁸⁷ II *Sent.*, q. 15, 353, 15-16: "...bonitas moralis vel malitia connotant quod agens obligatur ad illum actum vel eius oppositum..."

As far as I know, Ockham does not explicitly call '*bonitas*' or '*bonitas moralis*' a relative term, but, on the other hand, he himself refers to a usual practice of calling relative names connotative: "...Sancti frequenter vocant nomina relativa nomina connotativa" (I *Sent.*, d. 18, q. *unica*, 577, 20-21). Calling a term connotative can then quite well imply its being relative.

⁸⁸ I *Sent.*, d. 18, q. *unica*, 577, 21 - 578, 6: "Et similiter Philosophus sic accipit, volens quod aliqua nomina sunt 'ad aliquid', hoc est connotant aliquid aliud praeter illud quod principaliter significant. Et ideo dicunt aliquid referri quando tale nomen connotativum de eo praedicatur, quamvis tale nomen nihil nisi absolutum significet, et per consequens non significat aliquem respectum qui quocumque modo differt ab omnibus absolutis."

See also Adams 1987, 224-225.

⁸⁹ Compare with III *Sent.*, q. 11, 389, 1-5: "Sed tantum est bonitas illa nomen vel conceptus connotativus, significans principaliter ipsum actum sic neutrum, connotans actum voluntatis perfecte virtuosum et rectam rationem quibus conformiter elicitur. Ideo denominatur virtuosus talis actus denominatione extrinseca."

⁹⁰ Compare with Adams 1987, 251: "According to Ockham, unaided natural reason would hold that relation terms are connotative terms that signify both *relata*, or signify one primarily and connote the other, and connote that the *relata* exist in a certain way."

⁹¹ Adams 1987, 225: "...it is logically impossible that two white things exist without being similar. Ockham concludes that similarity must not be a thing really distinct from absolute things and naturally posterior to them. The same

would then be its being in conformity with God's precept. Given the facts (relata) that God wills that a person obey Him by doing a certain deed and that a person also wills that he obey God through this deed, the relation, i.e., the moral goodness or the person's act of will in conformity with divine will, cannot fail to obtain.⁹² The view of moral goodness as a relation does not seem to be very far from the view of moral goodness as the similarity between divine and human will.

When the term 'virtuous' is predicated of the complex act of will, the abstract correlate of the term can be added after the predicate: the act of will which is intrinsically virtuous is virtuous through *virtuositas* (or moral goodness). In other words, the complex act of will is said to be intrinsically virtuous with respect to its part. This part, again, is said to be virtuous relative to God's law. This being the case, one could also say that the intrinsically virtuous complex act of will is virtuous through being in conformity with a precept.

Some habits of will can also be called necessarily and intrinsically virtuous.⁹³ This could be explained as follows. A necessarily virtuous act of will is the act which cannot be caused by the will without its being virtuous. In the same way, a necessarily virtuous habit of will caused by necessarily virtuous acts cannot make one inclined to acts without their being virtuous. Ockham's view of a habit of will as intrinsically virtuous does not seem to be anything else but a corollary of his view of an act of will as intrinsically virtuous.

argument can be repeated for other intrinsic relations, which cannot fail to obtain given the existence of their relata."

⁹² Ockham writes in *Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. II, 435, 592-593: "Sed voluntas creata...tenetur velle quod Deus vult eam velle."

Freppert 1988, 117: "There are two ways in which a will can conform to another will. First by willing the same thing that is willed by the other will. And secondly, by willing what the other will would will it to will. In Ockham's opinion it is this second way, and only the second way, that constitutes true conformity to the will of God." See also Freppert 1988, 120.

⁹³ *Quodl.* III, q. 14, 257, 96-98: "...solus habitus voluntatis est intrinsece et necessario virtuosus, quia quilibet alius habitus inclinat indifferenter ac actus laudabiles et vituperabiles."

According to Ockham, acts of will can be extrinsically and intrinsically virtuous. I will now return to the question of the relationship between the virtuous acts of will which are in themselves indifferent and the acts of will which are in themselves or intrinsically virtuous. Ockham sometimes treats these acts as two different acts having a special relation to each other, but there are also passages where they are treated as building one complex act which is intrinsically virtuous. My thesis is that these approaches are not incompatible.

Extrinsically virtuous acts of will are discussed by Ockham within the pattern in which an indifferent act and an intrinsically virtuous act are treated as two different acts of will. I think that Ockham needs this pattern for explaining how indifferent acts of will can become morally relevant.⁹⁴ This is illustrated by Ockham's example:

But if, by nature, there can simultaneously be two acts in the will - which I believe is true, as is proved in the first book of the *Commentary on the Sentences* - there can, in this case, be an indifferent act in the will in the way mentioned. For example: if I love some person as such directing my willing to this person and not to any good or bad circumstance, this act is in this case neither morally good nor is it morally bad, but it is indifferent. If I then elicit another act - that (first) act remains as it is - by which I will love this person for God's sake, in conformity with right reason, and in accord with all the other

⁹⁴ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 383, 16 - 384, 1, 385, 10 - 386, 2: "Sed adhuc est dubium, utrum sit aliquis actus indifferens in voluntate sicut in appetitu sensitivo qui potest dici bonus vel malus denominatione extrinseca vel neuter: Respondeo primo quod idem numero non potest primo esse indifferens et post intrinsece bonus vel malus. ... Secundo dico quod si quaeratur utrum aliquis actus voluntatis possit esse indifferens primo ad bonitatem et malitiam et post fieri bonus vel malus denominatione extrinseca sicut actus partis sensitivae, tunc distinguendum est. Quia autem ponitur quod in voluntate possunt esse simul duo actus volendi naturaliter, aut non. ... Si autem duo actus volendi possunt simul esse naturaliter in voluntate, quod credo esse verum sicut in primo probatum est, tunc in voluntate potest esse aliquis actus indifferens modo praedicto."

When an indifferent act of will becomes morally relevant, this is not brought about merely by the co-existence of an act of prudence but a new act of will is required: "...actus potest dici virtuosus vel intrinsece vel extrinsece. Primo modo, impossibile est quod actus indifferens fiat bonus moraliter per coexistentiam actus prudentiae, quia impossibile est quod aliquis actus non virtuosus, per mere naturale fiat virtuosus. Secundo modo, bene potest, sed hoc non erit solum per coexistentiam prudentiae, sed cum hoc per novam volitionem" (*Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. IV, 384, 184-190). Freppert has paid attention to the need for two acts in the will from this point of view; see Freppert 1988, 59-60.

circumstances required, this second act is perfectly and intrinsically virtuous. And the first act, which at the beginning was indifferent, is now virtuous by extrinsic denomination, provided that it is elected in conformity with the perfectly virtuous act and with the right dictate (III *Sent.*, q. 11, 385, 19 - 386, 11).⁹⁵

The act of loving God is in the example identified with a certain kind of volition, viz., with the volition of loving some person for God's sake and in conformity with the right dictate.⁹⁶ This act of will is perfectly and intrinsically virtuous, and according to what is said in the example, it is a new act which comes into being after the first act which already lies in the will. This first act of will is, as such, an indifferent act of loving someone, and it can be denominated extrinsically virtuous. There are then simultaneously two different acts in the will; the first one is in itself indifferent and the second one is intrinsically or in itself virtuous. The indifferent act, which can become extrinsically virtuous, does not change in any way, but the new, intrinsically virtuous act in the will can be said to give an interpretation to the indifferent act: the act of will, indifferent in itself, can be understood as an act of will which is there for the sake of loving God; it is then taken to be an act dictated by God.⁹⁷ The indifferent act is extrinsically virtuous

⁹⁵ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 385, 19 - 386, 11: "Si autem duo actus volendi possunt simul esse naturaliter in voluntate, quod credo esse verum sicut in primo (I *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1) probatum est, tunc in voluntate potest esse aliquis actus indifferens modo praedicto. Exemplum: si enim diligam aliquem hominem absolute, terminando actum volendi ad illum hominem et non ad aliquam circumstantiam bonam vel malam, tunc iste actus non est bonus nec malus moraliter, sed est neuter. Si tunc, stante illo actu, eliciam alium actum quo volo diligere illum hominem propter Deum, secundum rectam rationem et secundum omnes alias circumstantias requisitas, iste secundus actus est perfecte et intrinsece virtuosus. Et primus, qui prius fuit indifferens, nunc est virtuosus denominatione extrinseca quatenus elicitur conformiter actui perfecte virtuoso et recto dictamini."

⁹⁶ *Quodl.* III, q. 14, 257, 87-88: "...hoc est diligere Deum super omnia: diligere quidquid Deus vult diligere..."

⁹⁷ Ockham's expression *propter Deum* or *propter honorem Dei* can be interpreted as the same as the expression *propter praeceptum Dei*. Compare with *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. II, 338, 200-205: "...aliquis actus est intrinsece bonus moraliter, aliquis intrinsece malus et vitiosus... Exemplum primi: velle orare propter honorem Dei et quia praeceptum est a Deo secundum rectam rationem etc. Exemplum secundi: velle orare propter vanam gloriam et quia contra praeceptum Dei et contra rectam rationem."

due to the other, intrinsically virtuous, act. These two acts, considered as a whole, are one intrinsically good act.

The other example used by Ockham also discusses an indifferent act of will and the mode of calling it virtuous:

...no act is morally good or virtuous without attaching to a volition which is willing to follow right reason, or without being caused by such a volition; for example, I will honour my father or keep on honouring him because I will do what the right reason dictates; and in the same way, I will do good for you because I want to do what the reason dictates (*Quodl.* III, q. 15, 260, 67-71).⁹⁸

The structure of this example is quite similar to the previous one, although Ockham does not use the terms 'extrinsically' and 'intrinsically' here. Ockham mentions two acts which are indifferent in themselves: (1) "an act of willing to honour one's father" and (2) "an act of willing to do good to someone". These acts can be understood as volitions for the sake of following right reason. They are then taken to be acts dictated by the right reason, and they are called virtuous due to another virtuous act of will (*actus volendi sequi rectam rationem*).

The formal condition of a virtuous act is the same in both examples: the will has to fulfil what the right reason dictates (conformity with right reason).⁹⁹ In the first example, it is mentioned that a person has an intention of loving God (*propter Deum*) and it is explicitly said that this act of will is intrinsically virtuous. When acts of will are called intrinsically virtuous, the formal condition of a virtuous act is in force in the following context: the will has to fulfil what God commands.

The following example also shows that there are acts of will which are extrinsically and not intrinsically virtuous. A person has in his mind an actual imperative act of going to church. Then, this

⁹⁸ *Quodl.* III, q. 15, 260, 67-71: "...nullus actus est moraliter bonus vel virtuosus, nisi sibi assistat actus volendi sequi rectam rationem, vel quia causatur a tali velle; puta volo honorare patrem vel continuare honorem, quia volo facere quod recta ratio dicit; et similiter volo bene facere tibi, quia volo quod dicit ratio."

⁹⁹ Notice here that according to Ockham it is right to follow even the erroneous reason - provided that it is innocently mistaken - because God wants it to be followed; see *Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. II, 436, 610-613. I shall discuss this later on.

act remaining in power, the will gives a new imperative which says that he should go to church *ad honorem Dei*. It is said that the first act of will is first morally indifferent and then it becomes virtuous. There is no change in the first act itself, which shows that a new act of will, related to the first act, makes the first act virtuous.¹⁰⁰

In the examples discussed above, the basic difference between the two acts in the will is that the first volition is a volition without a morally relevant intention: a person does not have any special reason for her willing, neither good nor bad (she just loves someone or she just wants to go to church, etc.). The second volition produced later is materially the same as the first act of will but what is new and makes the second act different from the first one is a moral intention "informing" the second act of will.¹⁰¹ Thus, in this second volition a person has a reason for her loving or for her willing to go to church, etc.

The program of deontological ethics is depicted in these examples. A virtuous act is always considered as an election for the sake of a dictate. This feature belongs to the structure of acts of will so thoroughly that we could speak of a system of first-order and second-order acts in Ockham's ethics. An act of willing to obey God or an act of willing to fulfil the law seems to represent a second-order act the object of which is the relationship of acts of will to divine commands. The second-order act is then an intrinsically virtuous act of willing to conform all acts of will to God's will. The first-order acts of will are as such neutral and their objects are states of affairs other than acts of will.

An intrinsically virtuous act is a complex act of will consisting of a second-order act and a "material" act in the scope of the

¹⁰⁰ *Quodl.* I, q. 18, 96, 59-65: "Eodem modo est de aliquo actu voluntatis, puta quando voluntas absolute imperat homini quod vadat ad ecclesiam, et non propter aliquem finem bonum vel malum; post stante ista volitione, imperat quod vadat ad honorem Dei et laudem. In isto casu primus actus imperatus est primo actus indifferens, et secundo est virtuosus; et tamen nulla mutatio est in illo actu, licet voluntas eliciat novum actum."

¹⁰¹ According to Ockham, intention is an act of will; see *Quodl.* III, q. 14, 256, 68-71.

second-order act, but it never seems to be this second-order act alone. If we take this to be Ockham's view, we do not need to speak of "at least one act which is necessarily virtuous" and of other acts of will which are "only secondarily necessarily virtuous."¹⁰² The act of loving God (the second-order act) is realized by some means (the first-order act); acts of willing just what God commands represent instances of the necessarily virtuous act of loving God. In other words, an act of willing to fulfil the law or to obey God will be concretized in some way - except if God does not obligate one to any special action; this could be the case by God's absolute power.¹⁰³ However, in the moral order given by God it seems to be that nobody loves God in a virtuous way only by willing generally to do everything that God wills us to do. This is also supported by Ockham's view of effective volition: a person does not really want the goal if he does not want the means without which the goal cannot be achieved. A person elects the means because he wills the goal; for example, he loves John because he wants to obey God.¹⁰⁴ These acts - the election of the means

¹⁰² Freppert 1988, 149: "...there is at least one act which is necessarily virtuous and this is the act of loving God above all and for himself. But it seems he holds that other acts of the will are also necessarily virtuous - but all of these other acts would depend on the condition that the divine precept which commands them remains in force. These other acts are what we have designated as the secondary necessarily virtuous acts. They depend, therefore, on the primary necessarily virtuous act, the love of God. Their goodness is derived from the love of God and obedience to His will. To love God is to obey Him. All other acts of the will except the act of loving God are only secondarily necessarily virtuous."

