

MODERNITY, MODERNISM, WOMEN *

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"Be rational - do not vote!"
(Graffiti on a wall in Kallio, Helsinki 1989).

INTRODUCTION

For political scientists of the eighties, graffiti poses problems. Decreasing voting rates in Finland actually raise the question of the possibility that non-voting can be rational behaviour. I guess the political scientists of the fifties did not need to worry about the problem. Non-voting could simply be seen as irrational, "backwards", "non-modern" behaviour. This does not necessarily depend on the behaviour itself: non-voting has, of course, been common before the eighties. The non-voting groups have changed. Now they are young people whereas before they used to be women. Even the women may have thought that it would be irrational to vote. However, they did not tell it to the political scientists, who would not listen. The point is not that young people are taken more seriously than women, even though that of course may be the case. The point is that the times have changed. Maybe we have come beyond "the modern times".

POLITICAL SCIENCE AS A MODERNIST SCIENCE; THE MASTER SCIENCE

The previous example illustrates the normative and modernist character often prevailing in political science discourse. Political scientists are supposed to speak for "enlightenment" and "progress", their point of view is implicitly connected to a modernist value judgement, which presupposes that the citizen should vote. They haven't just described different models of behaviour and searched for their potentially various and manifold rationalities.

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At this moment it merely seems that this kind of simple evaluation isn't possible any more. The values of modernity are put into question in "post-modern" times. As if we could look back on our own time from the threshold of another time.

"Political science as a "modern" discipline was born as a result of the historical rupture at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century" (Helsingin yliopisto, yleisen valtio-opin laitos, valtio-opin koulutusohjelma 1989-90). The ruptures of the time led to industrialization, the birth of nation-states and in connection to this, the birth of political institutions. They also led to an intellectual break in ways of conceptualizing and describing the world and constructing the social sciences. (Ibid.) The history and development of political science as a discipline can reasonably be expected to reflect the history of "modernity", the history of a period called "modern", but even a "modernist" history and world view. In this article, the term "modern" refers to a historical period, and the term "modernist" refers to a specific world view connected to this period. Modernity *does not* in this article refer to generally positive value-judgements, modern as "up to date" and progressive.

The idea of modernity is inherited from the enlightenment period of the 17th century, that raised slogans of liberty and reason. People were seen as trying to liberate themselves from the bonds of authority and tradition. Enlightenment was seen as the human struggle out of a state of immaturity caused by humans themselves. The origin of modernity also coincides with the birth of the "exact" sciences, the natural sciences, - a process that started in the late medieval period. Loss of magic (Entzauberung, Weber) and rationalization were seen as characteristic of modernity: the management of societal and political matters was secularised. Modernity was aligned to a belief in progress, the view of things "getting better". So, the conception of time was linear. Progress was expected to lead to a democratization of the societal-political order. In western societies, this led to the formation of parliamentary democracies with a general franchise, citizens rights and freedom of the press. Economic growth and the development of technology functioned as modernizing forces. Europe and the western countries attained a dominant position in the world system, which was seen as bringing civilization and progress for the whole of humanity. (v.Wright 1989,6-25).

Modernity is said to be a master narrative. According to Jameson, master narratives reflect a fundamental dimension of our collective fantasies about history and reality. They are allegorical narratives that reveal our collective thinking and collective fantasies but also, at the same time, repress different experiences and different desires. (Jameson 1981,34) The question I now want to pose is: What has modernity as a master narrative repressed and left concealed?

"Since our schooldays, we have poked fun at medieval artists, who in their pictures described kings and popes as big and central, and the ordinary people as small in the far corner. In fact, we in sociology still view the world from a similar perspective". (Liisa Rantalaiho 1989).

The discipline of political science focused from the beginning of the "modern sciences" on the parallel birth processes of nation-states and on issues connected to this, f.ex. the relations of the state institutions. Conceptions of progress, liberation and democratization formed the narrative of the new times. At the same time, the societal structures were seen to develop via specialization and fragmentation to greater rationality. The modernist way of thinking became rooted and was confirmed especially after the second world war, in the positivist-behaviorist period in the social sciences, when western civilization and western political systems were seen to function as models for other parts of the world.

Later on, the modernization paradigm was criticised by development theorists for being ethnocentric: the western model was considered to function in an imperialistic way and dominate the specific character of political change processes in other countries.

