POLITICS PROPER VS. THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE

POLITICS PROPER VS. THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE

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INTRODUCTION

From time to time the standard perspectives and conceptual arsenals of political science are critically examined by self-appointed reformists, who argue that the subject matter is disappearing from the discipline (Latouch 1982). In their derision of the barren formalism and intellectual poverty of the existing research these self-appointed reformists hold forth in favour of introducing new perspectives or revising the old ones (cf. Storing 1962; Surkin and Wolfe 1970; Marini 1971). It is possible, of course, to explain away these feelings of unrest and desires for reform by referring to the idea of paradigmatic crises and the need for paradigmatic change. However, this idea and this need scarcely apply to the social sciences in general (cf. Eisenstadt and Curelaru 1971) and they cannot be used to explain away the random or periodic sense of futility and frustration at the assumed loss of the discipline's subject matter.

The very expression »bringing politics back into political science» can, however, be perceived from a still wider perspective. This perspective requires an act of imagination and political will to penetrate the conventional ideas of scientific progress and paradigmatic change and it suggests that there is a larger battle being fought behind the backs of the political scientists, self-appointed reformists and believers in paradigmatic crises and scientific progress. According to this view the call for bringing back the subject matter of political science must be seen in the terms of more general dynamics of language and knowledge. The battle being waged by the self-appointed reformists within the field of political science only reflects a more persistent war which is continously being fought everywhere in society as the *politics of knowledge*. In this larger war the soldiers and victims are words, expressions and larger enunciative units of language; and they are steadily being

drained of their energy, i.e. their original meanings, left to stand on their spots and let to sediment and petrify on the ground or into the fortress walls of the battlefields. At times, the sedimented and petrified words, expressions and enunciative units are, however, called back into the fray and rearmed with old invigorated meanings or totally new interpretations.

Roland Barthes has described the battle front of political discourse in this war and elegantly made use of three reflexive verbs »repeat itself», »generalize itself» and »exhaust itself» to elucidate the sedimentation and petrification of language and knowledge:

> Political discourse is not the only kind to repeat itself, generalize itself, exhaust itself: as soon as there is a mutation of discourse somewhere, there follows a vulgate and exhausting cortège of motionless phrases. If this common phenomenon seems to him (Barthes speaks in this book of himself in the third person singular, I.H.) particularly intolerable in the case of political discourse, it is because here repetition takes the style of a climax: politics qualifying itself as the fundamental science of the real, we endow it, hallucinatorily, with a final power; that of checkmating language, reducing any utterance to its residue of reality. Then how to tolerate with sanguinity the fact that politics too belongs to the category of languages and turns to Prattle? (Barthes 1977, 53)

In the first sentence Barthes concisely defines the politics of knowledge, in the latter part of the quotation he explains the reasons for an intellectual's frustration at the drainage of politics from political discourse. This frustration — similar to that of the self-appointed reformists referred to above — is due to the fact that the sedimentation of political discourse prevents intellectuals as well as everybody else from using politics as the touchstone of social reality. Later, in a parenthetical aside, Barthes describes three alternative ways to rid political discourse of its sediment and petrification:

> (For political discourse not to be caught up in repetition demands unusual conditions: whether such discourse itself establishes a new mode of discursiveness: as is the case of Marx; or else, more modestly, by a simple intelligence of language — by the knowledge of its own effects, an author produces a political text at once strict and free, which assumes the mark of its aesthetic singularity, as if it were inventing and varying what has been said: this is what Brecht does in his writings on politics and society; or else, finally, the politics, at an obscure and even improbable depth, arms and transforms the very substance of language: that is the Text, that of Soller's Lois for example). (Barthes 1977, 53—54)

In these two quotations Barthes defines the subject matter of politics of knowledge: the inevitable sedimentation and petrification of language and knowledge and the equally inevitable countertrends arising from among those who (consiously or unconsciously) notice and resist this sedimentation

and petrification. Barthes also defines politics (»the fundamental science of the real») and locates it into the wider context of the politics of knowledge. These definitions of the »politics of knowledge» and »politics» are given from the perspective of a specific discourse formation of the present Western scientific and intellectual debate: the discourse of politics of knowledge.[1] This discourse — as we will see later — has its own epistemological and methodological premises, and it has been carried out within the intellectual traditions of structuralism, hermeneutics and discourse theory.

But »politics» also has its traditional established definitions and meanings within another present Western discourse, the discourse which can be called »the discourse of politics proper». It, too, has its own premises and it is maintained by the professional political actors, ordinary language and those established political scientists who shape the »practical» conceptions of politics. In order to get a more balanced view and a better starting point for the dialogue we are later staging between the discourse of politics of knowledge and the discourse of politics proper, we may also ask, how »politics» and »politics of knowledge» have been defined in the latter discourse.

There is, of course, no natural single conception of politics in the standard discourse of politics proper. It is not possible to list here all major variants of the »political» in this discourse. Still, it is possible to indicate within it major relevant properties which can be attributed to politics. We might do well to follow Barthes' lead and use three verbs: »instrumentalized», »externalized» and »aggregated» to describe this conception of politics. The first of these descriptors refers to the concept of politics as an activity carried out by individual conscious subjects, that is, by actors with well-defined motives and objectives. It is furthermore assumed that these actors use generalized political or politically relevant resources such as »power», »ideological persuasion», »information» or »sanctions» to alter each others' conduct. These premises, when they are conceptually connected with the assumed concrete aspirations and goals of the political actors, lead to the Lasswellian instrumental concept of politics: who gets what, when, how. The second descriptor refers to the concept of politics as an externally defined and given field of social activities, which can be entered and vacated at will by these individual actors; and this also implies that it is possible to escape from the field of activities by declaring oneself to be an impartial outsider or external observer. The more customarily the field of political activities is described and analyzed from the perspective of an »outsider» or an »external observer» the more easily it is »reified» as a field of power play and manipulatable social relations. The third descriptor refers to the concept of politics as some kind of aggregation: the aggregation of diverging interests into common goals, the aggregation of

opinions and attitudes into belief systems and ideologies, the aggregation of needs, demands or supports into authoritative decisions and policies. The idea of aggregation leads to the concept of politics as a means of adjusting diverging preferences and utility functions to each other via processes of compromising, coalition formation and collective decision making.

It is, however, unfair to characterize the concept of politics in the current standard discourse of politics proper only in terms of these three verbs and related ideas. Even in its most elementary positivistic forms this discourse attributes to politics further sinister traits which can be called Machiavellian. These Machiavellian traits in politics and political action can be described in many ways: concealment of the actual power motive, conscious manipulation of symbols and values, egotistic unleashing of unwished for consequences, and disguising domination as progress and development. In the standard political discourse the existence of such Machiavellian traits in politics is generally acknowledged by political actors and political scientists alike. Likewise, politics is also often seen in terms of a concerted battle against all that is sinister and negative. In the Machiavellian research traditions of political science this battle is seen as unending and rather hopeless.[2] Even the dimmest and most hopeless Machiavellian interpretations may, however, gain new positive content if politics is conceived as the dialectics of the sinister and its divulgence. It is this very dialectics which can make politics, in Barthesian terms, ». . . the checkmating language, reducing any utterance to its residue of reality». But to admit this leads us away from the realm of the traditional discourse of politics proper and back into the realm of the new discourse of the politics of knowledge.