¹⁰³ I *Sent.*, d. 17, q. 2, 475, 4-7: "Quia posset (Deus) statuere quod paucae sufficerent, puta de potentia sua absoluta posset statuere quod quicumque diligeret Deum super omnia et non faceret scienter contra rectam rationem, quod mereretur vitam aeternam."

¹⁰⁴ III *Sent.*, q. 7, 211, 1-20: "Exemplum: ponamus quod obiectum caritatis sit totum istud: 'Deus et omne quod Deus vult diligere', et quod diligam Deum caritative actu elicitio, ita quod aliquo uno actu diligam Deum et omne quod Deus vult diligere a me, quod est possibile. Si tunc cognoscam per intellectum quod Deus vult Ioannem diligere a me per revelationem vel quamcumque aliam viam, stante prima dilectione in voluntate cum cognitione praedicta, necessario habeo diligere Ioannem actu caritativo. Et ille actus est alius a primo, quia possunt separari. Et unus praecedit alium. Et unus, scilicet secundus, est praecise respectu unius incomplexi, puta Ioannis; alius, puta primus, non. Omnia ista

and the willing of the goal - are separable in the structure of moral action only in the sense that the intention or the act of willing the goal primarily consists in having merit, because it is properly a free act of will.¹⁰⁵ A person shows his obedience to God (the goal) by having such volitions (the means) that God wants him to have.

I have stated that Ockham needs "the pattern of two separate acts in the will" in order to explain how indifferent acts of will can become morally relevant. According to Ockham, most acts of will are indifferent acts.¹⁰⁶ It is clear that any act of this kind must be "free" to become virtuous (extrinsically) in the moral action of a person who wills that all his volitions would be such as God wills them to be (the second-order act). Thus, all indifferent acts of will are such that they could fall *sub praecepto divino*.

If a person already has some indifferent act of will, it may be that all she needs in order to have a morally good act of will is an act of willing to *continue* this already existing indifferent act of

arguunt distinctionem inter illos actus, et tamen voluntas non est libera respectu secundi actus, stante primo actu cum apprehensione praedicta. Quia impossibile est quod uno actu diligam Deum et omne quod Deus vult diligi a me in generali, et quod sciam quod Deus vult Ioannem diligi a me, nisi diligam Ioannem in speciali, quia contradictio est dicere oppositum. Et tunc, licet in primo actu voluntatis consistat meritum, quia est in potestate voluntatis, non tamen in secundo actu qui non est in potestate voluntatis."

¹⁰⁵ Compare with Freppert 1988, 48: "There is a distinction between the act of loving God and the act of loving this particular creature. ... That this second act is distinct from the first is evident from the fact of their separability; the one precedes the other; and the second is in reference to an individual while the first is general, 'to love all that God wills'. The point is, the second act, the act of loving this particular creature, is not immediately free even though it is an act of the will. A prior act of the will has already determined the second act. The second act is not immediately, but only mediately free. For it is impossible that I love God and everything that God wills me to love in general while at the same time I do not love this particular creature whom God wills me to love. Consequently, there would be merit primarily in the first act of the will, because it is immediately in the power of the will; but merit would only be mediately in the second act of the will, because it is only mediately in the power of the will."

¹⁰⁶ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 393, 410-415*: "...omnis actus voluntatis idem omnino manens potest continuari et conservari, facta sola apprehensione et ostensione obiecti illius actus, quia ad causandum actum voluntatis non videntur plura requiri quam Deus et ipsa voluntas et apprehensio obiecti; et ista sufficiunt ad causandum, sicut causae partiales, omnem actum volendi..."

will in conformity with right reason, provided that she believes without culpable error that the material act is in conformity with right reason. Thus, an intrinsically virtuous act of will could be read as follows: an act of willing to continue the first act of will (the first act in the will is the first-order act) because of willing to obey God (this willing to obey is the second-order act).¹⁰⁷

The above analysis shows how an intrinsically virtuous act always has the structure of a complex act. The standard action structure "a person wills the means because she wills the goal" in the form of the structure of a moral act is: "a person wants to do a certain deed because she wants to obey a moral authority." "*Doing a certain deed*" can be read: "a person wants to *continue her first act of will* because she wants to obey a moral authority." Here it becomes obvious that the intrinsically virtuous act of will is not the second-order act of will alone (the act of willing to obey God), but as a complex act of will it is the first-order act in the scope of the second-order act. The indifferent part of a complex act of will represents the first-order act and the intrinsically virtuous part of a complex act represents the second-order act. This second-order act (the act of willing to obey God) is the part which is the same in every intrinsically virtuous act of will.

Although Ockham believes that there can simultaneously be two acts in the will, he does not presuppose that first there must always be an indifferent act in the will. A person can will in the very beginning in the way which is intrinsically virtuous. For example, a person on waking up on Sunday morning decides to go to church

¹⁰⁷ Ockham explicitly mentions this way of reading in his examples: "...nullus actus est moraliter bonus vel virtuosus, nisi sibi assistat actus volendi sequi rectam rationem, vel quia causatur a tali velle; puta volo honorare patrem vel continuare honorem, quia volo facere quod recta ratio dicitat..." (*Quodl.* III, q. 15, 260, 67-70). "Exemplum: aliquis vult studere circumscribendo omnem circumstantiam. Iste actus est bonus ex genere. Et post intellectus dicitat quod iste actus volendi sit continuandus secundum omnes circumstantias requisitas, et voluntas vult primum actum continuare secundum dictamen rectae rationis. Iste secundus est perfecte virtuosus, quia conformis rectae rationi complete dictanti, et est intrinsece virtuosus; et primus est solum virtuosus denominatione extrinseca, quia scilicet conformatur secundo actui" (*Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. IV, 384, 191-198).

with the intention of honouring God. His election is intrinsically virtuous, and we do not "find" any indifferent act which he would first have. In this case, of course, the act of will has the structure of a moral act.

I have wanted to show that an act of will which is in itself or intrinsically virtuous can also be read as a complex act in those cases where two acts in the will are treated as separate acts. This means that the *description* of an intrinsically virtuous act includes as its part the description of an indifferent action. (This does not exclude the possibility of describing an indifferent act as distinct from an intrinsically virtuous act.) The description of an indifferent act as a part of an intrinsically virtuous complex act is a way of giving a concrete example of morally good election. The description of an indifferent act as extrinsically virtuous due to another act gives a conceptual pattern of how indifferent acts of will - which most acts of will are - can become morally relevant.

B Acts of Will and Moral Goodness

I will first look at some examples of how Ockham describes his view of the morally decisive role of the interior acts of will. In the next two sections, I discuss criteria for the moral goodness of an act of will, or how Ockham applies the rule concerning the use of the term 'virtuous' in connection with moral election. In the last section, the central question is the status of the necessarily virtuous act of will in Ockham's ethics.

1 *The Primacy of Interior Acts*

According to examples used by Ockham, moral goodness is nothing but an interior act as an intrinsically virtuous act of will. Correspondingly, moral badness (sin) only consists in an interior act (which is the same irrespective of whether there actually exists the

corresponding exterior act).¹ The examples also illustrate how Ockham thinks of an exterior act: the only way of evaluating an exterior act is to evaluate the interior act that is connected with it.

The following example shows in what way a minor sin is often punished more than a greater sin. Stealing is a lesser sin than spreading evil reports about someone; however, according to human law, the former will be punished more. Exterior acts are more punishable than interior acts, according to human law. But from the point of view of God, things look different: Ockham seems to claim that *coram Deo* the severity of punishment is directly comparable with the degree of sin.² Ockham seems to regard the breach of the eighth commandment as a greater sin than the breach of the seventh commandment for the following reason. The first one - if it is an act intended by an agent - is more in accordance with the fact that the agent does not love God and all that God wants to be loved.³

Ockham also directs attention to election (an interior act) and the exterior realization (an exterior act) of it in connection with the sixth commandment. A person who intends to commit adultery is not less guilty than a person who *de facto* commits it.⁴ In both

¹ *Quodl.* I, q. 20, 101, 52 - 104, 116. In *III Sent.*, q. 11, 376, 8-9, Ockham writes: "...peccatum solum consistit in actu interiori qui potest esse unus et idem cum actu exteriori, et sine..."

On the concept of sin in Ockham, see Freppert 1988, 161-166.

² *Quodl.* I, q. 20, 105, 145-150: "Sed a lege humana actus exteriores plus puniuntur, quia frequenter plus punit peccata minora quia sunt maiores occasiones destructionis rei publicae. Exemplum est de furari ovem et diffamare hominem; quorum primum est minus peccatum secundo, et tamen plus punitur apud homines quam secundum, licet non coram Deo."

Concerning the seventh commandment, Freppert rightly notices: "The seventh commandment forbids the exterior act of stealing; but implicitly it also includes the interior act of willing to steal" (Freppert 1988, 45). See also Adams and Wood 1981, 16.

³ *III Sent.*, q. 9, 298, 9-11: "Eodem modo de caritate, quod obiectum eius primum est aliquod complexum, puta hoc totum 'Deus et omne quod Deus vult a me diligere'..." *III Sent.*, q. 12, 425, 2-8: "...quantum ad principia practica generalia omni virtuti... Exemplum... Aliud 'omne bonum dictatum a recta ratione est diligendum'." *III Sent.*, q. 7, 215, 15: "Deus est bonus."

⁴ *Quodl.* I, q. 20, 104, 111-116: "Praeterea Augustinus, *De libero arbitrio*: 'Ut intelligas libidinem in adulterio malum esse, si cui etiam non contingat oportunitas concumbendi cum coniuge aliena, planum tamen aliquo modo sit illud

cases the decisive election is the same in the moral sense. Ockham also makes a comparison between an interior act of will and an act of sensitive appetite. According to Ockham, whether Christ had a desire (*inclinatio* et *desiderium*) to fornicate or not is an insignificant question; sin does not consist in an exterior act or a sensitive desire. If Christ had a sensitive desire, he, however, did not have an act of will (*volitio*) in regard to fornicating. Christ remained beyond sin because sin as intrinsically vicious only consists in an act of will.⁵

Ockham does not claim that one would not be able to sin by exterior acts or sensitive desires, but he emphasizes that sin does not consist in them as such; instead, it consists in an act of will that connects with them. They are denominated extrinsically vicious (or sin) on the basis of an act of will connected with them.

To a degree, the contents of Ockham's ethics are disclosed in two examples concerning the fifth commandment. The first example, on the one hand, illustrates such a case where an exterior act cannot be evaluated as a moral deed (in an extrinsic sense); on the other hand, it is an example of how penitence as intrinsically virtuous and meritorious⁶ presupposes that an exterior act does not have the nature of being a moral act (*qua* being intrinsically virtuous or vicious).

eum cupere, et si potestas detur sibi esse facturum, non minus reus est quam si in ipso facto deprehenderetur."

⁵ *Quaest. variae*, q. 6, art. IX, 270, 422 - 271, 432: "Si quaeras iuxta praedicta utrum in Christo fuit aliqua rebellio inter vires inferiores et superiores, respondeo quod non fuit aliqua rebellio vitiosa. Quia quantumcumque in appetitu sensitivo eius fuisset inclinatio et desiderium ad actum fornicandi - ponamus dummodo non haberet volitionem respectu illius actus nec umquam peccaret. Quia, ut patet alibi, in sola volitione consistit peccatum et nullo modo in actu exteriori nisi quadam denominatione extrinseca. Et ideo ille actus appetitus sensitivi non esset vitiosus. Credo tamen quod nullum actum talem in appetitu sensitivo habuit qui dicuntur vitiosi denominatione extrinseca concurrente volitione."

⁶ Ockham emphasizes the significance of complete repentance, that is to say, the repentance at the very beginning arises from the loving of God (*contritio*); see *IV Sent.*, q. 11, 220, 6-9: "Et ideo dico sine omni praeiudicio aliorum quod per nullum sacramentum potest remitti peccatum mortale sine omni contritione in generali vel speciali. Et hoc dico de eo qui potest uti libero arbitrio..."

The starting-point in Ockham's first example is that no act is vicious if it is not mediately or immediately in the power of the will. The example is of the following kind. A person who willingly lets himself fall from a precipice can repent the deed; in doing so, he does not want to fall (*actus nolendi illum descensum*) any more. This act of will is virtuous and meritorious. The falling is no longer vicious due to the repentance; and note especially that the falling at this stage is in no way under a person's control, or in the power of the will.⁷ If the exterior event (the falling) were vicious after the repentance, God's order would be internally conflicting: a person would simultaneously be virtuous and vicious - saved because of his interior act and damned because of his exterior act.⁸

The repentance could not have a morally decisive role, if the exterior act could get the status of a moral act; viz., it is in any case clear that the repentance cannot cancel the exterior act. Thus, the exterior act exists after the repentance, but what is it like? A person has changed his intention; his vicious act of will has changed into a virtuous act of repentance. We can guess that this change bears on the exterior act in some way. That is to say, the intrinsically virtuous interior act takes away from the exterior act the moral badness which earlier belonged to it extrinsically, but it cannot make the exterior act extrinsically virtuous. The reason for this inability is that the exterior act in question is not within the power of the will. The result is that the exterior act becomes indifferent in the moral sense.

Within Ockham's ethics, one could take a position on the suicide of somebody along these lines. If it is imaginable that a person can

⁷ *Quodl. I, q. 20, 103, 83-91*: "Praeterea nullus actus est vitiosus nisi sit in potestate voluntatis mediate vel immediate; sed si aliquis voluntarie dimittat se in praecipitium et in descendendo paeniteat et doleat et simpliciter nolit illum descensum, immo revocaret si posset, ille actus nolendi est virtuosus et meritorius; sed actus descendendi non est vitiosus quando paenitet, quia non est tunc in potestate voluntatis. Immo, si esset vitiosus, ille homo simul foret vitiosus et virtuosus, damnandus propter actum exteriorem et salvandus propter interiorem."

