CHAPTER II

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF
SUPPRESSED DISCOURSE IN SOCIAL INQUIRY

Introduction

The previous chapter defined the objectives of the present study and
indicated its general starting point. In this chapter we shall elabor-
ate the starting point and develop a conceptual framework for the
analysis of the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry in
general, and of the discourse of public policy evaluation in particular.

In developing this framework we must draw on recent discussions on
the methodology of the social sciences. Reference was in Chapter I
made to the works of Kristeva, Derrida and Foucault; we can develop
their analysis toward a more concrete investigation of the problems of so-
cial research by resorting to ideas developed by *Anthony Giddens* in
his book *Central Problems in Social Theory*.[1]

The originality of Giddens's approach lies in his way of treating
the problem of social action and its grounds. Giddens rejects both the
phenomenological approach and traditional action philosophy due to
their neglect of the social conditions of action; he also rejects the
structuralist and structuralist-functionalist approaches because they
neglect the potential of individual actors to account for their action,
to penetrate constraints of the action, and to creatively produce,
reproduce and transform rules and practices guiding the action.
Giddens introduces the concept "duality of structure" which entails
three features. (1) Actors in their intentional action reflexively
monitor their action. (2) In doing so in social interaction, the
actors draw on the institutional organization of society as a "re-
source" or "facility", at the same time reproducing and reconstituting
the organization. (3) In drawing on the institutional organization as
a resource, the actors apply "interpretive schemes" which are "the

core of mutual knowledge whereby an accountable universe of meaning is sustained through and in process of interaction".[2] According to Giddens, the mutual knowledge is thus constituted and reconstituted in social interaction; and it is in this interaction that the actors' "knowledge" about physical, social and temporal contexts of their action is generated, and the relevance of the different types of contexts created and recreated.

It is easy to accept Giddens's idea of "conceptual schemes" as a "core of mutual knowledge", and the grounding of these schemes in social relations (social interaction). But Giddens assumes "automatically" that the "creative abilities" of the actors - or the unintended consequences of their action - will necessarily change and transform the conceptual schemes - or their institutionalized forms, the "structures of signification". One can also - and often on good grounds - argue that the creative abilities are but variations in the ability to use fixed categories of the conceptual schemes; and that the unintended consequences of the use of the schemes tend to enforce the "fixation" of the categories ("finalize" the schemes and force actors to use them). This perspective becomes especially relevant when we are dealing with more "specialized" and "regulated" conceptual schemes than those of everyday language use: e.g., with the conceptual schemes of social science, and of social inquiry in general. Persuasive arguments about the "finalization" and regulative power of these conceptual schemes as regards actors have been advanced, e.g. by *Michel Foucault* and *Richard Whitley*.[3] In order to get closer to the concrete content and social context of social science research and social inquiry in general than Foucault or Whitley, we must go beyond the sheer categorizations and search for intellectual and social conditions which tend to lead to finalization. We can here lean on ideas developed by the sociologist *Piotr Sztompka*, who suggests that certain fixed assumptions of social science theorizations necessarily lead to the finalization of their categories and, consequently, to the suppression of their discourse.[4]

Sztompka divides first the assumptions of social science theorizations into presuppositions and implications. Presuppositions are claims which one is compelled to accept by the force of "logic" or by the force of what are regarded as "facts" - if one is to accomplish the theorization at all. Implications are the suggestions or support that the

theorizations can render for future research or for action in "practical life".

Following Sztompka, we can divide the presuppositions of social inquiry into three types: ontological, epistemological and methodological presuppositions. First, theorizations of social inquiry must "tell" at some stage their conceptions of their subject matter; thus their discourse is *referential discourse* in the sense defined in Chapter I; and they must make ontological presuppositions which concern this subject matter. Second, theorizations of social inquiry provide, as *communicative discourse*, "knowledge" about their subject matter; they must make epistemological presuppositions that legitimize this knowledge by referring to general modes and purposes of its acquisition. More exactly, this legitimization can be perceived as a part of the encoding stage of the communicative discourse. Here, the communicative discourse must be conceived of widely, as encompassing also its "appendix": the "mythical" and "self-descriptive" *autocommunicative discourse* of those who pursue social inquiry; some of the epistemological presuppositions also pertain to this appendix. Third, the theorizations must prove the validity of the knowledge they promise to provide by referring to standard strategies and procedures by which one can extract knowledge concerning the subject matter of inquiry: they must make methodological presuppositions which also pertain to the encoding stage of the communicative discourse of social inquiry. Attempts to prove the validity of research strategies and procedures - when they exceed the limits of the discussion about sheer research techniques - usually lead back to ontological considerations of the nature of the subject matter.

Sztompka divides the implications into two categories: evaluative implications and practical implications. Social inquiry may have evaluative implications, because it may directly or indirectly stimulate or support some beliefs and attitudes concerning its subject matter, and exclude support of some other possible beliefs and attitudes. The beliefs and attitudes may concern either inquiry itself (e.g., by distinguishing "adequate" from "inadequate" inquiry), or they may concern external contexts of inquiry (e.g., they may explicitly "judge" or lead to judgments of some practical field of action which relies on social inquiry's advice or is otherwise "forced" to listen to it. Or they may

be implicit: the "silence" of inquiry legitimizes something which is "consigned to silence". Social inquiry may have practical implications, because it may directly or indirectly suggest or support views that some courses of action are possible, some impossible, some easy, some difficult; and because it may also suggest or support views concerning consequences of alternative courses of action. These practical implications may also pertain either to inquiry itself (e.g., by suggesting modes of enhancing methods and techniques of inquiry or by contributing to better designs for the institutional arrangements of inquiry), or its external contexts (e.g. by helping the control of practical action through predictions, or by improving practical actors' understanding of their own or other actors' action). The evaluative and practical implications are part of the decoding stage of the communicative discourse of social inquiry, including the decoding stage of the communicative discourse's autocommunicative appendix.

The presuppositions and implications of social inquiry are interconnected: ontological presuppositions delimit the domain of inquiry; and epistemological and methodological presuppositions determine ways of attaining knowledge about that domain and of putting this knowledge "into communicative discourse". The implications consist of explicit or implicit evaluations and suggestions for practical action concerning that domain and its analysis. As we shall see, it is often difficult to speak about some presuppositions or implications without referring to some others. From the perspective of our research objectives, the connections between the presuppositions and implications are particularly important. It is to be expected that some presuppositions, e.g.,epistemological presuppositions about a general mode of acquiring knowledge, are conducive to some implications rather than others (e.g., because of a resulting "purity" or "applicability" of knowledge). Implications of social inquiry, in turn, may feed back to the level of presuppositions: if certain presuppositions make it easier to harness inquiry to render certain practical services in its social context, these presuppositions may gain a privileged position within inquiry and in society in general. Thus presuppositions and implications may reinforce each other as the intellectual and social conditions for the production and articulation of knowledge - as well as reinforce each other as conditions which are

conducive to the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry. We shall later return several times to this reinforcement as the problem of the "finalization" of discourse.

Next we shall elaborate upon the above rough and tentative categorization of the presuppositions and implications of social inquiry for the purpose of the analysis of its suppression. The analysis will hopefully also lead to suggestions for the dissolution of the suppression, and hence to "better" social inquiry - the latter of course provided that the analysis can be communicated and made acceptable in society. The economy of presentation dictates our own "discursive strategy" below. We shall not discuss the ontological, epistemological and methodological issues or the issues concerning evaluative and practical implications *ab ovo*, but only select some main issues which, according to latest theoretical and methodological social research, are crucial in the formation of social science research and social inquiry in general. Hence our purpose is to constitute a "grid", not all-encompassing but focussed and dense enough to catch major dimensions of the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry.

In all the issues of the above categorization, we shall first formulate a "basic stand" which, according to latest theoretical and methodological studies, is most "defensible" in the sense that the adoption of the assumptions it entails will least likely lead to the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry. Because the "non-suppression" of discourse is comprehensible only in relation to suppression, support for the defensibility of the chosen basic stand is also separately in each issue sought by indicating, in terms of dichotomies,[5] how divergence from the basic stand will lead to the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry.

Ontological Presuppositions

When formulating our own "basic stands" and the diverging extreme
stands as regards the ontological presuppositions, we can again draw
on Giddens's analyses and consider the ontological issues from his
perspective of action and its grounds. Giddens's perspective will
lead us to two major ontological issues of social inquiry, viz. the
issues of intentional action and the formation of society.

