THE PROVINCE STRIKES BACK IMPERIAL DYNAMICS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Edited by Björn Forsén and Giovanni Salmeri

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Preface

This volume is based on the conference *Experience of Empires – Responses from the Provinces* held at the Finnish Institute at Athens in June 2006. The conference was sponsored by the *European Cooperation in the Field of Scientific and Technical Research* (COST) as part of the COST A36 project *Tributary Empires Compared: Romans, Mughals and Ottomans in the Pre-Industrial World from Antiquity till the Transition to Modernity*. This project, which was proposed in 2004 by Peter Bang, University of Copenhagen, supports meetings on the history of pre-modern Empires. The Athenian conference was organised by Björn Forsén and Giovanni Salmeri, the representatives of Finland and Italy in COST A36.

The editors are grateful to all the contributors for their readiness to accept the suggestions made by the anonymous referees. Mark Weir was kind enough to translate Giovanni Salmeri's chapter, while Ian A. Todd read the remaining chapters with a vigilant eye paying careful attention to the use of English. Special thanks are given to Maurice Sartre for his thoughtful report on the contents of the volume which offered most useful material for the introductory chapter. Thanks are also due to Peter Bang, Jeannette Forsén, Maria Martzoukou, Mikko Suha and Esko Tikkala for help in organising the conference and to Vesa Vahtikari and Marjaana Vesterinen for help in preparing this volume. *Est in votis* that it stimulates further comparative research on pre-modern Empires in the Eastern Mediterranean area, where the idea of Empire originated and where Empires took their first steps.

Athens, 30 November 2007

Ideology and Practice of Empire

Björn Forsén and Giovanni Salmeri

Over the last decade the topic of Empire, together with that of democracy, has been a focus of attention for historians and students of politics. Democracy has been considered in particular in its electoral dimension and from the point of view of its bearing on freedom, while studies of Empire have been dictated by the need to define it as a political category. In addition various empires have been analysed in the light of their contribution to overall political stability on one hand, and the processes which led to their dissolution on the other. We shall not here go into the strong bond – which has frequently been pointed out – existing between these enquiries and the world order that has come into being following the demise of the Berlin wall. An event which, together with the Gulf wars, sparked off a process of significant expansion of electoral democracy, with the United States occupying a new, overtly imperial role in world politics.[1]

To begin let us mention the interconnection between democracy and Empire and the phenomenon of globalization, which is increasingly emphasized in both a positive and negative sense. Thus for example the expansion of electoral democracy has been seen also as the outcome of globalization, while democracy *tout court*, in the sense of citizen power within the prevailing political system, is thought to be progressively threatened by globalization. There is a well pondered consideration of this matter, with some incursions into philosophy,[2] in O. Höffe's *Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung*,[3] where the author gives a comprehensive analysis of the demands which the process of globalization makes on the political organisations of humanity.

Turning to Empire, the contemporary process of globalization has contributed significantly to the genesis of Hardt and Negri's approach in a volume which, leaving aside all the criticism it has attracted, has unquestionably opened up a new vision of the notion of Empire.[4] As for the ancient world, one would perhaps question the relevance of globalization to studies of the nature and functioning of the Roman Empire, a characteristic of various works in recent years in the Anglo-Saxon world.[5] In fact the recent phenomenon of globalization is at the heart of a radical mutation which is economic and financial, certainly, but is above all human. Integration and interconnection have taken on such importance that today one can no longer exist in the local dimension without being aware, above all through media, of belonging to the world's 'globality'. Whereas for the Roman Empire, which cannot be seen as globalized, it would seem more appropriate to adopt, with all due caution, the notion of *mondialisation*, based on fluxes and movements, and which is commonly referred to the last part of the nineteenth century, which saw the beginnings of economic internationalization.[6]

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[1] On this see Münkler 2005 and Hobsbawm 2008, and with a different perspective Mann 2003.
[2] Interest for the philosophical approach seems to be absent in the Anglo-Saxon production on the subject.
[3] Höffe 1999.
[4] Hardt and Negri 2000, see also Negri 2006.
[5] See e.g. Hingley 2005 and Sweetman 2007 (basing her approach on Waters 1995).
[6] See Abélès 2008.

It is interesting to see how the prevailing attitude among scholars and political analysts to democracy and Empire has shifted in recent years. From the Second World War onwards, and in some cases going back to the beginning of last century, democracy – associated with classical Greece – tended to be viewed in a very positive light, while Empire – associated with the experience of Rome – was often the object of reservations and accusations. Whereas today even some scholars of classical Athens, invariably the most passionate advocates of democracy especially in the English speaking world,[7] have begun to take a rather more critical stance. For example, L.J. Samons II in *What's Wrong with Democracy?* seeks to highlight its limits in both the ancient and modern world, focusing in particular on elections as its key episode.[8] And in a book that has provoked considerable discussion, L. Canfora emphasises what is basically the ideological aspect of democracy seeking for centuries to pave the way for the so-called 'power of the masses' while opposed by the élites building up the electoral legitimation of their power.[9] Canfora also unmasks the paradox – both ancient and modern – which allows a state to pursue a hegemonic design while claiming to be the champion of liberty and democracy.[10]

The last few years have seen some works dealing specifically with democracy in the modern world which, in addition to a reinterpretation of the global advancement and retreat of democracy across the centuries proposed by Ch. Tilly,[11] include such critical appraisals as the studies by M. Mann, R.A. Dahl and S. Ringen.[12] To sum up drastically, Mann for example maintains that the ideal of rule by the people can actually transform *demos* into *ethnos*, generating organic forms of nationalism and fostering the cleansing of minorities.[13] Dahl on the other hand looks at the fundamental issue of equality and tries to pin down the reasons why governments have not fulfilled their democratic ideals. While recognising that complete equality is utopian, Dahl argues that the present situation in the United States is disturbing: the unequal accumulation of political resources suggests that the condition of political imbalance will increase until it becomes irreversible. In other words, the overall advantage in terms of power, influence and authority can become so overwhelming that, even if the 'have nots' are in the majority, they are simply incapable, and possibly also reluctant, to make the effort necessary to combat and defeat the forces with a vested interest in inequality.[14]

This critical trend is quite prevalent nowadays in the domain of studies of democracy, while in studies of Empire we see a tendency to acquire a deeper knowledge which somehow supersedes the anti-imperial mentality. Right at the beginning of last century this received a strong impulse from *Imperialism* by J.A. Hobson,[15] and then brought together such radically contrasting figures as V.I. Lenin and R. Reagan.[16] It must be clearly understood, however, that the current demand to gain a deeper knowledge of

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[7] An example is offered by A.H.M. Jones (1904-1970), on whom see Salmeri 2007, 146-148.

[8] Samons 2004.

[9] Canfora 2006.

[10] Canfora 2007, see also Zakaria 2003.

[11] Tilly 2007.

[12] Mann 2005, Dahl 2006, Ringen 2007.

[13] Mann 2005.

[14] Dahl 2006.

[15] Hobson 1902.

[16] See Hart 2008, 1-2, with interesting considerations. Lenin's classic *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* first appeared in Russian (Lenin 1917).

Empire has nothing to do with the ideological adhesion to the Roman Imperial experience on the part of the British ruling class in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.[17] There is more of an analogy for it in the interest which a sixteenth century author such as J. Bodin, in his *Six livres de la République* (1576), took in investigating sovereignty and its basis, or in the reflections which in the same century and the following one J. Lipsius and others pursued concerning Tacitus and Seneca,[18] or again in the conceptual framework of a work like E. Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776-1788).

It is significant that both Bodin and Gibbon are points of reference for Hardt and Negri, the authors of the study that epitomises the current trend of research on Empire. While making a clear distinction between the modern concept of Empire and the Roman Empire, they place the latter in the genealogy (*à la* Foucault) of the former. According to Hardt and Negri, we now have an Empire that certainly cannot be compared with the 'territorial' empires of world history, but rather is to be seen as a new form of sovereignty governing a world where transformation of the productive processes has brought in its wake transformation of every aspect of social life. The link that the authors identify between this form of sovereignty and the Roman Empire, over and above such outward characteristics as the permeability of borders and administrative fluidity, lies in the extreme radicalisation of the correspondence between the ethical and juridical perspectives, to the point that the basic principle of both appears to be that of ensuring peace and guaranteeing justice for all peoples with all possible means.[19]

The volume by H. Münkler, *Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten*, pays less attention to the theoretical dimension than do Hardt and Negri. The author adopts a perspective which is in many ways comparative, and elaborates a number of questions concerning Empire: What has characterised imperial sovereignty throughout history? What contribution to stability does an Imperial regime offer, and what are the risks this involves? These are undoubtedly key questions, and Münkler manages to come up with answers which are by no means simplistic.[20] Whereas in her book *Day of Empire,* A. Chua addresses a single question, namely *How hyperpowers rise to global dominance and why they fall*. The author uses "hyperpowers" to mean "globally dominant empires, pluralistic and tolerant" like the Roman Empire. After analysing their histories she tackles the question of whether in future America – which has grown in a little over two centuries from a regional power into a hyperpower – will be able to maintain its position as the world dominant power, or whether it is already in decline.[21]

Right from the title there is no mistaking the historical approach taken in *Empires. Perspectives from Archaeology and History,* edited by S.E. Alcock, T.N. D'Altroy, K.D. Morrison and C.M. Sinopoli. Its papers "explore polities from both the Old and New World and span early prehistoric empires through later historic empires, including the problematic early modern period and the first century of European intercontinental imperial expansion". However it specifically denies any ambition of standing as "the

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[17] On this see Hingley 2000.

[18] See especially Oestreich 1982.

[19] Hardt and Negri 2000, 10.

[20] Münkler 2005.

[21] Chua 2007. See Kennedy 1987, where the term 'Empire' is not used in the title.

big book of empires", seeking instead to break down "some predetermined and arbitrary boundaries, both disciplinary and temporal".[22] In fact the papers are organized in five transverse sections – from 'Empires in a wider world' to 'Imperial integration and imperial subjects' and 'Imperial ideologies' – which constitute a formidable basis for future work on this topic.

Lastly we can recall the volume *L'empire gréco-romain* by P. Veyne.[23] In a masterly synthesis of philosophy and sociology, archaeology and psychology, social history, cultural history and history of mentalities, he puts the variegated world of the Roman Empire on the stage. The strong point of this work is that Veyne does not gloss over the differences within the Empire itself. He makes much of its dual linguistic nature (Greek and Latin), and the considerable autonomy accorded at the level of local administration. While pointing up the multicultural and *mondialisée* dimension of the Roman Empire, he does not fall into the trap of establishing a precise comparison with our world. For him, the study of history means underscoring the differences between past and present, even though he is well aware that the Roman Empire occupies an important place in the genealogy (once again *à la* Foucault) of our globalized world.[24]

The current interest in the notion of Empire and the history of the individual empires is well reflected by the papers brought together in this volume. In general they set out to explore how the people in provincial societies[25] relate and respond to the action of the imperial government. Most of the contributions deal specifically with areas of the Eastern Mediterranean – Anatolia, Crete, Greece – that came under a succession of different empires, and also seek to show how the inhabitants reacted to the change of imperial rule. The final section features papers dealing with more general issues such as 'Empire and collective mentality' and 'Empires and migrational trends', still in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean.

In chronological terms the papers span some two and a half millennia, starting from the Persian Empire and finishing with the last century of the life of the Ottoman Empire. The decision to exclude both from the conference and from this volume treatments of the Hittite, Assyrian or Babylonian empires was motivated by the fact that the issues they raise are not readily compatible with later empires. It can hardly be insignificant that Münkler himself takes Rome as the starting point for his work.[26] And in the case of the Persian Empire, as Vincent Gabrielsen well illustrates in the first chapter of this volume, there are numerous points of contact with the subsequent experiences of Alexander and the Hellenistic kingdoms and hence Rome.

As for the general theme of the volume, the scholarly emphasis on the relation between provinces and central government in ancient empires has during the last two decades come to lay more stress on regional variation inside the empires and on native agency in the development of the provincial responses. The traditional image of empires

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[22] Alcock *et al.* 2001, xvii-xviii.

[23] Veyne 2005.

[24] The sub-title chosen for the Italian translation of Veyne 2005 is *Le radici del mondo globale* (Veyne 2007). On Foucault and his approach to history, see now Veyne 2008.

[25] On the use of the notion of 'province' in the cases of the Persian, Seleucid, Venetian, and Ottoman Empires, see *infra* the chapters by V. Gabrielsen, C. Brélaz, M. Georgopoulou, and S. Faroqhi.

[26] Münkler 2005.

based on the idea that they exploit the periphery, meaning the provinces, has gradually been revised, becoming more lenient to the centre, particularly in the case of the Persian Empire following the work done by P. Briant.[27] Thus before presenting a brief overview of the volume as a whole, it is perhaps appropriate to highlight some general aspects concerning provincial status and provincial responses, mostly using examples connected to the Roman Empire which have parallels elsewhere.

First of all we can consider the distinction between the systems of administration and command within empires outlined by Hardt and Negri in *Empire*, as a way of gaining a better understanding of the forms of relation between centre and provinces. The authors reject the idea that the current world order, alluded to above, arose spontaneously from the interaction of fundamentally diverse global forces. They are also opposed to seeing the new order as being dictated by a single power, or descending from a single, rational centre, capable of over-riding global forces and influencing historical development according to a conscious purpose.[28] Coherently with this perspective, Hardt and Negri consider the systems of command and administration to be two distinct sectors: administration aims at solving specific problems one by one, without following any broad guidelines, the criterion for success being local efficacy; while the objective of command is general control of the multitude through the application of tools such as military power and communications.[29]

A scheme conceived in this way can not simply be applied to the structures of the Roman Empire, or to the dynamics of relations between centre and provinces, but it can certainly help us towards a better understanding of the interaction between central power and provinces in the Roman Empire. Let us take an example, drawn from the recent volume by C. Brélaz, *La sécurité publique en Asie Mineure sous le Principat*.[30] The main focus is on the provinces of Asia Minor, where the presence of the Roman army did not make itself greatly felt, and where the Greek cities showed a highly developed civic organisation and enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. With regard to the public security system, moreover, the author brings revealing light to bear on the separate spheres of action respectively of the central authorities and the local communities. The picture he traces corresponds to the vision of Hardt and Negri: the central authorities are seen to have had a hand in the sphere of command, which saw the Roman forces directly involved only when strategic interests were at stake, while the local communities were responsible for administration – the everyday management of law and order – with a fair degree of autonomy.

The distinction between command and administration drawn by Hardt and Negri also proves enlightening when we read the tenth book of Pliny the Younger's *Epistulae*, containing both the letters the author sent to Trajan in his capacity as governor of Bithynia and the emperor's answers. What is particularly striking about these answers is Trajan's deftness and elasticity in addressing administrative problems, two qualities which also appear to characterise the action of his successors and predecessors when faced with comparable situations.[31] Usually this type of behaviour is thought to derive

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[27] Briant 1996.

[28] Hardt and Negri 2000, 3.

[29] Hardt and Negri 2000, 339-348. No reference to Hardt and Negri, and very limited interest in defining administration and command in the papers collected in Haensch and Heinrichs 2007 (*Herrschen und Verwalten [...]*).

[30] Brélaz 2005.

[31] See Salmeri 2005, 188-189.

from the unplanned, contingent nature of the relations between emperor and subjects as hypothesised, for example, by F. Millar.[32] But it could also derive from the conviction, which seems to have been widespread among the members of the Roman ruling class, that the approach to problems of administration, which was concerned with managing separate, segmented social forces, should be different from the one applied in the exercise of command.

There are various other cases where application of Hardt and Negri's distinction between administration and command can be of help in tracing back the origins of the relatively ample scope for manoeuvre characterising the action of the local communities under the Roman Empire. Here however we would stress the fact that Hardt and Negri's distinction suggests some doubt about the conception of Roman provincial administration as something rigid, with sets of precise rules to be applied. Such appears to be the point of view of certain scholars who take a particular interest in the needs of the central powers, like the German authors J. Bleicken, M. Wörrle and W. Eck.[33] Wörrle, for example, in his valuable work *Stadt und Fest*,[34] attributes a – perhaps exaggeratedly – important role to the central authorities in determining the organisation of the festival founded by Julius Demosthenes at Oenoanda in Lycia. Rather more convincing is the position taken by F. Millar, based as it is on pragmatic analysis of the material rather than theoretical assumptions of an *étatiste* type. In particular, in *The Emperor in the Roman World*,[35] Millar places considerable stress on the ample scope for action which the central authorities conceded to the provincial cities and their inhabitants. It is an approach that has greatly influenced the study of political life in the cities of the Empire, and in particular in the provinces of Asia Minor, with increasing attention being given to their capacity for initiative that had already begun to emerge under the rule of the Hellenistic kings.[36]

An excellent example of this state of affairs is offered, once again, by the letters exchanged between Pliny the Younger in his role as governor of Bithynia and the emperor Trajan.[37] A formula we find in these letters runs *suis legibus uti*,[38] referring to the possibility some provincial communities enjoyed of bringing their own legislative tradition to bear in the field of administration. The impression we receive of quite considerable degrees of autonomy for the provincial communities is also confirmed by study of the literary sources and epigraphic material, above all that from the eastern provinces of the Empire and dating mainly from the second century AD.[39]

Another aspect concerning provincial responses we should emphasise is how the Empire changes the life of the people in the provinces, or to put it in another way, how the people of the provinces react to the actions and impositions of imperial government. Life in the areas conquered by the Romans, especially in the West, usually changed in much the same way, with the appearance of such elements of Roman material and social culture as roads, towns, villas, baths, aqueducts and amphitheatres, not to speak of the spread of

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[32] Millar 1992.
[33] Bleicken 1982, Wörrle 1988, Eck 2002.
[34] Wörrle 1988.
[35] Millar 1992.
[36] See Ma 2000, and now Capdetrey 2007.
[37] See Salmeri 2005, 188-189.
[38] Plin. *Ep*. 10.92.
[39] See Veyne 2005, 163-257; Salmeri 2007.

the Latin language, the Roman monetary system etc.[40] Preceded by T. Mommsen's vision of a Romanizing Empire,[41] in the early twentieth century F. Haverfield and C. Jullian[42] described this process as Romanization, and maintained that the Roman administration played an active part in it with the purpose of unifying and centralising the Empire as the newly conquered provinces were civilised. The interpretation of Mommsen, Haverfield and Jullian was clearly influenced by the national and imperial ideologies of their own times,[43] and has recently come in for criticism in several quarters as being over-simplistic, focusing attention on the élite of the Empire, and conceiving of identity and social change in terms that are too crude and concrete. S. Alcock, G. Woolf, D. Mattingly and R. Hingley[44] have argued that we should abandon the term Romanization altogether in order to avoid its inherent Romanocentric bias.

Part of the criticism of Mommsen and Haverfield is connected to the fact that they do not allow any agency for the provincial peoples in the process of spreading Roman material and social culture. Scholars such as P. Brunt and M. Millett,[45] on the other hand, tend to interpret the spread of Roman culture as a result of the native élites in the provinces Romanizing themselves under the influence of Rome. Following the same orientation, G. Woolf's recent approach to 'becoming Roman' makes much of the differences between the various provinces and regions, which led to Roman culture being adapted in different forms. The Roman culture was in a way reinvented over and over again in the context of local needs. Indeed Woolf goes further, stressing the fact that the provinces, especially the Eastern ones, also influenced the culture of the centre, and that the imperial culture that developed somehow supplanted the previous Roman culture of the capital just as it came to replace other earlier cultures of the inhabitants of the provinces.[46]

To end this section it has to be added that much of the study of the provincial responses to imperial government still concentrates on the élite, while the impact of Empire on the lower strata of the population is more difficult to grasp.[47] However, this is such a vast topic that we can certainly not pursue here, although it must be borne constantly in mind in reading the chapters of this volume, which in most cases deal only with the élites.

It is appropriate that this volume on empires in the Eastern Mediterranean opens with a wide-ranging chapter by V. Gabrielsen concerning Asia Minor, embracing several empires and various topics. He tends to highlight the elements of continuity (not merely territorial) without glossing over differences and breaks in his consideration of the empires of the Achaemenids, of Alexander and of the Seleucids, taking the Athenian Empire as a

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[40] A similar process can be detected and followed also in the Ottoman Empire with the spread of mosques, tekkes, hamams, caravanserais, aqueducts, bridges, fountains, domestic architecture etc. See e.g. Kiel 1990.

[41] Mommsen 1885.

[42] Haverfield 1912, Jullian 1920.

[43] Hingley 2005, 16-19, 30-35.

[44] Alcock 1997, Woolf 1998, Mattingly 2002, Hingley 2005.

[45] Brunt 1990, Millet 1990.

[46] Woolf 1994, Woolf 1997, Woolf 1998.

[47] It can be studied through factors such as trade, or presence of military contingents, which came to influence, although indirectly, the life in the provinces, see Bang 2003, 204-205; Bang 2006; Mitchell 1993, 118-142. For the use of pottery as evidence for ancient social history, especially with regard to the lower strata of population, see Roth 2007 (concentrating on the process of 'Romanization' in Central Italy).

countermodel in order to achieve a clearer picture of the features of the former ones. The richness and interest of the subjects Gabrielsen deals with concerning the role and action of the provinces in the empires of Asia Minor, is well symbolised by his identification of a tradition of *Empire-as-integration*, characterising the Persian Empire, and of *Empire-as-disintegration*, applied to the Seleucid Empire, or again his interpretation of revolts as contributing to the consolidation of imperial power. While usually seen as factors of destruction and disintegration, they are presented, with a large number of examples, as "the quasi-ritualized re-enactment of conquest by means of separate acts of re-conquest of imperial components". Surely this interpretation can also be applied to some cases that occurred in the Roman and Ottoman empires.

The second chapter, by C. Brélaz,[48] also focuses on Asia Minor, and offers a neat presentation of the ways in which order was maintained and justice exercised in the Roman provinces of the area. The author pays particular attention to the division of responsibilities in this connection between local autonomy and imperial power, and emphasises – with explicit reference to the distinction between administration and command made by Hardt and Negri – how the cities had a relatively large scope for manoeuvre in everyday matters, while the imperial authorities kept a monopoly over the military and matters of supreme jurisdiction.

Moving on to the Ottoman Empire, in her study of pious foundations from the late fifteenth to the early seventeenth century S. Faroqhi shows how local élites managed to hold on to some of their power in the province of Anadolu. For example, some of the administrators sent by the central government would settle in the provincial towns of Anadolu, their families entering the ranks of the local élite and pouring money into pious foundations. Although the local élite remained at a lower level in the imperial structure, with very few of its members managing to graduate into the upper élite, this investigation is of great importance for our understanding of the relations between central government and provinces in the Ottoman Empire.

The contributions by Brélaz and Faroqhi both reveal the need for empires like the Roman and Ottoman ones to have local intermediaries acting in the provinces. J. Haldon for his part examines in depth the relationship – quite often involving competition – between provincial élites and central authorities in the Byzantine Empire, with a special emphasis on the ninth through the eleventh centuries. The author tries to identify the structural constraints which determined the patterns of evolution of the Byzantine state, that is to say the means through which its social élites maintained control over resources, whether human or material. Conflicts or tensions concerning the distribution of resources both within dominant élites, and between them and other elements in society, are seen as a dynamic element prompting institutional and organisational change, to the advantage of one group or another. Within this perspective, the taxation system appears a fundamental way of appropriating resources by the state or those acting on its behalf.

No less than three contributions take into consideration the provincial status of the island of Crete in three different historical moments. The key question in each case is: what changes? A. Chaniotis shows that, in the case of the Roman Empire, in practice everything changes. He has no hesitation in affirming that, by putting an end to the political fragmentation that had characterised Crete in the previous centuries, the coming of Rome

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[48] See Brélaz 2005.

"was the most significant turning point in the history of the island since the destruction of the Minoan palaces". Once it had been integrated in a unified Mediterranean ambit, Crete saw its social, economic and indeed cultural structures deeply modified without the central power which originated this change ever imposing strong signs of its presence.

The situation of Crete under the Venetian Empire was rather different. In this case it was defined as *colonia* by the ruling power, and M. Georgopoulou offers some interesting notations on the meaning of this term for the island. She goes on to explore the topic of the transfer of cultural and political forms from the mother city to Crete, and in particular of how cultural symbols were able to foster new power relationships when reused in a different context. An excellent example of this is provided by the author through the analysis of the origins and development of the church of St. Mark in Candia/ Herakleion, the island's capital city. Entering the Ottoman Empire quite late on, Crete appears to have been ruled according to a model which can be compared perhaps more with the Roman than with the Venetian one. In his chapter A. Anastasopoulos focuses on the island and relations between centre and periphery in the eighteenth century, and in particular on administration and taxation. His reconstruction of the process of formation of the local élite is of great interest, as is the evaluation of the various motives underlying the conversion from Christianity to Islam of part of the island's population following the Turkish conquest.

After these three studies dedicated to Crete, the volume concludes with four more general chapters, of which the one by J. Haldon has already been discussed. In an innovative approach, G. Salmeri sets out to show how a structure like the Roman Empire could produce transformations and innovations in the sphere of the collective mentality. He analyses the development of the notion of *eutaxia* from the fifth century BC to the second century AD. *Eutaxia* went from indicating orderliness on the battlefield, indispensable for obtaining victory, in classical Athens, to signifying obedience and decorum as a female quality in the Roman Imperial age. In addition, in the first half of the second century AD it featured in political debate in the cities of Asia Minor, expressing the need for law and order on the part of local notables. At the root of this transformation the author identifies the change in mentality brought about in the Greek world by the emergence of large centralised states like the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman Empire.

The penultimate chapter, by B. Forsén, takes the most comparative approach. It looks in depth at migrational trends in Greece under the Roman and Ottoman empires, illustrating for example parallel situations of demographic increase respectively in the islands of Delos and Hydra. On account of the extent of its territory, the multiple possibilities it offers and its ability to impose its solutions, the imperial structure appears to the author as particularly favourable towards migrations, using them to significantly modify demography in its provinces. He also emphasises how empires from the time of the Assyrians have forced or encouraged people to move with the explicit purpose of consolidating their power over conquered areas.

The final contribution is by I. Arnaoutoglou and focuses on Athens in the last years of the Ottoman Empire and the first of the new Greek national state. In 1813 the Philomousos Society was founded in the city, comprising not only most of the local élite but also a large number of Greeks from elsewhere, Britons and other Europeans. Soundly rooted in the variegated context of Ottoman Athens in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the Society clearly felt the influence of the Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment, not least in its task of collecting and conserving antiquities for the better education of Greek

youth. The *Philomousoi* pursued this interest in antiquities even during the Greek war of independence: two years after resuming activities in 1824 they were deeply involved in safeguarding and ensuring new lustre for some of the city's ancient monuments.

In the new Kingdom of Greece it is undoubtedly significant that G. Chr. Gropius, an early and active member of the Philomousos Society, was among the founding members of the Archaeological Society in 1837. A constant attention for the antiquities of Athens, then, was shown by members of the composite local élite in the first four decades of the nineteenth century. As has frequently been the case for the élites in the history of empires, they were able to withstand fundamental political changes, conserving some of their interests and habits. In view of this it comes as no surprise to learn that, prior to its destruction in 1842, the Turkish mosque shown occupying the cella of the Parthenon in James Skene's watercolour reproduced on the front cover, was used for several years for storing antiquities from the Acropolis, the most sacred site in Greece.[49]

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[49] Tsigakou 1995, 54.

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Provincial Challenges to the Imperial Centre in Achaemenid and Seleucid Asia Minor

Vincent Gabrielsen

I. Introduction: counting empires

The period of time treated in this chapter stretches from 550 to around 63 BC. The core geographical area is Asia Minor (or Anatolia), from its Mediterranean seaboard in the west to its inland fringes at Mesopotamia in the east. Within this area and this 500-year time-span, no less than five major empires left their heavy imprint on the historical record.[1]

Three of them followed each other in direct succession. They are the Achaemenid (or Persian) Empire (550-330), Alexander's Empire (330-323 plus the 'acephalous' years until ca. 306) and the Seleucid Empire (from 312 [Babylonian era] or 281 [Macedonian era] to 63). From an Anatolian perspective, our fourth entity was an off-shore empire: the Athenian Empire (478-404), both a contemporary *and* a rival of the Achaemenid Empire, and the only Mediterranean-based power in our ensemble. The regions that it had brought under its sway as tribute-paying subjects included parts of the westernmost Persian realm (in Anatolia). Occasionally, the Athenian Empire tried to grab more such parts, while invariably making Persian rule over Egypt difficult. Finally, sandwiched between the final stages of the Seleucid Empire and the ultimate Roman takeover in the East was the short-lived Empire of Mithradates VI of Pontus (ca. 110-62). Even though this is usually not counted among the Ivy League of empires, it nevertheless was one of the few powers to challenge seriously Roman rule in Asia Minor.[2] Given its characteristic blending of Iranian and Hellenistic modes of rule, we may let this empire here be represented by the other grand empires on Asiatic soil; especially since it shared some of their main structural features.

This being the larger historical framework for the present chapter, it might be useful, before proceeding to treat the theme of *provincial challenges to the imperial centre*, to make explicit some of the analytical challenges facing my own attempt to deal with this matter. One is – within such a short space and in a way that neither deters the non-specialist in this period nor entails an excessive narrowing down in scope – to achieve a fair and meaningful coverage of 'provincial challenges' in empires which were vast, which exhibit many differences when investigated at ground-level, and whose study, traditionally pursued by separate groups of specialists, has produced distinct historiographies, each of them as idiosyncratic and controversy-ridden as it is voluminous.[3]

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[1] In this paper I do not to try to prove a particular case, or to argue in detail all the points that appear in the course of my discussion. Rather, taking a broad view of the empires in question, I attempt to point out some important similarities and differences between them, which might have impinged directly on their history and thus can be regarded as amongst their defining characteristics. Therefore, my references to modern scholarship are necessarily selective, guiding the reader to more specialized works. Otherwise, I document the main points made in the text with reference to the ancient sources. I am indebted to Kurt A. Raaflaub, who allowed me to read an early draft of his forthcoming chapter 'The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Athens and Persia after the Persian Wars'. Unless otherwise stated, all dates are BC.

[2] See McGing 1986; Hind 1994.

Our most immediate challenge is, however, to provide satisfactory answers to the following two questions. (1) In which sense can the term *province* form the common ground for a comparison of all our empires? (2) Given that the imperial centre was facing various kinds of challenges, which stands out as having an appreciably greater impact on the history of these empires? Accordingly, in Section II our comparison chiefly pursues a conceptualizing aim, as it is mostly directed towards establishing the sense in which the term 'province' is best used here. Section III, in turn, focuses on 'revolt', the kind of challenge I single out for its profound effect on the relationship between imperial centre and 'provinces', an effect that was not necessarily negative. Revolt, it will be argued, generated both integrative and disintegrative forces. Section IV looks briefly at how these forces became articulated through the 'family metaphor', one of the means which the imperial centre and its 'provinces' used to balance their relationship. In sections II-IV, more is said about some central structural features of imperial rule in Anatolia than about the specific policies and concrete modes of governance or administration which each of these empires applied in Anatolia. In terms of chronological and thematic coverage, the task on which this chapter embarks is admittedly a formidable one. Recourse to three commonly avoided vices – *generalization*, *oversimplification* and at times excessive *limitation* – is therefore imperative.

II. Three similar empires and a deviant one

It seems best to start by defining the place of Alexander's Empire in our comparative endeavour. Two aspects are relevant to consider. In the first place, we should not be pernickety about the incontrovertibly double character of Alexander's Empire: that is, simultaneously a continuation of Achaemenid rule *and* a new power-entity generating its own imperial dynamic. With the defeat (and death) of Darius III in 330, the *ethnic* continuity distinguishing the dynastic base of Persian imperial rule was indeed broken, as managerial responsibility for the whole realm now passed into the hands of an outsider from the Balkans and his retinue. Yet in several other respects Alexander can rightly be regarded, and in fact is regarded by some scholars,[4] as Darius' successor and the last 'Achaemenid' king of the *unified* Empire; incidentally, the only king to succeed where all other Achaemenid kings had singularly failed, namely, in attaching what still was (even if nominally) his Imperial Motherland, Macedon, and Greece firmly to the empire. So, as long as the error of reducing it to just a 'transitional phase' is avoided, Alexander's brief rule can be said to carry, if not the main responsibility, then a good deal of responsibility for the institutional and other continuities which we can observe from Achaemenid rule to Hellenistic rule – and well beyond. The phenomenon known as *imitatio Alexandri*

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[3] Several studies treat (aspects or states of) Classical Greece and the Persian Empire: e.g. Lewis 1977; Walser 1984; Wallinga 1989; Miller 1997; Raaflaub forthcoming. Similarly, some studies treat the Achaemenid and the Seleucid empires together: e.g. Bickerman 1966; Briant 1990; Briant 1994; Kuhrt and Sherwin-White 1987; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993. But I know of no scholarly work that compares all four of the empires discussed in the present chapter. I only refer to a few of the standard works that exist on each of our empires; they are all rich in further bibliographical references. Achaemenid Empire: Briant 1982, 2002; Sancisi-Weerdenburg *et al.* 1987-1994; Wiesehöfer 1993. Alexander's Empire: Bosworth 1988. Seleucid Empire: Bikerman 1938; Ma 2000; Capdetrey 2007; and the short but lucid introduction of Austin 2005. Athenian Empire: Meiggs 1972; Schuller 1974; Hornblower and Greenstock 1986.

[4] Briant 1982, 318-330; Briant 2002, 876.

played a key role in the continuation, by Hellenistic kings and even Roman emperors, of a particular style of royal conduct and self-representation.[5]

However, it is just as indisputable that the year 330 did also mark a clear break with several traditions, the most venerable among which was the *Empire-as-integration* tradition that had been founded by Cyrus the Great some 220 years earlier, in 550. In building the Persian Empire, Cyrus and his immediate successors created the first territorial empire which for more than two centuries brought political unification into an immense area and number of peoples.[6] It can be described as Vast, Stable and Catholic (I use capitals to indicate the emblematic nature of these qualities, which are explained below); though it suffered the fate of having its history written by subjects and outsiders, mainly Greeks. This whole entity was taken over by Alexander, who held it for less than ten years. But after Alexander, though partly because of systemic failures created already during his reign (most importantly, the issue of dynastic succession), the tradition which was to become the dominant one for the next 250 years or so changes track, as it becomes the *Empire-as-disintegration* tradition; incidentally, Bactrian and Parthian vassal rulers within the empire can be credited for recognizing that fact much sooner (during the reign of Seleucus II in mid-third century) than the Romans themselves.[7]

From Alexander's death in 323 and for the next forty-odd years, the king's marshals, the Successors, and their own successors fought bitterly between them over who should inherit the whole Empire;[8] and as none of them proved able to prevail, they ended up splitting it into three parts, each with its own dynasty (the first major *disintegrative* step): in Macedon and mainland Greece, the Antigonids; in Egypt the Ptolemies; and in Asia the Seleucids, who thus claimed recognition as overlords of Anatolia.[9] The subsequent story of each of these *Hellenistic* empires is essentially one of gradual disintegration, a process greatly assisted by Rome, the power to benefit immensely from the incessant Hellenistic in-fighting. Her direct involvement in these conflicts after ca. 200 made her look all the more like a Successor herself – indeed, the first Roman province in the area, the province *Asia*, was created after king Attalus III had bequeathed the kingdom of Pergamon to the Roman people in 133 (*OGIS* 435; transl. Austin 2006, no. 251). It was nonetheless the Romans, who, emerging as the sole victors over the Hellenistic kings in 31, brought the *Empire-as-integration* tradition back in. As they were consolidating their *imperium*, the Romans succeeded in re-establishing the grand imperial legacy of 'Vast, Stable and Catholic' rule that had been created by the Achaemenids and then broken after the death of Alexander.

The substantive features just mentioned recommend a particular procedure as more interesting and fruitful than possible alternatives: namely, to look at *provincial challenges to the imperial centre* – i.e. the forms in which they manifested themselves, the ways in which they were dealt with and the results they produced – by turning the spotlight onto the two empires that had divided equally between them the period treated here (550-63), the Persian Empire and the Seleucid Empire; giving lesser space to the Athenian Empire

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[5] Stewart 1993, esp. 229-240.

[6] See Cook 1985; Stronach 1978, 285-295.

[7] Just. 41.1-5; Strabo 11.9.2-3 [515C]; *FGrH* 156: Arrian F 31-32; App. *Syr*. 65. Cf. Will 1979, 281-290; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 84-90; Holt 1999; Lerner 1999.

[8] Will 1984; Bosworth 2002.

[9] Braund 2005, esp. 29.

is not the same as regarding it an unimportant entity in our comparison. Alexander's reign, finally, will serve as our analytical middle-ground; being chronologically flanked by the other empires, it is endowed with the potential of providing us with the kind of questions and interpretative tools that we need in an inquiry into what came before – the *Empire-as-integration* – and what came after Alexander – the *Empire-as-disintegration*.

Limitation has thus left us with only three empires, two of which share a number of institutional, constitutional, ideological, military, territorial and power-logistical characteristics, while the third one seems, in several respects, to stand all by its own. Enter the Athenian Empire of the fifth century, an acknowledged deviant case, and on more counts than simply being ethnically and culturally homogeneous (i.e. almost entirely Hellenic), or being based at a distance from the Asiatic heartland.

As wielders of authority, or domination, the Achaemenid and the Seleucid empires, like that of Mithradates VI of Pontus, were driven forth by a grand vision of universal rule personified by a valiant, just, caring and godlike monarch. Provided it can be conceived with a neutral value, 'despotism' was their common form of government and territorial expansion their political creed. From the very day of its creation, in contrast, the Athenian Empire justified its existence, not with reference to a grand imperial ideology that was informed by the wish for universal dominion, or even to the blessings of territorial expansion as such; but simply with reference to the imminent threat posed by the huge neighbour in the East (the Persian Empire) and the fear caused by that threat amongst a wider circle of polities (Thuc. 1.96). Thus in its earlier career, at least, it presented itself as a defender and a protector rather than as a ruthless conqueror. Only when it started coming of age did this empire explicitly link its claim to an uncontested right to rule to an ideology of power (see e.g. Thuc. 3.37-40). But even then it did not underrate the propensity of fear to secure internal and external support, to create unity around a common purpose and under one hegemonal authority (*arche*).

Deviation is also detectable at the imperial metropolis itself, Athens, the heart and soul of *this* empire. Constitutionally, a direct democracy; territorially, an insignificant entity; militarily a mediocre land-power, but a superb naval power; a city-state (*polis*), in terms of political organization, and the leader of a tribute-fed empire, in terms of geopolitical description, certainly.[10] Yet – and here comes the greatest difference of all – mistress over an empire with no territorial extension as such (cleruchies on which colonists were planted are quite another matter);[11] no continuous or discontinuous expanse which had been won through the conquest of foreign lands and which had been incorporated into the realm after 'planting the flag' on these lands. And, consequently, no provinces, as we know them, to be defended, pleased or punished; only a large number of subject polities (at its apogee well over 400), by far the majority of which were city-states. Formally, their status was that of tribute-paying 'allies' (Greek: *symmachoi*, literally, 'co-fighters': e.g. *IG* I³ 55, line 5); all were situated by the sea, or easily reached by sea, a characteristic intimately related to the imperial polity's status as a consummate naval power.

Whereas the Achaemenid and Seleucid empires were land-based empires, this one was in every sense a 'seaborne empire'. As a power-wielder, it stood (and stands) out for its special, rather modern-looking features. Its modes of action, tactical or

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[10] On the Classical Greek city-state: Hansen 2006. Tribute-payments to Athens: Meritt, Wade-Gery and McGregor 1939-1953.

[11] Athenian cleruchies: Meiggs 1972, 124; Erxleben 1975; Brunt 1966.

strategic concepts, organization – and perhaps its ideological preferences, too – were to be mimicked ages later by a newer type, the 'airborne empire'. For one, each of them requires the services of a first-rate military establishment that runs eminently costly, high-tech *offensive* weaponry.[12] For another, their speciality consists of tactical capability to effectuate lightning, long-distance strikes, or landings, and so be present in 'hot-spots' much faster than any of their land-based competitors, past or present, has ever been able to do; the Athenian historian and seasoned general Xenophon made the following comment on the Persian Empire's principal weakness on account of being Vast: "While the King's empire was strong in its extent of territory and number of inhabitants, it was weak by reason of the greatness of the distances and the scattered condition of its forces, in case one should be swift in making an attack upon it" (Xen. *Anab*. 1.5.9).[13] Furthermore, since the limit of their striking-range went as far and wide as the location of logistical bases under their control, building the widest possible web of such bases – on subjects, dependencies or allies – ranked high amongst their aims: in 1942, Franklin Roosevelt defined his country's military doctrine at the time with the formula 'fly high and strike hard' from secure perches in the United States and beyond;[14] the corresponding tactical formula of Classical Athens – whose navy consisted of state-of-the-art war-craft – seems to have been 'sail fast and strike hard' from secure naval bases in the Aegean and beyond. In short, the Athenian Empire does indeed represent the quite rare species of 'province-less' – and for that matter, emperor-less – empire. Nevertheless, it had plenty of off-shore subjects which provided part of their wealth as tribute, their manpower as levies for campaigns and their ports as bases for the imperial fleet. All this, and much more besides, offered sufficient scope for challenges to the imperial centre.

As may have become apparent, by far the greatest analytical challenge facing us is posed by the concept of 'province' itself, properly a Roman coinage (*provincia*) that chiefly refers to a Roman-Empire situation. What are, in our case, the 'provinces' from which challenges might issue? That one of our empires did not have provinces constitutes but one of our difficulties in answering that question. Further difficulties are encountered with our two land empires; for in our case, our selection of the appropriate imperial component cannot be solely based on the fact that it fits the description 'province'; it must also constitute a satisfactorily analytical category. It is precisely at this point that (a healthy measure of) *oversimplification* might prove helpful in our comparative endeavour.

The 'satrapy' is commonly accepted to be the principal administrative unit in both the Achaemenid and Seleucid empires. Consequently, it might initially be singled out as *the* 'province' in our period and region. In a formal sense, this is true.[15] But one-sided focus on formal administrative structures can be misleading. The satrapies of the Achaemenid Empire can indeed be considered as amongst the principal units generating 'provincial' challenges to the Great King. In the Seleucid Empire, however, 'satrapy' is not a sufficiently fine-meshed analytical category, such us to allow us to pick out the provincial challenges that really mattered. First of all, as a territorially-based mechanism of rule, the satrapal

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[12] Cost of the Athenian navy: Gabrielsen 1994.

[13] On the 'failings' of the empire: Tuplin 1993.

[14] Quoted in Reynolds 1992, 24.

[15] Achaemenid Empire: satrapies in the Behistun inscription: *DB* (*OPers*.) § 10-19 (Satrap of Bactria), § 54-64 (Satrap of Arachosia); Hdt. 3.89: Darius "divided his dominions into twenty governorships called satrapies". See Petit 1990; Jacobs 1994; Briant 2002, 63-67, 389-393, 693-768.

system of the Seleucids seems to have fluctuated greatly in size and composition, a feature it also shared with its Achaemenid counterpart. Second, there are considerable gaps in our knowledge regarding the distribution of powers and administrative responsibilities within each satrapy, while the entire system as such is still very poorly documented.[16] Third, and perhaps more importantly, within either empire, but especially in the Seleucid Empire, there existed other administrative units with at least as important roles in the day-to-day implementation of the king's decisions and the crucial task of ensuring the unity and safety of the empire. Some of these were *above*, others *below* satrapy-level. Examples of the first kind include the command over western Asia Minor given to Cyrus the Younger (appointed by his father as *karanos* ('lord'): Xen. *Hell*. 1.4.3);[17] the 'overall command' over Asia Minor (*ho epi ton pragmaton*), a kind of 'viceroy' that is best documented during the rule of the Seleucid king Antiochus III;[18] and the command over the Upper Satrapies (or upper regions, i.e. the eastern parts of the Seleucid realm), a post normally reserved for the heir to the Seleucid throne.[19] As examples of the second kind we can mention the numerous governors and garrison commanders, particularly those posted in capital cities (such as Sardeis, Babylon and Antioch), or in strategically important areas.[20] All these are to be included in the challenge-generating entities within the empire.

Fourthly, we must also include a number of less formal, local (and in some cases intra-satrapy) powerbase units along the breadth and length of the empire, Achaemenid or Seleucid. They consist of five, sometimes overlapping types: (1) *vassal kings* (e.g. king Euagoras of Cyprus under the Achaemenids);[21] (2) *dynasts* (e.g. Olympichos in Anatolian Karia under the Antigonids and the Seleucids; Moagetes in the Kibyratis); (3) *cities*, Phoenician, Babylonian or Greek, old ones as well as new foundations; (4) *'temple-states'* ruled by a High Priest (e.g. at Pessinus and Hierapolis, the cult centres of respectively Cybele and Atartagis); and finally, (5) *peoples* (*ethne*), who, to the extent they were under religious leadership – as, for instance, was the case with the Jews – fulfilled the description of a *'temple-state'*. Almost all entities in this list were recognized by the Seleucids as typifying the main constituents of their empire (see *OGIS* 229, line 11).

All these powerbases exhibit at least two interesting features. One is their generally 'free-floating' status vis-à-vis the imperial centre; that is, depending on the nature and quantity of the resources they commanded, including their success rate in mobilizing local support, some of them (and not only those with a logistically crucial location at the fringes of the empire) enjoyed greater independence and more privileges than others. Ability to provide military resources ranked of course high amongst the qualifiers to better status within the empire. Because of its reliance on the Phoenician fleet, the fifth-century Persian Empire had to allow more leeway to the Phoenician city-states (Hdt. 8.67); and naval resources constituted a weighty factor behind Persian indulgence of Greek tyrants in the western fringes of the empire (e.g. Histiaios of Miletos).[22] It was said of Cyrus the Great that he "had never sent a Persian as a satrap to govern either the Cilicians or the

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[16] Musti 1984, 184-189; Ma 2000, 123-125, revising the views of Bengtson 1944.

[17] Briant 2002, 600.

[18] *SEG* XXXVI 973, lines 3-5; Polyb. 5.41.1 (Hermeias). Bengtson 1944, 109-110; cf. Schmitt 1964, 150-158.

[19] Bengtson 1944, 78-79, Schmitt 1964, 15-18; Ma 2000, 125.

[20] A lucid account of the Achaemenid satrapies and their subunits (phylarchies, etc.) is given by Cook 1983, ch. 16.

[21] Wiesehöfer 1990.

[22] Graf 1985; Austin 1990; Briant 2002, 496-497.

Cypriotes, but was always satisfied with their native rulers" (Xen. *Cyr*. 7.4.2). Greek and Phoenician city-states retained their own (forms of) government and political institutions. Similarly, the Seleucids indulged entities from the west to the east end of their realm.

An empire-wide hierarchy of relationships between power-bases and imperial centre thus resulted that ran parallel to the *formal*-administrative structures. It was mostly distinguished by its versatility, indeed its fluidity, since relationships and status were wont to change with some frequency. The sum of these relationships defined our empires, not only geographically, but also constitutionally as forms of state. Fluidity, dynamism and change was the order of the day, as privileged imperial favourites that had turned unruly became demoted by the centre while others, as a reward, were being promoted to take their place.[23] Even our seaborne empire cultivated a few selected favourites, whom it regarded as more privileged 'friends and allies' than the rest. That was, for instance, the status enjoyed by the naval islands of Samos, Chios and Lesbos, all of which eventually were to forfeit their privileged status after seditious action.[24]

What endowed our two major empires with one of their chief characteristics, i.e. their being pulsating, dynamic entities, seems to have been the unceasing acting or reacting of their free-floating powerbases in their attempts to improve their location within a concentrically patterned imperial world; in short, their challenges to the imperial centre, whether of a positive or a negative character. In Anatolia, this whole process moved into a higher gear in the period after Alexander, as a particular type of powerbase – the Greek or Hellenized city-state (the old Lydian capital of Sardeis being one) – grew in both numbers and vigour. Seleucid kings, committed to monarchic ideology and demanding submission to their imperial rule, faced now the challenge of having to accommodate within their concentric system of rule a political entity whose lifeline consisted of the notions of autonomy, freedom and democracy. This we can call a challenge of the first order.

Within such a concentric imperial system, 'free-floating' status also meant that the powerbase in question might, on its own accord, move in the opposite direction, away from the centre or even out of the imperial fold; that, precisely because of its resourcefulness and manifest capabilities, it might be allured by the promises and stronger attraction of an expanding outsider (or an ambitious insider) on the look-out for a base of action from which to try to erode the imperial strength and unity from within, or to usurp the imperial seat of power – the possibility of collusion between locally stationed imperial commanders and the powerbases placed under their charge was therefore a perennial anxiety. One example of this situation, which concerns an outsider and presages both the so-called Great Satraps' Revolt of the 360s (cf. below) and the grand usurpation affected by Alexander in 330, may suffice here. It is the expedition into the interior of Asia Minor, and so right to the Achaemenid heartland, carried out in 396-394 by the Spartan king Agesilaus with a large army.[25] Advertised beforehand as a liberation trek, that expedition, if anything, had the effect of putting on display, for the benefit of potential rebels against the Great King, a ready-drilled foreign army; a touring force signalling to scheming subjects along its route (Spithridates and certain Paphlagonian chiefs, among others) that, if they had the will, the Spartan Agesilaus had indeed the means (Xen. *Hell*. 3-4, esp. 4.1.2; 4.1.35; Diod. 14.80.5 *et passim*). Though far greater in scale, Alexander's campaign train was

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[23] Achaemenid Empire: Briant 2002, 302-353, 842-852. Seleucid Empire: Bikerman 1938, 40-46; Musti 1984.
[24] Thuc. 1.19, with Hornblower 1991, 55-56; cf. Quinn 1981.
[25] Cartledge 1987, 180-218; Briant 2002, 637-645.

transmitting precisely the same kind of message to city-governments and Achaemenid satraps alike; and, as is known, while some of the Achaemenid powerbases in coastal Asia Minor yielded to Alexander's promises of liberty, others, remaining loyal to their master, resisted him firmly.