See also *Quaest. variae, q. 6, art. IX, 263, 265 - 264, 276; Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. I, 329, 150 - 330, 156.*

⁸ *Quodl. I, q. 20, 103, 89-91; Miethke 1969, 304; Freppert 1988, 41-42.*

have repented his act without being able to prevent his death, the act as a suicide - in this case - has to be left outside of moral evaluation. What would be decisive from the point of view of the moral evaluation is a person's intention, i.e., his act of will; but to make it clear is impossible. This pattern of "ethics of inner life" partly describes Ockham's theory of ethics.⁹

The other example also illustrates Ockham's view of an interior act of will which as a moral act forms the sole criterion for evaluating an exterior act.¹⁰ The master who orders his servant to kill a person whom he dislikes is not guilty insofar as he regrets his order. He is not guilty even if his servant is quick enough to put the order into effect. At the very moment when the murder as an exterior act occurs, there is no longer an interior, morally bad act of will; this is so because of the penitence.¹¹ Thus, the exterior act cannot be said to be in accordance with any interior act. Furthermore, if there are two masters who order their own servants to kill some person they both dislike, the master whose hate is more intensive sins more; and he sins more even in the case that the servant of the other master is he who actually kills the person. Thus, in moral evaluation exterior acts are not decisive. However, according to human law, exterior acts also have a decisive role, which means that a minor sin sometimes will be punished more,

⁹ Miethke 1969, 305: "Sittlichkeit also kann offenbar nur in einem 'actus interior' realisiert werden."

¹⁰ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 378, 1-14: "Ad hoc sunt exempla. Unum est: ponamus quod hic sunt duo quorum uterque habet voluntatem interficiendi aliquem, tamen primus habet intensam voluntatem et secundus remissam. Si uterque praecipiat servo suo interficere illum hominem, si servus secundi interficiat illum et non servus primi, certum est tunc quod primus magis peccavit, quia intensius eum odivit et magis fuit ad hoc ut interficeretur quam sedundus. Et tamen secundus puniretur plus poena temporalis quam primus, cum tamen minus peccavit. Igitur aliquando minus peccatum gravius punitur. Et pono ultra quod secundus dominus poeniteat de mala voluntate et praecepto, et primus non, et quod servus secundi interficiat illum hominem - hoc posito, primus dominus peccat et secundus non in interfectione hominis, et tamen secundus punietur, et primus non."

¹¹ Freppert emphasizes the same point but in connection with the example discussed previously: "...the external act could no longer be a sin, because there is no interior act to which it conforms. The example of this is...the man who jumps from a precipice (Freppert 1988, 46).

as it is in this case. The minor sin of the master whose servant killed the person will be punished, and the greater sin will be not punished at all.

Ockham further states that love (*caritas*) as an equally virtuous interior act of two different persons earns the same kind of reward. It makes no difference if one person is able to produce an exterior act in accordance with the interior act and another is not.¹²

When the moral status of some action is considered, one has to pay attention to this act as an interior act of will - as such it has its first, and morally decisive, existence. However, I think that this view of Ockham does not underestimate exterior acts and their role in the moral context; exterior acts can be called virtuous or vicious, although only in an extrinsic sense. The idea of the effective willing found in Ockham's thought also explains in what way exterior acts take their place in moral action. If one wills the goal, one also wills the means without which it is not possible to obtain the goal; furthermore, after an act of willing the means, one produces the act (e.g., an exterior act) by means of which the goal is obtained, provided that nothing prevents it. Ockham thinks that a person does - insofar as it depends on him - what he wants to do in order to obtain the goal that he wants above all.

2 *Right Reason and a Virtuous Act*

An act of will, in order to be morally good or bad, presupposes that the created will is the subject of it and that it has right

¹² *Quodl.* I, q. 20, 103, 97-103: "Praeterea aequali merito debetur aequale praemium, et omnis actus bonus moraliter habet aliquod praemium. Sint igitur duo quorum unus non possit in actum exteriorem, et alius potest et facit; et ponamus quod habeant actus interiores aequales. De quibus quaero aut habent bonitatem moralem aequalem aut non. Si sic, habetur propositum; si non, igitur aequali caritati non debetur aequale praemium."

reason as its internal object.¹³ I shall discuss the role of right reason as an object of a virtuous act of will at the end of this section. First I shall consider the connection between the notions of right reason and conscience and thereafter the relation between right reason and virtue.

According to Clark, the notion of right reason has two different meanings in Ockham's theory. In a literal meaning it "stands for correct knowledge about one's obligation". More frequently used is the notion in a technical sense; the phrase "the dictate of right reason" refers to this use.¹⁴ 'Right reason' in a technical sense means a dictative act of the intellect (*actus dictandi intellectus*) that is an assent (*actus assentiendi*) to some directive proposition.¹⁵

¹³ Freppert calls attention to why it is not enough to speak of right reason as merely a cause of a virtuous act: "It is not enough to say that right reason is required as a partial efficient cause without adding that it is also required as a partial object of the virtuous act. This point, as indicated above, was at stake in the controversy between Ockham and Scotus regarding the role of right reason in the production of a virtuous act. For if right reason is required only as a partial and essential cause, then if God would supply the causality exercised by right reason - and it appears that he can, since he can supply the causality exercised by any secondary - then the act of the will in cooperation with God would be perfectly virtuous without an act of prudence. But that is manifestly false. For no act is perfectly virtuous unless it is elicited in conformity with right reason actually inhering in the subject who elicits the act. Therefore, says Ockham, right reason is required as a partial object of the virtuous act as well as its partial cause" (Freppert 1988, 64-65). See also *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 394, 429-442*. I would like to emphasize more than Freppert does here that for Ockham right reason as an object of a virtuous act is a partial cause of this act: "...recta ratio est obiectum actus virtuosus; et ex hoc quod requiritur ad actum virtuosum tamquam obiectum in esse reali, sequitur quod habet causalitatem effectivam respectu actus virtuosus..." (*Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 394, 443-446*). See also *III Sent., q. 11, 382, 5-7*. Actually Freppert stresses this point elsewhere: "But all of these 'circumstances' are really objects of the act and as such are also effective partial causes of the act of the will which is intrinsically virtuous" (Freppert 1988, 70-71). See also Freppert 1988, 61-64, 157.

¹⁴ Clark 1973, 15-16.

¹⁵ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 393, 419-420*: "...recta ratio, sive actus assentiendi qui vocatur recta ratio..." *III Sent., q. 12, 422, 6-7*: "...Recta autem ratio est prudentia in actu vel in habitu." *Ibid., 422, 21 - 423, 3*: "Et sciendum quod actus dictandi intellectus non est formaliter complexum, sed est actus assentiendi vel dissentendi complexo iam formato. Et ex illo actu assentiendi generatur prudentia, non autem ex formatione complexi."

See also Clark 1973, 16; Freppert 1988, 52-53.

Ockham makes a distinction between two kinds of apprehension (*apprehensio*). It can mean either the formation of a proposition or knowledge concerning the proposition already formed. The assent of right reason represents the latter type of apprehension.¹⁶ "The intellect must judge that rule to be true now, in this situation, before the agent explicitly recognizes a moral obligation."¹⁷

From the point of view of moral action, it is not enough to use the notion of right reason in a literal or propositional meaning. A person could form a moral rule and act in accordance with it, but he still would not have acted in conformity with right reason. The reason for this is that conformity with right reason is the criterion for the moral goodness of an act of will and as such it should be understood in a special way: the will has to will what right reason dictates just because it is dictated by right reason.¹⁸ Ockham uses the notion of right reason so that it covers both meanings of the

¹⁶ *Quodl.* V, q. 6, 500, 16 - 501, 23: "...duplex est assensus: unus quo intellectus assentit aliquid esse vel aliquid esse bonum vel album; alius quo intellectus assentit alicui complexo. Secunda distinctio est quod duplex est apprehensio: una quae est compositio et divisio propositionis sive formatio; alia est quae est cognitio ipsius complexi iam formati, sicut cognitio albedinis dicitur eius apprehensio."

See Clark 1973, 16, footnote 10, 19, footnote 16.

¹⁷ Clark 1973, 16-17.

¹⁸ *III Sent.*, q. 12, 422, 8-17: "Si dicas quod ostenso aliquo obiecto diligibili sine omni dictamine rationis, potest voluntas illud diligere, et iste est bonus moraliter quia diligit quod diligendum est, et eodem modo etc. Puta si formatur hoc complexum 'hoc bonum est diligibile' et intellectus non assentiat, est tunc dubium utrum illa dilectio sit bona moraliter: Respondeo: licet actus ille sit bonus ex genere et non sit malus moraliter, tamen non est virtuosus, quia de ratione actus virtuosus est quod eliciatur conformiter rationi rectae et respectu obiecti convenientis, et quod habens talem actum sit sciens." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. IV, 394, 443 - 395, 459: "...recta ratio est obiectum actus virtuosus... Confirmatur, quia nullus actus est perfecte virtuosus, nisi voluntas per illum actum velit dictatum a recta ratione propter hoc quod est dictatum a recta ratione, quia si vellet dictatum a ratione, non quia dictatum, sed quia delectabile vel propter aliam causam, iam vellet illud dictatum si solum esset ostensum per apprehensionem sine recta ratione; et per consequens ille actus non esset virtuosus, quia non eliceretur conformiter rationi rectae, quia hoc est elicere conformiter rectae rationi: velle dictatum a ratione propter hoc quod est dictatum."

See also Clark 1973, 16; Freppert 1988, 67.

notion. However, he clearly places emphasis on a technical or functional meaning of right reason (*dictamen rationis*).¹⁹

The notion of right reason can refer both to the dictate concerning the willing of the goal and to the dictate concerning the means that is necessary for obtaining the goal. In the latter case one can use the term '*prudentia*' instead of using the term '*recta ratio*'. Knowledge of a particular conclusion (through a practical syllogism) is right reason or prudence which as a dictate immediately directs one to virtuous action.²⁰ Prudence as knowledge of the conclusion (*cuius notitia est prudentia*) refers to right reason in the propositional meaning of the notion. "Immediately directive" (*immediate directiva*) refers to right reason in the functional meaning of the notion.

Ockham makes a distinction between habitual and actual prudence. The distinction is comparable with the distinction between the propositional and functional meaning of right reason.²¹ A virtuous or right act of will presupposes that actual prudence

¹⁹ Clark 1973, 19: "The objective and subjective norms of morality, the literal and the functional meanings of *recta ratio*, are mutually consistent and required."

²⁰ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. III, 347, 142-147*: "...virtutes morales omnes connectuntur in quibusdam principiis universalibus, puta 'omne honestum est faciendum', 'omne bonum est diligendum', 'omne dictatum a recta ratione est faciendum', quae possunt esse maiores et minores in syllogismo practico concludente conclusionem particularem, cuius notitia est prudentia immediate directiva in actu virtuoso." See also *ibid.*, 347, 154-155: "...una virtus...cum voluntate et recta ratione sive prudentia..."

Note that a person can act against right reason although she knows the particular conclusion that is to direct her action (see *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. III, 367, 604-612*).

²¹ *Quaest. variae, q. 8, art. I, 410, 36-37*: "...prudentia aptitudinalis non sufficit ad actum virtuosum." *Ibid.*, 412, 85-86: "...conformitas actus voluntatis ad prudentiam habitalem non sufficit ad actum virtuosum." *Ibid.*, 413, 96-101: "Cum igitur de ratione prudentiae sit regulare actum voluntatis, quia est recta ratio agibilium etc., impossibile est quod regulet habitus quicumque in intellectu nisi mediante actu suo, non plus quam si talis habitus non inesset intellectui. Igitur prudentia habitualis non sufficit ad actum rectum, sed necessario requiritur prudentia actualis." *Ibid.*, 414, 124-128: "...ad rectitudinem actus voluntatis requiritur prudentia actualis actualiter inhaerens illi cuius est talis actus rectus. Hoc patet, quia secundum omnes ad actum virtuosum aliqua prudentia requiritur necessario; sed nec aptitudinalis nec habitualis sufficiunt; igitur necessario requiritur prudentia actualis."

inheres in a person.²² It means that reason has to judge (*iudicare*) that a certain action in some concrete situation is obligatory (*dictamen rationis*).

'Actual prudence' corresponds to the notion of conscience in Ockham's use.²³ An act of will can also be virtuous in a certain way when it is in conformity with erroneous reason or in conformity with the dictate of erroneous reason. However, an error cannot concern the whole deliberation presupposed by virtuous election. This means that a major premise of a practical syllogism (*ratio universalis*) must be correct, as is the principle 'one has to help everyone who seriously stands in need of help.' The error then concerns the other premise of the syllogism and its conclusion.²⁴ An act of will can be right when it is in conformity with erroneous conscience or with the dictate of erroneous reason, provided that it is inculpably erroneous.²⁵ But what is it to be erroneous in this way? Ockham might have thought specifically of the case where the error is not total, viz., the case where the starting-point of deliberation is right reason (*ratio universalis est recta*). Concerning the goal, a person rightly knows the practical principle that he should follow; still, he could be mistaken about what should be done

²² When Freppert discusses the necessity of actual prudence, he first pays attention to the fact that actual prudence or an act of prudence is a natural act by means of which a non-virtuous act cannot become virtuous (see Freppert 1988, 54-58, see also 64-65).

²³ *Quaest. variae, q. 8, art. I, 411, 42-45*: "...impossibile est quod aliquis actus voluntatis elicetus contra conscientiam et contra dictamen rationis - sive rectum sive erroneum - sit virtuosus."

Compare with Clark 1973, 17: "And in this functional sense, Right Reason coincides with Ockham's doctrine of conscience. ... Thus, the technical meaning of *recta ratio* (hereafter this usage is indicated by capitalizing) is that simple act of practical assent which provides the proximate norm of morality and the subjective basis of obligation."

²⁴ *Quaest. variae, q. 8, art. II, 424, 339-345*: "Sed licet haec sit ratio particularis errans circa minorem et conclusionem, tamen ratio universalis est recta, ista scilicet quod 'omni indigenti extrema necessitate est subveniendum', igitur etc. Et haec recta ratio concurret cum ratione erronea - immediate forte - ad causandum illum actum rectum voluntatis. Quia si non esset in intellectu talis ratio recta, nullo modo esset actus voluntatis virtuosus."