In social inquiry, the term "*intentional action*" may refer to
several types of action. These types can be arranged along the dimen-
sion of "discursiveness";[6] and all these types can be topics of referential
discourse of social inquiry. First, discourse itself can be considered
intentional action ("language as action", "action via language") of dif-
ferent types (e.g., as cognitive, evaluative or prescriptive discourse,
as mentioned in Chapter I). Like any other action, discourse may as
action via language unfold on at least two different levels of actors'
(e.g., speakers') "consciousness": it may be "routine parlance" or
"creative" and "self-reflexive" use of language. The problem of
reflexiveness is complicated: discourse, including social inquiry, can
have as its topic not only action that is not discourse, but also any
other discourse - including itself. Second, intentional action may be
"pure action" ("discursive practices") where language is a mere
"medium" in formulating goals and assessing success. The "purity" na-
turally diminishes if one admits that, e.g., the goals are formulated
and the success assessed according to conscious or conventional
"rules" or "procedures"; or if one admits that any action can
have "representational" aspects - it may be not only "doing" but also
"showing". Third, action may be intentional in terms of "non-
discursively" accepted objectives and "non-discursively" known and
accepted rules which the actors know and control but which they are not
able or willing to express ("nondiscursive practices").

The above classification of different types of intentional action
indicates that social inquiry has a great variety of possible objects
for its referential discourse; consequently, social inquiry may make
a great variety of ontological assumptions while choosing and defining
these objects - and its subject matter. While formulating here our
own basic stand as regards the "appropriate" subject matter and the

related ontological presuppositions of social inquiry, we can accept
some basic tenets of Giddens's line of thought. Accordingly, we
shall first accept the idea that intentional action can be meaningful
and accountable to actors only if it is grounded on actors' (import-
antly, individuals') expectations that their action has a meaning in
a context of interindividual relationships of "intersubjectively
shared meanings" ("social relations of mutual understanding").[7] This
means that the actors more or less understand what they themselves are;
what they do; what others are and what they do; and the conditions of
all this being and doing. We also agree with Giddens even when he
suggests that "all social actors, no matter how lowly, have some
degree of penetration of the social forms which oppress them."[8] Just
as communicative discourse would be impossible if there were no direct
or indirect supposed understanding between its encoder and decoder, no
intentional action could unfold if it had no definite meaning in a con-
text of social interaction.

Even though the basic stand we are developing agrees this far with
Giddens's views, it will - in order to avoid presuppositions which may
lead to the suppression of discourse - part here from Giddens's com-
pany to a more "pessimistic" and "suspicious" direction. In order to
do this, we must return to Kristeva and Derrida and make two distinc-
tions: (1) a distinction between "seeming" ("obvious" and "apparent")
mutual understanding and the "actual" state of affairs - "mutual non-
understanding" which produces and reproduces the seeming mutual under-
standing;[9] and (2) a distinction between "socially adjusted","reified" social
relations which ground the seeming understanding, and "deeper", "under-
lying" or "more real" social relations which ground the mutual non-
understanding. This distinction can also be found in Giddens, even
though he does not wish to develop it further. He does, however, in-
dicate that actors act on the basis of their "basic 'ontological
security' system" and tend to reject all disruptions - be they psycho-
logical or caused by the actors' social relations. Giddens indeed
goes as far as to suggest that "in most circumstances of social life,
the sense of ontological security is routinely grounded in mutual
knowledge employed such that interaction is 'unproblematic' and can be
largely 'taken for granted'".[10] From this perspective we can expect
that *because* there is *obvious* and *apparent* seeming mutual understanding

and pertinent reified socially adjusted "social relations of mutual
understanding", there *necessarily* is mutual non-understanding, at least
in the sense that something is "left unsaid" about the production and
reproduction of the obvious and apparent; and there are social relations
of mutual non-understanding which ground this production and reproduc-
tion. We do not assume anything about the nature of the latter social
relations, but suggest that they are the the necessarily hidden source
of effects on the level of discursive and non-discursive intentional ac-
tion (including language as action, i.e., discourse); and the latter re-
lations provide for the Kristevian "germination of meaning" in social
interaction and communicative discourse.

In summary, we shall take as our basic stand the ontological pre-
supposition that the idea of intentional action necessarily has its
grounds on two levels of conceptual understanding and social relations:
on the level of seeming mutual understanding, and on the level of
mutual non-understanding. This stand may sound circular: on the basis
of the assumed "seemingness" it is concluded that there is something
"more real" which produces and reproduces the seemingness. However,
the seemingness of mutual understanding, i.e., its routinized char-
acter and lack of reflexiveness, can be rather easily documented - as
the above quotation from Giddens indicates - and there are also
theoretical grounds - like Giddens's reference to the "ontological in-
security", or ideas of Kristeva and Derrida - which support the argu-
ments made. But one can also develop further theoretical arguments, and
give sociological and historical evidence to support the idea of the
"two-level grounding" of intentional action.

In this further elaboration we can again resort to Giddens's
views. He suggests that unintended consequences of intentional action
may "escape" actors' conceptual penetration to society and produce and
reproduce institutional patterns (and systems of language), and that
the unintended consequences may "break through" the routinized and
apparent and change and transform it.[11] Giddens seems to assume that
these two effects of unintended consequences "balance" each other so
that "real" changes "necessarily" take place. He does not account for
the possibility that the unintended consequences may not be random, but
some "deeper" sources, i.e., our "social relations of mutual non-
understanding", may regulate them. The institutional patterns and the

changes produced and reproduced by the unintended consequences may actually conceal these deeper sources and reinforce their effects. An example of this is the "finalization" of knowledge hinted to in the first section; but, moreover, the unintended consequences, while producing and reproducing the "seeming", may also have their own "second-order consequences", which appear as "ritualistic institutional forms" where power and suppression are more "naked" than in the usual "average and routinized" action and discourse.

In order to lay a basis for examining different "ritualistic forms" of discourse and other action, one can give examples of how the second-order consequences of each type of intentional action distinguished above can become ritualized and be "sedimented" as extremely "reified" social relations of mutual understanding. (1) Language as action (discourse) may be ritualized and sedimented into more or less opaque "texts", and the monopoly to interpret them may become a source (and, in the final analysis, a reproduced effect) of power (the Bible, the Koran and *Das Kapital* suffice as examples), or discourse may arrange into no less opaque "*façons de parler*" which, e.g., discriminate between social classes, occupational groups or subcultures. (2) Discursive practices may be ritualized and sedimented into "institutions" which are capable of exerting power over actors *and* which tend to be considered legitimate by the actors (the "state", the "(labor) market" and the "scientific community" suffice as examples). (3) Nondiscursive practices may be ritualized and sedimented into "patterns of social practices", which those engaged in the practices may not be able to discern at all, because the action that the patterns ground may be so routinized as not to be acknowledged as intentional action at all (fashion, established tacit patterns of nonverbal communication and "cultivated" or otherwise "socially appropriated" physical environment necessarily "regulating" action suffice as examples).

The above comments on unintended consequences and the "reified" social relations also have implications as regards the relationships between knowledge, power and coercion. If an actor, e.g., an individual, is to be at all engaged in intentional action (which is ultimately grounded on social relations of mutual non-understanding), he cannot help subsuming himself to different kinds of physical, lingual, economic, political, moral or other coercion - which,

however, do not have their origin in conscious use of power by other actors. Here, the social relations of mutual non-understanding make it necessary for the individual to act in some ways rather than others if the action intended is to take place - and many an individual may not know that he is subject to coercion exercised by the social relations: "many of the actions people perform are caused by social conditions over which they have no control, and ... a great deal of what people do to one another is not the result of conscious choice."[12] However, it is possible that some individuals quite consciously accept milder forms of what they experience and understand as coercion caused by the social relations of mutual non-understanding, e.g., because of expected short-run personal benefits, or because of "reflexive" intentions to dissolve the social relations of mutual non-understanding before long. The last case suggests that the social relations of mutual non-understanding - and the "ritualistic institutional forms" - may not always be a constraint on intentional action, but (in concordande with Giddens's principle of "duality of structure") they may also be a source of possibilities ("resources" or "facilities") for action aiming at dissolving these very relations.[13] Accordingly, Giddensian optimism can, to a certain extent, be mixed up with the "pessimism" we have here adopted; and this optimism is necessary if we wish to have any reasons to carry out with our present research - or any inquiry or other action at all.

To complete the basic stand we are elaborating here in the issue of intentional action, we can draw on Michel Foucault's views.[14] Foucault's stands, applied to the analysis of intentional action, suggest that, from the point of view of social relations of mutual non-understanding, an actor is not a sovereign source of his or her intentions; the intentions are to a great extent effects of possibilities provided by the social relations, as these possibilities have been and can be more or less successfully understood and drawn on by the actor. The actor is here a kind of "intersection" of the social relations that provide him possibilities that he may or may not know, and that he may or may not be able to actualize.

