THE PROVINCE STRIKES BACK
IMPERIAL DYNAMICS
IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

edited by
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Cover: James Skene, *The Parthenon from the southeast*, 1838. Watercolour on paper (Museum of the City of Athens, Vouros – Eutaxias).

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Empires and Migrational Trends:
The Case of Roman and Ottoman Greece

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In this chapter I intend to discuss the effects created by pre-modern empires on migrational trends.[*] When an empire expanded and added new territory to its domain a certain restructuring of the conquered areas always took place. Further changes could also be added later on by the central government. Very often the restructuring of provinces included movement of people on a large scale that affected above all the ordinary man, but also to some extent the élite. Such population movements can be divided into two different types. Firstly we have forced movement of people, in connection with compulsory urbanization, politico-administrative foundations or large-scale population relocations or deportations. Secondly we have voluntary movement, due to tax incentives, new trade and market advantages or any other changes brought forward by imperial rule.

   In order to limit the topic I will begin by scrutinizing migrational trends caused by the imposition of Roman and Ottoman rule in an area roughly corresponding to modern Greece (not including Crete). Thereafter I will on a more general level look for possible parallels among other pre-modern empires in the Eastern Mediterranean. But before going into detail concerning Roman and Ottoman Greece there is reason to recapitulate the very problematic source situation. Even though Roman demography has developed hugely during the last few decades,[1] we lack, except for Egypt,[2] access to vital demographic data such as nativity or mortality rates, the distribution of population among sex and age groups, life tables, the average life expectancy or migrational data. Nor is this situation likely to improve in the near future. A close study of skeletal data from cemeteries may help us to approximate some of these rates. However, as only very few data are available I will mainly rely on references in Roman literature and on archaeological and epigraphical remains, which can only give us some idea of the general trends, but no absolute figures.

   The situation concerning the Ottoman period is slightly better thanks to the recent publication of data from *tahrir defter*s concerning several different regions of the Ottoman Empire. However, the use of *tahrir defter*s as demographic sources is not unproblematic.[3] The *tahrir*s were never intended as census documents, but rather as tax registers. In principle they only supply a list of adult male taxpayers, but do not include information on inhabitants in villages belonging to *vakıf*s, that is religious endowments, or on any other tax-exempt part of the population in the empire. Ottoman *cizye* registers or poll tax lists have been used as another way of estimating the population size. However, these lists only include adult male Christians with a moveable property of more than a certain value.

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[*] I greatly appreciate help and advice received from several colleagues while writing this chapter. In this regard I should like to mention especially Evangelia Balta, Melek Delilbaşı, Suraiya Faroqhi, Dimitris Loupis and Giovanni Salmeri.

[1] See recently e.g. Scheidel 2001 with all previous references.

[2] Bagnall and Frier 1994.

[3] For the pitfalls and limitations of the *tahrir defter*s as a source for social and economic history, see Lowry 1992, esp. 7-12.

In addition some villages managed to get away by paying the poll tax as a lump sum, thus making the use of these registers as a source for demographic changes extremely dangerous.[4] I should also mention that the *tahrir defter*s and *cizye* registers in most cases do not mention migrational movements straight out,[5] although we can try to reconstruct such movements on their basis. Regardless of these problems the *tahrir defter*s and *cizye* registers still give us more information about migrational movements than we would have had only on the basis of chronicles and archaeological or architectural remains.

After these *caveat*s concerning our sources I proceed to my real subject. First of all I shall touch briefly on the question of forced movement of people as a result of enslavement. In both the Roman and the Ottoman Empire it was common practice to slaughter or enslave the population in cities that refused to surrender and had to be captured by assault.[6] The losers could also suffer the same fate for smaller offences. This type of punishment was not uncommon in early warfare, but under empires the number of people who could be affected grew enormously. If we are to believe the ancient historians, the largest slave-hunting operation in Roman history took place in Epirus in 167 BC, when a total of 150,000 inhabitants were carried off as slaves by the soldiers of Aemilius Paullus.[7] As a comparison one could mention the 60,000 persons that Murâd II is said to have carried off as slaves after his Peloponnesian raid in 1446.[8]