²⁵ On Ockham's view of three distinct possible conditions of conscience, see Baylor 1977, 86-90.

in order to obtain the goal - his error is then not total.²⁶ Note again that in Ockham's theory practical principles concerning the goals are also norms; the motivation of morally deliberated action is based on the obligation.

Conscience can be determined to be actual prudence which morally obligates the will. Thus, it is either the dictate of right reason or the dictate of erroneous reason (in the way described above), and it obligates the will to elect the means by which the goal is to be obtained.

It is right to follow the inculpably erroneous reason because God wills it to be followed, according to Ockham.²⁷ Right reason - when it is not mistaken - dictates what God wills a person to will in a certain situation. Right reason - when it is inculpably mistaken - dictates unlike God would obligate a person to will; in this case, too, one must follow the erroneous reason. The demand to follow one's conscience is divine demand; it belongs to the moral order prescribed by God. The acceptance of this demand shows in principle obedience to God, and this is not affected in cases in which an agent is inculpably mistaken in his particular decision. What is decisive is that he believes, however, that he chooses rightly. Ockham emphasizes the functional meaning of right reason (*actus dictandi intellectus*) or the demand to follow one's conscience, because he emphasizes the obligation of the created will to obey God's precepts.²⁸

²⁶ Baylor has commented on the question as follows: "For Ockham invincible error too was a mistake about the factual nature of some case, error about what constituted the minor term of the practical syllogism and thus the conclusion. But invincible error is that which unavoidably remains after a determined effort to discover the nature of the moral facts in a given case or what is necessary to fulfill one's moral obligations" (Baylor 1977, 89-90).

²⁷ *Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. II, 436, 610-613: "...voluntas creata sequens rationem erroneam errore invincibili est recta, quia voluntas divina vult eum sequi rationem non culpabilem, et sic faciendo contra illam rationem peccat quia obligatur ad oppositum."

²⁸ *Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. II, 428, 433-437: "Et voluntas eliciens conformiter actum suum illi rationi erroneae peccat, quia semper peccat voluntas peccato commissionis quando elicit aliquem actum ad cuius oppositum obligatur per preceptum divinum vel ordinationem divinam, - vel alio modo obligatur ad

Ockham discusses various kinds of patterns of acting rightly by distinguishing between five grades of moral virtue.²⁹ Each grade of moral virtue deals with one way of acting in conformity with right reason, or in conformity with the dictate of right reason. Before considering the different patterns of moral action it is useful to pay attention to some general points.

In moral action, both an act of will and a virtue are to fulfil the same condition. An act of will - in order to be virtuous - must be in conformity with right reason (*actus dictandi intellectus*); a perfect moral virtue - in order to be a virtue - has to be in conformity with right reason (*actus dictandi intellectus*).³⁰ Right reason, again, is not dependent on moral virtues, which Ockham proves as follows: The will can will against the dictate of right reason; in consequence, an act of will is vicious. Thus, there can be the dictate of right reason, although there is no act of virtue.³¹ What is interesting in Ockham's proof is that he does not seem to miss a single chance to emphasize the principle of the freedom of the will. The independent status of right reason (with respect to virtues) is stated by referring to the independent status of the will (with respect to virtues); the

oppositum -, et numquam aliter peccat." III *Sent.*, q. 11, 375, 7-9: "...puta si hoc faciat per oboedientiam illius cui tenetur oboedire. Et ideo ille actus potest esse bonus moraliter et virtuosus..."

²⁹ *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. II, 335, 116 - 337, 167; see also Suk 1950, 22-26.

³⁰ III *Sent.*, q. 12, 422, 15-17: "...de ratione actus virtuosi est quod eliciatur conformiter rationi rectae et respectu obiecti convenientis, et quod habens talem actum sit sciens." *Ibid.*, 427, 1-2: "...omnis perfecta virtus moralis est conformis rationi rectae, quia aliter non est virtus..." III *Sent.*, q. 11, 358, 22: "...solus habitus voluntatis est proprie virtus." III *Sent.*, q. 12, 422, 1-7: "...virtus moralis perfecta non potest esse sine prudentia, et per consequens est necessaria connexio inter virtutes morales et prudentiam. Quod probatur, quia de ratione virtutis perfectae et actus eius est quod eliciatur conformiter rectae rationi, quia sic definitur a Philosopho, II *Ethnicorum*: Recta autem ratio est prudentia in actu vel in habitu." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. II, 331, 32-33: "...quaelibet virtus moralis habet propriam prudentiam et notitiam directivam."

See also Freppert 1988, 53.

³¹ III *Sent.*, q. 12, 421, 11-22: "...prudentia potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus sine aliqua repugnancia. ... Probatur, quia voluntas potest velle oppositum illius quod dictatum est a ratione. ... Sed actus quo voluntas vult oppositum illius quod dictatum est a ratione est contra iudicium rationis, et per consequens est actus vitiosus. Igitur prudentia potest stare sine actu illius virtutis. Et sicut arguitur de una virtute, ita arguendum est de qualibet."

will can will against the dictate and in that way prevent an act of any virtue - an act which would originate from the inclination of a virtue without the intervention of the will.

In the first grade of virtue, a person has to fulfil the minimal condition of moral action: he who has a virtue and who wills to act in accordance with his virtue must also will the action that is in conformity with right reason and take account of other required circumstances.³²

In the second grade of virtue, a person wills to act in conformity with a right dictate and wills it with special intention: the person does not want to give up right conduct at any price.³³

In the third grade of virtue, a person wills to do a right deed in conformity with right reason and with the intention mentioned above. Furthermore, a person wills to do the deed in question in conformity with all required circumstances just because it is dictated by right reason.³⁴

In the fourth grade, virtue is called perfect; it is a real moral virtue. The previous descriptions of virtue are also included in this

³² *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. II, 335, 116-123*: "Primus gradus est quando aliquis vult facere opera iusta conformiter rationi rectae dictanti talia opera esse facienda secundum debitas circumstantias respicientes praecise ipsum opus propter honestatem ipsius operis sicut propter finem, puta intellectus dictat quod tale opus iustum est faciendum tali loco tali tempore propter honestatem ipsius operis vel propter pacem vel aliquid tale, et voluntas elicit actum volendi talia opera conformiter iuxta dictamen intellectus."

On five distinct grades of moral virtue, see Miethke 1969, 331-332; Freppert 1988, 166-169.

³³ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. II, 335, 124-128*: "Secundus gradus est quando voluntas vult facere opera iusta secundum rectam dictamen praedictum, et praeter hoc cum intentione nullo modo dimittendi talia pro quocumque quod est contra rectam rationem, etiam non pro morte, si recta ratio dictaret tale opus non esse dimittendum pro morte..."

³⁴ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. II, 335, 132-136*: "Tertius gradus est quando aliquis vult tale opus facere secundum rectam rationem praedictam cum intentione praedicta, et praeter hoc vult tale opus secundum circumstantias praedictas facere praecise et solum quia sic est dictatum a recta ratione."

McGrade 1974, 203-204: "The previous grade [the third grade] of virtue in Ockham's analysis consists, as we have seen, of action in accordance with *recta ratio* performed *because* of its rationality. ... From the standpoint of unassisted natural reason, the very existence of God is doubtful. Hence, respect for *recta ratio* at the third grade of virtue must presumably be impersonal."

grade. But in addition to them, a person wills to do a right deed for the sake of loving God.³⁵ Ockham seems to think that the dictate to act virtuously *propter amorem Dei* belongs to the notion of right reason.³⁶ The act of loving God is an intention given to right reason. This interpretation is based on Ockham's view of God who in creation gave men the intellect and will to be the principles of their virtuous acts.³⁷

The basic formal condition in every grade of virtue is the same: conformity with the dictate of right reason. The grades differ from each other so that every grade (except the first one) takes some additional condition as compared with the grade before it.³⁸ By distinguishing different grades of virtue, it is possible to consider virtue from the point of view of how perfect it is.

The fifth grade of virtue does not include any additional condition, since the fourth grade of virtue is already perfect. The fifth grade, i.e., heroic virtue, is defined in a different way. It can mean every virtue which is emphasized in moral action so that an act itself or some aspect of an act exceeds the common state of man and is against natural inclination. Heroic virtue is always disclosed as human virtue because it is based on the freedom of man. Any free agent can act in a heroic way.³⁹ Thus, a

³⁵ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. II, 335, 137 - 336, 142*: "Quartus gradus est quando vult tale opus facere secundum omnes condiciones et circumstantias praedictas, et praeter hoc propter amorem Dei praecise, puta quia sic dictatum est ab intellectu, quod talia opera sunt facienda propter amorem Dei praecise. Et iste gradus solum est perfecta et vera virtus moralis de qua Sancti loquuntur."

See also McGrade 1974, 203-204.

³⁶ Compare with *Quodl. III, q. 16, 263, 42-44*: "...recta ratio deberet dictare quod volendum est abstinere propter Deum quia sic est dictatum a recta ratione, aliter non esset recta sed erronea..."

³⁷ See *IV Sent., q. 5, 51, 8-15*.

³⁸ Miethke 1969, 331; see also McGrade 1974, 194. On the mutual connection of the moral virtues in the different grades of virtue, see Suk 1950, 91-98.

³⁹ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. II, 336, 152 - 337, 167*: "Quintus gradus est quando aliquis eligit tale opus facere secundum praedictas condiciones excepto fine, quando indifferenter potest fieri propter Deum tamquam propter finem, et propter honestatem vel pacem vel aliquid tale, - quod dico pro intentione philosophi -, et praeter hoc eligit tale opus facere actu imperativo formaliter, non tantum aequivalenter. Et si tunc velit actu imperativo formaliter facere vel pati aliquid

Christian's and a non-Christian's heroic actions, which originate from the same virtue, differ from each other only in their intentions. The intention of a non-Christian (*philosophus*) is something other than loving God.

Ockham's view of the relation between dictate and virtue is included in the different patterns of moral action or in the different grades of moral virtue. His view also implies the idea of two kinds of moralities. These moralities are equal in the sense that they both represent ethics based on obligation and in the sense that 'virtue' is not a primary moral concept in them. Ockham makes a distinction between natural morality and Christian morality as follows. The first three grades and the fifth grade of virtue represent natural morality. Christian morality covers the whole scale but in a specific way. Its *proprium* is the description of right action at the level of the fourth grade of virtue.

An agent may elect either natural morality (a philosopher's choice) or Christian morality (a Christian's choice). As an advocate of natural morality, she has to make her moral choices just because right reason dictates it (the third grade of virtue). As a Christian, she has to make her moral choices because right reason dictates thus and, furthermore, specifically because she loves God (the fourth grade of virtue). It is very important to notice that in Ockham's ethics moral choices cannot be choices because one loves God without simultaneously being choices because of the dictate of right reason. In this sense natural morality is always included in Christian morality.

The *proprium* of natural morality is *propter rectam rationem*, and the *proprium* of Christian morality is *propter Deum*. The highest intention of the advocate of natural morality is right reason; he values morality in itself. As far as the contents are concerned, his

quod ex natura sua excedit communem statum hominum et est contra inclinationem naturalem, vel si tale opus...solum ex aliqua circumstantia est contra inclinationem naturalem, talis inquam actus imperativus formaliter talis operis est generativus virtutis heroicae vel elicitus a virtute heroica secundum intentionem philosophi et secundum veritatem, et nullus alius habitus generatus ex quibuscumque aliis actibus est virtus heroica."

morality is right, even though imperfect: if he believed in Him who gives the reason to man, he could love Him more and above all.

I have considered above Ockham's view of the relation between moral virtue and right reason, when 'right reason' has been understood in the functional sense of the term (*actus dictandi intellectus*). Ockham also discusses the relation so that he takes the notion 'right reason' in the propositional sense: knowledge which directs action always concerns action which is consistent with some virtue. I shall make a short digression to this topic next.

Ockham distinguishes between four different ways of using the term 'prudence'.⁴⁰ The fourth way of using the term is the most interesting, I think, because it "includes the directive knowledge of all virtues necessary for leading a perfect life. It is somehow the aggregate of all preceding classes of prudence, and as such, certain moral virtues must accompany it while others may be lacking."⁴¹ The fourth kind of prudence refers to the knowledge of judgments that immediately direct human action, whether these judgments have been got through self-evident principles or through the principles known by experience. Ockham does not give a list of these judgments or these principles (*notitias*); he remarks, however, that there are as many as there are moral virtues.⁴² Neither does

⁴⁰ Bonnie Kent writes on four different kinds of prudence as follows: "The first consists in the knowledge of universal principles that are either self-evident or known through experience. The second is the knowledge of particular judgments deduced from self-evident principles, the third knowledge of particular judgments deduced from principles based on experience. The fourth seems to be an aggregate of the other three kinds of prudence" (Kent 1984, 565). Freppert also considers different ways in which the term "prudence" is used, see Freppert 1988, 20-21. Ockham's distinctions between different kinds of prudence are found in *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. II, 330-331.

⁴¹ The quotation is from Suk 1950, 108. Suk discusses every use of the term 'prudence' and looks at how the moral virtue is connected with prudence when 'prudence' is understood in all the four ways, see Suk 1950, 103-109; see also Kent 1984, 565-566.

⁴² *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. II, 331, 27-33: "Quarto modo, accipitur pro aliquo aggregato ex omni notitia immediate directiva, sive habeatur per doctrinam sive per experientiam, circa omnia opera humana requisita ad bene vivere simpliciter. Et isto modo prudentia non est una notitia tantum, sed includit tot notitias quot sunt virtutes morales requisitae ad simpliciter bene vivere, quia quaelibet virtus moralis habet propriam prudentiam et notitiam directivam."

Ockham specify those virtues without which one cannot have prudence of the fourth kind.⁴³ But he seems to refer to those judgments the knowledge of which is based on a person's own experience.⁴⁴ If the knowledge in question has been acquired through experience, it must be based on a person's virtuous action; this kind of action, again, produces a virtue. Thus, one can say that there are some judgments which one cannot know without the corresponding virtue or without the corresponding virtuous action, i.e., the action that produces a certain virtue.