The above suggests that the second-order consequences and the social relations of mutual non-understanding can also be viewed from the perspective of their effects at the level of individual actors' intentional action. This could lead us to a more elaborated analysis of

"consciousness" - and moreover, of the "intrapsychic"; but for our purposes it is sufficient to discuss these effects in terms of knowledge (or lack of it: ignorance) and coercion (power generated by the effects). From this perspective we can distinguish four types of the effects on the level of individual actors. First, there may be total lack of consciousness, i.e., the actors take the meanings incorporated in the socially adjusted social relations of mutual understanding for granted, as they take the germination of the meanings in the social relations of mutual non-understanding. Here, the effects conceal and hide their origins. This "lack of consciousness" may also have conscious but "non-discursive" aspects: the actors may "suspect" the obvious meanings or know a good deal of their germination, but wish to remain "really" or seemingly ignorant because they are afraid of the consequences (e.g., "getting involved", "having to assume responsibility", or "being labeled"). Second, the actors may suspect the obvious meanings, but they may be afraid to contest the meanings because of the social sanctions (in the extreme, direct physical coercion) which may follow. Here, the actors may or may not perceive that the threat of sanctions stems from the social relations of mutual non-understanding - but they may perceive that a "subject" (such as the "capitalists", the "socialists in the Cabinet" or the "state") is an origin of the sanctions. Third, the actors may see through the "seemingness" of the obvious meanings - although they may not know or be interested in the germination of the meanings; and they may use this knowledge cynically or opportunistically for their own advantage. And finally, the actors may see through the seemingness and they may also know the grounding of the meanings in social relations of mutual non-understanding; here, the actors may either challenge the meanings and the relations directly or, more likely, use their knowledge "strategically" in their planned action to have the obvious meanings abandoned and the pertinent social relations of mutual understanding dissolved.

In brief, only in the first case above have we "total ignorance", while in all the other cases we have combinations of ignorance and knowledge of coercion; and only in the last case have we a full self-reflexive account of the social relations of mutual non-understanding. Here, all the other cases are mixtures of ignorance and self-reflexive knowledge.

The above suggests that the social relations of mutual non-under-
standing produce and reproduce themselves via their effects on actors
and via the feedback of these effects. Ignorant actors evidently are
totally unaware that they contribute to the production and reproduction
of these relations; actors that are directly coerced cannot do otherwise
than contribute even where they do not want to; frightened actors lack the
courage to contest the relations; and cynical actors do not care whether
they contribute or not to the production or reproduction. Opportunistic
actors are a problematic case. Many, or most of these actors may not
be aware at all that they are producing and reproducing social relations
of mutual non-understanding; some may know and fundamentally not accept
the relations but, e.g., acknowledging that "life is short", hold that
it does not "pay" to contest the relations; and some may consider that
it may "pay" to contribute to the production and reproduction of the
relations. Finally, the position of the self-reflexive actors may be
one of a continuing "frustration": as far as the other actors remain
as they are, there may not be much hope of dissolving the social rela-
tions of mutual non-understanding.

The above suffices to indicate our basic stand as regards the first
ontological issue, that of intentional action. We can next elaborate
upon this stand by investigating how divergence from it is conducive
to the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry. In order to
sharpen and shorten our argument we shall consider this divergence in
terms of a dichotomy, two opposite stands which can be called "deter-
minism" and "relativism".[15]

The determinist stand perceives human action - including its inten-
tions - as determined by external circumstances or actors' personality,
or both; we shall here concentrate on the "external determination".
There are several areas of intentional action and social
life which cannot be accounted for from the deterministic perspective.
First, if discourse, discursive practices and non-discursive practices
and the types of intentional action they imply are understood in a de-
terminist manner as passive imitation and adaptation, it is impossible
to account in a uniform and systematic fashion for the continuous pro-
duction, reproduction and transformation of texts, *façons de parler*,
institutions and patterns of social practice via unintended consequences
of action. Similarly, determinism cannot account for the possibility

that actors may overcome their ignorance or fear and act strategically
to dissolve "seeming" meanings and social relations which ground them.
To say that social inquiry adhering to the determinist stand cannot
"account for" the mentioned areas of intentional action means that the
inquiry's ontological stand suppresses its discourse - and from the
perspective of our own basic ontological stand, this is the very con-
sequence of the relations of mutual non-understanding which are not
acknowledged by the inquiry.

The relativist ontological stand perceives intentional action ex-
haustively in terms of conscious intentions: action consists here of
aims, means, motives or calculations. Action is seen in terms of its
internal logic: definitions of goals, or success or failure in lin-
guistic and cognitive understanding of motives or in choosing means. So-
cial inquiry based on this stand also neglects several important areas
of intentional action. It cannot account for the conditions and con-
sequences of action in the unintended consequences of prior action.
Relativism also fails to acknowledge that action may be enabled and
constrained by coercion, including direct physical coercion or anti-
cipation of such coercion; this penetrates and corrupts the meaning of
the action, whatever the expressed intentions of the coercing or
coerced actor or actors may be. In more general terms - as Giddens has
suggested in his criticisms of the philosophy of action - social in-
quiry adhering to this ontological stand altogether or almost ignores
or denies that action has social grounds. Here, action is reduced to
mere "behavior", and the existence of any social relations (be they
relations of mutual understanding or relations of mutual non-
understanding) is, so to say, "consigned to silence". The discourse
of inquiry is suppressed - and, according to our own ontological basic
stand, the reasons for this should be sought for in the relations of
mutual non-understanding.

The basic stand we outlined above as regards the issue of inten-
tional action directly suggests at least four views of the other side
of the same ontological "coin", i.e., the issue of *society* as "a" or
"the" context of action. First, society is perceived as a sedimented
composite of "reified" unintended consequences of intentional action:
texts, *façons de parler*, institutions, and patterns of social prac-
tices. As indicated above, these effects may be constraints or

facilities for action - depending on the ignorance or lack of ignorance and on the courage or lack of courage of actors. Second, this composite is - as far as the meaning of its "elements" is concerned - ultimately constituted by social relations of mutual non-understanding; the relations appear as ignorance (the "true" germination of the meanings is concealed), and as coercion (meanings are imposed upon actors against their will - sometimes by physical force or by the threat of force). Third, even though many facets of social life appear as "reified wholes" or "collectivities" with a genuine "subjectivity", they can always be "divided" and related to intentional action. Hence, texts, *façons de parler*, institutions and patterns of social practices can be regarded as an ensemble of social relations of various orders grounding intentional action. Fourth, even though society is ultimately an ensemble of social relations of mutual non-understanding, there always remains a possibility of increased knowledge, understanding and courage, and subsequent degrees of freedom for actors to dissolve the relations.

As regards the issue of society, we can again elaborate a dichotomy of two extremes which diverge from our basic stand: "atomism" (or "ontological individualism") and "collectivism".[16] Even though atomism is here of course only the other side of relativism and collectivism the other side of determinism, it is not redundant to introduce this second dichotomy; for the dichotomy atomism-collectivism pertains to the texture of society and not directly to the grounds of intentional action.

The collectivist ontological presuppositions emphasize that supra-individual entities, such as society, organizations or social classes, are indivisible actors. In this case it is impossible to account for the fact that individual actors may be ignorant of the germination of the meanings that make them belong to such a supraindividual entity and accept it as a constraint on or a facility of action. It is also impossible to analyze if the individuals belong to the entity "voluntarily" or "against their will", and how this "belonging" is due to effects of texts, *façons de parler*, institutions and patterns of social practices - and due to underlying mutual non-understanding. Moreover, in collectivism it is impossible to acknowledge that membership in a supraindividual entity may not entail only constraints, but also possibilities (facilities) for action which

openly contests or strategically subverts the entity and dis-
severs it from the relations of mutual non-understanding that
ground it. Thus social inquiry based on "collectivist" ontological
presuppositions suppresses its own discourse in important areas of
analysis - including the analysis of its own limitations.

In atomist social inquiry, in turn, society is seen as a random,
disaggregated cluster of actors and their actions; in atomism it is
impossible to account for the texturedness of society entailing
action's permanent but steadily or suddenly changing constraints and
facilities, materialized as texts, *façons de parler*, institutions and
patterns of social practices which all are produced and reproduced
through unintended consequences of action. Here, as in extreme rela-
tivism, all social relations which in their concrete forms of appearance
ground action tend to be consigned to silence by social inquiry; and
its discourse is thus suppressed in general as well as where its
capability to reflect upon its own limitations is concerned.

