The Professional Politician

Rehabilitating the Politician. On a Neglected Genre in Political Theorizing

REHABILITATING THE POLITICIAN ON A NEGLECTED GENRE IN POLITICAL THEORIZING

TO A CONSIDERABLE extent, politics is what politicians do and say, wrote J.D.B. Miller in an inaugural lecture at Leicester University in 1958, recommending the study of politicians political scientists (Miller 1958, 16). Here, I move on the level of the second order discussion and study what has been said about politicians within the perspective of conceptual history. The apologies of politicians form a genre of literature—perhaps a parody of both the *Fürstenspiegel* and the 'statesman'-biographies—that is unduly neglected by political theorists and intellectual historians.

I have two objectives in this article: to historically identify the genre and to use some examples in order to analyze the strategies of rhetorical redescription (in the sense of Quentin Skinner 1996, 1999) as styles of the apologies of politicians.

My thesis is that the genre of the apologies of the ideal type of politician has only arisen as a response to the massive body of literature against the professional politicians of the late 19th century. Whereas the lamentations of politicians are legion, there are not very many more systematic examples of the defences of politicians. As a response to this derogatory literature, the apologies of the politician also provide us with one of the best sources for studying the activity-concept of politics. Max Weber's *Politik als Beruf* (1919) in a sense both originates and transcends the genre.

1. *The disreputation of politicians*

Politicians have not always been treated as scapegoats. There is no lack of writings—particularly in the 19th century—that hold politicians in high esteem. The situation really changes towards the end of the century. After the introduction of the 1867 Reform Act in Britain, the conservative eulogies of politicians became a thing of the past. An author in the *Quarterly Review*, for example, wrote that: '...the profession of politics, rightly estimated, all its grander possibilities fully realised... is the noblest a citizen can embrace' (*Politics as a Profession*, 1869, 27). A new type of professional politician first appeared in the United States. As James Bryce noted, the first presidents 'down to the election of Andrew Jackson... had been statesmen in the European sense', whereas those 'from Jackson to the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861... were either mere politicians... or else successful soldiers... whom their party used as figureheads' (Bryce 1889/1914, 74). 'Mere politicians' were those living 'off politics' and not 'for politics' (*op. cit.*, 732).

In French, a new noun, *le politicien*, was introduced in the 1870s. Originally it referred to the American *politician*, but it added a corresponding pejorative variant to the French usage. For example, the leading republican

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politician of the time, René Waldeck-Rousseau, expressed this nuance in 1897: 'Il faut enfin que... le député soit moins exposé à cette endémie parisienne qui tende à faire des hommes politiques — des politiciens' (Waldeck-Rousseau 1904, 388).

The range of reference to the 'politician' also shifted in Britain from the competent parliamentarian to a specialist in electioneering and party activities. A trend towards a decline in the estimation of politicians was obvious, and, for example, Hilaire Belloc wrote that: 'it is rapidly bringing into contempt the reputation and the public position of politicians' (1911, 34). Still, a certain difference from the American style of politicians was maintained, for example, when Hugh Platter claimed that: 'our English democracy seems to possess a faculty of sufficiently discerning to choose at least educated men for its representatives' (Platter, 1901, 16).

In Germany, the figure of politician did not have as elevated a meaning as in Britain or France. Nonetheless, the critique of professional politicians was also beginning to appear in early 20th century Germany. One such critique was launched by Werner Sombart (1907). Slightly later, expressionist *literati*, such as Kurt Hiller and Ludwig Rubiner, advocated a *Politisierung* of literature and other phenomena (*cf.* Palonen 1985, 1989). Rubiner addressed the poets and wrote: 'Seien wir Politiker: trocken, hart, listig, gütig, erschütternd' (Rubiner 1916, 119). Wilhelm Hausenstein favored the politician over the poet as someone who is capable of a broad and complex judgment (Hausenstein, 1915/16, 187). The politicians and politicized *literati* were most militantly attacked by Thomas Mann in his massive wartime pamphlet *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (1918).

2. *Max Weber's* Politik als Beruf

Max Weber presented *Politik als Beruf* at the end of January 1919, at a time when the revolutionary Eisner regime had already lost the elections, the new *Landtag* had not yet convened, and a lively revolutionary agitation existed. Weber's audience included revolutionaries, such as Ernst Toller and Erich Mühsam, but also right-wing academics like Carl Schmitt. Between the lecture and the publication of *Politik als Beruf* in July 1919 lay the Bavarian *Räterepublik* and the white terror against its leaders. Thus, *Politik als Beruf* had a number of different audiences in post-war Germany, most of whom were hostile to professional politicians.

In the genre of epideictic rhetoric, *Politik als Beruf* contains a true eulogy of the politician as an ideal type (*cf.* Palonen, 2002). Here, Weber understands *Beruf* in the double 'Lutheran' sense of its being both a profession and a vocation (*cf.* Weber 1904/05). The defence of the politician is not restricted to the vocational meaning, but also concerns the professional politician in terms of his or her being an indispensable agent in a mass democracy (*cf.* Weber 1918, esp. 226-227).

Simulating arguments by presenting them as if they had already been accepted by the audience is, as Skinner (1974) emphasizes, an effective means of rhetorical redescription in order to achieve shifts in the audiences' beliefs. Weber's main rhetorical strategy in *Politik als Beruf* is, however, precisely the opposite—he provokes the audience. I think Weber was convinced that only a provocative defence of politicians could, to a certain extent, facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of politicians, and Weber himself was challenged to rethink the concept of politics from the perspective of the politician. This kind of provocation also corresponds to Weber's stature, and he also used a similar type of rhetoric on various other occasions (for an example of a 'Wider den Strom' argument see esp. Weber 1906, 99-100).

Weber's nominalistic style allows him to play with conceptual distinctions, using both *amplificatio* and *reductio* as they suited his specific purposes. He plays with the double meaning of *Beruf* in German, and his insistence that the formation of professional politicians is an aspect of that occidental *Sonderweg* that he has emphasized in his studies on religion is also characteristic:

> Dem Okzident eigentümlich ist aber, was uns näher angeht: das *politische* Führertum in der Gestalt des freien 'Demagogen', der auf dem Boden des nur dem Abendland, vor allem der mittelländischen Kultur, eigenen Stadtstaates, und dann des parlamentarischen 'Parteiführers', der auf dem Boden des ebenfalls nur im Abendland bodenständigen Verfassungsstaates gewachsen ist (Weber 1919, 38).