The other feature of the powerbases in question, issuing directly from the first, is that their interacting with the imperial centre inevitably endowed them with many of the characteristics common to provinces. To an appreciable degree, they had become functionally 'province-ized'.[26] Even though most of them did not belong to the group of formal units (e.g. satrapies, toparchies and the like), they all were parts of a concentric web of power-relationships that linked together the ruler and all the power-wielding entities/persons of his realm, including the group of royally appointed caretakers. In fact, parts of a larger system of interaction through which the distribution of power, status and privilege by the centre was being returned, or was expected to be returned, with those chief prerequisites of imperial cohesion: acceptance of rule, goodwill, loyalty and unfailing co-operation. The system's prime aim was to neutralize or forestall those 'provincial challenges' that might threaten the *unifying* structures of the realm – its Stability; or the *territorial extent* it had achieved – its Vastness; or, again, the *almightiness* which ideology and tradition vested in the authority of the imperial ruler – a theoretically undisputed power-monopoly that branded the empire as Catholic. Ensuring the working of the whole system was a complementary pair of devices that stemmed from a very old doctrine of conquest and rule: (a) persuasion and (b) physical force; that is, recurring negotiations, at which exchanges of gifts, favours and vows of loyalty regulated the relationship between ruler and powerbase; and the use of violence, a duly issued corrective to all those who mistook for reality the mere illusion of equality such negotiations were wont to create. Urging Philip II of Macedon to lead a pan-Hellenic invasion of the Persian Empire, an influential teacher of rhetoric from Athens, Isocrates, advised the king that "it is advantageous to employ persuasion with the Greeks and a useful thing to use force against the barbarians. That is more or less the essence of the whole matter" (Isocrates, *Philip.* 10).

Seen in this light, our 'province-less' empire, too, can be said to have encompassed entities (i.e. the allies), which – given their obligation to pay tribute, provide troops, receive imperial 'governors' (*archontes*) and garrison commanders (*phrourarchoi*), etc.[27] – to some degree had become functionally 'province-ized'; one might almost say 'satrapized'. Each of these entities was capable of generating any one of the challenges that are situated between unconditional loyalty and violent rebellion. Indeed, in this and other regards, the Athenian Empire may after all not be as deviant as we tended to depict it above. One other pointer in the same direction is its ideologically split mindset: anti-monarchic to the bone and a sworn champion of the notions of 'freedom', 'autonomy', 'equality', 'the will of the people' and so forth, when it came to domestic affairs; *but* a warm supporter of the complete opposite notions and a fearsome autocrat prone to use iron-fisted 'rule' (*arche*), when it came to external affairs: "a democracy cannot manage an empire", was the view of a leading imperial hardliner in 427 (Thuc. 3.37.1). Still another pointer is this:

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[26] When referring to Greek *poleis*, 'province-ized' here carries a different meaning than 'provincial cities', '*villes provinciales*' and 'provincialization of the *polis*' (i.e. "the conversion from free state to community dependent on grants and privileges") in Ma 2000, 158-159, 173.
[27] Leppin 1992, 257-271; Balcer 1976.

even though in most other matters it was dwarfed by the huge and eminently polyethnic Achaemenid and Seleucid empires, as regards warlike aggressiveness the Athenian Empire definitely proved to be a match for both of them, and indeed any one of its historical peers. Lastly, though 'expansion of rule' was an article of faith absent from its official ideology, it certainly was a cardinal goal of its actual policies. In effect, the closer we look at the matter, the clearer it becomes that our deviating, 'seaborne empire' shared a number of structural features with our two land empires.[28]

In sum, the picture emerging from all this is a much less tidy and far more complex (though no less interesting) one than that produced by the vision of a homogeneous, unifying gridiron-like pattern of 'provinces', the hallmark of the neatly-ordered, uniformly governed and clearly delineated land empire. Complexity is pretty much due to the circumstance that, in our particular case, the very category that seems to provide a reasonably adequate historical coverage in all three empires, because it is fine-meshed enough to capture a greater variety of challenges to the imperial centre, is the 'province-ized' powerbase. It is represented on the ground by a variety of free-floating, power-holding components of the empire, each with its own type of local leadership; they existed together with the formalized units of governance or command, and, like the latter, possessed the potential to generate a whole range of challenges. So much by way of *oversimplification*. I now turn to *generalization* by asking: what is the most important kind of challenge to the imperial centre, one that can reveal the main integrative and disintegrative forces at work in *all* of our three empires?

III. Revolt

The completion of conquest – this charged moment of 'creation' of the empire – provided the ultimate and tangible proof of the ruler's unchallenged might. Such grandiose, power-enhancing and spectacular successes, however, could hardly be a daily occurrence in either the Achaemenid or the Seleucid empires. This being so, what else could offer to rulers the opportunity to keep the superb advantages of such climactic moments alive and active? An answer with a universally special appeal seems to have been: the perpetuation of 'creation' of the empire by means of its recurrent 'recreation'; the quasi-ritualized re-enactment of conquest by means of separate acts of re-conquest of imperial components. Almost unexceptionally, such a regularly occurring re-enactment was set in motion by the 'provincial' challenge *par excellence*: revolt.

Accordingly, the principal generalization to be made here is the following. While ideology condemned revolt as a destructive and disintegrative force, imperial practice tended to be fond of it on account of its distinctly power-consolidating and integrative qualities. Rather than being a malign factor or a socio-political abnormality *tout court*, revolt often constituted an energizing force, a structural necessity of empire – arguably, the more so in those instances in which 'Catholic' had become synonymous with absence of noteworthy rivals. Revolt could work as a system of political control and readjustment over the very units that produced it.

This generalization takes four things for granted. (1) Revolt constituted a dominant feature in the history of each of our empires from beginning to end. (2) As such, it regularly triggered counter-responses that were functionally indistinguishable from campaigns of

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[28] See also Raaflaub forthcoming.

conquest – in fact, any time a part of the empire revolted, the scene was set for a re-enactment of conquest. (3) Depending on the goal pursued, revolt came in two main varieties: (a) dynastic revolt, through which a usurper aimed only at replacing the current ruler; and (b) rebellion (or war) of independence, through which a component of the realm tried to exit the concentric system of imperial organization, or even to co-operate with outsiders towards its destruction; sometimes, the two varieties merged into one. Finally, (4) revolt can be viewed (a) as an event and (b) as a structure.

Even though eminently important, treatment of revolt *as an event* belongs to a different kind of study. The few examples mentioned briefly here simply go to illustrate its tenacity and ubiquity in all three of our empires. The history of the Athenian Empire-cum-anti-Persian-alliance almost begins with a revolt, that of Naxos (ca. 472), which soon was to be followed by that of Thasos (ca. 460) and other resourceful allies (Thuc. 1.98.4; 1.101.3). One specific circumstance suffices to show that revolt had become endemic. By entering the great war against Sparta's Peloponnesian League in 431 (the Peloponnesian War, 431-404), imperial Athens actually acquired a second major war front, the one already at hand consisting of her continually discontented and seditious allies. Indeed, it was pretty much the fact that actual revolt, or the eventuality of revolt, was an ever-present factor that made this empire one governed by fear. In 428/7, ambassadors from Mytilene, one of the 'privileged' allies that had just revolted against Athens, explained to the Spartans and their allies who had assembled at Olympia that

> So long as the Athenians in their leadership respected our independence we followed them with enthusiasm. But when we saw they were becoming less and less antagonistic to Persia and more and more interested in enslaving their own allies, then we became frightened … And in an alliance the only safe guarantee is an equality of mutual fear; for then the party that wants to break faith is deterred by the thought that the odds will not be on his side … In wartime they [the Athenians] did their best to be in good terms with us because they were frightened of us; we, for the same reason, tried to keep on good terms with them in peace-time. In most cases, goodwill is the basis of loyalty, but in our case, fear was the bond, and it was more through terror than through friendship that we were held together in alliance (Thuc. 3.11-12).

Later, the Hellenistic historian Polybius was to remark that "It is indeed the part of a tyrant to do evil that he may make himself the master of men by fear against their will … but it is that of a king to do good to all and thus rule and protect a people, earning their love by his beneficence and humanity" (Polyb. 5.11.6).

From the very beginning of its existence the Achaemenid Empire, which itself was created from the revolt of its founding-father Cyrus the Great against the Medians (Hdt. 1.127), constantly had to fight and quash violent uprising by imperial officers, vassal kings and subject peoples (the Ionian Greeks and the Jews included). In one of the earliest and most momentous on record, that of 522-518, Darius waged a series of fierce wars against a number of rebel kings, who tried to break loose from the still young empire. Later, in 404-401, Cyrus the Younger, with considerable military help from outside, made a large-scale attempt to usurp the throne from his brother, King Artaxerxes II, thus in a sense presaging Alexander's takeover in 330.[29] Under the same Artaxerxes, but now during

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[29] A principal source is Xenophon's *Anabasis* (esp. 1.2.3-4; 1.7.10, where the 12,900 Greek troops mobilized by Cyrus are mentioned). On the historiographical issues: Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1987 (Greek sources) and Stolper 1994, 238-239 (Achaemenid sources). Critical analysis of both: Briant 2002, 615-630.

the years 361-358, the governors of several satrapies in Asia Minor, joined by the king of Egypt, took up arms allegedly in order to fight for independence in what was to be known as the Great Satraps' Revolt; [30] the previous liberation trek of the Spartan Agesilaus in Asia Minor has been mentioned above. In 331-330, finally, the momentous attack on the imperial centre from outside – i.e. Alexander's campaign of conquest – inevitably became tangled up with defection of royal subordinates from within.

Nevertheless, none of these, nor any of the numerous other instances of sedition and armed rebellion, ever had a lasting effect on the unity of the empire, its structures of rule or its strength. If anything, further consolidation or stronger integration was the outcome each time. [31] Most of the challenges themselves, on the other hand, disintegrated from within. In 358, the famous Satraps' Revolt was fouled up by a chain of betrayals amongst the rebels: for instance by Orontes (Diod. 15.91.1-2) and then Rheomithres, who, arriving at Leucae, "summoned many leaders of the insurgents. These he arrested and sent in irons to Artaxerxes, and though he himself had been an insurgent, by the favours that he conferred through his betrayal, he made his peace with the King" (Diod. 15.92.1, cf. *OGIS* 264, lines 4-9).

All this adds to the evidence showing Persian Satraps at each others' throats, often in their attempts to accomplish their traditional mission to enlarge the royal territories (Hdt. 3.120). Slightly earlier, Datames had been exposed to a series of betrayals by his first-born son, his father-in-law, many of his companions, and by Mithradates, who feigned rebel (see below). [32] In 401, after his victory over his rebel-brother Cyrus at Cunaxa, Artaxerxes II not only had his legitimacy and strength re-affirmed, but he even gained more loyalty by pardoning those of the rebels who paid homage to him. One of them, Ariaeus was made satrap of Phrygia (Diod. 14.80.8; Polyaen. 7.11.6), and later (395) he was posted to Sardeis, where he put his experience to good use: rebels wishing to be pardoned by the King used him as a mediator "because he, too, had revolted from the King and made war upon him" (Xen. *Hell*. 4.1.27). The history of the empire is replete with examples of disintegrative endeavours being turned to serve integration.

In many respects, the historical record of the Seleucids offers a similar picture. It includes the familiar mixture of challenges to the imperial centre. (1) Dynastic struggles: for instance, the bitter rivalry between the two brothers Seleucus II and Antiochus Hierax (the 'Hawk') in 240/39-228, as a result of which Hierax carved out his own, short-lived kingdom. [33] (2) Uprisings by peoples with a strong feeling of religious or ethnic identity (e.g. the Maccabean uprising against Antiochus IV in Judaea in 166-164), [34] or a strong ideological commitment to 'freedom' and 'autonomy' (the city-states within the realm). (3)

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[30] Only Greek sources report these revolts, esp. Diod.15.90-93: "the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast revolted from Persia, and some of the satraps and generals rising in insurrection made war on Artaxerxes". The leading rebels included Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, Mausolus ruler of Caria, Orontes satrap of Mysia and Autophradates satrap of Lydia. Tachos, the king of Egypt, joined them. Moreover, besides the Ionians, there were the Lycians, Pisidians, Pamphylians, Cilicians, Syrians, Phoenicians and other *ethne*. Diodorus (15.90) claims that "half the revenues of the King were cut off and what remained were insufficient for the expenses of war". The 'minimalist' view – that this was not a general, coordinated conflagration in Asia Minor in 361, but rather a series of limited local revolts over the course of a decade – is favoured by Briant 2002, 674-675. In north-western Asia Minor, for example, the unrest may belong in the context of the long history of conflict between Sardeis and Dascylium.

[31] Briant 2002, 674-675, 875.

[32] Briant 2002, 674.

[33] Just. 27.2, 10-12; Athen. 13.593e; [Plut.] *Mor*. 184a, 489a-b.

The bid for 'big' power by several usurpers: famous examples of this include the revolt of Molon, satrap in Media and other eastern provinces, who declared himself king (222-220: Polyb. 5.40-44); the revolt of Achaios, the super-governor over cis-Tauric Asia Minor under Antiochus III and the king's cousin, who from 220 to 213 ruled independently over his own Anatolian kingdom and aspired to become the new Seleucid king (Polyb. 4.48, 5.57.3-8); and the revolt instigated by Diodotos Tryphon in Syria in 145-138. Lastly, (4) the events (not all of them rebellions) which resulted in the great territorial losses: the creation of the kingdom of Pergamon under the Attalids in the 260s; the loss of Asia Minor after defeat by the Romans in 189; the irrecoverable loss of the eastern provinces with the defeat (and death) of Antiochus VII to the Parthians in 130-129; the subsequent but equally definitive loss of Babylonia and western Iran; and, shortly before the final Roman takeover in 63, the replacement – from 83 to 69 – of Seleucid rule by Tigranes of Armenia.[35]

Yet, even though the Seleucid historical record has 'disintegration' written all over it, we should be wary of naming revolt *as such* the principal cause of the collapse. The relative failure of this empire to become 'Catholic' for real, and for a longer period of time, seems to be a much deeper cause.[36] In this respect, a marked difference is detectable from our other two empires. In the case of the Achaemenid Empire, 'Catholic' mostly signified the absence, for a very long time, of serious external rivals, who not only might pose a real threat to the unity of the realm but might also prove capable of receiving defecting powerbases into their own concentric system of rule – this was precisely what the Seleucids' main rivals (including the Romans) almost constantly did. In the case of the Athenian Empire, 'Catholic' possessed a different, more complex sense of power monopoly. It simultaneously meant several things: (a) arming Athens to the teeth by disarming her imperial components; (b) centralizing the empire's military and monetary potential by bringing it (as tribute, war indemnities, punitive fines or confiscations after revolt) wholesale to the imperial metropolis; (c) attaining military expertise and edge in the use of so enormously expensive weaponry (the navy) that the military doctrine of the day became "War is not a matter of weapons, but of money which gives weapons their usefulness" (Thuc. 1.83.2-3) – pronounced at a time when 'big' money was concentrated in the Athenian coffers, in a few major temples (untouchable) and in Persian treasuries (unreachable); in short, (d) sucking so much strength out of its constituent powerbases that when these "revolted they found themselves inadequately armed and inexperienced in war" (Thuc. 1.99.3).[37]

To sum up: Achaemenid powerbases prone to revolt (and their leaders) possessed the financial and military potential to make their move, but had nowhere to go – with the result that revolt quite often ended in the perpetrator's voluntary, (dis)graceful return to the imperial fold. Athenian powerbases (and their leaders), on the other hand, had several places to go, but were inadequately equipped to move – with the result that revolt usually ended in the humiliation of the perpetrator, who was whipped back into line. In contrast to both of these, the Seleucid powerbases (insignificant entities excluded) not only had

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[34] But see also Jos. *AJ* 12.142, with Bickerman 1980, 40-48, regarding a letter of Antiochus III to the governor of Syria and Phoenicia, which specified the privileges of Jerusalem and permitted the Jews to live in accordance with their laws.

[35] Musti 1984, 210-216.

[36] See also the balanced judgement of Austin 2005, 132.

[37] Gabrielsen 2007.

the potential to move, but could even almost freely choose between several concentric systems of rule that readily offered themselves as an imperial home. It was exactly this situation that could transform revolt from an energizing and integrative force (witness the case with the Achaemenid Empire) into a serious disintegrative one. In the face of such a major shortcoming, that is, of not being Catholic in any real sense, the remarkable thing is therefore that the Seleucid Empire lasted even that long.

With this we have already commenced treatment of revolt as a structure, a main concern here. In this area, too, it is to Alexander's Empire – our analytical 'middle ground' – that we must turn for selecting those issues which will best demonstrate that revolt qua 'provincial challenge' was an indispensable component of imperial rule. An attending question is the following: what were the mechanisms that permitted such a potentially dangerous and destructive factor to be a structural necessity of empire? One specific episode is especially instructive.

One of the truly 'disintegrative' moments in Alexander's reign is the mutiny of his army at Opis in 324 (Arrian 7.8-11). Rebellion by the troops, led by some thirteen ringleaders, threatened to nullify the hard-won achievements of the entire conquest.[38] Yet on that occasion the King proved his mastery of the 'integrative' methods. The grievances of the rebellious troops – recurring annoyance with Alexander's Persian dress, the training of the barbarian 'Successors' in the Macedonian style of warfare and the introduction of foreign cavalry into the squadrons of the Companions (*hetairoi*) – were all summed up by Callines, one of the Companion cavalry, who facing Alexander said the following: "O King, what grieves the Macedonians is that you have already made some Persians your 'kinsmen' (*syggeneis*), and the Persians are called 'kinsmen' of Alexander and are allowed to kiss you, while not one of the Macedonians has been granted this honour".

At once, Alexander interrupted Callines and proclaimed: "I make you all my 'kinsmen' (*syggeneis*) and henceforward that shall be your title". At this Callines stepped forward and kissed the King and so did everyone else who wished. Then, the men picked up their arms again with shouts and songs of triumph. The rebellion was over, and the reconciliation of king and his men was celebrated with Alexander offering a grand sacrifice and a public banquet, at which the entire camp was arranged into three concentric circles: the innermost circle consisting of Alexander and his newly-made kinsmen, the Macedonians; the middle circle of the Persians, the newly-demoted kinsmen, who however, continued to dominate in terms of numbers;[39] and, finally, the outer circle of the remaining peoples (Arrian 7.11.1-4). Reporting the same event, Plutarch, knitting into the story ideas held by Stoic philosophers, has Alexander urge the Macedonian and Persian leaders at the banquet to regard the inhabited earth as their fatherland and good men as their kindred, he himself being merely a mediator in the world, sent by the gods (Plut. *Alex.* 33.1; [Plut.] *Mor*. 329c).

The disintegrative moment – one caused by revolt – was thus craftily turned into an integrative one, as Alexander by means of a considered act that we may liken to a collective baptism promoted all the Macedonians into members of his huge extended family. By awarding the gift of 'kinship' he succeeded in re-establishing the traditional, close correspondence between acknowledged ethnic core and putative imperial kindred.[40]

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[38] Bosworth 1988, 159-161.
[39] Bosworth 1980; Bosworth 1988, 161.
[40] On the fictional kinship between Greek cities: Curty 1995.

This is among the clearest illustrations we can get of the powers residing in the family metaphor as a means of creating yet another sense of 'Catholic': namely, long before the emergence of the modern nation-state, the cradle of long-range nationalism, to create and maintain short-range or middle-range nationalisms. This, too, in answer to the question raised above, stands foremost among the mechanisms that allowed such a potentially destructive factor to be a structural necessity of empire.

As to the concentric circles, they reflected the dominant vision of empire, indicating the distance between its centre and the periphery. In the vision, just as in the banquet gathering, the circles marked the various limits to be crossed for reaching into the heart of imperial rule – or, conversely, for exiting the 'family'. At the same time, they offered a notional master-grid to be used any time it was deemed necessary – typically after a major power-restructuring prompted by revolt – to provide visible proof of the prevailing order of relationships within the Empire. The same arrangement had been observed earlier in Susa (*FGrH* 81: Phylarchus F 41).[41] Later (in 317), Peukestas, governor of Persepolis, replicated it, though using four circles, "each at sufficient distance from the next so that nothing would annoy the banqueters and that all the provisions should be near at hand" (Diod. 19.22.2-3).

The mutiny at Opis offered Alexander the opportunity (which he used) to 're-conquer' his own army. For most of the time, however, revolt instanced the re-enactment of conquest of the empire itself, or parts thereof. A Seleucid example illustrates the point. "Such was the final result of Antiochus' expedition into the interior, an expedition by which he not only made the upper satraps subject to his own rule, but also the cities by the sea and the dynasts this side of the Taurus, and, in short, he secured the kingdom, having intimidated all his subject by his daring and industry. It was this expedition, in fact, which made him appear worthy of the kingship not only to the inhabitants of Asia, but also to those of Europe" (Polyb. 11.34.14-16).

Thus reads Polybius' judgement of the effect of Antiochus III's campaign in the Upper Regions from 212 to 204.[42] A triumph, nothing less. The seditious subjects, the 'challengers' whom the king successfully appeased one after another (though more by means of separate settlements than by the direct use of military violence), counted several vassal kings: Xerxes king of Southern Armenia, Arsakes II king of the Parthians, Eutydemos king of Bactria, and Sophagasenos king of the Indians. On his homeward march, Antiochus passed through southern Iran and Persis before dealing with the Gerrhaians in Arabia. Thence he reached Babylon where, as an extant document from the spring of 204 attests, the victorious Seleucid king made a thank-offering sacrifice at Esagila.[43] In the passage just quoted, Polybius places the stress on the immense value which this carefully prepared, large-scale 're-conquest' – Antiochus' *anabasis*, as it were – had for the future of the empire and its ruler. Much like Alexander, Antiochus III effectively used the revolts to turn disintegration into integration. Not that the uprisings in the Upper Regions were of negligible importance or unreal; far from it. But it was the forward-looking aspects of the king's successful re-conquest that came to dominate. Especially, the clear and loud announcement which the whole event made, within as well as outside the Empire, that

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[41] Bosworth 1980.

[42] Will 1962; Ma 2000, 63-65.

[43] Sachs and Hunger 1988, no. -204 C, rev. lines 14-18. Del Monte 1997, 61-63 attributes the document to the spring of 205.

the climactic moment of 'creation' had just been relived; and that the one responsible for such a feat was King Antiochus. Indeed, it was after this campaign that the king (again, Alexander-style) obtained the title 'the Great' (App. *Syr.* 1).

Clear and loud, too, is the lengthy announcement which King Darius put up in writing on the high plateau of Behistun, near Ecbatana. For there is definitely much that is forward-looking in this inscription (and the accompanying relief),[44] copies of which were to be posted in every country of the Empire.[45] Darius drew up a fairly detailed register of all the great victories he had scored during his suppression of revolts in 522-518. At the same time, alluding to his ability to use both persuasion and force, he also advised the reader, for his own good, (a) to be persuaded by the King's glorious exploits, (b) to make them widely known and, as a slightly concealed warning, (c) to refrain from challenging the King's rule, if he wished to live long. In his own words "Now let that which has been done by me [sc. the suppression of revolts] convince thee; thus to the people impart, do not conceal it: if this record thou shalt not conceal (but) tell it to the people, may Ahuramazda be a friend unto thee, and may family be unto thee in abundance, and may thou live long" (*DB* (*OPers.*) § 60; Briant 2002, 123).

The discrete challenges – which in one year alone (522) came from Persia, Elam, Media, Assyria, Egypt, Parthia, Margiana, Sattagydia and the Saka of Central Asia (*DB* (*OPers.*) § 22) – set the scene for what royal monumental historiography afterwards presented as *one* challenge and *one* grand project of re-conquest. As the guardian of Truth and Justice on earth, the Great King had personally restored order and hindered his challengers – the Liar-kings, as Darius calls them – from destroying the unity of the empire; the widely-publicized exploits testify to his turning of disintegrative forces into integrative ones. In this instance, too, the challenges represented a form of interaction that was both vital to the maintenance of the imperial power-structure *and* a product of that structure. Some times, though, revolt had to be provoked. Around the year 360, the satrap Mithradates, feigning himself a conspirator, allured Datames to join him. However, no sooner had Datames turned rebel than he was defeated and punished by no other than the Great King's loyal officer, Mithradates; this episode belongs to the series of upheavals in Asia Minor that we have just described as the Great Satraps' Revolt (see above). Datames' betrayal was a pre-arranged act of demotion and power-restructuring, since Mithradates' rebellion was done on instructions from Artaxerxes himself (Nepos, *Dat.* 10.2-3; Polyaen. 7.29.1).

In 522-518, the ensuing, empire-wide power-restructuring offered the occasion for promotion and demotion, reward and punishment. These were observed punctiliously and in full accordance with a simple but strictly adhered to formula that is clearly expressed in Darius' brief statement: "These are the countries [23 subject countries in all] which came unto me; by the favour of Ahuramazda they were my subjects (*bandaka*). They bore tribute (*bâji*) to me; what was said unto them by me either by night or by day, that was done. Saith Darius the King: Within these countries, the man who was loyal, him I rewarded well; (him) who was evil, him I punished well" (*DB* (*OPers.*) §§ 7-8; Briant 2002, 125).

So said, so done; merciless punishment was meted out instantly. None of the chief rebels – the Liar-kings – came to 'live long'. Some were impaled and put on display.

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[44] On which see Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1982, 198.

[45] For the different versions (Elamite, Babylonian, Persian and Aramaic) and modern editions, see Briant 2002, 899-901, with further references. Discussion of the revolts of 522-518: Briant 2002, 114-128.

Others, like the Sagartian rebel Ciçantakhma, met a more gruesome death: "I cut off both his nose and ears, and put out one eye; he was kept bound at my palace entrance; all the people saw him. Afterwards I impaled him at Arbela" (*DB* (*OPers*.) § 33). The manual of imperial punishment of 'challengers', it would seem, had changed little over time. Having been captured by his king in 220, the Seleucid rebel-satrap Molon was impaled "at the most conspicuous place in Media" (Polyb. 5.54.6). Again, when Achaios the rebellious Seleucid super-governor was captured while trying to sneak out of the citadel of Sardeis in 213, "it was resolved first to cut off in the first place the unfortunate man's extremities, and then, after cutting off his head and sewing it up in an ass's skin, to impale his body" (Polyb. 8.21.2-3) – it was the next year (212) that Antiochus III would embark on his grand campaign of re-conquest in the Upper Satrapies (see above). Imperial Athens stayed faithful to tradition. The city-state of Mytilene, which, as we saw earlier, had revolted from the Athenian Empire (in 428/7), was by a resolution of the Athenian people to be punished by putting all adult males to death and reducing all women and children to slavery (Thuc. 3.36.2). That they were actually spared at the last moment was due to a sudden and radical change of imperial mood (in the citizens' Assembly of Athens), as the view that won the day was the one advocating a method of rule "by which, employing moderation in our punishments, we [the Athenians] can in future secure for ourselves the full use of those cities which bring us important contributions" (Thuc. 3.46.6).

Here, 'persuasion' was certainly seen as more recommendable, a line of thinking not without precedents. Even though in the statement of Darius we have just quoted the two means of rule are given equal weight, 'reward' (i.e. ruling through persuasion) seems always to have been preferable to 'punishment' (i.e. ruling by sheer force), and it became even more preferable in the course of time. Simply put, rulers were becoming increasingly appreciative of the former's ability to produce more lasting integrative and co-operative results. Indeed, a piece of Persian royal wisdom, transmitted by Herodotus, held that "Force has no place where cunning is needful" (Hdt. 3.127). Cunning is usually associated with the Greek gift-bearing Odysseus rather than the Persian Great King. Yet, it is hardly accidental that the Persian Empire stands out as the historical exemplar of gift-giving (see n. 76).

Interestingly, the 'persuasion rather than force' line of thinking appears to have been especially prevalent whenever the challenges issued from a particular type of Anatolian powerbase, the Greek city-state, the *polis*. Even though common to all three of our empires, the Greek (or Hellenized) *polis* attains a special historical significance in the context of the Seleucid Empire. Very much so, because from 323 onwards a much larger number of such polities – many of them founded by the Seleucids themselves – came to fill precisely the political space in Asia Minor which the Seleucid kings claimed as their rightful possession, and for which they fought bitterly against their Hellenistic rivals.[46]

The peculiarities of the *polis*, especially its peculiar relationship with the Hellenistic monarchs, cannot be treated at length here.[47] Suffice it to note the simultaneous presence of two complementary trends. On the one hand, there is a pronounced degree of co-operation which is predominantly based on Greek communicative traditions. A handful of documents from Sardeis, originally the capital of Lydia, typifies a larger body of

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[46] Cohen 1978 and Cohen 1995.
[47] Relations between Hellenistic kings and Greek cities: Jones 1940; Heuss 1937; Bikerman 1939. Particularly under the Seleucids: Orth 1977; Ma 2000, chs. 3 and 4.

evidence that shows not only how widespread (or globalized) Hellenic political culture and institutions had become in Asia Minor, but also how two different ideologies – city-state and monarchic – had grown accustomed to using a common political language. The documents in question (from the year 213) consist of a decree issued by the city-state of Sardeis and letters to the city by queen Laodike and her husband Antiochus III; what they chiefly record is the city's award of honours in return for privileges (*SEG* XXXIX 1283-1285).[48]

But on the other hand, the city-state's twin ideological strongholds, 'freedom' and 'autonomy' – often accompanied by a third, 'democracy' – not only tended to be at loggerheads with monarchic ideology; frequently, they also stood in the way of such vital and practical imperial requirements as (a) unconditional political submission (visible in the posting of garrisons, billeting of troops, etc.), and (b) high-handed economic exploitation (imposition of tribute, various kinds of taxes, etc.). The struggle looks hopelessly unequal if we set the city-state up against Hellenistic monarchy (or all the Hellenistic monarchies) *tout court*. That however, would be incorrect. In the real world, in which a given city-state faced *one* major monarchy at a time, commitment to 'freedom' and 'autonomy' could (and often did) prove a powerful asset.[49] For one, it amounted to a standing – albeit tacit – invitation to any willing liberator from outside the empire to come to the city's rescue. For another, it was a constant reminder to that city's imperial master that failure to grant privileges in the quantity and kind mostly needed (e.g. a larger degree of freedom and autonomy, exemptions from tribute or taxes),[50] entailed the risk of being decried as a despotic oppressor – hardly the ideal image for monarchs ever anxious to have the legitimacy of their rule widely recognized. Granted, not all city-states possessed that potential;[51] but a good many did.

With these powerbases – and chiefly because of the constant rivalry amongst the major Hellenistic empires over Asia Minor – revolt was enriched with a new variety. It mostly manifested itself, not as a regular armed uprising set in motion in and by the powerbase in question, but as a shift of allegiance to another imperial ruler and his organization, thus causing a kind of disintegration that was best countered by persuasion rather than force. As a result, Hellenistic cities and rulers were enmeshed in a nearly continual act of 're-conquest'-cum-'liberation', with the outgoing ruler always cast as a tyrannical oppressor and the incoming one as a magnanimous peace-bringer, saviour and liberator. If there ever was an imperial powerbase that tended to float more freely than the rest, this is it. Consequently, each of the great imperial powers – the Antigonids, Ptolemies, Seleucids, Attalids, and eventually the Romans, too – often had to face a kind of challenge for which re-conquest, simultaneously construed as loss of freedom *and* liberation, was the proper response. An event during Antiochus III's campaign of re-conquest in Asia Minor in 197/6 can be cited to illustrate the point; in addition, it brings once more to the fore the attention rulers paid to the appropriate mixture of 'persuasion' and 'force'.[52] The Roman historian Livius, following Polybius, writes:

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[48] Ma 2000, 284-288.

[49] Ma 2000, ch. 4, and pp. 243-253.

[50] To explain the interaction between king and *polis* Bickerman developed the model of 'surrender and grant': Bikerman 1938, 133-141, cf. Ma 2000, 111-112, 152-153.

[51] In 190, Notion and Kolophon were besieged by Antiochus III for rallying to the Romans (Livius 37.26.5-9).

[52] See also Polyb. 5.62.5.

In the same year (197/6) … King Antiochus … sought to bring all the cities of Asia back to their former status within the empire. He could see that the remainder would submit to his rule without difficulty … but Smyrna and Lampsacus were asserting their freedom and there was a danger that if they were granted what they sought, other cities might follow the example of Smyrna in Ionia and Aeolis and Lampsacus in the Hellespont. And so he (Antiochus) himself sent an army … to besiege Smyrna and ordered the troops stationed at Abydus to proceed to the siege of Lampsacus … In fact he was not relying so much on the fear inspired by force, but through envoys he would send them conciliatory messages and reproach them for their rashness and obstinacy; he sought in this way to raise the hope that they would soon have what they were seeking, but only when it was sufficiently clear to themselves and to all others that it was from the king that they had obtained their freedom and that they had not seized it in favourable circumstances (Livius 33.38.1-7; transl. Austin 2006, no. 195).

Both Smyrna and Lampsacus stubbornly denied Antiochus the privilege of being their benefactor and granter of their freedom. Even though both cities had previously been under Seleucid authority, they now categorically refused to be re-incorporated into the Seleucid Empire, responding to the king that he "should be neither surprised nor angry that they should not lightly accept seeing their hopes of freedom being put off" (*ibid*.).

But what gave each city the strength to challenge this mighty king's will? Given their microscopically small military strength, where did they base their "hopes of freedom"? An answer is suggested by an honorary decree passed by Lampsacus in the following year (196/5).[53] It records the itinerary of, and diplomatic results achieved by, an embassy headed by one Hegesias. Starting from Lampsacus, the embassy crossed over to Greece, where it met with the Roman general in command of the naval forces and the questor of the fleet. Then, arriving at Massalia, the embassy appeared before the city Council; from there it made the journey to Rome, where it obtained a hearing before the Senate. On its way back to Lampsacus, the embassy stopped at Corinth in Greece, where it met again with the admiral of the Roman fleet and the ten Roman commissioners. The mission of this embassy, and the results it achieved after such a cumbersome journey, need to be laid out in some detail. At their first meeting with admiral Lucius Quinctius Flamininus, the ambassadors – the decree reports –

discoursed at length to him to the effect that the people (of Lampsacus), [who was related (*syggenes*) and] friendly to the Roman people … urged and [beseeched] them since we are kinsmen (*syggeneis*) of the [Romans, to take thought] for our city so as to bring about [whatever seemed] advantageous to the people (of Lampsacus), for it was incumbent on [them (sc. the Romans) to] champion the interests of the city because of the kinship (*syggeneia*) [which exists] between them and us, which [they] too [recognised] and because the Massaliotes are our brothers [and are friends] and allies of the Roman people.

Flamininus' reply is reported as follows:

(Flamininus) declares that he recognises the [close kinship] which exists between us (sc. the city of Lampsacus) and the [Romans, and he promised] that if he should conclude friendship or an alliance with anyone, he would include [in them] our city, and would protect [the democracy], autonomy and peace

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[53] *Syll.*³ 591; *I.Lampsakos* 4; transl. Austin 2006, no. 197, extracts from which are in the text above. See also Bickermann 1932, 277-299.

(of the city) [and that he would do anything in his] power to favour us, and that if anyone [tried to harass us] he would not allow this but would prevent it.

Further assurances to the same effect – all grounded on the mutual ties of 'kinship' – were provided by the Massaliote Council and the Roman Senate. Particularly the Senate responded positively to the Lampsacene request "to [show concern] for the [security] of their … close friends [and] to take care of our city, [because of our kinship and] because of the [friendliness] which exists between them and us". Finally, when they met again Flamininus and the ten Roman commissioners in Corinth, the ambassadors urged them "to take thought [for us and to help] in preserving [the autonomy] and democracy of [our] city".

Thus, in 197/6, Lampsacus refused to be re-conquered by Antiochus III because it had already started negotiating its entry into another concentric system of imperial rule, one whose power was rising steadily. Though this was the kind of a 'quiet revolt', it nonetheless posed a serious challenge to the unity of the empire and the ruler's power, since it exposed, more than did anything else, the signal failure of this empire to become truly Catholic. As may have been noticed, in the diplomatic encounter through which Lampsacus seeks to become integrated into a new empire, the family metaphor – expressed by the term 'kinship' (*syggeneia*) – plays a key role. What it really signifies has been briefly noted in connection with the mutiny of Alexander's troops at Opis. It is now time to revisit it in order to look briefly at some of its integrative and disintegrative qualities.

IV. Ruling relatives

Relatives can be lethal. According to one tradition concerning Mithradates VI of Pontus, Pharnakes, the king's son and heir to the throne, not only betrayed his father to the Romans but also had him assassinated (Dio Cass. 37.13.3); early in his life, Mithradates himself had his own brother, namesake and rival to the throne killed.[54] Right after Alexander's death, the king's staff hurried to kill a rumour to the effect that Alexander had been poisoned by his own generals (the sons of Antipater).[55] In 281, Seleucus I (the founder of the Seleucid dynasty) was assassinated by the very recipient of his benefactions, Ptolemy Ceraunus – two of his successors (Seleucus III and Seleucus IV) were assassinated during conspiracies instigated by their own men, while a third (Antiochus III the Great) is said to have been on a permanent prescription of antidote against all poisonous creatures except the asp.[56] The Persian king Darius III was murdered by the satraps Nabarzanes and Barsaentes, two of the threesome of conspirators whose leader was Bessus, the rebellious satrap of Bactria *and* the King's own relative.[57] Other high-standing political figures met a similar fate, some of them seemingly in a more systematic way. It has been calculated that in the period 432-355, at least one-fifth of all Athenian generals (*strategoi*) – who together with the *rhetores* are regarded as the ancient equivalents of our 'politicians' – were politically prosecuted by their co-citizens, and most of those who were prosecuted were sentenced to death, by means of a legal procedure called *eisangelia*.[58] In all cases, a general had been denounced by a fellow-citizen, and in most cases, the main charge was treason.

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[54] McGing 1986, 165-166 (Pharnakes), 44 (Mithradates Chrestus).
[55] Bosworth 1988, 171-172, citing the relevant sources.
[56] Antiochus III: Pliny *HN* 20.264.
[57] Briant 2002, 866.
[58] Hansen 1991, 216-217.

These are quite dismal statistics. What is striking about them is less the fact that they relate to ruling personalities, but more the fact that sedition, death and destruction came from the hand of one's own circle – one's brethren, trusted officers, friends and relatives. It is striking because 'friends' and 'kinsmen', also whenever these terms refer to imagined but institutionalized kinship groups or fraternities, occupied so central a place in the endeavours to integrate into a unitary ideology of rule all the crucial components of the empire; that is, to graft sameness and common-ness onto a stupendous variety of differences without eradicating these differences. These are the short- and middle-range nationalisms we have had occasion to note earlier. Yet, as even our rudimentary statistics imply, 'friendships' and 'kinships', alongside their integrative properties, did harbour fiercely disintegrative properties as well. A prominent feature of the family metaphor is, in short, its ambiguity.

One aspect of its integrative qualities is revealed by an Aramaic papyrus of 419. It is a letter of king Darius II which, via the satrap of Egypt, reached Elephantine (or Edfu), a frontier province with a large Jewish population segment, and with a garrison (at Syene-Elephantine) manned by Iranian commanders and mostly Jewish troops. The letter regulated the celebration of the Passover in such detail that it stipulated the dates of unleavened bread and instructed abstinence from beer and work.[59] Even though the initiative might have been a concrete response to a general petition for religious patronage (e.g. by the Jewish segment of the Empire), the instructions were officially sent by the king himself. It therefore demonstrates both the imperial centre's willingness to respect and preserve religious (as also ethnic and linguistic) diversity; *and* the kind of means it deemed effective – here, that of 'portable religion' – in the attempts to create a sense of imperial unity, a unity achieved not through homogenization, but through formal, almost ritualistic indication of nearness to the imperial core. Similar aims and techniques are recognizable in the attempts of the Seleucid house to streamline cultic activity over a larger region through the establishment of the office of 'High Priest over all the shrines in Asia Minor';[60] or through its establishment empire-wide of royal cult, including the queen-sister cult (e.g. that of Queen Laodike).[61] Such steps towards unification and integration were imposed from above. In contrast, when city-states within the empire themselves voted to honour their living ruler with a cult (and regularly awarded him the appropriate divine honours), integration as increased nearness to the imperial core came from below.[62]

At the same time, Darius' letter belongs to countless similar manifestations of the fact that the ruler's fatherly thoughts and feelings were constantly with his people, especially those at the outposts of the empire. He was a solicitous and omnipresent king, whose Eyes and Ears were simultaneously everywhere within the realm; a king sensitive and responsive to the particular needs of his multifarious subjects. When Seleucid kings took such official nicknames as *Eupator* ('the Fatherly One'), or *Philopator* ('Father-loving'), they basically communicated the same kind of image about their relation to their subjects.

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[59] Cowley 1923, no. 21 (419 BC).

[60] *SEG* XXXVII 1010, lines 29-41. Cf. Ma 2000, 26.

[61] Robert 1949, 5-22; transl. Austin 2006, no. 200; cf. Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 203-210; Ma 2000, 147-150.

[62] Habicht 1970; Chaniotis 2005a.

These are distinct illustrations of the *patrimonial* character of rule. Like Alexander's performance at Opis, they show how adept exploitation of the family metaphor could make its integrative qualities encompass large segments of the empire and thus create 'middle-range' nationalisms. In this area, the Athenian Empire (again) parts company from the rest. At no time did its particular relationship to its subjects/allies permit the notion of *patrimonial* to invade the prevailing term *hegemonial*; as we have seen above, not invented kinship but fear was the 'glue' that kept this empire together, a circumstance that turned revolt into a much more dramatic *provincial challenge* than was the case elsewhere. By contrast, a very modern-looking nationalism – of the intensive and fiercely exclusive variety – pertained in the imperial metropolis itself. Its citizenry perceived themselves not only as equal shareholders in the democracy, but also as a blood-related fraternity united under *patrimonial* rule, children of an abstractly conceived Fatherland (*patris*). One of the ways in which the family metaphor manifested itself there is particularly telling: monetary payments to the citizenry in lieu of their participation in administration and politics were often expressed with the verb 'to feed' (*trephein*) and the noun 'sustenance' (*trophe*).

However, the vision of Empire-as-a Family cannot be reduced to the bipolar and straightforwardly vertical affair that is implied by the term *patrimonial*. In short, kissing Alexander, or any other of our kings for that matter, signified a much more complex and elastic kind of 'kinship' (*syggeneia*). A main characteristic was its possession of a number of grades, each of which indicated the degree of one's remoteness from, or closeness to, the ruler himself – the exact equivalent of the concentric circles used during ceremonial feasting. And, as is known, neither the kissing of, nor the kinship with, Alexander outlasted its rhetorical purposes, i.e. quelling the revolt through persuasion rather than force. Even though it some times stretched out to include the many and lowly, the family metaphor stayed securely the preserve of the ruling nobility.

'Friends' – in the expression "the King, his Friends and his Armed forces" (*OGIS* 219, line 15) – bespeaks the central position occupied by the royal 'extended family' in this typically Hellenistic, triadic presentation of the Empire as power-wielder. "His Friends all around him, and he in their midst, as though they were the stars and he the sun", is how a Macedonian king, Demetrius I Poliorcetes, and his courtiers are depicted in a hymn sung in his honour: the image of the Sun-King as the centre of Universe.[63] In the Achaemenid Empire, too, the language of friendship and kinship permeates most descriptions (nearly all of them in Greek) of the relationship between the king and his imperial caretakers.[64] Sometimes it is the narrow group of courtiers; at other times it is all those who, as holders of key imperial positions, were linked to him with bonds of loyalty and familiarity (e.g. Plut. *Them*. 29.5: *peri ten aulen kai tous philous* [under Artaxerxes I]; cf. Plut. *Art*. 11.2; Xen. *Anab*. 4.4.4). As we saw with Alexander, the family metaphor enabled the King (a) to establish a correspondence between ruling class and the dominant ethno-class (Persians in the Achaemenid Empire;[65] Greeks-Macedonians, in the Seleucid Empire);[66] and (b) to let the unifying dynamics contained in that metaphor continuously confirm the existence of a distinct identity of interest between ruler and his men – what

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[63] Athen. 6.253B-F; transl. Austin 2006, no. 43.
[64] Wiesehöfer 1980; Briant 2002, 129, 131, 187, 308-311, 321-322, 623-624, 781-783.
[65] Briant 2002, 867-871.
[66] Habicht 1958, 1-16, esp. 5; *contra*: Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993.

has been called 'the dynastic pact'.[67] Or, again, if circumstances recommended it as wise policy, (c) to achieve a higher degree of incorporation of the *indigenous* ruling class (Babylonian, Iranian, Egyptian, Syrian, or other) into the *imperial* ruling class (a fourth-century Achaemenid accomplishment; Alexander's attempt) – even if this line of action might provoke such complains as 'our king is being kissed by strangers'. Finally, (d) the family metaphor, being part and parcel of the system of promotion to and demotion from positions of power, assisted the ruler in the task of keeping his gigantic machinery of rule in balance. All these, in short, constituted challenges and counter-challenges of the first order; together they solidified the integrative sinews of the empire.

In 349/8, in return for great services performed in the war against the unruly Egyptians, king Artaxerxes III advanced Mentor to "over and above his other friends", giving him besides a hundred talents of silver, the best of expensive decorations, the post of "satrap of the Asiatic coast", and designating him general with plenipotentiary powers (Diod. 16.52.1). Such a promotion within the group of Friends suggests the existence of a formalized hierarchy. In the Ptolemaic and Seleucid courts (especially from the second century on), we encounter a large, stratified and hierarchal administrative class of Friends – in ascending order: Friends (*philoi*), First Friends (*protoi philoi*), Honoured Friends (*timomenoi philoi*), Most Honoured Friends (*protimomenoi philoi*), First and Most Honoured Friends (*protoi kai protimomenoi philoi*), over and above whom stood the group of titular Kinsmen (*syggeneis*).[68] In describing a procession of Darius III, a writer of the Roman imperial period mentions as many as 15,000 relatives (*cognati*) and 200 'near relatives' (*propinqui*), presumably titular Kinsmen and real kinsmen (including in-laws), respectively.[69] Likewise, in his account of the grand pageant staged by the Seleucid king Antiochus IV at Daphne (in Antioch, 166 BC), the Greek historian Polybius, using military terminology, mentions 'the contingent of Friends' (*to syntagma ton philon*: Polyb. 30.25.7, cf. 5.50.9, 8.21). Also at the time of Darius III, the title of Royal Kinsmen (*syggeneis*) is seen to have been borne by a corps of 10,000 élite horsemen, chosen for their 'virtue' (*arete*) and 'loyalty'(*eunoia*: Diod. 17.59.2).

These and further instances reflect the propensity of the time-honoured and predominantly aristocratic tradition of 'friendship' to create sometimes large, concentrically patterned networks of extended families. It is important here that we avoid the fallacy of expecting to find clear-cut distinctions between 'friendship' and 'kinship'; or the existence, within this class itself, of neatly differentiated ranks with lasting validity and meaning. Besides blurring the line between Friend and Kinsman, the relationships to which these terms refer valued the qualities of 'trust' and 'loyalty' much higher than any distinction between 'real' versus 'fictional' relatives. Speaking of the Persian court under Artaxerxes II, an ancient author refers to 'the breakfast of the family' (*syggenikon ariston*: Athen. 2.48f); one wonders whether the king, in contrast to modern scholars, would have bothered at all to clarify whether *syggenikon*, at his breakfast table, meant 'real' or 'fictional' family. Nor does it seem appropriate to define too rigidly the kind and number of people covered by the titles of Friend/Kinsman, since 'entries' and 'exits' would have caused the system to fluctuate considerably. Acknowledging the fact that "the

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[67] Briant 2002, 869-870.

[68] Bikerman 1938, 31-50; Habicht 1958; Herman 1981; Savalli-Lestrade 1998, esp. 374-387. Ptolemaic kingdom: Mooren 1977.

[69] Quintus Curtius 3.3.14-21; Briant 2002, 310.

most precious among possessions is a wise and loyal friend", Darius I invited Histiaios of Miletos (later proven to be a "shrewd and cunning Greek") to come with the Great King to Susa and become his Tablemate (*syssitos*) and advisor (*symboulos*: Hdt. 5.24). Thereby the king, in addition to recompensing a Greek for useful services rendered, took into his Empire-cum-Family the leader of a free-floating and resourceful powerbase situated at the Empire's western periphery. New entries occurred with some frequency. The reverse process, i.e. expulsion from the Family, is illustrated by Artaxerxes II's punishment of Orontes with exclusion from the company of his friends (Plut. *Art.* 24.9); the farther one was removed from the 'inner family circle' of the empire, the greater the political demotion and disgrace.