We can next ask, how the traditional discourse of politics proper has viewed the main problems of the politics of knowledge, i.e., those connected with the sedimentation and petrification of language and knowledge. These problems have been mainly treated within the Machiavellian tradition; and there they have been viewed as problems of ideologies and their irrationality. The orthodox view of these problems is that the élites construct ideologies — are forced to construct them — and let them become irrational and mythical — if they were not that from the very beginning. Or, as James Burnham has stated:

> But the leaders must profess, indeed foster, belief in the myths, or the fabric of society will crack and they be overthrown. In short, the leaders, if they themselves are scientific, must lie. It is hard to lie all the time in public but to keep privately an objective regard for the truth. Not only is it hard; it is often ineffective, for the lies are often not convincing when told with a divided heart. The tendency is for the deceivers to become self-deceived, to believe their own myths. (Burnham 1963, 304)

A clear resemblance between this Machiavellian creed and Barthesian-type definitions of the politics of knowledge can be noticed. But there is a still clearer difference: the touchstone of reality for the former is the science of politics and its rationality, for the latter the touchstone is politics as an inter-play of the sinister and its divulgence.

These introductory comments offer a preliminary view of both the politics of knowledge and politics proper. Or they offer actually two views of both: one from the perspective of the politics of knowledge discourse and the other from the perspective of the present discourse of politics proper, (i.e., from the perspective of the present standard discourse within politics and political science). It would be possible to proceed from here to analyze and judge the respective practical and scientific merits of these views. It is, however, against the general tenor of this paper to stage the confrontation between the politics of knowledge and politics proper in general evaluative terms. Instead, in the rest of the paper a confrontation, or a mutual cross-examination, will be staged between the two discursive formations which we have above prelimina-rily introduced: the discourse of politics proper and the discourse of the politics of knowledge. Both will be viewed as concrete discourse formations of the present Western societies, and no historical or cross-cultural generali-zations are aimed at.

In order to give a better background to this confrontation the discourse of politics of knowledge is first elucidated in greater detail. This is done by constructing a kind of ideal type of its basic premises and major features. Besides serving the subsequent strategy of confrontation this ideal type has another function: it also elucidates the premises of this paper. Confronting two different types of discourses is itself an event in the politics of knowledge discourse — on the secondary meta-analytical level.

The ideal type will automatically provide a means to confront the two discursive formations: the discourse of politics proper can be located in those regions of language and knowledge where it is subject to the impacts of the politics of knowledge. The potential sources of sedimentation and petrific-ation can then be pointed out and trends of development analyzed and evaluated. After this first stage of confrontation the tables can be turned and the discourse of politics of knowledge cross-examined from the »political» perspective of politics proper. The core of this examination is the question of what the discourse of politics of knowledge amounts to ideologically and politically: whom it benefits or harms and whose side it may take in the present system of domination and ideological confrontations.

By proceeding in this stepwise manner we might first hopefully be in a position to understand better the wider ramifications of the question of what

is meant by the statement that politics is being drained from the political discourse or brought back into it. In addition we might gain an insight how the discourse of the politics of knowledge can serve to expand the scope of the discourse of politics proper and more specifically the scope of political science. Finally, we might find an answer to the question of to what extent and how the politics of knowledge can escape the problems of political commitment.

THE PREMISES AND CONCEPTS OF THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE DISCOURSE

The following ideal type construction of the present politics of knowledge discourse relies heavily upon the structuralist, hermeneutical and discourse theoretical analyses as exemplified in the writings of Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur and Michel Foucault.[3] From the political science point of view the similarity of these writings to those of the Machiavellian research tradition has already been pointed out. The confrontation of the ideal type of politics of knowledge discourse with the discourse of politics proper can thus also be conceived as a confrontation between the »new» and the »old» Machiavellian analysis of politics. The epistemological and methodological premises of the structuralist and discourse theoretical writings differ, however, radically from those of the traditional political science. We shall not here analyze these writings at any length nor involve ourselves in epistemological discussions. Instead, we shall take from these sources two basic premises and two specifying assumptions which can serve as the foundation of our ideal type construction.

The first basic premise states that in the politics of knowledge discourse we must focus on knowledge and its mediation *in their concrete forms* (cf. Foucault 1974, 6—7, 26—28, 79—87). We do not need to concern ourselves with the Kantian problems of justification of our judgements nor the Hegelian problems of the logic and unfolding of concepts; our interest is in speech, texts, different »languages» and discourse formations, and in the meanings and knowledge they may contain and mediate. The second premise states that in the politics of knowledge discourse we must avoid the glorification and legitimation of knowledge in any of its forms (cf. Foucault 1974, 7—8, 189—192). We must not assume *a priori* that any one type of knowledge, such as, for example, scientific knowledge, is »more objective» or »better» or »better conveys reality» than any other type of knowledge. »Reality», insofar as we are at all able to speak about »reality», is conveyed to us through our ability to interpret and reinterpret the constellations of discourse produced

from different epistemological perspectives by different modes of human discursiveness (science, ordinary language, the arts, etc.).

The first specifying assumption concerns the much maligned »decentering of the subject» (cf. Foucault 1972, 54—55; 1977, 113—138; Giddens 1979, 38—40). In the discourse of politics we must assume that the real subject in the creation of language and knowledge (or more generally in any representational action) is not an individual or a collective actor but different »languages», »types of knowledge» or »discursive formations». Furthermore, external circumstances, rules and discursive practices regulate the dynamics of language, generations of meanings and knowledge and the emergence of discursive formations (Foucault 1974, 45—46). The individual and collective actors are best conceived as the points where the dynamics of language and knowledge materialize; or as the subdued objects of language and knowledge engaged in futile fight of self-reflexion. The second specifying assumption states that there is no progress or predetermined right direction in the evolution of language, discursive formations or knowledge. We cannot assume anything about the »accumulation of knowledge», »making meanings more accurate» or »receiving corrective causal feed-backs from nature» (cf. Shapiro 1981, 145—150).

These premises and specifying assumptions already elucidate to some extent, how the concepts of »language», »knowledge» and »discourse» have been used and will be used in this paper. We are now in the position to define them and their relationships more accurately. To start with, we can look at language and its relationship to knowledge in the same way as some hermeneutical analyses look at the concept of »expression» and its relationship to the concept of »meaning». »Meanings» and »knowledge» are, on one hand, generated when an accurate relationship is established between a concept (or a set of concepts) and its referent (a set of referents).[4] But, on the other hand, meanings and knowledge are also generated when the established relationships between concepts (sets of concepts) and their referents (sets of referents) are transgressed, i.e. established relationships are severed by transferring a concept (a set of concepts) from its context of established meanings to another context of meanings and used there e.g. metaphorically or as an analogy to refer to new and surprising fields of referents.[5] (Here Machiavelli's use of the concepts »Fox», »Lion», and »Fortune» provides an example, see Burnham, 1963, 68—69, 72—73).