Perhaps the most important extension of the concept in order to blur the conventional distinction was his explicit denial of the opposition between citizens (*Bürger, Staatsbürger*) and politicians. For this purpose he introduced the expression 'occasional politician':

> 'Gelegenheits'politiker sind wir alle, wenn wir unseren Wahlzettel abgeben oder eine ähnliche Willensäußerung: etwa Beifall oder Protest in einer 'politischen' Versammlung vollziehen, eine 'politische' Rede halten usw., — und bei vielen Menschen beschränkt sich ihre ganze Beziehung zur Politik darauf (Weber 1919, 41).

The *Gelegenheitspolitiker* is a fine example of Weber's nominalization of concepts: 'politicians' are defined in terms of their activities. Thus, everyone who acts politically is a politician. This holds true even if s/he does so only occasionally, and every occasional politician has the chance to become a professional one. The degrees and modes of acting politically are variations within the same ideal type. For Weber, correspondingly, those who criticize politicians are already occasional politicians themselves. This is his implicit *tu quoque* argument, which he presents to the audience.

The denunciators tend to render politicians responsible for everything. Weber countered such a conspiratory view by insisting on the key role played by the officials in the modern state. In Germany, a veritable *Beamtenherrschaft* had arisen due in major part to the lacking powers of politicians (Weber 1918, 212-234). Although Bismarck was a politician by vocation, his

regime tended to depoliticize citizens and prevent the formation of politicians with ambitions to lead a great European power.

> Was fehlte war: die *Leitung* des Staatswesens durch einen *Politiker* — nicht etwa: durch ein politisches Genie, was man nur alle Jahrhunderte einmal erwarten kann, nicht einmal durch eine bedeutende politische Begabung, sondern durch einen Politiker *überhaupt* (Weber 1918, 224).

In *Politik als Beruf*, Weber elevates the politician through his depreciation of its counter-concept: officials tend to be just as incompetent as politicians merely by pursuing the virtues that make them into good officials:

> Der echte Beamte... soll seinem eigentlichen Beruf nach nicht Politik treiben, sondern 'verwalten', *unparteiisch* vor allem — auch für die sogenannten 'politischen' Verwaltungsbeamten gilt das, offiziell wenigstens, soweit nicht die 'Staatsräson', d.h. die Lebensinteressen der herrschenden Ordnung, in Frage stehen. Sine ira et studio, 'ohne Zorn und Eingenommenheit' soll er seines Amtes walten (Weber 1919, 53).

This critique of the German situation illustrates Weber's normative orientation towards the rehabilitation of the politician and his distinctions within this ideal type. The provocation of a hostile audience was the presentation of the politician as a figure that could not easily be ridiculed. Here, Weber synthesized the results of James Bryce (1889/1914), Moisei Ostrogorski (1903) and Robert Michels (1911), even adopting Bryce's distinction between politicians living *off politics* and *for politics* (Weber 1919, esp. 42-44). The historical role and significance of professional politicians was analyzed by Weber mainly with the help of British and American examples. Rhetorically, Weber illustrates here the 'argument from an authority' in order to get the audience to admit that their antipolitical attitude was due to a lack of proper historical knowledge. The use of Anglophone examples was, in post-war Germany, already a provocation, especially in the academic world (*cf.* Llanque 2000).

Weber made a further provocative move in not presenting the figure of the politician as an honourable person who was unduly criticized (exceptions are to be found in the apologies of advocates and the journalists as politicians, Weber 1919, 52-55). Weber's portrait of the American party boss in particular—here again he closely follows Bryce's description—is harsh yet cool (*op. cit.*, 67-69). In other words, Weber does not simply excuse vices in order to render the politician more virtuous but, rather, discusses the political significance of the new types of professional politicians in the era of mass democracy.

According to Weber, the extension of suffrage and the increased significance of electoral politics had rendered campaigning, party machines and the professional politicians indispensable. The part-time politicians of the *Honoratiorenparteien* belonged to the pre-democratic era (*op. cit.*, 59-64), and the less brilliant but more effective and numerous professionals in parties and electoral campaigns were a price worth paying in a mass democracy. By using these types of arguments Weber also defended the parliamentary government (esp. Weber 1917, 186-189; 1918, 258-275) that was

denounced at that time in Germany on the right and left with almost similar arguments.

Not believing in the two traditional arguments for democracy, natural rights and historical progress (*cf.* Weber 1906), Weber, more readily than Bryce, Ostrogorski and Michels, accepted the omnipresence of the unanticipated consequences of political actions (*cf.* Weber 1919, 75-76) as well as the co-presence of incompatible values in democratic politics. He too supported a key point in the critique of professionalized politics, namely the danger of bureaucratization within the party machine. This was particularly illustrated by Michels' *Parteiwesen*, written under the auspices of Weber himself (*cf.* the letters to Michels from 1906 to 1910 in the *Briefe*-volumes V and VI). In order to counter this tendency, at the end of *Politik als Beruf* Weber sketched out the ideal type of 'vocational' politician. This is a further move towards rehabilitation by using the argument that, as an ideal type, the politician cannot be reduced to the mere professional living off politics.

By applying three requirements—*Leidenschaft, Verantwortungsgefühl, Augenmass*—and the two ethics—*Verantwortungsethik, Gesinnungsethik*—Max Weber constructs an image of the politician living for politics as the type of person who is ready and able to live with antinomies. A politician is someone who encounters opposed requirements for action and is obliged to combine them in her/his own person. For Weber, the value of politics consists of the readiness to meet such incompatible demands openly and face them as an inherent part of the political condition of human beings.

The Weberian rehabilitation of the politician is a radical normative variant of a rhetorical redescription of concepts (*cf.* Palonen 1999 and Skinner 1999). Considered historically, Weber marks the end of what I would like to call 'gentleman politics'. The old *topoi* of politics, such as 'the public interest' or 'the common good', were now understood as contestable in themselves. There were extra-political criteria hidden throughout the contingent, antinomous, conflictual and historical character of politics and the political character of the human situation. Weber's rehabilitation of the politician is, thus, concomitant to his accentuation of the value of politics itself.

3. *Apologies of the politicians after World War I*

The critique of politicians was commonplace in the aftermath of World War I in England, France and Germany. This attitude was, however, also criticized as a search for scapegoats. For example, J.A.R. Marriott—later a Conservative M.P.—wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* that: 'The "politician" has always been fair game for criticism', but when 'the electors get the representatives they deserve; politicians are very much what the people make them' (Marriott 1918, 529).