Epistemological Presuppositions

As indicated in the first section, the epistemological presupposi-
tions of social inquiry pertain to the encoding stage of its communi-
cative discourse; here, the referential discourse (in our discussion:
the "ontologically defined subject matter of social inquiry") is trans-
mitted from a sender (a researcher, a professional "social inquirer")
to a receiver (other researcher, inquirer, "reader", "subscriber"). The
two epistemological issues of this encoding discussed below are selected
from a great number of potential issues which recent philosophical and
methodological analyses have raised; the issues are selected from the
perspective of their relevance for developing the "discursive social
inquiry" we pursue as defined in Chapter I.

The first of the two issues concerns the "models" which social in-
quiry constructs about its subject matter, especially "iconic models"
used to interpret formal theorizations and to unite theorizations
stemming from different approaches and their frames of reference. The
reason for stressing the role of models is that social inquiry, as
communicative discourse, necessarily uses at its encoding stage some

kind of "metaphorization", i.e., it "sees" its subject matter as "something else", or "as if" it were analogously something; and this metaphorization leads typically to iconic modeling in the theoretical conceptualization of inquiry. The second epistemological issue discussed here is that of "knowledge and value", i.e., the problem of the possibility or impossibility to achieve normatively "binding" evaluative knowledge through the discourse of social inquiry. The reason for choosing the second issue is that our own above basic ontological stands which focus on the social relations of mutual non-understanding and their dissolution are necessarily strongly evaluative, and they must be justified as such.

Our basic ontological stands have several implications as regards the epistemological basic stands we can take. The ontological stands suggest in particular what kinds of *modeling* are acceptable and can be applied when the referential discourse of social inquiry is encoded into communicative discourse. Thus the first task here is to spell out what these implications are and what kinds of models ("metaphors") they suggest; i.e., we must try to make our own metaphorical discursive communication more self-conscious. In this task we shall mainly draw on the ideas of *Richard H. Brown* and *Roy Bhaskar*.[17] The former has given a general account of models in social inquiry, and the latter has elaborated a model congruent with our "ontology" of intentional action, its grounds, and the production and reproduction of the grounds. Brown's views will connect our argument to discursive social inquiry, and Bhaskar's views to part of other current theoretical and methodological discussion of social science research.

Brown distinguishes three different uses of metaphors in social inquiry: first, for illustrative purposes, second, as analogies and iconic models, and third, at the most diffused and least conscious level, as "root metaphors" from which many kinds of illustrative and model metaphors and analogies are derived.[18] Brown suggests that metaphorization in social inquiry can best be understood in terms of five root metaphors: "mechanism", "organism", "language", "drama" and "game". Variants of these metaphors may overlap, and one variant may be built within another variant of the same or different type.

Brown's suggestions help us make explicit root metaphors and their variants which our own ontological basic stands derive from as model

metaphors, and thus help us encode our subject matter into communicative
discourse. The fundamental root metaphor underlying our ontological
stands is language. Because this root metaphor was introduced in Chap-
ter I, its use above has been rather conscious even to begin with. The
emphasis on "language as action", "action via language", "action as
discursive practices", "mutual understanding", and "mutual non-under-
standing" are variants of the root metaphor of "language". The "poetic"
effect of many of those variants is what Brown calls a "metaphor of
irony": there, poetic effects are brought about by seeing something
from the viewpoint of its opposite (most importantly, by seeing
"mutual understanding" from the viewpoint of "mutual non-understand-
ing").[19] However, in terms of Brown's concepts our discussion was not
"pure": we also used variants of other root metaphors. E.g., the con-
cepts "reproduction" and "germination" are variants of the root
metaphor of "organism"; the emphasis on actors' strategic possibilities
to draw on the consequences of social relations of mutual non-under-
standing as facilities or resources to dissolve these very relations
has as its root metaphor "game"; and the elaboration of different
types of actors who are ignorant or forced to accept the "social
burden" are based on the root metaphor "drama". However, the most im-
portant non-language root metaphor in our formulation of the basic onto-
logical stands was the root metaphor of "mechanism": our variant of
this root metaphor was the metaphor of social "relations" (of mutual
non-understanding). The metaphor suggests that something not capable
of expression "ties", in a "nature-like" way, actors to other actors
as an ultimate "generator" of the actors' apparent mutual understanding.
Roy Bhaskar's views can be utilized for spelling out the implications
of our basic variant of the root metaphor "mechanism" - built within
our variants of the root metaphor of "language".

Bhaskar's epistemological model consists of:[20] (1) what he calls
a "mechanism" and "causal laws", understood by Bhaskar as "tendencies"
- stemming from the mechanism - to bring about manifest effects of one
or another kind; (2) "patterns of events" which are "traces" of the
manifest or nonmanifest effects - traces which, however, do not
necessarily appear as related to the effects; and (3) "experiences", or
observations of phenomena of which some may be disclosed by research as
traces of the above kind. Bhaskar emphasizes that the mechanism is

"transfactual": it does not consist of, or cannot be wholly explained by, experiences or patterns of events ("empirical regularities"); and the mechanism produces through its tendencies the regularities in such ways as cannot be inferred from the regularities alone. Bhaskar stresses that, in comparison with the tendencies, the empirical regularities are *prima facie* accidental; and the tendencies cannot be verified by instances of their manifestation nor falsified by counter-instances; and any observable outcomes may be products of several mechanisms.

Bhaskar presupposes that his model can be applied in social re-search - and it seems especially suitable for such social research as adheres to our ontological basic stands elaborated in the previous sec-tion. According to Bhaskar, social research starts the construction of its models by analyzing the results of actors' action (results of discourse and discursive and nondiscursive practices).[21] When adapted to the purposes of social research, the Bhaskarean approach could first fix its attention on the actors' conceptions as they are re-flected in their action and its results; and research could next try to infer how the actors' conceptions as traces have "reified" the ten-dencies stemming from the mechanism that is the tendencies' source. According to Bhaskar, the tendencies, reified as traces, in a way "con-ceal" the mechanism, and the actors may not be able to reveal, let alone dissolve, the mechanism via their understanding and action. Bhaskar's point of view can be perceived as congruent with the "onto-logy" we assumed in the previous section: his approach can be seen as a sketch for a model of the very combination of concealment and more or less "conceptual" coercion which social relations of mutual non-understanding impose on actors. It is also possible to draw a parallel between Bhaskar's conception of the mechanism and Kristeva's corre-sponding views of a translinguistic mechanism, which is the source of the germination of meaning (about Kristeva's views, see Chapter I, *supra*).

We can also relate Bhaskar's ideas with our basic ontological stands in a more concrete and detailed way. (1) Bhaskar's epistemological model can be used to account for the mechanism of concealment and coercion which is embedded in social relations of mutual non-understanding and appears as texts, *façons de parler*, institutions

and patterns of social practices, or combinations of some or all of these. (2) Bhaskar's model explicates how tendencies stemming from the mechanism produce and reproduce in actors such conceptions (e.g., ignorance, fear or cynicism) which as reified traces of the tendencies contribute to the production and reproduction of the mechanism through unintended consequences of action. Accordingly, Bhaskar's epistemological model, when applied in the social sciences and embedded in our variant of the root metaphor of "language", leads to a kind of "cybernetic" model of an "organism-like" equilibrium - but this cybernetic model is one of "pathology", not of "rationality".

We can take the above adapted and modified Bhaskarean model as our own epistemological basic stand in the issue of "modeling". We can next investigate how divergence from this basic stand may be conducive to the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry. We can continue to argue in terms of opposites as in the previous section; and we can contrast the basic stand with two "caricatures" of social inquiry, often discussed in current theoretical and methodological literature: extreme "empiricist" and "positivist" social inquiry which imitates the natural sciences, and extreme "hermeneutic" social inquiry which emphasizes the "method" of conceptual understanding. We shall discuss these extreme stands in the same form as Bhaskar has defined and evaluated them.[22]

According to Bhaskar, both the "positivist" and "hermeneutic" view of social inquiry can be labeled as a view of "empirical realism", because the former sees that the inquirer is a mere sensor of given "facts", and the latter adheres to the view that the inquirer is a mere interpreter of "genuine" and "incorrigible" meanings.[23] Bhaskar ascribes the positivist variant of empirical realism to structural-functionalist, behavioralist and postbehavioralist analyses, and the hermeneutic variant to Weber's, Winch's, Apel's, Habermas's and symbolic interactionists' analyses. In terms of metaphors, Bhaskar claims, in effect, that adherents to both views rely on a variant of the root metaphor of "mechanism": a "mirror". Both the "positivists" and the "hermeneuticians" derive their epistomological iconic models about the subject matter of social inquiry from this basic metaphor by making the presupposition that the subject matter is isomorphic with the inquirer's perception or understanding.