The above formulation — which follows rather closely the analysis of the »rule of metaphor» by Paul Ricoeur (1978, 289—313) — could be further elaborated and its similarity to the analyses of Roland Barthes (1957, 193—213) and Levi (1967) pointed out. For our purpose it needs to be broadened

by three qualifications. The first qualification is that both establishing »conventional meanings» and transgressing them vary from one »language» (region or a sub-region of language and knowledge) to another (i.e., they are different in ordinary language, in scientific language, in the language of social sciences, in the arts etc.). The interplay between established denotational meanings and their new metaphorical uses is only an elementary example of the whole range of different ways of creating conventional meanings and transgressing them.[6] Secondly, transferring linguistic (or other) presentations from one »language» (region or sub-region of language or knowledge) into another may create new »meanings» and »knowledge»; but this is not only due to new denotational relations which are thus created. Every effective transfer also changes the »original» and the »receiving» connotational contexts — or creates totally new ones. Thirdly, the idea of creating meanings and knowledge through »conventional establishing» or through »transgressing» emphasizes too much the autonomy and internal dynamics of language and knowledge. The external rules and discursive practices — which can be perceived to form regulative »practical metalanguages» — set the limits to this autonomy and internal dynamics of language and knowledge.[7] These rules and discursive practices (»practical metalanguages») determine to a large extent what can be said (i.e. the scope of a given »language»), and how things can be said (i.e. the accptable ways meanings and knowledge can be generated in this »language»).[8]

The concept of discourse can be defined as an observed sequence of events of discourse materialized within a given »discursive formation». An »event of discourse» refers to a situation, where interconnected meanings or »units of knowledge» are activated by linguistic (gestic, artistic, etc.) presentations; and a »discursive formation» refers to a system of regularized relations between a set of series of these »activating presentations». Each of these regularized sets (a discursive formation) has its own historicity (its story of appearance, maintenance, transformations through events of discourse), its own syntagmas (concepts and objects its presentations may incorporate; stories they may tell using these concepts and objects; enunciative purposes these stories may have), and its own paradigms (internal regulative systems, »grammars»). These discursive formations are located in the different regions and sub-regions of language and knowledge and they are externally regulated by the practical metalanguages (rules and discursive practices) of these regions and sub-regions.

REGIONS, SUB-REGIONS AND PRACTICAL METALANGUAGES IN THE POLITICS
OF KNOWLEDGE

In his essay »Semantics and Hermeneutics» Hans-Georg Gadamer discusses
the tensions between the individualizing tendencies of the ordinary language
and the universalizing tendencies of technical and scientific languages:

> An exemplary occurrance of the tension I refer to is that which has always
> existed between terminology and living language. It is phenomenon well
> known to the scholars, but even more so to the layman desirous of educa-
> tion that technical expressions present an obstacle. They have peculiar
> profile that prevents them from fitting into the actual life of the language.
> Nevertheless, such precisely defined, unambiguous terms live and commun-
> icate only in as far as they are embedded in the life of language, and hence
> it is obviously essential that they enrich their power of making things
> clear — a power previously limited by their vague ways of speaking. To be
> sure, science can ward off such muddying of its concepts, but method-
> ological 'purity' is always attained only in particular areas. (Gadamer,
> 1976, 86)

In his essay Gadamer analyzes the transformation in the meaning of the
concept of »force»: how in Germany this universal concept of Newtonian
physics was made comprehensible to the public through the use of metaphors
taken from everyday life, integrated into ordinary language and individualized
to the point of becoming untranslatable as is seen in the example of Goethe's
dictum »In the Beginning was die Kraft» (Gadamer, ibid.).

The above example suggests that professional language and ordinary
parlance delineate and label different »regions» of language and knowledge,
such as »science», »technology» and »the arts», which can be characterized and
differentiated from each other in terms of their semantic and hermeneutic
properties (»individualizing», »universalizing», »exact», »metaphorical» etc.).
Secondly, the example suggests that these delineated »regions» are subject to
their own particular internal and external determinants, which guide their
development. Thirdly, it is suggested that these regions through their mutual
interaction shape each other and determine each others' development.

How do these delineated »regions» relate to »discursive formations» and
»practical metalanguages»? It is tempting to answer that these »regions» are
simply aggregations of interlinked discursive formations which are regulated
by the same practical metalanguage. Such an answer, however, gives too
simplified a picture of »regions», »discursive formations» and their mutual
relations. We can approach the question by examining first how different
»regions» have been defined by the users of specialized languages and in or-
dinary language.

In the work quoted above Gadamer compares the semantic and hermeneutic nature of scientific language and ordinary language. Gadamer as well as other proponents of hermeneutics list as »other languages» (regions) the languages of history, religion and the arts (among the arts poetry is often taken as a special case because of its use of individualizing and metaphorical language, cf. Ricoeur 1978, 284). Metaphysics and other meta-analyses (e.g. the philosophy of science and epistemology) are often considered to generate their own languages which mainly pertain to the principles upon which other kinds of language and knowledge are based or justified (Ricoeur 1978, 281—282, 304—305). The same distinction is reflected in some structuralist thinkers' way of distinguishing between »object language» and »mythologies» (Barthes 1957, 200).

These general deliniations do not exhaust the different ways of defining the regions of language and knowledge. The general regions listed above can be further divided and analyzed in terms of sub-regions. The arts and sciences are divided customarily into sub-regions, i.e., the established disciplines and branches. These are often as far removed from each other as are the general regions mentioned above. Some dividing lines between sub-regions are given special importance. Thus, in the case of sciences, the differences between natural and social sciences are often emphasized and history is usually defined as a special sub-region with its own semantic and hermeneutic properties. As regards the arts it is similarly common to distinguish between the verbal, visual and audial arts, »creative» and »performing» arts, and »live» and »reproduced» arts. A further dividing line which is emphasized both in philosophical analyses and in ordinary language is that between »pure analytics and explanation» and »practical application». It is reflected in the ordinary language in the contrast between »social practices» and »techniques», in science in the contrast between »pure science» and »applied science» (technology) and in the arts in the contrast between »the arts» and »the applied arts».

While we would not want to claim any eternal validity for the different ways of delineating the regions and sub-regions of language and knowledge, we can accept the claim that they define separate areas within which »language» and »meanings/knowledge» are, in some semantic and hermeneutic sense, homogeneous. This homogeneity can be attributed to the internal »intentions» of the specific languages of these regions and sub-regions and analyzed from the linguistic and hermeneutical perspectives (cf. Ricoeur, 1978, 299—300). From the perspective of the politics of knowledge more interesting are, however, the external determinants which separate the regions and sub-regions from each other and maintain certain orthodoxy in the form and content of their language — or allow deviations from the established

orthodoxy. These external determinants can be analyzed in terms of »discursive formations» and »practical metalanguages» as they were defined above. The perspective of the politics of knowledge, however, requires that we must give up the neat picture of homogeneous regions and sub-regions which in their development are pushed forwards by their internal linguistic and hermeneutical dynamics and proctored and protected by clear-cut systematic metalanguages. Instead, we must proceed to analyze the hierarchical relations between the regions and sub-regions and their respective practical metalanguages and the emergence of concrete discursive formations which, by nature, transcend regional and sub-regional boundaries.

