


**POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY**



## POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY

### Four Phases of Development in American Political Science

*Erkki Berndtson*

#### INTRODUCTION

To gain better understanding of what modern political science is really about, we will look in this article at the qualitative changes in the development of American political science. American political science has been selected as the topic of this brief analysis for several reasons. In its present form the discipline is American, not only because the first university chairs in political science were founded in the United States, but also because there has been an unbroken tradition of political science in the United States, while elsewhere in the world the uniform academic development of the discipline has been hindered by internal and external problems.<sup>1</sup> Continuity, together with the overwhelming resources and manpower, have given American political science its great international prominence. On the intellectual plane, the dominant theoretical frameworks and concepts of modern political science are mainly »American«, and still in the 1950s and 1960s one could justifiably claim that most theoretical »innovations« came from the United States. All this is reinforced by the fact that American political scientists have, until the last two decades, occupied the leading positions in the international organizations of political science. It is easy to agree with Carl Friedrich who, among others, has claimed that ». . . the field known as 'political science' is in many ways a peculiarly *American* discipline« (Friedrich 1947, 978).

The idea to utilize the present internationally dominant American political science as a case to elucidate what the political science is about reflects a certain philosophical stand. We will seemingly analyze the development of political science from its beginning to its presence. Still, by focusing on what is presently dominant, we at the same time construct the past from the present.

## ON THE ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

We referred above to the institutionalization of political science. One method to approach the historical development of political science is to focus on its institutionalization as a product of quantitative changes in science and society. Thus Hans J. Morgenthau has claimed:

The first departments of political science in this country, then, did not grow organically from a general conception as to what was covered by the field of political science, nor did they respond to a strongly felt intellectual need. Rather they tried to satisfy practical demands, which other academic disciplines refused to meet. For instance, in that period law schools would not deal with public law. It was felt that somebody ought to deal with it, and thus it was made part of political science. There was a demand for instruction in journalism, but there was no place for it to be taught; thus it was made part of political science. There was a local demand for guidance in certain aspects of municipal administration; and thus a course in that subject was made part of the curriculum of political science. (Morgenthau 1955, 436–437)

Morgenthau may be right in emphasizing the practical aspects of the development of political science, although one could question his functionalist approach. His views are difficult to connect with the ideas of qualitative development of political science. There are, however, various types of analyses and interpretations of qualitative changes. First of all, there are the different kinds of reviews and bibliographies of political scientists which are probably the largest group of «written histories» of the discipline (cf. e.g. Waldo 1975; Karl 1975). When these histories have tried to explain the development, they have usually resorted to a kind of hermeneutical reading of the texts (cf. e.g. Crick 1959), or to a standard approach of sociology of science (cf. e.g. Petras 1971). Although this has seldom been their main objective, these types of explanations have also shed light on the qualitative changes in the discipline. Utilizing the ideas presented by Thomas Kuhn the qualitative changes have been mostly treated within the approach of «paradigmatic changes». (For a typical case, see e.g. Truman 1965)

Analyses of qualitative and paradigmatic changes have often had a «political» role within political science. They have been either used for or against the prevailing tradition and/or the state of the discipline. The «behavioral study of politics» has especially produced its defenders and opponents. There have been attempts to explain the history of political science as a march towards behavioralism (Somit and Tanenhaus 1967), as well as attempts to criticize the concepts of «old-fashioned» political science (Easton 1971). Critical studies

on the other hand have tried to show, how the roots of behavioralism lie in the socio-economic reality of the United States (Petras 1971).