If we first look at "positivist empirical realism" in social inquiry, we find the presupposition that scientific laws and theories can be inductively confirmed by the empirical regularity of their instances, or falsified in terms of their counterinstances. We can also find the presupposition that scientific laws concerning society are inductive, empirical generalizations; they are supposed to "explain" facts by generalizing observations. Alternatively, we can find the presupposition that events can be "explained" by stating their initial conditions and then deducing them from (or "subsuming them under") one or more "universal" scientific "covering laws". Finally, we can find the presupposition that explanation in social inquiry implies prediction; this is quite evident insofar as it is held that there are universal scientific laws of society, but positivist views also emphasize, in the case of empirical generalizations, that these "laws" hold in the future. Sometimes the stress on prediction is so heavy that, in an "instrumentalist" way, the ability of social inquiry to predict future is considered a criterion for the value of its results.

In contrast to extreme empiricist positivist social inquiry, hermeneutic social inquiry emphasizes conceptual understanding as its epistemological means of sharpening reflexion in the mirror it "holds" in front of action and society. According to Bhaskar, the hermeneutic inquiry presupposes that scientific laws of society can be found through conceptual interpretation of such phenomena as rules and norms of language, or of economic activity, politics or morals. The idea of conceptual interpretation and understanding implies that the inquirer can superimpose a new and better mutual understanding upon the existing, potentially deficient system, and upon the social relations which ground the system. Thus the hermeneutic inquiry necessarily works on the basis of a kind of "data", i.e.,"givens", the meanings of which are expressed within the existing system of mutual understanding; and it cannot penetrate to the sources which produce and reproduce both the old and new system of mutual understanding.

On the basis of our earlier discussions and conceptual elaborations, we can argue that the implicit epistemological metaphor of a mirror - as it is "internalized" both in empiricist positivist social inquiry and hermeneutic social inquiry - is misplaced and misleading. First, the "mirror" is in social inquiry necessarily a "mirror of another mirror":

it reflects mutual understanding and socially adjusted social relations which, in turn, can be (and, according to our basic stand, are) distorted reflexions of the underlying "deeper reality". The sharpening of the reflexion by means of positivist and hermeneutic inquiry contributes to concealing this underlying reality - especially where the "mirror" of social inquiry becomes a mediator and "reinforcer" of the existing mutual understanding based on the socially adjusted social relations. Both types of social inquiry merely "glide" on the surfaces of this understanding and the corresponding social relations: the one "verifies" or "falsifies", the other "interprets" and "understands". The second problem with both the empiricist positivist social inquiry and the hermeneutic social inquiry is that they neither want nor are able to account for their own "reflexion" in the mirror; and they neither want nor are able to account for the possibility that their own results may be mere reflexions of a "deeper reality" which they distort and which distorts them and reproduces the distortion. In the case of the positivist inquiry, in particular, the distortion of the inquiry's own image in its own mirror and the distortion of the image of the scientific laws and predictions which the inquiry proposes, undermines its own supposed logic of explanation and prediction; thus extreme instrumentalist positivist social inquiry tries, in effect, to assume the impossible task of "predicting its own predictions". All the above comments suggest that the epistemological stands of both empiricist positivist social inquiry and hermeneutic social inquiry - at least if they are maintained in an extreme form - lead to the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry.

The second epistemological issue on our agenda is that of *knowledge and value*, i.e., the issue concerning the possibility or impossibility of producing and articulating normatively "binding" evaluative knowledge through social inquiry. In discussing this issue, we can again draw on Bhaskar's views. Bhaskar suggests that, as a type of discourse, social inquiry is not in a specific sense "value-free": it is necessarily committed to the value of "knowledge over ignorance". Due to this commitment, social inquiry implies valuations that the world is or is not as it should be. Bhaskar's views suggest, more exactly, that social inquiry, as far as it reveals the "reality" underlying seeming mutual understanding, also evaluates negatively everything which conceals that

reality. This negative evaluation covers, according to Bhaskar, more than the "conceptual system", because "to criticize a belief is *ipso facto* to criticize any action informed or practice sustained by that belief or theory."[24] Bhaskar also anticipates and answers a potential counterargument to his inference:

> Might it not be objected, however, that the fact/value dichotomy breaks down in this way because one is committed to a prior valuation that truth is good, so that one is not deriving a value judgment from entirely factual (natural) premises? But that truth is good (*ceteris paribus*) is not only a condition of moral discourse, it is a condition of any discourse at all.[25]

Bhaskar's view implies that insofar as social inquiry provides new knowledge, it extends the horizon of such intentional action as actors can consider possible: it suggests new possibilities for such action as builds upon the above types of negative evaluation; it proposes the discontinuation of such discourses and lines of action as are subjected to its criticism; and it aims at abandoning or dissolving texts, *façons de parler*, institutions and patterns of social practices which conceal the "underlying reality" by "reifying" it. However, Bhaskar admits that social inquiry alone is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for action proceeding beyond the previous limits of the "possible": he argues that the "most powerful explanatory theory ... will increase our rational autonomy of action ... (but) it is a mistake ... to suppose that ... it will tell us what to do".[26] Because Bhaskar does not, on the other hand, deny the possibility that such a "most powerful theory" might incorporate subtheories that address to questions of the implementation of its own suggestions, his view can be combined with our ontological basic stands and with our epistemological basic stand in the issue of "modeling".

To study how divergence from the above basic stand in the epistemological issue of knowledge and value tends to lead to the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry, we can again argue in terms of two opposites; we can continue to draw in part on Bhaskar's views;[27] and we can contrast here two stands, "objectivism" and "subjectivism". There are two versions of "objectivism" in social inquiry, predominantly in positivist inquiry. The first of these is "contemplativist". It holds that social inquiry is a "pure" pursuit divorced from social

values, social action and social practices. However, only "application-oriented objectivism" is discussed here, which emphasizes the contribution of social inquiry to the maintenance of extant social values, to the achievement of extant goals of social action, and to the amelioration of extant social practices through application of "tools" provided by social inquiry.

"Subjectivist stands", found in particular in hermeneutic social inquiry, exist in two versions, too. The first version presupposes that social inquiry cannot be objective because it studies subjective social values through inquirers' subjective interpretations. We are here interested only in the second version of "subjectivism", "application-oriented subjectivism", which holds that social inquiry can and must start by adopting some of the extant valuations, e.g., that "efficiency and effectiveness is good", "it is good to increase understanding by interpretation", or that "it is good that people are emancipated from social conditions which oppress them".

Our above basic stand in the issue of knowledge and value in social inquiry suggests that both the objectivist and the subjectivist application orientation lead to problems. According to the basic stand, social inquiry - as far as it succeeds - "transgresses" extant values by showing how the meanings that the values consist of are made obvious, and how this obviousness is produced and reproduced. Here, social inquiry is critical toward extant social practices and "reified" forms of social relations, but application-oriented objectivism takes extant values and goals for given - and fails to acknowledge that it thereby contributes to the reproduction of the values and their grounds. Application-oriented subjectivism, in turn, fails to see that social inquiry may contribute to whatever "good" purposes only after it has achieved results and after the results have exerted impact on society, not by assuming at the outset an "interest" to "do good". Namely, in the latter case at least the meanings that the interests incorporate are taken for granted - and reproduced through unintended consequences of the "application" of the interests. These comments on the deficiencies of extreme application-oriented objectivism and subjectivism imply that they are conducive to the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry.