The search for simplicity and harmony was a common *topos* in this critique of politicians. The French jurist Émile Giraud criticizes the view of *les honnêtes gens* as longing for 'une certaine politique, la bonne, la vraie, et que celle-ci se réalisât sans phrases, sans à-coups, sans complications'. According to Giraud, however, 'il n'y a pas une vérité politique qui s'imposerait à tous les jugements sains, la politique reflète la diversité des tempéraments, des convictions, des passions et des intérêts' (Giraud 1931, 493-494).

In Germany, Helmuth Plessner's *Grenzen der Gemeinschaft* (1924) is a remarkable pamphlet against the 'communitarian' tendencies on both the right and the left. He insists in particular on the insight into the moment of action: 'In der Verpflichtung auf den *kairos*, den rechten Augenblick, ist der Politiker nur Exponent allgemein menschlichen Schicksals' (Plessner 1924, 124-125).

As 'representative anecdotes' (*cf.* Burke 1945) of this genre of rehabilitation, I will analyze two books from the inter-war era. *Le Politique,* by Louis Barthou (1923), is a portrait of the politician written in the style of La Bruyère's 17th century *Les caractères*. *Politics and the Politicians* is F.C. Oliver's introduction to his Walpole-biography. Although they are not comparable with Weber, they are worth remembering both for their own merits and as variants of a genre.

3.1. *Louis Barthou*, Le Politique

Louis Barthou was a French politician and essayist, a member of the *Assemblée nationale* from 1890, a *Dreyfusard* republican who was, however, critical of the radicals, and a Prime Minister before World War I. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was assassinated in 1934 while in the company of Yugoslav King Alexander. *Le Politique* appeared in 1923 in a series entitled 'Les caractères de ce temps'.

Barthou considers his book as a testimony: 'Ce petit livre n'est pas une plaidoirie : il est un témoignage' (Barthou 1923, 7). A dimension of the rehabilitation of the politician is, however, already involved in a presentation of this type: Barthou's portrait is, to a great extent, a self-portrait. Had he not considered himself to be a politician, he would have not written this characterological study. He does not discuss politicians historically and comparatively but, rather, presents just one type, that of a French politician of the Third Republic: 'Chaque *temps a ses caractères*, et il y a à la fois très près et très loin du *Politique* sous Louis XIV au *Politique* sous M. Alexandre Millerand' (*op. cit.*, 12).

Like Weber, Barthou acknowledges the increasing role of politics and politicians in the democracies, and he presents a continuum between citizens and politicians: « Avec les démocraties, son rôle s'accroît : "l'animal politique" est un "citoyen" qui a la charge des affaires de la "cité" » (*ibid*). Barthou

is, nevertheless, more traditional than Weber insofar as he considers the parliamentary mandate to be a necessary condition of any discussion of the politician:

> Mais il ne suffit pas d'être électeur ou éligible pour être un *politique*, L'électorat et l'éligibilité sont des droits : on les exerce ou on ne les exerce pas. Le *Politique*, au contraire, ne laisse pas ces droits en souffrance, même s'il ne vit pas d'eux, il vit en eux et pour eux [...]. Ne suffit-il pas de dire que le *Politique* est l'homme qui fait de la politique, dans l'exercice ou dans l'espérance d'un mandat parlementaire, son occupation principale (*op. cit.*, 13).

Departing from politics as 'l'art, la volonté, la passion de gouverner' (*op. cit.*, 16), Barthou considers parliament and government as the proper playgrounds of the politician: 'Le *Politique* exerce son action dans le Parlement et dans le Gouvernement [...]. Dehors, il cherche à y entrer ; dedans il ne veut pas en sortir' (*op. cit.*, 14). The parliamentarian to which Barthou refers is a full-time and vocational politician, not just anyone who happens to have been elected to parliament: 'il faut qu'elle soit un besoin et une habitude, la satisfaction d'une première nature ou, à l'extrême rigueur, la forme irrésistible d'une seconde' (*ibid.*). It is this vocational character, the passionate aspect of politics (Weber's *Leidenschaft*), that is the main appeal of the career of a parliamentary politician in Barthou's portrait:

> Il n'y a pas de vocation plus forte que celle du *Politique*. Celui qui en a senti la première morsure ne résiste plus : il est pris pour toujours [...]. Combien de mandats au Palais-Bourbon et au Luxembourg sont un rêve de lycée réalisé dans un âge plus ou moins mûr (*op. cit.*, 16-17).

Barthou emphasizes the extraordinary openness and tightness of the competition as a constitutive criterion of the parliamentary career that is often neglected in public criticism of the parliamentarians:

> La politique est une carrière ouverte [...] elle est accessible à tous. C'est une tentation [...]. Quand on représente la politique comme la « classe des déclassés » on ne prend pas garde que la sévérité du jugement n'atteint pas moins les électeurs que les élus. Mais il y a une injustice dans cette sévérité elle-même (*op. cit.*, 20).

The next step is to insist on the difference between politics as a vocation and politics as a mere *métier* amongst others. In this sense, he utilizes the distinction between *le Politique* (with a capital 'p') and *le politicien* as being between living for politics and living off politics. By separating the types by applying two different words, he is able to make the distinction much more dichotomous than Weber's.

> La politique est une bataille dont on ne peut pas recueillir les bénéfices sans en courir les risques. Si vous ne voulez pas que le *Politique* soit un politicien, et que le mandat s'avilisse en métier, frottez-vous d'huile, entrez dans l'arène et livrez le bon combat pour la cause que vous jugez bonne (*op. cit.*, 22).

This difference is due in part to Barthou's governmentalist view of politics as activity—'On ne s'agite qu'au gouvernement' (*op. cit.*, 84). It is also conditioned by the peculiarities of French political practices in the

Third Republic, with weak parties and fluid parliamentary groupings as well as the two-stage *scrutin d'arrondissement*, which left the local *notables* to play an influential role in the process of candidate nomination as well as in the electoral campaign. The American *bosses* or the British *election agents* did not have a chance in the French Third Republic.

'Les politiciens' are defined by Barthou on the basis of three criteria: that they live off politics, that they are oriented towards private interests, and that they are specialists of intrigue.