A mere glance at the Athenian Empire suffices to convince of its failure, or rather unwillingness, to absorb those mechanisms that would have made the family metaphor an instrument of empire. The only attempt worth speaking of – the Athenians' claims of heading the larger Ionian family, i.e. one of the four main 'tribes' into which all the Hellenes were divided – was an overly conspicuous piece of propaganda, activated only whenever mobilization of support among the 'allies' was urgently needed; and a clumsy one at that, since some of the allies by tradition were Aeolians, not Ionians.[70] By contrast, inside the imperial metropolis, the narrow group of citizens did perceive itself as a self-contained, highly privileged fraternity. The same group of citizens often put on display its intolerance towards the use of the family metaphor by its leading political figures in order to describe their personal relationships, some of which did straddle several cultural and political borders: the charge of 'treason' was constantly in the air. Finally, the same group stubbornly rejected the idea of sharing their 'citizenship' with their allies or with any other. In fact, the operational logic of this empire remained that of "more tribute, less military or political partnership".[71]

Where it *did* play a prominent role, the family metaphor exposed its own ambiguity (creator of both integrative and disintegrative forces) as well as that characterizing the relationship between ruler and ruling class, imperial centre and province-ized powerbases.[72] Since ambiguity, too, offered itself as an instrument of rule, the kings made use of it in order to maintain discipline and check overly ambitious Kinsmen. Having told the story of a very ambitious commander who had been expelled from the 'inner family circle' by his own king (Philip V of Macedon), Polybius remarked: "So brief a space of time suffices to exalt and abase men all over the world and especially those in the courts of kings; for these are in truth exactly as counters on a counting-board. For at the will of the reckoner, they are now worth a copper and now worth a talent, and courtiers at the nod of the king are at one moment universally envied and at the next universally pitied" (Polyb. 5.26, esp. 26.3-13).

Again, describing Artaxerxes' disgracing of Orontes, his own son-in-law, Plutarch adds: "it was the same with the Friends of [Hellenistic] kings: at one time they are omnipotent at another time almost impotent" ([Plut.] *Mor.* 174b). In the face of such ambiguity, neither the imperial Friends/Kinsmen, nor their own subordinates, nor, for

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[70] Smarczyk 1990, 464-472; Hornblower 1991, 520-525. Aeolians: D.M. Lewis apud Hornblower 1991, 190.

[71] The point is made by Momigliano in his comparison between the Roman and Athenian empires: Momigliano 1975, 45.

[72] See Austin 1986, 462.

that matter, city-states could feel secure. Anyone who tried to challenge the imperial centre had to reckon with the centripetal forces surrounding it. How strong these could be, preserving the Empire-as-a-Family when its unity was at risk, is thus the last aspect to be considered here.

Some Hellenistic kings were prone to measure their invincibility and martial strength in terms of weaponry: "How many warships is my presence worth?", asked the Macedonian king Antiogonus Gonatas on hearing that the Ptolemaic fleet outnumbered his own ([Plut.] *Apophtheg*. 183c). In 220, the Seleucid rebel-satrap Molon decided to offer battle against his king at night, "reflecting that it is difficult for rebels to risk attacking kings in daylight and face to face" (Polyb. 5.52.8-9). Shortly afterwards the crack troops of another Seleucid rebel and usurper, Achaios, mutinied when they heard that they were campaigning "against their natural and original king" (Polyb. 5.57.6). The king's presence had a paralyzing effect.

However, even though effective, pure personal charisma was not a sufficient generator of centripetal forces. What counted for more is alluded to by the following story told by Aelian. Having discovered that Aribazus the Hyrcanian and the other Persian notables who were accompanying him in his hunting party had plotted to assassinate him, Darius looked them straight in the eye and said: "Why don't you do what you are set to do?" Seeing his unflinching gaze – continues Aelian – "they abandoned their plan; fear gripped them to such an extent that they dropped their spears, jumped off their horses and knelt before Darius, surrendering unconditionally. He despatched them in various directions, sending some to the Indian frontier, others to the Scythian. They remained loyal (*pistoi*) to him, remembering his beneficence (Greek: *euergesia*)" (Aelian *VH* 6.14).

The operative word here is not 'fear', but 'beneficence' (*euergesia*), one among the finest instruments of royal persuasion. Above all else, it represented the massive transference, via gift-giving, of material wealth from the king to the various caretakers of his imperial powerbases. And 'massive' here ought to be understood in the strongest possible sense, since the prime purpose of this royal gift-giving was to pour so much wealth onto loyal officers that a wealth-hungry imperial governor became a contradiction in terms.[73] Alexander adhered firmly to this practice. Learning that his general and honoured friend Phocion was leading a humble life in Athens, Alexander offered him a present of 100 talents. When Phocion refused the present, the king informed him that "he did not consider those who refused to accept anything from him to be his friends" (Plut. *Phoc*. 18).[74] Hellenistic kings, the Seleucids no less than others, followed suit. Benefaction (*euergesia*) was a cardinal element of monarchic ideology and practical rule, and some kings attained the epithet Benefactor, *Euergetes*.[75] Yet, in this regard, the Achaemenid rulers virtually outbid all others.[76] The examples illustrating this are countless. Here, however, I cite one which shows the centripetal forces in the making, as a famous rebel details the rewards awaiting those assisting him in his grand project of usurpation; a would-be king's covenant with those about to become prime members of his empire-wide family. Prior to the decisive battle against his brother King Artaxerxes at

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[73] Austin 1986; Chaniotis 2005b, ch. 7.

[74] Berve 1926, no. 816; Austin 1986, 462.

[75] The evidence is collected in Bringmann and von Steuben 1995. Brief discussion: Bringmann 1993. Monarchic ideology: Walbank 1984.

[76] Lewis 1977, 4-5, 122 ; cf. Briant 2002, esp. 174-178.

Cunaxa (401 BC), Cyrus the Younger spoke to his assembled officers as follows: "Well, men, my father's realm extends towards the south to a region where men cannot dwell by reason of the heat, and to the north to a region where they cannot dwell by reason of the cold; and all that lies between these limits my brother's friends (*philoi*) rule as satraps. Now, if we win the victory, we must put our *philoi* in control of these provinces. I fear, therefore, not that I shall not have enough to give to each of my *philoi*, if success attends us, but I shall not have enough *philoi* to give to" (Xen. *Anab*. 1.7.7).

Cyrus counted on heaps of wealth to keep the Family together, while Alexander, we have seen, could sometimes manage with just a kiss. It was at a ruler's discretion to decide which one of a whole range of persuasive devices seemed most suitable to the occasion.

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Maintaining Order and Exercising Justice
in the Roman Provinces of Asia Minor

Cédric Brélaz

Law and order are, together with taxation, the main attributes of sovereignty and the most visible demonstrations of the power of an authority. Furthermore, public order is an essential factor of political stability for an empire. These two fields of State activity – the maintaining of order on the one hand, and the exercise of justice on the other – are probably some of the best ways to inspect the institutional relations between imperial central power and local communities. For this reason, the impact of Roman imperial rule on local communities of the Anatolian peninsula, and especially on Greek or Hellenized cities, can be measured by examining these two particular spheres. The study of how law was enforced in Roman Asia Minor will allow us to look into the prerogatives of the imperial State and into the tasks of the local communities within the provincial frame.

The purpose of this paper is first of all to describe briefly the functioning of policing and judicial institutions in the Roman provinces of Anatolia, as well as the interaction between imperial structures and local ones. This analysis will be no more than an overview, permitting structural observations and comparisons on the functioning of imperial government. Then, I will try to make some systematic comments on the distribution of the tasks between imperial State and local communities and on the scope of Roman imperial intervention within the Anatolian provinces.[1]

Geopolitical and historical frame
The Roman provinces of Anatolia covered roughly the territory of modern Turkey (Fig. 1). They were never unified into a single province and the Anatolian peninsula in Roman times never formed a political or administrative entity within the empire. However, Anatolia can be said to constitute a geopolitical unity, considering the common history of its regions at least since the conquest of the peninsula by the King of Macedon, Alexander the Great, at the end of the fourth century BC and because of the Hellenization that was induced by the conquest.[2] The provinces of Anatolia, which were shaped at different times from the second century BC to the first century AD, formed within the Roman Empire a sort of tactical and political theatre of operations.[3] In spite of this relative unity, these provinces are an interesting case for a study such as ours because of their diversity. Anatolia under

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[1] The section on jurisdiction of this paper, as well as Appendix I, were written in collaboration with Julien Fournier (Ecole française d'Athènes), whom I thank for having shared with me his great experience on the topic. My English text was kindly revised and improved by Robert Pitt (British School at Athens); all remaining errors are mine.

[2] See Mitchell 1993; Sartre 1995. I will concurrently use boths terms, Anatolia and Asia Minor, to speak of the same geographical entity, that is the whole Turkish peninsula in Antiquity.

3 This theatre of operations can easily be distinguished as opposed to the European Greek-speaking provinces (including mainland Greece) on one side, and to the Semitic Near East provinces on the other. On the Near East provinces (Syria, Judaea-Palestine, Arabia), see Isaac 1992; Millar 1993.

Fig. 1. Asia Minor in Roman Times, Second Century AD.

Roman imperial rule was most of the time divided into six provinces:[4] some were very urbanized and deeply Hellenized (as on the Western coast of Asia Minor) – and we will see later the importance of such factors (urbanization and Hellenization) for the impact of imperial rule in the provinces; others, on the contrary, were less well Hellenized and were mostly rural as in the Eastern part of the peninsula, especially Cappadocia which lay on the external border of the empire (*limes*) on the river Euphrates.[5] The case study of Anatolia enables us to draw up a typology of the provinces within the Roman Empire according to their geopolitical shape and their internal structures.

I will focus, in this paper, on the first three centuries AD, that is to say on early Roman imperial times, which constitute a coherent period in the history of the institutions and the structures of the Roman Empire. This period coincides with an era of peace and political stability for the Anatolian provinces, as well as for most of the remaining regions of the empire. The form into which Roman rule was shaped during this period in Anatolia arose from a fundamental political action: the pacification and the demilitarization of the peninsula by Augustus, the first emperor, who built up an autocratic government in Rome after decades of civil strife and wars against enemies and others who rebelled against the power of Rome throughout the empire.[6] The internal organization of the Anatolian provinces under Roman rule proceeds from this uncontested condition: the military victory and political supremacy of Rome. Rome defeated all its enemies and imposed its political and ideological hegemony in Anatolia. From that time on, Rome established a military monopoly in the Anatolian provinces and became the reference power for all the most important matters.[7] These military and political transformations had very deep consequences on the institutions of Greek cities, in particular on the conditions in which public security was managed and jurisdiction was exercised.[8]

Keeping order in Anatolia under Roman rule[9]
The main change in the sphere of public security due to the pacification and provincialization of Anatolia is the disappearance of royal and local armies of Hellenistic type. Royal and

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[4] See below n. 7. For the episodic administrative modifications of the borders of these provinces, see Rémy 1986. For Rome's penetration in the East in the late Hellenistic times, see Kallet-Marx 1995; Dmitriev 2005b.

[5] Van Dam 2002, 13-38; Cassia 2004.

[6] For the ideology of pacification, see *R. Gest div. Aug.* 13; Vell. Pat. 2.126.3. See also Kneppe 1994, 217-281.

[7] Such policy was first applied by Augustus to the ancient provinces of Anatolia created at the time of the Republic (Asia, Pontus and Bithynia), and then to the new province of Galatia in 25 BC. The same model was adopted by his successors as new provinces were created during the first century AD, namely Cappadocia, Lycia and Cilicia. From the reign of Vespasian onwards, we can speak of a complete integration of the Anatolian peninsula into the Roman Empire. The provinces of Asia and of Pontus and Bithynia, the oldest and most peaceful, were left by Augustus to be administered by the Senate (*provinciae populi Romani*). In contrast, emperors tended to keep for themselves the control of the newly created provinces (*provinciae Caesaris*), where Roman troops could be engaged (as in Galatia and in Cappadocia). However, too much emphasis should not be put on the distinction between these two types of provinces (cf. Strabo 17.3.25; Dio Cass. 53.12.1-3), since the difference lies first of all in the way their governors were chosen (respectively, election by lot within the Senate and direct appointment by the emperor): cf. Millar 1989.

[8] For the Western part of the Anatolian peninsula, a general overview on provincial administration in Mitchell 1999. For the whole peninsula, see Magie 1950. For Roman provincial administration in general, see Eck 2000.

[9] For more details on this topic, see Brélaz 2005.

mercenary troops were dismissed or included in the Roman army. Local military offices were suppressed. For all that, particular administrative structures were not created on behalf of the Roman State to take the place of those former civic institutions. There was, within the Anatolian provinces, no State instrument specialized in keeping order that was supposed to promote justice, such as the police in the modern Western State since the seventeenth and eighteenth century.[10] There was indeed no direct link between the two spheres that we are dealing with: policing on the one hand, and jurisdiction on the other. Policing operations on the territory did not prejudge the judicial activity that could be carried out afterwards. This meant that public order could be kept and criminals would be arrested to avoid threats to society, independently of any jurisdictional power. Local policing activities were not limited by the division of judicial tasks between the Roman State and the cities. We will perceive the relevance of this point when dealing with the prerogatives of Roman authorities for criminal law.

Although they were deprived of their military apparatus and independence, local communities within the Roman provinces of Anatolia actually enjoyed a complete autonomy in keeping order on their territory: they were able to create and organize any police functions and troops, such as guards and patrols (including youth associations of ephebes and *neoi*), to pursue, to arrest and to keep as prisoners any suspects or criminals. Keeping order locally was a necessity for local communities themselves. That is why we hear of a lot of local officers in the cities of the Roman provinces of Asia Minor who had different preventive or reactive police tasks against criminals and brigands (like respectively the *paraphylakes* and the *eirenarchoi*). In performing these functions these local officers, nominated by the town councils, did not work for Rome, but for their own city.[11] These civic functions were created or developed by Greek cities during the first century AD to ensure the security of their inhabitants within the pacified provinces of the Roman Empire. Rome indeed did not systematically control territory within the provinces to enforce law, nor did it vouch for the internal security of local communities. The emperor Trajan reminded his governor in Pontus and Bithynia, Plinius the Younger, of this very principle of government, when he was asked for military protection for the little city of Juliopolis, frequently harassed by merchants and Roman officers passing through: "But if we should assist the city of Juliopolis in the same manner (as Byzantium),[12] we should burden ourselves with a precedent; for other towns will request the same aid, and the more readily, the weaker they are".[13] Imperial power did not deal with public order at local level, and problems such as delinquency, and residual or sporadic brigandage, did not fall within its prerogatives. It is clear, however, that imperial power took advantage of the job that cities were doing by maintaining order: to ensure the rule of Rome, the provinces ought to be quiet and provincials should enjoy imperial peace and security. But local communities were not controlling territory on Rome's behalf. The two parts

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[10] See Napoli 2003.

[11] The nomination of the eirenarch by the governor, as detailed by Aristid. *Or.* 50.72, does not prove an ordinary practice: see Brélaz 2005, 108-111. See also Dmitriev 2005a, 206-213. What Burton 2001, 207-210, says about *dekaprotoi*, concluding that these taxation officers were not created nor chosen by Roman authorities, could be applied also to eirenarchs.

[12] Due to its very strategic position on the Bosporus at the entry of the Anatolian peninsula, the city of Byzantium was protected by a Roman garrison.

[13] Plin. *Ep.* 10.78 (Trajan's answer; transl. Melmoth-Hutchinson, Loeb 1915). See Brélaz 2002.

obviously had the same interests, but on two different levels. Local officers cared about the security of the inhabitants of their city and the safety of their own homeland, while Rome was trying to preserve the stability of its imperial rule.[14]

Moreover, the intervention of Roman power in the provinces for policing matters was restricted to the defence of its direct interests. In principle, soldiers were set firstly on the outer frontiers of the empire. Actually, there were only two legionary camps continuously for the whole Anatolian peninsula (Satala and Melitene), and they lay on the Euphrates border in Cappadocia. Within the provinces, restricted military contingents (legionary detachments, auxiliary units) were put at the disposal of every governor, and small groups of soldiers taken from these troops were set locally where there were strategic targets to protect, as for instance the most important roads, customs, and imperial properties such as estates, quarries and mines.[15] Additional soldiers were also employed directly in the governor's services (*officium*) to back him up in the administration of his province, and especially in his judicial tasks,[16] but there were very few of them, because emperors wanted to avoid withdrawing operational manpower from the purely military tasks.[17] The troops quartered in Anatolia, reinforced if necessary by further imperial forces called from other parts of the empire, were engaged locally only as subsidiary measures, in case of emergency, when cities were not able to oppose big threats, such as external attacks (as during the Gothic invasions in the middle of the third century AD)[18] or brigandage on a large scale approaching rebellion (as in Isauria, where several outbreaks were quelled by Roman troops during the reign of Augustus).[19] In such cases, military troops intervened to protect the political and territorial integrity of the empire. In the same way, although governors were theoretically responsible for keeping order in their whole province and were supposed to arrest all the "bad guys" (*mali homines*),[20] only criminals dangerous for the Roman political and ideological order, such as rebels, sacrilegious persons or leaders of brigands' gangs, were actively pursued by the governors' staff and Roman officers. Christians were at times included in this category of criminals too, because they refused to recognize the moral preponderance of the emperor, as is made clear in the narratives of the martyrs' lives showing how they were arrested and executed:[21] these people were pursued for lese-majesty as sacrilegious persons and for disturbing public order and morality as a factious mob and troublemakers.[22]

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[14] *Contra* Yannakopulos 2003, who thinks that local policing functions were created on Rome's behalf according to the imperial propaganda of pacification in order to ensure the *pax Romana* within the Eastern provinces.

[15] See Petraccia Lucernoni 2001. The fortress (*castellum*) of one of those contingents, lying in Phrygia, was studied by Christol and Drew-Bear 1987.

[16] Nelis-Clément 2000, 211-268.

[17] Plin. *Ep.* 10.20; 22 (Trajan's answers).

[18] Salamon 1971.

[19] Syme 1995, 257-269. For the evolution from brigandage to open warfare in Isauria, see Dio Cass. 55.28.3; Shaw 1990, 218-233; Lenski 1999. For brigandage in Anatolia, see Wolff 2003.

[20] Ulp. (*7 de off. proc.*) *Dig.* 1.18.13pr; Paul. (*13 ad Sab.*) *Dig.* 1.18.3. See also Appendix II.

[21] Ronchey 2000; Meyer-Zwiffelhoffer 2002, 143-171. A selection of these narratives in Musurillo 1972; one of the most famous is the martyrdom of Pionios in Smyrna: see Robert *et al.* 1994.

[22] For the debate about the reasons for the Christian persecutions, see Giovannini 1996; Teja 2000.

In short, we could say that, since Greek cities in Asia Minor had enjoyed autonomy for their internal security for centuries,[23] the aim of Roman rule in this sphere was never to substitute a radically different system for local institutions. Rather, the impact of this rule took the form of a superimposition of an imperial political structure above local institutions. Rome enforced its rule and intervened locally, only when its sovereign attributes and its tactical interests were in danger. The task of keeping order on a day to day basis was, on the other hand, left to the cities themselves. The emperor Commodus was aware of this division of the duties, as he sent a letter to the Lycian city of Bubon to congratulate its inhabitants because they had successfully opposed the attack of a large band of brigands.[24] By thanking the local population for having repelled the enemies, the emperor implicitly admits that the threat was beyond the local context and that the Roman army should have intervened. But we have to keep in mind that such an approach, very favourable to the cities because it avoided imperial intervention in the local sphere for minor concerns, only became possible and viable thanks to the military submission of local communities to Rome and the destruction of any other power than the Roman one in the very beginning.

Roman and local jurisdiction in Asia Minor (with Julien Fournier)

If we turn now to how legal and judicial matters were organized by imperial power in the Anatolian provinces, we will see that the same line of government was followed as for policing. Local jurisdiction was by no means suppressed after the creation of Roman provinces in Asia Minor: local courts were everywhere preserved and kept working,[25] and local judges were not chosen or nominated by Rome. However, their competence was limited by the power of Rome:[26] penal and criminal prerogatives were reserved for Roman courts; in particular, local courts were not able to fine beyond a certain amount or to pronounce capital punishment on freemen. In the same way, local courts were not allowed to try Roman citizens on civil matters, if they chose to appear before a Roman court.[27] Therefore, the jurisdiction of local courts was bypassed by Roman jurisdiction. Since sovereignty was given to imperial authorities, provincial and imperial courts – that is to say the tribunal of the governor, or of the emperor – also worked as courts of appeal and could annul verdicts of local courts, if a plaintiff chose to appeal to the Roman courts.[28] The Roman provincial courts were made up of a jury which assisted the governor in exercising justice: this jury also included provincial representatives – who were not Roman citizens –, at least for the trials which involved provincials and as far as civil law was concerned.[29] So provincials were in some way allowed to take part in Roman jurisdiction too. Moreover, the governor administered justice in an itinerant form

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[23] For security and war in Hellenistic Asia Minor, see Ma 2000. See also the papers edited by Couvenhes and Fernoux 2004.

[24] *AE* 1979, 624.

[25] Nörr 1966, 30-34.

[26] Horstkotte 1999.

[27] Roman citizenship gives the privilege to escape local jurisdiction, at least when a Roman citizen is in the position of a defendant. This advantage was explicitly specified in the Senate's decrees awarding citizenship or other privileges to foreigners during the first century BC: see Raggi 2001, 98-109.

[28] Millar 1992, 507-516; Fournier 2005.

stopping in a limited number of cities chosen for this purpose (*conventus*),[30] so that the preponderance of Roman jurisdiction was obvious to everyone within the provinces.[31]

Since it had to do with public order and could hand down capital punishment, the supremacy of Roman jurisdiction was particularly clear for criminal law. Consequently, imperial authorities reserved for themselves the highest expression of jurisdiction and of public force: capital punishment.[32] Provincial freemen could be tried for criminal matters only by the governor, and not by local courts, and Roman citizens could even be handed over to the emperor, if they appealed to him. On the contrary, slaves could be judged and put to death by local courts and officers. Early Christian history gives us several examples of this functioning of the Roman judicial system: Christian martyrs indeed, as citizens of Greek cities or inhabitants of native communities, were judged and executed by Roman governors in the provinces (as Jesus Christ in Judaea because he was a *peregrinus*), while Paul the apostle claimed the privilege he had as a Roman citizen to appear before the emperor to defend his cause. This is why he was brought and finally put to death in Rome and not in Judaea.[33] However this system of differentiation was theoretical, for Roman authorities would not be able to control every local court. That is why we hear of executions of freemen in provincial towns,[34] and in the case of dangerous criminals caught in the act or of notorious brigands, these punishments were probably tolerated and even encouraged by Roman authorities, because it was considered to be expedient to the State and the society in general to get rid of such threats as soon as possible.[35]

The study of how criminal trials worked in the Anatolian provinces clearly exemplifies the limits of imperial power in the provinces. As stated above, the governor, as the agent of the imperial power within the provinces, was supposed to control the provincial territory dependent on his authority and maintain order. But the means left at his disposal were very meagre: he only had a few soldiers to keep order and pursue criminals in a whole province. In reality, the function and the efficiency of Roman criminal courts depended on the initiative and the participation of local officers.[36] Most criminal trials were induced by local officers, who decided to arrest some criminals and to hand over to the governor's courts those who were accused of crimes punishable by harsher penalties and capital punishment, that is to say of crimes which could be judged only by Roman courts. So, Roman criminal jurisdiction, to be effective, often needed the active involvement of local communities and postulated common interests between governors and local élites in keeping order. In civil law, on the contrary, where the interests of the imperial power were not so crucial, the intervention of Roman authorities was much less. Local rights were preserved and tolerated as far as they did not directly contravene

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[29] Nörr 1999. In Cyrenaica (Oliver 1989, nos. 8-12), there were even mixed juries with native representatives for criminal matters. But these courts seem to have been created following riots or abuses in order to reform the judicial system. Such courts, inspired by the permanent criminal courts known in the city of Rome (*quaestiones perpetuae*), do not seem to have existed in every province.

[30] Burton 1975; Haensch 1997, 305-311 and Appendix VIII; Mitchell 1999, 22-29.

[31] For the participation of local populations in the trials that were publicly organized by governors in the towns, mainly on the basis of fourth century sources, see Amarelli 2005.

[32] Garnsey 1968; Liebs 1981.

[33] See Colin 1965.

[34] Riess 2001, 313-324; Porena 2005, 66-67, 77-91.

[35] Ulp. (*10 ad Sab.*) *Dig.* 28.3.6.9; Call. (*6 de cogn.*) *Dig.* 48.19.28.15; Mod. (*6 diff.*) *Dig.* 49.1.16.

[36] See Appendix II.

Roman legislation or other political requirements,[37] and there was no systematic attempt to substitute Roman civil law for those rights or to impose it.[38] Moreover, by trying on appeal lawsuits between provincials, the governor had to pronounce sentence in accordance with local law.[39]

Sovereignty and local autonomy

The main conclusion to be drawn from this brief study is the differentiation that Rome made between the tasks which came under sovereignty and the tasks which did not. We saw that imperial power reserved for itself all the sovereign prerogatives in policing and judicial matters: military defence of the borders, protection of strategic and tactical targets within the provinces (especially places of fiscal or economic relevance), pursuit of people opposing Roman political and ideological order and of the most dangerous criminals; finally, supreme jurisdiction such as capital punishment and the court of appeal. The most important political transformation induced by the Roman provincialization of Anatolia is precisely this transfer of sovereignty from local communities to imperial authorities, which appeared through the withdrawal of military independence and capital jurisdiction from the cities. With the exception of these prerogatives, local autonomy was preserved, so that local institutions could keep functioning, including police and courts. In dealing with order and jurisdiction, local communities were not granted a privilege by Rome. These tasks were not delegated to them by imperial authorities. These competences and this autonomy actually pre-dated Roman rule in Asia Minor, and then were maintained.

So, we can consider local communities within Roman provinces of Anatolia not as simple administrative units entirely depending on central power and on imperial rules and working for Roman interests, but as self-governing political entities, forming together a network constituting the imperial State.[40] However, this model of imperial and local political interaction was valid only in the most urbanized and in the most deeply Hellenized provinces of Anatolia (as on the Western coast of Asia Minor), where the Greek city institutional standard was by far the most prevalent political organization at local level.[41] On the contrary, in regions not so well pacified where such a model was lacking, especially in the Eastern part of the peninsula near the frontier, the intervention of Roman military and administrative authorities within local communities to keep order was much more important. In the same way, in other provinces lacking Greek cities elsewhere in the East, as in Southern and Eastern Syria, Judaea-Palestine or Egypt, and in border zones, Roman troops used to act as policing power and judicial authority, since no local community had institutions able to undertake such tasks.[42] Consequently,

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[37] See, e.g., Plin. *Ep.* 10.20; 34; 84; 93; 109; 111; 113; 115. Even the concession of Roman citizenship does not involve the suppression of local law's validity; see *AE* 1971, 534 (*Tabula Banasitana*): *civitatem Romanam salvo iure gentis dare.*

[38] Lintott 1993, 154-160. However, the spread of Roman law in substitution of local rights was a long-term process: see Lepelley 2001.

[39] Cf. Iul. (*84 dig.*) *Dig.* 1.3.32.

[40] Cf. Lévy 1899, 285.

[41] One could probably make the same observation for other deeply pacified and urbanized provinces elsewhere in the empire, as Achaia (mainland Greece), Narbonensis (Southern Gaul) and Baetica (Southern Spain).

[42] See Pollard 2000, 85-110; Gebhardt 2002; Isaac 1992, 54-118; Alston 1995, 74-101. The same could be said of the procuratorian provinces: see Loreto 2000.

we note that the autonomy allowed to local communities by imperial authorities was proportional to the degree of sophistication (according to the Graeco-Roman standard) of their internal political structures. For example, in Lycia in Southern Asia Minor, where Greek cities were united for a long time in a confederacy, Rome retained those native federal institutions within provincial administration which precisely had fiscal, judicial and police powers. Imperial authorities kept on the one hand this federal structure, but on the other hurried to seize military power and supreme jurisdiction from the confederacy as Lycia was turned into a province.[43] In the same way, a few cities in the Roman provinces of Anatolia enjoyed the privileged status of free cities thanks to good turns done to Rome previously, mainly during the wars of the first century BC. According to this status, those cities gained tax exemptions and were even allowed to continue to sentence provincial freemen (but not Roman citizens) to capital punishment.[44] These were of course great privileges; nevertheless none of those free cities was allowed to retain its military forces. Even if the free cities theoretically did not belong to the Roman provincial administration, Rome deprived them of the most crucial instrument of sovereignty: military power.[45] It follows from these examples that Roman imperial power did not rely on a single pattern of government: Rome could tailor its rule according to the pre-existing conditions and structures it found in the regions it was subduing and transforming into provinces. So, the impact of imperial power depended on the state of organization of local communities and differed from place to place.

Nevertheless imperial authorities tended to favour a particular line of government: Roman imperial power deliberately fostered local autonomy within the provinces and encouraged the creation of new self-governing cities. Some rural communities gained civic status through Roman emperors during imperial times.[46] The diffusion of Greek culture and education in the East, and the assimilation of the local ruling class through the concession of Roman citizenship, were also measures used to stimulate local autonomy and to spread the institutional standard of the Greek city. Hence Roman rule supposed the participation of local communities and of their officers in governing the empire, and the valorisation of the city-state as the basic core on which the imperial State could rely.[47] Local élites in Anatolian provinces were aware of the value of their involvement in the administration of the empire, as the orator Aelius Aristides from Smyrna proclaims in the middle of the second century AD in his praise of the Roman Empire. According to Aristides, the main advantages of Roman rule for local communities were the following: "There are in every city a lot of people who are fellow citizens of yours [that is to say Roman citizens] no less than of their own compatriots, although many of them have not seen Rome yet. So, there is no need of garrisons to control the citadels. Because the most important and the most powerful inhabitants of each place keep for you their own homeland, so you hold the cities in two ways, from Rome and one by one thanks to them".[48]

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[43] Behrwald 2000, 129, 145-146.

[44] Ferrary 1991; Millar 1999.

[45] See Dio Chrys. *Or.* 31.102-104, 113, about the free city of Rhodes. On this speech of Dio, see Veyne 2005, 163-257.

[46] Mitchell 1993, 86-97; Sartre 1995, 212-216.

[47] Lintott 1993, 129-153. See also Appendix I.

[48] Aristid. *Or.* 26.64.

Such behaviour actually permitted a relative disengagement of imperial power in the administration of the provinces. After the military victory of Rome and the creation of the provincial administration, as soon as Roman hegemony was imposed and consolidated, routine government was left to the cities under the supervision of governors who represented the sovereignty of the imperial State in the provinces. Then, as mentioned above, imperial authorities intervened locally only to protect fundamental interests. I have only spoken in this paper of the monopoly of the military and of the supreme jurisdiction, but we should also mention taxation,[49] minting, economic exploitation of the imperial properties,[50] and ideological submission of provincial societies to the emperor through oaths of allegiance and political cult.[51]

Local autonomy and world empire

As Giovanni Salmeri has already pointed out elsewhere,[52] such an imperial rule, leaving much room for local autonomy, fits pretty well with the theory that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri evolved in their influential essay entitled *Empire*, where the authors analyse the contemporary concept of empire in the globalization process of the international relations we are attending to for more than a decade (the 'empire' nowadays is supposed to be the new political and economic order worldwide inspired by Western capitalist countries). In discussing the concept of empire, Hardt and Negri draw a difference between the activities related to the sovereignty of empire on the one hand – such as military hegemony and political command – which are watched over by imperial structures, and the tasks of day to day administration, on the other, which are carried out locally. Moreover, intervention of imperial structures in the local sphere takes place only in case of threat to the imperial prerogatives.[53] Such an approach – distinguishing two levels of government, one imperial dealing with matters which have an importance related to sovereignty, the other local attending to ordinary civic administration – is very stimulating for our understanding of the functioning of the Roman imperial system. But it is not certain that this theoretical model, which happens to correspond with Roman provincial rule, is also valid for other imperial administrations.

"Local autonomy was the corollary of world empire" said Sir Ronald Syme commenting on Pompeius' favourable policy towards Eastern cities in the middle of the first century BC.[54] This is incontestably true for the Roman Empire, as is shown by the example of how law and order were managed in the Anatolian provinces. But is this interaction and subsidiarity between imperial power and local communities a characteristic of all supranational empires? The status of local communities in other world empires claiming universality proves quite different. In the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, for example, which succeeded the Roman Empire in the East, local communities were not conceived as self-governing political entities, and they did not enjoy such an autonomy.

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[49] See Merola 2001.
[50] See Lo Cascio 2000.
[51] See Ando 2000, 359-362, 389-390, 394-395.
[52] Salmeri 2005, 187-188.
[53] Hardt and Negri 2000, 339-348.
[54] Syme 1995, 124.

Local communities were administrative units depending on central power and most cities were directly ruled by imperial officers.[55]

The comparison with the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires actually reveals a particularity of Roman rule. In the Roman Empire, and especially in the East where there had been a tradition of civic experience for centuries, the basic political cell was precisely the local community relying on a civic group and disposing of its own institutions. Furthermore, Rome itself was a city-state;[56] the Roman provinces were the result of the territorial expansion of a single city, and they were governed by imperial officers representing the civic magistrates of Rome; likewise the Senate was at the same time the governing assembly of the empire and the town council of the *Urbs*. In short, we could say that the Roman Empire is the application and the extension on a world scale of the idea and of the political model of the city. Hence the principle of self-governing communities was by no means unknown to Rome, which deliberately preserved and spread this network of cities to establish its rule, as the Hellenistic kingdoms had already done in Asia Minor.[57]

Local autonomy was not an impediment to imperial rule. On the contrary, this way of governing, which would seem a paradox to other empires, made the Roman provincial administration easier. After their integration within the provinces, local communities became active collaborators in the workings of Roman power by managing their internal concerns themselves and attending to tasks which happened to be crucial for the maintenance of imperial rule (raising taxes, keeping order, exercising justice). Such a ruling system lasted till local communities were dissolved as civic organizations in Late Antiquity. From the fourth century AD onwards, sociability ties changed within the cities. Individual as well as collective identity ceased to pass through citizenship and civic life. The richest and the most influential inhabitants of each city monopolized power. Town councils gradually disappeared, and imperial officers or local magnates took the place of civic magistrates, as central power intervention in the local sphere was becoming more frequent. The Early Byzantine period corresponds with the end of local autonomy as the imperial ruling method.[58]

The existence of different imperial ruling patterns – as suggested when dealing with the importance of local autonomy in the Roman Empire in comparison with the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires – prevents us from considering imperial power as a homogeneous historical and political phenomenon. Empires can of course share some common structural features (formation of a multinational organization, tendency to universality, progressive assimilation of native people), as Eisenstadt observed by proposing a sociological definition of what an empire is.[59] This does not imply, however, that there is only one way for an empire to rule the provinces and that the relations between imperial power and local communities would always and everywhere be determined by the same conditions.[60]

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[55] Haldon 1999; Ivison 2000; Inalcik 1977.

[56] Cornell 2000.

[57] See Ma 2002.

[58] See Lepelley 1996; Liebeschuetz 2001, 104-136; Laniado 2002.

[59] Eisenstadt 1963.

[60] Furthermore, the ruling systems of empires, as well as the status of local communities, can evolve as time passes. See, for example, the birth of a civic movement in the towns of Western medieval Europe during the twelfth century (see Boucheron and Menjot 2003), and the emergence of municipalities in the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century (see Lafi 2005).

The comparative analysis of imperial systems reveals, on the contrary, that behind the generic and often idealized concept of empire lies a kind of political organization which is very dependent on historical circumstances and lacks the innate strength and the intrinsic legitimacy we usually ascribe to it.[61]

Appendix I

Normative aspects of local autonomy (with Julien Fournier)
The distribution of the tasks between imperial power and local communities in the sphere of law and order described above raises the question of the existence of any imperial regulation in connection with that. In other words, does this division of attributions arise from juridical texts stating positively the limits of local competences?

As far as disarming is concerned, for example, we have no trace of a systematic attempt to prohibit through legal arrangements the use of local armies in the Roman provinces of Anatolia during the reign of Augustus.[62] On the other hand, the effects of such a policy are clearly perceptible during the first century AD (disappearance of local armies, suppression of military offices). Rather than a unilateral decision, the disarming of local communities in Asia Minor is probably the result of a long-lasting political process, which consisted in the transfer of military sovereignty from the cities to the imperial power during the first decades of the Principate. Under Roman rule, which henceforth was the only reference power, local military troops became useless. Moreover, it does not seem that provincial charters (*leges provinciarum*) setting out the inner administrative organization of the provinces – whose existence we partly know for the two double provinces of Pontus and Bithynia and Lycia and Pamphylia – contained any clause about how order should be kept and what should have been the attributions of local communities in this field.[63] Apart from some general instructions (*mandata*) that emperors addressed to their governors about their duty to keep order in the provinces they ruled,[64] the prerogatives of local communities for maintaining order were not positively expressed by the Roman State. One of the main reasons is the fact that policing was not conceptualized at that time as a distinct activity of public power.[65]

As for jurisdiction, some regulations about the separation of competences between Roman and local courts seem to have been inserted in the general edict that the governors used to issue as soon as they took up their duties in the provinces and where details were given of the procedure to be followed to refer to their court.[66] However, in opposition to local communities in the Western part of the empire, which were provided with municipal

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[61] See Ménissier 2006.

[62] See Brunt 1990, 255-266.

[63] The few clauses that we know from these regulations deal with qualifications for the inhabitants of a city to become councillors and with the fiscal immunities of individuals and communities. See Fernoux 2004, 129-146; Dmitriev 2005a, 302-303.

[64] Marotta 1991, 99-122, 156-176.

[65] See also Brélaz 2007.

[66] See the edict of Cicero as governor of Cilicia in 51/0 BC (Cic. *Att.* 6.1.15) and the edict of M. Petronius Mamertinus, prefect of Egypt from 133 to 137 AD (*P. Yale* 1606 [*SB* XII 10929]). Cf. *Lex Irnitana* (J. González, *JRS* 76 [1986], 147-243), <LXXXV>.

charters of the Roman type,[67] the limitations of local jurisdiction were not expressed in the constitutions and laws of Greek cities in the East, because those were not issued by Roman authorities. Nevertheless the normative intention of Roman power was more extensive for jurisdiction than for policing. On various occasions,[68] and with the help of various statutes (decrees, edicts, instructions, rescripts), specific decisions issued by the governor or even the emperor set out the respective extent of Roman and local jurisdiction. This normative trend consisted in asserting the preponderance of Roman jurisdiction through two main items.

First are stated the legal prerogatives of Roman citizenship: as defendants in a civil action, Roman citizens had the privilege to choose the jurisdiction they wanted.[69] This principle recalls the content of the judicial clauses of the treaties that Rome stipulated with its allies under the Republic, whose purpose was to safeguard Roman citizens from the effect of local jurisdiction.[70] It follows that one of the most important duties of Roman provincial authorities was to guarantee the legal privileges due to Roman citizenship. Second is asserted the monopoly of Roman jurisdiction on criminal law: capital suits can be brought only before the governor.[71] Apart from that, local communities can continue to use their own laws and to exercise justice in civil matters.[72] This local civil jurisdiction, however, seems to have been limited in accordance to the amount of money involved in the case.[73] The range of local jurisdiction is also bound by the possibility given to provincials to appeal against a local judgment to the governor's court. Thus rescripts from Roman authorities defining the procedure of appeal show implicitly the superiority of Roman jurisdiction over the local one.[74]

The lack of a more formal definition of the prerogatives of local communities for policing and jurisdiction cannot be attributed only to a shortage of sources.[75] There was in any case no constitution of the empire stating the separation of the tasks between Roman power and local communities.[76] As the example of jurisdiction makes clear, only the matters escaping local courts were specified by Roman authorities. The capacity of local communities to keep order and to exercise justice did not need to be stated by law, for in this sphere cities were not granted powers delegated by Rome. The innovation which

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[67] See Wolf 2006.

[68] This occured mainly after disturbances of the judicial machinery, when the governor or the emperor intervened to specify or to modify the prerogatives of local courts. So, misuses of power by local officers pushed Augustus into reforming the judicial system in Cyrenaica and Antoninus as governor of Asia into limiting the powers of local policemen (see below n. 71).

[69] See, for instance, in Sicily the so-called *Lex Rupilia* in connection with that: Cic. 2 *Verr.* 2.32.

[70] See lastly the treaty between Rome and the Lycian confederacy (Mitchell 2005).

[71] Oliver 1989, nos. 8-12 (Augustus' edicts in Cyrenaica); Plin. *Ep.* 10.30 (imperial instructions); *P. Yale* 1606 (*SB* XII 10929: provincial edict in Egypt); Marcian. (*2 de iud. publ.*) *Dig.* 48.3.6.1 (imperial instructions and provincial edict in Asia).

[72] Cic. *Att.* 6.1.15 ironically observes that "the Greeks regard such provisions as their charter of liberty, that cases between Greeks should be tried under their own laws" (*... sibi libertatem censent Graeci datam, ut Graeci inter se disceptent suis legibus… Graeci vero exsultant quod peregrinis iudicibus utuntur. 'Nugatoribus quidem' inquies. Quid refert? Ii se αὐτονομίαν adeptos putant*).

[73] Oliver 1989, no. 156.

[74] Oliver 1989, nos. 91, 160, 170, 276 a-b. See also Fournier 2005.

[75] On the sources concerning Roman provincial administration, see Burton 2002 with methodological insights.

[76] See Marotta 2000-04, II 185-197 on the lack of norms about governor's duties.

required to be proclaimed and regulated in the Anatolian provinces was henceforth the sovereignty of Roman imperial power, not the usual functioning of civic institutions.

Appendix II

Policing collaboration and criminal procedure: inquisitorial and accusatorial features
During the Principate, the emperor – who progressively took over jurisdiction within the Roman State as he monopolized political power –, as well as his representatives in the provinces, are able to decide a judicial enquiry on their own behalf and to bring a suit against any person without the intervention of an accuser. Henceforth all criminals are prosecuted by the State and there is no more need of the complaint of a private citizen to set in motion an official enquiry, as was the case in Republican times. This new procedure is called inquisitorial by the scholars, or *extra ordinem* because the judgment was given by the emperor or the magistrate outside the penal permanent courts (*quaestiones perpetuae*) existing in the city of Rome since the late second century BC which could be referred to only after a citizen had lodged a formal accusation.[77] According to the inquisitorial procedure, the governor is theoretically at the origin of the criminal repression within the province. He is able to arrest or to make an enquiry against anybody handed over or even only denounced to him. He can decide on his own will to seek delinquents and to punish them. So, one might think that, in imperial times, Roman authorities were entirely responsible for the pursuit and the indictment of criminals throughout the provinces.

However, imperial and provincial legislation shows that active participation in this field was requested from local communities too, and that a sort of accusation was at any rate maintained in the criminal procedure. A provincial edict of Antoninus Pius, when he was governor of the province of Asia in AD 135/6, deals in particular with the procedure to be followed in case of arrest of a criminal. This edict stipulates that "eirenarchs, when they had arrested robbers, should question them about their associates and those who harbored them, include their interrogatories in letters, seal them, and send them for the attention of the magistrate. Therefore, those who are sent [to court] with a report [of their interrogation] must be given a hearing from the beginning although they were sent with documentary evidence or even brought in by the eirenarchs".[78] Two phases of particular relevance are pointed out in the procedure. First, it follows from the edict that local magistrates (appearing in this case through the figure of the eirenarch, a policing officer) play a decisive role in discovering, hunting down and arresting criminals. Second, to be effective, the judicial procedure in front of the governor must rely on a first questioning of the accused carried out by the local officer who conducted the arrest. These elements invite us not to consider the governor as the unilateral source of criminal repression in the provinces.

The presence of local officers in the inquisitorial procedure is due to practical requirements. Although imperial instructions advise them to hunt brigands and to catch criminals in their provinces, governors do not have enough means (and in particular enough soldiers at their disposal) to fulfil that duty. Governors cannot obviously be aware

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[77] Pugliese 1982; Santalucia 1998, 213-215, 241-249, 256-268.

[78] Marcian. (*2 de iud. publ.*) *Dig.* 48.3.6.1 (transl. A. Watson, Philadelphia 1985). For more details, see Rivière 2002, 274-282.

of every offence committed in their provinces. That is why Roman authorities appeal to informers[79] and need the cooperation of local officers, who know the situation on the territory and are directly confronted with criminals. Apart from the cases where special kinds of criminals were explicitly prosecuted by the Roman power for political reasons (such as rebels, or Christians but only from the introduction of systematic persecutions in the middle of the third century), most criminals in the provinces were indeed arrested and handed over to the governor's courts by local officers on their own initiative.[80] As Antoninus' edict shows, governors used in such circumstances to require local officers to draw up a report of the questioning of the accused carried out immediately after the arrest. This report (*elogium*), stating what accusation was made against the person arrested, is intended to serve as a sort of bill of indictment.[81] As the governor (or his representative) will hear the accused during the preliminary investigation of the case, he will compare his declarations with the report written by the local officer. If this report happens to be forged and the charges fallacious, the accused will be acquitted and the local officer reproved for his negligence or his dishonesty.

Thus the maintenance of an accusatorial principle in the inquisitorial criminal procedure during the Principate[82] strove to combat Roman and local officers' misuses of power, and especially to avoid unjustified charges and to restrict arbitrary arrests about which provincials frequently complained to the emperor.[83] Such provisions belong to a voluminous legislative tradition whose purpose was to control the abuses and extortions of Roman soldiers and functionaries.[84] In this way, emperors were motivated by philanthropic thoughts, in particular by the ideal of an equitable and fair government and by the care to warrant the presumption of innocence of the persons arrested. But more concrete considerations had some weight too: the limitation of unjustified charges also tried to prevent the obstruction of Roman courts due to the great number of suits brought to them. This supervision of the policing activities of local officers by Roman authorities – before judicial investigation and trial – also fought the opposite excess, that is to say laxity. Thus, in the same way, imperial instructions forced governors to reproach local officers who discharged arrested persons without a sufficient enquiry about their guilt.[85] Such legislation aimed at outlining the frame of the policing collaboration between Roman provincial authorities and local communities, a collaboration which was essential to governors to allow them to perform their duties in the field of criminal repression and capital jurisdiction.

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[79] Rivière 2002.

[80] Nevertheless in the prosecution *ex officio* too, that is when Roman authorities directly seek some precise criminals, the collaboration of local officers is requested to arrest them, as shown, for example, in the acts of Pionios' martyrdom, in *Cod. Iust.* 8.40.13 about a notorious brigand, as well as in Ulp. (*1 ad ed.*) *Dig.* 11.4.1.2 and Paul. (*1 sent.*) *Dig.* 11.4.4 about fugitive slaves.

[81] Marotta 2003, 72-87.

[82] For such an interpretation, see Botta 2000; Rivière 2002, 263-305. *Contra* Santalucia 2001, who denies any accusatorial value of the local officer's preliminary enquiry and questioning.

[83] See, e.g., Hauken 1998, 35-57, ll. 1-16; 58-73, ll. 1-5 (petitions from peasants and villagers near the Lydian city of Philadelphia).

[84] See Mitchell 1976, 111-112; Kolb 2000, 117-139.

[85] Ven. Sat. (*2 de off proc.*) *Dig.* 48.3.10.

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Local Elites and Government Intervention
in the Province of Anadolu

Suraiya Faroqhi

The interaction between the Ottoman central authorities and local élites is currently a 'hot' topic at least where the Balkans and the Arab provinces are concerned. Yet relatively speaking this question has been little studied with respect to Anatolia. I would contend that this is so because today's Republic of Turkey is a strongly centralized state and thus there is not a great deal of motivation to study the more decentralized regimes that may have prevailed in the past. Although we now possess a sizeable number of monographs covering the towns and cities of Anadolu (Fig. 1), which focus on Bursa, Edremit, Manisa, İzmir, Ankara, Çankırı and Kastamonu, the question even of urban élites in the narrow sense of the term has not too often become a major concern of historians.[1] However it seems that the time has come to take a closer look at Anatolia as well.

Our analysis will concentrate on the 'classical period' from the late fifteenth to the early seventeenth century, while the last section will connect with the work that has been done on parts of Anadolu during the 1700s and early 1800s.[2] Not that at least at first glance, this early period of Ottoman control over the peninsula appears as a very propitious period for a study of locally based political élites. It is well known that in the second half of the fifteenth century, once Ottoman power had been consolidated, provincial lords were eased out of their positions and replaced by centrally appointed officials.[3] Many of the latter had come into the Ottoman palace as slave-pages, received their educations in the chambers of the Topkapı Sarayı and were then appointed to a sequence of military-administrative positions that might culminate in sub-provincial (*sancak* or 'banner') commands and finally, if a given servitor of the sultan was especially fortunate, in the governor-generalship of the province itself.[4] Given rapid rotation from one appointment to the next, these military men cum officials would have had trouble forming ties with the localities they were called upon to administer; and that indeed must have been the rationale for instituting these procedures in the first place.[5] A low degree of local 'rootedness' also characterized the young princes of the dynasty who in the sixteenth century were sent to Kütahya or Manisa in order to prepare for the succession struggle. For even if in their temporary residences these princes were allowed to build mosques and covered markets, they were probably eager to leave for Istanbul as soon as was politically feasible.