We can easily see, that most discursive formations — in the sense defined above — operate in several regions and sub-regions of »language» and »knowledge». We outlined above a sketchy description of the present discourse of politics proper. For instance this discourse — its discursive formation — contains aspects of »scientific», »philosophical» and »ordinary» languages as well as aspects involving questions of »pure description» and »practical application». In other words, a »discursive formation» is proctored as to its objects, its paradigms, its thematics and its enunciative functions by more than one practical metalanguage — and consequently also by competing and contradictory rules and practices. Discursive formations can thus be seen as battlegrounds of different practical metalanguages. This interpretation takes us to the very core of the politics of knowledge: the analysis of the regulative principles and mechanisms which emerge from the interaction of different practical metalanguages.

REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS IN THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE

From the above perspective different regions and sub-regions of language and knowledge incorporate (usually in material form: as texts, as memorizable and reproducable speech, as established representational acts) those aspects of discursive formations which fall under the authority of their own practical metalanguage (that is, more or less coherent interlinked rules and discursive practices). From the reversed angle this means that the mutual interplay of different practical metalanguages generates principles and mechanisms which regulate what can be incorporated into the corpus of language and knowledge of any given region or sub-region — and thus also what can be said within any given discursive formation.

Following the works of Michel Foucault we can identify some of the

major principles and mechanisms which feature prominently in the processes of inclusion and exclusion in the present Western societies (Foucault, 1972, 216—228). These principles and mechanisms can be divided into three major groups.

The principles and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion in the first group are generated by the very acceptance of the idea that language and knowledge can be divided into different regions and sub-regions which have their own semantics, their own ways of generating meanings and knowledge and their own rules and practices for doing that. Michel Foucault refers to *discipline* as one of the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. Scientific disciplines define themselves ». . . by groups of objects, methods, their corpus of propositions, the interplay of rules and definitions, of techniques and tools», which function and can be used irrespective of the person who operates or uses them. (Foucault 1972, 222) Actually all regions and sub-regions of language and knowledge can be interpreted as more or less coherent »disciplines» which develop their own autonomy and internal modes of operation and action and which resist all »irregularities» and external interferences in their assumedly »own» discourse. If we accept Ricoeur's formulation that the creation of meanings and knowledge involves continuous interplay between establishing meanings »conventionally» and transgressing these meanings, the »disciplinary» autonomy of a region or sub-region may become a major obstacle in maintaining vitality and preventing the sedimentation and petrification of language and knowledge. The transgression is often based on metaphors and analogies — or more generally also on ideas and procedures — which are borrowed from other regions and sub-regions. A strictly maintained »disciplinary» autonomy may stop borrowing, prevent transgression and lead to sedimentation and petrification.

The principles and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion of the second group emerge when the regions and sub-regions (their metalanguages) form systems of dominance or authoritative hierarchies where the »underdogs» are prevented from developing freely their own language and stock of knowledge. It is easy to point out cases where a specialized (e.g. scientific) language and stock of knowledge obtain control over ordinary language. This control may be enhanced and legitimated by the arguments of philosophy of science. When we now speak in our Western societies about »welfare» or »voting» we relate these terms automatically to social science definitions of »dimensions of welfare» or »voting systems». This is not a result of sheer transference of terms from science to everyday language. We also, at least implicitly, assume that the social science definitions are »more exact» or »more valid» than the concept of welfare and voting which have prevailed in ordinary language.

The rules and discursive practices of the social sciences — backed by the philosophical assumptions concerning »exactness» and »validity» of concepts — have penetrated the metalanguage of the ordinary language. We can discern here a hierarchical system of metalanguages (those of philosophy—social sciences—ordinary language) which tends to silence the bottommost's, i.e., the ordinary language's, »own voice».

The third group of general principles and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion has its roots in the formalization of the practical metalanguages themselves. An indication of this formalization is the development of specific systems of validation and authorization, which define the qualifications for the use of language and production of knowledge. The rules of validation may concern methods of using language and obtaining knowledge or more generally what amounts to s specific type of language (e.g. scientific language) or a specific type of knowledge (e.g. scientific knowledge). The rules of authorization in turn define who is qualified to have access to institutional resources and opportunities to use language (e.g. make a legal statement) or produce knowledge (e.g. to do research, to design a certain piece of applied arts). The rules of validation and authorization may develop themselves into a many-layered formalized practical metalanguages which in turn leads to sedimentation and petrification of the discourse in the regions and sub-regions where it reigns. Roland Barthes (1970) has convincingly pointed out how this validation and authorization leads in the classical fiction to formalism and constructionism. Similarly at times logic, mathematics and philosophy of science have united their forces with the practical metalanguages of certain branches of science, formalized them and accelerated the processes of sedimentation and petrification (cf. Boehm 1980). Or, for a more prosaic example, one can imagine, how cook-books and restaurant rating systems lead to sedimentation of the practical techniques of cooking (its language and knowledge).

These three groups of general principles and mechanisms can interconnect and function in unison. Michel Foucault has suggested that in our Western intellectual tradition the »will to truth» and the related rules about »true» and »false» discourse have evolved into a set of »super-rules» which has penetrated or pushed aside such more traditional mechanisms of exclusion as the exclusive privileges of expression, intellectual rituals and taboos and the distinction between reason and madness. In Western societies the emphasis on science and rationality permeates all other principles and mechanisms. This emphasis is all the more insidious as it becomes less visible because: ». . . true discourse, liberated by the nature of its form from desire and power, is incapable of recognizing the will to truth which pervades it; and the will to truth, having

imposed itself upon us for so long, is such that the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it» (Foucault 1972, 219).

It may be that most of the structuralist and phenomenological criticism of the metaphysics and intellectual traditions of the West is too general and based on a misunderstanding of, the intricate dynamics of language and knowledge (Ricoeur 1978, 289–295, 311–313). Still, from the perspective of the politics of knowledge discourse it seems that Foucault's »will to truth» as it manifests itself in the emphasis on science and rationality is, in the West, the main force in shaping the principles and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion and in determining the sedimentation and petrification of language and knowledge.