The obvious faults of these »politically» oriented approaches are the assumptions of unilinear development and/or the belief in strict social determination. Even the more sophisticated Kuhnian approaches which pay more attention to the internal dynamics of the science have been heavily criticized. Gunnar Sjöblom (1977, 6) points out that the Kuhnian conception of paradigmatic change has no validity in the analysis of political science. There is, however, a kind of paradox in most of the criticism directed against the Kuhnian idea of paradigmatic changes. Thus Sjöblom must admit that there has been some »dramatic shifts» in the history of political science which, according to Sjöblom, cannot be analyzed using the Kuhnian paradigm, because they represent shifting views on the discipline's scientific status and the shifting emphases on the types of problems (Sjöblom 1977, 8–20). Critics of the Kuhnian idea of paradigmatic changes cannot, however, come up with any good alternative explanation to the question why these shifts occur. Sjöblom only reduces the problem to that of the scientific status of the discipline: the political science is still preparadigmatic and the shifts are not due to paradigmatic changes but to the lack of a general framework and to the oscillations in the choice of the problems studied. This answer is a kind of tautology: because of the shifting nature of the discipline, shifts do occur.

If we do not accept the Kuhnian idea of paradigmatic changes in the »fully-developed» science nor the Sjöblomian idea that certain sciences are at the preparadigmatic stage and thus not able to stabilize paradigms or systematically change them, then what other alternatives do we have to analyze the development of science in general and political science in particular? This article, like the previous one in this book, suggests that we can draw upon hermeneutic thinking and the discourse theoretical thinking, such as they are exemplified in the works of Paul Ricoeur and Michel Foucault. The move to this direction does not imply that earlier analyses of the development of political science, and the Kuhnian or Sjöblomian arguments are invalid or wrong. There is just a need to go further and avoid the problems Sjöblom indicates in the Kuhnian approach and the ones indicated in his own. There are naturally many ways to do research on the development of science and different disciplines. These different ways can also be combined, albeit not necessarily into a unified perspective. This paper suggests that we can combine different approaches into a multi-level analysis of development and in doing that avail ourselves of the works by Foucault and Ricoeur.

The basic premises of Foucault and Ricoeur, like the structuralist discourse

theory and the hermeneutic modes of analysis, seem to contradict each other. It can be claimed, however, that structuralist and hermeneutic perspectives can be viewed complementary to each other, and as such they can be used parallelly in the multi-level analysis of intellectual history. We can next briefly review the seeming contradiction and the possibilities to overcome it.

Applying Foucault's type of analysis to the history of a social science means giving up the search for the origins of social analyses in the works of social scientists. Social analyses are produced also in social practices, especially in such practices which reflect upon themselves and more generally upon all social activities. Foucault has expressed this idea concisely in an interview statement where he considers the origins of a social science:

Countless people have sought the origins of sociology in Montesquieu and Comte. This is a very ignorant enterprise. Sociological knowledge (*savoir*) is formed rather in practices like those of the doctors. For instance, at the start of the nineteenth century Guépin wrote a marvellous study of the city of Nantes . . . (Foucault 1980, 151)

All social analyses and social knowledge whether formed in social practices or produced by »professional« social scientists intermingle in social discourse and are regulated by joint discursive practices (Foucault 1974). While trying to understand the development of a social science discipline we must not only look at the theoretical and conceptual side, but we must try to reconstruct historical sequences of »theoretical objects« where practical concerns, theories, concepts and actual research practices can be seen logically interconnected to each other.

On the other hand, if we try to apply Ricoeur's type of analysis to the history of a social science we must then, in order to reveal the »reality«, focus on the texts and interpret them (Ricoeur, 1981). The texts (and social institutions which also can be treated and »read« like texts) present us different possible »worlds«. How we, as readers, interpret the texts and the »worlds« need not be contingent upon the author's original intentions. The texts are always open to different readings and the reader always reconstructs his own meanings and makes guesses. These guesses, however, are not arbitrary, because the texts themselves delimit the field of possible interpretations and the reader assumedly follows the logic of probability. Consequently the reader's pre-understanding, his »theory«, gives the reading necessarily subjective factor, and affects the interpretation of the text as a whole. On the other hand, the reading of the parts of a text (or of a larger textual unity) offers procedures for testing and falsification. If a part of a text (or a text in a textual unity) does not »fit« into the whole, the reader must reconsider his interpretation of the whole. The subjective factor will remain in the analysis.

This is a fact which cannot be overcome by any scientific procedure. The readers can only be conscious of this fact and solve the problem of subjectivity with open discussion between different interpretations (cf. Whitaker, 1982).