Methodological Presuppositions

The methodological presuppositions of social inquiry further
elaborate the "encoding" of its communicative discourse by indicating
how those who pursue the inquiry should compile knowledge about the
subject matter. The methodological presuppositions pertain to the
strategy and methods of inquiry; but at the same time they clarify
the position of the epistemological stands as regards the subject
matter of inquiry. We shall analyze and discuss below the stands
taken and presuppositions adopted in two methodological issues. The
first of them concerns the way in which the subject matter of social
inquiry can and should be conceived of and "technically" treated in
actual research practice; and the second issue is one of the specific
strategy of inquiry, i.e., the problem of relating observations and
analyses on one "aggregate level" of social inquiry to observations and
analyses on another level or other levels. The first issue can be
called that of analyzing the "social" in actual research and inquiry,
and the second issue can be called that of "connecting levels of
analysis" or, briefly, "reduction".[28]

Our own basic stand as to the issue of *analyzing the "social"* is
implied by the ontological and epistemological stands formulated above.
This stand can best be characterized as a variant of "quasi-naturalism".
Here, the subject matter of social inquiry consists of "concrete" ob-
jects produced and reproduced by the unintended consequences of inten-
tional action - be the objects social relations of "obvious" mutual
understanding, "reified" forms of this understanding, or social rela-
tions of mutual non-understanding from which the former two germinate
or have gradually germinated. The subject matter is "quasi-natural"
or "pseudo-natural" in two respects: first, an important part of it is
discursive, i.e., knowledge and conceptions penetrate it - sometimes
"self-reflexively"; and discourse as the subject matter may incorporate
knowledge and conceptions concerning its very own "nature". Second,
the discursive nature of the subject matter may challenge its own
persistence; self-reflexion may contribute to the dissolution of the
subject matter in its obvious and reified forms.

The position of quasi-naturalism implies that social inquiry can
and must use models and postulate "theoretical entities" via

"metaphorization". But in doing so, it always runs the risk that the
social relations of mutual non-understanding and mutual understanding
transform its models and metaphors into apparent "natures" - or into
images which contribute outside inquiry to the production and reproduc-
tion of quasi-natures appearing as natures. For social inquiry to avoid
this "naturalization", those who pursue it must define their position as
the "anti-subjects" we discussed in Chapter I, as conscious encoders of
their own referential discourse into communicative discourse. This en-
coding - to be discussed in detail below - is a kind of "political" act.
Here, social inquiry comes to consist of strategic consideration of its
own relation to existing forms of discourse; and it must consider the
"surplus" that its results may produce either in enhancing or dissolving
its quasi-natural subject matter.

The above basic stand concerning the nature of the subject matter
of social inquiry and the corresponding research strategy also has
definite implications as regards the use of measurement and "harder"
research techniques. Roy Bhaskar writes about this issue:

> The conceptual aspect of the subject matter of the social sciences
> circumscribes the possibility of measurement in a ... fundamental
> way. For meanings cannot be measured, only understood. Hypotheses
> about them must be expressed in *language*, and confirmed in *dialogue*.
> Language here stands to the conceptual aspect of social science as
> geometry stands to physics. And *precision in meaning* now assumes
> the place of the accuracy of measurement as the *a posteriori*
> arbiter of a theory ... In both cases theories may continue to be
> justified and validly used to explain, even though significant
> *measurement* of the phenomena of which they treat has become im-
> possible. (Emphasis added).[29]

Although we may agree with this view, it does not necessarily de-
prive measurement and research techniques of all role in social inquiry.
First, in some cases when social inquiry analyzes discourse (as we do in
this study),this subject matter may be so "dispersed" that its structure can-
not be grasped without the use of measurement and techniques on at least
some level of sophistication; and measurement and techniques can be
used to condense the discourse and to extract out "average", "typical"
or "central" meanings that it incorporates. This may be the easier,
the more "structured" and "nature-like" are the reified forms of
"obvious" mutual understanding. Second, in analyses of discourse,

measurement and techniques can be used to identify "densities" of different types of discourse and their subtypes, and contextual locations of the types and subtypes; i.e., measurement and techniques can be used to suggest where in a given society or in a given "sector" of society certain types or subtypes of discourse - and discursive practices - can be found. The latter aspect is also important from the point of view of defining the strategies of those who pursue social inquiry as anti-subjects: the exact identification of the densities and locations of certain types of obvious and reified discourse is instrumental for outlining strategies that might be tried in order to discontinue such discourse.[30]

Our own basic stand is that of "quasi-naturalism", and the two extreme stands that diverge from it are, evidently, those of "naturalism" and "anti-naturalism". I.e., we once again argue in terms of a dichotomy.

"Naturalism" is a stand that stresses similarities and de-emphasizes differences between the natural sciences and the social sciences (and, evidently, between the natural sciences or technology, and social inquiry). Naturalism - very often coexistent with "positivist" epistemological views - perceives the subject matter of social inquiry as a set of "natural" objects which are not fundamentally different from the subject matter of the natural sciences. This subject matter is then conceived of characteristically in terms of "behavior" and empirical regularities of behavior. Another feature often encountered in naturalist social inquiry is reliance on measurement and statistical tests used in order to ensure that the observed regularities are not due to random variations.

The extreme opposite of naturalism is "antinaturalism", which often coincides with "hermeneutic" epistemological views. "Antinaturalist" social inquiry presupposes a strict demarcation between the subject matter of the natural sciences and of social inquiry; it may be prepared to accept the view that natural science investigates empirical regularities of its subject matter, but it tends to emphasize that the subject matter of social inquiry consists of shared meanings (and social relations of mutual understanding) and products of human action which embody shared meanings (e.g., language and tradition). Consequently, antinaturalist social inquiry may be inclined to give its

results in terms of its "understanding" of the "original", "meant" or "true" meanings that an episode of action has or draws on in its own cultural or other social context. At the same time it tends to deride the possibilities of using scientific measurement and standard research techniques in social inquiry.

On the basis of our earlier analyses, it is possible to see why naturalism and anti-naturalism in their strict forms necessarily lead to the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry. They both direct the inquiry - although from different angles - to "glide" on the surface of the obvious and reified without questioning its origins and the germination of the pertinent meanings. Although they may "sharpen" the image of the obvious and reified in their "mirror of inquiry", they may at the same time - most probably unwittingly - contribute to the production and reproduction of the image - and the production and reproduction of that which is mirrored. As regards measurement and research techniques, the extreme naturalist stand overemphasizes their use and "reifies" them, and the extreme anti-naturalism tends to neglect them.

In the issue of *connecting levels of analysis*, or *reduction*, the above quasi-naturalist stand explicitly defines our basic stand: the effects of intentional action are "aggregated" into "collective and societal facts" via unintended consequences of the action; and the "aggregation" produces "quasi-nature" which social inquiry investigates. Here, social inquiry does not explain "nature" by extracting out laws which are supposed to regulate it, but social inquiry explains "quasi-nature" by extracting out how it is produced and reproduced; and social inquiry thereby contributes to the dissolution of the quasi-nature. But if social inquiry "fails" in the latter task, it contributes to the very production and reproduction of the quasi-nature, as itself both a part of the "produced" and "reproduced", and as one of the "producers" and "reproducers". Thus, according to our stand, non-suppressed social inquiry is in the final analysis also concerned with monitoring and observing its own effects as regards the formation - and transformation - of its subject matter.

The two stands diverging from our own basic stand are two types of reduction, "microreduction" and "macroreduction". Microreduction consists of attempts to derive general laws of social inquiry from

observations, generalizations and laws concerning properties of actors (characterized here often in terms of individual psychology); and macro-reduction consists of attempts to derive general laws from observa-tions, generalizations and laws concerning "supraindividual entities", such as society as a whole, culture, class or elite.

Our basic stand enables us to see how both microreduction and macro-reduction favor the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry. Microreduction "rationalizes" the "quasi-natural" obvious and reified and prevents its analysis via social inquiry, makes it appear as "na-tural", and thereby effectively hinders its dissolution. Macro-reduction "petrifies" the obvious and reified by seeing intentional action as totally determined by supraindividual entities, which it fails to see as social relations of mutual understanding of various orders - relations ultimately grounded on the underlying "real" rela-tions of mutual non-understanding.

Implications of Social Inquiry and Finalization of Discourse

As the final stage in the compilation of our conceptual framework we can analyze and assess the implications of social inquiry. As indi-cated above, both types of implications, evaluative and practical, per-tain to the decoding stage of the communicative discourse of social in-quiry - a stage often leading to a feedback to inquiry itself.

Our basic stand concerning the evaluative and practical implications of social inquiry is directly suggested by our basic epistemological stand as regards "knowledge and value". According to our stand, non-suppressed social inquiry is inherently critical. It has direct evaluative implications, because it expresses negative evaluations of the "obvious and reified" which conceal their origins. Consequently, social inquiry should always monitor its own effects and strive to direct them to dissolving the "quasi-nature" of its subject matter. Social inquiry adhering to this stand does not provide "alternatives" or "policy instructions"; all that it may offer is fleeting vantage points for "self-reflexive" action. The basic stand can thus be stated only "negatively"; there is nothing "constructive" in it.[31] The impli-cations do *not* entail the harnessing of social inquiry to support

existing circumstances or "positive" practical purposes, but it "programmatically" negates all such harnessing. This is a feature congruent with the "discursive analysis" whose elements are incorporated into the epistemology and methodology of this study; consequently, the basic stand concerning the implications can be elaborated by drawing on our discussion on discursive analysis in Chapter I.