The rationale behind this savage treatment of enemies can, and has been discussed. It clearly encourages surrender in the future, but can also be seen as part of a policy of intimidation or as a means of retaliation. Whatever the ultimate reason was, economic considerations must have played a role – the slave trade was indeed a lucrative business.[9]

But let us move onwards and look at the question of forced movement of people for the purpose of urbanization. This very common practice of the Hellenistic Empires of Alexander and his followers was continued by the Romans.[10] Just as in the Hellenistic period several of the Roman colonies were in reality re-foundations of urban centres. The urban character of the Ottoman Empire never reached the same level as in the Roman Empire, but nonetheless a similar way of re-population and urban renewal of existing cities also occurs in Ottoman history.

The Roman colony Patrai (*Colonia Aroe Augusta Patrensis*) and the *civitas libera* Nikopolis are two often quoted examples of Roman urbanization in Greece.[11] Both were

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[4] For the use of the *cizye* registers as a source for the understanding of demographic developments, see Kiel 1997, 319-320 and Faroqhi 1999, 93-94. The limit for the movable property was as a rule 300 *akçe* per year. Kiel suggests that approximately 20 to 30% of the people actually living in the villages do not appear in the poll tax lists.

[5] The *defter*s concerning sixteenth century Euboea constitute an exception. Here the proportion of immigrants in the villages ranges from 2% to 25%, although most immigrants came from settlements nearby. Cf. Balta 1990-1991, 97-98.

[6] This was actually part of the Islamic law, the *şerîat* (Inalcik 1973, 26).

[7] Liv. 45.34.1-6; Plut. *Aem*. 29; Strabo 7.7.3; Pol. 30.16.

[8] Doukas p. 223 (Bekker). These were the slaves taken in one single event. Just between 1437 and 1443 Bartholomew of Yano estimates Ottoman slave acquisitions to amount to as many as 400,000 persons, thus giving an idea of the numbers of people enslaved (Horden and Purcell 2000, 380).

[9] Ziolkowksi 1986, 69-80; Harris 1979, 54-105. Plundering played an especially important role in the Ottoman Empire. See e.g. Lowry 2003, who describes the early Ottoman Empire as a plundering confederacy.

[10] Woolf 1997, 3-4.

established by Augustus, who at the same time attached large territories to the new centres and settled Roman veterans in Patrai. Some of the communities attached to the new centres became subordinate to and dependent on them, whereas others apparently were completely abandoned. Even the population of formerly prominent regional centres such as Kassope and Ambrakia seem to have been transplanted in order to boost the population of the new centres.[12] Pausanias (7.18.7) even mentions that some of the smaller former towns, like Rhypes, were razed to the ground in connection with their inhabitants being moved away. We can get an idea of the number of people who must have been included in these movements by the fact that Nikopolis may have reached a population of ca. 100,000.[13]

Patrai and Nikopolis, as well as other Roman colonies in Greece such as e.g. Corinth or Philippi thrived and grew fast. After the first phase of veteran settlement, often combined with immigration of Greeks from neighbouring areas, most of these cities seem to have continued to attract new settlers, partly even from the Italian peninsula. This is probably due to their administrative and cultural importance as well as to their locations along militarily and commercially important routes such as the Via Egnatia leading from Dyrrhachium and Apollonia to Byzantion/Constantinople, or the east–west sea route along the Corinthian gulf (Fig. 1).[14] It is also due to the so-called "élite mobility", whereby existing Greek élites transferred their activities to new and more prestigious locations, that is larger urban centres endowed with attractive amenities and the presence of other wealthy and intellectual families. Prosperous citizens of other towns can e.g. be traced epigraphically in Corinth.[15]