When Ockham discusses the relation between prudence (in the sense of the knowledge of directive principles) and moral virtue, his main point is again that moral virtue is dependent on prudence; prudence is required for virtuous action either in the sense of the knowledge of particular judgments deduced from universal self-evident principles or in the sense of the knowledge of particular judgments deduced from principles based on experience.⁴⁵ It is worth noting that Ockham actually emphasizes once again that the

⁴³ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. III, 374, 789 - 375, 793*: "...prudentia quarto modo dicta, qua aliquis dicitur prudens quantum ad totum vivere, secundum quod includit notitias directivas omnium virtutum quae requiruntur ad perfecte vivere hominis, potest esse sine aliquibus virtutibus, et sine aliquibus non potest esse."

⁴⁴ Suk interprets Ockham's view as follows: "One can, for instance, have the knowledge of universal propositions or of particular conclusions evident by themselves or obtained through experience without having the corresponding virtue. But one cannot know the proposition, for example, 'In loving God I have greater delight than in loving all temporal things', without having experienced it, and by experiencing it one must also possess the virtue of the love of God" (see Suk 1950, 108-109).

⁴⁵ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. II, 330, 2 - 331, 21*: "...prudentia accipitur quadrupliciter: uno modo, accipitur pro omni notitia directiva respectu cuiuscumque agibilis mediate vel immediate... Et isto modo tam notitia evidens alicuius universalis propositionis quae evidenter cognoscitur per doctrinam, quia procedit ex propositionibus per se notis...quam notitia evidens propositionis universalis quae solum evidenter cognoscitur per experientiam...est prudentia. ... Alio modo, accipitur pro notitia evidenti immediate directiva circa aliquod agibile particulare, et hoc pro notitia alicuius propositionis particularis quae evidenter sequitur ex universali propositione per se nota tamquam maiori et per doctrinam. ... Tertio modo, accipitur pro notitia immediate directiva accepta per experientiam solum respectu alicuius agibilis." *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. III, 375, 800-812*: "...quaelibet virtus moralis potest esse sine prudentia primo modo et secundo modo dicta... Sed ad hoc quod actus virtuosus eliciatur, necessario requiritur prudentia secundo modo vel tertio modo dicta."

dictate of right reason (*actus dictandi intellectus*) is required for virtuous action. This becomes clear from the fact that he presupposes the knowledge of some *particular* judgment; a moral agent's obligation is to make a choice in some concrete situation consistent with that particular judgment - something concrete is dictated by right reason.

According to Ockham, it is divine demand to follow the dictate of right reason, i.e., to follow one's conscience ('right reason' in the functional sense). It is consistent with Ockham's view to think that God has given man certain principles of right reason ('right reason' in the propositional sense). One example would be the universal self-evident principle '*omni benefactori est benefaciendum*' (*Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. II, 330*).

Finally, I shall make some remarks on the role of right reason in Ockham's discussion of the objects of a virtuous act of will. This theme is closely connected with the theme of right reason as a dictative act of the intellect. How can the objects of a virtuous act of will be delineated, and what does it mean to be expressly the object of an act of will? The question in this form also covers the subsequent section of this chapter (III B 3).

One necessary object of a virtuous act of will is conformity with right reason in the sense of an actual dictate to elect a certain means for obtaining a certain goal. An act of will cannot be virtuous without being in conformity with right reason; an act of will while being vicious is against right reason.⁴⁶ To will something in conformity with right reason is to will it just because it is dictated by right reason.⁴⁷ The dictate is about a particular

⁴⁶ *Quodl. III, q. 15, 260, 67-71*: "...nullus actus est moraliter bonus vel virtuosus, nisi sibi assistat actus volendi sequi rectam rationem, vel quia causatur a tali velle; puta volo honorare patrem vel continuare honorem, quia volo facere quod recta ratio dictat; et similiter volo bene facere tibi, quia volo quod dictat ratio." *III Sent., q. 12, 421, 18-20*: "Sed actus quo voluntas vult oppositum illius quod dictatum est a ratione est contra iudicium rationis, et per consequens est actus vitiosus."

⁴⁷ *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. IV, 395, 458-459*: "...hoc est elicere conformiter rectae rationi: velle dictatum a ratione propter hoc quod est dictatum."

act in a certain situation; therefore it is natural that the right time and place and the right end belong to the objects (or criteria) of a virtuous act of will:

...the end is the object of a virtuous act, because when the will wills something for the sake of the end, it rather wills the end... Likewise, it is clear that the place and the point of time are objects because in another case an act of will would be as perfectly virtuous without them as with them, which is wrong, since an act of willing to eat is a virtuous act if one wants to eat in the right place and at the right time; in another case it is vicious rather than virtuous. Thus, I say briefly that all the circumstances are the partial objects of a necessary virtuous act, and the end is the primary object (*Quodl.* III, q. 16, 265, 75-91).⁴⁸

The right dictate of reason covers all the objects of a virtuous act. The end which one should obtain is dictated; likewise, a virtuous act of will should occur at the time and place dictated by right reason.⁴⁹

The following example elucidates the question of the types of objects of a virtuous act of will:

Example: In order that the act of will in which someone wills to pray to God would be perfectly virtuous, these circumstances are necessarily required: He wills to pray for the sake of honouring God, in accordance with the right dictate of reason, at the given point of time, e.g., on Sunday, and in the place where one should pray, e.g., in church; now this virtuous act has the honouring of God as a primary object, praying as a common object, and the right reason, Sunday and church as secondary and partial objects in such a way that these circumstances are objects and effective partial causes with respect to this act of will (*III Sent.*, q. 11, 381, 16 - 382, 7).⁵⁰

⁴⁸ *Quodl.* III, q. 16, 265, 75-91: "...finis est obiectum actus virtuosus; tum quia quando voluntas diligit aliquid propter finem, magis diligit finem... Idem patet de loco et tempore, quod sunt obiecta, quia aliter esset actus voluntatis ita perfecte virtuosus sine illis sicut cum illis; quod falsum est, quia velle comedere est actus virtuosus, si velit loco et tempore, et aliter est magis vitiosus quam virtuosus. Dico igitur breviter quod omnes circumstantiae sunt obiecta partialia actus necessario virtuosus, et finis est obiectum principale."

⁴⁹ See *Quodl.* III, q. 16, 263, 27 - 264, 50.

⁵⁰ *III Sent.*, q. 11, 381, 16 - 382, 7: "Exemplum: si enim ad hoc quod actus voluntatis quo aliquis vult orare Deum sit perfecte virtuosus requirantur necessario istae circumstantiae: quod velit orare propter honorem Dei, secundum rectum dictamen rationis, in tempore statuto, puta die dominico, in loco debito, puta in ecclesia, tunc iste actus sic virtuosus habet honorem Dei pro obiecto principali, actum orandi pro obiecto communi, rectam rationem, diem dominicum et ecclesiam pro obiectis secundariis et partialibus, ita quod respectu actus voluntatis istae circumstantiae sunt obiecta et causae effectivae parciales

Perfectly virtuous is the act of will in which the will wills to pray to God (the exterior act as a common object) because it loves God (the end as a primary object), consistent with the right dictate of reason (the right reason as a secondary object) in church (the place as a secondary object) on Sunday (the point of time as a secondary object). The primary object of loving God together with the other partial objects constitutes a morally good election, i.e., an act of willing to pray to God in the way described above. If nothing prevents it, a person prays to God; thus, praying is the consequence of his moral election.

As the previous example shows, loving God (*propter honorem Dei*) is an act which is included in the intrinsically virtuous act of willing to pray to God. Loving God as a necessarily virtuous act of will can also be called a necessarily virtuous intention which is included in every intrinsically virtuous act of will. This being the case, the right dictate of reason is a dictate to will some means for the sake of a certain goal; the willing of this goal is a necessarily virtuous intention. Right reason dictates to elect a certain means because it is in conformity with the necessarily virtuous act of loving God. As far as the goals or ends are concerned, the will, then, has one object which is always consistent with right reason.

In the whole discussion, the crucial point has been that a virtuous act of will presupposes the dictate of right reason; right reason has to be a partial object of it.⁵¹ Therefore, an act of will which is based on the dictate of the intellect differs numerically and specifically from an act of will which is not based on the dictate (although these acts would be similar in other respects).

respectu illius actus."

⁵¹ III *Sent.*, q. 12, 422, 8-17: "Si dicas quod ostenso aliquo obiecto diligibili sine omni dictamine rationis, potest voluntas illud diligere, et iste est bonus moraliter quia diligit quod diligendum est, et eodem modo etc. Puta si formatur hoc complexum 'hoc bonum est diligibile' et intellectus non assentiat, est tunc dubium utrum illa dilectio sit bona moraliter: Respondeo licet actus ille sit bonus ex genere et non sit malus moraliter, tamen non est virtuosus, quia de ratione actus virtuosus est quod eliciatur conformiter rationi rectae et respectu obiecti convenientis, et quod habens talem actum sit sciens."

3 Purpose and a Virtuous Act

When a person acts consistent with her election, her purpose is to obtain the goal or the end for which she acts. As has been previously said, the end, the right reason, the point of time and the place belong to the objects of an act of will.⁵² The change in some object of a moral act (virtuous or vicious) brings about a new moral act. The end is a primary object because it is the most wanted through action. An exterior act, again, is a common object because it can be connected with different kinds of ends and can be chosen in various circumstances.⁵³ Therefore, it cannot form the criterion for the moral goodness of an act of will.

The end is the primary object, since when a person wants some means for the sake of the end, she in fact wants this end more.⁵⁴ The will is first of all free in electing its ends. The basic moral choice is to will such an end which the will cannot will because of some other end (*finis ultimus*), and which the will is obligated to

⁵² III *Sent.*, q. 11, 384, 15-16: "...circumstantiae non sunt nisi obiecta partialia actus voluntatis virtuosi ad quorum variationem variatur necessario actus."

See also *Quodl.* III, q. 16, 265, 75-91; III *Sent.*, q. 11, 389, 23 - 390, 2.

⁵³ *Quodl.* III, q. 16, 267, 129-137: "...finis est obiectum principale actus virtuosi intrinsece, et hoc quia dilectio finis principaliter intenditur; sed actus exterior est obiectum commune isti actui voluntatis et multis aliis; sicut aliquis potest ire ad ecclesiam propter amorem Dei vel vanam gloriam; et sic de aliis circumstantiis. Et semper mutatur actus voluntatis, sicut variatur circumstantia. Sed actus exterior est semper idem obiectum respectu omnium illorum actuum; ideo est obiectum commune, et finis est obiectum principale."

See also III *Sent.*, q. 11, 383, 10-15; *Quodl.* I, q. 20, 100, 23-26.

⁵⁴ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 380, 13 - 381, 6: "Sed fines sunt obiecta primaria actus voluntatis, quia quando voluntas non diligit aliquid nisi propter finem, magis diligit finem, quia sine illo non diligeret aliud. ... Igitur si unico actu diligo finem et aliud, finis est obiectum primarium. igitur ad variationem finium sequitur variatio actus, et per consequens sunt distincti actus." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. IV, 396, 471-474: "Et eodem modo potest probari quod finis, qui est una circumstantia, sit obiectum actus virtuosi; quia volo tale dictatum propter talem finem, igitur per illum actum volo finem quia propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis." *Ibid.*, 395, 459-462: "Nunc autem est impossibile quod aliquis velit aliquid propter aliud, nisi velit illud aliud, quia si nolit vel non velit illud aliud, iam vult primum magis propter se quam propter illud aliud."

will (*est diligendum*), and which the will freely wills.⁵⁵ If one wants the end, one also wants the necessary means for obtaining it; if one loves God, one also loves all that God wants to be loved.⁵⁶

Ockham has examples of how a virtuous act changes to vicious, or *vice versa*. The change of the primary object is crucial in these acts.⁵⁷ When seeking vain glory changes to the praise of God, that which changes is an intention (*mutare intentionem*). The change occurs in the will and includes an act of willing a new end. When a person intends a bad end (*intendere malum finem*), he wants to do something for the sake of vain glory (*propter vanam gloriam*). When a person intends a good end (*intendere bonum finem*), he wants to do something for the sake of God (*propter Deum*). An election (dictated by the intellect) which is not an election *propter Deum* is not the election dictated by the right but by erroneous reason.⁵⁸

The objects of morally good election (the end, the right reason, the time and the place) form partial causes of the election.⁵⁹ Ockham also says that the activity of an act of prudence and the activity of the will (together with God) are two partial causes of a virtuous act

⁵⁵ I *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, 375, 21 - 376, 5: "...finis ultimus non est ad aliquid aliud referibilis, sed Deus est simpliciter finis ultimus. Tertia conclusio est quod omne aliud a Deo potest esse obiectum usus ordinati. Hoc probatur, quia omne aliud a summe acceptato potest assumi in facultatem voluntatis propter summe acceptatum; sed Deus ordinate summe acceptatur; ergo omne aliud a Deo potest ordinate assumi in facultatem voluntatis propter Deum, et per consequens omni alio contingit ordinate uti." *Quodl.* III, q. 14, 256 64-67: "...quilibet pro loco et tempore obligatur ad diligendum Deum super omnia, et per consequens iste actus non potest esse vitiosus; tum quia iste actus est primus omnium actuum bonorum."

See also *Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. II, 435, 592-593; III *Sent.*, q. 11, 375, 5-8; III *Sent.*, q. 12, 425, 7-8.

⁵⁶ III *Sent.*, q. 7, 211, 14-20: "...impossibile est quod uno actu diligam Deum et omne quod Deus vult diligere a me in generali, et quod sciam quod Deus vult Ioannem diligere a me, nisi diligam Ioannem in speciali, quia contradictio est dicere oppositum. Et tunc, licet in primo actu voluntatis consistat meritum, quia est in potestate voluntatis, non tamen in secundo actu qui non est in potestate voluntatis."

⁵⁷ See III *Sent.*, q. 11, 360, 5 - 361, 1; *Quodl.* I, q. 18, 95, 49-58.

⁵⁸ See *Quodl.* III, q. 16, 263, 30-44.

⁵⁹ See III *Sent.*, q. 11, 381, 16 - 382, 7.

of will.⁶⁰ What is the relation between the objects as causes and the mentioned activities as causes?

