Prisms of Moral Personhood: The Concept of a Person in Contemporary Anglo-American Ethics

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Synopsis

Despite the popularity of moral philosophy and ethical literature it is not clear whether any joint issues belie the multiplicity of ethical approaches. Still, ethical theories are usually philosophical explications of the moral language people use and of the institution of morality. These explications cannot be made without referring to human beings as moral persons. In this sense, “person” is one of the most central conceptions in any moral theory irrespective of its form.

The present study takes the centrality of the concept of a person as its starting point and proceeds to ask how different kinds of moral theories imply the concept of a person, which kinds of concept of a person are included in such theories and finally, what significance the concept has for understanding the nature of moral theories. These questions are explored by using models of three different types of ethical theories — utilitarian, contractarian and virtue theories — as material for the analysis. The analysis reveals three different types of a “moral person”. Theories which belong to the same group on the basis of the form of the normative moral theory represent a similar concept of a person which, again, differs from the notions of “person” provided by the other two groups of theories.

The theories of Richard Brandt, Richard M. Hare and Derek Parfit form the basis for the examination of the utilitarian theories in the study. The utilitarian concept of a person is a desiring agent who aims to realize her preferences by her action. The role of morality is to qualify the way in which the person naturally acts but moral and non-moral action do not basically deviate from each other. The contractarian theories which the study examines are by John Rawls, David Gauthier and Alan Gewirth. These theories define the constituents of moral personhood through the sufficient and necessary conditions of intentional action. The same conditions also explicate the foundation of the institution of morality: it is based on a contract guaranteeing everyone the conditions by virtue of which their intentional agency becomes possible.

Thirdly, the study examines two schools of thinking in modern virtue ethics, the first including the theories of Philippa Foot and James Wallace and the second those of Martha Nussbaum, Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. The notion which emerges from these theories can best be characterized as a narrative conception of a person: a person is the narrative of her life, something that is determined by historical and cultural contingency.

The last part of the study analyses the significance of the concept of a person as far as moral theories are concerned. The definition of the morally relevant and the notion of a moral person are closely connected. Moral theories are models for a good life and they are always designed for a certain kind of a person. In this sense, every moral theory incorporates a conception of a person within its premises. This conception is not ethically neutral but implies a view of what is good, normal or meaningful in and for a human life. This result gives rise to a conclusion that has a practical bearing: the concept of a person cannot be used as a basis for solving ethical disputes, for each version of the concept is likely to imply positions that are already normatively loaded.

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Published

2025-01-28

Details about this monograph

ISBN-10 (02)

951-9047-37-9