Given this state of affairs for a long time it seemed unproductive to seek for provincial élites active before the second half of the seventeenth century. 'Early modern centralization', often misunderstood to mean centralization in the post-1850 sense of the

[1] Gerber 1988; Yılmaz 1995; Gökçen 1946a; Gökçen 1946b; Goffman 1990; Frangakis-Syrett 1992; Ergenç 1995; Ergene 2003.
[2] Inalcik 1973.
[3] Inalcik 1954, 103-129.
[4] Kunt 1983.
[5] Barkan 1975, 17.

Fig. 1. Towns of Ottoman Anatolia.

word, has long appeared as one of the glories of sixteenth-century Ottoman rule, and there seemed little point in watering down that particular achievement.[6]

However today we are less inclined to regard centralization as a *summum bonum* and hallmark of political 'progress'.[7] Recent work on Syria and also on the town of 'Ayntab (today: Gaziantep) in south-eastern Anatolia has shown that local élites played an important role in these places, even at the height of Ottoman power in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.[8] And if a degree of decentralization was tolerated in a province such as Syria, wealthy and also especially important for sultanic legitimization due to its role as a staging point for the pilgrimage caravans to Mecca, the matter appears worth investigating also where other centrally-located provinces are concerned. Thus even though Anadolu in the 1500s does not seem a very favorable territory for the emergence or self-perpetuation of local élites we will see that they managed to operate none the less.

Even if fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Ottoman centralization involved control of local affairs by centrally appointed holders of tax assignments (*sipahi*s and *zaim*s), it is hard to imagine that these men should have done so unaided. Many *sipahi*s had but very modest tax grants (*timar*), and in addition they were so often away on campaign. Certainly whenever the army was mobilized, a few holders of small *timar*s might be left behind to secure public order, but given the great distances often involved, these men cannot have done their jobs without some local aid. Moreover the kadis of this early period also were usually in charge of large districts, and given the lack of surviving kadi registers for most towns before the mid-sixteenth century or even later, there is reason to suspect that the bureaucratic organization of the courts of justice (*mahkeme*) was also still in its beginnings. In addition the guilds that in later times played a major role in both defending the interests of the urban population and ensuring the collection of taxes and the provision of services, were at this time also still in an embryonic state. Therefore there must have been local élites that enjoyed certain privileges and in exchange helped the members of the administrative apparatus in the extraction of taxes and general administration. These are the people that we will attempt to track down here.[9]

The province and its parts

The enormous province of Anadolu is already documented under Murad I (r. 1362-1389) although for that early period we cannot be sure of its borders. By the 1520s and 1530s Anadolu reached from Çankırı and Kastamonu in the north-east of the Anatolian peninsula to Antalya and Alanya/Alâiye in the south-west.[10] Following the coasts of the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean while encompassing the earliest possessions of the Ottoman sultans (Hüdavendigâr, Sultan üyüği, Koca eli and Karası) Anadolu formed part of the Ottoman 'core lands'.[11] In the western coastlands of the Aegean, the corresponding

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[6] On the characteristics of 'early modern' centralization see Abou-El-Haj 1991, 34-40.

[7] Salzmann 1993.

[8] Abu-Husayn 1985; on 'Ayntab/Gaziantep see Canbakal 2007.

[9] Khoury 2006, 135-156.

[10] Binark *et al.* 1993; Binark *et al.* 1994; Binark *et al.* 1995.

[11] On the concept of 'core lands' see Kreiser 1979.

province was Rum eli.[12] That these were for a long time the major divisions of the empire is reflected in the fact that the two military judges (*kadıasker*) throughout the empire's existence were called 'of Rum eli' and 'of Anadolu'.

Within this province quite a few 'banners' (*sancak*, *liva*), under which the cavalry assembled in case of war, down to the administrative changes of the nineteenth century bore the names of certain princely dynasties that the Ottomans had displaced: Germiyan, Saruhan, Aydın, Menteşe, Hamid, Teke. All these principalities have left scant records of their own, but Ottoman, Venetian and Genoese documents have made it possible in some cases for twentieth-century scholars to trace at least certain aspects of their histories in monographs. Most of these princes lost their thrones for the first time to Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402), but were reinstated by Timur after the battle of Ankara (1402); however Ottoman re-conquest followed rapidly, at varying dates during the early fifteenth century, by either Mehmed I (r. 1412-1420) or Murad II (r. 1420-1451, with interruptions).

As a result only the names remind us, as they must have reminded some educated people of the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, of the pre-Ottoman political situation in western and central Anatolia. However the history of these principalities was not really part of the intellectual baggage of Ottomans educated in Istanbul, even of those who were reasonably well versed in the history of their own rulers. Thus to the seventeenth-century Ottoman gentleman and traveler Evliya Çelebi the town of Muğla (in antiquity: Mogolla), located in the sub-province of Menteşe, had been founded by a perfectly imaginary lord named Muğlı bey. While the latter supposedly had been a vizier to the Menteşe, it was an encounter with the Prophet Muhammad himself that had induced this personage – or so the story went – to convert to Islam.[13]

Putting down roots: a former palace dignitary and local charities
In their attempts to connect pre-Ottoman and Ottoman provincial histories, present-day historians try to do a little better, even though when studying local personages who but rarely made it to the seat of the central government, it is often very difficult to locate suitable sources. In the absence of family names not much can be gathered from registers enumerating fifteenth- and sixteenth-century *sipahi*s and *zaim*s, but records concerning pious foundations are sometimes more helpful. Such types of documentation often form the final sections of the famed tax registers (*tahrir*), long a favorite source for historians of Ottoman society and indispensable even today. Further information can sometimes be found in the records compiled by the scribes of local judges: for Bursa the series begins in the last decades of the fifteenth century, while for Manisa and Ankara these registers are available starting with the mid-1500s. When all is said and done, the men and women rich enough to finance mosques, schools or dervish lodges must have formed part of some kind of social élite.

Certainly some of these personages had come into the regions where they established their pious foundations as officials of the sultans. Yet no matter what members of the central administration, and in their wake modern historians, may have thought, not every Ottoman official conformed to the image of the eternally mobile servitor of his

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[12] *Encycl. Islam*, *sub voce* 'Anadolu' (by F. Taeschner).
[13] Evliyâ Çelebi 2005, 105.

sultan who never developed any local ties. To the contrary the very fact that these servitors of the ruler chose to establish their charities in a town of Anadolu and not in the Ottoman capital or its environs, means that to a degree they had put down 'roots' in a place where they had once officiated. This may for instance have applied to the chief black eunuch (*Kızlar ağası*) Ahmed Ağa who built a primary school in Manisa: however by 1593-94 the teacher complained that since the foundation was administered from Istanbul, necessary repairs had been neglected and now the building was in a parlous state.[14] Possibly Ahmed Ağa, deceased by 1593, had spent time in Manisa as a young man, perhaps accompanying a prince who had once resided in this town, and remembered this episode in his biography after rising to prominence in the sultan's palace.

A (former) dynasty of viziers and the pious foundations of its members

In 1575-76 a certain *sipahi* had farmed revenues in the region of Bergama; as his guarantor, who was to stand surety for the punctual discharge of his debts to the exchequer, the candidate tax farmer proposed the administrator of the local dervish lodge bearing the name of İlaldı Hatun. This foundation administrator put up the not inconsiderable sum of 5000 *akçe*, and also involved his own son in the deal.[15] Given the rarity of the name of İlaldı, especially for a woman, quite possibly the founder of this lodge was the daughter of a fifteenth-century Ottoman vizier of the Çandarlı dynasty who was in fact known by that name.

As to the Çandarlı/Çendereli family as a whole, they are a fine example of a particular type of local élite, namely the descendants of prominent personages that had been allies of the Ottoman sultans while the latter were still small but dynamic princes in the course of expanding their power to the east and west of the Sea of Marmara. Contrary to what is often believed, these families did not always disappear into obscurity when from the late 1400s the principal offices had come to be filled by slaves of the sultans (*kul*). A case in point is this Çandarlı family whose members were so often buried in İznik that they must have cultivated a special tie to that town. Yet in their heyday during the 1400s many of these men had traveled all over the empire while officiating as high-level judges. In a remarkably large number of cases moreover scions of the Çandarlı dynasty changed course in mid-career to serve as governors and ultimately become grand viziers.

By the sixteenth century, however, members of this family no longer achieved the highest offices in the realm. But they still might become governors and judges in places as remote from İznik as Buda, Aleppo or Damascus. Yet even now the Çandarlıs often had themselves buried in their old home-town by the lake, once a centre of the fledgling Ottoman principality. Moreover some latter-day descendants of the family even show up as notables (*ayan*) in the very same area during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This means that over more than four hundred years certain Çandarlıs were part of the local élite of this small town, which due to its production of fine colorful faience has gained lasting fame among art connoisseurs.[16]

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[14] Gökçen 1946a, 28.

[15] Gökçen 1946a, 45-46.

[16] *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* VIII, *sub voce* 'Çandarlı', 208-210 (by M. Aktepe). Unfortunately the patrons of most pieces of faience remain unknown; therefore we cannot tell whether any Çandarlıs employed the artists/artisans of İznik.

From our point of view the ties of the Çandarlı to 'their' region are demonstrated mainly by their pious foundations. Çandarlı Kara Halil Hayreddin Paşa who lived in the time of Sultan Osman (d. 1326) and seems to have been the founder of the family's fortunes established a mosque in İznik that is still extant, and a family burial place came into being next to this charity. An Ottoman register of pious foundations compiled in 1530 records the benefactions of Hayreddin Paşa in some detail; however in the absence of sobriquets distinguishing individuals bearing the same names from one another it is difficult to say whether all the pious foundations on record were linked to the founder of the dynasty or else to some homonym about whom nothing is known.[17]

In order to protect their assets against the vicissitudes of public office the Çandarlı also established a family foundation properly speaking of which members of the dynasty were the principal beneficiaries; this institution was somehow connected to Sultan Murad I (r. 1362-1389). In addition women who were probably members of the Çandarlı family by birth or marriage including İlaldı Hatun and Hundi Hatun also immortalized themselves by pious foundations.

Moreover in 1442 Çandarlı Mahmud Çelebi, who had the misfortune of being captured by Janos Hunyadi (1444), was later handed over to the Serbs and only released after paying a ransom of 70,000 ducats, also founded a mosque in the family's home town.[18] A relative by marriage of the Ottoman dynasty, he was ultimately buried next to his İznik foundation. In addition the family instituted some charities in Edirne and when its political fortunes were in decline, some of its members went to live in this city and administered them. We may assume that the family's great interest in pious foundations was also connected to the fact that so many of them had trained as religious scholars before embarking on military-administrative careers. But if we look beyond the province of Anadolu to other prominent families of the early Ottoman period active in Anatolia we find that this behavior was by no means unique.

Traces of pre-Ottoman princes

When the Ottomans conquered the territories of Muslim rulers they normally respected the pious foundations of these predecessors. Ottoman charities were always recognized by entering them into the official registers of pious foundations, and the identical procedure was followed whenever defeated Muslim princes were concerned. Throughout the Ottoman Empire the late 1520s and early 1530s were a time when a grand set of summary (*icmal*) tax registers was prepared, presumably in order to facilitate the re-distribution of state revenues to augment the Ottoman armies in a period of conquest in Hungary as well as Iraq. Now available in publication, the sections of these compilations dealing with charitable enterprises will form the basis for much of our discussion.[19]

A good example is the double foundation of the Menteşe prince Ahmed Gazi (d. 1391): a mosque of his was situated in the town of Milas and in addition there was a larger complex in nearby Peçin, then a thriving town and princely residence but today

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[17] Binark *et al.* 1994, 801-805 (facsimile section).
[18] *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* VIII, *sub voce* 'Çandarlı', 208-210 (by M. Aktepe).
[19] Binark *et al.* 1993; Binark *et al.* 1994; Binark *et al.* 1995.

more or less abandoned.[20] Ahmed Gazi's theological school in Peçin which also contains his mausoleum is still in existence; it has intrigued researchers by the strange shape of its gate, which shows features reminiscent of Cypriote or Rhodian gothic structures.[21] But due to the near-absence of written documentation nothing can be said about Ahmed Gazi's artistic interests or the origins of his workmen.

From the revenue sources recorded in the register of 1530 it is immediately apparent that this was the enterprise of a very highly placed and indeed princely personage, for the foundations had been granted the entire taxes payable by three villages. Non-royal pious foundations typically only enjoyed this privilege in two specific cases. Either the sultan might have granted the settlements in question to the original donor, thus permitting him/her to prepare for the hereafter: while this was a relatively common occurrence in recently conquered regions of the Balkans it was quite rare in Anatolia.[22] Or else, as was true in our case, the charity in question pre-dated the arrival of the Ottomans. In addition five Christian families had been assigned to the service of the public soup kitchen that formed part of the Peçin complex. This was also an arrangement that by the early sixteenth century a non-member of the Ottoman dynasty would not have easily secured, and the same consideration applied to the rice-fields which the foundation also possessed and which by the sixteenth century were so often a state monopoly.[23]

As for the administrators of the two complexes, they must originally have been determined by the founder; unfortunately our text does not tell us anything about their backgrounds. However the will of Ahmed Gazi as the founder of this charity probably did not prevent the Ottoman sultans from getting involved in the running of these two foundations. For the expenditures of the latter, which reached the – in 1530 – very substantial sum of 56,833 *akçe*, were determined not by the will of the founder as would normally have been expected, but by a 'new distribution document of the ruler' (*tevziᶜname.i şahi*).[24] These expenditures included pensions to ten people who knew the Koran by heart and in addition to fifteen men who recited prayers, to say nothing of a numerous staff serving the upkeep of the foundation itself. In a small town such as Peçin all this must have formed a source of considerable patronage to be exercised by the top administrator. We may wonder whether the latter was perhaps a descendant of a former Menteşe household member, himself closely supervised by the administration in Istanbul.

Scanning the surface of a town, or how to find traces of sixteenth-century urban élites
These *icmal* registers permit us to search through entire towns and look for traces of local élites in the sections covering pious foundations. As an example we will take the town of Tire, once a residence of the Aydınoğulları princes and much more important in the sixteenth century than it is nowadays.[25] Some of the local pious foundations, such as the

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[20] Binark *et al.* 1995 (facsimile section) 492-495; Arel 1968; Sözen 1970, I, 179-182; Wittek 1967, 128-129; Uykucu 1983, 78-80.

[21] Arel 1968, 78-79.

[22] Barkan 1942.

[23] Inalcik 1982.

[24] It is unlikely that in a tax register from the year 1530 a document issued by any ruler but the Ottoman sultan would have been referred to as *şahi*.

[25] Aslanoğlu 1978; Binark *et al.* 1995, 379-390.

theological school (*medrese*) of Firişteoğlu or the dervish lodge of Ahi Baba, in fact went back to the time when Tire had been a princely residence. Moreover the vizier Lütfi Paşa, who had belonged to the entourage of Selim I had also paid for a complex of charities.[26] This means that apart from its princely past, just like Manisa the town attracted some high-level administrators willing to put down roots.

But many Tire mosques, some of which were still extant in the 1970s, had been established by people of less elevated positions. Thus the mosque of Mevlana Hüsamzade Musliheddin also called Kara Hasanoğlu possessed the right to collect 10 *akçe* a day from the Aydın saltpans, while a village mosque not far from Tire received half this sum from the same sources. Mevlana Hüsamzade evidently had connections to Istanbul for he must have been a judge, and his success in deriving income for local mosques from a state source of revenue such as the saltpans also demonstrates that he had friends in high places. But on the other hand the homely name of Kara Hasanoğlu – which the scribe was at pains to record in addition to the founder's more elevated official identity – makes us wonder whether this was not a native son who had made good at the Ottoman center.[27]

Other Tire foundations had been established by people who lacked official status of any kind. In some cases the markedly urban and commercial character of the properties that these people had set aside for their charities makes it likely that they were townsmen. Thus apart from a piece of rural land, the lodge of Kaziroğlu possessed 110 shops and a workshop for the production of millet beer. These sources of revenue were located close to the covered market and in the streets where shoemakers and saddlers plied their trades.[28] A certain Hoca Bahşayış had donated a shop/some shops to the small mosque bearing his name (*mescid*).[29] As to Hoca Alaeddin, for his charities he had set aside shops or perhaps stalls in the apple and grape markets, a workshop for the manufacture of soap and an entire caravansary; given their title of *hoca/hᵛace*, these two men may well have been successful merchants. Among many others, the *mescid* of Hasan Çelebi also possessed numerous shops; in this case they were located in the sword-makers' and blacksmiths' streets while others were mere stalls in the weekly fruit and vegetable market.[30]

Some of Tire's mosques, still extant and identified by inscriptions but which we have not been able to trace in the archival documentation, were also built by personages who bore no official titles and about whom nothing is known but their names. From the inscriptions and also from architectural characteristics the buildings have been dated to the late 1400s and more often to the 1500s. It thus makes sense to conclude that there existed in this former capital of the Aydınoğulları a stratum of reasonably well-to-do people who were not members of the sultans' provincial administration.[31] This observation is important for our understanding of sixteenth-century Ottoman society in general: for at least in Istanbul, such wealthy men were often integrated into the state apparatus as tax

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[26] I am not sure whether this person is identical with the grand vizier Lütfi Paşa who wrote both a chronicle and the advice book known as the *Asafnâme*. The article 'Lütfi Paşa' in *Encycl. Islam* (by Colin Imber) does not mention any foundations of this personage in Tire. But the latter had at one time been *sancak beği* of Aydın, so the possibility should not be excluded altogether.

[27] Binark *et al.* 1995, 379-390.

[28] Tapu ve Kadastro Genel Müdürlüğü, Ankara, section Kuyudu kadime (TK) No. 571, fol. 61a (no date, from the time of Kanuni Süleyman).

[29] TK No. 571, fol. 62a.

[30] TK No. 571, fols. 66a-68b.

[31] Aslanoğlu 1978, 40-45.

farmers and their fortunes therefore became liable to confiscation. As the foundations of Tire and other towns indicate, in the provinces this mechanism so inimical to capital formation probably operated to a much lesser extent.

Facing the state and keeping alive the privileges of pious foundations:
a strategy of local élites

We have seen that throughout the province of Anadolu, some local élites went back to pre-Ottoman times. These families usually protected their possessions against dispersal among multiple heirs by converting freehold property into pious foundations and holding on to the administration of the mosques and especially dervish convents financed through their pious donations. However this was not always an easy task. It would seem that Abdal Musa, a famous Bektaşi saint active both in Bursa and in the 'banner' (*sancak*) of Teke, was able to recruit the son of the governor of Alanya, later to become the Bektaşi poet Kaygusuz Abdal. However the governor at first tried to forcibly prevent his son from joining the dervishes, and it was only the dervish sheik's (*şeyh*) superior spiritual power that finally obliged him to change his mind.[32]

In the *vita* of Abdal Musa the governor is called a *sancak* commander. But Barbara Flemming who has studied the late medieval history of this area in detail assumes that this title must be a later addition to the text, for the events recounted probably took place when the Ottoman sultans did not as yet control south-western Anatolia. In the fifteenth century it was rather the Mamluk sultans of Egypt that played the dominant role in the area. But for our purposes, namely the explication of the tension between *şeyh* and governor inherent in the story, the question whether the title of '*sancak* commander' should be viewed as a later addition is not really relevant. We can interpret this story as an indication of the fact that both in pre-Ottoman and in Ottoman times, dervish lodges often owed their possessions to the support of government élites; yet this help was not something available as a matter of course.[33] Rather the dervishes secured supporters and revenues only by judicious networking, or 'spiritual powers' according to the language of the saints' vitas.

However in spite of the vicissitudes that they periodically encountered, quite a few heads of dervish lodges must have retained the wherewithal to intervene in local politics and administration. Where the sixteenth-century Ottoman central government was concerned tax exemptions to dervish lodges were granted because the beneficiaries were obliged to feed and house travelers. But this duty could only be fulfilled if the heads of such institutions enjoyed a degree of local prestige, power and financial resources.

A case in point is the struggle of the *şeyh*s and dervishes of Seyyid Gazi, a major lodge located not far from Eskişehir on the long caravan route leading from Istanbul to Konya and ultimately to Damascus. The town of Seyitgazi, today totally eclipsed by nearby Eskişehir, around 1600 seems to have depended on the dervishes for financial credit and probably also for political protection.

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[32] Flemming 1964, 116-119; Evliya Çelebi has relayed another foundation legend concerning this dervish lodge, but here no outside intervention was involved. According to this latter story, which may well be of later date but predates the 1670s, the saint is supposed to have caused a hail of stones which allowed the dervishes to pave the muddy yard that made access to the building difficult and thereby inconvenienced both visitors and inhabitants of the lodge: Evliya Çelebi 1935, 275.

[33] Barkan 1942.

Yet the institution was itself under severe pressure because the dervishes had a reputation for heterodoxy and therefore had been forced to share their foundation income with the students of a latterly founded theological school.[34] At times the *şeyh* and dervishes of Seyyid Gazi tried to mobilize allies in Istanbul: in the later 1500s candidate janissaries visited the lodge as devotees of its patron saint Seyyid Gazi, and seemingly were well received. The young soldiers participated in ceremonies that were quite annoying to pious Sunni Muslims. We are left to wonder whether accusations of heterodoxy, which officially were given considerable weight due to the ongoing conflict of the Ottoman sultans with the Shiite Safawids, in the eyes of the central administration were not also a convenient manner of curbing the local 'influence' of the dervishes.

In other instances the central government apparently tried to nullify the tax privileges of dervish lodges. As we have seen, on condition of providing hospitality to travelers the heads of the latter normally were exempt from certain burdensome payments, particularly the extraordinary wartime taxes soon transformed into regular payments (*avarız-ı divaniye*) and further dues not instituted by religious law (*tekâlif-i örfiyye*). The following instance provides a graphic example: at the turn of the seventeenth century the sultan ordered all retired *sipahi*s, sons of *sipahi*s not holding down any *timar*s as well as heads of dervish lodges to provide twelve days of service in the workshops that manufactured the saltpeter needed for the manufacture of gunpowder.[35] Some people in the sub-province of Saruhan liable for this service protested that no such workshops existed in their region and they would have to travel long distances to comply with the sultan's order. But the answer that the authorities sent to Manisa was uncompromising. Those who for whatever reason did not provide service would be asked to pay a substantial amount of money as compensation. In addition they would have to defray a slew of taxes from which at least some of the men and institutions in question hitherto must have been exempt. Apart from the sultan's overriding concern with gunpowder supplies at a time when the Long War with the Habsburgs was still raging, this measure may well have been aimed at reducing the privileges especially of the poorer dervish lodges as well as the lowest level of local élites typically associated with these institutions. For those tax-exempt persons unable to comply with the sultan's order were liable to find themselves pushed back into the tax-paying population.

In yet other instances local figures might lose control of important pious foundations because an ever impecunious central government was inclined to grant military men willing to forego their soldiers' pay positions as administrators of pious foundations. Concerning the İshak Çelebi lodge of Manisa, founded by a member of the Saruhanoğulları dynasty such a takeover was documented as early as 1597-98; a further case of the same kind, involving the lodge of Kıllu Işık in Palamud near Manisa was recorded in 1602-03.[36] Similar grants typically concerning positions as guild headmen were encountered in the 1600s and became commonplace by the eighteenth century.[37] The insertion of the military into all kinds of occupations that had no direct connection to

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[34] Refik 1932, 32-33; Faroqhi 1981a.
[35] Gökçen 1946b, 62-63, 68-69. On gunpowder manufacture see Ágoston 1993.
[36] Gökçen 1946b, 59.
[37] Genç 1994, 59-86.

warfare was an overarching characteristic of Ottoman society during the later 1600s and especially the 1700s.[38]

However it is quite possible that at least some of the military men who acquired the revenues of lodges in this fashion ultimately adapted to the dervish milieu. Thus the lodge of Kıllu Işık in Palamud continued to enjoy appreciable revenues until it was closed down in 1826 as a Bektaşi possession; this means that the 'outsider' *şeyh* did not plunder the lodge to such an extent that it was obliged to suspend operations. Alternatively the dervishes may have resumed control over their lodge by buying out the newly arrived military man: at least such transactions have been encountered among Ottoman guildsmen and may have been employed in other walks of life as well.

Ulema *and dervish networks as sources of local 'influence'*

Thus in spite of numerous hindrances the administrators of pious foundations continued to play an important role in Anadolu's towns and villages. Where dervishes were concerned affiliation with one or another of the recognized orders such as the Halvetis, the Nakşbendis or the Bektaşis must have provided solutions to many of their problems; for in this case the *şeyh*s and dervishes of provincial lodges might even be able to mobilize fellow members who had the ear of sultans or viziers. Ever since the work of Fuat Köprülü in the 1930s scholars have studied the formation especially of the Bektaşis; unfortunately there are very few sources referring to this process. But we do know that certain heads of lodges out in the Anatolian provinces used the mediation of fellow members of their orders well established in Istanbul in order to make their wishes known to the central authorities.[39] Especially when the sultan was personally favorable to particular dervishes – as was for instance true of Murad III (r. 1574-95) – such networks must have been a source of empowerment at the local level.

However, religious cum legal scholars associated with mosques and teaching institutions in Manisa, Tire or Bursa could exercise even more political 'influence' in their respective towns. Kadis were appointed only for short periods of time and thus often knew little about local conditions. Apart from records that their predecessors had kept, they must have relied on what 'respectable' witnesses told them; and who in the eyes of an incoming kadi was better qualified for this purpose than a teacher at a *medrese*, or if such a person was not available a preacher at the local Friday mosque? Recent studies have shown that the kadis were much aware of social status and took account of it in giving judgment, even though at the same time, it was necessary for them to listen to the complaints of ordinary people if the court was to continue 'attracting customers' that preferred its services over other types of dispute resolution.[40]

Lower-level kadis often seem to have officiated within a given geographical area and did not migrate over great distances as was true of their more prominent colleagues. We may assume that when out of office such former lower-level kadis often lived in places like Tire or Manisa and helped out the court by informally advising the incumbent judge. Teachers and preachers were often asked to witness contracts and in the course

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[38] For the fullest discussion to date see Raymond 1973-74, 659-808.
[39] Köprülü 1935; Faroqhi 1993.
[40] Ergene 2003; Peirce 2003; Canbakal 2007.

of so doing, some of them had occasion to meet officiating judges and recommend to
them their own offspring still studying Islamic law and divinity while contemplating the
move to Istanbul, momentous indeed in so far as it determined the young men's future
careers. Another recent study has determined that at least in the seventeenth century
many successful members of the religious cum legal establishment were the sons of
such teachers, mosque administrators and preachers, who thus made better careers for
themselves than had been possible to their fathers.[41] In fact it was largely the influx
of these people that prevented the high *ulema* from becoming a closed corporation. At
least for the 1600s we can, therefore, postulate connections of local men of religion to
the Ottoman center that served as sources of empowerment in their home towns; and
for a select few, these contacts were a resource to be used in building high-level official
careers. By the eighteenth century, however, increasing 'aristocratization' of the high
ulema in Istanbul progressively cut off these connections to the provincial world.[42]

Upper- and lower-level élites?

At the end of our study an interesting problem can be formulated although its resolution
remains tentative: as far as we know practically none of the local magnates who dominated
provincial administration in Anadolu and elsewhere during the 1700s and early 1800s
came from the foundation-linked milieu discussed here. Nor incidentally did such power-
holders very often emerge from the circles of *timar* or *zeamet* holders. Magnates of the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were often of unknown backgrounds, even
though occasionally they seem to have claimed 'noble' descent. Thus the Tekelioğulları
of the Antalya region around 1800 used the name of a princely pre-Ottoman dynasty,
with what justification if any, remains unknown. For the sake of argument, let us
therefore assume that between the early seventeenth century, when tax-farming expanded
dramatically and the early 1800s, the province of Anadolu was run by two types of local
élites. There was a more powerful 'upper' stratum that by and large owed its fortunes to
the tax-collection processes instituted by Istanbul and in addition, a more modest 'lower'
notability many of whose members had connections with local pious foundations. Some
of the latter institutions might go back to pre-Ottoman times, even though that did not
necessarily imply that the administrators were physically the descendants of the Hamid-,
Aydın- or Menteşeoğulları.

　　We thus have to postulate that a connection to established pious foundations
– whether they were theological schools or else dervish lodges did not make much of
a difference – kept people on the lower rungs of provincial notability. These men had
virtually no chance of ever breaking into the tax-farming circuit or even the distribution of
provincially assessed dues among individual villages and households.[43] On the other hand
it was these latter activities, and also the chance to act as deputies for absent governors
or major life-time tax farmers, that might catapult a family line of particularly fortunate
locals into magnate status, as most famously was achieved by the Kara Osmanoğulları of
İzmir and Manisa.[44]

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[41] Klein 2007.
[42] Zilfi 1988.
[43] Inalcik 1980, 283-337.
[44] Darling 2006; Nagata 1997.

On the other hand, at least until the *de facto* confiscation of the resources of pious foundations under Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839), in many places an élite with a local base and control over these *vakıf*s remained in place. Apparently well into the eighteenth century the central bureaucracy, albeit considerably expanded in the mid-1700s, did not regard it possible to govern without such local supports. As a result older pious foundations might expand and new ones be instituted. Thus the Bektaşi lodge of Abdal Musa, located not far from Elmalı in the province of Antalya seems to have benefited from the wheat boom of the Napoleonic wars to round out its patrimony. The *şeyh*s purchased land and as a status symbol of provincial gentility, had acquired over fifty horses by the time the lodge was closed down and its properties confiscated in 1826, when the janissary corps was abolished.[45] Moreover the Kara Osmanoğulları once they had risen to power in the Manisa-İzmir region engaged in the foundation of mosques, schools, hospitals and other charities with a frequency that seems near-royal, even if the individual buildings they put up were much more modest than those constructed in the names of the sultans and their relatives.[46] Less prestigious pious foundations were put up by their Antalya neighbors the Tekelioğulları around 1800; but even today a mosque in this city perpetuates the family name.[47]

We may assume that pious considerations apart, the dynasties in question wished to establish reputations as promoters of local welfare, with special emphasis on the towns or villages where their main residences were located. But vesting administrative responsibilities in the hands of family members and trusted servitors must also have been intended to establish these people and later their descendants as members of the 'lower' élites of their respective localities. Of course given the confiscations of *vakıf*-properties under Mahmud II these projects quite often did not come to fruition. But that is a different story.

In conclusion

As the first major point it is worth stressing that even at the high time of Ottoman 'early modern' centralization in the middle and later sixteenth century, the administrators sent out by the government were not in a position to run the districts and sub-provinces making up the vast province of Anadolu all by themselves. There may have been members of local élites of which no trace remains today, because their activities were circumscribed and thus if at all documented, recorded mainly in the kadi registers. However, as we have seen these documents in most cases have not come down to us.

By contrast those local notabilities that we can 'nail down' typically had some connection to pious foundations. These included the descendants of pre-Ottoman rulers and the sons, grandsons and great-grandsons of people once connected to the courts of these princes, but also the progeny of personages who had once been associated with the early Ottoman sultans themselves. In some instances the descendants of such fourteenth- and fifteenth-century lords were able to hold more or less elevated official positions even under Sultan Süleyman and his successors, when most positions of power were however

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[45] Faroqhi 1981b, 54-68.

[46] Kuyulu 1992.

[47] Halaçoğlu 2002; Faroqhi 2005. Unfortunately I only found Halaçoğlu's monograph after my own article had gone to press.

held by palace-trained 'slave' servitors. But office-holders who had 'struck roots' in the places to which they had been sent, as well as their offspring, also figured among local élites documented in the foundation registers, in spite of the central government's attempts to prevent such occurrences. In addition it is noteworthy that in certain localities a few merchants might also become wealthy enough to enter this group.

Many such families achieved a degree of permanency in the provincial towns of Anadolu. But due to their modest powers, these households should be classified as members of 'lower' élites. Before the nineteenth century, the central government does not seem to have regarded these small-scale notabilities as a threat. Certainly there were attempts to erode their tax-related and other privileges. But this occurred in a piecemeal fashion and the erosion could sometimes even be reversed; on the whole the sultans' bureaucrats respected privileges that were considered 'ancient' and recorded as such in the registers of the financial administration. Only by the mid-nineteenth century did this policy change, and I would suggest that here we have a valuable indicator concerning the difference between Ottoman centralization in the 'classical' as opposed to the Tanzimat style.

Secondly: it was almost unheard of for members of this lower-level group to pass into the 'upper' élite of substitute governors, major tax-farmers and other people in a position to influence the processes of revenue appropriation. Certainly wealthy provincial kadis were by no means a rarity, and their families were often able to hold on to their possessions from one generation to the next, as *ulema* enjoyed a degree of immunity from confiscation. The *şeyh*s of large dervish lodges were also sometimes money-lenders in their own localities and thus must have been accustomed to financial activity. Therefore these people probably were not debarred from bidding for minor and middle-level life-time tax farms due to lack of money. But rather it was perhaps their very privileges and local status that made the central government wary of according positions of financial responsibility to these men. We will need to delve more deeply into provincial history before we can get a fuller answer to this question.

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What Difference Did Rome Make?
The Cretans and the Roman Empire

Angelos Chaniotis

What have the Romans ever done for us?

There is a memorable scene in the film *Monty Python's Life of Brian*. A member of the Patriotic Front of Judea asks the question: "What have the Romans ever done for us?" A rhetorical question, one might think. The other members of the Patriotic Front present, however, a list: the Romans have built streets, baths, aqueducts; they have brought sanitation, irrigation, education, wine, security, peace ... What difference the Roman Empire made in the life of the Cretans is the question I will address in this chapter, trying to sketch the major results of the provincialisation of Crete.

The coming of Rome was the most significant turning point in the history of Crete since the destruction of the Minoan palaces. It not only meant the subjugation of Crete under foreign rule – for the first time since the coming of the Mycenaean Greeks; it not only meant the establishment of a provincial government. It also meant the extinction of a social and political order that had existed for almost a millennium. After the conquest, the many competing dwarf states of Crete were united under a single administration. Crete was now an island not on the periphery of the Aegean, a sea troubled by wars and raids, but an island in the middle of the pacified Eastern Mediterranean, entirely integrated into the Roman system of rule and the economic networks of the Roman Empire.

To a certain extent my response to the question of what difference the Roman Empire made will not differ very much from that of the ingenious makers of *Life of Brian*. Yes, the Romans built streets, e.g., a street funded with the sacred money of the sanctuary of Diktynna in western Crete.[1] And, yes they did build baths, e.g., in Aptera, Arkades, Gortyn, Eleutherna and many other places.[2] And of course, the Romans built aqueducts. The largest work of architecture surviving from ancient Crete is the aqueduct of Lyttos, probably built in Hadrianic times, that leads from the *caput aquae* in the mountains of Lassithi to the harbour of Lyttos, at Chersonesos.[3] All this is Roman in Roman Crete (Fig. 1); indeed, most of this would have been inconceivable in pre-Roman Crete.

The new factors

Unity under external central authority
I have intentionally begun my paper with visible, major works of architecture that best

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[1] Tzifopoulos 2004.

[2] Ducrey and van Effenterre 1973 (Arkades); Sanders 1982, 70 (Kato Asites), 80 (Gortyn), 83-84 (Lappa), 151 (Arkades), 158 (Gortyn), 163 (Lappa); Harrison 1993, 273-274 (Makrygialos), 281-284 (Gortyn, Aptera, Zaros, Arkades, Koufonisi, Kastelli Kissamou); Niniou-Kindeli and Christodoulakos 2004, 323-326, 329-334 (Aptera); La Rosa and Portale 2004, 488-490 (Phaistos).

[3] Sanders 1982, 147-148; Harrison 1993, 197-201.

Itanos
Zeus Diktaios
Praisos
Sitia
Makrygialos
Kavousi
Leuke
Gournia
Hierapytna
Vrokastro
Chersonesos
Simi Viannou
Lyttos
Keratokambos
Lassithi
Archanes
Biannos
Arkades
Herakleion
Knossos
Priansos
Inatos
Gortyn
Lebena
Idaean Cave
Phaistos
Mesara
Eleutherna
Kommos
Sybrita
Rhethymnon
Lappa
Aptera
Kydonia
Diktynnaion
Elyros
Lissos
Kissamos
Polyrhenia
Phalasarna

20 Km

Fig. 1. Hellenistic and Roman Crete.

express the radical break with Hellenistic traditions. For such works require an organisation of manpower and an administration of resources, the procuring of funds and material; and above all they require the crossing of the boundaries of individual communities. The political fragmentation that characterised Crete from the Late Bronze Age to the Roman conquest,[4] made such communal works impossible, since they required the cooperation of more than one community. They required the existence of a central authority with access to funds and resources. Here we see the first among four new factors I will consider.

Pre-Roman Crete was characterised by political fragmentation into at least sixty communities fighting against one another for land, resources, and honour.[5] The continual wars of the Hellenistic period had reduced the number and expanded the territory of these communities substantially,[6] but it was the new order brought by Rome in 67 BC that left only 15 or 16 settlements with the status of a polis and determined their boundaries.[7]

The cities of Hellenistic Crete had often been united in alliances, but never once in a single alliance comprising the entire island.[8] Not even the final attack of the Romans against Crete found all the Cretans united and willing to face the invader.[9] Under Roman rule the remaining 15 to 16 communities retained the status of a polis as members of the new *Koinon ton Kreton* (League of the Cretans).[10] This change is clearly reflected in the epigraphic habit of Roman Crete with regard to the spatial distribution of inscriptions. One observes a high concentration of inscriptions in only three cities: Gortyn, Knossos, and Lyttos. On the contrary, in the Hellenistic period inscriptions were more evenly distributed among the forty to sixty independent poleis. These three cities were prominent already in the Hellenistic period, but then as leaders of rival alliances. Their prominent position in the Imperial period is due to the fact that they were the cities with the largest territories in Crete, and this also applies to Hierapytna in the East. What we observe in the Imperial period is the concentration not of military and political power in these cities but the concentration of economic power, related both to huge territories and to new forms of exploitation in these territories. This is connected with the second, and certainly most significant, impact of empire, the reorientation of the Cretan economy.

A new orientation of the Cretan economy
Hellenistic Crete was an area with intensive contacts with the rest of the Hellenistic world. But these contacts primarily took three forms: the service of mercenaries in the Hellenistic armies from the Black Sea to Nubia and from Italy to Iran; the raids of the notorious Cretan pirates in the Aegean; and – related to these raids – transit trade and trade with war booty and slaves.[11] Cretan society from the Archaic to the Hellenistic period was based on

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[4] Bennet 1990, 200-201; Chaniotis 1996, 11-13.
[5] Chaniotis 1996, 27-56; Chaniotis 2005b, 9-12.
[6] Chaniotis 1996, 170-175; Chaniotis 2005b, 12. Cf. Bowsky 1994 (Hierapytna).
[7] Rouanet-Liesenfelt 1994, 17-18.
[8] Chaniotis 1996, 99-100.
[9] Sanders 1982, 3-4.
[10] Rouanet-Liesenfelt 1994.
[11] Mercenaries: Petropoulou 1985, 23-34; piracy: Brulé 1978; Petropoulou 1985, 35-45; Wiemer 2002, 155-176, 341-351; Kvist 2003; trade: Chaniotis 2005a; Hadjisavvas and Chaniotis forthcoming. Many studies of the economy of Hellenistic Crete, in particular by archaeologists, tend to overemphasise and misinterpret the significance of trade in Hellenistic Crete, failing to make a distinction between trade with local products and transit trade or trade with booty.

the military training of the youth, the organisation of citizens in men's houses (*andreia*); and the organisation of common meals (*syssitia*) in men's houses; for the funding of the common meals, the Cretan cities had established a rigid taxation system.[12] Economic production was aimed primarily at funding the *syssitia* with contributions of citizens, the community, and the tithe of the dependent population. Consequently, the economy of Classical and Hellenistic Crete was dominated by the production of staple goods for local consumption. Trade did exist, in particular within the island,[13] but it did not dominate economic activities. Long distance trade also existed, but to the best of our knowledge not in connection with a planned and intensive production of surplus.[14]

All this changed under Roman rule, and it changed abruptly. The military activities of the Cretans could not be reconciled with the rule of Rome. The *syssitia* were abolished and with them the fundaments of the archaic social system. Agrarian production was suddenly freed from the regulations imposed by the system of the *syssitia*. The producer was now free to decide what, how much, and for whom to produce. The ownership of land was no longer confined to a class of privileged warrior-citizens; the legal and social discrimination against merchants and craftsmen disappeared. The impact of this change was all the greater because it occurred in a period in which wars ceased in the Eastern Mediterranean and this area was integrated into the economic network of an empire. The radical changes the Cretans experienced in the last decades of the first century BC are comparable with the effects the introduction of a market economy had in the former East Block in 1989. The impact of these developments was intensified due to two other factors: the payment of tribute to Rome and the migration of a foreign population that ignored the old traditions.

The migration of Italians

Non-Cretans came to Crete both as individuals and in larger groups of colonists.[15] From 65 BC onwards veterans of the great generals of the late Republic were given land on the island; their presence is reflected by the Latin names that gradually appear in Crete.[16] After his victory over Marc Antony, Octavian founded a Roman colony in Knossos, which had been the victim of destructions during the conquest of Crete. The population of Colonia Iulia Nobilis Cnosus consisted of new settlers, probably from Campania, and possibly of a group of the old population that received Roman citizenship.[17] Octavian had settled some of his veterans in Capua, which was compensated by receiving land in the former territory of Knossos.[18] Many families of Campania used this possibility to settle in Crete, as we can infer from the onomastic material.[19]

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[12] Talamo 1987; Lavrencic 1988; Link 1991, 119-121; Chaniotis 1999a, 193-194.

[13] Guizzi 1999a.

[14] Viviers 1999 (transit trade); Chaniotis 2005a. The military relations with other areas explain cultural exchange, e.g., the introduction of Egyian cults (Magnelli 1994/95) or the presence of Sicilian capitals in Gortyn in the late third century BC (Portale 2002).

[15] The best source for migration of Italians to Crete, often via Delos, are the Roman names that are being studied by M. W. Baldwin Bowsky (Bowsky 1994, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2004b).

[16] Bowsky 2001a, 2002a.

[17] Paton 1994, 143; Bowsky 1997, 2002b, 2004a.

[18] Rigsby 1976 and note 17.

[19] Bowsky 1997, 2002b. On the relations between Crete and Campania see also Pagano 2004.

A third important group were traders from Rome and Italy, eager to exploit the island's economic potential.[20] Already in the first century BC an organised group of Roman traders existed in Gortyn.[21] They must have been attracted by the trade in olive oil and wine, and contributed to the economic growth of Crete and its economic as well as social and cultural integration in the Roman Empire.

A substantial part of land property came into the hands of persons who had come from Italy.[22] From their country of origin they were familiar with the possibilities, but also with the risks, of an agrarian production oriented towards exports; they were familiar with the production methods of latifundia. One of the first governors of Crete, Cnaeus Tremellius Scrofa (50 BC),[23] was a specialist in agriculture, but unfortunately we do not know whether his expertise played any role during his short stay on Crete. Among the names that appear on inscriptions related to economic activities (inscriptions on wine amphoras, locally produced clay lamps, etc.) we hardly find any typical, traditional Cretan names (e.g., Sosos, Dryton), whereas Latin names are very common.[24]

The emperor

The most important Roman who had economic interests in Crete was of course the emperor. The interest of the Romans in the years immediately before the conquest was primarily economic in nature. The Cretans were not only dangerous as pirates, they were also notorious for the wealth accumulated in their island in the last decades of the second and in the first century BC, a wealth still visible in archaeological finds of this period. The wealth of Crete in these last years of its freedom may easily be inferred from the amount the Romans requested in order to reach a peace agreement in 70 BC. They demanded the payment of 4,000 talents of silver. This is equivalent to half the tribute the Romans received from all their Eastern provinces.[25] This is an enormous amount, 1/4 of what the entire Seleucid Empire had to pay in 185 BC; if we estimate a day's salary for a mercenary at one drachma, this amount corresponds to a year's salary for 70,000 mercenaries.

We have almost no direct information concerning the payment of tribute by the Cretans during the Empire, and in general we know little about Roman administration on Crete.[26] Since the Roman army was not stationed on Crete, Crete was a senatorial province, governed by a proconsul of praetorian status with his seat in Gortyn.[27] Hardly any of these governors is known for a splendid career, and this suggests that the administration of Crete was not a very challenging job. The emperor Tiberius is known to have sent exiles to Crete,[28] and an ambitious senator might have seen his transfer to Crete as an exile; such senators must have recognised that the emperor did not need their services for one of the

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[20] Bowsky 1999, 2001a, 2004b. On the Roman economic interests in Crete cf. Viviers 2004.
[21] *I.Cret.* IV 278, 290-291; cf. Bowsky 1999, 310-311; Bowsky 2002a, 37-39.
[22] Bowsky 1999, 328-329; Bowsky 2004b.
[23] Sanders 1982, 5.
[24] For Roman names on wine amphoras see Marangou-Lerat 1995, 152-154 (with my comments in *SEG* XLV 1244); on lamps: Chaniotis 2005a, 103-107; on ostraka from Chersonesos: Litinas 1999 (*SEG* XLIX 1218).
[25] Sanders 1982, 3.
[26] Sanders 1982, 5-15.
[27] Roman governors of Crete and Cyrenaica: Bowsky 1983, 1987; Pautasso 1994/95; Reynolds and Alí 1996; Bowsky 2001b, 106-109 (*SEG* LII 1133). For the administration during the Late Republic see Perl 1970, 1971.
[28] Sanders 1982, 7 (Tac. *Ann*. 4.21).

more demanding tasks. But if the job of the Roman governor was not very exciting, there was more for the procurator of the emperor to do.

The imperial procurators were members of the equestrian order who represented the emperor's economic interests.[29] What could have justified the service of imperial procurators in Crete? Did the emperor own land on Crete? This is not attested directly, but it is conceivable. Crete was under the rule of Cleopatra when it fell into Octavian's hands, exactly as Egypt. Egypt remained the emperor's property. What about Crete? If Octavian was in a position to give Knossian land to Capua, then perhaps he originally regarded the territory of Knossos not as property of the populus Romanus, but as his own property. Future epigraphic finds may shed more light on this matter.

We are on safer grounds when we consider the emperor's involvement in the collection of and trade in medicinal plants.[30] With its more than 1200 different plants Crete offers the largest variety of herbs in Europe. From the first century BC onwards we find evidence for a massive export of Cretan herbs that were used in medicine, in the production of perfumes, in cooking, and in magic. The medical authors mention more than 40 different Cretan plants and describe their healing properties.[31] Some of these plants exclusively grew on Crete. Galen, the greatest physician of the Imperial period, stresses in his work *de antidotibus* both the importance of the trade in Cretan herbs and the role of the emperor in this business:[32] "Every year, in the summer, many medicinal plants come from Crete to Rome. The emperor keeps on the island herbalists (*botanikoi andres*), who deliver not only to him but to the entire city baskets full of medicinal plants. Crete exports these herbs to other regions, too, because this island does not lack herbs, fruits, corns, roots, and juices. All the other products are pure, but some juices are adulterated, although this does not happen often. The variety of plants on Crete is so huge, that the herbalists do not really need to cheat their customers". This explains why the emperor needed a procurator on Crete, and I shouldn't be surprised if the emperor owned land in the mountains.

The effects

Commercialisation: the example of the wine trade

The abolition of the *syssitia* and with them of a system of supply for the entire citizen body must have meant a setback for a large part of the population. In particular those citizens who did not own land, but had an income through mercenary service and booty, must have suffered from this development. Nevertheless, after this initial shock, the conquest in combination with the *pax Romana* made new economic activities possible and ultimately contributed to economic growth.

Agrarian production, no longer bound to the public meals, could be oriented to more profitable branches such as the massive production of wine and oil for export. Such a

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[29] Procurators in Crete: Rigsby 1976, 319; Bowsky 1986/87; Chaniotis and Preuß 1990, 196-197; Burton 1993, 21.

[30] Chaniotis 1991, 105-106, 108-109; Rouanet-Liesenfelt 1992; van Effenterre and Rouanet-Liesenfelt 1995; Chaniotis 1999a, 209-210, 219-220.

[31] Chaniotis 1999a, 219-220. For the relation between the glass production in Crete and the exploitation of medicinal and aromatic plants see Taborrelli 1994.