First, the implications built into our basic stand entail that non-suppressed social inquiry is necessarily a context-specific "localized" intervention in a "locus", "arena" or "region" of society (cf. the conception of society assumed above). Here, social inquiry always has the potential implication that it leads to the dissolution of underlying "real" social relations of mutual non-understanding. These relations underlie the "obvious" and "reified" as sources of "nature-like" coercion and domination, which in part entails actors' ignorance of what is at stake. This suggests that an organic phase in any "piece" of non-suppressed social inquiry is necessarily the "localization" of its own "action" in a concrete locus, arena or region where it may have effects if it, so to say, "succeeds" - at least effects due to a disclosure of "real" social relations. Second, the implications suggest that the role of a "social inquirer" is necessarily that of an "anti-subject" "struggling" to end the suppression of discourse. This struggle cannot, however, be assumed to have automatically any "emancipatory effects" in the sense of the dissolution of the "quasi-nature" of its subject matter, but the effects presuppose specific strategies over and above mere strategies of analysis. Third, because the inquiring anti-subject - let alone an "emancipatory" "subject" - is in constant danger of annihilation of its "project" by the hegemony of the knowledge and power it analyzes - and maybe contests - it must monitor its own effects continuously; and it must also try to focus its analysis - and maybe its "attack" - on a "weakest link" or a "blind spot" of the hegemony, i.e., in a locus, arena or region where suppression of discourse can be disclosed - and perhaps contested - with the least of ambiguity and risk. Fourth, even though the anti-subject is a special "self-reflexive" actor, it is also one subject among others, and it is compelled to account for the other subjects in formulating its analytic - or emancipatory - strategies. If the inquiring anti-subject pursuing social inquiry wants to investigate prospects of "emancipation", it may

have to answer questions such as: (1) What are the other subjects in
the loci, arenas or regions where the emancipatory anti-subject may contest
suppressed discourse? (2) What are the relationships between these
subjects (e.g., integration, mutual consensus, lack of integration and
consensus)? (3) How "powerful" are these subjects or the reified so-
cial relations (establishments) which support them; and how "loyal"
are the subjects to these relations? (4) How might tactical coalitions
(coordination of discourse, possibilities of joint discourse) with the
other subjects promote the strategy of contestation which the emanci-
patory anti-subject might choose to pursue?

How can extreme divergences from the above "inherently critical"
stand lead to the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry? We
can first investigate a position which explicitly aims at advicing how
the capability of action to produce intended consequences can be en-
hanced. This position - which obviously is usually connected with
"positivist" ontological, epistemological and methodological stands -
can mean several things: the results of social inquiry may, e.g., de-
crease actors' uncertainty by indicating patterns or regularities in
observations; they may help the actors in constructing hierarchies of
their objectives (ends-means schemes); or they may help actors to
translate "law-like" empirical regularities ("if A then B") into "re-
commendations" ("if you want B do A"). This position obviously aims,
as far as its practical implications are concerned, at providing alter-
natives for intentional action; but at the same time it comes to approve
and positively evaluate certain types of action. This evaluation evi-
dently does not acknowledge the nature of action (its potential germina-
tion from relations of mutual non-understanding, and its potential
second-order consequences), but the evaluation is and remains implicitly
grounded - and based on its face level on purely subjective values.

The opposite stand - which tends to combine with "hermeneutic" onto-
logical, epistemological and methodological stands - aims more or less
explicitly at "socially relevant" social inquiry by advising how actors'
actions and "socially adjusted" social relations can be supported and
ameliorated through increased "mutual understanding". This can also
mean several things: the results of social inquiry may, e.g., clarify
to actors themselves "true" meanings of their intentions; or the
results may clarify the intentions and meanings to other actors; or

enhance the meanings of action in given cultural or social contexts.
These "enhanced meanings" suggest "automatically" alternative ways of ac-
tion; and they also imply positive evaluations, if not of the "old ac-
tion" and its meanings, at least of the "new action" based on the
"improved meanings". Even yet the origins of the meanings and the
second-order consequences of the action are not analyzed, and the
choice of courses of action and meanings to be enhanced remains impli-
citly and randomly grounded - and altogether subjective.

Our earlier analyses suggest why the implications of the both above
positions contribute to the suppression of the discourse of social in-
quiry. First, in both cases social inquiry contributes "positively"
and "constructively" to the enhancement of existing action and under-
standing; this makes it support *social technology* or become a part of
such technology. Second, social inquiry adopting either position be-
comes through its evaluative implications a *legitimatory discourse* or
a *legitimatory practice,* and as such it contributes implicitly to the
legitimacy of what it fails to thematize or, less implicitly, of what
it accounts for but takes basically for granted. One might more
readily admit that the above is the case as regards application-
oriented positivist social inquiry - but deny that it holds where
hermeneutic social inquiry is concerned, which explicitly aims at en-
hancing understanding. Two examples can be offered to dispel the be-
lief in the greater "critical" interests of hermeneutic inquiry. First,
legal discourse involves typically "hermeneutic" interpretations; but
as social inquiry it is typically a social technology, a legit-
imatory practice, or both. Second, hermeneutic social inquiry can
easily be adapted in the field of cultural studies as a technology or
as a means of legitimization: e.g., political or economic penetration
of a foreign culture can effectively be carried out and legitimized if
the penetrator "hermeneutically" learns to manipulate the culture as
a system of basic meanings and to control its practices (and the "gate-
keepers" who manage the practices).

In order to complete our scheme and lay grounds for its applications,
we must still have a more thorough look at the problems of the implica-
tions of social inquiry from another perspective. We must ask how the
implications of social inquiry may become reified and how they may feed
back to the inquiry, confirm its presuppositions, and reinforce the

potential suppression of its discourse. We can answer these questions by drawing on relevant methodological research. At the same time we can actually apply our own conceptual framework, so to say, "within the framework itself", i.e., we can account for social inquiry as a potential hegemony of knowledge and power.

The feedback of the practical implications to social inquiry and its theorizations has rarely been analyzed. *Ilkka Heiskanen*, however, has developed an argument that the advance of social research is adversely affected as a result of a specific type of assumptions.[32] Heiskanen has investigated how "application assumptions", i.e. orientation of social research for immediate practical application of its results, determines general research orientation and practices:

> If practical concerns determine the scientist's perception of his theoretical concepts, and thus the model of theory formation, the results may be disastrous to scientific progress. More generally, we suggest that practical concerns may consciously or unwittingly determine not only the way an individual scientist proceeds but also the orientation of a theoretically oriented scientific approach, its concepts, models and strategies of theory formation.[33]

Heiskanen argues that the application assumptions enhance the "artificial closure" of theorizations of social research - and this obviously holds also in other social inquiry. "Closure" is basically a neutral term characterizing theorizations which: (1) have definite equilibrium assumptions; (2) use static time-space invariant research designs; (3) focus research on rather homogeneous phenomena, and (4) are concerned mainly with the internal logical refinement of their concepts and relationships between them. "Closure" is sometimes also approvingly used of situations where research is firmly established by an integrated set of explicit assumptions that determine a dependable and reliable manner of research. Nevertheless, especially in the social sciences, "closure" is often used in Heiskanen's sense to refer to "premature" or "artificial" closure which suppresses the discourse of research.[34]

Why would social scientists, those who pursue social inquiry, and the users of the results of social inquiry, want such inquiry continued as leads to artificial closure and subsequent loss of more general and profound "information"? We have already referred to this dilemma and its basic logic in our earlier arguments and considerations, which can be elaborated upon as follows.

The presuppositions of social inquiry give the "original" conditions for carrying out its discourse. If the implications of inquiry - which "automatically" follow from the presuppositions - apparently begin to provide social technologies, i.e., means of analysis, evaluation, decisionmaking and control in society (and within inquiry itself), the implications are easily reified as texts, *façons de parler*, institutions, and patterns of social practices. These "reifications" define "good" implications and let inquiry know this defining; consequently, the presuppositions of the theorizations in question are steadily favored. The same may happen if inquiry has evaluative implications as a legitimatory practice.

If the implications get fed back time and again, they will easily become incorporated into inquiry as social conditions of its existence.[35] Thus a continuing subscription to presuppositions which - according to our analysis - suppress the discourse of social inquiry need not be due to inquirers' voluntary decisions; rather, this subscription may have gradually become a necessary condition for pursuing inquiry as an acknowledged professional, and for holding any professional's position in social inquiry.[36] The closure may thus result as far as inquiry becomes stabilized as a source of social technologies of applied analysis, decisionmaking and control, or as a source of legitimatory practices. In this stabilization, there may appear no need to challenge the presuppositions of the inquiry; the uncovering of the presuppositions may be seen more or less consciously as "dysfunctional"; and confinement - closure - of inquiry to an internal refinement of its theorizations appears under these circumstances as justified.