The primary cause of morally good election is an act of willing the end, or an intention; it is an effective act of will.⁶¹ The activity of the will as a cause of a virtuous act of will refers to this act of willing the end. According to Ockham, as we have noted, the end of knowledge and the end of a knower are the same in the sense that the only reason for acquiring knowledge is that which the knower himself has stated. In the same way, the end of an action and the end of an agent are the same in the sense that the agent himself freely decides for what purpose he wants to act.

The right reason, the place and the time as secondary objects of an act of will form the partial causes of morally good election. An act of prudence as a cause of a virtuous act of will refers to the right reason or to an actual dictate to elect a certain means of obtaining a certain goal. The dictate of right reason, again, includes the obligations concerning the place and time of the election.⁶² In fact, an act of prudence as a dictate of right reason can refer to any circumstance which could in a certain situation have an influence on the moral goodness of an act of will.

The activities of the will and an act of prudence, then, are two partial causes of a virtuous act of will, and they include the criteria of the moral goodness of an act of will. Ockham expresses the same by his rule concerning the use of the term 'virtuous':

...virtuosum et meritorium sunt nomina connotativa et significant ipsum actum non absolute, sed connotando cum hoc activitatem voluntatis et prudentiae, et quando deficit aliquod connotatum non dicitur talis actus virtuosus" (*Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. I, 417, 200 - 418, 203).

⁶⁰ *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. III, 363, 515-518: "...ad actum virtuosum necessario requiritur activitas actus prudentiae et activitas voluntatis, ita quod illae duae causae sunt causae partiales cum Deo respectu actus virtuosus."

⁶¹ III *Sent.*, q. 11, 380, 20 - 381, 1: "Sed si diligeret finem unico actu et aliud propter finem alio actu, actus quo diligo finem esset causa respectu alterius actus, quia non diligo aliud nisi quia diligo finem."

⁶² *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. IV, 397, 505-508: "...igitur si recta ratio dictet quod talis actus sit volendus loco et tempore, voluntas perfecte virtuosa debet velle talem actum in loco et tempore; et per consequens quidquid est obiectum actus dictandi recte, erit obiectum actus perfecte virtuosus."

4 *Divine Command Ethics*

The conformity of the created will with God's precept is a key conception in Ockham's ethics. It is noticeable that God's precept is not strictly the same as God's will; God's precept does not necessarily disclose all that God wills but only what He wills us to will.⁶³ God's precepts oblige one to will certain things and not to will others. Morality, then, takes divine precepts as its foundation: the obligation of the created will is to obey God, the moral authority.⁶⁴

My thesis is that Ockham's theory primarily represents a normative and deontological Divine Command ethics which is based on God's absolute power. Its structure, however, is such that it also allows the pattern of natural morality to which Ockham refers in some connections.⁶⁵ I am not satisfied, then, with Lucan Freppert's way of speaking of two systems or ethical theories within Ockham's ethics, one theological and another natural; neither do I agree with Marilyn McCord Adams who suggests that Ockham's theory could be labelled "Modified Right Reason Theory".⁶⁶ I wish to show why we need not (or cannot) speak of two theories in Ockham's ethics and what makes Ockham's theory specifically a Divine Command ethics.

⁶³ *Quaest. variae, q. 8, art. II, 434, 573 - 435, 578*: "...voluntas non semper est recta quando conformatur voluntati divinae in obiecto voluto. Nam aliquando vult Deus aliquid et tamen vult creaturam velle oppositum. Exemplum: Deus ab aeterno voluit mortem Christi et tamen voluit Iudaeos nolle mortem eius eo modo quod mortuus est ab eis."

Freppert discusses thoroughly the question "What is involved in conformity to the will of God?", see Freppert 1988, 112-121.

⁶⁴ *II Sent., q. 15, 353, 6-7*: "...voluntas creata obligatur ex praecepto Dei ad diligendum Deum..." *Quaest. variae, q. 8, art. II, 435, 592-593*: "Sed voluntas creata...tenetur velle quod Deus vult eam velle." *Quodl. III, q. 14, 256, 64-65*: "...quilibet pro loco et tempore obligatur ad diligendum Deum super omnia..."

⁶⁵ See e.g., *Quaest. variae, q. 7, art. II, 335, 132-136*; *III Sent., q. 11, 374, 10-18*.

⁶⁶ See Freppert 1988, 172-174, 179; Adams 1986, 33-34.

Ockham's view of God as omnipotent and absolutely free forms the theological basis for his ethical theory.⁶⁷ God by grace does what He does, gives what He gives, loves whom He loves. God is not a debtor to anyone, and He is not under any obligation.⁶⁸ The requirement of consistency is the only principle that restricts God's power.⁶⁹ In his theologico-philosophical writings Ockham uses the medieval distinction between God's ordered power (*potentia ordinata*) and God's absolute power (*potentia absoluta*).⁷⁰ The distinction does not imply that there are really two powers in God,

⁶⁷ Freppert 1988, 106-107: "Whatever God wills concerning creatures is not only willed freely but justly. And as he creates any creature that he wills to create, so also he can do anything he wishes concerning creatures. By the very fact that God does anything, it is done justly and well. How important these ideas are for an ethics which is fundamentally based on the will of God is immediately evident. The absolute freedom of an omnipotent God certainly has to be given serious consideration in examining the role of this God as the supreme lawgiver for the human race."

⁶⁸ I *Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, 455, 16-17: "Immo (Deus) ex mera gratia sua liberaliter dabit cuicumque dabit..." *Ibid.*, 463, 24 - 464, 2: "...dico quod non est necesse Deum diligere ex aliquo inductivo, sed liberaliter et mere libere diligit quem diligit." IV *Sent.*, q. 5, 55, 12-19: "...sicut Deus creat creaturam quamlibet ex mera voluntate sua, ita ex mera voluntate sua potest facere de creatura sua quidquid sibi placet. ... Et ratio est quia Deus nullius est debitor, sed quidquid nobis facit, ex mera gratia facit. Et ideo eo ipso quod Deus aliquid facit, iuste factum est." II *Sent.*, q. 4, 59, 4-7: "...malum nihil aliud est quam facere aliquid ad cuius oppositum faciendum aliquis obligatur. Quae obligatio non cadit in Deo, quia ipse ad nihil faciendum obligatur." II *Sent.*, q. 15, 343, 17-22: "...nunquam homo peccat nisi quia tenetur facere quod non facit vel quia facit quod non debet facere. Per istam [rationem] fit homo debitor; Deus autem nulli tenetur nec obligatur tanquam debitor, et ideo non potest facere quod non debet facere nec non facere quod debet facere." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. IV, 389, 322 - 390, 324: "...Deus nullius est debitor, et ideo nec tenetur illum actum causare nec oppositum actum, nec illum actum non causare..."

See also Adams 1986, 20-22; Freppert 1988, 112.

⁶⁹ *Quodl.* VI, q. 1, 586, 24-29: "Aliter accipitur 'posse' pro posse facere omne illud quod non includit contradictionem fieri...et illa dicitur Deus posse de potentia absoluta."

Freppert 1988, 110: "...God can do anything which would not involve a contradiction in being done..." Boehner 1957, xlix: "For God is nobody's debtor, and He is only restricted - if this can be called a restriction - by the impossibility of what contains a contradiction. Hence God can command everything with this power, except not to obey Him."

⁷⁰ On the distinction, see Courtenay 1985, 243-269; see also Pernoud 1970, 65-97; Pernoud 1972, 69-95; Freppert 1988, 109-110.

since the power in God is one, according to Ockham.⁷¹ Thus, God as omnipotent is God who has absolute power. The ordered power of God is implicitly included in His absolute power. Just because God has absolute power, He can also restrict His power, which is revealed as the power that God actually uses.

The distinction should be understood as follows. The ordered power refers to God acting in conformity with His statutes. The absolute power refers to God who can do anything which does not involve a contradiction; He can also do many such things which He does not want to do. Actually, God has established a special order (the order for morals and for salvation); He has revealed certain principles for His action.⁷²

The distinction made by Ockham concerns first of all the use of language (*accipitur, dicitur*).⁷³ When Ockham discusses God's action within the ordered power (*potentia ordinata*), he at least wants to mention that the action in question belongs to an omnipotent God (having *potentia absoluta*). The mention "licet absolute sit possibile" (*Quodl.* VI, q. 1, 586) is one example of this kind of clause used by Ockham. What God does by His absolute power becomes ordinate precisely because it is a state of things ordained by God.⁷⁴ Ockham

⁷¹ *Quodl.* VI, q. 1, 585, 15 - 586, 21: "Haec distinctio non est sic intelligenda quod in Deo sint realiter duae potentiae quarum una sit ordinata et alia absoluta, quia unica potentia est in Deo ad extra, quae omni modo est ipse Deus. Nec sic est intelligenda quod aliqua potest Deus ordinate facere, et aliqua potest absolute et non ordinate, quia Deus nihil potest facere inordinate."

⁷² *Quodl.* VI, q. 1, 586, 22-29: "Sed est sic intelligenda quod 'posse aliquid' quandoque accipitur secundum leges ordinatas et institutas a Deo, et illa dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia ordinata. Aliter accipitur 'posse' pro posse facere omne illud quod non includit contradictionem fieri, sive Deus ordinaverit se hoc facturum sive non, quia multa potest Deus facere quae non vult facere...et illa dicitur Deus posse de potentia absoluta." *Ibid.*, 586, 33-39: "Cum enim Deus sit aequalis potentiae nunc sicut prius, et aliquando aliqui introierunt regnum Dei sine omni baptismo...et nunc est hoc possibile. Sed tamen illud quod tunc erat possibile secundum leges tunc institutas, nunc non est possibile secundum legem iam institutam, licet absolute sit possibile."

⁷³ Miethke 1969, 150.

⁷⁴ *Opus Nonaginta Dierum, cap.* 95, 726, 418-430, here 425-430: "Et ita dicere quod Deus potest aliqua de potentia absoluta, quae non potest de potentia ordinata, non est aliud, secundum intellectum recte intelligentium, quam dicere quod Deus aliqua potest, quae tamen minime ordinavit se facturum; quae tamen si

makes use of the distinction between *potentia ordinata* and *potentia absoluta* when he emphasizes his view of God as having absolute power.⁷⁵ God's having absolute power is a crucial principle in Ockham's theology not only from the point of view of what God could do but also regarding what God has done, since He has done it as an omnipotent and free God.

God in His absolute power can command whatever He wills (this does not seem to involve any contradiction); anyone who takes seriously the obligation of loving what God wills to be loved is ready to obey God's precept whatever it is.⁷⁶ This being the case, the following problem seems to arise: you should also obey a precept which is contrary to another precept already given by God. In fact, the Old Testament includes examples of how God has deviated from His precepts (e.g., God's precept to Abraham to sacrifice his son). In the same way, God could make exceptions to His law today or tomorrow. However, the reason for obeying God in all these possible situations has to be the obedience to a divine precept. Otherwise acting in such a way can be a sin.⁷⁷

The role of God's absolute power has led to criticism of Ockham's ethics. Of the Ockham scholars, Anita Garvens has interpreted Ockham's view in a quite negative way. According to

faceret, de potentia ordinata faceret ipsa; quia si faceret ea, ordinaret se facturum ipsa."

Pernoud 1972, 89: "In this emphasis upon God's actions being ordinate, whether they stem from His *potentia absoluta* or *potentia ordinata*, we find Ockham reiterating the same characteristic insisted upon by Scotus."

⁷⁵ *Quaest. variae*, q. 6, art. XI, 293, 168-170: "Quia quod actus cum illo gradu causato mediante caritate sit acceptus a Deo et sine illo non sit acceptus, hoc solum est ex mera voluntate Dei sic ordinante."

⁷⁶ Ockham speaks of some kind of habit which inclines the created will to all that God wills us to will (I *Sent.*, d. 48, q. unica, 688, 12 - 689, 4); see on this Freppert 1988, 115. Boehner 1957, xlix: "As soon as a human person knows that a certain command is the will of God, he is bound to obey."

⁷⁷ I *Sent.*, d. 47, q. unica, 685, 8-12: "...spoliare Aegyptios non fuit malum, immo fuit bonum. Et ideo Deus praecipiendo spoliare Aegyptios non praeceptum malum, nec filii Israel peccaverunt in spoliando, nisi illi qui malo animo, non praecise obediendo divino praecepto, spoliaverint."

See also Miethke 1969, 313-314.

her, Ockham represents moral positivism in the sense that at any time God could give new orders and change the old ones. Garvens thinks that Ockham questions the whole competence of moral law (the Decalogue) by certain examples: God could command man to hate Him, or He could will that a person honour one's parents but at the same time that some other person not do so.⁷⁸

Many Ockham scholars have subsequently taken another course to interpret Ockham's view. Philotheus Boehner, for example, admits that in a way Ockham represents positivism. According to Ockham, what God wills is good, what He forbids is bad.⁷⁹ Boehner, however, does not consider Ockham a representative of theonomic moral positivism according to which the moral order is dependent on arbitrary divine will and not on God's essence. According to Boehner, when Ockham emphasizes God's absolute power, he still takes account of God's essence (His goodness and wisdom) and considers it to have an influence on what God actually commands.⁸⁰ Unlike Garvens, Boehner arrived at a result that the moral law is competent; God asked Abraham to sacrifice his son (*potentia*

⁷⁸ Garvens 1934, 248, 265-267. Ockham's examples are found in IV *Sent.*, q. 16, 352, 5-7; I *Sent.*, d. 48, q. *unica*, 690, 21 - 691, 26.

⁷⁹ Boehner 1957, xlvi-lix: "Ockham's ethical theory is sometimes called positivistic; and this is true in so far as the Venerable Inceptor maintains that a human act is good or moral, not because it is in conformity with an eternal law which exists of itself and even governs the will of God, but simply because it is ordained and commanded by the will of God. Hence what God wills is good, what He forbids is bad. It is, by definition, an impossibility that God can ever order or command a bad thing. It follows that God's will is the ethical norm and must be obeyed by every creature."