[32] Galen. *de antidot.* XIV p. 9 ed. Kühn. On this passage see the bibliography in note 30.

specialised production required an initial investment and was anything but free of risks;[33] but if successfully implemented it could bring large profit. New archaeological surveys attest to an increasing number of small settlements meant for more intensive exploitation of areas such as the plain of the Mesara,[34] and also to the presence of villas and small production units.[35] A small archive of ostraka discovered in Chersonesos (second century AD) records the delivery of an unknown product (oil or wine) and substantial amounts of money, which reveal transactions connected with the trade of agrarian products.[36]

This new orientation of the Cretan economy can best be observed in the wine trade.[37] Wine was continually one of the most important products from the Minoan period onwards, but intensive wine trade was practised only under Roman rule and in the Venetian period, i.e., in the periods of a foreign rule in which the Cretan economy was oriented towards the west. There can be no doubt that wine was traded, to a limited extent, already in Hellenistic Crete,[38] but the known wine-producing facilities are modest. An agricultural installation of the third century BC in Agia Pelagia was composed of wine-stocking stores of no more than 25 m^2, and the same modest size for vineyards is attested in the same century in an inscription from Kydonia (*I.Cret.* II.x.1). Cretan wine hardly finds any mention in the literary sources of the Classical and Hellenistic period, as opposed to the many references in the Imperial period. Cretan wine was certainly an object of trade, but the Hellenistic evidence supports the assumption that viticulture essentially responded to local needs. Locally produced amphoras with stamps or dipinti are almost entirely lacking, with the exception of a few wine amphoras produced in Hierapytna in the late second century BC; local amphora workshops have been identified only in Gortyn, Keratokambos, and Knossos.[39] The Hierapytnian amphora stamps have been found in Tripitos, close to Hierapytna, in Alexandria, and in Kallatis (west coast of the Black Sea). Even if more Hierapytnian amphora stamps may – and will – be recognized in museums in the future, this cannot be seriously taken as evidence for an extensive wine trade in the entire Hellenistic period and over the entire island. Since one of the most important issues treated in agreements about the employment of Cretan mercenaries was the supply of food,[40] one should not be surprised if Cretan wine amphoras are found in small numbers in Alexandria, the main employer of Cretan mercenaries. What is more important: the Cretan amphoras belong to the latest phase of the Hellenistic period which is a distinct

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[33] Chaniotis 1988a, 83.

[34] Watrous and Hadzi-Vallianou 2004, 351-358; their analysis of the economy of the Hellenistic period (pp. 334-338) is, however, based on a misinterpretation of the written sources. Other surveys confirm this picture (e.g., Archanes, Gournia, Kavousi, Lassithi, Pediada), but also demonstrate regional variations (Akrotiri, Kommos, Vrokastro). Akrotiri peninsula: Raab 2001, esp. 157-163. Archanes: Sakellarakis and Sapouna-Sakellaraki 1997, I 42-45. Gournia: Watrous, Blitzer, Haggis and Zangger 2000, 478. Kavousi: Haggis 1996a, 416-424. Kommos: Hope Simpson *et al.* 1994, 398-399 (however, with no differentiation within the 'Hellenistic period'). Lassithi: Watrous 1982, 24. Pediada: Panagiotakis 2003, 341, 354-365. Vrokastro area: Harrison 2000; Hayden 2004a; Hayden 2004b, 199-219. Cf. Harrison 1991.

[35] Altamore 2004.

[36] Litinas 1999.

[37] Chaniotis 1988a; Marangou 1994; Marangou-Lerat 1995; Marangou 1999, 2004; Yangaki 2004/05.

[38] Chaniotis 1988a, 69-71; Marangou-Lerat 1995, 9-13; Marangou 1999, 270; Chaniotis 2005a, 97-100.

[39] Hierapytna: Marangou-Lerat 1995, 123-124; Marangou 2000; *SEG* XLV 1244; XLVII 1410; L 876, 885; LI 1169; cf. Vogeikoff-Brogan 2004, 216-217. The date has been established by Stefanaki 2001; cf. Stefanaki 2006, 311. Gortyn: Portale and Romeo 2000. Keratokambos: Marangou-Lerat 1995, 67. Knossos: Eiring *et al.* 2002.

[40] Petropoulou 1985, 18.

period in the history of the Cretan economy.[41] Around 145 BC the large Cretan cities (Gortyn, Knossos, Lyttos, and Hierapytna) reached the peak of their expansion and in 110 BC the Cretan wars stopped, marking the beginning of a new period. This period is characterised by intensive raids of Cretan pirates, limited mercenary services, intensive trade in slaves and other booty, and a marked presence of luxury goods in Crete. The Hellenistic wine trade is a limited phenomenon of the very last decades before the Roman conquest. This is also the period in which we observe the production of Cretan amphoras that imitated well-known foreign shapes, and are consequently hard to detect.[42]

Things changed dramatically after the establishment of Roman rule and the coming of Italian immigrants and traders. Cretan wine is the wine more often mentioned in medical works, in particular a sweet wine made of dried grapes (*passum, passon, staphidites* or *hepsema*).[43] Wine is the only Cretan product mentioned in the *Expositio totius mundi et gentium* (64), a geographical handbook of the Imperial period. Its quality is praised in an inscription on a Cretan amphora in Pompeii (*CIL* IV 5526: *vinum Creticum excellens*).

Short texts engraved or painted on Cretan wine amphoras are an excellent source of information for wine production and trade.[44] They give us such information as the names of producers and merchants, the year of the production, the capacity of the vase, the place of production, and the particular variety. It is thanks to such texts, e.g., that we know that Lyttos must have been the most important centre for the export of Cretan wine to Italy. Forty-one amphoras in Pompeii, the largest group of inscribed amphoras found in the city, bear the inscription *Lyttios* ("wine from Lyttos").[45] Archaeological surveys and studies of Cretan wine amphoras and the workshops where they were produced now allow us to identify the Cretan vessels thanks to their form, exactly as today we identify various types of wine, Riesling, Chianti, Bordeaux, etc., from the form of a bottle.[46] So we know that the Cretan wine was massively exported throughout the entire Mediterranean, from Asia Minor to Spain, from the Black Sea to North Africa.

The texts on the Cretan amphoras and on stone inscriptions reveal a specialisation of production for which there is no evidence in pre-Roman Crete. We also have references to different types of wine, such as the sweet *Theraios*, made from grapes imported from Santorini, to the light white *hydatodes*, and to 'aromatic' wines (*aromatikos*) mixed with pepper, saffron, honey, and myrtle berries (*myrtites*) – the latter used in medicine, but also for dying the hair black.[47] Sweet wine (*glykys*) was often mixed with seawater; *athalassos* was wine that did not contain seawater. On an amphora from Eleutherna one reads: "Wine, not mixed with seawater, strong as Hercules".[48]

The export of wine must have contributed to the wealth of Roman Crete, although not every merchant succeeded in making a fortune with this risky business. Artemidorus,

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[41] Cf. Vogeikoff-Brogan 2004; Stefanaki 2006.

[42] Vogeikoff 2000, 71; Eiring 2000, 58; Eiring *et al.* 2002; Finkielsztejn 2002.

[43] Chaniotis 1988a, 72-73.

[44] Collection of the evidence in Marangou-Lerat 1995, 124-154 (with my comments in *SEG* XLV 1244); an addition: De Caro 1992/93 (with my corrections in *SEG* XLVIII 1265); cf. Chaniotis 2005a, 101-102.

[45] Chaniotis 1988a, 75; Marangou-Lerat 1995, 131-133.

[46] Workshops: Markoulaki, Empereur and Marangou 1989; Empereur, Kritzas and Marangou 1991. Typology and diffusion: Marangou-Lerat 1995, 35-154; Marangou 1999, 273-278; cf. Romeo and Portale 2004; Marangou 2004; Yangaki 2004/05.

[47] Chaniotis 1988a, 72-73; Marangou-Lerat 1995, 15-29, 151; cf. Ashton 2002.

[48] Marangou-Lerat 1995, 150 P106; Matthaiou 1992-98; *SEG* XLVIII 1250.

e.g., describes the following nightmare (*Onirocriticon* 4.41): "A big trader from Crete saw in a dream that he was washing his face with wine. A dream interpreter explained: You will be successful with your trade with wine and you will wash your debts away. But he had another thing coming. His wine was spoiled and became as unfit for consumption as water for washing". The names on the amphoras show that this trade was dominated by persons of Italian origin.[49]

The new economic orientation is confirmed by the archaeological evidence. A large building in Tholos in East Crete, may have served the purpose of storage of grain transported from Egypt to Italy via Crete.[50] In Koutsounari, in East Crete, large fish tanks have been identified;[51] and Crete developed into one of the most important centres for the production of lamps that were exported to Asia Minor and North Africa.[52] The impulse for the production of the Cretan clay mould lamps came from Italian immigrants. The names of the most important producers of Cretans lamps (Gamos = Gamus, Sergios = Sergius, Keler = Celer) originate in Italy, and in particular in Campania.[53]

Social complexity

The conquest and economic restructuring of Crete resulted also in a change in the character of social complexity. Social positions in Classical and Hellenistic Crete were defined exclusively according to legal criteria (freedom, citizenship, family);[54] what was praised was military achievement and deeds of manly behaviour.[55] The rule of aristocratic families in Hellenistic Crete was replaced by the rule of a new oligarchy of wealth in Roman Crete. The presence of this oligarchy is visible through the display of wealth and benefactions. Unlike pre-Roman Crete where the various social strata are hardly represented in the epigraphic evidence, in Roman Crete inscriptions represent the whole range of positions, the Roman magistrates, the wealthy benefactors, the women, the slaves, the freedmen, the foreign traders and entertainers, the Jews.[56]

The epigraphic habit in Hellenistic and Roman Crete helps us recognise these differences.[57] Categories of evidence, so well-represented in the source material of the larger Hellenistic world, are entirely absent in Hellenistic Crete. Let us take, for instance, one of the most striking phenomena of the Hellenistic world: the prominent role played by benefactors. They erected buildings, made loans to their cities, cared for their supply with cheap corn, and monopolised political life. Honorary decrees for local benefactors are entirely absent in Hellenistic Crete. In the rest of the Hellenistic world the activities of benefactors are recorded in many types of texts which served their self-representation: honorary decrees, building inscriptions, statue bases, dedications, and luxurious funerary monuments, consolatory decrees after an untimely death, sacred regulations concerning

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[49] Chaniotis 1988a, 85-86; Marangou-Lerat 1995, 154.

[50] Haggis 1996a, 419-423; 1996b.

[51] Davaras 1975.

[52] Mercando 1974; Apostolakou 1987; Papadopoulou 1989/90; Sussman 1995; Sapouna 1998.

[53] Sapouna 1998, 91-117 (cf. *SEG* XLVIII 1202 bis and 1212); Chaniotis 2005a, 103-107. I will discuss this subject in the forthcoming publication of the lamp signatures from the Idaean Cave.

[54] Link 1994.

[55] Chaniotis 2004.

[56] Chaniotis 2004, 82-83. Women: see notes 68-69. Entertainers: *I.Cret.* IV 222-223. Jews: Spyridakis 1988. Slaves and freedmen: e.g., *I.Cret.* III.iv.45; IV 263; *SEG* XLI 745.

[57] Chaniotis 2004.

cults and sanctuaries founded by them. This type of evidence is absent from Hellenistic Crete, but quite prominent in the Roman period.[58] A comparison between the dedications and building inscriptions in the Hellenistic versus the Roman period also confirms this picture. In Hellenistic Crete the epigraphic habit is predominantly public, anonymous, impersonal, masculine, local, and limited with regard to the representation of social groups. The epigraphic habit of Roman Crete is predominantly one of individuals, of men and women, of free persons and slaves, of Cretans and foreigners, of representatives of all social strata. For the first time we encounter honorary inscriptions and honorary statues set up by the cities for magistrates, members of the local élite, benefactors, and intellectuals; honorary inscriptions initiated by associations; and statues set up by individuals for members of their family, for educators, patrons, and friends; honorary inscriptions dedicated by women or for women. Inscriptions concerning economic activities mention freedmen and slaves or persons that may be identified as such because of their names (e.g., Isargyros, Onesimos, Threptos).[59]

In pre-Roman Crete a Cretan identified himself primarily as a citizen of his polis, then as a member of a tribe, of an andreion, as a member of a family.[60] Only outside Crete did he identify himself as a Cretan (*Kres*, sometimes followed by the name of his city), usually as a member of a military unit consisting of Cretan mercenaries. The most important factor of identity, citizenship, lost its significance in the Imperial period. It was not important in a legal or political sense, since the poleis no longer possessed sovereignty similar to that of the Hellenistic period; the assembly of citizens gradually lost its power.[61] Citizenship was not so important in an ideological sense, since the end of the Cretan wars also marked the end of a militant local patriotism. Unified administration through the governor, great mobility within and outside the island, the award of Roman citizenship to many Cretans, and the economic and social bonds between persons from different cities[62] made it less important whether someone was Gortynian, Hierapytnian, or Lyttian. The Cretans of the Empire identified themselves primarily by a social criterion: class.

It is not surprising that most of the sources concern the élite. Public and private inscriptions make men and – at last – women known to us, individuals who occupied a prominent position because of their economic power and their achievement; men such as the high priest of the Cretan Koinon Soarchos, who donated an aqueduct to the Gortynians in the first century AD (*I.Cret.* IV 330), or T. Flavius Iulius Volumnius Sabinus, who acquired the permission of the emperor to organise gladiatorial combats at exceptionally great expense (*I.Cret.* IV 305);[63] women such as Flavia Philyra, probably member of a family of freedmen of Lyttos, who built at her expense the temple of the Egyptian gods in Gortyn.[64] Cretan society was already aristocratic from the Archaic period onwards, and this did not change in the Hellenistic period. The innovation of the Roman period is the

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[58] Chaniotis 2004, 82-83 note 28. See also Martínez-Fernández and Ninioú-Kindelí 2002; Niniou-Kindeli and Christodoulakos 2004, 314-319; *SEG* LII 843-847 (public heroon in Aptera).

[59] Chaniotis 2004.

[60] Chaniotis 2006.

[61] For the decline of the power of the assembly see Chaniotis 1985.

[62] For possible economic networks see the prosopographical studies of Bowsky mentioned in note 15. See also notes 64 and 65.

[63] See also, e.g., *I.Cret.* IV 300.

[64] *I.Cret.* IV 249; Bricault 2005, 374. On her relation to Lyttos see Chaniotis and Rethemiotakis 1992, 37-38. Cf. Magnelli 2006 (on the family of the Petronii).

development of an élite whose activities were not limited to a single city, but extended to the entire island. This new élite, which primarily consisted of newcomers (as we may infer from the names), crossed the boundaries of the civic communities politically, socially, and economically.[65] Its members had a network of personal relations all over the island; their building activities were not limited to their own city.

Only a few of them were recruited by the Imperial administration,[66] possibly because of the small political and strategic significance of Crete and the presence of rather unimportant governors. Senators from Crete are a rarity – the most prominent among them being L. Flavius Suplicianus Dorion Polymnis from Hierapytna.[67]

The new form of social complexity may be observed also in the greater visibility of women.[68] Flavia Philyra has already been mentioned. Ago in Hierapytna founded a private association (*sodalitas*, *I.Cret.* III.iii.7). Women had access to the public bath in Arkades;[69] in Gortyn a new authority, the *gynaikonomoi* (overseers of women), was created precisely because of the more common presence of women in public life (*I.Cret.* IV 252).

Cultural complexity

At first sight Crete gives the impression of a fully integrated province, in the outlook of the cities, in art, especially in sculpture, in the occasional use of Latin in public documents, sometimes in private inscriptions,[70] in the forms of entertainment, in the cults. Roman Crete has a cosmopolitan outlook.

A modern visitor to the ruins of the Roman cities, whether those of the systematically excavated Gortyn or those of Lappa, hidden behind the trees of gardens or built in modern houses, will see what one sees in most cities of the Roman East. A prominent position is occupied by buildings for concerts and spectacles, such as the Odeion of Gortyn or the theatre in the small city of Lissos. Theatres have been found in many cities, e.g., in Aptera, Elyros, Chersonesos, Gortyn, Hierapytna, Lyttos, even on the small island of Leuke (Koufonisi).[71] Theatres are entirely unknown in pre-Roman Crete. Nothing can show more clearly the cultural impact of Empire on Crete than this new architectural form, which went hand in hand with the introduction of cultural events unknown or unimportant in pre-Roman Crete,[72] such as theatrical performances, performances of acrobats and mimes, concerts etc.[73]

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[65] Bowsky 1994, 38; 1995, 51 (Volumnii of Knossos and Larcii of Gortyn), 60 (the Supliciani in Gortyn and Hierapytna); on the contacts of the Cretan aristocracy with that of other areas see, e.g., Bowsky 1995, 44 and 57-59.

[66] The evidence is reviewed by Bowsky 1995, 60-62.

[67] *PIR²* F 375. On senators from Crete see Reynolds 1982; Bowsky 1995, 60-61.

[68] Bowsky 1999, 333-336 and 2000.

[69] Ducrey and van Effenterre 1973.

[70] Chaniotis 1985; Chaniotis and Preuß 1990, 1991; Bowsky 2004a.

[71] Spanakis 1968; Sanders 1982, 57-63; Papadakis 1983 (Koufonisi); Harrison 1993, 139-151; Barresi 2004 and Montali 2004 (Gortyn).

[72] Two foreign mimes are known in Hellenistic Sybrita (second cent. BC): Le Rider 1966, 258; theatrical performances are not directly attested in Hellenistic Crete. For cultural performances in the assembly see *I.Cret.* I.viii.11-12; I.xxiv.1; Chaniotis 1988b. Dance competitions were, however, very important, in connection with the education of the citizens; see Chaniotis 1996, 127.

[73] E.g., *I.Cret.* IV 222 A and B, 223, 305, 309. On the theatres see note 71. On gladiatorial combats and *venationes* in Gortyn see *I.Cret.* IV 305, 309, 373-375; Sapouna 2004, 958.

The ancient visitor to Roman Crete would also see other types of buildings unknown in pre-Roman Crete. The capital city had in addition to a so-called praetorium, three theatres, an odeion, an amphitheatre, a temple of Egyptian gods and monumental fountains.[74] The course of the aqueduct of Lyttos is still visible for a length of 15 km. Aqueducts have been identified in several other places, including Gortyn and Knossos.[75] Baths of the Roman type have been excavated in cities and villas, e.g., in Stavromenos and Makrygialos. Coloured marbles imported from various places, from Thessaly to North Africa and from Athens to the Propontis, are a visible witness to wealth and the display of wealth.[76] Roads and highways crossed the territories of old cities.[77] Marble sarcophagi decorated with reliefs were imported from the workshops of Athens and Italy.[78] Statues were signed by artists from Aphrodisias, Paros, and Athens.[79] The mosaics that decorated temples, villas, baths, and banquet rooms of private houses represent the works of foreign and local artists.[80] And in the large cities, in Gortyn and Lyttos, one admired the statues of emperors, public and private benefactors, magistrates, and governors.[81] None of this is known from pre-Roman Crete; none of this would have been possible in pre-Roman Crete. The division of the island, the lack of a central authority made joint building activities impossible. Citizens distinguished themselves through military achievements and not through benefactions for their community.

This impression of uniformity is nevertheless misleading, and I have intentionally avoided the term 'Romanisation' to characterise the change in Crete after its conquest.[82] Roman Crete was not 'Roman' but an integral part of the economic network of the Roman Empire; it followed the cultural and social trends of that period. Roman Crete is characterised by oppositions and contradictions no less than other Roman regions. In part they can be explained by the different origin of the population, in part as the result of the new social differentiation. I have already mentioned the migration of foreigners. Besides the Italians, we know of immigrants from various parts of Greece and North Africa, later also from Macedonia,[83] as well as a large community of Jews,[84] whose migration

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[74] Sanders 1982, 61-66, 70-71, 73-80, 156-159; Di Vita 1986/87 (amphitheatre, theatre); Ricciardi 2000 (amphitheatre). Nymphaion: Ortega 1986/87. On the urban development in Roman Gortyn see Di Vita 2001, 2004. On Knossos see Paton 2004.
[75] Sanders 1982, 153 (Knossos), 156 (Gortyn); Kelly 2006. For Lyttos see note 3.
[76] Paton and Schneider 1999; Pensabene and Lazzarini 2004. For Makrygialos see note 2.
[77] Tzifopoulos 2004; Bowsky and Niniou-Kindeli 2006.
[78] Sanders 1982, 47-48; Ghisellini 1985; Harrison 1993, 235-238.
[79] Sanders 1982, 48-51. For statues see also note 81.
[80] Markoulaki 1990; Paton 2000; Guimier-Sorbets 2004; Markoulaki, Christodoulakos and Frangonikolaki 2004, 366-373; Sweetman 2004; cf. Sanders 1982, 51-55.
[81] E.g., Guerrini 1974; Apostolakou 1980; Sanders 1982, 48-50; Guerrini 1984; Ghedini 1985; Chaniotis and Rethemiotakis 1992; Romeo 1992/93; Romeo and Portale 1998; Chaniotis 2004, 82-83 note 28 (epigraphic sources). Statues of emperors: Karanastasi 2004; Lagogianni-Georgakarakou 2004b. Portraits: Raftopoulou 1968; Ntatsouli-Stavridi 1981 and 1994-96; Portale 1992/93; Weber 1999 (with the remarks of Fittschen 2000); Lagogianni-Georgakarakou 2004a. The earliest portraits date to the late second or first cent. BC, which represents a separate phase in the history of Hellenistic Crete (cf. note 41); see Lagogianni-Georgakarakou 2006.
[82] Some reflection on why the term 'Romanisation' is inappropriate in Crete in Harrison 2000 and Sweetman 2006. Cf. also Wardle and Wardle 2004, 479-480.
[83] North Africa: *I.Cret.* I.xviii.83?; IV 372. Kos: *I.Cret.* IV 248. Macedonia: Spyridakis 1986.
[84] Noy, Panayotov and Bloedhorn 2004, 249-253; Spyridakis 1988.

from Cyrenaica to Crete from the first century BC onwards seems to be the result of the administrative connection between the two areas.

These immigrants brought their own traditions: the Jews a monotheistic religion, the Campanians new methods of production and the Latin language, but also an interest in entertainment and new funerary practices. Some of the first entertainers ever honoured in Crete are Romans: the pantomime L. Furius Celsus and the comic actor Babullius. The cult of the Egyptian deities had already been introduced in Crete by Hellenistic mercenaries, but its great diffusion is a phenomenon of the Imperial period.[85] New cults, as those of the 'Highest God' (*Theos Hypsistos*)[86] or of the Christian god, competed with the older cults that best corresponded to the needs of the people, in particular with the cults of Asklepios and Sarapis. The appearance of mausolea in Knossos and Gortyn in the first century AD can most plausibly be attributed to Roman influence.[87]

The most important cults in Hellenistic Crete are the cults of patrons of the community and its territory;[88] the most important cults in Roman Crete are those of the personal saviours of the people: the gods of the mystery cults, who promised security in life and a blessed life after death, and the healing god Asclepius, whose sanctuaries in Lebena and Lissos attracted large numbers of pilgrims.[89] If the cult of Zeus in the Idaean Cave revived in Roman times, this is probably due to its connection with a mystery cult and to its association with the Cretan Koinon, and possibly with the emperor cult as well.[90] The cult cave of Zeus on Mt. Ida and the Diktynnaion were closely connected with local myths and could contribute to a local Cretan identity, represented by the Cretan Koinon.[91] The most important new cult, however, was the cult of a mortal. The birthday of the emperor was celebrated in Crete, as it was celebrated everywhere from the Euphrates to Britain, with sacrifices, the dedication of statues, and spectacles.[92]

Despite the integration, despite the construction of a pan-Cretan identity, for example, through the promotion of joint cults, pan-Cretan sanctuaries, the organisation of contests, and the representation of local myths on coinage,[93] we may still observe a tendency towards local patriotism. Cosmopolitanism and the elimination of particularities always provoke reactions. At the same time that the Cretan Koinon constructed a joint Cretan identity,[94] a citizen in Lyttos attempted to re-introduce the *syssitia* that had been abolished three centuries earlier; they were to take place not on a daily basis, but only

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[85] Cult of Egyptian deities in Hellenistic Crete: Magnelli 1994/95; Di Vita 2000; Bricault 2005, 370-375 nos. 203/0101, 0201, 0601-0603, 0901. In Roman Crete: Salditt-Trappmann 1970, 54-66; Vassilika 2004; Bricault 2005, 370-376. For the entertainers honoured in Crete see note 56.

[86] Mitchell 1999, 136 nos. 119-124; Rizzo 2004.

[87] Vassilakis 2004. For a new type of grave monuments in Roman Knossos see Grammatikaki 2004.

[88] Chaniotis 1996, 68-75.

[89] Bultrighini 1993; Melfi 2004; Melfi 2007, 138-149. For the gods of the mystery cults see note 85.

[90] Mystery cult in the Idaean Cave in the Roman period: Chaniotis 1990 (on *IG* XII.6.584). The only stone inscription found there (*I.Cret.* I.xii.2) may be an honorary inscription for an emperor.

[91] Idaean cave: Verbruggen 1981, 99, 178-181; Alcock 2002, 126-129. Diktynnaion: Tzifopoulos 2004; cf. Sporn 2001.

[92] Emperor cult: Rouanet-Liesenfelt 1994. Dedication of statues: Chaniotis and Rethemiotakis 1992.

[93] Alcock 2002, 128; cf. Lagogianni-Georgakarakou 1995, who also stresses the influence from Rome on Cretan coinage. For the increased interest of the Romans in Cretan myths see Capomacchia 2000; Karamalengou 1995; Braccesi 2004; Armstrong 2006.

[94] Alcock 2002, 123-130.

on the occasion of two festivals, the Belchania and the Theodaisia.[95] The latter was the festival during which ephebes were introduced into the citizen body.[96] This initiative may, therefore, be connected with the re-introduction of ephebic institutions.[97] The document consciously uses an Archaic term to describe the tribes: *startoi*. The only other time we find this term in a Cretan inscription is in the laws of Gortyn, more than six centuries earlier.[98] We may detect similar archaisms in the occasional use of the old Dorian dialect[99] or in references to local myths in the Cretan epigrams.[100] In a time of imperial globalisation newly discovered and newly imagined traditions aimed at promoting a local identity.

Conclusions

The picture I have sketched is selective, impressionistic, not complete, and rather peaceful. Our sources hardly ever allow us to go beyond the surface. From Roman Crete we lack personal voices, we lack direct references to conflicts and oppositions that certainly existed. The replacement of the Hellenistic military élite of traditional families by an élite of entrepreneurs in part of foreign origin, the reorganisation of territorial boundaries, the payment of tribute, the competition among cults, are phenomena that entail conflicts. Our sources are silent in this respect, with the exception of indirect evidence concerning disputes about boundaries.[101] The assembly that still played an important role in Hellenistic Crete and in the cities of the Roman East, especially in Asia Minor, disappears from the epigraphic evidence of Roman Crete, unlike the council or the magistrates. In Knossos, the election of the magistrates seems to have been transferred from the assembly to the council, as a Latin honorary inscription implies.[102] Did this happen peacefully and with no conflicts? Our sources tell us something about Roman Crete, but hardly anything about the Cretans.

Let me return to the question of the Patriotic Front of Judea with which I opened this chapter. What have the Romans ever done for Crete? Roman Crete appears different from Hellenistic Crete: pacified, cosmopolitan, and multifaceted with regard to society and economy. The Romans did not introduce social complexity, but they changed its character; they did not invent cultural complexity, but they enhanced it. The most radical changes were the establishment of Cretan unity and the integration of Crete into the economic networks of the Mediterranean. An external central authority was necessary to implement intensive economic cooperation among the various regions of Crete. And here we see a convergence between Roman and Venetian Crete.[103]

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[95] *I.Cret.* I.xviii.11; Guizzi 1999b. Cf. Alcock 2002, 118-121 on local memories.

[96] Chaniotis 1996, 126.

[97] An ephebos is mentioned in *I.Cret.* I.xviii.123, possibly not as an indication of age, but of an institutionalised age-class.

[98] *I.Cret.* IV 72 col. V LL. 5/6; cf. *I.Cret.* IV 80.

[99] E.g., *I.Cret.* I.xviii.12, 13, and 51. On Greek identity in Roman Lyttos see Bowsky 2006.

[100] Vertoudakis 2000, 133-183.

[101] Rigsby 1976; Chaniotis 1986, 193-194; Chaniotis and Preuß 1990, 200-201.

[102] Chaniotis 1985.

[103] Cf. Bennet 1990, 201-208.

References

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Crete between the Byzantine and Venetian Empires

Maria Georgopoulou

The island of Crete during the Venetian period constitutes an interesting case for the exploration of issues of transference of cultural and political forms from the mother city to a distant colony and the formation of a maritime empire. The Venetians ruled Crete for four and half centuries (1211-1669) during which the island, a crucial possession for strategic, geographic, military, and commercial reasons, saw a distinct if gradual incorporation into the commonwealth of the Venetian Empire. Long before the Venetian Empire extended on the Italian peninsula (*Terraferma*) it had reached distant lands far away from Venice (*Oltremare*). Connected through a network of maritime routes traveled by convoys of commercial galleys[1] and governed by officials who lived in the colonies for short periods of time (two years as a rule for the governor of Crete called *duca di Candia*), the Venetian Empire resembled in some aspects the early modern Empires of the British and French and in some other aspects the Roman Empire.

In this chapter I explore the ways in which certain architectural and urban features of the mother city were replicated in the colony in order to forge political and cultural associations with the mother city. While in many instances of modern colonization there was a violent imposition of the 'national' traditions of the metropolis, which undermined and often obliterated the local heritage of each colony, the Venetian colonies exemplify a different pattern: an exchange of cultural forms that allowed the colonizers to maintain a smooth transition from the former Byzantine to the new Venetian hegemony. Rather than impose totally new configurations in the urban space but also in many other aspects of the colonial administration,[2] the Venetian colonists reused the existing urban structure of the city where they planted some new edifices associated with the new regime on the island. The central public spaces were renamed to fit the exigencies of Venetian rule but the city continued to work according to the old customs so as not to disrupt the character of the urban space. Gradually, new associations were formed and by the middle of the fifteenth century the urban space was literally and symbolically related to the mother city.

Colony or province

Before moving into my central argument, I will explore the notion of colony in the context of Venetian Crete. According to Webster's dictionary a 'colony' refers to "a body of people settled in a new territory, foreign and often distant, retaining ties with their motherland or mother state". The terms of colony and province had a distinct juridical meaning in the Roman period; given that late medieval Venice saw itself as an heir to the Roman Empire it is important to explore these notions in their medieval reincarnation.

The Roman Empire was constituted during the many centuries it lasted by a varying number of provinces (*provinciae*), i.e. a more or less remote region brought under

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[1] Lane 1973, 67-85; Stöckly 1995.
[2] Maltezou 1995.

Fig. 1. The Venetian colonies in the Mediterranean context.

the control of the Roman government, while the word colony (*colonia*),[3] which would have had a great fortune between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, was used to indicate a specific type of settlement far from the city, founded by public act. In the Republican period it consisted of Roman citizens who went there voluntarily retaining their citizenship and rights, and had a regular organization by the parent state and laws that regulated it. Old Roman colonies were often garrisons planted in conquered towns, and the colonists had a portion of the conquered territory assigned to them. Whether founded to control hostile populations on enemy territory, to send off unwanted persons, to increase the population or to provide land for veterans as Sigonius states in the sixteenth century, a *colonia* was a part of the Roman state, and was itself a *res publica*.[4] The old inhabitants retained part of their land and lived together with the new settlers, who alone composed the proper colony. The conquered people must at first have been quite a distinct class from, and inferior to, the colonists.[5] Their condition is not easy to define. They were not Roman citizens, nor yet were they *socii*; it appears also to be clearly proved by numerous instances that the condition of the conquered people among whom a colony was established, was not originally always the same; something depended on the resistance of the people, and the temper of the Romans, at the time of the conquest or surrender.

Here it is not possible to follow the lines along which the term and notion of colony, used by the Romans in the case of single cities having a special status in Italy or in the provinces, came to be used to indicate regions and countries belonging to the British and French in the early modern period, but we need to offer a brief discussion of Crete as a colony of the Venetians since it has been most often considered as such.[6] Fairly recently Sally McKee has presented Venetian Crete as "the premier example of pre-modern colonization", and has stressed the successful bureaucratic apparatus through salaried agents that kept the distant territory in check stating parallels in medieval Genoa, Aragon, Castile and England.[7]

The official document that dispatched colonists to Crete in 1211, the *Concessio insulae Cretensis*, does not use the term colony and the settlers are simply described as *milites* and *pedites*, terms that refer to their obligations in the settlement of Crete.[8] Lorenzo de Monacis, who had served as Venetian chancellor on Crete (1388-1428), in his chronicle of Venice refers to the island as "colonia Venetorum",[9] whereas in the sixteenth century the island is referred to as *regno di Candia* from the name of the capital city of the island, which was the seat of the Venetian governor. The chronicler Antonio Calergi presents Roman colonization as the best way to "maintain the loyalty of the people and the subjugated cities".[10] In fact, he introduces the Venetian colonization of Crete as a

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[3] Salmon 1969; Laffi 2003.

[4] Sigonius 1560.

[5] The definition of *coloniae* by Gellius (16.13) – "[...] ex civitate quasi propagatae sunt"; "populi Romani [...] quasi effigies parvae simulacraque" – stresses this. It can be noted that, when speaking of Roman settlements in the north of Italy, Strabo remarks (5.1.10) that the ancient names of the places were retained, and that though the people in his time were all Roman, they were called by the names of the previous occupiers of the land.

[6] The most influential book on the Venetian colonization of Byzantine lands after the Fourth Crusade is Thiriet 1959.

[7] McKee 2000, 5, 9-18.

[8] Tafel and Thomas 1856-57, II, 129-136.

[9] Lorenzo de Monacis 1758, 153 (book 9). The same term appears in Cornaro 1755, II, 226.

[10] Calergi, 699-702.

continuation of antique Roman practices, which he describes in this way: "I Romani…
subito che Cittade alcuna era nella loro potesta venuta illetto quel numero de' suoi, che
pareva loro bassevole, ne gli mandavano ad habitare. Et questi erano chiamati colonie"
(the Romans…as soon as a city came under their jurisdiction, they elected a number of
their own people that seemed sufficient, and they sent them to inhabit [the city]. And
these were called colonies). Accordingly, the island of Crete will be presented as a colony
and not as a province in the following pages.

The historical context

Following the Fourth Crusade of 1204 Venice established its control over a large network
of Mediterranean cities and islands which had formerly belonged to the Byzantine
Empire: Zara, Ragusa/Dubrovnik, Durazzo on the Dalmatian and Albanian coast, Modon
and Coron in the Peloponnese, Crete, and Euboea in the Aegean to name only a few (Fig.
1).[11] Venetian emporia (commercial bases) were set in the Levant from Constantinople
to Alexandria. The term that the Venetians used to designate their maritime empire, the
Oltremare, stresses the distance between Venice and its colonies along the coast of the
Adriatic, the Ionian, and the Aegean Seas. On the other hand, in its political, administrative,
and architectural organization Venetian Candia resembled to some extent the mother
city as a Venetian Senator claimed in 1455 (*considerando quod civitas Candide est alia
civitas Venetiarum apud Levantem*) in order to urge the authorities of Venetian Crete to
take measures for the cleanliness of the city.[12]

I have already argued[13] that the colonies of Venice played a vital role in the very
formation of the identity of the city. Whereas until recently the study of the relations
between Venetian and Byzantine culture was confined to Venice and Constantinople and
neglected the rest of the Venetian and Byzantine commonwealth,[14] the continual exchange
and transfer of cultural forms from the metropolis to the colonies and vice versa should
alert us to the fact that the colonies should not be seen as passive receivers of culture but
rather as active participants in the formation of a culture of empire. Indeed, the dominion
of Venice cast its net widely: it incorporated customs, practices, and forms peculiar to the
colonies directly into the heart of the metropolis. Thus, the inquiry into the architectural
styles in Venice and its colonies proves a slippery ground as it drifts between the familiar
and the foreign: was Venice's Byzantine façade a result of the colonial experience? Was
there in the minds of the people a clear, meaningful distinction between 'Byzantine' (i.e.
Eastern, Christian Orthodox, Greek) and 'Gothic' (i.e. Western, Latin Catholic, Venetian)
forms? Finally, how were the colonies constructed in the rhetoric of the Venetian regime
and in the minds of the colonists living in the *Oltremare*?

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[11] On the Fourth Crusade and the fragmentation of the Byzantine Empire see R. de Clari, ed. Lauer 1924; Carile
1965; Nicol 1988, 149-50.

[12] This phrase was used in a discussion on Crete at the Venetian Senate in 1455, see Thiriet 1958-61, III, 205-
206, no. 2994.

[13] Georgopoulou 2001.

[14] See for example the preface to Nicol 1988, viii, where we read that a book on diplomatic and cultural
relations cannot make extensive use of documents concerning trade and commercial interests. Nicol writes:
"The book might have been entitled *Constantinople and Venice*. But this would have obscured the fact that
Constantinople was the hub of the wheel of a wider world which the Venetians half admired and half despised,
and which in the end they sought to appropriate, to exploit it for their own profit and honour".

Fig. 2. Candia/Herakleion, *platea* (Liontaria).

Thinking about all this in a post-colonial frame of mind, it is not difficult to construct models concerning the architecture of empire and the overwhelming power that urbanistic and architectural associations with the metropolis had on the fabric of the colony. Indeed, numerous examples of urbanistic and architectural choices on the part of the Venetian authorities confirm schemes that have been observed in modern imperial configurations.[15]

It is fortuitous that a recent work on Cnossos, the only Roman colony on Crete, established in the 20s BC, offers us a model that allows us to appreciate the process of colonization by the Venetians in the thirteenth century. Rebecca Sweetman presents the formation of the Roman colony as a gradual process, one that retains parts of the local culture and eventually makes the colony a part of the Roman Empire in a globalization scheme whose ultimate effects cannot be seen until almost 100 years after the foundation.[16] This view questions static notions of colonization and offers a paradigm that proposes a model of "a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding".[17] It also allows for issues of agency to be dealt with and puts the question of intentionality-unintentionality into discussion as well as that of diversity of reactions across an empire.[18] All this fits well with what happened during the time of Venetian presence on Crete.

Crete was contested by the Genoese and the Venetians who, in 1211, managed to take control of the island. One of the first acts of Venice was to send settlers to the region around Chandax, a city that they renamed Candia, modern Herakleion. More settlers came from Venice in the course of the thirteenth century to colonize other parts of the is-

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[15] Among the evergrowing literature on the topic, see indicatively Celik 1997; Crinson 1996; Metcalf 1989; Mitchell 1988; Prochaska 1990; Wright 1991.

[16] Sweetman 2007.

[17] Waters 1995, 3 (in Sweetman 2007, 65).

[18] Sweetman 2007, 66.

Fig. 3. Plan of the *platea* and the old city of Candia, Christoforo Buondelmonti, *Descriptio insulae Candiae*, c. 1419 (Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, ms. Plut. 29.42, c.17 [1429]). By permission of Ministero per i Beni e le Attività Culturali, Italy.

land. They were given agricultural estates and were expected to keep a house in the cities, which were the seat of government and became the sole places with a numerous Latin population. Of their original residences and governmental palaces little remains, but many of the churches of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are still standing and give us valuable information on building practices at the beginning of Venetian rule. Until the sixteenth century there was no standing army and the defense of the island relied on these settlers/colonists who were referred to as knights (*milites*) and sergeants (*pedites*) according to the extent of their landholdings.

After a rough first century dotted with numerous revolts on the part of the Greek landowners, Venetians and Greeks found a *modus vivendi* and the island became actively involved in the culture of the Venetian Empire while allowed to keep many of its Byzantine traditions and individual traits, including its Orthodox faith albeit curtailed from the central Constantinopolitan ecclesiastical hierarchy. I have already argued that the deep knowledge that the Venetians had of Byzantium and its culture was partly due to the long cohabitation of Venetians and Greeks on Crete, where many Byzantine traditions were appropriated and from where some Cretan/Byzantine customs were transferred to Venice.[19]

The Piazza San Marco

My aim in this section is to explore the potential of cultural symbols to foster new power relationships when reused in different political situations by looking at the symbolic architectural trappings used in the establishment of the colony of Crete. Special attention will be paid to the space in front of the church of St. Mark, called *platea* and later piazza San Marco, as it was recreated in Candia/Herakleion (Figs. 2, 3, 6), the capital city of Crete. This highly charged space was key to creating an effective monumental language of empire on overseas territories; similar foci of imperial power existed, however, in almost all Venetian colonies. Its formal characteristics, linguistic designations, and the civic rituals held therein will be studied in order to explore the degree to which the

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[19] This process widened the Republic's cultural horizon and offered her novel ideas on how to deal with situations at home especially in three areas: the cult of the patron saint of Crete/Venice, the rituals centering on icons of the Virgin, and the establishment of a segregated Jewish quarter, see Georgopoulou 2001.

Fig. 4. Gentile Bellini, *Saint Mark Preaching in Alexandria*, 1509 (Milan, Pinacoteca di Brera).

architectural profile of the metropolis left distinct traces in this constructed image of the colonial/imperial space.

In and of itself such a resemblance is not unique. What is peculiar in the case of the Venetian Empire is the *flexibility* that the colonists had in 'reproducing' a space by incorporating certain of its main features. This similarity could be as vague as the mere presence of a Venetian consul and church (often dedicated to St. Mark), as fictitious as an imaginary view of Alexandria painted by Gentile Bellini in 1509 (Fig. 4), or as deep and complex as an actual imitation of the central public spaces in Venice (Fig. 5). What will become apparent by the end of this section is that the Venetian colonists

Fig. 5. Venice, Piazza San Marco, view.

did not necessarily reproduce architectural forms but rather topographical arrangements and names of monuments. Thus, the replication of urban features of the mother city in the colonies had to do with semantics and symbolic representations rather than with the reproduction of buildings.

Until 1204 Venetian emporia in the Levant shared a number of features: a Latin church to promote the official religion of the Venetian settlers and serve their liturgical needs – obviously different from the rite of the locals, a palace/administrative building, a warehouse (*fondaco*), and a communal oven. A public loggia (*loza* or *lobia*) was often included in the colonial privileges secured by Venetians in the East. The establishment of Venice's Empire formalized the arrangement of these structures. Foremost among Venetian sites recreated in the colonies was the church of St. Mark and the open space in front of it – the Piazza San Marco – which replicated Venice's main square if not in form at least in name, organization, and usage. To set the stage, I first look at the Piazza San Marco in Venice, then move to an investigation of the same space in Candia and to an analysis of the individual monuments that defined the space.

Saint Mark had a close, almost personal association with the doge that was brilliantly expressed in the ducal chapel in Venice: in the metropolis the basilica of San Marco was connected to the ducal palace and the ceremonial of the church centered on the appearances of the doge and his retinue.[20] By the beginning of the thirteenth century the ducal chapel of San Marco had become a symbol of the magnificence of the Republic. The Piazza San Marco was a landmark of Venice as it was unique in size, regularity, and monumentality among Italian cities. The Venetian piazza was more regular and at least ¼ larger than other piazzas in Italy (Bologna, Florence, Siena, Vicenza).[21] Even before the sixteenth century when Jacopo Sansovino regularized the boundaries of the piazza, the church of San Marco, the Gothic Palazzo Ducale, and numerous private houses belonging to the Procurators of San Marco were not heterogeneous but boasted the dual heritage of the city: a Latin Christian religious affiliation vis-à-vis a strong cultural kinship with Orthodox Byzantium. Obviously the Venetians were trying to emulate Constantinople, the most glorious of medieval cities in the Mediterranean at this period, with its great esplanades surrounded by porticoes: the *Augustaion*, the forum of Constantine, and that of Theodosius were surrounded by porticoes (*emboloi*) which were in use until the fifteenth century. The use of the Piazza San Marco was also almost imperial with its display of spoils and its ritual activities.

Dedicating a chapel to the patron saint of the Republic was a long established method to mark the presence of Venetians on foreign soil. Such chapels were established in Acre, Tyre, Constantinople, Palermo and Beirut in the twelfth century. The Genoese and Pisans did it as well. Obviously in theory the basilicas of the Venetians were related to the original church of St. Mark in Alexandria, but in fact the basilica in Venice was a replica of the church of the Holy Apostles in Constantinople and not of the inconspicuous martyr-

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[20] The importance accorded by the Venetian Republic to Saint Mark and the saint's critical role in the construction of the "myth" of Venice has been the object of numerous studies. For an extensive bibliography, see Sinding-Larsen 1974; Muir 1981.

[21] It covers an area of 12,100 square meters whereas the others are barely 9,500 square meters. More new buildings were built in Venice (seven or ten) whereas in Bologna, Parma there were six and usually three or four (Brescia, Padova, Verona, Vicenza). See Schultz 1992-93. The central square of most Italian cities was surrounded by heterogeneous edifices belonging to many different owners and did not command a large expansive space, e.g. Siena's piazza del Campo or the two piazzas delle Erbe and della Frutta in Padova.

ium of St. Mark in Alexandria. In the newly established colonies after the Fourth Crusade we hear of a church of St. Mark on the island of Euboea in 1209, in Candia in 1239, in other cities in Crete a bit later, and the cathedral of Curzola in Dalmatia even later in the thirteenth century.[22] There are no traces of the cult of Saint

Fig. 6. Candia/Herakleion, church of St. Mark (Hagios Markos), portico.

Mark in Traù, Spalato, Sebenico, Ragusa, or Zara, but a trace can be found in the small peninsula in the bay of Spalato, the borgo of Venezia Piccola with a small church of St. Mark.[23] In Durazzo, Corinth, Thebes, Abydos, Almyros, and Rodostos the Venetians had churches dedicated to different saints.[24] Most of these churches were administered by priors who in addition to their spiritual and religious activities also administered the possessions of the church, often supervised the weights and measures that were kept within the church, and acted as notaries or agents of Venetians abroad especially in the case of death.[25] Clearly the church of St. Mark and its keeper played a highly political role in the colonies.

Despite the similarities in name, very little in the outlook of the spaces opening in front of the churches of St. Mark in Venice's maritime Empire could have recalled their counterpart in the mother city. So how did the transfer of symbols work? As in the political organization of Crete, which was the first full-fledged colony of the Venetians, in urbanistic terms the capital city of Candia closely followed patterns of the mother city.

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[22] The cathedral of Curzola, one of the most splendid religious monuments of Dalmatia, was dedicated to Saint Mark, the patron of the city and the island. The church, a three-aisled basilica, constructed in the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries was built on the ruins of an earlier church. Its stupendous portal displays colonnettes and the bust of a woman dating on stylistic grounds to the late thirteenth century, possibly the wife of Diocletian who according to the legend had laid the foundations of the earlier church. The sculptor of the portal was Bonino da Milano, see Semi 1996, 600.

[23] Semi 1996, 602-603.

[24] In some instances the Venetian churches were dedicated to other popular saints such as St. George or St. Nicholas (in Durazzo, Corinth, Thebes, Abydos, Almyros, and Rodostos) – presumably when a preexisting house of prayer was reused. In Durazzo the Venetians owned the church of St. Andrew which must have been the parish church (probably in 1082). In Corinth, Thebes, and Abydos the Venetians owned the church of St. Nicholas in mid-twelfth century. In Almyros the Venetian colony was served by the church of St. George which had been given to the monastery of San Giorgio Maggiore, a major landowner in the Venetian colonies. In Rodostos there was also a church dedicated to St. George and a church near the *fondaco* dedicated to the Virgin. In Adrianople there was a Latin monastery dedicated to the Virgin, see Ferluga 1992, 700 and 704.

[25] Ferluga 1992, 704-705.

Fig. 7. Zorzi Corner, *Città di Candia*, 1625 (Biblioteca Marciana, Ms. It. VI, 75 [8303]).

The Venetians attempted to reproduce the successful scheme of the connection between the doge and Saint Mark on Crete, where the office of the *duca* of Candia emulated that of the Venetian doge and the colonial government of Crete attempted to reenact – in a provincial way – the situation in Venice. At the time of the first Venetian settlement in 1211, Saint Mark's feast day was introduced as one of the four most important feasts of the liturgical calendar of Crete.[26] As we see in the 1625 map by Zorzi Corner (Fig. 7), by the seventeenth century the church of St. Mark was singled out as the most significant monument for the colonial government, held by the personification of the city. The church is clearly shown with its prominent bell tower, on which the flag of the Venetian Republic is waving.[27] Civic ceremonies celebrating important events in the life of the colony included the parade of sacred relics and miracle-working Byzantine icons.[28] All this centered on the *platea* in front of the church of St. Mark.

This church demarcated a significant part of the urban space. It stood close to the land gate on the main square, which was named after it. Across from the church lay the ducal palace duplicating practices in Venice. The actual church of St. Mark in Candia (Fig. 6) was completed between 1239 and 1244, when a bell-tower was constructed to the south of the church following the model of the Piazza San Marco in Venice. Using marble from Ierapetra the Venetian colonists were granted papal permission to lay the

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[26] Tafel and Thomas 1856-57, II, 132-133.
[27] Map: Zorzi Corner, *Il regno di Candia* (10th of November 1625), Venice, Bibl. Marciana, Ms. Ital. VI, 75 (8303). Although this is the first personification of the city that has survived, the artist must have been inspired by an earlier image where the Venetian character of the city is symbolized by the ducal basilica.
[28] Papadaki 2005.

foundations for this first new Latin church on the island.[29] It was placed directly under the jurisdiction of Rome and, like the church of San Marco in Venice, it was not subject to the local archbishop,[30] but was administered by a state official (called *primicerius*).[31] This was the only church of St. Mark in the Eastern Mediterranean that duplicated the situation in Venice.[32]

This church defined a primary space within the city: the *platea* or piazza, which had probably been the primary market place of the city of Chandax since Byzantine times and was located in front of the land gate of the city. As the prime business sector of the city, the *platea* became an emblem of the new role that Crete played in the international Mediterranean trade after the arrival of the Venetians and justified their presence in Candia from a pragmatic point of view. By the fourteenth century numerous artisans and vendors of foodstuffs were based there, doing business either in their own workshops and boutiques, or selling their merchandise on public benches rented to them by the state. All important public official monuments (the church of St. Mark, the Latin cathedral, the ducal palace, the loggia, the palace of the general, the public warehouse, the land gate) were placed around the piazza, sanctioning the commercial and economic transactions taking place therein. Representing the government and the official faith of the Venetians, these religious and administrative buildings, in conjunction with the major stately rituals which culminated in this area, stood as a visual symbol of Venetian supremacy in every level of colonial life.