How can these two different conceptions be used to develop a scheme of a multilevel analysis of the history of a social science discipline? The Ricoeurian approach of reading the «real» texts of the discipline via reconstruction of the meaning of the texts is one of the potential levels of analysis. More specifically, on this level the «reader» can try to reconstruct the major theoretical objects of the discipline. The Foucaultian approach can be used to analyze both the authors' practices in producing the texts and the wider social practices which contribute to formation of analysis and social knowledge. Both approaches can be further related to the organizational history of discipline, which in turn can be related to economic, political and social conditions. These three levels of analysis can be complemented with case studies of the different authors who produce the texts.

An analysis not advocating a special cause but seeking to understand the development of a science (discipline) as a whole, must be carried out on all the above three levels. We can, for instance, begin with the organizational history and its relation to economic, political and social conditions. Analyses on this level introduce the problems and the basic facts of the development of the discipline. We can then move to the Foucaultian level of the social practices, where we can elucidate the institutional development revealed in organizational history. Next, we can move to reconstruct the theoretical objects of the discipline through text analysis. This text analysis may resort in its interpretations to the analyses of the two previous levels. On this level, the analysis necessarily emphasizes the overall logic and the common elements of the discipline. In order to overcome any possible one-sidedness of this analysis, it is necessary to carry out individual case studies of different authors and approaches, which will bring the analyses back to a concrete level. All these moves between the different levels can be interpreted as dialectics between the whole and the parts called for by the Ricoeurian strategy.

The above design of moving between different levels of analysis is only one among many alternatives and other strategies can be devised. We can also emphasize in different ways the dialectics of the «theoretical» and the «practical». If we look at the «origins» of the theoretical objects of a discourse (a discipline at a certain stage of its development), we may notice that the new ideas originate in the activities and speeches of the politicians, in the texts of the administrators, etc. But it is often equally true that they originate in the texts of the scholars, or at least are systematized by them. The relationship between the practices and the «internal» logic of the theoretical objects

is important and also offers different bases for devising alternative research strategies.

In this article the empirical analysis of American political science cannot do all what the above theoretical and methodological discussion promises. It tries to reconstruct the major phases of the development in terms of their major theoretical objects. The other levels of analysis are only referred to. The detailed analysis on all the levels and the analysis of the mediation between the levels are beyond the scope of this article. To make the reconstructed theoretical objects more understandable, some basic facts of the organizational development of political science and its relations to economic, social and political conditions have been incorporated into the analysis. The reconstruction of the development and the theoretical objects which emerge in the course of analysis is done by reading certain key texts of those American political scientists who are generally considered most prominent.<sup>2</sup> This reading focuses on theoretical concepts, conceptual frameworks, research interests (substantive problems) and research methods which constitute the theoretical objects.

#### FOUR PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE

The historians of social science development have argued about the internal logic and the external determination in the emergence of the different disciplines. Thus the American sociologist Scott Greer has suggested that, on one hand, the end of classical political economy signified the birth of economics and, on the other hand, emergence of political science as the study of constitutional law and as a doctrine of »good state». There was, however, an empty space left between these two areas of research and, sociology, the general science of society, was introduced to fill in this gap (Greer 1969, 52). Göran Therborn, in turn, has suggested that sociology was born after the French revolution mainly as the study of politics. It was only after the Revolution sociology began to develop as an independent field of thought. Sociology did not have any role in the Enlightenment. Therborn reasons that »political theory seems to be the intellectual background against which sociology's claim to represent a new science of society should be analyzed» (Therborn 1974, 96).

Whatever the respective merits of these two contradictory interpretations, they both emphasize the role of practical considerations and activities in the formation of the social science disciplines. Greer more specifically in-



dicates that the study of constitution and the doctrines of »good state» are the origins of political science. Therborn in turn indicates that even the »theoretical» general science of society, sociology, has its origins in practical political concerns. Both men connect the emergence of political science with the rise of the modern nation state. This gives us a clue that the theoretical objects of political science could be found by examining the concerns of political science with the governance of modern nation states and, more specifically, by examining the concerns of political science with the system of democracy.