> Le politicien vit de la politique, qu'il exploite comme un métier. Il n'a pas d'autres ressources que ses profits. Un mandat est pour lui une profession, à laquelle il faut faire rendre en honneurs et en argent tout ce qu'elle peut donner. S'il est vrai que ne *songer qu'à soi et au présent est une source d'erreur dans la politique*, le politicien commet cette erreur à bon escient. Peu lui importent l'intérêt général et l'avenir. [...] Il ne songe pas à la gloire et ce n'est pas pour imposer son nom à la postérité qu'il se donne tant de mal (*op. cit.*, 106).
> Le politique et le *Politique* sont des gens différents, comme sont choses différentes la politique et l'intrigue (*ibid.*).

The distinction between politics and intrigue refers to a historically relevant stratum of the meaning of political, or rather, of *politic*, as referring to ruses, tactics, 'machiavellianism' etc., from which the advocates of 'gentleman politics', such as Barthou, always wanted to demarcate themselves. Barthou's use of the distinction allows *le Politique* to degenerate to *un politicien*, although it does not allow the *politicien* any possibility to become *un Politique*. Nonetheless, he admits the indispensable auxiliary role of the intriguing *politicians*: 'toute la politique ne se fait pas avec les seuls honnêtes gens' (*op. cit.*, 108).

Louis Barthou's apology of the Third Republic parliamentary, 'ministrable' politicians is metonymical: it does not distinguish the ideal type from its paradigmatic example in the existing situation. 'The politicians do better than what is their reputation' is a common argument in the apologies, but for Barthou this is a self-defence, and for him the main enemy of *les Politiques* are *les politiciens*. His point is to encourage the common acceptance of the value-laden disctinction. I can only imagine that Weber would have objected to Barthou by saying that the *politiciens* are not dishonest in principle and, insofar as they are, that it is rather insignificant.

In the Third Republic, governmental instability and the strong position of parliament in relation to parties, elections and governments had its own advantages, which have long been neglected (for an explication of these practices *cf.* Rousselier 1997, 2000). In particular, the efficiency requirement causes us to easily miss the practice of the parliamentary oratory discussed by Barthou in a long chapter entitled *Le tribun* (1923, 47-83). It is time to understand—as Weber did (*cf.* 1919, 54)—that in parliamentary and electoral politics the oratory is no ornament but a constitutive part of 'political reality'. In the conceptual history of parliamentarism, the rhetorical practices of the Third Republic and its apologies, such as Barthou's portrait of *Le Politique*, surely inhabit a place of their own.

3.2. *F. C. Oliver*, Politics and Politicians

The best British apology of the politician dating back to the inter-war years is contained in F.C. Oliver's *Politics and Politicians*. His intention is also to rehabilitate a craft unduly disreputed: 'Politicians are like the pedants in Montaigne's essay: no one has a good word to say for them' (Oliver 1934, 75). He also provides some reasons for the disrepute of politicians:

> The antipathy that soldiers, sailors and country-gentlemen show for the politician is rooted in their conviction that no one who talks so much, and obviously knows so little about the conduct of war and the management of land can possibly understand any department whatsoever of public affairs (*op. cit.*, 78).

Oliver's comment on this is: 'What humbug it is, for the most part!' (*ibid.*) His rehabilitation of the politicians from such external critiques consists of refusing to apply the criteria of other activities to an activity that does not correspond to the specialist paradigm. In this sense, there is a parallel to Weber's critique of the officials.

Oliver's separate volume is written with Walpole in mind, and thus assumes a continuity from pre-democratic times to the present. Oliver even claims: 'How little the art of politics has changed in two thousand years' (XVIII). The British context and the parliamentary government are also presupposed in the volume, departing from 'the endless adventure of governing men'.

> My theme is the skill and blunderings, the courage and faint-heartedness, the energy and languor, the failures and successes of a small number of eminent persons who followed the trade of politics some two hundred years ago. My endeavour here has been to consider their craftsmanship rather than their morals, and the effects which their actions produced, not so much on the felicity of their country as on their own careers (*op. cit.*, 1).

His emphasis on craftsmanship presents a clear link to Weber's historical discussions. Oliver's first step in his rhetorical redescription is to justify the *wertfrei* mode of presenting craftsmanship:

> In taking stock of a politician, however, the first question is not whether he was a good man who used righteous means, but whether he was successful in gaining power, in keeping it, and in governing; whether, in short, he was skilful at his particular craft or a bungler (*op. cit.*, 25).

The next step is to reestablish a connection with morals through successful governing. In this sense, Oliver's strictly teleological view differs from Weber's special ethos of the politician: 'If a politician does actually succeed in governing, he thereby produces *some* good, no matter how he governs' (*op. cit.*, 26). In this way, Oliver, nonetheless, describes the dilemma of the politician in terms that are not so different from Weber's juxtapostion of the two ethics: 'At a juncture where no accommodation is possible between the two, the politician may be faced by these alternatives:—Shall I break the

rules of my art in order to save my private honour? Or shall I break the rules of my conscience in order to fulfil my public trust' (*op. cit.*, 30).

Like the Weberian politician, the important thing for Oliver's variant is also the capacity to deal with the antinomies of his situation, even at the cost of virtues such as consistency.

> The student of politics will not make a beginning until he has realised that in this art there are antinomies everywhere, and that it is no shame to a politician, or to the man who writes about him, if the opinions he utters are often in conflict with another. The politician or the writer who succeeds in proving his life-long consistency is less an object for admiration than for derision (*op. cit.*, 39).

Perhaps the most original trait in Oliver's rehabilitation of the politician is defence of opportunism as a readiness to change according to the requirements of any given situation: 'A wise politician... must needs watch the public taste and be prepared to change his slogans, his clothes and even his title as often as there is anything to be gained by it' (*op. cit.*, 70).

The 'opportunism' associated with Oliver's type of politician is connected with his break from the sovereignty model as it was commonly used by British scholars in domestic politics. This is, however, connected with the traditional virtue of patriotism: 'The politician is never his own master, as men are who seek their fortunes in private adventures. The most complete victory does not make him the possessor, but only the custodian, of that strange monster which he calls his country' (*op. cit.*, 79-80). According to Oliver, the uncontrollable character of politics 'makes politics the most hazardous of all manly professions' (*op. cit.*, 82). He has to face a situation that he cannot control: 'The greatest deeds in history were not done by people who thought of safety first' (*ibid.*).