The critics of modernist thinking have produced different kinds of critiques in different fields of research. In the following, I will attempt to sum up some of these critiques, or aspects of them:

A) a critique of *regional* ethnocentrism; the western systems seen as models for other parts of the world;

B) a critique of "*historical* ethnocentrism";

1) the history of the "developing countries" is described as if it started from the time when the western colonizers arrived and the western culture was rooted in the country;

2) the history of the western countries themselves is described as if it started only at the beginning of the modern period. Preceding periods are seen as if they had been unchangeable, as if no change had happened before modern times ("Muutos, valinnat, tulevaisuus, Komiteamietintö 1989:3), or as if the previous times had been "dark", "dirty" and primitive. (Medieval history).

C) Modern societies are described as if the entrance to modernity had been *total* and *simultaneous* in the whole society: as if everybody had simultaneously entered

1) the urban sphere, which sustains modernity, or, on the other hand

2) the sphere of wage labour, sustaining modernity, or

3) the public sphere and its conception of citizenship, which sustains modernity.

D. The story of the modern period is also written as if the *rationality* of modernity had in fact and totally been realized and mythical thinking, so

characteristic of human beings, had totally disappeared by the entrance to modernity. Or as if the individualization set as the ideal for subjectivity in modernist thinking was an *a priori* fact, not a process, and not necessarily even a positive value. Modernist thinking seems easily to get a *normative* and an *aprioristic* character. Modernity is no longer seen as a real, historical process, but as a general positive value, as a measure of everything that is good or as implicitly valuelweighted from the researcher's point-of-view. Maybe these can be called the myths of modernity as progress.

The biases of modernist thinking can be expected to lead to many kinds of dead ends in research, to categories left unexplained and to presuppositions that are groundless. Research on welfare states seems to tend to see state expansion as "coming from somewhere" (People's needs grow, but why?) Or people's behavior is seen as political if it is directed toward the "political apparatus" and the state.

It seems that this perpetuates a way of thinking, where things are seen as relations between a center and a periphery, but as if the periphery was dependent on the center and not vice versa. (Lakoff 1987). In this way, periphery disappears from conceptualization totally. (F.ex. kings conquer lands all by themselves; or as in the citation above, kings and popes appear to be bigger than other people).

In this way, the term "modernist" acquires an analogous meaning with the terms "sexist", "racist" and "imperialist".

Critiques of the modernist way of thinking have come from many different directions and fields of research. Examples of these are other than modernist schools of thought in development studies and in general in research on different cultures. The perspectives are manifold. Views on other cultures are questioned with the ambition to understand cultural difference. The western ways of writing history have become more rigorous, which reflects a change in western self-understanding. The critique of the *Annales*-historians has made "everyday-life" visible and constructed it as a field of study. The Foucaultian genealogical research approach has aimed at a "certain de-centering of political culture", understood as the visible top of the hierarchy. It has aimed at a distancing from a research practice which is described as "a compulsory reverence for a certain number of classical texts in political philosophy, which are commented on and declared ideological." Foucault, instead, started to study texts of minor rank which have gradually constituted the historically repressed part of our political culture, objects of daily life; texts, which to the reader appear as either cynical or "cooked up by the author". (Donzelot 1979b, 73-75)

The list of the critiques can be extended and made more thorough. The point, though, seems to be, that the modernist world view seems to be undergoing a change or loosing its legitimacy. The concepts of progress and a linear view of time don't seem so valid any more.

v.Wright, to whom I referred earlier, thinks that the original modernist myth of progress is dead now, but that the remnants of the myth of progress still widely affect society as motivating forces of technical and societal development that influence the actions of technocrats and politocrats. Revealing these mistaken mythologies is, according to him, the critical task of the intellectuals. He pleads for "nonmythologized" rationalism, for a form of rationality that has withered away, as an *instrumental* usage of reason has grown too much. v. Wright is criticising the myths of progress and enlightenment, but he still sees a hope for the future in *fraternité*, - this one of the basic premises of modernity: *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. (v.Wright1989) Why is it, that the word brotherhood is still seen to include the meaning of future hope, though only men, not women, are included. Perhaps the exclusion of women isn't a "technical" mistake that can be corrected without analysis of the consequences exclusion already has had.