If we examine the works of influential American political scientists, can we find some indications which tie the emergence of theoretical objects in American political science to the problems of nation states and democracy? The texts of such classic and/or influential scholars as John W. Burgess, Westel Woodbury Willoughby, Charles E. Merriam, Harold D. Lasswell, David Easton, Robert A. Dahl, Thomas R. Dye, Theodore J. Lowi have at least one common theme which centers around the concept of power — or its different forms as »sovereignty», »authority», »influence», »administration» or »decision-making». In each case a concept of power (sovereignty, authority, etc.) is further conceptually linked with a form of social organization, that is, a system of democracy. Examining the theoretical objects which emerge historically from this combination, the history of American political science may be divided into four overlapping phases. These phases labelled in terms of the development of social organization, (i.e. the system of democracy) are:

1. the formation of representative democracy (c. 1880—1920)
2. the emergence of the problems of representative democracy (c. 1900—1940)
3. pluralist democracy as a solution to the problems of democracy (c. 1920—1965)
4. the crisis of pluralist democracy (c. 1945—)

The beginning of this periodization is artificially truncated, because the formation of representative democracy was under way already much before 1880. However, the year has been taken as a starting-point, because the first academic institution of political science, the »School of Political Science» was founded that year in the Columbia University. Because the School was founded by John W. Burgess, he is also often considered the »founder» of the discipline.

The four phases have been reconstructed in a form of real historical development. The overlappness of phases, however, already proves that every phase contains as well the prophecy of future as the analysis of past.

## THE FORMATION OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE PREDICTION OF ITS PROBLEMS

The representatives of the first phase of political science dealt with democracy quite unanimously. John W. Burgess and Westel Woodbury Willoughby, two prominent and representative political scientists of the first era at the end of the last century, are two examples. When writing about freedom, Burgess states ». . . that in all states individual liberty consists in freedom of the person, equality before the courts, security of private property, freedom of opinion and its expression, and freedom of conscience» (Burgess 1900, 178). Freedom for him was linked to the state, i.e. to a written constitution. The state was the politically organized form of society, the form being defined through the concept of sovereignty. Although Burgess did not deal straight with the problem of extending political rights, his analysis was necessarily linked with the emergence of political liberty.

Willoughby, however, analyzed also directly the problems of representative democracy by pondering on the effects of the extension of democracy. His main concern was efficient administration and general welfare; and he also saw that their achievement could be endangered by voters and their low personal qualities as citizens. In spite of this, Willoughby did not deny the necessity of extending political rights. But what he wanted to ask was, that if the electorate is not ready to use new rights intelligently, is there any use of changing the form and function of government. According to Willoughby, democracy contained such inherent problems as meritocracy in political decision-making and strengthening of party-rule, one danger being the tyranny of the majority.

Democracy was a complex system which presupposed a high morality, high level of education, great amount of self-discipline, social equality and, above all, the active but interest-free participation in politics by the most talented citizens of society. The problems were also a challenge to political scientists, for it was up to them to construct the right kind of party system (Willoughby 1928, 396, 411–414, 439).

Because political science emerged as a separate discipline in the years when government and law were crystallized into a stable structure, it is no wonder that the classics of the discipline focused their studies on this process. The problems of liberty, sovereignty of the state and the tasks of the state became central research problems. For this reason, it is no wonder that research followed a comparative, juridical and historical method. No distinction was made between political philosophy and political science, because they were united in the same discipline forming an integral whole.

The first phase of political science was a continuation of the development which had started in political thought already in the 17th century and which took its classical form in the writings of John Stuart Mill, e.g. in his demands for universal suffrage. However, Mill revealed in his writings that within this tradition there are contradictions between ideals and practical fears. Although for Mill the representative democracy was in principle the best political system, there were in practice two great problems: ignorance and poor mental ability of the masses, and the generally harmful effects of class interests on society. Representative democracy would work only, if the system could be organized in such a way that no single class would be able to guide legislation and administration according to its own class interests. Its formation would be a slow process, because citizens have to first learn the general needs of society and the proper nature of democracy. This created an important task for educated people and for scholars in particular (Svensson and Sørensen 1979, 7–19). The similarity between Mill and Willoughby is clear in this respect.