Public usage of the area further emphasized its central position in the life of the city as it did in the other colonies of the Venetian Empire. The utilitarian monuments that were closely related to the civic landscape and to the well being of the citizens, such as the loggia, the tower of the clock, the public warehouse, and the public fountain, were all structures which meant to accommodate and serve the members of the élite and the higher middle class (merchants and professionals). As the foremost symbols of the commune, these public edifices promoted the official functions of the Venetian state. In Candia one of the primary monuments linked with Venice was the *lobium* (loggia), a place used for public announcements, meetings, and gambling. Originally located on the waterfront, in 1325 it was moved to a more salubrious and prestigious location across from the church of St. Mark on the piazza. The public auctions of state property were only allowed here after Sunday Mass. During these occasions the piazza became a theatrical stage for the higher Venetian officials: the duke and his counselors, supervised the event from the loggia of the church of St. Mark. Their personal involvement in the distribution of state lands offers a concrete example of state authority, one that can be paralleled with the nearby pillory (*berlina*) intended to punish crime publicly.

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[29] The letter of pope Gregory IX (Tafel and Thomas 1856-57, II, 349-51) reads: "[...] vos (milites Cretenses) quandam Ecclesiam in fundo proprio ad honorem Dei et beati Marci Evangeliste in ciuitate, que dicitur Candida, sita in insula Cretensi, construere intendatis, et fundum ipsum Romane Ecclesie duxeritis offerendum [...]".

[30] Fedalto 1972, 163 argues that the Venetian feudal lords of Crete addressed their letter to the pope, because either the archbishop's post in Candia was vacant, or the archbishop was not present in Crete at the time. A third possibility that Fedalto has pointed out is that the people did not want to be subjected to the archbishop, so they left the control of the church to the Apostolic Seat.

[31] The basilica of San Marco in Venice was also administered by a *primicerius* in association with the Procuratia of St. Mark's. The *primicerius* was responsible for the spiritual care of the basilica, while the procurators managed the sanctuary and the treasury. See Cornaro 1758, 198; Perocco 1984, 65.

[32] Pozza 1996, 615.

Fig. 8. View of St. Titus, detail from G. Clontzas, *Istoria ab origine mundi*
(Biblioteca Marciana, Ms. Graec. VII, 22 [1466], f. 150r).

The church, which immediately after the Ottoman conquest of Candia was converted into the mosque of the Defterdar Pasa, is still standing and is now used as a gallery and lecture hall. Its simple Gothic form is still seen in the gilded crochet capitals which crown the nave arcades and the columns of the portico, which is referred in the medieval sources as a *loggia*.[33] The city herald stood here to make public announcements. The bells regulated the offices, the closing of the city gates, and the beginning and end of the work day.[34] A clock that was set on the west wall of the *campanile* in 1463 served the needs of the market and the population, following the example of Venice.[35]

Yet, the church of St. Mark in Candia was not the most important Latin church of the city: that role was reserved for the Latin cathedral, a converted Byzantine church which was completely rebuilt in the mid-nineteenth century, dedicated to the local patron saint of Crete, St. Titus (Fig. 8). Being the seat of the Orthodox metropolitan in the Byzantine period, the site of the cathedral of the city had acquired a primary importance in Byzantine Chandax and was certainly recognized as the most sacred spot of the city by both Venetians and Greeks in the early thirteenth century. The cathedral was located on the main artery of the city, the *ruga magistra*, about 50 meters to the north of the *platea*. Originally, it was preceded by a large open space that opened to the street. The cathedral was thus the first large Latin church that one saw when walking on the main street from the harbor. It was only in the seventeenth century that the construction of the new loggia and the *armeria* obstructed the view to the church. All sources maintain that by 1211 the relics of St. Titus, the patron saint of Crete, were located in the Byzantine metropolitan church of Chandax.[36]

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[33] Unfortunately, we possess no documentary information on the construction of the portico of St. Mark's in Candia, a feature which was constructed *de novo* by the restorers in the 1950s. The sources inform us that the church of San Marco in Venice was adorned with a *loggia* as late as 1283. Clearly, for the Venetians the term *loggia* designated something other than a narthex, since the church of San Marco in Venice had a narthex from early on. In Venice the portico was erected in an area that previously had been occupied by three arches (*archivolti*) and a well at the beginning of the market; according to the prescriptions of the *Maggior Consiglio* it should measure approximately 10.50 meters. See Cessi 1931-50, III, 29 and 35.

[34] Pozza 1996, 616.

[35] The clock was transported from Venice, see Maltezou 1988, 141.

[36] *Bibliotheca Sanctorum* XII, 505 and Georgopoulou 2001, 109.

After 1211, the Venetians appropriated the Byzantine church. We have no record of a major modification of the church, but we can surmise that the liturgical layout of its interior was changed to conform with the Western rite, presumably by creating new chapels and multiple altars. The church had a dome but it is not sure whether its form was centrally planned or basilical. The cathedral of St. Titus was one of the most significant landmarks of Venetian Candia as it attracted Christians of the Greek and Latin rite who venerated the holy relics inside the church. It was, thus, the best spot to publicize the patron saint of Venetian Candia. It was also the space that housed a miracle-working icon of the Virgin, so-called Mesopanditissa. An icon with a pedigree relating it to Constantinople and the hand of Saint Luke was hailed as a palladium of the colony because it had brought peace to Crete after a revolt.[37] Thus, the cathedral had been incorporated into the foundation myths of the colony.

Let us return to Saint Mark. In contrast to the emphatically Byzantinizing form of the church of San Marco in Venice, its counterpart in Candia was an elongated basilica conforming to the latest artistic style in Western Europe. In both Venice and Candia, the church that contained the relics of the patron of the city was the one built according to the Byzantine style: San Marco in Venice and the cathedral of St. Titus in Candia were presented as martyria. As such they had to look old, and for the Venetians this meant that the churches had to be built according to the style of centuries past, that of Byzantium. Within this frame of mind, the ducal chapel of St. Mark in Candia had no reason to resemble a Byzantine structure. On the contrary, as a symbol of the newcomers it stood in the center of Candia to advertise their alterity and the particular strand in their artistic heritage that was different from that of the local Byzantines. The basilica of St. Mark was there to show the new blood that had arrived in the colony. Unlike the Venetian basilica of San Marco, the church of St. Mark in Candia and other similar churches built in the colonies were totally different in appearance: they were elongated basilicas displaying a Gothic stylistic pedigree, albeit of a simple variety especially in what concerns the vaulting of the nave and the façade.[38] As if to boast their religious alterity, these Latin churches, implanted in Eastern Orthodox Christian or Muslim cities, surely stood apart from other local monumental landmarks in these cities. Thus, our church shared the formal characteristics of the churches of other newcomers on the island: the Franciscan and Dominican friars whose churches advertised a strong Gothic character.

Contrary to the situation in Venice where the church of San Marco had almost usurped the rights of the cathedral, the Latin Cathedral of St. Titus in Candia remained the most significant church in the city. Obviously, the tension between the Greek and Latin rites demanded different solutions in the realm of ecclesiastical authority in the colonies. Whereas in Venice the ducal chapel of San Marco commanded the formal religious demeanor of the Republic through its clergy, its ceremonial, and its unique sanctity, the chapels/churches that were dedicated to Saint Mark were far less important in the religious life of the colonies. Despite their titles which resonated the direct sanctioning of Venice, they functioned as small state chapels, their maintenance being left to the discretion of the local government. Whether or not they followed the ceremonial of San Marco in

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[37] Georgopoulou 2001, 217-223.

[38] Although we can be certain about this in the case of the thirteenth century colonies and the churches built in the Holy Land, we have for the moment no way of knowing the appearance of the Venetian churches of Constantinople.

Venice, or they ever functioned as parish churches, the various churches of St. Mark must have come to life primarily during special state ceremonies including the inauguration or funeral of Venetian officers. Their imposing silhouette which emulated Venetian Gothic architecture of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries made them monuments of a foreign power that addressed an audience broader than the local inhabitants and the colonists – it visually created an architectural language of Empire. This was equivalent to what was accomplished in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the lions of St. Mark used as billboards on the city walls and the fortifications throughout the Venetian Empire. Consequently, they had minimal impact on the formation of the urban fabric except in a highly symbolic manner.

Similar patterns are discernible in Ragusa, an independent Republic that never fully submitted to the Venetians. The non-Gothic form seems to have been proper for the most famous church of the town: the church of the patron saint Saint Blasius that was not subject to the Venetians – we must imagine that the original building also had a non-Gothic form. On the contrary the Rector's palace (built between 1436 and 1465) displays in the cross-vaulting of its portico and in the imposing biforal ogival windows a full array of Italianate Gothic forms. Obviously, the choice of architectural style went beyond religious allegiance (in the case of Ragusa both locals and colonists followed the Latin rite) to signal the dominant style of Venice.

Since in practice similar binary oppositions are rarely played out so clearly in the built environment, especially in the case of Venice, the overtly Gothic chapel of St. Mark in Candia is a crucial monument for exploring these issues. In the colonies that formerly belonged to the Byzantine Empire, St. Mark's distinct Gothic style dissociated the church from the famous 'Byzantine' basilica in Venice and emphasized it as an imported edifice, foreign to the indigenous, Byzantine tradition. As this is obvious to the art historian today, it would also have been clear to anyone familiar with the exquisite public buildings of Venice. Venetian settlers and itinerant merchants of various nationalities were familiar with Venice. Moreover, many residents of the Levant would have heard of Venice's beauties. So, whatever statement the Venetian churches made in the colonies it would have had greater impact on the international community than on the locals.

As a church dedicated to the patron saint of the Republic, the chapel of St. Mark was a primary colonial symbol which linked the colonies with Venice and dissociated them from Constantinople. The churches of St. Mark were built according to the current stylistic trends in Venice (visible mostly in the new churches of the Franciscans and the Dominicans) indicating that, following the Fourth Crusade, the city of Venice had come of age. The Republic was no longer looking to Byzantium for artistic and cultural inspiration; as the head of an empire Venice could dictate its own novel artistic forms. Thus, they could appropriate the past and impose the present at will.

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Centre–Periphery Relations:
Crete in the Eighteenth Century

Antonis Anastasopoulos

Crete, which had been ruled by Venice since the early thirteenth century, was conquered by the Ottoman army between 1645 and 1669. In fact, most of Crete was brought under Ottoman sovereignty during the first two years of the campaign against it, and only Candia (Ottoman Kandiye, today Heraklion), the biggest city on the island, held on until 1669, when its defenders were finally forced to capitulate.

The change of sovereignty meant that Crete passed from the control of an aristocratic, Catholic republic to that of a monarchic Muslim empire with no formal aristocracy.[1] It also meant that the island politically joined the rest of the Eastern Mediterranean, as the Ottoman Empire acquired the single most important territorial unit outside its authority. Apart from a new political structure and a new administrative (and élite) language, the Ottoman conquest brought along Islam, and, in consequence, a significant change in the profile of the island's population. It is believed that conversion rather than immigration was the major factor which contributed to the emergence of Muslim communities throughout the island;[2] under the new regime prospects for upward social mobility for the local population were greatly improved if one became a Muslim, and the desire to become tax-exempt through recruitment to the military corps became, as Molly Greene has convincingly argued in her seminal work about Ottoman Crete, a major motive for widespread conversion of indigenous Cretans to Islam.[3] Conversion may have been somewhat facilitated by the fact that Catholic Venice had long hindered the proper functioning of the Christian Orthodox Church, as it prevented its bishops from establishing themselves on the island, but, on the other hand, there is convincing evidence for the existence of strong Orthodox feeling in Crete during the Venetian period.[4] Therefore, Greene's argument that widespread conversion under the Ottomans should primarily be attributed to the confusion brought about by the lengthy war, along with clashes within the Orthodox community after the Ottoman conquest of Candia, sounds much more plausible.[5] Furthermore, evidence from the Ottoman judicial registers (*sijil*) of Kandiye confirms that conversion to Islam was not restricted to the early decades of Ottoman rule, but continued until the nineteenth century.[6] It was perhaps the shallow understanding of Islam by the many converts and their descendants that made a state agent, the governor of Kandiye, issue two decrees around 1700 as a reminder that Muslims were obliged to observe the five daily prayers, and that Muslim women were not allowed to display their facial

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[1] For a review of the historical development of the Venetian view of the Ottoman Empire as the basis for discussing the emergence of the notion of despotic rule, see Valensi 2000.

[2] Peponakis 1997, 22, 37, 161; Andriotis 2006, 81-82.

[3] Greene 2000, 37-38, 41-44; cf. Valensi 2000, 30, 47 for reports of Venetian ambassadors according to which there were Venetian subjects who converted to Islam in the hope of a career in the Ottoman army or navy.

[4] Greene 2000, 175-178; Lassithiotakis 2004, 55, 58-60.

[5] Greene 2000, 40-41. Cf. Peponakis 1997, 38.

[6] Peponakis 1997, *passim*, esp. 37-39, 49-52, 65-67, 135-139; Andriotis 2006, 96-99.

features in public.[7] Such decrees (be they extra-ordinary or routine) may be considered in relation to the preponderance of Islamic principles in the organisation of the land regime in Crete, as will be discussed below, in the context of a more general strengthening of Islamic orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the seventeenth century. In this regard, it is somewhat ironic that relatively extensive Islamisation, in principle a success, most likely meant imperfect Islamisation.

Crete's incorporation into the Ottoman realm manifests certain peculiarities. First of all, Crete is an island; not only was access to islands more difficult since they could only be accessed via the sea route,[8] but islands may be seen to form 'closed systems' with a strong local identity, in which local élites and officials can enjoy more independence from central state control than their counterparts in mainland territories.[9] Crete is a sizeable island which in no way constitutes a single or homogeneous administrative or social unit; given its size, the multitude of settlements, the diversity of its geography and the significant difficulties posed to accessing its rural interior,[10] it has been described – with only slight exaggeration – as a "miniature continent", which, furthermore, fed a rather substantial population.[11]

Moreover, Crete was conquered late in comparison with most Ottoman territories; therefore, it was organised according to the ideas and conditions of the time of its conquest and not as most Balkan and Anatolian provinces had been in the past. The major difference was that even though after the early successes of the Cretan campaign it seems that full implementation of the 'classic' *timar* (granting tax revenues to the provincial cavalry in return for military services) system was envisaged, two decades later, when the conquest of the island was completed, there was a change of heart. More specifically, the Treasury did not take over (practically) the whole of extra-urban land – as expected and practised for centuries – in order to distribute its fiscal revenues as *timar*s to the provincial *sipahi* cavalry or farm them out as *mukataa*s (tax district) but private ownership of the island's land with full proprietary rights was declared legal through invocation of the precepts of the holy law of Islam. Such a policy was in violation of the imperial *kanun* law, which in earlier centuries had been the guiding principle behind the management of land and its fiscal revenues in the Ottoman provinces.[12] As such, it was a major break with the past,

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[7] Stavrinidis III, nos. 1537 (-), 1539 (1700); cf. Stavrinidis I, no. 90 (1658).

[8] Pirates and corsairs were one factor which obstructed easy access to Crete. Also the Venetians held the islets of Gramvoussa until 1692, and Spinalonga and Souda until 1715, and hoped to re-conquer Crete as they did with the Morea in 1685.

[9] For islands under Ottoman rule, see Vatin and Veinstein 2004. See also Kolovos 2006, esp. 19-20.

[10] Crete is rather mountainous and overland routes were of very poor quality in the Ottoman period (Andriotis 2006, 29-30, 32-33; Bonneval and Dumas 2000, 245-306 [but it should be noted that Dumas did not always stick to the main road]).

[11] There are no reliable population data about Ottoman Crete prior to the nineteenth century, but it would be safe to assume that the island's population exceeded 150,000 people at the turn of the eighteenth century, while most foreigners who visited Crete later in that century estimated the number of inhabitants at (well) beyond 200,000 (Greene 2000, 52-54; Andriotis 2006, 76-96). The expression "miniature continent" is used by Greene after Fernand Braudel (Greene 2000, 19).

[12] For the texts of the 1650 and 1670 *kanunname*s, see Gülsoy 2004, 315-325; cf. Veinstein 2004, 93-94, 106. See also Gülsoy 2004, 298-310: in 1650 there were 54 *zeamet*s and 995 *timar*s on the island; after the conquest of Kandiye, the *sipahi timar* system was abandoned, and all *zeamet*s and *timar*s were given to army personnel stationed in the three major towns. For the 1670 (the exact date is not certain) *kanunname* and the land regime after the conquest of Kandiye, see Greene 2000, 25-29, 33-35; Stavrinidis I, nos. 396 (-), 398 (1669); Karantzikou and Photeinou 2003, entries nos. 247 (-), 249 (1669).

which, in Greene's view, served the interests of the conquering élite: "the oligarchy that conquered Crete – headed up by the famous Köprülü family – was careful to reserve the riches of the island for itself, rather than to parcel out the land to the sultan's soldiers".[13] Greene's interpretation focuses on the notion of a clash between sultanic authority and élite households in the seventeenth century, as well as on the need of the latter group to acquire a more stable base of wealth in the light of the gradual 'aristocratisation' of the Ottoman political establishment. Gilles Veinstein, on the other hand, associates the application of a land and tax regime more in conformity with the *sharia* in Crete with the personality and religious beliefs of Grand Vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha.[14] However, the recognition of private property rights could also be treated as a sign of pragmatism on the part of the central Ottoman state, that is, as an acknowledgement of the limited usefulness of the *sipahi* system on an island such as Crete in the second half of the seventeenth century.[15] If we consider this political decision in the context of the peculiarity of island societies, we could claim that detaching land ownership, the major source of wealth, from the Sultan's control was fitting for an island, as it further emancipated it (and especially its élite) from restrictions imposed by external factors.[16] Besides, it should be noted here that the right to own rural private property served not only the interests of "the oligarchy that conquered Crete" and its descendants on or outside the island, but in the long run also those of indigenous families or groups (even if to a lesser degree), or of those who with time became localised.[17]

From an administrative point of view, Crete became a province (*eyalet*) consisting in the eighteenth century of three districts (*sancak*), further subdivided not into judicial-administrative units (*kaza*), as the normal administrative order would have required, but into sub-units (*nahiye*).[18] Officials with the rank of pasha were appointed governors in the three *sancak*s of Kandiye, which hierarchically enjoyed precedence over the other two, of Hanya (Chania) and Resmo (Rethymno).[19] The same three cities also served as the seats of judges (*kadı*), who appointed deputies (*naib*) in the *nahiye*s,[20] with the judge of Hanya being considered hierarchically superior to the other two and sometimes addressed as the *kadı* of Crete.[21] A chief financial official (*defterdar*) with jurisdiction over the whole

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[13] Greene 2000, 7, 27-28; cf. Bierman 1991, 59-63.

[14] Veinstein 2004, 104.

[15] In this respect, it is worth noting, I think, that the *timar* system was applied in Kamenets, which was conquered in 1672 (Finkel 2005, 275); maybe this was because the danger of losing Kamenets to enemy attacks was much more real than the danger of losing Crete. See Faroqhi 1984, 263-266, for the proliferation of private landownership in Kayseri in Anatolia.

[16] Veinstein suggests that legal 'experiments' were easier on islands than in mainland provinces (Veinstein 2004, 104-106). In the Cyclades, which were much smaller than Crete and with not as much cultivable land, private ownership of all the land had been introduced since the sixteenth century (Kolovos 2006, 57, 61, 75-76).

[17] Cf. Salzmann 2004, 98-100, for the inequality of opportunities for figures of the centre and those from the provinces.

[18] Gülsoy 2004, 225-227. There were 20 *nahiye*s on the island in 1650 and 1670. Eighteenth-century *sijil* entries also refer to *nahiye*s.

[19] Greene 2000, 22-23; Mantran 1986. Initially, the Ottomans retained the Venetian division of the island into four districts: Hanya, Resmo, Kandiye and Istiye (Gülsoy 2004, 223-227; Greene 2000, 46 n. 7).

[20] See, for instance, Stavrinidis IV, no. 2364 (1746). *Naib*s made Ottoman justice more readily available to non-urban populations, but occasionally they were accused of abuses (Stavrinidis III, no. 1683 [1704]).

[21] Adıyeke and Adıyeke 2000, 447-448. According to the two authors "… the kadı of Chania was regarded as the hierarchical superior of the other Cretan kadıs, an arrangement which has no parallel in other parts of the Ottoman Empire" (448).

of the island was established in Kandiye,[22] while janissary forces guaranteed security. Crete technically was a frontier region (*serhad*),[23] and its establishment as an *eyalet* certainly reflected its importance for the Ottomans.[24] Furthermore, this development may be taken to underline Crete's distinctiveness in that it was a sizeable island,[25] which was to a certain extent a world apart from the rest of the Ottoman realm in having been Venetian territory for four and a half centuries, and thus a 'different old world' entering the Ottoman orbit at an advanced stage in the Empire's history. On the other hand, one may also speculate that the balance of power at the time of its conquest played a part in the establishment of the *eyalet* of Crete as a separate administrative unit.[26] If personal or familial élite aspirations and considerations influenced the land-regime arrangements in Crete, then the same factors could account for the overall administrative organisation of the island; in a way, Crete was a land of opportunities (even if modest ones) for ambitious Ottoman officials.

Istanbul's appointees in the island's top administrative and judicial posts constituted the most formal channel of communication between Crete and the imperial centre. A 'secondary' channel was created when episcopal authority was reinstated on the island, and a Christian Orthodox Metropolitan and bishops were appointed and placed under the authority of the Patriarch in Istanbul.[27] For the Ottoman state, prelates were farmers of church taxes and heads of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of their dioceses, and their appointment and authority were ratified by the issuing of a patent (*berat*) by the Sultan.[28] Actually, however, nuclei of political and economic power and domination were formed around them; for instance, in 1718 the Metropolitan and the bishops of the island were those who put forward the name of the candidate for secretary to the governor's council (*divan*), the office through which non-Muslims were represented in this body.[29] Furthermore, bishops were privileged in that the fact that they held *berat*s meant that they could count on the assistance of Ottoman officials whenever their authority was contested or the collection of their tax revenues was hindered by their flock or outsiders.[30]

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[22] Tukin 1996, 88.

[23] See, for instance, TAH ('Turkish Archive of Heraklion', Vikelaia Municipal Library, Heraklion), *kadı sijil* no. 32/p. 32 (1781) and 32/80/entry no. 1 (1782).

[24] According to Tukin 1996, 87, Crete became a privileged province ("*imtiyazlı bir eyalet*").

[25] Size, revenue and resources, distance from the mainland, and historical circumstances were factors which influenced how an island was administered. For instance, Samos was granted to the grand admiral Kılıç Ali Pasha as his private holding (*mülk*) in 1584 and he endowed it (*vakıf*) to his mosque (Laiou 2002, 45); for the Cyclades under Ottoman rule, see Slot 1982 and Kolovos 2006, 34-85.

[26] It is interesting to note that in around 1670 Cyprus was brought under the authority of the Grand Admiral at the request of the island's élite (Anagnostopoulou 2002, 268-270), and a reasonable option would have been to do the same with Crete. Most Aegean islands belonged to the province (*eyalet*) of the Islands of the Mediterranean, also governed by the Grand Admiral; for evidence of the expansion of the authority of the Admiral and of the notion of the province of the Islands of the Mediterranean, especially in the eighteenth century, see Laiou 2002, 52-54 and Emecen 2002, 254-255. When conquered in 1715, the island of Tinos, which is much smaller than Crete and belongs to an insular complex, joined the rest of the Cyclades as part of this province.

[27] Cf. Kolovos 2006, 17, for the Cyclades. For resistance to the authority of the Patriarch and the Metropolitan, see, for instance, Stavrinidis III, no. 1578 (1701).

[28] Stavrinidis III, nos. 1617-1619 (1702). Fiscal revenues from the Church were split between state authorities in Crete and Istanbul (Tomadakis 1960, 9).

[29] Stavrinidis IV, no. 1938 (1718). For more information on this office, see below.

[30] Stavrinidis III, no. 1564 (-).

Bishops and the Metropolitan were only one aspect of an extensive network of tax farmers, which constituted the third formal channel of communication between Crete and the centre, since major tax farms were auctioned in Istanbul and chains of principal contractors in the capital and local sub-contractors on the island were formed.[31] The networks of tax farmers from Istanbul down to Crete, as well as the informal arrangements that led to their formation, are an aspect of centre–periphery relations which largely eludes us.[32] Ottoman sources suggest that certain taxes and market duties were auctioned locally through the *defterdar*,[33] while others were on offer in Istanbul or were held by persons from outside Crete;[34] however, even in the former case, the central authorities maintained and exercised their right to intervene when irregularities had been reported to them or when other issues arose.[35] It should further be noted here that taxation and market dues were not the only means through which the centre intervened in the economic and commercial life of Crete. Thus, for instance, from time to time state decrees were issued which imposed the dispatch of olive oil and soap from Crete to Istanbul for the needs of its population,[36] while the provision of Crete with cereals, in particular wheat, and issues related to the local market and handling of cereals were also a source of concern for the state authorities.[37]

Finally, another channel which connected Crete with Istanbul were those major endowments (*vakıf*) which had been established by high-ranking officials who participated in the conquest of Crete or were governors in the early Ottoman period, and were later administered by their descendants in Istanbul or elsewhere. For instance, when the people of Sphakia complained to the Porte in 1760 about abuses in the collection of the poll tax, their petition was forwarded to the government by Fatma Hatun, a princess of the house of Osman and a descendant of Gazi Hüseyin Pasha who was the head of the Ottoman military forces in Crete in the mid-seventeenth century and founded a large *vakıf* which included the region of Sphakia; Fatma was in the 1760s the administrator (*mütevelli*) of this endowment.[38]

Taxation, that is, surplus appropriation by the state and the ruling élite, was in Crete, as all over the Ottoman Empire, an issue about which the subjects of the Sultan quite often lodged complaints to the Porte.[39] On the basis of published Ottoman sources, one may infer that Cretan taxpayers rebelled mostly against the abuses of the tax collectors rather than about taxes as such. Furthermore, it seems that collective petitions about tax issues mostly came from non-Muslims, especially about the poll tax (*cizye*) that they were

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[31] See, for instance, Stavrinidis IV, no. 2458 (1750) (even though the *malikâne* [life-long tax farm] holder, Ragıb Mehmed Pasha, was at the time posted in Sayda, he should be counted as an Istanbul figure). The *malikâne* system was introduced in Crete in 1720 (Çizakça 1996, 171-174).

[32] On tax farming, see Salzmann 1993 and 2004, esp. chapter III; Greene 2000, 21-22.

[33] See, for instance, Stavrinidis I, no. 107 (1658); Stavrinidis II, no. 553 (1672); Karantzikou and Photeinou 2003, no. 753 (1750). Cf. Salzmann 1993, 404-405 and Salzmann 2004, 101.

[34] Triantafyllidou-Baladié 1988, 194; Salzmann 2004, 108-109 and n. 140, 122 n. 2; Cezar 1986, 44 n. 37.

[35] Stavrinidis II, no. 553 (1672); Stavrinidis V, no. 2840 (1765). Cf. Salzmann 2004, 156.

[36] Triantafyllidou-Baladié 1988, 145; Bonneval and Dumas 2000, 230-232; Stavrinidis V, no. 2814 (1764); TAH 32/47 (1781).

[37] Greene 2000, 74; Triantafyllidou-Baladié 1988, 172; Stavrinidis IV, no. 2241B (1735).

[38] Stavrinidis 1955, 293-298. Cf. Stavrinidis V, no. 2822 (1764), as well as Stavrinidis IV, nos. 2082 (1723) and 2128 (1724) for a mosque in Istanbul with property in Crete.

[39] For *sijil* entries concerning taxation, see, for instance, Stavrinidis III, nos. 1616 (-), 1632 (1703).

required to pay because of their religion.[40] If this impression proves to be accurate and we are not misguided by the sources which have become available to date, we may surmise, as scattered evidence from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century suggests,[41] that a possible reason for the general absence of tax-related grievances by Muslims is that many among them had managed one way or another to become tax-exempt, which is not out of line with developments in other Ottoman provinces;[42] in this respect, we should not forget that Crete was "the janissaries' island", as Greene calls it,[43] which means that numbers of Muslims could claim tax exemption because of their military status.

As a result of its self-representation as a defender of the weak against the abuses of power-holders, the central government – or its local representatives, basically governors and judges – could prove a useful ally for tax-paying communities in their disputes with tax officials or creditors,[44] even though things were not always settled simply with the issuing of a decree in the taxpayers' favour: the mechanisms required to enforce a decree were often lacking, the dispatch of special agents from the centre, charged with overseeing the restoration of order, could result in onerous payments for the local population who were required to meet their expenses, or a disgraced official could later return to power and seek vengeance upon his accusers. On the other hand, it is meaningful to reiterate here two observations which have been made as to other regions, but apply, I think, to eighteenth-century Crete as well: first, that the distant imperial centre often represented for the subjects a benign agent, the abode of justice, so to speak, as opposed to the local élite and local officials – who were mostly state appointees or associated with the Istanbul élite – of whose abuses and oppression taxpayers had first-hand experience; second, that part of the court business came, as seen in the Kandiye *sijil*s, not from the town itself but from villages around it or further afield,[45] which suggests familiarisation of even the rural population with the workings of Ottoman institutions (the stationing of *naib*s in certain major villages must have contributed to this), and also acceptance of their usefulness in dispute resolution.

Taxation was also a factor that shaped the pattern of self-organisation of Cretan communities (at least among the Christians). It became habitual for the Christians of the various settlements, but also regions, to appoint representatives (*kethüda*) whose main task was to manage their financial affairs, mostly tax payments,[46] but who also represented their communities before state authorities if need be.[47] These representatives sometimes

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[40] Stavrinidis 1955, 293-298, 305-311.

[41] Bonneval and Dumas 2000, 213; Peponakis 1997, 54.

[42] Raymond 1973-1974, 659-671; McGowan 1994, 665; Canbakal 2005, 47-48.

[43] Greene 2000, 33. Cf. Ivanova 2005, 240 for the case of Vidin, which was a frontier town, as Crete was a frontier province, and Inalcik 1977, 40 and n. 42.

[44] Stavrinidis III, nos. 1614 and 1646 (1703), 1642 (1704), 1655 (1703); Stavrinidis V, nos. 2735 (1761), 2775 (1762); cf. Stavrinidis V, no. 2840 (1765). Central-state decrees could also go against taxpayers: Stavrinidis IV, no. 2353 (1745); see also Salzmann 2004, 143-146.

[45] See, for instance, Stavrinidis III, no. 1587 (1703); Stavrinidis IV, no. 2273 (1739); Karantzikou and Photeinou 2003, no. 800 (1751).

[46] Stavrinidis III, nos. 1554 (1702), 1560 (1703), 1561 (1702), 1565 (1702), 1566 (-), 1567 (1702), 1572 (-), 1575 (-); Stavrinidis IV, nos. 1909 (1717), 2437 (1750); Greene 2000, 33. Cf. Stavrinidis V, no. 2788 (1762) for the city of Kandiye.

[47] See, for instance, Stavrinidis III, nos. 1588-1613 (1703); Stavrinidis IV, no. 2438 (1750).

were priests or bishops, which is an indication of the social role of the clergy.[48]

Incorporation of Crete into the Ottoman imperial fabric was not an easy task, and it took until the first third of the eighteenth century before things were stabilised. The war for Crete lasted for more than two decades, and then Ottoman sovereignty was contested for almost another half century by the Venetians, who hoped to regain control of the island. Furthermore, factionalism and power struggles at the top imperial level and the involvement of the Empire in a devastating war between 1684 and 1699 meant that the late seventeenth century was not an easy time for the Ottomans in general. Thus, Crete was not to experience very strict central control, as the Empire had started to enter a phase of so-called 'decentralisation'.[49]

Lack of or resistance to strict central control was multifaceted and manifested itself on various occasions. Its most meaningful expression, symbolically and practically, was, as already noted, the legalisation of private land ownership, which, although initiated by the central élite, also benefited the local Cretan élite, whether indigenous or 'imported'. Furthermore, Crete had its own treasury, which was independent of Istanbul. This arrangement apparently was in keeping with its frontier and island status and in principle made funds more readily available in emergencies, but, as a result, the central government was not, according to a sultanic decree of 1765, familiar with the details of the island population's fiscal obligations.[50] Other, lesser manifestations of challenge to the centre may include, for instance, a decree which the chief officer of the janissary corps in Istanbul issued in 1703. This decree granted the imperial janissaries of Kandiye their request that they be allowed to bequeath their estates to their children, contrary to 'classic' imperial order which forbade janissaries on active service to marry.[51] Such a concession was neither a novelty nor a Cretan peculiarity, but given the more general context, it is interesting to note the willingness of the centre to acknowledge social realities and the precedence of social stability in the provinces over imperial law and the Treasury.

Signs of resistance to central control may be detected among the island's Christians, too. As already noted, the Venetians did not allow Orthodox bishops to settle on the island. The appointment of a metropolitan in Kandiye provoked a long conflict with the Sinai monks, who saw him as an instrument of the Istanbul Patriarchate and, thus, as an outside challenge to their spiritual, political and economic authority over the faithful. More specifically, the Monastery of St. Catherine on Mount Sinai had an uninterrupted centuries-old presence on Crete and the monks who represented its interests on the island prevented the Metropolitan in Kandiye from acquiring a church in which to officiate until 1735, while between 1715 and 1718 it was made possible by sultanic decree for the Cretan notables to replace the Istanbul Patriarchate in the selection of the Metropolitan. Even though by the 1730s the monks were made to accept the Metropolitan's precedence and the construction of a new cathedral, their long fight can be seen as another manifestation of

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[48] See, for instance, Stavrinidis III, nos. 1561 (1702), 1574 (-), 1576 (-), 1592 (-), 1594 (-), 1599-1600 (1703), 1608 (1703); Stavrinidis IV, no. 2446 (1749); Stavrinidis V, no. 2586 (1755).

[49] For an influential paper centred on the notion of Ottoman 'decentralisation', see Inalcik 1977. Decentralisation is not tantamount to total lack of central control or chaos.

[50] Stavrinidis V, no. 2840 (1765); see also Cezar 1986, 331 and Salzmann 2004, 174-175 (Damascus is cited as another independent treasury in this document). Cf. the special tax status (*serbestiyet*) of some Aegean islands, which ideally guaranteed freedom from unauthorised exactions (Laiou 2002, 45; Emecen 2002, 257-258).

[51] Stavrinidis III, no. 1631 (1703); cf. Raymond 1973-1974, 671-677, 728-729.

a power game between Istanbul and the Cretan élites in which the former was represented by the Metropolitan and the latter by the Sinai monks. On the other hand, the full picture is undoubtedly much more complicated, even if we view this case strictly as a clash between centre and periphery – as we do here. In this respect, it is worth noting that the conflict started when the chief dragoman Panagiotakis Nikousios, that is, a representative of the centre, fell out with the first Metropolitan of the Ottoman era, Nikiphoros Patelaros, and decided to side with the Sinai monks. Patelaros was a native Cretan, thus a local element, but also a relative of the Patriarch and now his representative on Crete, while the monks, who were based on Crete and most likely were indigenous Christians, technically represented the interests of a non-Cretan institution on the island. Then, the clash was brought to an end in the 1730s under a metropolitan, who arrived from outside the island and was entrusted by the Patriarch with restoring canonical order, but was himself Cretan-born, thus representing some sort of a compromise, since Kandiye's Christian élite had long fought for indigenous metropolitans. Furthermore, the Kandiye church which the dragoman Nikousios had donated to the Sinai monks, and had been the original bone of contention, was from the start brought under the direct authority of their rival-to-be, the Patriarch (*stavropigiako*), and not of the Metropolitan of Crete as would have been expected, obviously because of this prelate's quarrel with Nikousios. Eventually, a compromise was reached here, too, as it was agreed that half of the church's revenue be given to the Metropolitan.[52]

The fact that a new church was allowed to be erected in 1735, in blatant violation of the precepts of the Islamic holy law on lands conquered from the infidels,[53] brings us to the issue of the attitude of the Ottomans towards their non-Muslim subjects in Crete, which often seemed to be one of inclusion. Thus we see that certain office-holders were non-Muslims; for instance, the chief architect (*mimarbaşı*) in Kandiye and his staff were sometimes Christian.[54] However, Ottoman willingness not to altogether exclude non-Muslims from the island's administrative hierarchy was primarily manifested in the creation of the office of the non-Muslim secretary to the council of the Kandiye governor (*kapu yazıcısı*). The secretary acted as an interpreter, but also played a part in tax collection (of the Christians' poll tax in particular) and the handling of various affairs which concerned the non-Muslim population of the island. He had three assistants in Kandiye, and representatives in Hanya and Resmo, and, according to a mid-eighteenth-century source, he held his office as a life-long tax farm (*malikâne*).[55] Nikolaos Stavrinidis, a pioneer in the study of Ottoman Crete, has correctly associated the appointment of a Christian secretary-interpreter in Crete with the proliferation of non-Muslim state interpreters both in the centre and in the provinces in the second half of the seventeenth century.[56] However,

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[52] This discussion of the conflict is based on the account and analysis of Greene 2000, 175-194. Greene (2000, 200-201) treats the conflict as a persistence of the old Venetian regime in a new political environment, and suggests possible ties to Venice. See also Stavrinidis 1981, 400.

[53] It is interesting to note that, according to a *buyruldu* (governor's decree) of 1771, which stipulated the status of the Sphakia region, building new churches was forbidden, as such a practice violated the holy law of Islam (Laourdas 1947, 288). Rossitsa Gradeva has remarked that "it seems that political considerations were often a stronger argument than the legal framework" as far as Ottoman policy towards non-Muslim cult buildings was concerned (Gradeva 2006, 206).

[54] Stavrinidis III, no. 1678 (1704); Stavrinidis IV, nos. 1993 (1720), 2183 (1730), 2276 (1739).

[55] Greene 2000, 194-195; Stavrinidis 1981, 398. See, also, Stavrinidis IV, nos. 2184 (1731), 2444-2447 (1749); Stavrinidis V, nos. 2721 (1761), 2803 (1764), 2812 (1764), 2818 (1764).

[56] Stavrinidis 1981, 397.

the fact that Bonakis, one of the early-eighteenth-century secretaries, maintained, with the consent of the religious and secular leadership of the Christian community, his post even after he had converted to Islam may suggest not only the blurring of religious identities in Ottoman Crete, but also the association of the office of secretary more with local élite interests than with a particular religious community.[57]

As far as the presence of non-Muslims on the governor's council is concerned, a similar, but more extensive, phenomenon may be observed in the eighteenth-century Morea. There the governor's council included not only a Christian dragoman, who among other things played a part in tax collection, but also two or three Christian notables as representatives of the Christian communities of the peninsula; in what may be the splitting of the single Cretan office into two, the Moreot dragoman was, according to Greek sources, assisted by the secretary of the Morea, head of the dragoman's bureau and in charge of financial affairs.[58] The Morea is in fact a province that shared certain common traits with Crete. Even though not an island, the Morea was connected with mainland Greece by a narrow stretch of land, and the Ottomans recognised this geographical peculiarity by rendering it, like Crete, an *eyalet* in its own right; furthermore, the Morea had a large non-Muslim population and a rather strong Christian élite, and was a region which in the eighteenth century was re-conquered from the Venetians, who held it between 1685 and 1715. As in Crete, the presence of Christians on the governor's council may be treated as a manifestation of the desire of the Ottoman authorities not to alienate their non-Muslim subjects where sizeable non-Muslim populations lived, and a sign of their willingness to incorporate the Christian élite into the governing élite, and thus use it as a sort of cushion between state institutions and the common subjects.[59]

Following the transitional first half-century of Ottoman rule on Crete, the island became, in Greene's words, "more tightly integrated into the Ottoman Empire in the course of the eighteenth century".[60] Occasional hiccups, such as janissary revolts,[61] did occur from time to time, but they were not of the sort that would put Ottoman sovereignty at risk, even though, according to certain reports, the janissaries were a constant source of trouble and oppression in the second half of the eighteenth century, and the Istanbul-appointed governors were unable to bring them under control.[62] Even the Daskaloyiannis revolt, carried out by Christians in the south-western region of Sphakia in 1770, really was in itself a hiccup, though it is significant because it signalled the first serious, albeit isolated, armed challenge to Ottoman authority as such on the island

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[57] For Bonakis, see Stavrinidis 1981, 401; Greene 2000, 197; Stavrinidis IV, nos. 1938 (1718), 2010 (1720). In Greene 2000, 203-205 can be found the author's interpretation of fluid religious identities.

[58] Kyrkini-Koutoula 1996, 176-177.

[59] For the Morea, see Kyrkini-Koutoula 1996, 124-180. Kyrkini-Koutoula (1996, 174) notes that the Morea dragoman was not necessarily a local person.

[60] Greene 2000, 193.

[61] Peponakis 1997, 45; Stavrinidis V, nos. 2767, 2770-2774, 2778, 2780 (1762). The 1762 *sijil* entries refer to what appears to have been a very serious janissary mutiny in Kandiye because of a considerable delay in the payment of their wages. It seems to have seriously upset city life for a while, but Ottoman sources indicate that it did not take long for order to be restored.

[62] Peponakis 1997, 53-67; Andriotis 2006, 36; cf. Bonneval and Dumas 2000, 213-214 (but see a contradictory comment on p. 217). Peponakis claims that one result of extensive oppression, especially by janissaries, was larger numbers of converts to Islam from the 1790s onwards (Peponakis 1997, 65-67). For the weakening of the authority of provincial governors in other provinces, see Marcus 1989, 86-94 (Aleppo); McGowan 1994, 663-664 and Zens 2002, 94-103 (Belgrade); Raymond 1973-1974, 8-16 (Cairo).

from within (even though with Russian encouragement).[63] Having argued above that Cretan taxpayers rebelled mostly against the abuses of tax collectors rather than against the Ottoman regime as such, we should note that the first manifestation of the Sphakia rebellion was, according to an Ottoman imperial decree, the refusal of the local Christian population to pay the poll tax and the expulsion of the tax collector.[64] On the other hand, Daskaloyiannis was a wealthy Christian merchant, who reportedly dressed in Western clothes, was in contact with Western culture, and was fluent in Italian and Russian;[65] in other words, he may be classified not so much as a member of the traditional élite in whose structures he had in fact served prior to 1770,[66] but rather as belonging to a new Western-orientated mercantile class which in the long run played an important part in the 'national awakening' of the Christian Balkan peoples and the preparation of the national movements and/or revolutions against Ottoman rule in the nineteenth century. In Daskaloyiannis' revolt, Crete meets the Morea again, as in both places Russian-instigated revolts headed by members of the indigenous non-Muslim élites broke out in 1770 with little success.[67] One of the side-effects of the revolt – and an indication of the adaptability of Ottoman administration when circumstances required – was the unification of the three *sancak*s of the island under one chief governor based in Kandiye,[68] apparently in order to better meet a possible Russian military challenge.

Since the history of Ottoman Crete, as we know it today, is largely the history of seventeenth-century conquest and organisation of the new province and nineteenth-century ethnic and sectarian violence, with the notable exception of relatively few studies which focus on the period in-between, our knowledge of eighteenth-century Cretan centre–periphery relations virtually ends with the Daskaloyiannis affair.

Undoubtedly, what we would like to know about the eighteenth century in Ottoman Crete greatly outweighs what we know. Thus, instead of a conclusion, I would like to briefly recount an incident which took place in Crete in June 2006: a police helicopter located an illegal cannabis plantation near a village in the Mylopotamos region, to the west of the city of Heraklion. However, when a ground police force tried to approach the village, they were met – as the official police press release reads – with "barrage of fire from local inhabitants with firearms; bullets came from several directions and the surrounding hills".[69] The police were forced to retreat, and apparently the cannabis plantation remained intact. This incident is without a doubt an extreme case, an exception, but the people of this same village had not long before persuaded the Greek government to pass a special law which, contrary to general regulations about local government, made it a municipality in its own right.[70] As a matter of fact, this particular village is not the only example of a rural community that nurtures ambivalent feelings towards state involvement in its life, and Crete has been described as an island that "regards itself as

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[63] For a brief account of the Daskaloyiannis incident, see Greene 2000, 206-209.

[64] Laourdas 1947, 277.

[65] Mango 1954, 45. Daskaloyiannis' full name was Ioannis Vlachos.

[66] Daskaloyiannis was the *kethüda* of Sphakia in 1765, and was required to settle tax issues (Sfyroeras 1985).

[67] Laourdas 1947, passim; Sfyroeras 1985.

[68] Tukin 1996, 87; Bonneval and Dumas 2000, 213.

[69] *Ελευθεροτυπία* newspaper, 15 June 2006 (also available on the internet: www.enet.gr). In spring 2006 a police officer described the mountainous Mylopotamos villages as beyond the reach of police forces (*άβατο*) (www.cretetv.gr/news/print.php?ArtID=20447) (webpage visited on 18 February 2007).

[70] *Ελευθεροτυπία* newspaper, 21 February 2006 (also available on the internet: www.enet.gr).

an idiosyncratic and proudly independent part of the national entity [Greece], distinct from it, physically separated from it, but yet endowed with qualities that have made Crete the birthplace of many national leaders in politics, war, and the arts".[71] Even though it would be far-fetched and possibly misleading to argue in favour of the relevance of this contemporary mentality to the establishment of Ottoman authority on Crete given what we know (or do not know) about it and the limits of pre-modern or early modern state authority in general, I would venture to suggest that the Ottoman state, at a time with no helicopters but with firearms, chose to restrict its direct presence to the main urban centres and more easily accessible districts. This happened, I would think, not out of fear of active resistance (as there is no evidence of any real challenge to Ottoman rule), but because of financial considerations and logistics related at least to a certain extent to the fact that Crete was both rather mountainous and an island, which raised accessibility issues.[72] Instead, it preferred to govern Crete through the incorporation of local (and localised) élites (without totally excluding the non-Muslim ones), which is not very different from what happened all over the Empire in the eighteenth century.[73] This originally facilitated the acceptance of its authority by the local population, whether it remained Christian or turned Muslim, and then saved the state from the considerable cost that controlling the whole of the island more strictly would have required.[74]

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[71] Herzfeld 1985, 6. For the ambiguous relation of a mountainous Cretan village with the state and national politics, see *ibid.*, 19-33, 92-122. I would like to thank Aris Tsantiropoulos for bringing this book to my attention.

[72] Cf. Slot 1982, 250. For a document of 1779 explaining that the Church had found it difficult to control the district of Sphakia "because of the inaccessibility of the place and the roughness of its people", see Detorakis 1988, 440.

[73] Cf. Salzmann 2004, 20-21, 25-26, but also 127-138, which makes us wonder if the central government was flexible or weak in administering distant provinces. See also Greene 2000, 55.

[74] According to a 1717 state decree, "the income of Crete … does not cover her expenses" (Greene 2000, 136); it should be taken into account that at the time the Ottomans were at war, so the expenses must have been, as Greene notes, "directly linked to the cost of defending the island". For comments on the low productivity and market value of Cretan agriculture and its produce, see Andriotis 2006, 33, 41.

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Empire and Collective Mentality: The Transformation of *eutaxia* from the Fifth Century BC to the Second Century AD

Giovanni Salmeri

1. The numerous workshops held over the last seven years as part of the international network *Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, c. 200 BC – AD 476)* have explored the transformations and innovations produced by a structure like the Roman Empire on the spheres of economy, administration, religion and so on, but have not taken into consideration that of collective mentality.

To my mind this is due primarily to the fact that international research in the sector of Roman history has for several decades now been the province of British and American scholars and those following their tradition who, naturally with a few exceptions,[1] tend to take a pragmatic approach to the subject. Thus even when dealing with cultural history,[2] they do not readily set about investigating such an 'intangible' aspect as mentality (*mentalité*). To date it is really only French historiography which has traced the history of mentalities (*histoire des mentalités*). Following the ground-breaking work of Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre several outstanding studies, featuring the medieval and early modern ages in particular, have thrown light on, for example, the sense of death or the idea of justice in certain periods and regions.[3]

But if the prevalence of the pragmatic approach to Roman history – especially concerning the Imperial age – focusing on institutions or specific economic, social and religious phenomena has undoubtedly impeded the development of a real interest in the history of mentalities, it is also true that the ambiguous nature of this history – to use the definition of Jacques Le Goff[4] – may well be considered an obstacle. It is no easy matter to define the history of mentalities, and there are no convenient frameworks to call on. As Le Goff himself has put it, the vocation of the history of mentalities is to give a sense to the residue of historical analysis, to the *je ne sais pas quoi* of history. Furthermore it is difficult to pin down shifts in mentality. When does one mentality give way to another? There is no hard and fast procedure to follow in constructing the history of mentalities. According to the topic in question, one must combine and juxtapose various kinds of sources: from the clinical records in a psychiatric hospital to the horoscopes in newspapers or on a papyrus scroll and the funerary inscriptions which political historians invariably dismiss; from the comedies and farces of popular theatre to masterpieces of literary achievement. This compound of causes has meant that the history of mentalities currently plays no more than a marginal role in the domain of the history of the Roman Empire.