The well-known urban repopulation scheme of Mehmed II largely follows the Roman practice of a combined "carrot and stick" approach. We can trace this process in detail in the cases of Constantinople and Thessaloniki.[16] Initially Mehmed tried to encourage voluntary immigrants through the promise of partial tax-exemption and free housing in unoccupied houses. When this failed to attract the population he turned to the practice of *sürgün*, or forced deportation of civilian population. These deportations were first conducted on a random basis, but later on individuals were targeted who possessed the craft and trade skills which would enable them to contribute to the urban economy. Thus Mehmed's policy undoubtedly reveals an awareness of the importance of trade and commerce and the role played in this circumstance by old centres such as Constantinople

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[11] Kahrstedt 1950; Alcock 1993, 133-143; Rizakis 1997. There has been much discussion concerning the status of the two cities. According to Purcell 1987, 78-90, both cities may even have had a dual status as *colonia* and *civitas libera*.

[12] Recently Gravani 2007 on the basis of archaeological evidence has argued that Molossians and Thesprotians were also displaced to Nikopolis even though this is not explicitly stated by any written source.

[13] For the founding of Nikopolis see also Büscher 1996. There are, however, no sources giving the number of inhabitants, and the estimate of Büscher 1996 is probably to be considered unrealistically high.

[14] See e.g. the excellent overview of Roman Corinth by Engels 1990. The Roman presence in Macedonia is evidenced by the frequent appearance of Roman *nomina* in inscriptions (Tataki 2006 with further references). The distribution of these *nomina* in Italy may even give indications concerning the specific origin of the Roman settlers in Macedonia (Salomies 1996).

[15] For élite mobility in general, see Alcock 1993, 154-160; in detail on Corinth see Spawforth 1996 and Rizakis 2001. For the same phenomenon in Macedonia, see Rizakis 2003.

[16] Lowry 1992, 47-63. Mehmed's approach can be compared to the Roman policy in connection with the founding of Constantinople in AD 324. See e.g. Dagron 1974, especially 518-521.

Fig. 1. Roman foundations in the provinces of Achaia and Macedonia (after Rizakis 1997, Fig. 2).

and Thessaloniki. Furthermore, in order to feed the growing population of Constantinople he settled some 30,000 peasants captured in Serbia and the Peloponnese in nearby uninhabited villages.[17]

We have already seen how the Romans founded colonies with veterans and other settlers from the Italian peninsula at strategic inland or coastal sites, linking Italy with Greece, Macedonia and Asia Minor. Through such settlements, tied to Rome either by commerce or by their privileged status, Rome reinforced its control of the provinces. Moreover they provided land to divide for the veterans, who required it after ending their

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[17] Inalcik 1973, 141. Mehmed succeeded in making Constantinople's population grow, but Thessaloniki needed another main infusion of people, which it received in connection with the arrival of the Sephardic Jews in the late fifteenth century. They had been forced to leave Spain and were welcomed by Bayezid II to settle in the Ottoman Empire. It is possible that Bayezid II ordered the authorities to direct the majority of Jews to Thessaloniki although no such instruction has survived. See Mazower 2004, 45-52.

service in the Roman army.[18] Although not being urban in its character the settlement policy of the Ottomans is in many ways similar to the Roman practice of founding colonies in conquered areas. Also in this case military and economic considerations played the biggest role next to the need to settle parts of temporary surplus population from Anatolia.

Like the Romans the Ottomans were aware of the importance of settling people that they could trust along the main highways. In the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they encouraged nomadic tribes from Anatolia, sometimes by forcible deportation, to settle in the Balkans, especially in Thrace and along the historic Via Egnatia in Macedonia and the main route through the Maritza and Tundja valleys towards the Danube in the north.[19] The reasons for the Ottoman migrational policy were apart from military (to secure the new conquests and the main routes in the peninsula) also political (to punish rebellious populations and problematic nomadic tribes) and economic (to move people from the overpopulated Anatolia to the desolated Balkans). Forced as well as voluntary settlers were given special social status and tax exemptions in varying degrees. Small groups of successful Ottomans were made *timar*-holders even further away in the Balkan provinces.