#### THE PROBLEMS OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

When representative democracy was slowly emerging, research areas of political science also started to change. In the first phase, political scientists had concentrated on problems of the state: government and its functions were studied from philosophical, historical and judicial angles. In this new phase political science began to focus more on problems already »predicted« by the first phase, such as the effects of group interests on political decision-making, and those of elections. Political propaganda and public opinion also emerged as major fields of research. The central force in this change was the Chicago School of political science, led by Charles E. Merriam, Harold F. Gosnell, Leonard D. White and Harold D. Lasswell (see, e.g. Merriam, Crane, Farlie and King 1923).

The concept of democracy was, at last, positively accepted. The influential James Bryce, for instance, defined the term by writing:

The word Democracy has been used ever since the time of Herodotus to denote that form of government in which the ruling power of the state is legally vested, not in any particular class or classes, but in the members of the community as a whole. This means, in communities which act by voting, that rule belongs to the majority, as no other method has been found for determining peaceably and legally what is to be deemed the will of a community which is not unanimous. Usage has made this the accepted sense of the term, and usage is the safest guide in the employment of words. (Bryce 1923, 23)

The extension of political rights, strengthening of the party system and growth of pressure groups had an effect on conceptual reorientation in the theory of the state. The old monistic theory of the state was abandoned for the pluralistic one (Ellis 1920). The pluralistic theory of the state denied the absolute nature of the state sovereignty: individuals could have also other objects of loyalty. It saw society as composed of competing groups where the state is a metagroup among the others. The representatives of the pluralistic theory of the state stressed the importance of groups in a new political situation. The monistic theory of the state had, in practice, been often reduced into legal analysis of the state and thus did not take into account the real influence of intergroup processes. It was only natural that the concept of sovereignty was soon replaced by the concept of power (cf. Merriam 1934, Lasswell 1936).

The method of analysis began also to change. The study of citizens and groups, their interests and behavior, soon demanded empirical research and application of statistical methods. The explanations were often taken from psychology which was seen as a mature science providing help to less developed social sciences.

The development was quite logical: the state as a political organization of society had become a meta-group of a society. From the study of the functions of the state one had moved into the study of behavior and political struggle of citizens and groups. Historical and comparative analysis had been changed into statistical psychology-based empirical research, the concept of sovereignty had been changed into the concept of power, and demands for liberty and freedom had been transformed into the analysis of the functioning of representative democracy.

Political science thus became what sociology had already been, i.e. an explanatory science, at the same time as sociology, taking now the role of a general science of society, was being depolitized. The fact that there was no more need for political »thinking» was very aptly put by William A. Dunning in 1907:

So far as concerns speculation that is chiefly juristic, there is *a priori* ground for the correctness of the tentative generalization, for where the goal has been definitely reached in the progress toward constitutional democracy, as is the case in Great Britain, France and the United States, reflection on what is gives way naturally to reflection on how it came to be so; while among peoples whose constitutional problems are still in a considerable degree unsettled, discussion will turn on those questions of sovereignty, rights and ideal organization which are the core of systematic political theory. (Dunning 1907, 693)

## PLURALIST DEMOCRACY AS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY

After the Second World War those problems which had been brought up between the wars became dominant problem areas in political science. Political scientists understood that the prevailing system of representative democracy did not meet the ideals of classical democratic theory. Voting percentage was low, private interests had priority over public interest, etc. There was a need for a new theory of democracy, which would soon be conceptualized as a theory of pluralist democracy, where »the conception of politics as a system of power-relationships clashes with such doctrines as that of 'popular self-government'» (Key 1964, 5). Politics was understood as a struggle for power between different power-centers (parties, parliaments, voters, pressure groups) and the functioning of society was explained by an equilibrium model.

Survey research on political attitudes and voting behavior had shown that people were not behaving in accordance to the theory of representative democracy: people should have been interested in politics, participated in politics, known political issues, voted rationally and according to principles. The situation was a paradox, but nevertheless the organizational form of society was considered to be a democratic one. Consequently, factors other than those associated with »rational» behavior became more important to democratic theory.