CROSS-EXAMINING THE DISCOURSE OF POLITICS PROPER

We have outlined in the three previous sections an ideal type of the discourse of politics of knowledge. In summary, this ideal type assumes, firstly, that language and knowledge can be analyzed in terms of concrete discourse formations which convey »what is being said» and »what can be said» in any particular society at any given time. Secondly, it assumes that these discourse formations can be analyzed in terms of the internal dynamics of language and knowledge; but they also can and must be analyzed in terms of the external rules and discursive practices, i.e., the practical metalanguages of different regions and sub-regions of language and knowledge. Thirdly, it assumes that the mutual interaction of these practical metalanguages generate principles and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion and determine to a large extent the sedimentation and petrification of language and knowledge.

We can now apply the conceptual arsenal and the ideas of this ideal type and analyze and evaluate the present discourse of politics proper such as it was defined above. More specifically, the following questions can be asked. To begin with, how susceptable this discourse seems to be to sedimentation and petrification of language and knowledge and which principles and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion may maintain and accelerate these processes? Is it possible to study empirically these processes and principles and mechanisms? Are there any counterprocesses, how can they be initiated and what are the chances that consciously planned counterprocesses will have any lasting effects? And finally, can the nature of the discourse of politics proper be redefined in terms of the politics of knowledge discourse, and what this redefinition may mean as regards the scope and orientation of the present dominant mode of the political science research?

In order to answer to these questions we must first take a new look at the discourse of politics proper and its location in the whole field of language and knowledge. This discourse, as it was defined above, is located mainly in two sub-regions of language and knowledge: the sub-region of practical every-day politics and the sub-region of intellectual political analysis and political science. This does not, however, mean that there are only two metalanguages which regulate it. Both of these sub-regions belong respectively to a wider region of language and knowledge: the ordinary language and knowledge and the language and knowledge of the social sciences. As we indicated above, the ordinary language in modern societies is especially susceptible to the regulative influences of the different branches of science. One could expect that there is a tendency towards the formation of a hierarchy, in which the languages and metalanguages of the social sciences dominate those of the ordinary language. One could expect furthermore that the »practical side» of the discourse of politics proper is influenced, not only by its »natural companions» the intellectual political analysis and political science, but also by other branches of the social sciences — and »scientific thinking» in general. Political analyses and political science research have been influenced varyingly e.g. by sociology, economics, and organizational theory; and also by theories of decision making, planning and system analysis. All these disciplines have also influenced directly the language and knowledge of practical politics. Thus if we are looking for the sources of sedimentation and petrification of the discourse of politics proper they can most probably be found in the »will to truth» of the present social sciences and in the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion their metalanguages jointly generate.

It is not possible within the confines of this paper to explore in detail whether the above assumption about the mechanism of inclusion and ex-clusion actually holds true as regards the discourse of politics proper. It would demand empirical research where the discourse of politics proper to be studied should be clearly identified in time and as regards its geographical and social coordinates. The following answers to the questions concerning the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion and their effects — as well as the other questions posed above — rely on the validity of the assumptions con-cerning the content of the »present» discourse of politics proper and on the results of some recent research which has investigated the ideologies and myths of the practical politics and administration.[9] Naturally, the answers are tentative at best.

After all these qualifications, what can be said about the nature and the causes of the sedimentation of the present discourse of politics proper? As indicated above, the present discourse of politics proper in the modern

Western societies maintains at least two separate areas of themes: one where politics is perceived in terms of aggregation of interests, opinions and attitudes, needs, demands and supports; and the other where politics is perceived in terms of »sinister» activities of power acquisition and maintenance. If the recent development of the discourse of politics proper in the modern Western societies is examined, it seems, that the former aggregative themes have in the last two decades pushed aside the latter Machiavellian themes. One can point to the popularity of the Eastonian scheme, policy analysis and planning of institutions in political science research; and to the emphasis on »positive» technical approaches to conflict resolution and consensual goal assessment in practical politics. These changes can be attributed to the continuous adoption of the technological metaphors and analogies borrowed either from more »technical» social sciences (e.g. economics, organizational theory) or directly from natural sciences (e.g. system analytical terminology). But one can also give a stronger interpretation. It is also possible that the Machiavellian themes have been pushed aside by »scientific» metalanguages which already form a regulative hierarchical mechanism that serves to exclude disruptive elements from the discourse of politics proper. This is reflected in the impoverishment of the Machiavellian themes. The sinister in politics is perceived more and more either in terms of »unintended consequences» or automatic prosesses (like bureaucratization or trends of corporatism and oligarchy); and less and less in terms of interplay of personalities, the corruptive effects of power and the inevitable predicament of human existence. It is easy to suspect that this development is due to the functioning of a Foucaultian type of mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion backed by a specific »social scientific will to truth».

The principles of inclusion and exclusion in the present discourse of the politics of knowledge are not generated only by the metalanguages of the social sciences. The discourse of politics proper has probably also been deprived of its deeper Machiavellian elements by the professionalization and autonomization of the language and knowledge of practical political life. The involvement in politics is expressed more and more in terms of »making a career» and »creating and maintaining image»; and less and less in terms of self-assumed duties, missions and responsibilities. This suggests that even the metalanguage of practical politics has been formalized and codified and increasingly resembles a kind of »practical cookbook of politics».

It can be also assumed that the »will to truth» of the scientific metalanguage and the »professional codification» of the metalanguage of practical politics penetrate and support each other. There is a mutual compatability of the language and knowledge they respectively regulate. The technical metaphors

and analogies taken from the social science language suits well professionally oriented political action and discourse: and in turn, professionally oriented action presents itself in such rationalistic terms as seems to support the rationalistic aggregative models of the social sciences.

Can the existence of these trends and the principles and mechanisms which sustain them be empirically demonstrated? This can be certainly done e.g. through textual analyses. Such textual analyses should use textual material, where »scientific analyses» and the »mythologies» of practical political action intermingle. Such material includes planning documents, expert statements and records of the representative and executive bodies; but also scientific research reports with clear application orientation. The analysis of these documents should focus on the succession of dominant metaphors and analogies (»models»): their emergence and wearing away. Such analysis could prove or disprove the »social scientification» and related sedimentation and petrification of the discourse of politics proper.

To demonstrate on the linguistic level the presence or absence of trends of sedimentation and petrification does not, however, amount to proof of the presence or absence of the principles and mechanisms of inclusion or exclusion. The trends could be also explained by an appeal to the internal dynamics of language and knowledge. In order to prove the presence of the mechanisms and principles, analyses of the rules and discursive practices, that is, of the practical metalanguages, must be carried out. This calls for reading and analysis not of texts of political discourse as such, but also the discourse which controls the production and reproduction of the »substantive» political discourse. Because this »metadiscourse» is seldom written or even orally expressed this would also call for the »reading» and analyses of »representational» (»speech-like») activities» and actions. Such reading and analyses need to focus on the texts and representational activities which show how »socially relevant» social science discourse is actually constructed and externally regulated and whereupon professional actors such as leaders, supporters, protesters etc. base the formulation of their »visible» texts, speeches and representational activities. Let us take some examples. Such texts, speeches and activities can be recorded e.g. in the faculty meetings discussing the courses, reading requirements and scientific merits of theses or applicants for faculty posts. Such texts can be also found in the authoritative guides of writing scientific reports, in the proceedings of scientific meetings and in the review sections of scientific journals. And, on the practical side of the discourse of politics proper, such texts are e.g. the rules of rhetorics in writing political speeches, the established procedures of political meetings and party congresses, the rules of drafting agendas, choosing candidates and recording meetings.