One distinction between Weber's 'existential' dilemmas or Barthou's oratorical competences in terms of their ideal type of politician lies in Oliver's appeal to the 'ordinariness' of politicians: 'Walpole... is the archetype of the *normal* politician who forces his way into the highest positions' (*op. cit.*, 75). The virtues that Oliver claims distinguish first rank politicians are remarkably similar to those that are attributed by Bryce and Weber to the American party bosses:

> The politician who succeeds is never a maker of philosophies, and very rarely a projector of constitutions and systems of law. His notions are usually unoriginal, crude, rough-and-ready. He borrows or snatches from other many anything that seems likely to serve his purposes (*op. cit.*, 53).

From the parliamentary perspective, Oliver objects to the critics of professionalization by comparing the situation of politicians to that of other professions (*op. cit.*, 84). Oliver's point is to insist on the role of politicians as indispensable persons who are ready to do and who are competent in doing something others neither want to do nor are capable of doing. Politicians are persons who are prepared to take on the role of the scapegoat, turning this into a reason for professionalization.

And though we may abuse politicians as much as we please in their individual capacities, it is foolish to dishonour their profession. For politicians are an essential part of the ancient system. They stand the racket, and are paid in fame or notoriety. Most of the blows fall on *their* heads, and when a sacrifice is required to appear any of the popular deities it is their privilege to offer up one of their own number (*op. cit.*, 91).

An interesting aspect in the defence of the politician is that Oliver, in accordance with his defence of opportunism, sees the politician as a person who concentrates on a medium-term time perspective:

He is little troubled with nightmares. His eyes are not fixed on the millennium nor yet precisely on the end of his own nose, but somewhere between the two. He deals with things as they occur, and prides himself of not thinking too far ahead (*op. cit.*, 92).

To sum up, F.C. Oliver's rhetoric of rehabilitating politicians plays with values of ordinary and extraordinary. Politicians are just 'normal' fellows who are not concerned with moral and intellectual requirements and who manifest their patriotism and serve as agents of the reason of the state. Professionalization and craftsmanship require the politician to normalize the extraordinary. Beneath the rhetoric of the ordinary, however, lies the insight into the special significance of time for a politician. The assessment of occasions, the readiness to catch them instead of normalizing them with a stable policy, as well as the medium-term orientation beyond both immediate interests and the search for an entire new order, is of special importance in the conceptual history of politics. Such a temporalization corresponds to Weber's key concerns.

4. *Post-war rehabilitations of the politician*

Changes in Western European polities tended to render the figure of the politician more acceptable in the 'democratic' regimes after World War II. The extension and intensity of parliamentary and partisan politics and the corresponding increased number of politicians living off politics, as well as the regularisation of M.P's. salaries, contributed to the *Veralltäglichung* of the encounters with professional politicians. It became difficult to speak of the 'normal' parliamentary and partisan politics without them. The 'social sciences', as a normal part of the universities, contributed to the rendering of politics as something harmless and even 'functional' to the regime.

Still, neither politics nor politicians were entirely normalized. Since the mid-1950s, fierce debates surrounding the 'end of ideology' or 'depoliticization' have been conducted, which are partly reminiscent of the struggles between 'isms' and which partly celebrate the replacement of politics by administration and expert rule. Again, this aspect also provoked apologies of politics, the most famous of which are perhaps Hannah Arendt's *Human Condition* (1958) and Bernard Crick's *In Defence of Politics* (1962). Here, however, I will focus my analysis on two defences of the ideal type of politician. The Australian-born professor of political science, J.D.B. Miller,

gave an inaugural lecture simply entitled *Politicians* (1958). A fragment from the third volume of Jean-Paul Sartre's *L'idiot de la famille* (1972) also contains an oblique for the politicians, presented in the disguise of a comment on the 'Second Empire'.

4.1. *J.D.B. Miller,* Politicians

Miller's lecture is perhaps the closest parallel to Weber's *Politik als Beruf*, although he never actually refers to it (as he does in Miller 1962). Both, however, are attempts at conceptualizing politics through the politician. Miller, however, neither presents a historical analysis of the formation and modes of this ideal type nor thematizes the special ethics of the politician, and his politician is almost exclusively British.

Miller contextualizes the politician with two characteristics: 'he is a long-standing British institution, and it is difficult to imagine the business of politics being carried without him' (*ibid.*). For a British audience, the reference to a long-term domestic tradition is already a move towards rhetorical redescription. He also explicitly refers to the tradition of being proud to be a politician, as well as to the unrealistic claims of preferring part-time over full-time politicians.

> It is true that in this country we still maintain the fiction that what we really want is part-time politicians, and that the professional politician is a curse; but all the great politicians of the past whom we revere were professionals, and most of them were proud of it (*op. cit.*, 4-5).

The second part of this passage refers to the obvious significance of politicians: today, even those who use them as scapegoats cannot figure out a way to dispense with them. Prior to beginning his discussion of the ideal type, Miller also makes demarcations of his concept of the politician. Similarly to Weber, he also considers citizens to be politicians, although he refrains from discussing this variant further.

> In the first place it is necessary to distinguish what we mean by a politician. In a sense, all of us are politicians: we are continually engaged in private political activity in the organizations to which we belong, in our work, and even in our families. But this is not the politics with which I am concerned tonight. Again, there is a sense in which anyone who can influence the course of national politics is a politician: in this sense in Britain, the Queen, the Cabinet, the Parliament, the Civil Service, and the voters themselves are politicians. Each of them will figure at some time in the business of decision and adjustment which takes place in any organized society and which we call politics. [...] perhaps we should say that they [civil servants, KP] are not *public* politicians. And we should rule out the voter, while also recognizing his ultimate function. We are left with the sort of men who make up Cabinets, Parliaments and city councils (*op. cit.*, 1-2).

To claim that 'all of us are politicians' was probably less provocative in the Britain of the 1950s than when Weber spoke of occasional politicians. Miller also follows Weber in his performative approach to the politician, but

while Weber concentrates on the art and degree of professionality, Miller demarcates 'ordinary' politics to the public sphere. The questions raised in Miller's inaugural lecture are more academic than those in Weber's public lecture, as Miller also applies the 'functional' jargon of the social sciences in the 1950s.

> And tonight I should like to ask three questions about him: What specific functions does he perform? Why is he so disliked in the mass, even though he may be approved as an individual? And what part does the study of his activities play in the general study of politics, as one might carry it on at a university (*op. cit.*, 1-2).