It was then claimed that democracy actually needed different kinds of people: if everybody was active in politics democracy would not survive. High involvement could lead to fanaticism, which would threaten democracy. Thus it was only desirable that only a part of citizens were active in politics. Citizens did not have to have any strong attitudes, it was enough that they had a general view of matters. The system demanded a mixture of consensus and cleavages in order to function. The stability of the system and its potentiality to satisfy demands of people together with formal political rights were as such marks of democracy. As Seymour Martin Lipset wrote, ». . . democracy is not only or even primarily a means through which different groups can attain their ends or seek the good society; it is the good society itself in operation» (Lipset 1960, 403). Charles E. Merriam had still stressed that the concept of democracy contains both the essential dignity of man and a constant drive toward the perfectability of mankind (Merriam 1938, 329); now the moral dimension of democracy was transformed into mechanisms of stability in society.

This new interpretation of democracy has been labelled as the »Schumpeter-Dahl-axis», because it was first formulated by Joseph Schumpeter in 1942 in

his »Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy» and Robert A. Dahl came to be its leading figure in the 1960s with his studies of power-mechanisms in the United States (Macpherson 1975, 78).

Political science centered around the problems of stability of political systems, political socialization and legitimacy. The concept of the state diminished into that of a government, which operated in a political system. Power as a central concept of political science was fragmented and perceived in terms of authority and influence. Demands and support were canonized as *the* input variables of the political system by David Easton in his theoretical writings at the same time as he defined politics as the authoritative allocation of values for a society.

It is interesting that the leading political scientists of the era never asked the question: how can political systems be changed? (Weinstein 1971, 7–9). They were only concerned with the problems of stability in the situation of well-functioning economy (whether »goods could be delivered») and the main problems otherwise were the growth of the socialist system and the uncertain future of developing countries (see, e.g. Lipset 1960, 92–96).

In this respect the leading political scientists of the era (Robert A. Dahl, David Easton, David B. Truman, Gabriel A. Almond, Sidney Verba, Anthony Downs, Seymour Martin Lipset etc.) form a logically united front. All represent political science where the state is understood as government, and where legitimacy together with a new understanding of the nature of democracy are central topics. This was also an era of »the behavioral study of politics» with a heavy emphasis on quantification, measurement, theory construction, and value-free research. There was no room for political philosophy in a society aimed at economic growth.

#### THE CRISIS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY

The economic crisis of the late 1960s led into new problems in political science. Rising living standards in the 1950s and early 1960s had revealed new social problems in the United States (poverty in the middle of abundance, position of blacks), and these problems gained new visibility in the context of economic crises and the war in Vietnam. Simultaneously citizens' trust in politicians diminished, and it was widely felt that the government is not a solution to any problems, but actually a problem itself.

First signs of crisis in the theory of pluralist democracy already emerged at the beginning of the 1960s. Criticism was both technical (»scientific») and »ideological» (based on classical theory of democracy). »Technical» criticism

focused on problems of measuring power, the one-sided concept of power, etc. Criticism based on the classical theory of democracy, in turn, accused the pluralist theory of conservatism and betrayal of democratic ideals.<sup>4</sup>

Critics argued now that there was no more need to worry about the stability of the political system, but, instead, to extend democracy. One had to emphasize the educational aspect of political participation and not only produce research results about passive citizens. Criticism, however, was not very successful, because it was based only on moral or technical grounds. More important studies criticizing pluralism came out from a new tradition called policy-analysis, which based its criticism on historical changes in the state and politics.