Analyses of such »metatexts» and »metadocuments» would show on one hand, how discursive formations take shape and develop in time, and on the other hand, how the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion emerge in a practical metalanguage or through the mutual interplay of several metalanguages. Several works by Michel Foucault demonstrate at least tentatively that such metalevel analyses are possible and fruitful (Foucault 1975, 1977a, 1978, 1981).

A preliminary answer to the question of the possibility of consciously initiating counterprocesses which would fight the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion and prevent the sedimentation of language and knowledge can be found by examining those countermovements which have tried to fight the »drainage of politics out of political science». The rare success of these movements suggest that little can be done by simple criticism or by suggestions of new ideal ways of orienting research or defining concepts. Changes in the mode of conducting political science research will not be brought about merely by proposing that »politics be brought back». If we wish to effect a change in political science or in the discourse of politics proper as a whole we must analyze first the rules and discursive practices of the dominant metalanguages. We can then try to induce changes in the most strategic areas where these rules and discursive practices relate to the principles and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.

It is, however, difficult — even with the most meticulous textual analyses — to trace the ultimate strategic rules and discursive practices of the practical metalanguages of a given discursive formation. As indicated above, we do not usually have only one dominant metalanguage but multiple metalanguages which penetrate each other and form hierarchies and systems of domination. Few cases are as simple as the one in the above quotation from Gadamer; and even Gadamer's case may not be as simple as he makes it look. It is still more difficult to effect changes by the manipulation of the rules and discursive practices — even if one accepts the very idea of manipulation — because of the unpredictability due to complexity of the network of interwoven practical metalanguages. To rely on the emancipatory effects, that is, on the auto-correction of the discursive formations after the results of analyses have become known, is mostly wishful thinking. The belief in the absolute truth of the rules and discursive practices permeates usually both the gate-keepers and controllers of the metalanguages and also those who produce the discourse. This belief is based on participation in reproducing and creating the rules and discursive practices; this participation binds more than sheer passive submission and obedience. Understanding this makes the politics of knowledge discourse pessimistic as to the possibilities of changing the rules and dis-

cursive practices and the direction of the discourse in general.

Despite this pessimism as regards the practical consequences of analyses of the politics of knowledge, we can however ask, how they might increase the understanding of politics proper among those who understand their perspective and come within their »emancipatory reach». First of all, the politics of knowledge analyses suggest that »politics» has a more fundamental meaning than the one predominant in the present discourse of politics proper. This »deeper politics» permeates all socially relevant discourse whether it concerns mental illness, the prison system, sex — or »politics» in the ordinary meaning of the word. The analyses of the discourse of politics proper reveals the same kind of »political» facts as the analysis of any other types of discourse: sedimentation of language and knowledge, formation of the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, battles and mutual penetration between the practical metalanguages of different regions and sub-regions of language and knowledge.

It might be well asked whether this emphasis on the »universal politics» of language and knowledge and the subsequent neglect of the substantive problems of traditional political discourse contradicts the Barthesian definition of politics as the »fundamental science of the real». Or more specifically, can we attribute any special position to the »micro-politics», (that is, the politics of language and knowledge) which is revealed by our analyses of the traditional discourse of politics proper. There seem to be some good grounds for granting this special position and maintaining that this »micro-politics» is the fundamental science of the real and even doubly so. There are traits of social meta-analysis already in all standard discourse of politics proper. In its aggregative form it suggests that the needs, demands and political interests of individual actors are not »real» but distorted by the actors' self-interests. Politics is needed to overcome this distortion. In its Machiavellian form it suggests that politics is »negative» meta-analysis: the actors know — at least on the unconscious level — that under a seemingly »objective» aggregation of separate needs, demands and interests lie vicious motives of power aspiration and power maintenance. From both of these perspectives politics is the »fundamental science of the real», because it penetrates behind the seeming importance and urgency of the »substantive problems». The politics of knowledge discourse, when it is focused on the political discourse, is consequently doubly the »science of the real», because it reveals the potential processes of sedimentation and petrification in the »original science of the real», that is, in the political discourse. In this function it also maintains and strengthens the Machiavellian aspect of the political discourse.

Secondly, the politics of knowledge analyses of the political discourse

teach us that we must not put too much stress on the seemingly voluntaristic aspects of politics or expect too much when the political discourse promises radical changes or suggests that such changes are taking place or have already taken place. It is, of course, a commonplace in everyday language that politics promises much and achieves little. The politics of knowledge analyses, however, teach us that this is not due only to the sinister Machiavellian aspects of politics; there are also the bondages of language and knowledge and their rules and discursive practices, which »tame» individual voluntaristic actions and most radical and sincere aspirations for change, reform or revolution.

Thirdly, the politics of knowledge analyses suggest that political discourse should not be conceived in terms of coherent ideologies or blueprints for efficient political action. There are, of course, ideologies as expressed doctrines in politics and plans and platforms in political decision making and administration. It is, however, important to see these »partial ideologies» only as series of »events of discourse» within the prevailing discursive formation of politics proper; and their properties can be seen to reflect more profound »total ideologies» which regulate the use of language and acquisition of knowledge.

The above three points suggest in general terms how we can expand our understanding of politics through politics of knowledge analyses. We can, however, also ask more specifically what this all means for the present political science research. How could we use the politics of knowledge perspective to expand its theoretical and empirical scope? Even if this may seem feasible, we, of course, need not try to do that. We can naturally carry out the two types of discourse side by side without attempting any kind of amalgamation. However, the present established political science research can — if it so wishes — take some lessions from the discourse of politics of knowledge (or more generally from the structuralism and discourse theory) without giving up its own epistemological or methodological premises. We can point out three directions, where these lessions could expand the present political science research. They are the same directions discussed above in terms of the expansion of the »general understanding of politics» which the analyses of the politics of knowledge may provide.

The first direction is the one which has been emphasized several times earlier: the expansion of the Machiavellian tradition of research. In the technical terms of reorienting research this means that one should give up the dominant interpretations of the accumulation and concentration of power as due to unintended consequences of action. The return to the more dramatic traditional Machiavellian analyses of the »iron law of oligarchy» or »circulation of elite» is not sufficient. The ideas derived from the politics

of knowledge discourse forces us still deeper. We must search for the roots of such political phenomena as submission, domination and lack of freedom and choice in the structure of language and the prevailing systems of knowledge. In order to do that we need not accept the structuralist and discourse theoretical approaches in their strictest forms. We may e.g. accept the active role of the creators and mediators and analyze them as »intellectual mandarins» who control the rules and discursive practices and shape the »intellectual climate», »styles and fashions» and the nature of political discourse (cf. Ringer 1969).