Miller presupposes here the polity a whole, the different parts of which are judged in terms of their contribution to its maintenance. It is perhaps this 'functional' approach that led him to exclude Weber's paradigm, the 'charismatic leader', from his characterization of the types of politicians (*op. cit.*, 2). It is also quite understandable that the opposition between bureaucratic and charismatic leadership is absent from Miller's discussion, and he also missed Weber's point in his insistance on such an opposition. Miller then specifies the politician's activities in 'functional' terms:

> What does he do? As I see it, he has at least three special functions which are not performed in the same way and to the same extent by anyone else. He is the adjuster of interests, the point of contact with public opinion, and the repository of the techniques of government and opposition (*op. cit.*, 5).

Unlike the strict functionalists, Miller clearly insists on the role of plurality and conflict in politics. It is precisely here that his view is really most provocative against the common sense apolitical mood: 'The sheer shock of political conflict is something which many people cannot bear to contemplate. [...] What is so disappointing about life as it reflects itself in politics is its excessive plurality' (*op. cit.*, 13). For him, 'interests', 'opinions' and the government-opposition-pair are the main aspects of this conflicting plurality that constitutes politics.

In a certain sense, 'interests' do not refer only to the 'interest groups' but also to a predemocratic stratum of British politics in which the parliament was still composed of 'interests' that were not decided by individual voters. The work of politicians is regarded by Miller as consisting of acting as a conciliatory force, not of allowing the interests to clash too directly with each other. The politician is a diplomat in domestic politics:

> [...] it is the distinctive job of the politician to seek arrangements of persuasion and compromise which will enable society to proceed without too much delay and confusion (*op. cit.*, 5).

The use of 'society' in such an 'totalitarian' sense is the mark of an holistic tradition in which 'interests' are something quasi-natural: 'it is in fact one of the essential characteristics of the politician that he takes notice of interests which makes themselves felt...' (*op. cit.*, 6). The rhetorical view

of politics as 'persuasion', however, links interests to the dimension of opinion:

> [...] the politician finds his seat in parliament. There he is connected, not just with other politicians, but with the public [...] or, as one might put it better, with the many publics of which a democratic community is made up. [...] The fact that politicians have to face re-election makes them take *some* account of what is being thought and said in the community at large (*op. cit.*, 8).

Like Barthou, Miller too considers the parliamentary mandate as constitutive of a politician. The opinion aspect refers simultaneously to elections, to recognizing the politician's 'mediating' role towards the 'public' both in the rhetorical adaptation to the audience and in the rhetorical legitimation of his activities before the electoral audience. 'I suggest, therefore, that the politician's function as a point of contact with the public opinion is not only that of a receiver; he is a transmitter too' (*op. cit.*, 9). This view of politicians as acting as a 'filter' between changes of opinion and parliamentary debates and decisions roughly corresponds to Oliver's view on the 'normalcy' of the politician, even if the rhetorical skills required in order to carry out such mediating work would have to be extraordinary.

Miller discusses the key activity of politicians in terms of the government-opposition distinction: 'But what makes the politician's voice important is that, in the last resort, he forms the government' (*op. cit.*, 10). From this perspective, he reactualizes, interestingly enough, the Weberian opposition between politicians and officials:

> It is often said nowadays that the politicians have no power, and that the civil servants tell them what to do, because the civil servants are professionals in a specialized field and the politicians are not. I am sure this is a fallacy. [...] our politicians *are* professionals, and they have been so for a great many years. [...] were all technicians in government. [...] The techniques in which such men are skilled are not just those of knowing their way about the government offices. They are skilled too in decision, in explanation, in negotiation, in parliamentary manoeuvre, and in public relations. [...] These techniques amount to the assumption of responsibility, both for making a final decision and for defending that decision when it is subject to criticism. We look to the politicians in a government to do these things, not to civil servants (*op. cit.*, 10).

The legitimating move here is to call politicians 'technicians in government', extending the range of reference to 'technicians' in an unusual manner that could increase their acceptability. The *techné* of the ancient Sophists is also indicated when the skills of politicians are enumerated by referring to different aspects of their persuasive activities. Miller's list of 'performatives' of the politician's action can be considered as a valuable addition to the description of the ideal type of politician, describing also what the 'civil servant' cannot do. This is nothing new or dramatic, but it is a theme that is seldom thematized.

Miller presents the 'government vs. opposition' dichotomy performatively, in terms of the 'techniques' of politicians. His claim, then, is that the politician is required to learn a double repertoire of the techniques:

> And we look to the politicians of the opposition to provide criticism and an alternative policy. [...] The rationale of our parliamentary system is that the Opposition is an alternative Government. This means that all front bench politicians must be masters of both sort of techniques, those of making the government machine to work and those of criticizing its performance (*op. cit.*, 11).

In addition to his relativization of the dividing line between citizens and politicians, Miller refuses to subscribe to the normative distinction between politicians and 'statesmen', which can only be made 'from hinddight' (*op. cit.*, 11-12). The posterior reputation of a statesman is attributed not by the character or quality of the activities performed, but by a success that is always a highly contingent matter: 'I think we are forced back on the view that a statesman is simply a successful politician, one who has taken the tide of fortune at its flood' (*op. cit.*, 12).

Turning to the study of politics, Miller views the politician's doings as key to the understanding of politics. It is especially through politicians that the moment of novelty becomes intelligible: 'But it is of the nature of politics that public demands produce new ways of doing things as well as new things to be done; it is through the politician that the new things are demanded, and through him that the new ways make their appearance' (*op. cit.*, 17). This is relevant not only for the study of laws and constitutions but also for the reception and modification through the 'filter' of politicians:

> Just as we can check the working of a constitution by seeing what politicians do, so we can check the effects, and, to some extent, the validity of political theories by seeing what politicians make of them in their thoughts and speeches (*op. cit.*, 18).

Miller does not use the jargon of the speech act theory or linguistic philosophy, but instead uses a performative approach in a broader sense. Sometimes he sounds like Weber after a 'linguistic turn'. In many key respects, Miller—like Barthou and Oliver—is more conventional than Weber. He clearly works with the existing 'political system'—and even with 'society', a concept Weber dispensed with (*cf.* Tyrell 1994 and Palonen 1998)—which lacked the 'existential' dimension in terms of the Weberian qualifications of the politician. In this respect, Sartre, of course, comes much closer to Weber.