The critiques of modernity seem to be constructed in different ways depending on which fringe group's perspective they are based on. (It actually seems that the peripheral groups are at this moment central politicizing forces; Heiskala 1989.) In this way we can assume that the critical perspectives on modernity are many and go in several directions. They may, to a great extent, be analogous, based on "a general theory of otherness". Though maybe not identical, the analogies may function in one direction but not the other. For example, why doesn't a researcher theorizing on the basis of race or class see the question of women as an analogous problem. Why doesn't a researcher theorizing on women seem to understand the situation of people which in their lives meet the problems of both sex and race, or class; the situation of women of colour or labour class women.

In general, we could see these relations as partly analogous but multiple and complex center-periphery- relations, i.e. binary relations. In this thinking the center tends to universalize its own condition and make its dependence on the periphery invisible. In this article I try to explore what the consequences would be for political science, if we are to describe and deconstruct ethnocentric thinking based on binary oppositions (on gender). That is why I ask: What is outside the center, and what is its relation to the center. It is also important to ask how the places change, and how we could, instead, describe modernity as a *process*; change processes as complex and manifold.

I intend to look at the place of women/woman in modernity. Woman can be understood as either "general otherness", as the category of otherness in representation, as a position in a thought construct and way of perceiving. On the other hand, on the level of concrete analysis, women are a social category, and their positions in real societies vary. In that case they actualize inner divisions of the societal totality, the inner ethnocentrism of the modern society on a concrete level. Making some kind of distinction between representation and social relations seems necessary; they can of course change co-variably

but not in a one-to-one relationship. An example of this is Petro's analysis of modernity (1989): modernity is represented as woman, but this reflects male imagination, not a change in women's position, for which modernity on the contrary has meant an intensification of the traditional roles.

The basic question is: Can political science integrate women/woman without undergoing changes in its content? (How about other others?) What would a post-modern political science be like if the center is scattered and dissolved?

Does the "woman question" disperse the modern project and the division of scientific disciplines built upon and bound to that project? The alternative answers to this question are also bound to differing ways of conceptualizing "the woman question", which vary on a scale from position a) no problem: all humans are similar citizens/ scientists...

to point ö) the political order depends on the exclusion of woman (Pateman & Gross 1986).

Modernity as a concrete social experience seems to be very ambivalent for women. (Petro 1989,75) The placement of women between modernity and tradition makes women highly interesting to analyse. And, this makes modernity a highly interesting subject of study for women's studies.

Dissolving the myths of modernity and modernist ethnocentrism would seem to presuppose dissolving the way of thinking, though which the center universalizes its condition and covers its dependence on the periphery. This presupposes acceptance of "the others" existence, making it visible, and reinterpreting the relationship between the center and the periphery.

The other can be thought of as A) regionally other B) as other in time, as pre- or postmodern. C) as other of the own society inside the modernity. D) as other of subjectivity, citizenship, not fulfilling the norm or the a priori expectation. Or E) the other of rationality, accepting "other than narrow rationality", accepting the existence of mythical thinking.

It should be noted that the developmental processes of scientific disciplines seem to follow the same logic of modernization; specialization and fragmentation, which raises the question posed by Irigaray: how to make the separated worlds of the scientific disciplines communicate with each other? (1987)

In order to dissolve the modernist valueburden, one has to look for the "other" and reconstruct its relation to the center.

Relations between the parts and the whole can be understood in two different ways:

The ontological view can be atomistic: there are things, not relations. Atomistic elements form groups in random ways and form aggregates.

Another kind of ontological view can be relational: parts get their identities in relationship to each other.

The researcher has to consider whether the object of research is an independent whole or a part of a relationship, of a totality. When reading political science discourse I try to pose the question whether political science "without women" is an independent whole or a reduced part. In reading and interpreting

the excluded other we can find relations and dependencies between the inside and the outside, and on the other hand also find that even the inside and the outside are revealed to be non-monolithic and complex. An atomistic reduction of political science produces an ethnocentric science: its autonomous spheres, abstracted individuals forming aggregates and its rationalist logic have "over-interpreted" the tendency of modernity and in that way become alienated. In the following, I will read some basic dimensions (of political science) from the point of view of the metaphor of "otherness" and a relations-based ontological view.

NO WOMEN IN POLITICAL SCIENCE?