We get a better picture of how such a mass deportation could work from a preserved imperial decree concerning the newly conquered Cyprus in 1572.[20] Every tenth family in some Anatolian provinces, chosen from all levels of the society, was to be sent to Cyprus. However, the first to be sent were peasants with insufficient or infertile land, the poor, the idlers and the nomads, later to be followed by convicted usurers and criminals. The settlers were given a special taxation exemption for a period of two years, but apparently this was not considered attractive as the authorities were told to carry out the measures with firmness. The expressed motive for this deportation was the rehabilitation and security of Cyprus.

As far as voluntary migration is concerned, we have until now only touched upon it. Changes brought forward by imperial rule can be divided into two different types. Firstly we have tax-exemptions and other incentives offered by the central government in order to encourage voluntary movement. Secondly we have trade and market advantages as well as any other changes that indirectly resulted in voluntary migration. I have already presented examples of incentives meant to encourage migration and will therefore now concentrate on the second type of changes, which may have resulted in larger numbers of people moving. However, in this case we are faced with the problem that our sources seldom explicitly describe the process itself or the number of people included.

The small Cycladic island of Delos from 166 until the mid-first century BC is perhaps the best Roman example of such voluntary movement. As a result of the gradual rise of Rome to empire – a process that can be traced back to the centuries preceding Augustus – the slave trade in the Mediterranean grew. After the establishment of a free market on Delos in 166 BC the slave trade was to a large extent concentrated there. The small island, measuring only some 3.5 km² attracted traders from all over

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[18] In general on Roman colonies in Greece, see Sartre 2001 and the different contributions in Salmeri, Raggi and Baroni 2004.

[19] E.g. Barkan 1949-1950, 101-129; Inalcik 1954, 124-128. The voluntary movement of people from Anatolia to the Balkans continued until the sixteenth century as shown e.g. by Şahin, Emecen and Halaçoğlu 1989.

[20] Barkan 1949-1950, 89-101. For the most recent study of the attempt to people Cyprus with Anatolian settlers and a careful evaluation of the reasons this attempt ended in failure, see Çelik 2004.

the Mediterranean, quite a few of them from the Italic peninsula. At most the island is calculated to have had a population of some 20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants,[21] who all in one way or another had moved there because of market opportunities. As we have already seen there is evidence for a similar voluntary migration from many small Greek inland *poleis* to the new Roman coastal centres.

But let us turn to Ottoman Greece (Fig. 2), where we have better demographic sources. On the basis of *tahrir defter*s we can today show that the population in several parts of Greece between the mid-fifteenth and mid-sixteenth century followed the general European trend, i.e. it roughly doubled in a century, thus having an annual rate of growth around 0.7%.[22] However, the population in Boeotia seems to have quadrupled in the same period, reaching an annual population growth of up to 1.36%.[23] A similar rate of growth has been recorded on the Aegean island of Thasos between 1521 and 1570,[24] whereas the annual population increase in the Zagoria villages of Epirus reached as much as 3% between 1564 and 1579.[25] Such rates are not compatible with pre-modern demographic realities,[26] and can only be explained by regional migration.

The reasons for the migration vary from region to region. The people who moved to the Zagoria villages probably came from the area of Ioannina and Arta, where the population declined, most likely as a response to changes in the Ottoman taxation system after the battle of Lepanto and the conquest of Cyprus in 1571.[27] In the same way villages belonging to the large *vakıf*s or religious endowments in Macedonia as well as areas along the Aegean coast and its islands in general enjoyed certain exemptions of taxes and thereby attracted immigration.[28]

Similar migrational patterns are discernible during the seventeenth century, which is characterised by an economic crisis and deteriorating climatic conditions. In several regions the population starts declining already during the late sixteenth century. Thus, the population in Boeotia, Eastern Locris and Arcadia fell by some 40-45% between 1570 and 1642.[29] In the Megarid or on Thasos, as well as on Crete, Kythira and the Ionian islands that belonged to Venice, the population on the other hand continued growing well

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[21] See Roussel 1931 for a discussion of the number and origin of the Delian population in 119/118 BC. For a more recent overview concerning the question of the size of the Late Hellenistic population at Delos see Papageorgiou-Venetas 1981, 114-116, who suggests the number of 28,000. In general on the ability of islands to feed large populations, see Horden and Purcell 2000, 381-383.