4.2. *Jean-Paul Sartre:* L'idiot de la famille III

At least from the 1950s onwards, Jean-Paul Sartre defended politics as a necessary instrument of the oppressed and as a 'dimension of person' (esp. Sartre 1964) in which everyone is engaged either explicitly or implicitly (for references *cf.* Palonen 1990 and 1992, ch. 2). In a posthumous fragment called *Kennedy and West Virginia* (1991), analyzing the rhetoric of ethics in the presidential primaries between Humphrey and Kennedy in 1960, Sartre is at least indirectly indebted to Weber's discussion (*cf.* Palonen 1994).

Rehabilitating the Politician. On a Neglected Genre in Political Theorizing

Another apology for the politician by Sartre is contained in his monumental Flaubert-study. In the third volume of *L'idiot de la famille* he analyzes the literary currents and generations in France from the Enlightenment *philosophes* to the early Third Republic in their relation to politics. Here, Sartre presents remarkable discussions on the chances to act politically and on the attitudes towards such chances within French political culture.

Sartre's point of departure is the contraction in the natural law ideology of the Enlightenment as it was adopted during the Revolution: while it was affirmed that *l'homme* is a *zoon politikon*, 'on refuse la dimension politique à l'immense majorité des Français' (Sartre 1972, 213), thus making *sous-hommes* of them (*op. cit.*, 230). For Sartre, the most important aspect is what happened to politics in the 1848 Revolution, the Second Republic and the *coup d'État* of Louis Bonaparte. His interpretation is presented in a concentrated form in the following passage:

> La classe dominante [...] a sacrifié ses droits politiques — dont elle était si jalouse qu'elle refusait de les partager, au point que ce refus est à l'origine des journées de février — et en a fait cadeau à un dictateur militaire qui lui garantirait, en échange, la sécurité économique. Elle s'enrichira, c'est sûr, et, puisque — depuis Saint-Simon — on sait que l'économie détermine la politique, elle demeure *dominante*. Mais elle perd son titre de classe *dirigeante* puisque le pouvoir lui échappe et qu'on gouverne à sa place [...] La vie politique disparaît ou plutôt elle se réfugie chez les militaires (*op. cit.*, 242).

This passage refers to a voluntary 'depoliticization' amongst the French bourgeoisie, which was judged by Sartre as spurious in so far as politics was displaced instead of replaced. The self-abolishment of French politicians in favour of a new Bonapartist regime was legitimated by the claim on the secondary significance of politics, which also forms the background for many later critiques of politicians. Large numbers of workers and *literati* also joined the chorus of those who considered political rights as secondary (*op. cit.*, esp. 253-256). Most interestingly, Sartre regards the rise of natural science as both 'une compensation aux déceptions de la politique' (*op. cit.*, 258) and as a depoliticizing move: 'détruire le quarante-huitard, cet illuminé dévoré par l'avenir ; remplacer la politique, dangereuse et trop humaine, par un conditionnement en extériorité' (*op. cit.*, 259).

Sartre judges this new situation as a shift in the type of person idealized: 'Le temps des tribuns est fini, celui des ingénieurs sociaux commence' (*op. cit.*, 261). The significance of such a new situation is judged more generally in this passage:

> On voit que la *politique* est tout entière disqualifiée ; la raison fût-elle machiavélienne, elle s'adresse aux hommes et demande leur approbation. Fût-il ambitieux, dominateur et perfide, s'imposât-il par la ruse ou la violence, le politicien dépend des masses ou d'un groupe social privilégié : il lui faut *persuader* ainsi que le gouvernement provisoire de la Seconde République était bien décidé à tromper les classes travailleuses ; mais, précisément par cette raison, il fallait qu'il tint compte, au moins en partie, de leurs exigences, pour les retourner contre elles. De toute manière, le pouvoir, tant qu'il reste politique, émane d'un groupement qui le mandate et l'épaule mais en même

temps le contrôle : les relations demeurent humaines, même déviées et faussées. [...] Bref, l'homme politique est *situé*. C'est sa faiblesse : l'ingénieur social ne le sera pas (*op. cit.*, 261-262).

It is this particular passage that contains an oblique apology of the politician as an ideal type, knit together with the story of the decline of a time dating back more than 100 years. It is also worth noting that Sartre does not distinguish *le politique* from *le politicien*, instead he intentionally adopts the pejorative term. This can be taken as a sign that the passage's tone is ironic and that it indeed contains a rehabilitation of the precise figure of the politician whose denunciation began with the Bonapartist *coup*.

Of course, in Gaullist and post-Gaullist France, tendencies similar to technocratic rule and to a self-submission of politicians were also visible. To describe a decline of politics and a self-negation of politicians in favour of accepting a Bonapartist regime may be analyzed as a rhetorical move that warns against analogous contemporary tendencies.

A further provocative move is that Sartre subscribes to the popular epitheta used in the denunciation of the politicians—'ambitieux, dominateur et perfide', etc.—but places them in a perspective that renders such 'vices' relatively harmless or even allows us to see in them as signs of 'virtue'. By using such a *paradiastolic* description (Skinner 1996), Sartre partially relativizes, or even excuses, his criticism of the politically naive republicans in 1848: even if they were less clever politicians, they were, in any case, politicians. Even the deception of deceiving the masses was marked by the fact that they have to be considered as human beings by those manipulating them; they cannot be treated as 'things', but instead must be viewed as potential sources of opposition and revolt.

This can be complemented by a quotation from Ernst Renan after the Bonapartist coup, to which Sartre refers as follows: 'Qu'est-ce que la politique de nos jours ? Une agitation sans principes et sans loi [...] Le flot montant des questions sociales forcera la politique d'avouer son impuissance...' (quoted in *op. cit.*, 262). Sartre does not contest Renan's view but, rather, reassesses its central point. The weakness of the politician in the face of the social engineer refers to a 'lived experience' after Bonaparte's *coup*.

However, Sartre's description is ironic: the 'strength' of the engineer lies in his ability to achieve desired results at the cost of treating human beings as things. Such an ability, which describes how results can be achieved by making oneself into a thing, is utilized by Sartre in his *Critique de la raison dialectique* (1960). In a broader sense, however, such strength becomes a weakness—namely, it becomes the inability to understand that the plurality of the agents and the adversity of their projects in a situation can be turned into an advantage. It is precisely this aspect that belongs to the treatment of the situation in a political manner (*cf.* Palonen 1992).