How is political science constructed? What did it forget? What does it pay debt to? The point of departure is the question of why and how gender has become a non-question, and why questions of gender, when they appear, seem to follow a peculiar logic, a binary logic. I deal with questions of ways of seeing, thinking and conceptualizing. To proceed:

"The major impulse of contemporary thought: the process of deconstructing the binary logic which valorises the single term and which consequently assures the repressive subordination of difference". (Petro 1989)

The aggregate end-result of the development has become gender neutral. The funny thing about political science discourse seems to be how it has become possible *not to see* gender though, for example, the gender of political leadership seems to be quite obvious and visible.

Modernist political science produces a picture of politics as public, dry, abstract, alienated and aggregated. For modernist political science, gender difference is non-existent, the question of gender is a non-issue. All humans are supposed to be included in the neutral concept of citizenship, be included in the sphere of citizen rights and freedoms in the same way as equal individuals alike. On the other hand, gender is seen only in connection with the private sphere, with no relevance to the public. In this way, the division into public and private spheres closes out gender. It has also been said that the concept of an individual in general is so aggregated, that human beings simply don't appear in the discipline's discourse. The Homansian phrase for "bringing men back in" was intended to oppose this problem of aggregating discourse. How about bringing women back in?

Feminist researchers have widely pointed out that the seeming gender neutrality of discourse is a reduction to masculinity, of only seeing men, or seeing men as a norm for human behaviour. Referring to the previous discus-

sion, the center has universalised its own condition and has become unable to see the other.

In this discourse, woman has no place in modernity. Though, all humans are supposed to be individuals alike. The modernist view of women sees no gender difference, except that women seem to be somewhat "backwards", they have not been capable of modernizing themselves. And in fact; replacing men with women in the existing organizations or institutions would, in itself, barely result in very big changes. Women "coming" to the spheres of wage labour and politics bearing modernity are, though, sometimes seen as mythical agents of change, the last instance of emancipatory politics and the salvation from the alienated situation.

In the modernist view the concept of individuation is given, not produced. This makes it function in a normative way. "Claims regarding subjectivity and national identity are universalized through reference to male spectator and subject alone." (Petro 1989)

The gendered formation of societies, which is very much present in everyones daily life, in the "life world", does not become an object of analysis inside the discourse. It does not form a question. From the "inside" of the discourse, there is no question, or the question becomes wrongly stated, and reproducing the same discourse with these questions and their answers does not bring any change.

The identity of political science discourse is based on the format of its aim to situate itself as writing political science as rational (not emotional; though these are actually not opposites), as public (not private), abstract (not concrete). As sacred not dealing with the banal facts of everyday life). The fact in itself, that these are considered to be opposites in modern western discourse is an interesting historical phenomenon. Forming the identities of scientific discourses presupposes, that a difference can be made between what the discourse is, and set aside what the discourse is not.

Still, the one cannot exist without the other. Conceptualizing the state or the public sphere or whatever object for political science discourse, presupposes the other, the spheres of privacy or the private, of family and civil society.

An analogical example of atomistic analysis of family is given by Donzelot (1979a). According to him, studies of family have been of two kinds:

a) Political; studies of attitudes of different political movements towards the family, conservatives and liberals supporting and socialists opposing, (later supporting)

b) Family-oriented histories (not in the political field). These do not deal with attitudes but a process of transformation, sentiments, mores, the organization of family and daily life. (The modern family was first born among bourgeoisie and aristocrats under the Ancient Regime, but diffused to other classes).

In Donzelot's view, both of these approaches are partial. The political approach neglects the personal. It deals only with conditions of reproducing a particular political order, or, how families reproduce a social order. The family-

centered approach deals with the personal and psychological, but not in connection with the political sphere. It deals with the family as a semi-autonomous unit. The two approaches together sustain a cleavage between the social, economic and political on one hand and the personal and psychological on the other.(ibid.)

When trying to overcome the problem with alienated research objects and transfer to relations-based views, the form of conceptualizing becomes binary. Pekonen (1987) has studied modernity in abstract terms as center-periphery-relations. Modernity is the concept and the symbol of the center, whereas periphery becomes "the other" and is valorized and symbolized as tradition. Modernity creates tradition for its "other". Modernity, in a historical process, seems to promise liberation/emancipation from traditional norms; normalization. Modernization is connected to the laws of development of capitalism: centres of capitalism are centres of modernization of society and often also centres of power. But capitalism can also produce its counter tendencies. The periphery may attain the position of the avant-gard, the leading force of modernization. Pekonen lists symbolic dimensions in signification as follows:

Modern
center
urban
international
individual
instrumental rationality

traditional
periphery
rural
national
community
tradition

Regarding political systems:

state
diverging interests and parties

internationalism
politics

nation
nation, unity, metaphysical
value, community
nationalism
antipolitics

In the process, modernity's "other" takes the picture of tradition. The traditional is projected far away, either regionally or in time.