If social inquiry finds ample applications - i.e., if it can, so to say, "prove" its implications - it may receive "resources" and institutional autonomy - which further enhance closure and promote an "assembly-line" production of advice, technologies and professionals (scientists and other). To elaborate this suggestion, we can utilize *Richard Whitley*'s characterization of the situation he calls the "finalization of science":

> Knowledge is "finalised" ... when it is expressed in a coherent, closed formalism. Knowledge production is hence directed towards the goal of logical closure which guarantees its validity and permanence and so science is ... a progression towards the finality of a closed logical system. In the last resort, then, ... sciences

will be expressed as derivatives of a central set of logically
interdependent axioms and knowledge production will stop. Given
enough resources and autonomy, a complete representation of a cer-
tain knowledge can be obtained, hence the powerful attraction of
this idea for scientific elites ... Radical changes in knowledge are
therefore ruled out as is the rationality of any substantive chal-
lenge to established authority and beliefs.[37]

Whitley discusses the finalization in quite neutral terms of
sociology of science research; on the contrary, we can from the posi-
tion given by our basic stands try to spell out what may be criticized
in the finalization. We can first note that while the attraction of
the finalization of knowledge from the perspective of scientific and
other professional elites of social inquiry is undeniable and a po-
tential reason for finalization, Whitley's stand leaves open the
possibility that the finalization may not originate from the "rational-
ity" of individual members of the elite. One can refine the argument
by suggesting that maintaining one's position in this elite may depend
on the continuing pursuit of finalization. Thus the finalized social
inquiry may become a kind of a "monopoly of symbolic violence"[38] or
a "cognitive hegemony"; here, the elite members are held accountable
by other members of the community of professionals (a scientific or
other professional community) or by lay authorities for an efficient
and effective operation of inquiry; and this accountability con-
cerns the efficient and effective production of advice, legitimization
and new professionals.

The above suggests that an apparently voluntary commitment of pro-
fessionals to the rules of their professional community of social in-
quiry may have "deeper meanings" as far as the community has and uses
monopoly of symbolic violence toward its members; and we can proceed
to investigating if and how "social relations of mutual non-understand-
ing" underlie this "legitimate monopoly". We can consequently suggest
that the pursuit and results of social inquiry is to a great extent
effects of the underlying "real" social relations, which may be
reflected, e.g., as (1) inquirers' ignorance and inability to question
the obvious and reified; (2) inquirers' fear of losing their position
or attracting their community's negative sanctions on themselves; (3) in-
quirers' cynicism and motives to work only for their short-run own advantage;
or (4) inquirers' strategic calculation and their aims to make before
long an end to the monopoly of symbolic violence.

In finalized social inquiry, the possibilities of all professionals to challenge the assumptions (both the presuppositions and implications) of inquiry are, accordingly, severely restricted; if the professionals would challenge the assumptions, they would subject themselves to the coercion of the monopoly of symbolic violence. In extreme cases, this coercion may have "physical" dimensions, e.g., the subverts are deprived of their material compensations, are denied admittance to the loci where inquiry is pursued, or are denied rights to use the facilities of inquiry; in Foucaultian terms, to challenge the assumptions is to challenge a hegemony of knowledge and power.

The conclusion from the above arguments is the following: apparent success of social inquiry dependent on or leading to finalization produces and reproduces the artificial closure of the inquiry and thereby produces and reproduces the suppression of its discourse. Therefore the sincerest efforts of professionals of social inquiry to increase the "relevance" of the inquiry may be conducive to suppression; and the same may happen if social inquiry is harnessed by other interests than those of its own professionals to further their purposes: social inquiry may become degraded into mere social technology or "legitimizer" of prevailing circumstances.

Conclusions

Our discussion about the potential finalization of social inquiry binds together the arguments concerning the presuppositions and implications and gives a final touch to our conceptual framework. As a result, we now have a grid which consists of our own basic stands as regards the eight issues discussed, and of corresponding eight opposite pairs of extreme stands which, according to our analyses and arguments, tend to lead to the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry. Our own basic stands naturally provide the basic premises of the present study; and the opposing pairs of extreme stands provide us with a frame of reference which we shall use in our subsequent analyses and assessments of the approaches to public policy evaluation and of the practical social theories of practical public policy evaluation.

Table II-1 presents the eight issues and the extreme stands one can take in these issues. The table only summarizes our discussion and

Table II-1. A Summary of the Conceptual Framework

Type of assumptions	Issue	Extreme stands which may be conducive to the suppression of the discourse of social inquiry	
Ontological presuppositions	Intentional action	Relativism	Determinism
	Society	Atomism	Collectivism
Epistemological presuppositions	Modeling	Positivism	Hermeneutics
	Knowledge and value	Application-oriented objectivism	Application-oriented subjectivism
Methodological presuppositions	Analyzing the "social" as the subject matter of social inquiry	Naturalism	Antinaturalism
	Connecting levels of analysis	Microreduction	Macroreduction
Evaluative implications	Criticism or legitimization of meanings and their grounds	Implicit legitimization of existing meanings which remain dissevered from their germination and "reified" by inquiry	Implicit - and often not so implicit - legitimization of existing meanings which are acknowledged and interpreted by inquiry but not questioned as regards their germination
Practical implications	Suggestions for alternative courses of action	Advice as to how the capability of action to produce intended consequences can be maintained or enhanced	Advice as to how action can be supported or ameliorated through actors' increased understanding of meanings

49

does not yet enable us to see how these stands may appear together and be combined as specific approaches to social inquiry. In our previous discussions - which have drawn on recent theoretical and methodological discussions in the social sciences - we have often indicated that several of these stands can be assumed to go together. Thus it has been suggested that the following "clusters" can be found: (1) "relativism", "atomism" and "microreduction"; (2) "determinism", "collectivism" and "macroreduction"; (3) "positivism", "application-oriented objectivism" and "naturalism"; and (4) "hermeneutics", "application-oriented subjectivism" and "antinaturalism". Clusters (3) and (4) can be considered the basic clusters, "positivism" and "hermeneutics"; and they may both be combined with either of the clusters (1) and (2): "micro-orientation" and "macro-orientation". In Table II-2 the extreme stands of our discussion and conceptual framework are organized as four "strong combinations", i.e., types of approaches incorporating related extreme stands as regards the presuppositions of social inquiry. These types can be called "macropositivism", "micropositivism", "macrohermeneutics" and "microhermeneutics"; and they can, furthermore, be connected with the corresponding "positivist" or "hermeneutic" application orientations as regards their evaluative and practical implications.

It must be emphasized that the strong combinations of Table II-2 are "ideal types" and few actual approaches to social inquiry can be expected to represent precisely these combinations or adhere to their stands in extreme forms; and it must also be remembered that we did not discuss but a few selected issues. Consequently, our "grid" is by no means exhaustive of all different approaches to social inquiry. The grid in the shape we have formulated it is a toolbox of a "Lévi-Straussian *bricoleur*" analyzing approaches to public policy evaluation and practical social theories of evaluation, no more or no less - at least within the confines of the present study.

Table II-2. Types of Theorization of Social Inquiry

Type of assumptions	Issue	Macropositivism	Micropositivism	Macrohermeneutics	Microhermeneutics
			Type of theorization		
Ontological presuppositions	Intentional action	Determinism	Relativism	Determinism	Relativism
	Society	Collectivism	Atomism	Collectivism	Atomism
Epistemological presuppositions	Modeling	Positivism		Hermeneutics	
	Knowledge and value	Application-oriented objectivism		Application-oriented subjectivism	
Methodological presuppositions	Analyzing the "social" as the subject matter of social inquiry	Naturalism		Antinaturalism	
	Connecting levels of analysis	Macroreduction	Microreduction	Macroreduction	Microreduction
Evaluative implications	Criticism or legitimization of meanings and their grounds	Implicit legitimization of existing meanings which remain dissevered from their germination and "reified" by inquiry		Implicit - and often not so implicit - legitimization of existing meanings which are acknowledged and interpreted by inquiry but not questioned as regards their germination	
Practical implications	Suggestions for alternative courses of action	Advice as to how the capability of action to produce intended consequences can be maintained or enhanced		Advice as to how action can be supported or ameliorated through increased understanding of meanings	

51