[22] See e.g. Kiel and Sauerwein 1994, 44, for Eastern Locris; or Forsén and Forsén 2003, 328 for Arcadia. For the average European development, see e.g. Braudel 1972, 410.

[23] Kiel 1997, 325-326.

[24] Balta 2001. The number of households increased from 467 in 1521 to 955 in 1570, which would give an annual rate of increase of 1.46%. It should be noted that the high ratio of bachelors to households on the island in 1521 (1/1.57) indicates that the increase must have depended largely on immigration. As a comparison one could mention that the Asea valley in the *tahrir defter* of 1512-1520, i.e. at the time of fast population growth (0.71% annually), had a ratio of bachelors to households of 1/3.95 (Forsén and Forsén 2003, 328).

[25] Delilbaşı 1996. I owe many thanks to Melek Delilbaşı for discussing the results of her research with me.

[26] For the general characteristics of Europe's demographic 'old regime', see e.g. Livi Bacci 1999.

[27] Delilbaşı 1996.

[28] Adanır 1998, 290. High peasant mobility is in general typical of the Ottoman Empire. Another reason for the fast population increase in villages whose status was changed from *timar* to *vakıf* was, according to Balta 1995, 61-62, that Ottoman dignitaries used to settle prisoners of war and freed slaves on the *vakıf*s.

[29] Kiel 1997, 349, tab. VII for Boeotia (46% from 1570 to 1642); Kiel and Sauerwein 1994, 100, tab. 2 for Eastern Locris (47.8% from 1570 to 1642); Forsén and Forsén 2003, 328, fig. 187 for Arcadia (41% from 1583 to 1642).

Fig. 2. Areas discussed in connection with migrational trends in the Ottoman Empire.

into the seventeenth century, with the decline not appearing until later, possibly as late as the Cretan war (1645-1669).[30] In the same way, many of the Cycladic islands and parts of Thessaly remained prosperous and populous throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[31] In these cases the cotton industry in Thessaly and the economic possibilities created by trade along the coast and on the islands may have attracted people from the mountainous parts of Greece.

For the Ottoman Empire in decline we have some further clear examples of voluntary migration. Some small Aegean islands such as Hydra, Spetses and Psara, which after the treaty in Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 enjoyed a half-autonomous status and virtual monopoly of the grain trade on the Black Sea, experienced a remarkable immigration. Thus, the small island of Hydra reached a population of ca. 18,000 to 28,000 inhabitants in the 1820s in a way that is nearly comparable to the heyday of Delos in the second to

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[30] Balta 2001 (Thasos); Balta 2002, 111-113 (the Megarid); Greene 2000, 50-52 and Rackham and Moody 1996, 98-100 and fig. 8.3 (Crete); Kiel in press (Kythira); *Istoria* X-XI (Ionian islands). The figures for the Ionian islands are only rough estimates by travellers, but they clearly indicate the trend. The population of Kephallonia seems for instance to have grown steadily throughout the period between 1572 and 1660. The strong annual population increase indicated by the estimates (i.e. from 18,200 in 1572 to 70,000 in 1660, which would give an annual rate of 1.54%) suggests immigration, e.g. from the Peloponnese.