The criticism was a part of the so-called post-behavioral revolution in political science. It was also a question of the shift in the problems of research. The notion that mechanisms of political socialization were the only legitimating factors was not accepted anymore, because the satisfaction of demands as a criterion of politics had gained in importance. As Thomas R. Dye wrote:

American political science has tended to emphasize the support a system receives as a product of commitments to the character of the system itself. These commitments are certainly important to any political system, but what consequences do policy outcomes have for the level of support accorded to a political system? Which demands must be satisfied in order to maintain enough support to enable the system to persist? How long can attachments to the system provide the necessary support for a political system in the face of unsatisfying outcomes? These and similar questions lie behind the need for future research on policy outcomes. (Dye 1966, 300)

The present is, of course, always difficult to approach from a historical perspective. And, at present, political science seems to be a very diversified discipline, with its mainstream and critical currents (Lindblom 1982). But in the background there is the question of democracy. Analyses of the functions of the state, different policy-typologies, etc. must be seen as attempts to answer the crisis of pluralist democracy. This is also the case with demands about the relevance of research in the so-called »post-behavioral revolution» and even with many of the works in other subfields of political science, e.g. with the analytical political theory. These trends reveal attempts to create a new society and a new theory of democracy. Whether the offered solution is a decision-making system based on experts and impartial public servants<sup>5</sup> or something else, we are in any case back at the problems of the first of our four phases. There is a new interest in the question of »right» political organization of society.



## CONCLUSION: ON THE NATURE OF THE RECONSTRUCTION

By using the concept of democracy in the reconstruction process, one is able to see political science as a science of democracy.<sup>6</sup> This also sheds light on the fact that the political science began to develop in the United States and not in the same way in Europe. It can be argued that democracy was far more advanced in the United States already in the 19th century than it was in Europe, a fact which was vividly described by de Tocqueville in his time. Although male suffrage was nearly universal from the 1860s onwards it was not the real reason for perceiving the United States democratic. Universal manhood suffrage was in principle prevailing at the same time also in many European countries (France, Germany, Greece, Switzerland). The real reason was that the United States lacked a feudal system (which one still had to struggle against in Europe) as well as a strong and militant working-class (which one was afraid in Europe).<sup>7</sup> The constitution of the United States emerged from a basically revolutionary political ideology, forming a political culture which stressed democracy and liberty as national values.

The American democratic tradition explains the emphasis on democracy reflected in our construction of theoretical objects of American political science. But this tradition does not explain the variations and development of the theoretical objects depicted above with the reconstruction of the four phases of American political science. The reconstruction is naturally only a construction, a kind of formulation of ideal types. The four phases represent the development of the »middle of the road« political science between conservatism and radicalism. American political science has naturally had its own share of diverging opinions and battles between the mainstream and its varying opponents. These, as well as many other sides of the development, are left unanalyzed by our ideal type construction.

The most serious omission of our analysis is naturally the neglect of the links and mediations between the four constructions of theoretical objects and the practical needs and social practices of politicians and administrators. To study these links and mediations would require the study of the plans of electoral procedure; activities and reports of such committees as the President's Research Committee on Social Trends (1929), the National Planning Board (1933), the National Resources Planning Board (1939); and activities and reports of such organizations as the American Legislators' Association, the American Municipal Association, the American Society of Planning Officials, etc. One should also study the policies and funding decisions of such private foundations as Rockefeller and Ford. All this would require



different strategy and a more refined approach that has been possible within the limits of this article.

#### NOTES

- 1 Of these factors one can mention e.g. the legalism (in France), wider interest in social relations (England), and political upheavals (fascism in Italy and Germany).
- 2 Who can be considered »most prominent» or »leading» scholars and which are their »key texts» are as such hermeneutic questions which will not be dealt with in this article. The material for the reconstruction in this article has been selected mainly on the basis of the »operational criterion» of »being in the front line of discussions».
- 3 Besides Lipset one can especially refer in this context to Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954), 307–309, 312–321; and Almond and Verba (1965), 340.
- 4 For the technical criticism, see e.g. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and for the ideological criticism Walker (1966).
- 5 See e.g. Lowi (1979). Lowi proposes a system he calls »juridical democracy» as a solution to the crisis of pluralist democracy. See also Dye and Zeigler (1975) who in turn offer as a solution a kind of technological elitism (see especially pages 449–458).
- 6 In its elementary form this idea was presented already by Lasswell (1942).
- 7 The facts about the expansion of the universal suffrage can be found in two books, Stein Rokkan and Jean Meyriat (eds., 1969); and Rose (ed., 1974).

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