Naturally this does not mean that we have no significant treatments of the subject. At least two appeared in the 1980s, written by Michel Foucault and Paul Veyne

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[1] For instance Woolf 1994, and now Morgan 2007.

[2] See Morris 2000, esp. 9-17 and Burke 2004.

[3] See Burke 1997 and Poirrier 2004. Several excellent studies of the emotions in the Greek and Roman world have appeared in recent years in England and in the United States (*e.g.* Konstan 2001, Harris 2001, Kaster 2005), but they bear little relation to the history of mentalities.

[4] Le Goff 1974.

respectively. In *Le souci de soi* Foucault[5] analyses the vast Greek and Latin literary output in the first and second centuries AD to show how an individualistic mentality emerged for the first time in the ancient world, with a new emphasis on the private sphere. He also identifies the development of an autonomous personal morality, independent from the public sphere and quite unlike the totalising vision of Christianity, whereas Veyne in a long essay on private life in the Roman Empire[6] sets out to reconstruct the mentality of figures like the city notable and the freedman. He also discusses such stimulating topics as the existence in the Roman world of oral doctrines or theories which corresponded to the standard mentality, being common to all social classes and having a bearing on all possible matters. According to Veyne they were in fact authentic philosophies, just as Marxism or psychoanalysis were the principal doctrines or theories in the West two or three decades ago.

Another comprehensive study which can *lato sensu* be included in the domain of the history of mentalities is Clifford Ando's[7] recent exploration of how the subjects in the provinces sought to conform to imperial ideology. There are, however, virtually no instances of research which go beyond the merely stylistic, literary or indeed philosophical approach involved in lexical analysis and seek to penetrate the collective mentality of the Imperial age. In order to set about rectifying this state of things, this chapter is devoted to analysing the development of the term *eutaxia* and its associated adjectival, adverbial and verbal forms starting from Aeschylus, and particularly Thucydides, and tracing them into the Imperial age, to seek to identify vestiges of the mentalities of different periods and the trasformation processes. For the Imperial age in particular, we hope to show how *eutaxia*[8] – having shed almost entirely those associations with the military sphere which had been so predominant at the beginning, and having come to mean simply 'orderliness' – was able to become a political slogan for the notables of the Greek world, accurately reflecting their mentality as individuals, characterised by the pursuit of decorum and the care of the self.

 2. The scholars who have had most to do with the term *eutaxia* have rightly highlighted its associations with the military sphere.[9] The matter, however, cannot be left there, and it has to be shown how it comes to relate also to the spheres of politics and ethics.

The fundamental starting-point for the investigation is a passage in the sixth book of Thucydides reporting a speech by Hermocrates aimed at raising the spirits of his fellow citizens in Syracuse following a severe defeat at the hands of the Athenians during their military expedition to Sicily of 415-413 BC. After dealing with some practical aspects such as the institution of compulsory military training, Hermocrates declares that "they (the Syracusans) had the courage already, and the discipline (*eutaxia*) would come with experience. There would, in fact, be an automatic improvement in both respects, as

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[5] Foucault 1984. Ten years earlier K. Dover published a book in England which, based on non-philosophical literary sources, sought to reconstruct *Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle*, meaning the value system and mentality of the ordinary Greek people in the fourth century BC. See also Whitehead 1993, drawing on epigraphic material.

[6] Veyne 1985.

[7] Ando 2000.

[8] In this chapter *ê* and *ô* are used to transliterate respectively η and ω.

[9] E.g. J. and L. Robert, *Bull. Ep.* 1970, 453 (see also *infra*); Pritchett 1974, 236-238; Whitehead 1993, 70; Ma 2002, 115-116; Chaniotis 2005, 93-94.

discipline would be learnt in the school of danger, and courage would rise to greater heights of heroism when supported by the confidence that comes from experience".[10] Thus here *eutaxia* alludes explicitly to that orderliness on the battlefield which is indispensable for obtaining victory. Besides, the adverbial form *eutaktôs* had already been used by Aeschylus in the *Persians* in describing the way in which the right wing of the Greek fleet advanced towards victory at Salamis.[11] Similarly Xenophon, writing later than Thucydides, used the adjective *eutaktos* in the *Agesilaus* to extol the efficiency of the *phalanx*: "Surely nothing is wanting to the strength of that battle-line which keeps in formation (*eutaktos ousa*) on account of its obedience [...]".[12]

In addition to these passages there are others, particularly in Xenophon, in which *eutaxia* refers to the orderly, disciplined behaviour of troops in general, without any particular reference to the battlefield. Indeed in some cases *eutaxia* loses all trace of its active function as an instrument of victory and becomes the means of defence and refuge for an army in difficulty, as is seen in one of Xenophon's speeches in the *Anabasis*.[13]

Moving away from the military sphere, in Aristophanes's *Birds*, written in 414 BC, *eutaktos* is associated with *polis*. Euelpides declares that a city in which Athena, "a woman born, a goddess, stands full-armed, and Cleisthenes assumes a spindle" cannot be "well ordered (*eutaktos*)".[14] For the playwright a city like Athens, in which the traditional roles and occupations of men and women were not respected, could not be considered *eutaktos*. Several decades later, some time before 350 BC, Isocrates is also speaking of Athens when he refers in the *Areopagiticus* to *eutaxia* as a quality of former times which saw "citizens so schooled in virtue as not to injure each other, but to fight and conquer all who attempted to invade their territory".[15] In fact *eutaxia* is attributed quite naturally – indeed with other virtues – to Sparta,[16] possibly also in recognition of this city's care in maintaining its military organization.

Turning to the personal sphere we find Xenophon, in the *Memorabilia*,[17] using the verb *eutaktein* to characterise Socrates's "scrupulous obedience to public authority in all that the laws required, both in civil life (*kata polin*) and military service (*en tais strateiais*)". The pair of definitions *kata polin* and *en tais strateiais* clearly evoke the whole field of Socrates's experience. It is significant that Xenophon felt the need to spell out the two components, as if the prevalently military connotation of the verb *eutaktein* risked causing his readers to think he was referring exclusively to Socrates the soldier.

Thus as early as the fifth and first half of the fourth century BC we find all the diverse associations which were to characterise *eutaxia* in the centuries to come, although associations with the military sphere were undoubtedly predominant in common mentality. Moreover, Aristotle in the *Politics* not only assimilates law (*nomos*) and order (*taxis*), but also puts forward the coupling of *eunomia* and *eutaxia*,[18] without taking the matter any

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[10] Thuc. 6.72.4, cf. 2.89.9, 7.77.5, 8.1.4.

[11] Aesch. *Pers.* 399.

[12] Xen. *Ages.* 6.4.4.

[13] Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.38, cf. 3.2.30.

[14] Ar. *Av.* 829, see Dunbar 1995, 496-497.

[15] Isoc. *Aereop.* 82, cf. 39; cf. also [Demosth.] 25.24.

[16] E.g. Pl. *Alc.* I 122C.

[17] Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.1.

[18] Arist. *Pol.* 7. 1326a.29-32; on *eunomia* see Ruzé 2003.

further. Also in the *Politics* the philosopher states that an oligarchic regime can only ensure its continuity by relying on *eutaxia*, presenting the latter as a quintessentially conservative political ideal.[19] Here then we see a new application for our term in the sphere of politics, and this was to prove crucial in the Roman Imperial age.[20] In general, however, the term most widely used to refer to order in the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries BC is not *eutaxia* but rather *kosmos*, found already in Homer and subsequently in Herodotus and Gorgias in a cultural and political usage and in the philosopher Empedocles with the sense of world-order.[21] *Eutaxia* could hardly compete with a term laying claim to such a pedigree as *kosmos*!

3. Following the defeat inflicted on Athens by Philip II at Chaironeia (338 BC), "la cité grecque n'est pas morte", as L. Robert put it on more than one occasion, just as it did not perish in the centuries to come. "Certes, Athènes et Sparte ne jouent plus le rôle que ces cités jouaient dans la Méditerranée – ou dans l'Egée. Mais cette décadence dans le pouvoir international efficace ne change rien aux rouages de la vie civique, à son activité, à ses responsabilités et à ses dangers".[22] For Athens itself, the fifteen years that followed Chaironeia were a period of peace in which the city was able to devote itself to important reconstruction work and above all to reinforce its civic spirit. Indeed this period has even been characterised as manifesting a peculiar "spirit of [...] renaissance".[23]

One particularly significant development was the reform of the training of the ephebes, established by the law of Epicrates in 336/5 or more probably 335/4 BC.[24] Another development was what we can describe as an 'explosion' of *eutaxia*. During the fifth and first half of the fourth century BC the term had not had a particularly high profile, but in Athens in the aftermath of Chaironeia it suddenly came into the limelight.

An inscription dating from 333/2 or 332/1 BC, which poses some problems of interpretation, provides the only evidence at our disposal for a liturgy called *eutaxia* performed by two men from each of the tribes (only one from Hippothontis).[25] We do not know precisely what this liturgy was, but it appears to have been connected with public games. There is a relief dating from the same years showing a male figure with a shield at his side being crowned by the *Dêmos* (?), with a personification of *Eutaxia* on the right side, her name being clearly legible in the border above her head.[26] If we combine the presence of the shield next to the man being crowned with a passage from the *Athenaion Politeia*[27] – "the second year, after giving a public display of their military evolutions, on the occasion when the assembly meets in the theatre, the ephebes receive a shield and a spear from the city [...]" – we can imagine that the *Eutaxia* competition, funded by the liturgists mentioned above, may have involved military exercises performed by the ephebes.

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[19] Arist. *Pol*. 6. 1321a. 3-4.

[20] See *infra* § 8.

[21] See Cartledge 1998, 3-4. In Arist. *Pol*. 6. 1321b. 7-8 *eutaxia* and *kosmos* are both presented as objectives of public offices (*archai*).

[22] Robert 1969, 42.

[23] Habicht 1997, 16.

[24] In favour of 336/5 BC is Habicht 1997, 16, *contra* Knoepfler 2001, 381-382 who prefers 335/4 BC.

[25] *IG* II² 417, see now Lambert 2001, 53-60 (with previous bibliography).

[26] Palagia 1975, 181-182; Lawton 1995, no. 150.

[27] [Arist.] *Athen. Pol*. 42.4.

This remains an isolated, specific case. In the gymnasia of the Greek world over the next few centuries *eutaxia* progressively lost its strong military connotation and became one of the most important 'judgement' contests, often accompanied by *euexia* ("maintien") and *philoponia* (endurance).[28] *Eutaxia*, in fact, came to mean 'discipline' or 'good conduct' in terms of individual behaviour. In the specific context of Athens, a significant number of inscriptions show *eutaxia* to have been one of the few prominent qualities, sometimes together with *kosmiotês* (decorum), for which the ephebes were commonly praised.[29] The term was thus subsumed into the domain of the gymnasia, maintaining only a faint trace of the meaning it had when used by Thucydides's Hermocrates. An early instance of this shift, coming hard on the heels of the reform of the ephebes' training, is the occurence of the term *eutaxia* and its associated forms in the ephebic monument of the Cecropic tribe, 334/3 BC.[30]

We feel justified in speaking of an 'explosion' in the use of the term *eutaxia* in Athens in the aftermath of Chaironeia thanks also to an inscription, dating from the year 329/8 BC, found in the Amphiaraion at Oropos,[31] which the Athenians seem to have retrieved in 335 BC.[32] The inscription features a decree honouring the ten men elected by the *dêmos* to serve as *epimelêtai* for the games and other rites at the sanctuary. Towards the end it records an official who is defined as *hairetheis epi tên eutaxian*. It is not certain what his duties were: he may have been responsible for the *Eutaxia* competition at the Amphiaraic games of 329/8 BC, but it is by far preferable to think that he was charged with maintaining orderliness at the festival.[33] This would then be an early example of the need for the maintenance of law and order at public events in the Greek world which was to persist until the Roman Imperial age.[34]

How are we to explain the 'explosion' in the use of the term *eutaxia*? At first sight its sudden prominence in so many different forms in Athens in the fifteen years after Chaironeia would seem to indicate its great versatility in a variety of contexts, without ever completely losing its original military connotation. However, to venture further into the domain of the history of mentalities, there is a passage in Thucydides[35] which seems particularly apposite. It occurs at the beginning of the eighth book, and describes the Athenians' initial reaction of panic at the news of defeat in Sicily in 413 BC, and their subsequent decisions. Thucydides concludes: "Under the spur of fear, as is the way of the *dêmos*, the Athenians were ready to put everything in order (*eutaktein*)".

Thus the decision to "put everything in order" is attributed by Thucydides to the fear aroused in the Athenians by defeat and to the need to avoid the worst by setting about a radical reordering of their affairs. In all likelihood this also happened after Chaironeia, and we can see a sign of this in the 'explosion' of *eutaxia* that echoes the passage in Thucydides.

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[28] Crowther 1991; Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993, 102-104, 104-105; Kah 2004, 79-80. "Maintien": Knoepfler 1979, 174.

[29] E.g. *IG* II² 1156 (*Syll.*³ 957) ll. 39-40; see also Pelekidis 1962, 38.

[30] See *supra* n. 29.

[31] Schwenk 1985, no. 50 = *IOrop* 298.

[32] Knoepfler 2001, 367-389, *contra* Faraguna 1992, 218-219 (338 BC).

[33] Lambert 2001, 56; Brélaz 2005, 179-180 n. 483.

[34] See *infra* § 5.

[35] Thuc. 8.14.

4. In the Hellenistic age the term *eutaxia* was subsumed into the domain of the gymnasia, while specifically in the military sphere (in common usage, of course) it lost the active, propulsive sense associated with victory in battle that it had in Hermocrates' words.[36] *Eutaxia*, along with its adjectival, adverbial and verbal forms, came to denote orderliness, the 'discipline' of campaigning armies and especially of the garrisons sent by the kings to keep the Hellenistic cities under control.

Foreign garrisons and mercenaries were part and parcel of daily life in the Hellenistic cities, whether in the economic, social or religious spheres, and their integration with the local population was never easy,[37] as we know from accounts of violent unruliness.[38] One particularly incisive account concerning a campaigning army features in a letter sent by a Hellenistic monarch to the city of Soloi in Cilicia.[39] In view of such situations of tension and conflict it is not difficult to believe that *eutaxia* was considered a quality of prime importance by the Hellenistic cities, which were only too ready to honour those commanders and troops who maintained an exemplary behaviour.

One case in point is the decree, dating apparently from the end of the third century BC, found at Apollonia under Salbake in Caria, honouring the Seleucid hipparch for, among other things, ensuring strict discipline (*eutaxia*) among his soldiers.[40] Something similar is found in inscriptions from Iasos in Caria, Colophon in Ionia, and Rhamnous, Megara and Delphi in Greece, to cite just a few other examples.[41] There is a decree from Amyzon in Caria in which both the contingent of troops and their commander are honoured for their *eutaxia*.[42] Then in a decree from Metropolis honouring the memory of Apollonios, the deceased is praised as the commander of a contingent of *neaniskoi* sent to Thyateira in support of the Romans against Aristonicos for, among other things, keeping strict discipline (*eutaxia*) among his men.[43]

In these inscriptions *eutaxia* is presented as a quality prized by the cities for the sake of their well-being. There are other instances, however, in which it is prized also by the ruler, because it prevents him having his plans disrupted by the actions of unruly troops. This transpires clearly in a letter from a high-ranking officer (probably Zeuxis) in the service of Antiochos III,[44] who during the closing years of the third century BC transmitted to troops stationed in Caria the sovereign's command that they should behave with order and discipline (*eutakteite*), avoiding setting up camp at Labraunda or causing any disturbance in the vicinity of the sanctuary.

In the Hellenistic age military organization and the conduct of war changed with respect to practice in the fifth century BC, above all with the introduction of large contingents of mercenaries,[45] and the usage of *eutaxia* reflects this change. With the shift in focus from autonomous city states waging war on each other to cities inserted into a

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[36] See *supra* n. 10.

[37] Launey 1949-50, 633-651; Chaniotis 2005, 88-93.

[38] *Ataxia* is the Greek term used to denote indiscipline among soldiers, see Robert 1976, 216-219.

[39] Welles 1934, 136-140, no. 30 favours one of the Ptolemies; Virgilio 2007, 217-228 favours Antiochos III.

[40] Robert 1954, 285-286, no. 166, ll. 3-4.

[41] Robert 1927, 121; Robert 1936, 75 n. 5; Robert 1954, 289 n. 1; Robert 1983, 198 n. 1.

[42] Robert 1983, 196-198.

[43] *IvMetropolis* I A l. 28; on the inscription in general see Jones 2004.

[44] Robert 1983, 139-140; see also Ma 2000, 304-305, no. 15.

[45] Chaniotis 2005.

state such as the Seleucid Empire, it came to denote above all the discipline of a foreign contingent in a garrisoned city.

5. The existence of an official charged with maintaining *eutaxia* at the Amphiaraic games in 329/8 BC has already been noted.[46] Another use of the term in Athens in the context of games and festivals is recorded in an inscription dating from soon after the mid-third century BC. Timokrite, priestess of Aglauros, is honoured for, among other things, "ensuring that orderliness (*eutaxia*) reigned during the night-festival (*pannychis*)".[47] It is a mistake to try to explain these two occurrences of *eutaxia* by taking them in isolation. At the beginning of the Hellenistic age the role of the officials known as *mastigophoroi*, *rabdouchoi* and *rabdophoroi* was transformed from that of assistants to the judges in competitions, or indeed judges in their own right, to guards responsible for maintaining order among the spectators during festivals and games.[48]

It is not possible here to go into the reasons for such an 'institutionalisation' of the task of controlling and sanctioning crowd behaviour on public occasions from the last decades of the fourth century BC, but it would seem that this new trend corresponds to a new emphasis on order and discipline in Hellenistic society which manifested itself also in the shift of usage of the term *eutaxia* in the military sphere. Festivals, games and spectacles, with all their potential for unruliness, were kept under strict control in the Hellenistic cities by means of officials created *ad hoc*. This same form of surveillance, possibly indeed on a still more institutional footing, continued throughout the Roman Imperial age. We know that considerable importance was attributed to this aspect from a series of inscriptions concerning the institution of festivals such as the *Dêmostheneia* at Oenoanda in Lycia in the first half of the second century AD[49] and the regulations for societies like the *Iobacchoi* in Athens at the time of Herodes Atticus.[50]

Eutaxia is the term used for the orderliness to be maintained on public occasions, apart from Athens, also at Ilion in Troad, as we know from an inscription dating from the second century BC. This text records the decisions of the city concerning the running of the foundation set up by Hermias, son of Skamandrios. One of the regulations specifies that *eutaxia* is to be ensured during the planned procession by people armed with sticks entitled to lay about any unruly elements.[51] While according to the new regulations concerning the conduct of the ceremonies of the mysteries of Demeter and Kore at Andania in Messenia (92 BC), twenty *rabdophoroi* were to be appointed to ensure that the participants behaved seemingly (*euschêmonôs*) and in a disciplined manner (*eutaktôs*).[52]

To indicate proper order at festivals and spectacles, however, we find also another term, *eukosmia*,[53] which, particularly during the Roman Imperial age, seems to prevail

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[46] See *supra* § 3. On the Amphiaraic games see Parker 1996, 149, 247, 250.

[47] *SEG* XXXIII 115, see Lambert 2001, 60.

[48] Brélaz 2005, 171-173.

[49] Wörrle 1988, 10 (ll. 63-64), 219-220. Here the *mastigophoroi* appear to be responsible for maintaining *eukosmia* in the theatres.

[50] Sokolowski 1969, 95-101, no. 51 ll. 72-90, 134-146. For a translation of the inscription see Tod 1932, 86-93. The person responsible for maintaining order and decorum in the assemblies of the *Iobacchoi* is called *eukosmos*.

[51] *IvIlion* 52 ll. 27-29.

[52] Sokolowski 1969, 120-134, no. 65 ll. 41-45.

[53] See *supra* nn. 49-50.

over *eutaxia*.[54] In parallel, to go back for a moment to the context of the gymnasia, we can recall that the *kosmêtês* was responsible not only for *eukosmia*, but also for *eutaxia* among the ephebes.[55]

6. So far, with only rare exceptions,[56] we have seen *eutaxia* used in connection with the behaviour of groups: from the army of Athens, Syracuse or Sparta to the ephebes in the gymnasia and their contests; from the garrisons sent to Hellenistic cities to the crowds attending games and festivals. The usage of *eutaxia* to indicate an individual quality, on the basis of inscriptions dating above all from the second century BC, will now be taken into consideration.

One of the pseudo-Menandrean *monostichoi*[57] – *Karpos d'aretês dikaios eutaktos bios* – can be cited by way of introduction. Here a just, ordered life is held to be the product of virtue; *eutaxia* appears devoid of military associations and fully integrated into the civil sphere. Significantly, two distinct presentations of *eutaxia* are present in a decree from Aegina in honour of the Pergamene *epistatês* Cleon,[58] dating from the central decades of the second century BC. In this inscription *eutaxia* is defined on one hand as *pragmatikê*, with reference to Cleon's official duties, and on the other as *kata bion* for the strictly personal sphere.[59] The formula *kata bion* is in fact quite often found in the inscriptions discussed below, almost as if to emphasise that here *eutaxia* is a quality pertaining to the individual conduct of the various figures honoured and not to the military sphere or the gymnasium.

The inscriptions in question are of the honorary type and relate, to use the words of Louis and Jeanne Robert, to "étrangers en séjour, médecins, musiciens, ambassadeurs, résidents".[60] With respect to the "médecins" we have a quite outstanding document: a decree issued in the second century BC by the *damos* of Halasarna on the island of Cos. The subject is the physician Onasandros, whose entire career is recorded and whose praises are sung for his services to the inhabitants of the *damos*. In particular it is stated that early on in life, at Halasarna, Onasandros was the assistant of the famous physician Antipatros and displayed great competence in his art (*kata tan technan empeiria*) and an orderly way of life (*kata ton bion eutaxia*).[61] Menekles too, one of two envoys sent by Teos in Ionia to Crete to confirm the city's *asylia* (ca 170 BC) is praised, for two reasons. The honorary decree, emanated by Knossos, speaks of his *eutaxia* and of his ability to perform the compositions of Timotheos of Miletus, Polyidos of Selymbria and the old Cretan poets, accompanying himself on the *kithara*, as befits a well educated man (*anêr pepaideumenos*).[62]

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[54] In any case *eutaxia* is part of the title of some of the centurions responsible for maintaining order at the regional level in the Near East, see Brélaz 2005, 85-86 n. 84.

[55] Pelekidis 1962, 38.

[56] See *supra* n. 17.

[57] [Men.] *Mon*. 418

[58] *OGIS* 329, see Allen 1983, 105.

[59] *OGIS* 329, ll. 9-10.

[60] Robert 1989, 25 n. 85.

[61] *SEG* XLI 680 (ll. 11-12), see Jouanna 1999, 370-372.

[62] *IC* I 11*, see Chaniotis 1988, 154.

In a decree found at Claros Polemaios, who was sent by Colophon as *theôros* to Smyrna, is said to have been praised by the inhabitants of the latter city for his *peri ton bion aretê kai eutaxia*,[63] a formula which features no less than three of the terms present in the Menandrean *monostichos* cited above. In some inscriptions found at Priene[64] *eutaxia* is extended beyond the categories of physicians, envoys and *theôroi* to the *grammateis* (secretaries) who accompanied those who, according to a normal practice in the Hellenistic world, were despatched – on request – by the city to administer justice elsewhere.[65] It is interesting to note that in the honorary decrees sent by Iasos to Priene for judges and *grammateis*, the former are extolled for their *aretê* and *kalokagathia* (nobleness) and the latter for their *eutaxia*.[66] Thus in the hierarchy of the qualities attributed to individuals, *eutaxia* ranked lower than *aretê* and *kalokagathia*.

In conclusion, the process of personalisation of *eutaxia* that characterised the second century BC was in effect limited to certain categories of the inhabitants of the Hellenistic world – physicians, envoys, *theôroi* and the *grammateis* who accompanied the judges – most of whom practised their occupations outside their *patris*.[67] We can see here the premises for the attribution of the quality of *eutaxia* to much more extensive categories in the Greek world during the centuries of Roman domination.

7. There has never been agreement among historians as to the reasons which induced Rome to enter the Hellenistic world. Some have seen it as an aggressive expansionism, others more as the city safeguarding its interests and spaces.[68] In a book which I consider to be still fundamental, Eric Gruen goes beyond such an antithesis and focuses on the political and diplomatic reality of the encounter of Rome and the Greek world, underlining the aspect of interaction. He emphasises "both Rome's receptiveness to Hellenic principles, which she found congenial, and the Greeks' ability to take advantage of Roman presence within a system familiar to themselves", and concludes: "Hellas ultimately fell under Roman authority not because the Romans exported their structure to the East, but because Greeks persistently drew the westerner into their own structure – until it was theirs no longer".[69]

Thus Gruen pays attention to the cultural dynamics, but he does not give any consideration to the transformations produced in the collective mentality by the coming of Rome to the Hellenistic world. Certainly during the third and second centuries BC the Greek cities in Asia Minor had been incorporated into centralised states like the Hellenistic kingdoms, but it was the introduction of the Roman provincial system which

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[63] Robert 1989, 12 (ll. 43-44), 27.

[64] *IvPriene* 49 l. 3; 53 I l. 25 and II l. 53; 54 ll. 22-23, 49.

[65] See Robert 1973; Crowther 2006, esp. 38-39.

[66] *IvPriene* 53 and 54.

[67] Robert 1964, 161 rightly points out that *eutaxia* "est toujours appréciée chez qui est à l'étranger et qui sait se tenir à sa place". It appears to be preferable not to use the category of liminality proposed in Ma 2002, 115 as a "common denominator" among groups (ephebes, foreign soldiers serving as a garrison) and individuals (travelling artists, foreign judges) to whom *eutaxia* is applied. Liminality, among other things, carries political and social implications which establish a clear distinction between, for example, ephebes and foreign judges. Moreover, from a heuristic point of view it seems more appropriate to keep separate the groups and individuals to whom *eutaxia* is applied.

[68] On this see Salmeri 1987.

[69] Gruen 1984, 730.

eventually brought about significant changes – without provoking drastic breaks – in the conduct of city politics, in the making and advancement of the ruling class and in the mentality of the individuals.[70]

The presence of Rome throughout the Eastern Mediterranean was less tangible than it was in the West. To give just one example, Latin only came into very limited use in Asia Minor; it did not really take root even in the few colonies established in the area. The administrators sent out from Rome to the provinces of Asia Minor often used Greek to communicate, especially in the Imperial age; this was also the language used during court sessions, but for sentencing Latin was normally used. In the cities the time-honoured Greek political and religious institutions, although transformed, continued to exist and function.[71]

This state of things must not, however, be taken to mean that the action of Rome in the Eastern Mediterranean, and particularly in Asia Minor, was guided by the local reality. Right from the outset, with the creation of the province of Asia in 129 BC, Rome was fully aware of the economic potential of the area. During the Imperial age, moreover, tax revenue from Asia Minor – and from the province of Asia in particular – represented a significant part of the Empire's budget.[72] In terms of our enquiry it is even more significant that Rome was aware that the type of administrative organization adopted in Spain and Gaul would not do for an area like Asia Minor, characterised by robust urbanization especially along the Aegean coast: therefore she allowed the numerous Greek cities and their political structures to continue in existence. In addition to setting up *conventus iuridici* (assize districts), which in Asia Minor often served to neutralise long-standing ethnic and territorial aggregations,[73] the decisive innovation in the Republican age was to make membership of the city councils for life, thereby consolidating a local ruling class that was loyal to the centre and could take charge of internal law and order.[74] In the Imperial age, on the other hand, Rome intervened above all by granting immunities and privileges, which had most impact on the hierarchies of the cities in the various provinces.[75] As for the less urbanized areas, for a long period Rome refrained broadly speaking from direct intervention, entrusting its interests to local dynasts who were, however, of Greek culture and possessed an urban mentality.[76]

Thus in Asia Minor Rome was represented not only by its governors but also by the notables of the Greek cities. Building on the structures of the Hellenistic kingdoms, Rome maintained the *poleis* within a wide-ranging framework under a unified administration. To some extent all this prepared the ground for the growth of a united Hellenic consciousness, at least at the cultural level.[77] At the same time, however, given the considerable political responsibility they were entrusted with, the notables of Asia Minor found their ties with

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[70] Salmeri 1991, 571; Salmeri 2000, 53.
[71] Salmeri 2000, 54 and n. 6; Adams 2003.
[72] See Hopkins 2002.
[73] See Salmeri 2000a, 165, 176; Campanile 2003.
[74] See Salmeri 2000, 55 and n. 11 (with bibliography).
[75] Salmeri 2005, 196-197.
[76] See Braund 1984; Kaizer and Facella forthcoming.
[77] Salmeri 1987, 793; Salmeri 1991, 575.

their native cities strengthening, and with them the desire to spend the rest of their lives in their homeland, following a pattern unparalleled in the western provinces.[78]

When Paul Veyne and Michel Foucault[79] came to investigate the mentality of the Imperial ruling class, they took a special interest in the notables of the Greek world. The fact is that the Greek world, and Asia Minor in particular, makes a happy hunting ground for such research, since in the first and second centuries AD many of the writers and intellectuals came from there. It is hardly necessary to repeat what Veyne has to say concerning the increasing attention which, above all from the end of the first century AD, the urban upper classes – quite independently from the progress of the Christian religion – paid to their own inner world, and the rapid disappearance of the form of 'bartering' which characterised pagan religion in the face of a more personalised relationship with the divine world.[80] It is more interesting to consider what lay behind this shift, although the French historian pays little attention to this question. He merely suggests that the origin of the shift towards the inner world lies in the transformation of the forms of competition – political, social, economic and so on – in the Imperial age.[81] With the support of the writings of Plutarch and Dio of Prusa,[82] we can take the matter further by recognising that the new emphasis on interiority from the end of the first century AD in the eastern area of the Empire was linked to the transformations in the conduct of political life introduced following the advent of Rome, and above all after the institution of the Empire.[83]

The outcome was not, as an old cliché would have us believe, the end of politics in the cities of the Greek East, with the withdrawal of the local ruling classes into private life. By redrawing the political and administrative profile of the cities and significantly reducing – through the provincial form of government – their ability to project themselves outwards, Rome in fact forced them to concentrate on internal matters.[84] The literary sources featuring Asia Minor in the first centuries AD reveal quite clearly the levels of conflict reached in the cities' political life. The aim of the notables – Dio and Plutarch *in primis* – was to keep the representatives of Rome out of the running of their *polis* as much as they possibly could, for the governors could intervene drastically in cases of serious disorder and decide, in cases of financial mismanagement, to verify the accounts of a city.[85] In connection with this state of things it is surely quite legitimate to suppose that the Greek notables developed a new absorption with their own interiority and its safeguarding, and several passages in Plutarch and Dio bear this out. In particular we can single out a passage from the latter's tenth oration.[86] Dio, using Diogenes as his mouthpiece, states that if an individual takes care to know himself, thereby attaining wisdom, there is no longer any need to consult the oracles. One almost feels one is listening to Dio inviting his

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[78] Quass 1982; Salmeri 2000, 55-56. This must not, however, be taken to mean that Asia Minor did not also provide a certain number of senators who played their part in the administration of the Empire at large, see Halfmann 1982 and Salmeri 1991, 569-575.

[79] See *supra* nn. 5 and 6. On Foucault's conception of ancient and Christian sexuality, see e.g. Gaca 2003.

[80] Veyne 1983.

[81] On all this see Salmeri 1999, 112-113.

[82] On Plutarch and Dio of Prusa, see Swain 1996, 135-241; Swain 2000.

[83] On political life and its forms in the Greek world during the Roman period, see Salmeri 2007.

[84] Salmeri 2007, §§ 1 and 2.

[85] Salmeri 2000, 70-77.

[86] *Or.* 10. 27-28.

fellow-citizens – in his political speeches – to resolve their conflicts within the city rather than calling on the intervention of the Roman authorities.

This then is the context for our investigation of *eutaxia* in the centuries of the Roman Empire. We left the term at the end of the second century BC, when the association with the military sphere had long since faded, and *eutaxia* had passed from being an instrument of victory on the battlefield to indicating the 'disciplined' behaviour of groups or certain categories of individuals. In the first century BC, and increasingly so thereafter, this trend in its usage strengthens. Corresponding to the shift towards interiority outlined above, the most indicative application of the term *eutaxia* emerges in the "decrets de consolation", as Louis Robert called them, honouring a citizen on his death.[87]

These decrees are characteristic of the Imperial age, and to judge by the material available to us they seem to have been particularly in vogue at Aphrodisias and Amorgos, with other examples coming from Iasos, Aizanoi, Herakleia under Salbake and elsewhere in Asia Minor.[88] Of particular interest are two decrees from Herakleia under Salbake. The first commemorates Euneikos, who having died young was honoured among other things for his *sôphrosynê* (temperance), *eutaxia* and *kosmia agôgê* (well-ordered training).[89] The second commemorates a woman called Ammia who had lived *eutaktôs*, *sôphronôs* (discreetly) and *axiôs tês tôn progonôn aretês* (showing herself worthy of the virtue of her forebears).[90] In these two texts *eutaxia* is no longer a quality reserved for certain categories such as envoys and *grammateis*, but is attributed more generically to young men and women. This is borne out by some of the decrees referred to above, such as one from Aphrodisias which honours a woman for living *eutaktôs* and *kosmiôs*,[91] and one from Iasos in which *eutaxia* figures among the qualities ascribed to a youth.[92] It can also be recalled that *eutaktôs* is the word used for the behaviour of the son of Apollonius in the *consolatio* dedicated to the latter contained in the *corpus* of Plutarch's works.[93] And in the *Praecepta coniugalia*, the author of Chaironeia repeatedly presents *eutaxia* as a requisite for every bride.[94]

How is it that the quality of *eutaxia* came to be extended to youths and women, naturally of the upper classes? For the former the answer must lie in the practice of the gymnasium, while for the latter we can only point to the gradual turning inwards of mentality in the Imperial age.[95] In this respect *eutaxia* in its meaning of obedience and decorum could well be attributed as a female quality.

In the same centuries we find a parallel development of the term, corresponding to usage in the "decrets de consolation", in medical and philosophical texts. Here too *eutaxia* refers to an orderly, sober behaviour on the part of an individual. In Epictetus we read a 'recipe' for ensuring victory in the Olympics: "You have to submit to discipline (*eutaktein*), follow a strict diet, give up sweet cakes, train under compulsion, at a fixed

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[87] Robert 1965, 229-31.
[88] See *supra* n. 87; *IvIasos* 118-120; J. and L. Robert, *Bull. Ep.* 1976, 304-305, no. 676; Robert 1954, 177.
[89] Robert 1954, 177, no. 70.
[90] Robert 1954, 177-178, no. 71.
[91] Robert 1965, 229-230.
[92] *IvIasos* 119.
[93] Plut. 119f.
[94] Plut. 141e, 142a, 145a. See Robert 1964, 161, and for the Hellenistic period Zanker 1993.
[95] See Salmeri 1999.

hour, in heat or in cold; you must not drink cold water, nor wine just whenever you feel like it; you must have turned yourself over to your trainer precisely as you would to a physician".[96] In this passage *eutaktein* covers all the restrictions and limitations which an athlete must submit to in order to be victorious, bearing out the notion that in Imperial times *eutaxia* was one of the most representative terms alluding to the need for self-control. Indeed the term was used in common parlance to indicate sexual continence.[97] And it is highly significant that in the Imperial onomastics, where terms of quality and competence are particularly prized, *Eutaxia* and *Eutaktos* figure as nouns applied to all classes of society, from slaves to the upper echelons.[98] Nothing of the kind would have been conceivable in the Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries BC.

8. So much, then, for the individual sphere. During the Imperial age the term *eutaxia* also came to be used in the political sphere, and this was a highly innovative departure. As we have seen, in Aristotle's *Politics* there are some references to *eutaxia*,[99] but it was in the Imperial age, and especially in the first half of the second century AD, that it came to feature in political debate in the cities of Asia Minor. Before looking at some specific cases it is worth recalling its use by Dio of Prusa in describing the constitution (*politeia*) of Rhodos.[100] This usage – for a state that was certainly not considered by the ancients as a democratic one[101] – seems somehow to be connected to the Aristotelian characterisation of *eutaxia* as the guarantee of continuity for an oligarchic regime,[102] confirming the inclusion of the term in the sphere of conservation and safeguarding of the existing order.

    It is once again Dio of Prusa who enables us to appreciate the role of *eutaxia* in the political debate that characterised the Greek cities during the Imperial age. Of particular significance are three of his speeches delivered in the first decade of the second century AD, one in Alexandria and the other two in Tarsus. His aim on each occasion was to ensure the return of law and order following episodes of disorderly behaviour on the part of the inhabitants, while civic life in Tarsus in particular was marred by fierce contrasts at all levels.[103]

    To judge from what he himself says in the course of his speeches, Dio seems to have been invited by local people to address the inhabitants of Alexandria and Tarsus, and of other *poleis* in Asia Minor, on account of the prestige he had acquired during his long life for his oratorical skills and, above all, his sound wisdom.[104] In his missions as 'counsellor' to cities Dio used the term *eutaxia* no less than five times in the speeches he

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[96] *Encheiridion* 29.

[97] Gal. 8.451K; Suet. *Domit.* 10.2. In the latter it is the senator L. Aelius Lamia who uses *eutaktein* to indicate sexual continence, showing the term's diffusion in this sense also in Rome in the last decades of the first century AD. In *De off.* 1.142 Cicero states that in Latin *eutaxia* is usually rendered by *modestia* ("quo in verbo modus est"), but adds that it can also be understood as "ordinis conservatio". In the military sphere *eutaxia* seems to have been translated as *disciplina*; for the cult of *Disciplina militaris* or *Augusti*, see *AE* 1993, 15, no. 26.

[98] Robert 1964, 160-162.

[99] See *supra* nn. 18-19.

[100] *Or.* 31.146.

[101] Strabo 652C; see Gabrielsen *et alii* 2000.

[102] *Supra* n. 19.

[103] *Or.* 32 (Alexandria), *Or.* 33-34 (Tarsus); see Salmeri 2000, 73, 81-83.

[104] Salmeri 2000, 76-81.

delivered in Alexandria and Tarsus. In one case, in the Egyptian city, *eutaxia* is presented as the right way for the city to respond to the goodwill shown by the Emperor.[105] It is associated with *kosmos* and with the inhabitants' ability to show themselves sane and steady (*sôphrones, bebaioi*). In Tarsus, on the other hand, Dio presents *eutaxia* as the instrument for maintaining the privileges obtained from the central power.[106] More generally, in Alexandria Dio – associating *eutaxia*, among other things, with *praotês* (gentleness), *homonoia* (concord) and *kosmos politeias* (civic order) – declares that a city should be praised for these qualities rather than for a large population, abundance of trade or the size of its fleet.[107] At Tarsus he cites *eutaxia* and *sôphrosynê* as the two qualities which once ensured the city's reputation.[108] In one final passage of outstanding importance, Dio reminds his listeners in Tarsus that the Spartans, after losing their pre-eminence in Greece to Athens as a result of the Persian wars, gave up all their claims to the islands, Ionia and the Hellespont. At the same time they set about teaching themselves self-control and confined their attention to the affairs of the city, fully realising that nothing should be held more important than *nomos* and *eutaxia*.[109]

Here *eutaxia* is associated with *nomos* just as in one of the two passages from Aristotle cited above,[110] and moreover it is linked to taking care of one's own affairs and the inner dimension. It is presented as a quality for times of difficulty, when one is more inclined to turn in on oneself than to look outwards. As a key word in political debate in the *poleis* of the Imperial age, *eutaxia* is quite distinct from the terms associated with equality (*isêgoria, isonomia*) that characterised such debate in classical Athens.[111] It is much more concerned with conservation, evoking the maintenance of acquired privileges and the avoidance of Imperial intervention in the city's internal affairs.

This picture can be further elaborated if we look at the orations by Aelius Aristides composed a few decades later. In spite of some variants, his presentation of *eutaxia* does not really differ from that of Dio.[112] Nonetheless, in a passage from an oration in honour of Athena[113] he attributes to the goddess the ability to banish, among other things, *ataxia* (disorder), *stasis* (faction) and *hybris* (violence), replacing them with *eutaxia*, *homonoia* and other positive qualities. Here *eutaxia* appears as a divine gift, lying like *homonoia* outside the sphere of human action, and this is certainly a departure from Dio of Prusa's approach to politics, characterised by rationality and concreteness. It brings to an end the development of the term *eutaxia* we have traced starting from Aeschylus and particularly Thucydides. This development involved transformations and indeed inversions in meaning but prior to the mid-second century AD the term was never associated with the supernatural sphere. The figure of Athena as purveyor of *eutaxia*, albeit in the context of an oration which is in effect an aretalogy, is quite incompatible with the historical outlook of Thucydides or the political outlook of Aristotle or indeed Dio of Prusa.

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[105] *Or.* 32.95.
[106] *Or.* 34.25.
[107] *Or.* 32.37.
[108] *Or.* 33.48.
[109] *Or.* 34.49, cf. *supra* n. 35.
[110] *Supra* n. 18.
[111] See Meier 1983, 283-284; Salmeri 2007, § 3. On *isonomia*, see Levy 2005.
[112] See e.g. Aristid. *Or.* 23.34, 34.63.
[113] *Or.* 37.27.

To conclude these reflections on *eutaxia*'s role as a key word in the political debate in the Greek world of the Imperial age, we can note that *homonoia*[114] was the term more commonly used to express the need for law and order on the part of the notables in the various *poleis* so as to reduce the risk of interventions by the central authorities and maintain the status quo. At the same time, however, *eutaxia* as a political slogan appears to be more deeply rooted than *homonoia* in the contemporary mentality, because of its usage in the "decrets de consolation", the onomastics and in the writings of the moralists.[115] In this material *eutaxia* shows itself as a quality implying control, associated above all with the world of women and youths, expressing the ideal of an orderly, submissive behaviour which was precisely what notables wished for on the part of the inhabitants of the *poleis* of Asia Minor. Thus we encounter a case of mirroring of the private sphere in the public sphere, and vice versa, which I believe to be unmatched for perspicuity in the Imperial age. *Eutaxia* in fact had remained in use for centuries without becoming worn out, and had proved its worth in manifesting a mentality grounded in that need for order and control that following Chaironeia had characterised the transformation – not the end! – of the Greek city in the framework of large centralised states.

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[114] On *homonoia*, see Thériault 1996. In any case *eutaxia* is often found in association with *homonoia*, see supra nn. 107, 113.
[115] See *supra* § 7.

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Provincial Elites, Central Authorities:
Problems in Fiscal and Military Management
in the Byzantine State

John Haldon

There has been over the last 15 or 20 years an increasingly determined effort to come to terms with the evidence for the ways in which provincial populations, at all levels, experienced imperial government in a number of pre-modern state systems. In particular, the ways in which such populations were able to express their opposition to, or participation in, the imperial system of which they were or had now become a part, have generated important debate. But as often as not, this enterprise has involved a greater focus on élites than the 'ordinary' population, certainly in the earlier medieval western Eurasian world, for the simple reason that in most pre-modern states the nature of the evidence lies very much in favour of the former. Elites were usually literate, articulate and interested in their own affairs, or were seen as interesting to those who kept records, whether historians and chroniclers, or letter-writers, or whatever. Naturally, where there are archival documents or fiscal records, or forms of 'popular' literature, or at least, literature which addressed the interests of the mass of people in the provinces, such as hagiography or religious tracts and sermons and so forth, or where we have legal literature or texts which are concerned with property and inheritance and so forth, then we can say a good deal more about the non-élite. Where there is also material cultural evidence from archaeology or standing structures we can also say something about everyday life, about housing or family structure, for example, as well as about patterns of exchange of wealth in various forms. This chapter[1] will not deal with these topics, however, but will rather concentrate on the more general question of the relationship between state centres, however defined, and their élites, and of the structure of the power relationships which evolve.

The reason for my focus is straightforward. In looking at the elements which unite and which differentiate social and political systems, I have always found that a good starting point is to try to locate the structural constraints which determined how a particular formation evolved – in particular, the means through which their social élites maintained or tried to expand their control over resources, whether human or material. This is true of both the Ottoman or earlier Islamic states as well as the Byzantine state, and no less true of any other pre-capitalist state formation.

Before discussing élites, a brief comment on the way I understand the term 'state' is perhaps in order, since the word has a range of possible valences according to context. As with any definition, the notion of 'the state' must remain flexible if it is to generate explanations; it should function as a heuristic tool. A great deal of ink has flowed in attempts to generate all-embracing concepts of the state – from Marx's various definitions of the state as both the embedded forms of property-relations and social power in social formations in which religious-ideological power was the form through which political structures were expressed (his 'Asiatic' mode, for example) and as the instrument of

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[1] The text is based around my chapter, 'Social élites, wealth and power', in Haldon forthcoming.

domination by a ruling class, through to Max Weber's concept of the state as a system of institutions and impersonalised relationships evolving out of late medieval society, or as a territorial entity with a central power monopolising coercive power. Emphasis has also been placed by some, following the approach elaborated by Norbert Elias, on the processual cruxes around which state formation takes place, tracing the points or periods at which differential rates of socio-economic and institutional change attain a certain qualitative transformation, during which modes of resource-extraction and the evolution and transformation of the political forms through which these were achieved under varying conditions also change, and how these impact upon, yet are also affected by, the processes of socio-cultural class formation, awareness and conflict.[2] Modern discussion has tended to focus around efforts to reconcile these alternative and in many respects conflicting approaches – Mann's approach, for example, sees the state as both an instrument of coercive and ideological power as well as an organ through which élites may reproduce their domination, and which places emphasis on process as much as on structure.[3]

At one extreme of social-political organisation, the term 'state' can refer to a relatively short-lived grouping of tribal or clan communities united under a warlord or chieftain who is endowed with both symbolic and military authority – in anthropological terms, a 'Big-man' polity. Such 'states' rarely survive for long, however, and may reasonably be referred to as 'proto-states', since they have not yet attained a degree of institutional permanence. The majority of the 'nomad empires' which arose on the Eurasian steppe zone from the beginning of the first millennium BC and periodically re-appeared until the seventeenth century may exemplify such systems.[4] At the other extreme are more-or-less territorially unified political entities, with an organizational 'centre' of some sort (even if it is in fact peripatetic) from which a ruler or ruling group exercises political authority, and which maintains its existence successfully over several generations. An essential element in the formation and degree of permanence of such formations is that the authority of the ruler or ruling group is recognised as both legitimate and exclusive. In this respect, the ideological aspect is absolutely fundamental to state-building.

Key identifying markers might therefore include a territorially demarcated region (although lands may well have been geographically dispersed and frontiers ill-defined or fluctuating, reflecting the process of formation – through amalgamation, conquest, inheritance and so forth), controlled by a centralised governing or ruling establishment of some sort, which may or may not have a monopoly over the use of coercion, but which usually has the coercive power to assert its authority over the territories claimed, at least on an occasional 'punitive' basis when needed. To some extent, assuming there exists a (theoretical) monopoly on coercive power, this fits Weber's 'ideal type' definition of the state.

In all pre-modern states there have been gaps in the extent of state authority – border or mountainous regions, for example, difficult of access and untouched by state supervision; 'tribal' groups nominally owing allegiance and occupying territory

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[2] Elias 1969, esp. vol. II.
[3] Weber 1921; Weber 1972, III, 619-630, 650-678; Mann 1986, 20-32. See the useful summaries of concepts and theories in Giddens 1993, 50-52, 308-311; and the discussions in Sanderson 1999; Trigger 2003. The general discussion in Bang and Bayly 2003, and Bang 2003, reflects the current diversity of approach.
[4] See Runciman 1989, 152-153, for example.

claimed by the state, but not always easily brought under the state's authority or control. Where geography has favoured a tribal pastoral and/or nomadic economy, the nomads have frequently formed important elements in the armies of conquest states, certainly in the initial stages of their evolution. However, this has also meant that, because of the mobility of such pastoralists, their internal social cohesion and self-sufficiency, and the fact that their wealth is generally easily moved away from the reach of state officials, they are both able and sometimes inclined to resist any central authority that does not directly favour their own interests. By the same token, the relative patchiness of central control may represent a point on the line from local to supra-local state to empire (and back again). Ideological power can overcome this at certain times, but by itself generally remains a short-term means of cementing such power-relationships.[5] The very different configuration of power-relationships within three late ancient/early medieval states, for example – late Rome/early Byzantium, Sasanian Iran, and the early Umayyad caliphate – provides striking examples of the ways in which these features combined.