[31] Slot 1982, tabs. 1-2 and Dimitropoulos 2004, 173-326 (the Cyclades); Kiel 1996 (Thessaly).

first centuries BC.[32] Another late example is constituted by Smyrna on the west coast of modern Turkey that thanks to privileged trading conditions attracted immigrants in large numbers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Between 1840 and 1880 alone some 200,000 Greeks from all over the Aegean sea moved to Smyrna.[33]

What can we learn from all these examples of voluntary migration? Clearly mobility was high within the Roman and Ottoman Empires.[34] The creation of empires certainly facilitated migration. Regional differences within the early empires and their vassal states in taxation, laws etc. at the same time encouraged mobility. Furthermore, the empires stimulated demand by increasing the level of surplus extraction and the spending power. Thereby growth in long-distance trade and development of some commercial groups was fostered.[35] In this connection the development of large capitals and other populous urban centres definitely played a special role. It seems indeed as if the main reason for voluntary mobility lay in the economic opportunities created by the empires. Political and religious reasons seem to be less important, except perhaps for the élites, which I have not explicitly dealt with.

As we have seen there are striking similarities between the effects of the Roman and Ottoman Empires on migrational movements. But how should we understand these similarities? Are they to be considered coincidental, or are we dealing with features that are characteristic of empires in general? Forced movements of population or deportations are well attested for most of the early empires in the Eastern Mediterranean, whereas the lack of suitable sources makes it more difficult to look for parallels for voluntary movement of people.

Forced movements of people had already been undertaken by the Egyptian, Hittite and Babylonian Empires.[36] However, the Neo-Assyrian Empire in the late eighth century BC is the first for which we have more detailed sources dealing with deportations. The largest of the Assyrian deportations encompassed as many as 208,000 persons.[37] B. Oded identified several aims and objectives behind the Assyrian policy of deportations.[38] Firstly, mass deportations were used as punishment for rebellion as well as a means of liquidating rival powers and weakening centres of resistance. Deported minority groups tended in general to be loyal to the empire as they depended on the Assyrian king for protection. Thus they were well qualified to serve in the Assyrian administration. But deportees could also be sent off by the Assyrians to serve as soldiers strengthening fortified cities and fortresses on the borders and along highways, or to populate urban

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[32] For an overview of population estimates of Hydra, see Dimitropoulos 2004, 249-251. These brackets accommodate most of the estimates, although there are some lower estimates (15,000 and 16,000) as well as a couple of clearly exaggerated figures such as 30,000 or 40,000.

[33] Kleanthi 1997, 38. Interestingly enough a large number of these people left the new independent Greek state in order to move to Smyrna.

[34] In general on mobility in the Mediterranean in a diachronic perspective and on the varying constraints placed on people's freedom to move at different times, see most recently Moatti and Kaiser 2007.

[35] For trade and markets in early empires, see Bang 2003, 204-206.

[36] For references concerning these early deportations, see Oded 1979, 42-43.

[37] Most of the deportations seem to date to the reigns of Tiglath-Pileser III, Sargon II and Sennacherib. It was Sennacherib who deported 208,000 persons from Babylonia to Assyria, and he is also known for deporting a total of 200,155 persons from the Kingdom of Judah. See Oded 1979, 19-22 with further references.

[38] Oded 1979, 41-74.

centres, thus strengthening the economy and keeping trade routes under control. In some cases the deportees were sent to repopulate abandoned regions and to make them fit once again for agriculture. They could even be needed as craftsmen and unskilled workmen for the building of temples and palaces in the cities.

After the demise of the Neo-Assyrian Empire, the Neo-Babylonian and Persian Empires both continued to deport defeated people from one place to another within their territory. Well-known cases are constituted by the Chaldaeans who forced the inhabitants of Jerusalem and Judah to move to Babylonia (the Babylonian exile)[39], or the Persians who settled the Barcaeans of Cyrenaica in Bactria (Hdt. 4.202-204), and the Milesians (Hdt. 6.20) and Eretrians (Hdt. 6.120) in the neighbourhood of Susa in Mesopotamia.[40] Mass deportations were also used by many later empires, for instance the Byzantine Empire where the largest ones involved several hundreds of thousands of people.[41] Even Alexander the Great and later Hellenistic kings transferred people by force in order to populate their newly founded cities, although this was usually on a smaller scale.[42]