In fact, what has constructed thinking on gender difference in everyday speech and thinking as well as research, is structured by the very same binary oppositions as above:

men
center

women;
periphery; women are not
found in the centers of power
but at the bottoms of
hierarchies or outside
of them.

public	private; women are positioned via the family, they are directed towards the family, not the public.
gesellschaft	gemeinschaft; women are characterised by communality; men are seen as instrumentalists acting in the public
state	civil society; women are active in the grass-roots movements, men in the state
modern	traditional, women are religious and conservative
rational	emotional, women are emotional
public	private; even in politics women apply the rationality of caring.

This binary in conceptualizing gender seems to reproduce itself with or without reason; it describes real social relations as they have been produced and are reproduced, but it also functions as a stereotype to which gender difference is returned, even when there actually is no difference.

Binary thought constructs by the "great classics" have been summed up by Minna Salmi (1988). She found a basic structure in divisions between "everyday life" and "something else" that is considered more valuable. Everyday life was often constructed as a hindrance to realisation of the sacred. So even politics has become constructed as the opposite of everyday life. In this way, "thinking" is supposed to be done outside of everyday life. The opposite of everyday life seemed to be thinking, abstracting, distancing, universality, self-realization, "individuality", the center (be that political, economic, or cultural institutions). Everyday life, instead, consists of the wholeness of peoples' activities, ordinary, immediate life, reproduction, particularity, non-reflectivity, cyclical time, rhythm, familiarity, naturality.

This everyday life seems to be constructed as the opposition, the other of modernity's linear view of time. Modernity is connected with the sacred, whereas the everyday is seen as banal and less worthy. The model seems to produce a thought construct, where only through immediate denial of self does it become possible to ground an abstracted, for the self, outer sphere, for instance the state as a complex meaning. Bodily existence is closed outside the sacred.

Would this prevalence of binary thinking give enough basis for calling these binaries "the programmatic field" of modernity, as Donzelot does? He studies the history of modernity and finds a common birth period of the current

discourses, when "the strategic configuration of modernity" was formulated. It began in 1848; from today's point of view, neither part has won. The same discourses continue existing, but their legitimacy has diminished. Does there still prevail a "prominence of the center and positions favouring social cohesion against that of extremes" (Donzelot 1979b)? Are the modern rules of the game perpetuated?

Minna Salmi, as other feminists, criticises the division between the everyday and the sacred saying that binary thinking does not see any possibility for change and opposition in everyday life. The only noble thing to do is to deny the self.

Another problem with binary thinking is pointed out by Donzelot (*ibid.*): "Political culture is also a systematic pursuit of an antagonism between two essences; state and civil society, placed in opposition." In binary thinking, the state becomes a monster, and the working class (or other others) becomes the civil society, which always heroically resists the blind rationality of the state. The civil society is seen as everything good: customs, mores, a living sociability, sought in the residual margins of society and promoted to the status of history's engine. This way of thinking has, according to Donzelot, a frightening theoretical price: the state can never be seen as effective, as a historical product of western culture, but always as a shadow above our history. One example of this is the leftist-reactionary view of the state. Another example may be the whole integration-autonomy discussion in the feminist movement. Women are also sometimes seen as heroic change forces. In the green movement, the opposition takes the traditional direction of "back to nature", back to "authenticity". Donzelot: "Only by considering power as a specific phenomenon, irreducible to the state, can we find the way out of the prison." (*ibid.*)

The binaries create two equally limiting options: identifying with cultural authority or lapsing into passivity, self-destruction, despair. (Petro 1989) In this way, even the occultation of the "other", and placing it in the position of *avant-garde*, follows the same binary logic.

Another problem is the vertical connection of the binaries. False associations between different levels often produce stereotypic and tautological explanations. F.ex., how, exactly, is women's voting behaviour explained by their participation in the labour force? This can be the case but why is it so? The *maritices* seem to steer thinking, though the connections are not cleared. (Yetman gives examples of this, 1986).