⁸⁰ Boehner 1957, xlix; González 1973, 109-110; Junghans 1969, 252. There are other scholars who emphasize the same point as Boehner: Freppert 1988, 176: "Man's relation to the moral law is better seen in the light of God's ordered power, his wisdom and other attributes, in virtue of which the present moral order is established." Adams 1986, 34: "Those who fear that God cannot be trusted to be good to His creatures may well shudder at the extensive power and freedom Ockham assigns Him." Miethke 1969, 316: "Aber wir haben schon gesehen, dass man den Gottesbegriff Ockhams nicht einfach auf die Formel einer despotischen Willkür bringen kann, denn in Gottes Wesen sind Wille und Intellekt nicht real oder formal unterschieden..."

absoluta), which showed that God alone can deviate from the precept 'do not kill' that is based on natural law.⁸¹

Ockham uses the example according to which God could command that He is to be hated. This has been taken as the expression of positivism according to which moral precepts are precepts of a sovereign God.⁸² Jürgen Miethke pays attention, as does Garvens, to the aspect of Ockham's view that at any time God could give some new precept which would deviate from the earlier one and would bind the created will.⁸³ However, Miethke does not arrive at the result that Ockham would question the competence of the moral law. Miethke thinks that God's free precepts are reasonable (*rationabiles*), but he also emphasizes that the created order is fully contingent; the only necessity it has is that it is willed and established by God.⁸⁴

Ockham's ethics, I think, can be considered "positivistic" in the sense that the moral order is established by God and as such it is ontologically contingent. I agree with Miethke that Ockham's ethics does not represent positivism in the sense that some kind of "Blinder Gehorsam" would be presupposed in the prevailing moral order.⁸⁵ God is the authority of the moral order but this order is not conceived as arbitrary by men.⁸⁶

81 Junghans 1969, 253.

82 Miethke 1969, 315. Ockham writes in IV *Sent.*, q. 16, 352, 5-7: "...omnis voluntas potest se conformare praecepto divino. Sed Deus potest praecipere quod voluntas creata odiat eum, igitur voluntas creata potest hoc facere."

83 Miethke 1969, 314.

84 Miethke 1969, 316-317: "Diese rationabilitas der ontologisch kontingenten Ordnung zeigt sich in der geschöpflichen Welt daran, dass die sittliche Qualität eines Aktes nicht allein, wenn auch primär, an die Konformität des geschöpflichen Willens mit der voluntas divina gebunden ist, sondern zugleich an die Konformität mit der sittlichen Einsicht (*recta ratio*). Die sittliche Einsicht ist ja gerade der 'Ort', an dem Gottes praeceptum dem menschlichen Willen praesent ist, und damit ist sie eine notwendige Bedingung jeder Tat sittlichen Gehorsams."

85 Miethke 1969, 318-319.

86 McDonnell 1974, 386-387: "However, dependence upon the will of God, as Ockham conceives that will, does not necessarily imply arbitrariness. For men to claim that the will of God commands some action arbitrarily, they would have to

God in His absolute power can command whatever He wills, even the hatred of Himself, according to Ockham. Those who consider this view troublesome will emphasize that God's precepts actually are in conformity with His essence. I do not regard this emphasis as necessary. Ockham himself is not interested in the aspect of the ordered power, i.e., what God actually commands consistent with His essence while emphasizing the following point: moral right or wrong is ultimately based on God's precept.

Ockham is mainly interested in the question of the source of moral obligation. Morally good action is to fulfil moral obligation as a moral obligation. This is a conceptual and necessary truth. Another question is whether there are moral obligations. In *Quodlibet* III, question 14, Ockham tries to prove that the act by which God is loved above all and for Himself is a necessarily virtuous act in the sense that it cannot be vicious *stante praecepto divino*, nor can it be caused by the created will without its being virtuous.⁸⁷ It is especially important to notice here that the clause "stante praecepto divino" is included in Ockham's discussion. Freppert misleadingly separates a few lines of Ockham's text (*Quodl.* III, q. 14, 255, 61 - 256, 64) from the whole context (*Quodl.* III, q. 14, 255, 43 - 256, 64) and claims that "here in the *Quodlibeta* there is no reference to any dependence on the precept of God remaining

be able to point to some external standard according to which the will of God is bound to operate. But granting the nature of God as creator of all things, it is impossible that there be any such independent standard. If men claim that God is acting in an arbitrary fashion, they are simply imposing the present structure of human reason upon God. Ockham, on the other hand, holds that human reason is dependent upon the will of God. Perhaps if God were to arrange it that adultery were the right thing to do, there would be men to claim that it would be perversely arbitrary and irrational, and therefore impossible, for God to command monogamous marriage."

⁸⁷ *Quodl.* III, q. 14, 255, 43 - 256, 64: "Tamen aliter potest intelligi actum esse necessario virtuosum, ita scilicet quod non possit esse vitiosus stante praecepto divino; similiter non potest causari a voluntate creata nisi sit virtuosus. ... Tertio dico quod ille actus necessario virtuosus modo praedicto est actus voluntatis, quia actus quo diligitur Deus super omnia et propter se, est huiusmodi; nam iste actus sic est virtuosus quod non potest esse vitiosus, nec potest iste actus causari a voluntate creata nisi sit virtuosus..."

in force."⁸⁸ Ockham does claim that the act of loving God above all is virtuous by conditional necessity, viz., provided that God's precept remains in force. Here Ockham confirms his view of God's absolute power; there is no act which would be virtuous (or vicious) independent of God's precept.⁸⁹

According to Freppert, the basis for obeying God's precept that He must be loved is the love of God itself. In other words, man obeys God precisely for the reason that he loves Him. This means that the divine precept does not form the basis for the obligation to love God.⁹⁰ Freppert is right in the sense that the love itself (without any precept) could be the motivating basis for obeying. I do not see any reason why Ockham would deny this. The point is, however, that Ockham is discussing a moral act of loving God and not a natural act of loving God as a possible motivation for obeying.⁹¹

The moral act of loving God is virtuous *stante praecepto divino*; if it were not, there would not be any acts which would be virtuous in this way. This holds insofar as we take it to be Ockham's view that the second-order act of willing to obey God is realized by some first-order act.

After having given the act of loving God the status of necessarily virtuous *stante praecepto divino*, Ockham has to answer

⁸⁸ See Freppert 1988, 147-148.

⁸⁹ Ockham reminds us that the whole moral order established by God could be different; see II *Sent.*, q. 15, 352, 3-19. As far as the present moral order is concerned, God can make exceptions with respect to the positive precepts already ordered by Him; see I *Sent.*, d. 48, q. unica, 690, 11 - 691, 26.

⁹⁰ See Freppert 1988, 121-122.

⁹¹ Ockham in fact makes a difference between two kinds of loving God: "Sicut si aliquis diligeret Deum super omnia [sed] non secundum aliquam circumstantiam requisitam, et iste idem post diligeret Deum super omnia secundum omnes circumstantias, puta secundum rectam rationem, quia est finis ultimus, et sic de aliis, hic actus pure naturalis et meritorius necessario distinguuntur, non solum numero, sed etiam specie propter distinctionem specificam circumstantiarum quae sunt obiecta partialia actus meritorii" (*Quaest. variae*, q. 6, art. XI, 292, 146-293, 153). Loving God above all as a natural act differs numerically and specifically from the meritorious act of loving God above all. The former is not a morally evaluable act; the latter is because it is in conformity with right reason and with all required circumstances.

affirmatively the question of whether God could command men so that He be not loved during a certain period of time - God can command whatever He wills. This question is connected with an example by which Ockham's view of a necessarily virtuous act could be criticized. According to the example, God could command that He be not loved during a certain period of time; God's precept, then, could be that a person should concentrate on studies during this time and not on thinking about God.⁹² He who wants to show by this example that loving God above all cannot have the status of "the first of all good acts" begins by demanding: "*Tunc volo quod voluntas tunc eliciat actum diligendi Deum*". It seems that the act of loving God is not virtuous. In his answer Ockham does not speak about a special religious act of loving God. The act of will which he claims to be necessarily virtuous is the act of loving God in the sense of willing to fulfil divine law, and of this act Ockham says: "*voluntas non potest pro tunc talem actum elicere*" ("the will cannot then elicit such an act"). According to Ockham, if God gives the kind of command that He be not loved, the will cannot then (*pro tunc*) obey it.⁹³ In this case, no act of will can be an act which would fulfil the divine law; i.e., no act of will can be a necessarily virtuous act of obedient love, although the will can love God in a natural way in this situation as well.⁹⁴

⁹² *Quodl.* III, q. 14, 256, 74-84: "Si dicis quod Deus potest praecipere quod pro aliquo tempore non diligatur ipse, quia potest praecipere quod intellectus sit sic intentus circa studium et voluntas similiter, ut nihil possit pro illo tempore de Deo cogitare. ... Respondeo: si Deus posset hoc praecipere, sicut videtur quod potest sine contradictione, dico tunc quod..."

⁹³ Ockham's expression "*voluntas non potest pro tunc talem actum elicere*" has been interpreted in different ways; see Junghans 1969, 252, footnote 394. According to Freppert, "*talem actum*" refers to the act of loving God and "*pro tunc*" to a certain period of time; see Freppert 1988, 137. In order to be more accurate, we should say that "*talem actum*" refers to the necessarily virtuous act of loving God (and not, for example, to the act of loving God in a natural way which is not a moral act). I think that Ockham's expression "*pro tunc*" refers to the case when God has commanded that He be not loved. Thus, the expressions *tunc* (*Quodl.* III, q. 14, 256, 77), *pro tunc* (*ibid.*, 256, 85) and *per casum* (*ibid.*, 257, 89) all refer to this case.

⁹⁴ *Quodl.* III, q. 14, 256, 84 - 257, 92: "...dico tunc quod voluntas non potest pro tunc talem actum elicere... Posset tamen Deum diligere simplici amore et

In *Quodlibet* III, question 14, Ockham discusses, thus, the case in which action as moral is not available. Ockham gives reasons for his view:

For by the very fact that the human will would elicit such an act it would love God above all, and consequently it would fulfil the divine precept, because to love God above all means to love whatever God wills to be loved; and by the very fact that it would love in this way it would not fulfil the divine precept in this case; loving God and not loving God, fulfilling God's precept and not fulfilling it would follow loving God in this way (*Quodl.* III, q. 14, 256, 85 - 257, 91).⁹⁵

Loving God above all means willing whatever God wills to be willed. In this case God wills that He be not loved. A person might try to fulfil God's precept that He has to be loved by willing what God wills him to will. But at the same time he would not fulfil God's precept that He be not loved *per casum*.

The following two points explain Ockham's way of considering the question of whether God could command that He be not loved. First, Ockham does not try to avoid describing a conflicting case; he does it and actually shows in what way the system of norms can become irrational. God could make the divine law irrational by giving at the same level two precepts which are in contradiction to each other.⁹⁶ According to Ockham, it depends on God's will whether there is any reliable ethics or not.

The second point is that Ockham's answer to the critical example does not in any way change his main thesis of loving God as a

naturali, qui non est dilectio Dei super omnia..."

⁹⁵ *Quodl.* III, q. 14, 256, 85 - 257, 91: "...quia ex hoc ipso quod talem actum eliceret, Deum diligeret super omnia, et per consequens impleret praeceptum divinum, quia hoc est diligere Deum super omnia: diligere quidquid Deus vult diligere; et ex hoc ipso quod sic diligeret, non faceret praeceptum divinum per casum; et per consequens sic diligendo, Deum diligeret et non diligeret, faceret praeceptum Dei et non faceret."

⁹⁶ Simo Knuuttila has commented on the question of whether God can command men that He be not loved as follows: "The question was theoretically interesting because it offered an extreme case for considering the rationality of a system of norms. According to Ockham, God can add into the divine law an obligation to the effect that all obligations must be violated. Such a rule, if it is given at the same level as the others, makes the system of norms irrational, because then no rule can be fulfilled, without violating the others. God can make it impossible for man to act meritoriously by making the divine law irrational" (see Knuuttila 1981, 236-237).

necessarily virtuous act. It may be that there is no opportunity to love God through obedience, but still loving God would be a necessarily virtuous act.

I shall briefly look at some interpretations of question 14 in *Quodlibet* III. According to Miethke, the main idea of Ockham's answer in *Quodlibet* III, q. 14 is that moral action is also bound up with obedience in exceptional cases.⁹⁷ Generally speaking, this of course holds in Ockham's ethics.⁹⁸ But here the core of Ockham's view does not, in my opinion, lie in this point. Ockham does not treat the critical example as an example of an exceptional case; he does not speak of the obedience which would be possible in this case. On the contrary, the will cannot elicit the act of obedience, since by the act of obedience the will would love God which, again, was forbidden by God. According to Ockham, it is not possible to fulfil God's precept that He be not loved, that is to say, the act of willing not to love God cannot represent one instance of the necessarily virtuous act of loving God.

When Ockham considers God's precepts in the sense that they represent occasional deviations from His Decalogue or exceptional cases, he always presupposes that the created will can fulfil the precept in question. (He presupposes this even in the case when God's command is that He be hated.⁹⁹) However, Ockham does not presuppose the possibility to fulfil the precept if God commanded that He be not loved. On the contrary, it is an ethical impossibility to fulfil this kind of precept.

According to Freppert, there seems to be no difficulty if the case is such that the creature obeys the command not to love God during a certain period of time (by remaining intent on studying, as

⁹⁷ See Miethke 1969, 319-322.

⁹⁸ See, for example, I *Sent.*, d. 47, q. *unica*, 685, 8-12.

⁹⁹ IV *Sent.*, q. 16, 352, 5-7: "...omnis voluntas potest se conformare praecepto divino. Sed Deus potest praecipere quod voluntas creata odiat eum, igitur voluntas creata potest hoc facere."

See also I *Sent.*, d. 47, q. *unica*, 685, 8-12; I *Sent.*, d. 48, q. *unica*, 690, 21-691, 26.

the example suggests). This kind of situation is not problematic at all because it does not offer the case of violating any obligation. God does not demand specific acts of loving Him all the time. God can command the creature to do something else (studying) instead of incessantly eliciting acts of the love of God; for example, when God commands that He be not loved, the creature can obey by not eliciting an act of the love of God at this particular time.¹⁰⁰

Boehner, again, writes: "If God commanded a creature to hate Him or simply not to love Him, the creature would be obliged to obey, but it could not obey since in obeying it would love Him."¹⁰¹ At this point, Freppert criticizes Boehner's solution according to which the creature cannot obey the command not to love God. Freppert remarks: "By obeying the command it is true that the creature would love God, but it would not love God by a specific act of the love of God."¹⁰² Freppert wants to say that obeying is loving and in this sense the creature loves by obeying but he does not love in any way which is forbidden because of God's command not to love Him.