Oded's list of aims and objectives behind the Neo-Assyrian policy of mass deportations presents interesting parallels to the state of affairs among the Romans and Ottomans. Many of the Assyrian aims and objectives appear as well among the Neo-Babylonians and Persians[43] not to speak about the Seleucids or Ptolemies.[44] Similar aims and objectives can furthermore be found behind the Byzantine deportations; people were moved for military reasons as more manpower was needed in particular spots, in order to supply cities with dwindling population or to repopulate and economically rehabilitate various regions, and finally to contribute to the elimination of heretical groups and the assimilation of barbarians in the empire.[45]

Arnold Toynbee was the first to emphasize the general connection between pre-modern empires (or universal states as he puts it) and large-scale population movements, drawing heavily on examples from other empires than those mentioned here, such as China and especially the Inca Empire.[46] He also distinguishes the main categories of resettlements: punitive deportations, military colonies or garrisons along the frontiers and main roads, as well as civilian settlements established primarily for economic reasons. However, large-scale population movements have since then still not been further pursued as one of the basic characteristics of pre-modern empires.

Large-scale population movements are, as a matter of fact, also common among modern empires. Thus, when the Russian Empire expanded towards the south in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it quickly adopted deportation policies akin to the Ottoman ones and before the First World War some 2.5 million Muslims were deported

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[39] See e.g. Albertz 2003 and Lipschits 2005 with further references.

[40] About the Persians and their policy of moving people, see e.g. Asheri 1983, 30-35, 71 or Briant 1996, 521-523, 980-981. In general, the people deported by the Persians seem to have been provided with a permanent settlement and the use of land.

[41] Charanis 1961, 141-150. The largest deportations include some 200,000 Slavs moved from the Balkan peninsula to Anatolia in the mid-eighth century and the displacement of possibly as many as 400,000 Armenians to the west in the eleventh century.

[42] See e.g. Bosworth 1994, 867; Green 1990, 150-170; and especially Cohen 1983.

[43] See e.g. Briant 1996, 522-523.

[44] Cohen 1983.

[45] Charanis 1961, 150-151.

[46] Toynbee 1954, 108-163.

from the Crimea, the Balkan peninsula and the Caucasus while other people were invited to settle in the conquered areas. Even as late as at the end of the Second World War Stalin used the same policy transferring, e.g. 189,000 Tatars from the Crimea and over half a million Chechens and Ingush from the Caucasus to Central Asia accused of supporting the German invasion forces.[47] Mass migration also played an important role in laying the foundation of the British Empire.[48] Millions of Africans were forcibly transplanted to the new world as slaves in order to work the land, but one should not forget that the colonisers also included political prisoners, thieves, food rioters, radical weavers etc. in a way that brings the thoughts to Cyprus in 1572. In the British case we also have reliable demographic data which show the extent of voluntary migration, something that is lacking for all earlier empires.

Throughout history the establishment of empires has created larger markets and thus facilitated voluntary movement. At the same time the empires have forced or encouraged people to move especially to places located along important routes of connectivity[49] or on the borders, with the explicit purpose of consolidating their power over conquered areas. Large scale migration is thus inseparably connected to the development and life of empires. The existence of clear parallels between different pre-modern empires in the Eastern Mediterranean concerning the policies of mass deportations and voluntary migration definitely constitutes a good basis for further comparative studies. Drawing on data from the Ottoman Empire and other empires for which we have sufficient sources, we may gain a better understanding of the migrational trends in the Hellenistic and Roman Empires.

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[47] King 2004, 207-210, 229. For the deportations of Muslims between 1821 and 1922 see more detail in McCarthy 1995. For the new settlers in general see Khodarkovsky 2002. They included among others also Germans, who mainly settled along the big rivers: see Keller 1980 with fold-out map.

[48] There is a vast bibliography on this topic, see e.g. Ferguson 2003, 53-112. It should be noted that 1/2 to 2/3 of the Europeans moving to the new world between 1650 and 1780 did so under contract of indentured servitude, or as Ferguson puts it as "slaves on fixed-term contracts".

[49] For connectivity and routes of connectivity in the Mediterranean see Horden and Purcell 2000.

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