The historical changes in valorizing gender seem to give information about cyclical changes in modernity. Social movements seem to attach themselves to variably modernist - traditional symbols (Pekonen 1987). Also the feminist movements actualise variably modern-traditional tendencies, as do the ideal pictures of woman and men. The "modern" woman of the sixties appeared in unisex-clothing, stripped of sexuality and difference; masculinized. According to Petro, destabilized female identity seems to be rendered masculine, aggressive, threatening; destabilized male identity is rendered passive, "feminine".

Polarization of gender symbolics may accentuate the matrices' vertical connection; totalitarian ideologies seem to make women return to the home-sphere, motherhood and rurality.

In order to bring the atomistic ontological view back into a relational view, we end up studying the "origins" of the atoms. The "origin" in itself is fictive; every point in time will write its own history, its selfunderstanding of the past.

The modernist story of political science often originates in the formation of the state. The starting point of political science "as a modern discipline" is founded in the state building processes of the 17th and 18th centuries. Antiquity is discussed as a previous time of state formations, but for instance medieval political systems do not appear as objects of study in the masculine paradigm of writing history. The bias in time view becomes visible in writing history (own or other countries histories): Where are the areas that have not produced centralised and phallic structures?

Modernist science constructs as its objects of study nation-building and state-building processes in different countries, which are supposed to follow a general model. What existed before the modern state? Early societies were structured by kinship structures. Why is the object of research in political science constructed as if nothing existed before state-formations, and why - after the birth of state formations - as if they had totally taken over and as the kinship structures had disappeared totally and hadn't existed since then? The embryonic state formation develops to an ever bigger and more diversified formation that is constructed as an independent object of study.

The central idea of Hegelian thought was to see, that the center-periphery - relations cannot change, only accumulate. Their own inherent law of evolution leads to bigger and bigger problems. The master-center increases the control over the periphery but loses self at the same time, because the coherence of the center is loosened. The masters' control becomes more and more hysterical. Hegel saw a solution to this inherent law of development only in building a new system. Feudal relations should be overcome by contract relations. In the new system, conflict would be integrated inside the individual (the individual is then borne). This new free individual is associated in the community with other individuals on a contractual basis. In this way, the contractual nation-state (citizens/state) structure is built in Hegelian thinking. To be noted, though, is that Hegel at the same moment created a new binarity between the public and the private, between state, civil society and family. The division between the family and the state spheres was institutionalised in a division between individuals, but now between men and women, which were concretely produced through different personality structures for each and reproduced via the socialization structure of the bourgeois family (Freud). The spheres of men and women became seemingly autonomous and the public forgot its debt to the private, without which it could not have been borne. It is noteworthy that the division between public and private gives birth to both at the same time, one cannot exist without the other. Neither of them existed before the division was

made. Nation-state and relations between the new free citizens are not possible without the family.

As an example of "the original division" with visible relations between the spheres, I will present Turpeinen's discussion about Snellman (1982). Her presentation sees women as a part of the system, not "coming in from the outside". This is a way of putting women in context; as an essential part of the system:

Snellman (a Hegelian thinker) based his system of thought on reason. Reading the system of thought from within, Turpeinen looks at Snellman's writings on education and civilization, history and nationality and the state. Her interpretation puts Snellman into intertextual context, looks at other texts from the same period. In Finland, discussion on the woman question was raised in the middle of the 18th century as a question of education, not as a question of women's individuality or civil rights for women. This was due to the fact that Snellman's system of thought was constructed in a way that would fall apart by conceptualizing women's emancipation in terms of individual freedom. That would have broken the totality of the structure where women's place was constructed to be in the family. Would the family be overthrown? Then the community where women would come to enjoy human rights would also be overthrown. "Outside of the family she would have to experience the common fate of the weaker on this earth: that the stronger one would make her subordinate and destroy her".

Snellman defined woman via the family; the family, in its turn was organically connected to the civil society and the state as one form of virtue and a developmental stage of freedom. Family was, in Snellman's thought, the basis of all human action. The nation's physical and ethical power was in the "deep roots of the people". The purity of family life was the ground for national survival.

The civil society was a fighting field, where the individuals drove their own interests. Sins and ill-deeds always derived from societal life but could infiltrate inside the family. The political fight was the arena of passions. "Man is hardened to this fight. But preserving even the hardened man's peace of mind would require that he every now and then retire to the shelter of the family. Were a woman to take part in men's social endeavours, the spirit of family love, and with it all ethical mores and habits would be destroyed".