According to Freppert, Ockham's answer does not properly deal with the case in which the creature would obey the command not to love God (although this obeying would be possible for the creature in the way discussed by Freppert). Thus, Ockham's answer concerns the case in which the creature turns from his studies to eliciting an act of the love of God. And in this case, "a genuine act of love -

¹⁰⁰ Freppert 1988, 138: "...let us suppose that the creature takes either one of two possible alternatives in reaction to the command of God that he is not to be loved during this particular time of study. First, the creature remains intent on studying, does not elicit an act of the love of God, thus fulfilling the particular command of God that he be not loved during this time. Secondly, the creature turns from his studies to elicit an act of the love of God. In the first alternative, it seems that no difficulty will be encountered. For by following the command not to love God at this particular time, an act which is precisely an act of loving God is not elicited, it is true; but God is loved in the act of being intent on studying since this is in fulfillment of a command of God. ... Therefore, by not eliciting an act of the love of God at this particular time no obligation is violated.

¹⁰¹ Boehner 1957, xlix-l. See also Vedder 1987, 121.

¹⁰² Freppert 1988, 139.

the love of God and what God wills - would be impossible."¹⁰³ The creature cannot disobey the command not to love God by eliciting a genuine act of love - the love of God and what God wills - during this time, because the condition of willing what God wills is not fulfilled by any particular act of love. Freppert thinks that his interpretation has the following advantage: "By saying, however, that the creature cannot disobey we avoid the contradiction that God is loved and not loved at the same time."¹⁰⁴ It is thought here that Ockham's answer to the counterexample is that the command not to love cannot be violated by a particular act of love. It is not at all clear, however, why an intended act of loving God by a particular act would not violate the precept that God should not be loved by such an act. I find Freppert's criticism of Boehner's account unfounded.

God has given men a moral order which is as God has willed it to be (*potentia ordinata*). All intrinsically virtuous acts of will gather under the necessarily virtuous act of loving God. The moral act of loving God is an act of loving whatever He wills to be loved; by being defined in this way it is always an act of obeying God. God has given men intellect; it is a necessary principle for morally good action. The dictate of right reason (*regula*) represents in some concrete situation divine will which is the primary commandment for virtuous action (*prima regula directiva*).¹⁰⁵ I maintain that Ockham's view of the relation between these two norms - right

¹⁰³ See Freppert 1988, 138-139.

¹⁰⁴ Freppert 1988, 138.

¹⁰⁵ *Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. I, 409, 16 - 410, 25: "...ad hoc quod actus rectus eliciatur a voluntate necessario requiritur aliqua recta ratio in intellectu. Hoc patet per rationem et auctoritatem. Per rationem, quia illa voluntas quae potest, quantum est de se, indifferenter bene agere et male, quia de se non est recta, necessario ad hoc quod recte agat, indiget aliqua regula dirigente alia a se. Hoc patet, quia ideo voluntas divina non indiget aliquo dirigente quia ipsa est prima regula directiva et non potest male agere. Sed voluntas nostra est huiusmodi quod potest recte et non recte agere. Igitur indiget aliqua ratione recta dirigente."

reason and God's will - guarantees the structural unity of his ethical theory.

Ockham presupposes that right reason is one of the objects of a virtuous act of will.¹⁰⁶ The will is also obligated by God's precept to love God.¹⁰⁷ The precept to love God can be expressed in this form: will whatever God wills you to will.¹⁰⁸ Divine will as a primary commandment (*prima regula directiva*) is disclosed in this form of the precept. Respect for right reason could be expressed thus: will all the good that right reason dictates you to will. The dictate of right reason as a rule for morally good action (*regula*) would be disclosed in this kind of principle. Actually, Ockham does say that the one common principle concerning every virtue is '*omne bonum dictatum a recta ratione est diligendum*'.¹⁰⁹ The ethical value of moral action is then bound up both in its being in conformity with right reason and in its being one instance of the act of loving God. Its value as an act of loving God arises straight from God's precept which *per definitionem* is morally right. But what about its value as an act in conformity with right reason?

According to Ockham, the divine will is that one should follow one's conscience; that is to say, one should follow the dictate of right reason: *voluntas divina vult eum sequi rationem non culpabilem*.¹¹⁰ This means that the divine will wills that morality is in force. The principle '*omne bonum dictatum a recta ratione est diligendum*' tells what morality is, and it is in force because of an act of divine will. If a person puts his morality into practice in conformity with the virtue of the third grade, his obligation, then, is to follow the dictate of right reason; and he does it because he

¹⁰⁶ See e.g., III *Sent.*, q. 12, 422, 8-17.

¹⁰⁷ II *Sent.*, q. 15, 353, 6-7: "...voluntas creata obligatur ex praecepto Dei ad diligendum Deum..."

¹⁰⁸ See *Quodl.* III, q. 14.

¹⁰⁹ See III *Sent.*, q. 12, 425.

¹¹⁰ *Quaest. variae*, q. 8, art. II, 436, 610-613: "...voluntas creata sequens rationem erroneam errore invincibili est recta, quia voluntas divina vult eum sequi rationem non culpabilem, et sic faciendo contra illam rationem peccat quia obligatur ad oppositum."

respects morality. If a person represents morality in the fourth grade of virtue, his obligation is also to follow the dictate of right reason; he does it because of his respect for morality as created and ordered by God. In both cases, the divine demand to follow the dictate of right reason is the same. It does not lose its status as being stated by God, although there would be men who would not treat it as such.¹¹¹

God wills that the dictate of right reason is to be followed because the dictate is to say what He wills to be willed in a certain situation. The concept of right reason consists of the kind of dictate (*regula*) included in the divine precept (*prima regula*). This being the case, the representative relationship between the dictate of reason and divine precept does not break down, although the subjective reason would be mistaken, provided that the decision of a person's conscience is based on some objectively right principle (*ratio universalis*). What is decisive is that a person believes that the dictate of his intellect is the dictate of right and not erroneous reason. If he is a Christian, he also believes that he elects as God wills him to elect.¹¹²

Reason dictates to will what God wills to be willed. God's precept, then, forms the primary foundation for man's obligations, independently of whether people believe that the moral content of right reason is a part of created order or not. Ockham does not construct two ethical theories, the one system based on right reason

¹¹¹ Compare with III *Sent.*, q. 7, 215, 15-17: "Bonitas significat Deum connotando actum volendi, et Deus dicitur bonus sive sit actus volendi sive non, immo, si nullus actus volendi posset esse."

¹¹² *Quodl.* III, q. 16, 263, 42-44: "...recta ratio deberet dictare quod volendum est abstinere propter Deum quia sic est dictatum a recta ratione, aliter non esset recta sed erronea..." *Quaest. variae*, q. 7, art. II, 338, 200-205: "...aliquis actus est intrinsece bonus moraliter, aliquis intrinsece malus et vitiosus... Exemplum primi: velle orare propter honorem Dei et quia praeceptum est a Deo secundum rectam rationem etc. Exemplum secundi: velle orare propter vanam gloriam et quia contra praeceptum Dei et contra rectam rationem." I *Sent.*, d. 41, q. unica, 610, 1-5: "...omnis voluntas recta est conformis rationi rectae, sed non semper est conformis rationi rectae praeviae quae ostendat causam quare debet voluntas hoc velle. Sed eo ipso quod voluntas divina hoc vult, ratio recta dictat quod est volendum."

See also Freppert 1988, 81-82.

and the other based on God's will.¹¹³ These norms are linked together in Ockham's theory of ethics; for Ockham, ethics is a matter of divine law always discerned through reason or conscience. Ockham's ethics allows the pattern of natural morality to be separated from it without breaking the core of it as the deontological and theological theory of ethics. One could also say that Ockham teaches a single theory of ethics which allows two moralities in practice.¹¹⁴ As far as the contents of these

¹¹³ Clark describes Ockham's ethical theory as follows: "Ockham teaches a single doctrine of ethics which includes two parts - the positive and non-positive. Interpretations of voluntarism and rationalism, therefore, account for only part of Ockham's ethical theory. Furthermore, it can be illustrated that Ockham reconciles the positive and non-positive parts of moral doctrine as the content and form of morality. Interpretations utilizing the notions of 'dogmatic' and 'formal' can be faithful to the diverse aspects of Ockham's system without destroying the fundamental unity of his moral doctrine" (Clark 1971, 86). "Anita Garvens expressed the positive and non-positive aspects of moral theory as the 'content' and 'form' of moral doctrine" (*ibid.*, 83, footnote 47). "...Ockham does not contrast the positive and the non-positive parts of moral doctrine by distinguishing between acts which are 'evil because they are prohibited' and acts which are 'prohibited because they are intrinsically evil'. Secondly, Ockham never asserts that the positive and the non-positive are antithetical" (*ibid.*, 83, footnote 45).

In Linwood Urban's interpretation, right reason has the status of the primary lawgiver ("God Limited by Right Reason"): "From the conjunction of 'God cannot violate the analytically self-evident principles of right reason', and the principle 'The will ought to be conformed to right reason', it follows that 'God cannot violate the principle that the will ought to conform itself to right reason'" (Urban 1973, 320). For one thing, God has given men the intellect; it is believable that the formal principles of reason (*per se nota*) are willed by God. Secondly, if it were true that God cannot violate the principles of reason, what does it matter? It does not follow from it that God wills some definite things because right reason dictates them to be willed.

Compare with *Quodl IV, q. 3, 313, 77-81*: "...haec universalis est vera, per se nota a me 'quaelibet res est talis qualem Deus vult eam esse'; tamen haec est falsa 'de qualibet re scitur a me quod ipsa est talis qualem Deus vult eam esse', quia multae sunt res de quibus nescio utrum sint vel non, et utrum sint volitae a Deo."

¹¹⁴ Adams speaks of non-positive and positive morality in Ockham's moral theory: "Thus, there is a double criterion of a morally virtuous act - the dictates of right reason, on the one hand, and divine precepts on the other. But within the sphere of non-positive morality, the latter derives its authority from the former" (Adams 1986, 24). "It is within a sub-division of positive morality - that of merit and demerit - that divine commands are fundamental" (*ibid.*, 34). "The result is once again a double criterion, but this time divine precept is primary and yields right reason as a partial and derivative but internal rule regarding merit and demerit" (*ibid.*, 26). See also Adams 1990, 14.

moralties, natural and Christian, are concerned, they do not differ from each other. What makes the difference between them is that a Christian respects not only morality but morality as ordered by God.

SUMMARY

The aim of this study has been to clarify William Ockham's theory of the foundations of ethics as it can be found in his theological and philosophical writings.

In the first chapter of the study, I treated Ockham's philosophical anthropology and the meanings of psychological concepts used in it. Ockham's voluntaristic conception of the will as a source of free choice proved essential in view of his ethics.

In the second chapter, I discussed Ockham's conception of practical knowledge. The first result was that knowledge, according to Ockham, has no other final cause than the one a knower himself intends. The second important inquiry was concerned with Ockham's distinction between ostensibly practical and dictatively practical knowledge. The distinction turned out to be very similar to Kant's distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. It became obvious that ethics diverges from the other practical sciences; ethics as a practical science, like the categorical imperative, directs human action without conditions.

The first part of the third chapter concerned the different uses of the connotative term 'virtuous'. Ockham's conception of denominative predication can be applied to several uses of the term, which shows the influence of his logic on moral philosophical and moral theological concepts. The deontological structure of Ockham's ethics was found in the theory according to which the term 'virtuous' is predicated of acts of will, some of which are intrinsically virtuous acts and some extrinsically virtuous acts, i.e., acts which are virtuous due to the former. I have shown through a detailed analysis how Ockham specifies a basic intrinsically virtuous act, which is an act of willing to fulfil moral law *qua* moral law, and how all other acts may be called virtuous through a denominative predication. As the basically virtuous act cannot occur without an act of willing to fulfil the moral law through a particular material act, it can also be considered as a complex act a part of which is extrinsically virtuous.

In the latter part of the chapter I first discussed the criteria for moral goodness of an act of will, or, in other words, how Ockham applies the rule concerning the use of the term 'virtuous' in connection with moral choice. The subsequent discussion pertained to Ockham's conception of the foundations of ethics. According to Ockham, morally good action is to fulfil moral obligation. This is a conceptual and necessary truth. Another question is whether there are moral obligations. Ockham thought that in ethics, as distinct from some other disciplines, there are no eternal truths. Actual moral obligations are introduced by moral authority, which is God. God has revealed divine precepts to Christians, who should understand them as a Divine Command ethics. God has also created conscience, which tells men their moral obligations. They may consider morality as consisting in naturally valid precepts, but in fact they are recognized as moral obligations only because God has made the conscience to recognize them. This is a divine command interpretation of natural morality.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Exp. Elench.</i>	<i>Expositio super libros Elenchorum</i>
<i>Exp. Phys.</i>	<i>Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis</i>
<i>Exp. Praedic. Aristot.</i>	<i>Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis</i>
<i>FcS</i>	<i>Franciscan Studies</i>
<i>FS</i>	<i>Franziskanische Studien</i>
<i>Loux, Ockham</i>	<i>Ockham's Theory of Terms.</i> Part I of the <i>Summa logicae</i> . Translated and Introduced by Michael J. Loux.
<i>OPh</i>	<i>Opera Philosophica.</i> Guillelmi de Ockham, <i>Opera Philosophica et Theologica.</i> Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae
<i>OTh</i>	<i>Opera Theologica.</i> Guillelmi de Ockham, <i>Opera Philosophica et Theologica.</i> Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae
<i>Quaest. variae</i>	<i>Quaestiones variae</i>
<i>Quodl.</i>	<i>Quodlibeta septem</i>
<i>I Sent.</i>	<i>Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum</i>
<i>II Sent.</i>	<i>Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum</i>
<i>III Sent.</i>	<i>Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum</i>
<i>IV Sent.</i>	<i>Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum</i>
<i>SL</i>	<i>Summa logicae</i>
<i>Summ. phil. natur.</i>	<i>Summula philosophiae naturalis</i>

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