The second lession which the present political science research could learn from the politics of knowledge discourse concerns the concept of micro-politics. There is a need to overcome the atomistic ideas of the present political science research where micro-politics is seen as mutual interaction of institutionally and ideologically determined individual actors. This interaction is seen to generate, unleash or alter »political forces» which in turn may shape the institutional or ideological restraints of the individuals. The discourse of the politics of knowledge offers an alternative view: the view where individuals are perceived as victims of discursive practices which they themselves re-produce and maintain and which bind them to acceptance of dominant modes of language and knowledge. These modes in turn dictate how indi-viduals relate to each other and shape each others' experiences and destinies (Daudi 1981). We can also alter this original pessimistic conception of micro-politics e.g. by emphasizing the autonomy and creative role of an individual actor in producing language and knowledge and in reproducing discursive practices (Giddens 1979, 71—73). Whichever alternative one chooses, the pessimistic or the optimistic, the politics of knowledge discourse opens new possibilities to conceptualize micro-politics, inter-individual relations and human experience.

The third lession the politics of knowledge discourse can offer to the present political science research concerns the analysis of ideologies. It has been often suggested in the recent social science research that the analysis of ideologies should not focus on any specific »system of symbols» as distinct and separate ideologies (Giddens 1979, 187—188). Instead, research should focus on the ideological aspects of all systems of symbols in society. From the perspective of the politics of knowledge this suggestion is acceptable and well-conceived; but it does not yet tell us how to proceed to analyze these »ideological aspects» of the »systems of symbols». The discourse of the politics of knowledge takes a step further. It suggests that instead of focusing directly on the ideological formations (as »political» or »social» doctrines) and their »social determination» the analyses of ideologies should study the »ideological basis of ideologies», that is, the practical metalanguages which regulate not

only the production and reproduction of ideological formations (explicitely expressed »doctrines») but also their own ideological aspects (what is counted for »socialism», »conservatism», »Marxism», etc.) and· similar ideological aspects of any other formations of language and knowledge (what is counted for »politics»/»science», »religion», »arts», etc.). These ideological aspects are generated by the differentiation, codification and formalization of the practical metalanguages and by the hierarchies and systems of domination they may form; and the identification and analyses of this differentiation, codification and formalization and of the hierarchical systems and systems of domination help us to understand the nature and real micro-political (»ideological») effects of »ideologies».

It is, of course, possible to try to anchor the different ideological aspects of major discourse formations into a general »total ideology» which can be assumed to permeate the major dominant practical metalanguages. Such an attempt can be seen in the Foucaultian emphasis of the »will to truth» in the societies of the West — and also in the above hypothesis about the »social scientific will to truth» which may have shaped the present discourse of politics proper. Such ideas about »total ideologies» may function as heuristic devices in orienting empirical research; but further progress in the analysis of ideologies demands more methodological and conceptual clarification of the relations between the »content» of ideologies and their meta-analytical ideological aspects. Such empirical analyses of »metatexts» and »metadocu-ments» as were suggested above may help to elucidate the nature of these relations.

The above three suggestions, the strengthening of the Machiavellian tradition, the redefinition of the concept of micro-politics and the analyses of the »ideological basis of ideologies» do not exhaust all ideas which political science research could draw from the politics of knowledge discourse. These three have, however, distinctly emerged in our discussions of the politics of knowledge and they are, no doubt, crucial to all political science research irrespective of its epistemological and methodological premises.

Finally, it should be still once more emphasized that it is a matter of opinion — or more so, a matter of the choice of strategy in the politics of knowledge battle — whether one should try to incorporate ideas from the politics of knowledge discourse into the standard discourse of political science research. Such incorporation can also be conceived as misinterpreta-tion of the basic premises of the politics of knowledge and diluting its radical objectives.

CROSS-EXAMINING THE DISCOURSE OF POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE

We can next turn the tables and cross-examine the politics of knowledge discourse from the perspective of the discourse of politics proper. As indicated above, this cross-examining will focus on the practical political intentions and the political commitment of the proponents of the politics of knowledge discourse.

These questions concerning the political intentions and political commitment of the politics of knowledge discourse have not been asked in practical everyday politics. This is understandable, because the politics of knowledge discourse does not have direct implications for practical politics; and its own language is complex and detached from the language of everyday life. The questions have been, however, asked in the scholarly discourse — and even in the most vehement and aggressive political form. We can take our first example from the literary research in which the political and social implications of the structuralist and discourse theoretical research have been most thoroughly discussed.

In his article »The Politics of Anti-Realism» Gerald Graff labels the structuralist and discourse theoretical writers (together with a whole host of other »radicals»: Freudians, Jungians, existentialists, Hegelians and Marxists) anti-realists and romanticists and accuses them of irrationalism and nihilism (Graff 1978). He argues that ». . . anti-realist strategies — in a consumer society that subsidises picturesque solipsism — are misplaced and self-defeating» (Graff 1980, 78). Graff's latter comment implies that in the present social situation anti-realism and solipsism also undermine all possible educative purposes the structuralists and discourse theorists may harbour in their minds. The same accusations can naturally be extended to apply to the politics of knowledge discourse.

But the structuralist and discourse theoretical thinkers also have been accused of conservatism: that their epistemological premises — which were briefly reviewed above — neglect the innate non-discursive wisdom and creative and self-reflexive abilities of individual actors (and, especially, lead to derogation of the »lay actor», Giddens 1979, 71). They also preclude the possibility of developing a clear critical theory (Giddens 1979, 250—251).

This two-faceted criticism reflects a built-in political contradiction in the structuralist and discourse theoretical approaches and hence also in the politics of knowledge discourse. These approaches try to reveal the strongest constraints which can bind the individual and collective actors: the constraints of their own language and knowledge. They also imply that these constraints are beyond the control of the actors themselves: they can do nothing to remove

them. Our ordinary language — our common sense — assumes that we usually reveal constraints in order to remove them; and the structuralist and discourse theoretical thinking as well as the politics of knowledge discourse encounter this common sense conception. This contradiction is further accentuated by the very fact that most structuralists and discourse theoretical thinkers have been active and radical in deeds: the pessimism of their message has not prevented them from committing themselves to political action.

If we consider the nature of the structuralist and discourse theoretical thinking — as well as of the politics of knowledge discourse — we can find some implicit premises which make these contradictions and incongruences rather logical. In addition to their seeming antirealism and pessimism, these heterogeneous approaches have one thing in common: the wish to break conventional thinking and take a playful attitude both in respect to language and knowledge. This rejection of conventions and the playfulness is also reflected in the attitude towards common sense expectations concerning the responsibilities of researchers. This attitude immediately invites rejoinders to all invitations to scholarly responsibilities: why should one always pay attention to the »good impact» of research results; why should one reveal only to reform? The rules and discursive practices which dictate the positive response to these questions can also be seen as ploys which lead to the traps of established and sedimented language and knowledge.