The essential point here is not that Snellman in this way puts women in a secondary position, placing them as well as men in one-sided roles. For the moment, the structure of thought is essential. There is a clear view of the different spheres of the family, the civil society and the state; their essential characters and interdependencies. The family is an essential part of the thought construct, an essential basis of the state, and it is clearly connected to gender difference.

The kinship functions in the system are also clear, the tradition is mediated from family to other by women in a pure form. In man, the tradition and customs

have "become spoiled", because of the destructive forces outside the family. That is why man is not able to build a family.

In Snellman's system, the moral rule of the society decided the places of everyone. In Sweden, Almqvist represented more individualistic ideas of equality between men and women. According to Snellman, these ideas would disrupt moral order. Free love and social subversivity were in his thought connected to the same threat: communism was connected to free love.

According to Turpeinen, reality broke into Snellman's thought construct. Even he realised that the division between the public and the private was connected to another kind of valuation than his appraisals of the private virtues: Women seemed to experience negatively, that they were left with only the minor tasks in life, that "they were not even considered good enough to take part in common societal activities".

Another kind of break was brought about by the social misery Snellman did not see: a problem of the time was a surplus of women in the population, which in the gender system of the time caused social misery and a general worsening in the life situation of women and children. Unmarried women did not have any place in Snellman's thought constructs, as women were just supposed to belong to the family sphere. The "surplus women" were expected to end up in a position of "self-despising labour force". As wage labour was not supposed to be in accordance with woman's essential nature, their position in wage labour was despised. In any case, Finnish women of the labour class found themselves very early and in great numbers in this position.

Later on, Snellman tried to develop his thoughts about women's position, love, etc. But he ended up destroying his own manuscripts on the subject, calling them "a lazy man's work, to please women and children." This does not sound like a positive evaluation of women's virtues.

According to Turpeinen, social reality overpowered Snellman's ideal model. He could not solve the problem of the family and the civil society and it became a receding element in the thought construct. Is this the point where Snellman forgot "the other"?

The essential thing in looking at Snellman is that it provides the possibility to see the connections between the parts. How about connections and their changes in the real world? How does, for instance, women's participation in the labour force change the relations of the spheres: f.ex. change in labour force participation must affect the family sphere in some ways, for instance the power structure of the family.

On the other side, women's participation in the labour force may also effect the functioning of work organizations. This must obviously also raise many questions about functions of the welfare state, where the borderlines between the private and the public are fused and mixed. This makes "borderline knowledges" important and interesting.

CONCLUSIONS; STUDYING MODERNITY AS A CONFLICTUAL PROCESS

Studying modernity from another point of view would start from the point that modernity's other is an "inner enemy", a part of oneself, that, when integrated, could bring transgression. Transgression, that does not simply repeat and reproduce the binary logic. Modernity could then be seen as also including cyclicalality, diversity, multiple dimensions and also mythical aspects.

We could then find borderline knowledges between the public and the private in politics. Politics could be seen as other than only center-directed action. This would also lead out of the wage labour centration in research, criticised by Tuija Parvikko in this volume.

Studying modernity as a process, - including conflict, with differing conceptions of time, local varieties, differences, - would then give a richer picture of society, where the other's voices are not silenced.

Why would this be important for women? The social positions of women have tended to be bad for women in rising periods of nationalism and nationalist symbols. But they are not necessarily good in periods of seemingly strong adoration of woman. Beneath the changing valorizations of femininity and masculinity there are social positions. Maybe there is even the factor of womens' subjectivity, women acting as subjects, not merely bearing the pictures of men's projections upon "the other".

And maybe it would be good for everybody, if the masculine myths of for instance technology did not reign in an irrational manner, and that mythical thinking would be recognized as such, and even welcomed as a positive force.

Modernity could then be a renewing process, regenerated all the time. The binaries are also produced in an ongoing process. Scott (1989) gives an example of reading political movements in an intertextual context: what do they produce as their countersubjects, their enemies? Is it still necessary for political movements to define themselves as against femininity, to depart from feminine symbolization in order to create a masculine identity, - in order to "make it", as the working class men according to Scott's study did.

Seeing womens' difference as something other than just a male projection and a counter-picture might just provide a richer view.

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