Sartre provocatively accepted the characterization of politics as 'agitation without principles and without a law'. This is expressed in an appreciative vocabulary when Sartre refers to the primary activity of the politician as

'persuasion' and characterizes her/him as 'situated'. In other words, the modality of politics-as-activity is opposed to science—precisely because of its rhetorical character and correspondingly, is adapted to the audience to be persuaded. Or, the 'social engineer' misses the legitimation by the audience, while the political action is dependent on such a legitimation. The 'situatedness' of the politician is a mark that her/his actions are based on the treatment of others as free agents.

The oblique apology of the politician in this Sartre fragment refers to an *Umwertung der Werte* as a condition of the intelligibility of the politician's activity. As long as we continue to judge the activities with the assumptions and criteria of the natural sciences, we are liable to miss the point concerning both what politicians are doing and what the significance of their activities actually is. Rhetoric and the Sophistics, as traditions accepting plurality and adversity, the contingency and contestability of activities, then, have a much better chance than science to understand politicians and politics-as-activity in general. In writing a history of the 'rhetorical turn' in 20th century political theory, Sartre's contributions should not be overlooked.

5. *Revaluation of the politician: perspectives to conceptual change*

In the fourth chapter of his *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes,* Quentin Skinner provides a sketchy presentation of the techniques of rhetorical redescription, using them as media of the interpretation of conceptual change. Summarizing Skinner's analysis, we can distinguish between four aspects of conceptual change: the renaming, revision of meaning, reassessment of the significance, and re-evaluation of a concept. They signify, in the Skinnerian perspective of 'linguistic action' (Skinner 1996, esp.7-8), the different alternatives that are available to the agents. All of them are used in the genre of the politician-apologies.

The rehabilitation of the politician is most immediately concerned with the evaluative dimension of the concept. Skinner's point is that such evaluation can only be achieved through reverting other dimensions of conceptual change (*cf.* already Skinner 1974). This is also recognized by all the authors whose apologies for the politician I have discussed here. Still, we can discern different degrees of intensity among the authors. While Barthou, Oliver and Miller are only interested in legitimating politics as a vocation and profession among others, Weber's and Sartre's projects are more extensive and relate to a reinterpretation of the concept of politics in general.

While all of the authors speak of politicians, there are, nonetheless, noteworthy differences in Barthou's rehabilitation concerns only *le Politique,* not *le politicien*, while Weber and Miller defend both those living for politics and those living off politics, and Sartre provocatively applies the pejorative variant to his own usage. Both Oliver and Miller explicitly deny the distinction between politicians and statesmen, and neither of the others use it either.

The understanding of politics around such *topoi* as contingency, adversity, ambiguity and contestability as characteristics of the activities that a politician is engaged in is common to all of the authors discussed here. Here too, however, noticeable differences do appear: Barthou, Oliver and Miller try to 'normalize' such concepts into a professional specialty of politicians within the existing order, while in Weber's and Sartre's usage the same *topoi* refer to existential qualifications of the politicians. Correspondingly, Barthou and Oliver use modes of the re-evalution of the politician that 'normalize' the ideal type in order to render it more easily acceptable, while Weber and Sartre apply a provocative strategy in their attempt to alter the allegedly 'ordinary meaning' of politics. The 'range of attitudes' (*cf.* Skinner 1979) towards politicians thus differs in adaptative and provocative rhetorics, which are oriented towards narrower and wider perspectives of conceptual change.

All this is related to what Skinner (1979) calls the 'range of reference'. Weber and Miller extend the range of politicians to include a broad palette of different kinds and degrees, and Sartre joins them by viewing politics as a 'dimension of person'. Interesting differences can be noted in the forms of historicization and contextualization. While Weber presents a broad ideal type with different historical variants and insists on the uniqueness of the 'occidental' type of politician, Barthou and Miller restrict discussion to their immediate context of a definite regime and political cultures, while Oliver's politician transcends regimes but remains very British. Sartre is explicitly historical but implicitly both contemporary and generalizing. All these strategies serve as rehabilitating modes through their specification of the conceptual significance of the discussion.

The contextual differences in thematizing the concept of politics through the politician allude to phases in the processes of 'democratization' and 'parliamentarization' of politics. In his rethinking of politics through the politician, Weber regards the critique of politicians as a move against parliamentary democracy and a defence of the politicians requires conceptual rethinking. Barthou and Oliver work within relatively stable regimes, regarding the lamentation of politicians as misinterpretations of the regime's conditions. Miller and Sartre are situated in established 'democratic' regimes in which, in particular, the technocratic tendencies are turned against professional politicians. While Miller is content with defending politicians against unjust accusations, Sartre's subversive defence of politicians refers beyond the representative democracy.

The opposition between normalizing the provocative style in the apology of the politician also indicates the difference in the authors' wider projects. Barthou and Oliver take the polity of the 'ordinary usage' more or less as a given and remain content with certain nuanciations, which they consider sufficient for the rehabilitation of the value of the politician. Weber, Sartre and partly also Miller depart from a 'performative' view, describing the activities independently from the frameworks and with a critical intention

towards the original meaning. Especially for Weber and Sartre, this is connected with their broader nominalistic programme of reconceptualization.

The contributions clearly play a different role in his conceptual history of politics. Barthou's and Oliver's views are 'locutive', as opposed to 'illocutive', indicators of a certain state of the 'ordinary meaning' of politics and their internal chances for defending the activity of politicians against 'unjust' 'accusations. Miller's and Sartre's view indicates the possibilities of rethinking politics, although they remain mere hints at this time Weber's *Politik als Beruf* is the most important 20th century attempt to reconceptualize politics as a multi-dimensional concept.

Using *topoi* such as contingency, adversity, ambiguity and contestability as criteria for politics, the '*Politikerspiegel*' abandon the horizon of textbook or educative defences of politics. It is not the political order, system or community etc., but politics as activity, as a performance, that is rehabilitated. In this perspective, the apologies of politicians appear to be a thousand times less boring than the so-called normative political theory and philosophy.

6. *An afterthought*

Finally, I want to call attention to an existential limit to the rehabilitation of politicians. Olivier, Barthou and Miller explicitly speak of the politician as a male figure, even a married man, and neither Weber nor Sartre explicitly oppose this. The question is not only of upholding grammatical conventions but the person and his environment are also described in a manner only suited to men. In the texts of the 1960s it still seemed to be commonplace to assume that a 'politician' is—*ceteris paribus*—a man. To remove this assumption would have required a further layer of provocative rhetoric. The removal and even an inversion of this assumption would be a first rank topic in the conceptual history of politics in the last decades of the 20th century.

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