Nietzschean motives may explain some of the inherent contradictions in the structuralist and discourse theoretical thinking and also in the discourse of the politics of knowledge. But there is a further contradiction which concerns the politics of knowledge implications of the changing social position of these approaches and their proponents. Far from being new and radical these trends of thought and their leading figures have become accepted and established intellectually and academically (Graff 1978; Buttigieg 1982). Does this not automatically mean that also the language of these approaches and their proponents is becoming more and more sedimented, their once new metaphors and analogies worn-out and their playfulness and dislike for conventions another established doctrine? There seems to be two possible answers to this question. Firstly, it can be argued, at least on the theoretical level, that there is no end to exposing the bondage that language and knowledge continuously generate: those who are sufficiently suspicious and sufficiently skillful can always find ways to transgress the sedimentation of language and knowledge and escape the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. The second answer can be given in the vein of the Nietzschean playfulness: one shouldn't pay too much attention even to this issue. Such »overcare» may itself turn into a new constraint.

BRINGING POLITICS BACK INTO POLITICAL SCIENCE

We may end our dialogue between the discourse of politics proper and the discourse of politics of knowledge and return to our original issue: the drainage of politics from political science. Our dialogue was staged on one hand to show the wider ramifications of this phenomenon and to indicate its nature as an example of the »iron law» of the sedimentation and petrification of language and knowledge. On the other hand, the very fact that there is intellectual unrest due to sedimentation and petrification of language and knowledge and systematic analyses of the mechanism which produce them also indicates that there are counterprocesses and mechanisms which maintain them. As the politics of knowledge discourse implies, we can scarcely do much to accelerate these counterprocesses. The best we probably can do is to keep alive in the social sciences and in the humanistic research a detached and demystifying research tradition which rejects all orthodox solutions to the problems of the Cartesian cogito and suspects the transparency of language and established knowledge (cf. Giddens, 1979, 38).

Our above discussions have suggested some clues as to how this tradition can be kept alive and strengthened within the present political science research. We mentioned three areas where research can be especially renewed and invigorated: the expansion of the Machiavellien orientation to cover the bondages created by language and knowledge, redefining and reinterpreting micro-politics, and focusing analysis on the »ideological basis of ideologies». Attention should be also paid to such politically relevant theoretical and methodological dilemmas as the commitment and practical consequences of anti-realist and pessimistic research, and the sedimentation and petrification of the language and knowledge of the research which aims at revealing and hindering these very processes.

Finally, the above discussions offered a reinterpretation of the Barthesian conception of politics which also may help to maintain the living basis of political discourse and political science research. It was suggested that political discourse is basically always meta-analytical because it probes behind the substantive social problems offered for political solutions. The present political science research, if broadened in the direction of the politics of knowledge discourse, may help maintain this meta-analytical aspect in political discourse and while doing that remain itself ». . . the fundamental science of the real».

NOTES

1 From here on the generic terms »politics» (or »politics proper») and »politics of knowledge» will be used to refer to »phenomena» as topics or themes of discourse; and the discourse theoretical terms »discourse of politics proper» and »discourse of the politics of knowledge» will be used to refer to the concrete discursive formations in the present Western societies. The terms »discourse» and »discursive formations» will be defined later. When no confusion is possible, the shorter terms »political discourse» and »politics of knowledge discourse» will be used instead of the above two longer terms.

2 James Burnham's classical account of the Machiavellians as the »defenders of freedom» emphasizes too much the optimistic reformatory element in their writing. Burnham's overall evaluation neglects the inherent pessimism he himself points out in Sorel and Michels (Burnham, 1963, 145—146, 186—187)

3 The structuralist and discourse theoretical texts used here are: Roland Barthes, Mythologies, Paris: Seuil 1957; Roland Barthes, Barthes par Barthes, Paris: Seuil 1972 (references to the English translation Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, New York: Hall and Wang 1977); Roland Barthes, S/Z (sur Sarrasine de Balzac), Paris: Seuil, coll. »Tel Quel», 1970; Jacques Derrida, L'écriture et la différence, Paris: Seuil, 1967 (especially pages 409—436 which discuss the »discourse of the human sciences»); Jacques Derrida, Marges de la philosophie, Paris: Seuil 1972 (references to the English translation Margins of Philosophy, Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1982; Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. by Donald F. Bouchard, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977; Michel Foucault, L'Archéologie du savoir, Paris: Galimard 1969 (references to the English translation Archaelogy of Knowledge, London: Tavistock 1974); Michel Foucault, L'Ordre du discours, Paris: Galimard, 1971 (references to the English translation »The Discourse on Language», published as an appendix to The Archaelogy of Knowledge, its first English translation, London: Tavistock 1972). The texts of two hermeneuticians have been utilized: Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1976; and Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor. Multi-Disciplinary Studies in the Creation of Meaning in Language, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. The political and political science implications of the structuralist and discourse theoretical thinking and of the hermeneutics have been explored by several writers. The ideas in this paper have been honed against the following earlier attempts: Philippe Daudi, »Power and Knowledge. A Discussion Based on the Theory of Michel Foucault», Studies in the Economics and Organization of Action, Discussion Paper Series of the Department of Business Administration, University of Lund, 1980; Michael J. Shapiro, Language and Political Understanding. The Politics of Discursive Practices, New Haven: Harvard U. Press, 1981; Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory. Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis, Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1979, pp. 9—48, 250—253.

4 This is, of course, only one meta-analytical (»mythological») way of explaining how meanings are generated in the scientific discourse and in the discourse of ordinary language; cf. Barthes, 1977, 67.

5 The idea of »transgression» and the dialectical »emergence» of meanings is another meta-analytical (»mythological») way of explaining how meanings are generated. It

is usually connected with the artistic creation (»poetry») especially if it uses meta-phoric means (Ricoeur, 1978, 284). The metaphysical roots of the idea of transgression are sometimes traced back to Hegel and his concept of Aufhebung, cf. Derrida, 1967, 402—407. In this paper no special position is given to these two ways of explaining the »generation» or »emergence» of meanings and knowledge. They are only examples of, how the development of language and knowledge is explained by the internal dynamics of language and knowledge. The politics of knowledge is mainly concerned with the practical »extra-linguistic» and »extra-cognitive» determination of language and knowledge.

6 For the analysis of the formations of »meanings» or »styles» in the arts, see e.g. Roland Barthes 1982, 119—127; Muller 1979, 176—189.

7 The attribute »practical» is used here to indicate the difference between present concern with the regulative rules and discursive practices and the philosophical or linguistic meta-analyses pertaining to the internal dynamics of language.

8 »What can be said» and »how» does not, of course, refer here to individual communicative intentions or their suppression by conscious censorship; it refer to »subjectless» discursive formations and the evolving of their enunciative functions, which are shaped by the impersonal rules and practices.

9 Political science research has from time to time been interested in myths as irrationalities, aberrations or sources of political spontaneity and energy. Recent research has, however, paid more attention to the myths of the »ordinary language» of politics, see e.g. Hewitt and Hall 1973, Landowski 1980, Latouche 1982. There is less research on the myths of the present political science research; see, however, Latouch, 1982, 1.

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