One crucial aspect of state formation is the generation of fairly complex ideological and legitimating systems, on the one hand, and at the same time more impersonalised and institutionalised modes of surplus extraction than proto-states or clan or tribal groupings are capable of developing. In Weber's concept a focus around sacred monarchical/priestly authority is seen as one important initial stimulus to the formation of administrative-bureaucratic institutions evolved to secure the surpluses required for the temple and related religious-social functions. Administration based on kinship and lineage relationships, and the exploitation of kin-based modes of subordination, tend then gradually to be replaced by non-kinship-based bureaucratic or administrative systems (although kin and lineage are rarely entirely absent – the example of the later Byzantine Empire, with its close familial networks, provides a useful illustration). In most examples, a bureaucratic-administrative structure of some sort confers a clear advantage, and appears to be a necessity if the political system is to retain its non-tribal existence and cohesion. This point was made already by the Muslim philosopher and political analyst Ibn Khaldun, for example, who saw this process as generally following the initial formation of a supra-tribal political entity from tribal elements under a chieftain of some sort, in which a crucial role was played by religion as a unifying element providing a new, supra-kinship set of relationships, identities and loyalties. While Ibn Khaldun was clearly working on the basis of his knowledge of the evolution of Islamic states, his main point remains valid for any state formative process.[6]

For the purpose of this chapter, therefore, 'state' refers to a territorially coherent political formation dominated by a centralised court and associated administrative apparatus, the whole reinforced through an ideological system in which concepts of 'empire' and divinely-appointed rulership played a key role in legitimating both claims to territory as well as the right to extract and deploy resources in order to maintain the whole system, and which is furthermore able to reproduce itself on a continuing basis independent of the kinship interests of the ruling dynasty or of the vested interests of social élites.

How do we define the term élite? The first point is that élites are rarely monolithic – they usually comprise a number of separable elements or factions, distinguished by

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[5] This is not only a pre-modern phenomenon: see, for example, Fabietti 1982.

[6] See Ibn Khaldun I, 247ff.

family and clan ties, by geographical location or origin, by political affiliation, functional position in the state system of which they are a part. The second point is that there are generally layers or levels of élite status and identity, involving also vertical as well as horizontal solidarities. All these elements have different values at different moments, so that there is generally a constantly-fluctuating overlap of vested interests, identities, alliances, networks of patronage and influence and so forth. We can see this very clearly in the example of the so-called senatorial élite of the later Roman world, and most particularly and clearly in Egypt, or in the Byzantine provincial and metropolitan élite of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Third, awareness of élite status may take very different forms – in many cases competing elements of what we may identify, structurally, as an 'élite', sharing certain key characteristics in respect of access to and control over resources of one sort or another, may themselves perceive no such common markers, and see themselves rather as independent, autonomous groups in competition with other similar groups. Indeed, the development of an awareness of shared socio-economic status and political interests generally marks a crucial transformative stage in social evolution, politics and the organization of resources. My main point, however, is that although I will be talking somewhat crudely of 'élites', these groups are neither monolithic nor simple, nor are they constant or stable in their constitution.

State élites have a powerful vested interest in the maintenance of those institutional relationships to which they owe their position, and conflict or tensions over the distribution of resources both within dominant élites, and between them and other elements in society, provide us with at least one dynamic element through which institutional and organisational change occurs, to the advantage of one group or another. There is in all pre-modern, tributary state formations a systemic tension or contradiction between the interests of those running and dominating the state or court – 'the state', in one sense – and those at any given point who stand outside that immediate group of families, clans or individuals. The history of the different elements which make up the Byzantine élite at any given time is, therefore, determined largely by the position they occupy in this framework, and what the options for them might have been with regard to securing their position (in terms of wealth, status, property, titles and so forth) for their successors as well as for themselves individually. Being a member of the late Roman or Byzantine élite was never, in consequence, a fixed or determinate quantity – on the contrary, it was to occupy a position in a complex set of social and cultural relationships, in which position, status and income remained both negotiable and fragile. Members of élites generally attempt to achieve economic and social security for themselves and their immediate kin by investing wealth in land on the one hand, and in the court or palatine or administrative apparatus of their state on the other, the first as a means of securing a regular revenue to fund their activities and promote their interests, the second in order to maintain their access to power and resources. Byzantium was no different.[7]

It is especially important to bear in mind the fact that in the context of both the later Roman as well as the Byzantine state, individuals saw service for the state as a means to an end – for their own individual and family interests – at least as much as, if not more than as a form of public service to 'the state' as an abstract entity or concept, although

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[7] For good discussion of the structure, form and history of different elements of the Byzantine élite(s), see the essays in Cheynet 2006a; Haldon 2005; Kazhdan and Ronchey 1997.

such a concept was part of the symbolic universe of the élite, and brought with it a sense of certain duties and responsibilities, as well as rights. Office and title were aspired to as part of the process of realising such vested interests, even if being in the service of the emperor, at court or in the provinces, was in itself an esteemed and praiseworthy attainment.[8] But while the administrative and military apparatus served the interests of the state, however conceived, it also needed to be paid or maintained in such a way and by such means as would secure its loyalty, or rather the loyalty of the individuals who comprised it. State salaries (regular annual payments to individuals, in cash and accompanying the tenure of specific functions and titles) and privileges, which increased in quantity and scope with rank and title, were the chief means of securing such loyalty, and thus were seen as desirable objectives of social and political competition. While in one sense the east Roman state was undoubtedly understood as essential to the fortune of individual members of the élite, it was largely and understandably taken for granted, so that what we might perceive as short-sighted over-exploitation of resources or inter-clan fighting at certain moments would have been far less obviously seen as a threat to the empire's continued existence. The factional competition and violence of the civil wars of the period from 1071 onwards provides a clear example. By the same token, the payment of enormous salaries on a yearly basis to the chief officers of the state was a pragmatic and taken-for-granted response to the need to secure the loyalty of these important and potentially dangerous individuals.[9]

From Late Roman to Byzantine forms

The term 'senatorial aristocracy' has been used to describe the late Roman élite up to the middle of the seventh century. This establishment, however, embodied a wide range of people of different economic statuses, and people not necessarily of similar social origins. The senatorial order, which represented the established landed and office-holding élite of the empire, had been enormously expanded during the fourth and fifth centuries. The emperor Constantine I (324-337) began to employ senators in the administrative machinery of the state in great numbers, in contrast to Diocletian (284-305) who for political reasons had introduced a number of restrictions on the posts senators could fill.[10] In the middle of the fourth century there were perhaps three hundred senators belonging to the senate of Constantinople, although it was constituted somewhat differently, in both its political and its economic structure, from the older senate at Rome;[11] by the end of the century there were as many as two thousand, a result of the creation by the emperors of ever more senators, and the tying of increasing numbers of posts to senatorial rank. One result of this was, inevitably, the devaluation of senatorial status, and the consequent establishment of new grades of higher status to compensate for this movement. All senators held the grade of *clarissimus*, which was hereditary; but a regrading in the later fourth century introduced two new levels – *illustris* and, below this, *spectabilis*. Only the first title was hereditary, the two senior ranks being tied to tenure of an imperial office or post in either military or civil service, although the title of *spectabilis* rapidly lost its status

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[8] See the discussion in Schuller 1975; and that in Gizewski 1988.
[9] Oikonomides 1989.
[10] Heather 1994.
[11] Zuckerman 1998, 130-135.

and was limited to fairly humble posts by the end of the fifth century. As grades internal to the ranks of *illustris* were introduced, according to whether the holder held an active post or not, and whether he was based at court or in the provinces, so the system became increasingly complex, since functional posts could also be awarded on an honorary and inactive basis.[12]

'Senatorial aristocracy' thus refers both to those who held the title *clarissimus* hereditarily – a considerable number by the sixth century – as well as to all those who were awarded the higher titles of *spectabilis* and *illustris*, neither of which was hereditary, although the children of those who held these titles were automatically graded as *clarissimi*. Many of these would have been fairly modest landowners, some may even have been in quite straitened economic circumstances, while a substantial number were certainly extremely wealthy and owned very substantial estates. During the sixth century, a further refinement of the grading system occurred, by which new titles – *magnificus* and *gloriosus* – replaced *illustris* at the higher levels, so that most key military and civil posts were of these ranks.[13] The term 'senatorial aristocracy' included also those who held high office in Constantinople and the provinces, men who actually exercised state authority at various levels, and whose salaries enabled them – if they were not already from a wealthy background – to establish themselves as members of this economically powerful élite. Once a senatorial family had established itself through imperial service, of course, it had the resources to further the interests of its own junior members and to build up a clientele, so that successive generations were assured of their membership of both a social élite and the ruling establishment.[14] But it never became an aristocracy of birth, since the emperors were always able to make new senators and fill posts with men whom they preferred, for whatever reason. The composition of the élite was extremely varied.[15]

The late Roman élite, internally diverse and highly regionalised though it was, was also the bearer of late Roman literary culture and the guardian of the urban-centred cultural traditions of the earlier Roman and Hellenistic worlds.[16] But the dramatic changes of the seventh century – changes in the role of cities, the huge losses of imperial territory, the narrowing of cultural and ideological horizons which the Persian and especially the Arab wars ushered in – affected this in many ways.[17] Many of the hallmarks of late Roman culture vanish almost completely, along with much of the cultural capital it carried with it. And although many of these transformative developments existed long before the seventh century, the crisis of that time brought things to a head and promoted the development of new structures and responses. As the relationships of power to land and to office within the ruling élite change, so the nature of literary culture, and the bearers of that culture, change considerably. The old senatorial establishment, with much of the literary cultural baggage associated with it, faded away during the seventh century, to be replaced by a service élite of heterogeneous ethnic, social and cultural origins. The new élite incorporated many elements of the older establishment, especially in the metropolitan region and in the

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[12] Jones 1964, 523-62; Overbeck 1973; Barnes 1974; Arnheim 1972.
[13] Jones 1964, 529-35; Arsac 1969.
[14] Näf 1995.
[15] See now the detailed survey in Heather 1998; and for senatorial landowning, Kaplan 1992, 155ff., 169-183.
[16] See Cameron 1998; Morgan 1998.
[17] Brandes 1999; Brandes and Haldon 2000.

senior church hierarchy,[18] but élite culture underwent radical change. The major shifts in urban culture meant that wealthy provincials turned to Constantinople, the seat of empire and source of wealth, status and power, and there they invested their social capital in order to become part of that system, although that might just as easily mean a post in their native territory. Only the Church provided an alternative and equivalent career structure, but that also was centred in Constantinople. The emperor and the court became, more than ever before, the source of social advancement. And while there were many minor routes to power that were not directly pulled into that nexus, the imperial court nevertheless constituted the dominant mode of entry.

The new élite thus owed its origins to the period of turmoil and re-organisation of state structures that occurred in the seventh century. The needs of the state in respect of finding persons competent to deal with both civil and military matters in the provinces in this period of crisis were a central consideration. The advantages an individual had over both local landlords and peasantry if he occupied a position of military or civil authority in the provinces were considerable – a monopoly of armed force, for example, the power to seize or confiscate food or other produce for the army, and so on. Persons appointed to such posts thus had every opportunity to further their own interests if they desired. Members of provincial élites hitherto overshadowed by local senators, or who had not been able to compete successfully at court but who had still been important in their own regions, now found themselves in a position to join state service and benefit therefrom. These tendencies are illustrated by the fact that many of the military commanders of the period appear to have been Armenians who took service with the empire, and serve as a useful reminder that the government was looking for people with the appropriate skills and resources for the tasks in hand, for such men – usually from the middling or upper nobility of Armenia – often brought their own personal armed retinues with them, thus further strengthening both their value to Constantinople as well as their local power.[19] But what is particularly important is that the composition of both the senate in Constantinople and of the state's leading officials changes. Although there had always been a place for 'newcomers', under imperial patronage, in the state establishment during the later Roman period, the greater proportion of non-Greek names, for example, of officials known from all types of source, is very striking from the 660s and after. There seems to have taken place a considerable change in the cultural and social origins of key personnel in the imperial establishment at all levels.

At the same time, the old system of senatorial dignities and titles (the *clarissimi*, the *spectabiles* and the *illustres*) seems to drop out of use, only the leading category of the *illustres* group, referred to as *gloriosi* (*endoxos* or *endoxotatos* in Greek) retaining any significance. Titles that no longer corresponded to social or political realities become irrelevant, disappearing entirely or being fossilised at a lower level of the system of ranks and status. By the end of the seventh century a re-structuring of the whole system of titles and precedence had taken place, in which the importance of titles and posts dependent directly upon imperial service in the palace and at court increases, to the disadvantage of older titles associated in one way or another with the senatorial order. Power was

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[18] See Haldon 2005.

[19] Armenians were not the only 'foreign' group to play a role: see Charanis 1959; Charanis 1961; Winkelmann 1987, 203-207; Gero 1985; also Ditten 1983. See also the comments of Cheynet 2006b, 12.

concentrated and focused more than ever before on the figure of the emperor and in the imperial palace, while the older, much more pluralistic system of rank, privilege, wealth and power disappears.

One effect of these changes was to make 'senatorial' titles and epithets part of the common system of titles based on service in the palace and at court. Their survival as 'senatorial' grades was still recognised in the ninth and tenth centuries.[20] The conclusion must be that, if senatorial grades had been reduced to one aspect of an otherwise entirely imperial and palatine hierarchy of ranks, and the older titles marking out membership of the senatorial order in the late Roman sense had fallen out of use, then the senatorial order as such no longer existed. 'Senators' were now imperially-appointed – there was no longer a hereditary clarissimate – which in turn may suggest that the socio-economic and cultural elements which had constituted the older senatorial order in all its diversity no longer existed or, at the least, were no longer able to dominate the state and government. The senate in Constantinople – which continued to wield influence because it included high-ranking state officials[21] – thus no longer embodied the economic or political interests of a broad stratum of landowners, an aristocracy of privilege whose urban-based municipal culture was also the élite culture of the late Roman world.

This does not mean that in the period from the middle of the seventh to the middle of the ninth century there were no wealthy, large-scale landowners; nor that their vested interests were unrepresented in the activities and politics of the ruling élite at Constantinople. On the contrary, there is just enough evidence to suggest that many leading families in the capital retained their properties, wealth and, in consequence, influence and access to the court through the seventh and into the eighth century and beyond; and that many of the important 'new' families or individuals of uncertain background who come to dominate the army and civil administration of the empire during the eighth century and afterwards came from well-off provincial families who had remained relatively invisible in the sources of the preceding centuries.[22] But this element in society seems no longer to have dominated the state in the way it had previously, although lack of clear evidence for continuity at the upper levels of society make any firm conclusions difficult. Service at court and imperial sponsorship was now far more important to social and economic advancement. The collective political-cultural strength of the late Roman senatorial élite had lain in its monopoly of high civil office in particular, the civil magistracies, governorships, judicial posts and so forth, in both the provinces and in Constantinople. Many of these disappeared or were reduced in status and importance as a result of the changes in the role of cities and in fiscal and military administration that occurred over the period from ca. 640-650 on, a process which involved a re-concentration of supervisory authority in the hands of the emperor and a few close advisors, and a focus on service at court for promotion and advancement.[23]

The incorporation of senatorial titles into a single imperial hierarchy appears to develop in parallel with the disappearance of the senatorial establishment and the system of grades that were its outward mark of identification. A more court-centred, imperial 'meritocracy' evolved, in which members of the old establishment competed on more-

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[20] Winkelmann 1985, for a detailed analysis, 28-42, 48-49.
[21] Beck 1966.
[22] Haldon 2005; Cheynet 2006b, 10, 21-22.
[23] Kaplan 1992, 310-326; Kaplan 1981.

or-less equivalent terms, depending upon competence and patronage and connections. In the situation of sporadic near-crisis which characterised the empire's administration from the middle of the seventh century until the 720s, the culture of the old establishment was increasingly marginalised, a factor reflected most obviously in the reduction in the production of many genres of non-religious literature and other shifts in the cultural pattern of the period. As the importance of the court increased, so that of the senatorial order waned, as those who belonged to it came to depend more and more upon the court for their status. Birth and lineage also became less important: the hagiographical writings of the later seventh to ninth centuries, for example, have no commonly-employed vocabulary to describe persons of wealth and power, concentrating usually on descriptions of their wealth and status at the time, rather than their lineage (although this does also continue to be mentioned on occasion).[24]

The result of all these changes was not simply that the dominance of the older aristocracy was broken. It was that the new 'pseudo-meritocratic' service élite depended, at least in its formative period, entirely upon the emperor. The shrinkage of the empire territorially, the centralisation of fiscal administration, the effective disappearance of cities as intermediaries, socially and economically, between the provinces and Constantinople, were all part of this shift in emphasis. It gave the imperial system a new lease of life, which was to last until the eleventh century.

The court, the élite, and the provinces
The Byzantine imperial court and the government defined their interests relatively narrowly – to protect the empire's territorial integrity, maintain an effective fiscal apparatus through which resources could be extracted for this purpose, maintain the imperial household, and maintain an international diplomatic network which likewise contributed to the preservation of the state. They were less interested in local society and economy – they achieved their aims pretty efficiently and successfully, but stopped short of taking an active interest in provincial affairs. Indeed, central administration was relatively apathetic and ignorant in this respect and, in the context of the ability of members of provincial élites to exercise influence, created a great deal of political space within which local affairs could be manipulated.[25]

But the government – the state – was at no time a neutral observer and manager of the empire's resources. The imperial administration in the Byzantine world was embodied in individuals who occupied a multiplicity of social roles. On the one hand, as members of the state establishment bearing imperial titles, they were regarded as, and understood themselves as, members of the imperial household. On the other hand, they had roles in their own households and families – as heads of family, as landlords, as brothers or fathers or sons, and so forth. This meant the imperial system was highly flexible and malleable, since the people who made it up were members of frequently extensive networks of clientage and patronage, connected by family interest as well as local identities to a wide range of intersecting circles of influence. At the same time, prominent provincials could make use of personal connections at the capital among people who outranked the

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[24] See Haldon 2005.
[25] This point is well brought out in Neville 2004, 99-135; see also the survey by Cheynet 2003b.

local state officials in respect of access to the emperor or one of his senior confidants. Friendship, social obligation and gift-giving were common forms of putting pressure on people or obligating them in some way, locally as well as at the capital. Social power was thus embodied in a series of overlapping networks, and is reflected in the vested interests and actions of various individuals and groups as they seek to negotiate their ways through these relationships. Social power was exercised to secure and improve one's situation in respect of the centre and the imperial household, in respect of one's family situation, and one's position in a hierarchy of associations with other individuals similarly connected and with access to greater or lesser sets of resources.[26] What this meant in practical terms was that for members of the Byzantine élite it was their position in a network of relationships dominated by their household and kin, and the prestige of court and imperial posts, which framed their actions and determined how they interacted with others in the different social contexts in which they found themselves.[27] The point is underlined by the ways in which emperors too – the most successful members of the power élite – surrounded themselves with relatives or associates of their families, and by the ways in which those outside this charmed circle strove to gain admittance.[28] This was hardly less true of outsiders who aspired to enter this élite at whatever level – most wealthy households maintained some servants and retainers, the wealthier sometimes considerable bodies of servants and armed retainers, and joining the ranks of such a retinue which, among the very powerful, was organised along the same lines as the imperial palace, could offer many advantages to someone who aspired to greater things. The stories of Leo, Michael and Thomas in the retinue of Bardanes Tourkos and later Nikephoros I, or of Basil I, among several, are illustrative, although it should be emphasised that none of these three were in fact of humble origins.[29]

But however complex the actual forms of such networks, the importance of maintaining one's position in the imperial system and of retaining the approval of the emperor and his immediate household and advisers was always paramount to the sense of social worth and honour of members of the Byzantine élite in both the capital and the provinces. This gave the emperor a clear advantage in neutralizing competition for control over resources.[30] One outcome of the changes during the seventh century traced above was that up to the later tenth and mid-eleventh centuries, Byzantines identified no 'aristocracy' as such – they described their world in terms of those with state positions, the middling and private citizens or subjects of the emperor, and the poor, or in terms of those who held a palatine rank or state position, and the rest.[31] But they certainly had a sense of 'noble lineage' or 'good birth', and a 'good' or 'well-born' family was recognised as a

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[26] What is known of the history of various clans and families illustrates these points: see Cheynet 2003a; and in particular Krsmanović 2001; Cheynet 1990, 261-301; Vlyssidou 2001; and especially the careful study by Winkelmann 1987, 143-219.

[27] Magdalino 1984; Neville 2004, 85-93; Cheynet 2006b, 32-36 for the tenth-eleventh centuries.

[28] Cheynet 2006b, 13-14.

[29] Beck 1965b; Winkelmann 1987, 75ff. For Leo, Michael and Thomas, see Winkelmann 1987, 77-78; Cheynet 2006b, 12 and notes; 31-35. For Basil I: Winkelmann 1987, 79ff.

[30] See Kazhdan and McCormick 1997, 168-172, 195-197.

[31] For the absence of lineage and family identity as significant social markers before the middle of the ninth century, see Guilland 1948; Guilland 1953; and for a brief discussion of the concept 'aristocracy' as it appears in the modern literature on the Byzantine élite, see Antonopoulou 2002.

[32] Cheynet 2006b, 5ff. and sources.

desirable asset.[32] The prosopography of the major office- and title-holders of the empire across the seventh to ninth centuries has shown how some of these networks functioned in practice. In particular, it has shown that the central authority managed to maintain a remarkably firm hand on the élite, rotating even the most powerful senior military officials on a fairly regular basis, able to isolate malcontents or potential threats and have them neutralised (exile, execution, imprisonment) and, time and again, to ward off challenges to central authority by rebellious provincials.[33] And this promoted the continuing vitality of the palatine hierarchy and the system of precedence from which social status, privilege and access to power and wealth flowed. The general Katakalon Kekaumenos was praised, reportedly, by the emperor Michael VI (1056-1057), himself a former senior government official, for achieving his success and high rank by his own merit and not by virtue of family connections, reinforcing the impression that lineage and 'good birth' were in fact well-established as markers of social distinction.[34]

By the eleventh century there had evolved a substantial provincial aristocracy in the Byzantine world. Those who held state positions and who had invested a portion of their wealth in property in their native districts, for example, had married into other wealthy families and inherited land and other property. They were able to transmit this wealth to successive generations and at the same time to secure positions at court and in the army and administration through the exercise of patronage, connections, marriage and, just as importantly, the education available to those who could afford to acquire it.[35] Access to élite status and position remained open to those of more humble origins, but it was certainly becoming increasingly difficult by the later eleventh century. Yet still, in spite of the potential for such an élite to reduce its dependency on the court and palace (through the acquisition of economic resources in land independent of the court and the emperors), it remained to the very end firmly anchored in the palatine hierarchy. The values and self-esteem of individuals and families were determined always by their position within the system of court titles, ranks and administrative or military offices, and closeness to the throne. In consequence, the emperors were still able to exploit this situation to advance the careers of those of less privileged background who came to their attention. The system of yearly salaries or *rogai* paid to those who had invested a lump sum in return for certain titles and the social status they brought is an ample illustration of this (up to the later eleventh century, at least), for the return on such investments was often very small indeed and may often have meant an absolute loss, if measured in purely financial returns, to the investor.[36] But as an investment in status and esteem the purchase of such titles clearly brought very considerable benefits and was widely practised. This *ideological* identity of interests between those who joined or who were born into the social élite, and the palace, thus generated what we might call a systemic impasse, where in the end neither court nor élite could free themselves from one another, and where the élite could never assert an identity independent of the court in the way which western aristocracies were able to do.

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[33] Winkelmann 1987, 99-142.

[34] Skylitzes, ed. Thurn 1973, 483.13f.

[35] Hendy 1985, 100-107 for some magnate lands, their extent, origins and their location; Cheynet 2006b, 7-12.

[36] See Lemerle 1967; Oikonomides 1997, 205; Neville 2004, 25-31. This system broke down in the second half of the eleventh century, however – see below.

Interests and conflicts

The structural tensions thus generated showed themselves in the political life of the empire in terms of the relationship between individuals or groups of magnates and their kin, and the imperial government, court, or individual emperor. As the élite became gradually less *economically* dependent on the court, and as it began to develop an awareness of its interests – reflected by an increasing use of family names and an awareness of social status, tradition and expectations from the later eighth, but more clearly from the early tenth century onwards – so there began to appear also a real structural tension between the economic interests of this increasingly independent, but internally fractured élite, dominating as it did at least certain key sectors of the machinery of the state, on the one hand, and the fiscal interests of the state itself and of the particular power élite or dominant faction which directed it at any given moment, on the other hand. This tension can be seen in the efforts of both parties, reflected in imperial legislation in particular, to maintain or increase its access to the surplus that could be appropriated from the producing population. Should that surplus go to the landed power-élite and magnates, as rent, or to the state (and thus, of course, indirectly, to the power élite of the moment) as taxes and other impositions?

We must be careful not to oversimplify. For 'the élite' was not a single or monolithic group, but consisted, as we have said, of a range of competing and sometimes hostile families, clans and individuals, each with specific cultural and political origins and allegiances. Each of these elements acted in its own perceived best interests, not as members of any co-ordinated body, and certainly not with any sense of common identity except at the level of peer respect and worth; in addition, the range of people identified in imperial legislation as 'the powerful', those who presented an actual or potential challenge to the imperial government for resources, was very wide and, in purely economic terms, represented people from very disparate positions in society – indeed, it has been noted that it represented a relationship of relative power and wealth rather than a distinct social grouping.[37] What they did have in common was an imperial position or rank, and therewith also an income derived from imperial service – whether as a soldier in the *tagmata* or guards regiments at Constantinople, at one level, or as a senior fiscal administrator and title-holder at Constantinople or in the provinces, at another. And this returns us to the point that it was primarily at and through the court, the imperial palace, and in the presence of the emperor, that social rank was conferred and wealth acquired. While this might have been inflected or nuanced by notions of family and lineage and so forth, the emperors were well aware – and exploited the fact – of the crucial importance of membership of and participation in the imperial system.

Nevertheless, the body of people who, in the imperial legislation of the tenth century, are collectively referred to as 'the powerful' did constitute, from a structural perspective, a focus of competition for resources in landed wealth and, perhaps more significantly and, for the state, more dangerously, in manpower, whether or not they were aware of their position in this respect. In particular, senior provincial officers who acquired lands and thereby some authority and patronage over the occupants of such lands, who might at the same time be the source of soldiers for provincial armies, were an obvious threat. The emperors tried to limit the length of service of individual officers

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[37] Morris 1976; Neville 2004, 68-69, 79ff.

in particular regions to avoid the development of such personal ties of dependence and loyalty, and as noted already, in the eighth and throughout much of the ninth century appear to have been fairly successful in this respect.[38] The policies of the emperor Basil II (976-1025) in particular have been picked out as exemplifying this tension and the strategies available to emperors to address the problems they perceived.[39] During the eleventh century, and following the eventual failure of draconian legislation on the part of rulers such as Basil II, they seem to have been less able to maintain such a firm control, and their leading officials were more often than not also among those who were most likely to compete with the court for control over manpower and wealth. This is where the contradiction becomes most apparent – to preserve their own authority over resources the emperors issued legislation, which they then expected to be enforced by members of the very social élite against whose interests the legislation was in part directed. Naturally, they tried to select individuals whose immediate interests were closely allied to those of the ruling emperor, and thus generally from among those factions or families closest to them and most dependent upon them, but the point remains valid.

The parties to this struggle were conscious of this contradiction at the level of political vested interests, but differentiating between 'the state' and the social élite of the empire is to create an artificial separation between the two, since they overlapped in so many ways. It was to the emperor and the concept of the orthodox Roman *politeia* that individuals gave their loyalty. And while it was the emperor who recruited members to the élite, promoting the careers of individuals from a wide range of social backgrounds and thus inhibiting the development of a closed and aristocratic élite, the court was dependent upon the élite for all its chief civil and military functionaries, regardless of the distinct family and patronage factions that existed, each of which attempted constantly to use the state against their particular rivals, not only at the highest level of power-politics but also in provincial and local political competition.[40] In the course of the later eleventh century, a partial solution was for the emperors to concede revenue extraction to those upon whom it depended. As the tensions between the different poles of authority and power intensified, what had been a systemic paradox and potential opposition became open and political, yet doubly complicated by the factional rivalries between clans. The other part of the resolution was then the seizure of the state by the representatives of a particular faction of the ruling élite, and the establishment of a more openly dynastic and aristocratic system of administration, dependent upon a precarious network of clan alliances and patronage supported by the leading magnate families.[41] As the historian Zonaras remarks of the system established by the Komnenoi, the emperor Alexios I (1081-1118) distributed state positions and state lands and the income derived therefrom among his kin and relatives by marriage, with the result that the Komnenos clan became the wealthiest family in the empire.[42]

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[38] Survey of the evidence in Winkelmann 1985, 72-140; Winkelmann 1987, 99-142.

[39] Cheynet 2006d.

[40] Neville 2004, 136-164.

[41] As a good example of this see Cheynet 2003a. I use the term loosely, to refer to those families which shared a monopoly of key state positions, owned substantial private wealth, headed substantial networks of patronage, and were in a position to challenge the imperial family on matters of state policy.

[42] Zonaras, ed. Bóttner-Wobst 1897, 767.2-10. This whole process is analysed in Kazhdan and Ronchey 1997.

While by no means united ideologically, constituent elements of this group, made up of a number of dominant families with their clients and retinues throughout the provinces as well as in the central administration, eventually came into open conflict with those elements which dominated the state apparatus at Constantinople at given moments, especially during the first three-quarters of the eleventh century. This conflict was prefigured in the tenth century by the temporary dominance exercised over the imperial court by members of particularly influential clans, such as the Phokas family. But factional rivalry prevented any longer-term ascendancy at this point, and the exploitation of that rivalry by Basil II and his successor Constantine VIII (between 1025 and 1028) permitted the emperors to destroy this particular threat to their own dynasty and power.[43] The clash between the bureaucratic faction which dominated policy during the brief reign of the emperor Michael VI (1056-1057), and the leaders of the Anatolian armies, all members or associates of well-established 'military' clans, a clash which resulted in the rebellion led by Isaac Komnenos and Katakalon Kekaumenos and the deposition of Michael, reflected a more dangerous development from the point of view of the ruler. And it is, ironically, clearly reflected in the fate of the emperor Isaac I (1157-1159): as soon as he was on the imperial throne and confronted by the issues of resource control and expenditure from the perspective of the government, he began to legislate to re-establish imperial control, only to suffer a similar fate himself as the vested interests of the élites at both Constantinople and in the provinces allied together to cast him out.[44] Nevertheless the relations within and between the different elements which made up these groups remained fluid and subject to constant change, so that it is impossible to speak of clearly identifiable or long-term political solidarities. It is true that, by the middle of the eleventh century, contemporary commentators were speaking in terms of identifiable 'military' (provincial) and 'civil' (Constantinopolitan) factions, although it has been shown very clearly how much even this perspective was the product of a very particular and relatively short-term situation. The so-called military faction was identified with the great magnates of Asia Minor, an élite of birth, the metropolitan group with the central bureaucracy, to a degree at least an élite based on office and direct and regular access to the imperial household.[45]

This does not mean that the latter did not also possess or invest in landed property in the provinces; nor that the demarcation between the two groups was not always very fluid and subject to a wide range of conjunctural pressures, factional alliances and individual personalities – indeed, interests were represented and embodied precisely in individual family histories and individual careers.[46] Competition for power and influence took place within the context of a patrimonial political structure, dominated by the formal hierarchies and system of honours and status of the imperial state, and between rival clans and families. While landed wealth played without doubt a crucial role in the consolidation of magnate autonomy, families and individuals invested also very heavily in the imperial system itself: posts and sinecures, state 'pensions' (annuities attached to the possession of specific ranks and titles in the imperial system, not necessarily active posts with functions attached), often amounting to considerable yearly incomes in gold and precious cloths, as

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[43] Howard-Johnston 1995.
[44] See Attaleiates, ed. Bekker 1853, 60-62; and esp. Zonaras, ed. Bóttner-Wobst 1897, 667-668.
[45] Cheynet 2006c, 16-19.
[46] Cheynet 1990, 191-198; Cheynet 2006b, 11.

well as thesaurised coin, jewellery, plate and so on. All members of the dominant social class, as well as their clients, invested and accrued wealth in this way. While many families thus consolidated their position economically over a number of generations through the acquisition of lands, equally large numbers seem to have possessed relatively little landed wealth, and were in consequence much more directly dependent upon the state or, more specifically, the particular ruler and palatine faction of the moment.[47]

Such persons may be described, in fact, as clients of the state itself, and formed thus an important group of interests at the capital and in the palace. And it must be stressed again that even the more independent magnates – both individuals and clans – depended for titles, honours and, to a certain extent (depending upon distance from the capital, relationships with local society and similar factors) social status and respect on this bureaucratic, imperial system. In the tenth century there was still no real aristocracy, even if there were a number of élite families who remained consistently important in the state's affairs, military and civil; and the emperors were still able to isolate dangerous individuals and families and deal with them, make and break senior officers, bring in people of humble origins or outsiders to fulfil key roles in their governments. And eunuchs played a significant role as well, even if it is also the case that several of these did also favour their own relatives' economic and political interests, and thus cannot be said to be either genealogically or culturally deracinated or independent of the pattern of vested interests of members of the élite. Indeed, the significant positions achieved by many eunuchs is a clear illustration of the relative openness of the establishment and of the centrality of imperial patronage and choice, and at the same time of the absence of any consolidated élite groups at court or in government administration in general. Only during the later eleventh and especially during the twelfth century does the rise to power of the military aristocracy of the Komnenian era lead to the exclusion of eunuchs, among other groups, from the highest positions.[48]

This was still, in many respects, a pseudo-meritocratic regime, in which connections, patronage, talent and opportunity played as important and sometimes a much more important role than birth. Symeon the New Theologian, writing in the early years of the eleventh century, noted that the élite fell into two groups – those who were present at court, who accompanied the emperor on campaign, devoted themselves to imperial service; and those who dwelt on their own lands, stayed at home in luxury. The former were the *archontes*, one of the generic terms used for those in power and authority, and hence for the social élite.[49] Only during the later eleventh and twelfth centuries did some of these families acquire sufficient wealth and resources on a secure enough basis to become, potentially at least, more independent of the court and its system of titles and precedence. And it was the successful rise to imperial power of one of them, the Komnenoi, and the system of clan and dynastic alliances they employed to cement their position, that facilitated and speeded up the process of aristocratisation that accompanied this.[50]

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[47] The best analysis of these relationships and the factional strife within the élite is Cheynet 1990.

[48] See Spadaro 2006; Cosentino 2006, both with further literature and valuable discussion. See also Sideris 2002; Tougher 1997; Ringrose 1994. Older literature: Kazhdan 1973; Seibt 1978, 145; Winkelmann 1985, 66.

[49] See Darrouzès 1967, 106.

[50] See Cheynet 1990, 339-377.

Elite power vs. central authority?

The growth in the power of the élite had been stimulated by two developments in the period from the middle of the tenth to the middle of the twelfth century. In the first place, the sources show the increasing subordination of the peasantry to both private landlords and, from the later eleventh century, to holders of state revenue concessions. This long-term process was hastened by the occurrence of a series of natural disasters affecting harvests in the first half of the tenth century, and exposed peasant smallholders in particular to pressure to convert their lands into tenancies in return for support through difficult periods. While the government enacted a number of laws to restrict the alienation of such lands to 'the powerful' (a loose term denoting most of those with the resources to buy up land, and thus not necessarily signifying the very wealthy alone), success was very limited, and in the end, and in spite of draconian measures enacted by the emperor Basil II, the state began to lose control of the fiscal resources which such independent producers represented.[51] The peasantry, while they became increasingly liable to the depredations and encroachments of the big landowners and magnates (especially in the tenth century) as well as those who were also the tenants of large landlords, were all still subject to the fisc, that is to say, they were taxed directly (although some estate owners, particularly monastic or ecclesiastical, were exempted as a special privilege by certain emperors).[52] At the same time the rapaciousness of some imperial officials, anxious to exploit their own positions, further exacerbated the problem of over-taxation, and the situation was further complicated by the fact that provincial landlords might also be the centrally-appointed representatives of the state, responsible for various fiscal duties, for example. The contradictions inherent in such a situation are graphically brought out in the ways through which provincial peasant producers were exploited by such officials, a situation made very apparent in the letters of archbishop Theophylact of Ochrid for the late eleventh century.[53]

In the second place, from the later eleventh century the state conceded the right to receive the revenues from certain public (i.e. fiscal, or taxed) districts; or of certain imperial estates, and their tenants, along with part or all of the rents and taxes raised from them. Such grants – known as grants of *pronoia* – were made for a variety of reasons to individuals by the emperors, chiefly as an administrative and political tool designed to bind potentially antagonistic individuals or clans to the imperial family. They took the form of personal grants from the ruler, who represented the state in the institutional sense; and while there was also a more general meaning of the term *pronoia*, the most usual involved *pronoia* grants in return for military service. In order to maintain the loyalty of many magnates, emperors also granted increasing numbers of tax exemptions to individuals, who in turn benefited from the fixed rates of taxation in a context of rapid price inflation and devaluation of the gold currency. With the expansion of magnate landholding, a process of alienation of the state's fiscal and juridical rights set in, although the extent to which the institution of *pronoia* contributed to this before the thirteenth century is open to doubt: such grants only seem to have become generalised from the middle of the twelfth century as a means of supporting soldiers, and many of them were very small – not major

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[51] Morris 1976; Howard-Johnston 1995.
[52] A process summed up in Harvey 1989, 35-79.
[53] See Gautier 1986, esp. nos. 12, 17, 19, 21, 24, 26, 31, 55, 61, 85, 96, 98; and also Herrin 1975.

estates designed to support a mounted soldier and his retinue, but quite small revenues intended to maintain a soldier for a limited period.[54]

Nevertheless, through obtaining fiscal exemptions of varying sorts, landlords – both secular and monastic – were able to keep a larger proportion of the revenues extracted from their peasant producers for themselves, as rent, while the government's hold on the remaining fiscal land of the empire was constantly challenged by the provincial élite.[55] This had important consequences, for, in conjunction with developments in the way the government recruited and financed its armies during the later tenth and early eleventh century, it meant that the overall burden placed upon the peasant producers grew considerably.[56] In the period before the changes of the later tenth century, it is likely that this burden was fairly evenly distributed across the rural population of the provinces, and that, although the transit of imperial forces did involve unusually heavy demands on the communities closest to the routes used by military detachments, such demands were neither frequent nor regular.

The divergence between the interests of those members of the landed and office-holding establishment outside the court power élite, and the central authority (or the 'state' as a political entity) and its allies, which begins to make itself felt during the later tenth and eleventh centuries, was resolved from the time of Alexios I and until the end of the twelfth century by the transformation of the empire under the Komnenos dynasty into what was, in effect, a gigantic family estate. While the process may well have begun to take form under the Doukai in the 1070s,[57] the Komnenoi ruled through a network of magnates, relatives and patronage that expanded rapidly during the twelfth century and, in uniting the vested interests of the dominant social-economic élite with those of a ruling family, re-united also the interests of the former with those of a centralised empire. This can be viewed from one perspective as a 'papering over'. But from another angle it was an efficacious way of recognizing a very different set of circumstances and of creating the space for the development of new solidarities and networks of patronage, which enabled the state to survive as a powerful eastern Mediterranean entity until the very end of the twelfth century.

The factional politics that led to these developments, in particular over who would control Constantinople and sit on the throne, become particularly apparent in the squabbles and civil wars that followed the defeat of Romanos IV (1068-1071) by the Seljuks in 1071, a situation resolved only by the seizure of power by Alexios I in 1081. By the same period, the élite had crystallised into a multi-factional aristocracy of birth, with a few very powerful families at the top, and a number of subordinate and collateral clans and families dependent upon them, often with strongly regional affiliations and identities. Under the Komnenoi, the imperial family and its immediate associates monopolised military and higher civil offices, while the older families who had been its former rivals dominated the bureaucratic machinery of the state, leaving local affairs and provincial administration to members of the local élites, who had benefited from the economic stability of the tenth and eleventh centuries and the revival of urban economies.[58]

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[54] The extent of grants of *pronoia* before the later twelfth century is still unclear. See Ahrweiler 1980; Khvostova 1988; Magdalino 1993, 172, 175-176, 231-233; and esp. Cheynet 2006b, 28-30.

[55] Harvey 1989, 68-69, 91ff.

[56] Harvey 1989, 35-79, 102ff.

[57] Cheynet 2006b, 5.

[58] Cheynet 1990, 413ff.; Magdalino 1993, 18-227; Kazhdan 1984.

Yet even with this aristocratisation, vertical mobility remained quite usual, because the absolute authority of the emperor at court made palatine service at once both highly desirable and remunerative, as well as insecure and potentially dangerous. Personal service on the emperor and proximity to him on a day-to-day basis meant influence and power. It also encouraged rivalry from competitors.[59] The rise to power and influence, and the fall from grace, of senior courtiers and palatine officers, whether well-connected outside the court or not, is a commonplace throughout Byzantine history, until the very end. There are many examples: in the late seventh/early eighth century the fate of those who failed to succeed in carrying out some of the policies of Justinian II (685-695 and 705-711);[60] in the eighth century the revolt of Artavasdos (741-3) against Constantine V (741-775) is itself an indication of the potential threat perceived by that great ally of Leo III (717-741) in the succession to the throne of his younger brother-in-law Constantine V; the discovery of a plot against Constantine V in 765-766 and the subsequent punishment of several senior military and civil officials and their clients at court;[61] under Eirene (797-802) the competition between the eunuchs Theoktistos and Staurakios;[62] the *vita Basilii* (a laudatory *Life* of the emperor Basil I, 867-886), however much elements may have been pro-Macedonian propaganda, reveals a court full of factional rivalries and jostling for position; the rise to power and subsequent removal from authority of Basil the *parakoimomenos* in the 980s,[63] and so on – up to and beyond the case of Theodore Styppeiotes and his disgrace through the plotting of his rival John Kamateros at the court of Manuel I (1143-1180).[64]

Provincial and metropolitan élite society
But the structure and history of 'élite society' is more complex than the importance of the great magnate clans would suggest. Below the clans and families who came to dominate the imperial system during the tenth and eleventh century stood a much larger number of lower-ranking but still 'powerful' families and individuals, people who invested in the middling hierarchy of state and army, but who were also closely associated with the society and economy of their home districts and towns. From the later seventh and eighth centuries, the fiscal system had been focused on the village community, so that the revival of urban centres from the later ninth century onwards meant the appearance of a series of important towns which remained more-or-less independent of the imperial administration, except that they served as administrative bases and residences for the various local and visiting imperial officials whose business lay in the provinces. The local élites, who more and more preferred to live in their district town rather than on their estates (if they had ever dwelt outside the local towns, something which the lack of evidence on this issue makes impossible to decide), had a free hand in the running of such towns, in the governance and administration of which they, together with the local bishop and senior clergy, constituted the chief elements. The bishop, in fact, was generally a key member

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[59] Kazhdan and McCormick 1997, 176-185, 189-195.
[60] Ostrogorsky 1968, 142-143.
[61] Rochow 1991, 144-159, 191-192, 204-205.
[62] Lilie 1996, 102-103, 279-291. See also for a general survey of stability and instability at court and in the imperial administrative establishment more widely, Winkelmann 1987, 98-142.
[63] Brokaar 1972.
[64] Kresten 1978; Magdalino 1993, 198-200, 254-256.

of this élite, and often had family connections with the middling and higher aristocracy of the town and its hinterland. Indeed, just as it seems likely that the bishop had remained throughout the period from the sixth to tenth century a major figure in local urban life, so it is just as likely that local élite families were likewise important figures, although we hear very little of them in the sources. The revival of local agriculture, increasing monetisation of exchange, increased market activity, all contributed to an improvement in their situation and a higher political as well as economic profile as they were able to take advantage of stable economic circumstances to invest in agriculture as well as markets.[65] This group of largely middling landlords supplied also many of the local state officials in both the civil and military administration, so that the interests of the families who were thus represented could be furthered with little real opposition. Indeed, the term used to describe them – *archontes*, a term which may be loosely translated as 'lords' – meant also an official or holder of an imperial post of some sort, and points to their origins. Their income came from both land as well as from town property – the recovery of urban markets and economies meant that town properties increased in value, with the result that substantial incomes could be drawn from urban rents and the commercial activities that may have been associate with many of them.[66]

The emergence during the eleventh century of provincial urban élites who had the interests of their own town, as much as a career at Constantinople, as the centre of local society and economic activity, created a new element in the pattern of relations between capital and provinces. It meant that local interests could now be represented more vocally than hitherto, and also created a basis for opposition to the activities of fiscal officials sent from the imperial capital. The development of ties of patronage and dependence between these archontic families and their tenants and clients reinforced these local solidarities, generating an additional barrier between both central government and the major aristocratic families, and local tax payers. But the relative apathy about non-fiscal provincial matters on the part of the government meant that a high degree of local autonomy was the norm, with prominent households or groups of allied families able to exercise influence through their networks of patronage and contacts at the capital and in the central administration.[67] As a result, when the central administration did attempt to get more involved – either in changing fiscal rates or in other respects – the possibility of armed opposition to government officials also arose. One or two examples of local revolts which were clearly inspired by popular or communal hostility to imperial fiscal policy are recorded in the sources. A good example is the rebellion, during the reign of Constantine X (1059-1067), of the townspeople of Larissa, a small *kastron* in Thessaly in Greece. Led by their *archontes*, they wished to protest against the imposition of extra taxes by Constantinopolitan officials. Even though one of these local lords, a certain Nikoulitzas Delphinas, tried to warn the emperor, he was ignored, and eventually ended up at the head of the rebels. The revolt ended peacefully, by negotiation, but signalled an important change in the relationship between Constantinople and the provinces.[68]

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[65] See Neville 2004, 83ff.; Harvey 1989, 207ff., 226ff.; Angold 1984c, 236-253; Cheynet 2006c, 21-23.

[66] For the local 'gentry' and their relationship to the expanding urban and rural economy in the eleventh century and after, see esp. Angold 1984c; Neville 2004, 66-98; also Harvey 1989, 261; Magdalino 1993, 150-156.

[67] Neville 2004, 39ff.; Angold 1984c; also Cheynet 2003b.

[68] See Harvey 1989, 113-115; Hendy 1985, 297.

New elements were introduced into the élite during the middle years of the eleventh century as emperors such as Contantine IX Monomachos (1042-1055) and his immediate successors opened senatorial membership, and thus access to senior state positions and titles, to individuals from hitherto excluded groups such as merchants and lower-ranking administrative personnel. This was partly to boost the state's income, since the titles thus awarded had to be paid for; and it may also have served factional political aims, creating a body of venal dependents on the emperor who would support him against other factions at court and at Constantinople. Since some of these newcomers also held imperial posts as tax-collectors or similar in the provinces, it also impacted upon the ways in which the state collected revenues and is associated with the increasing farming of revenue contracts and oppressive exploitation of rural taxpayers.[69] But it changed the composition of the metropolitan, civil élite – much to the chagrin of some contemporary observers[70] – and had important consequences for the structure of the élite as a whole. It contributed likewise to an inflation of titles and the need to generate new strata within the existing hierarchy to accommodate the changes, a tendency exacerbated by the declining value of the devalued imperial gold coinage – since imperial *rogai* were paid in a depreciating currency, the élite and the palace generated more and more senior titles with correspondingly higher *rogai* attached to them as a means of safeguarding their income and investment.[71] At the same time, as the eleventh century drew to a close, the upper strata of the metropolitan, predominantly 'civil' establishment and the provincial, largely 'military' families became increasingly differentiated, with the Komnenos clan favouring a select group of leading military landowning clans, more-or-less closed to newcomers, and actively discouraging the social advancement of people of middling origins. The shift is accompanied by a downgrading of what had by this time become designated as 'senatorial' – which is to say, 'civil' – titles, and the creation of new 'imperial' titles founded less on functional attributes than on connections to the imperial family. It also appears to have entailed the exclusion, to a greater or lesser extent, of both eunuchs, who had played a significant role in élite and palatine politics from the seventh until the middle of the eleventh century, and of foreigners, especially in the army. Vertical mobility, while remaining possible primarily as a result of imperial sponsorship and patronage, becomes less possible; and while there were certainly a few individual exceptions, the civil élite also suffered in status and esteem.[72]

From the middle of the twelfth century at the latest – at the height of what has been dubbed 'the Komnenian system' – the élite of the empire can truly be said to be dominated by this militarised aristocracy of birth. In contrast with the earlier period, when relatives of emperors occupied very few senior posts, it has been noted that almost 90% of senior military positions were held by the Komnenoi or their relatives and kin during the reign of Manuel I.[73] And although strong and politically-sensitive rulers like Manuel I were able to maintain imperial authority very effectively through manipulating the different interests of these families and by using outsiders, it is also clear that while individuals from outside

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[69] See Lemerle 1967, 84-90; Lemerle 1977, 287-293; Hendy 1985, 570-582.

[70] E.g. Michael Attaleiates' contemptuous remarks: ed. Bekker 1853, 275.12-19.

[71] Weiß 1973; Hohlweg 1965, 34-39; and esp. Cheynet 1983.

[72] For these tendencies, see Kazhdan 1974; and the detailed analysis of the Komnenian system in Magdalino 1993, 180-192; also Lemerle 1977, 309ff.

[73] Kazhdan and McCormick 1997, 170; Magdalino 1993, 186-188.

this class can be brought in and raised up to positions of power by an emperor or a senior patron at court, the dominance of the major families, through a combination of dynastic alliance and a near-monopoly on key positions, could no longer be challenged. The results of the Fourth Crusade (1203-1204) and the recovery of Constantinople in 1261 merely reinforced these tendencies. Imperially-bestowed titles and posts, presence at court, and membership of the palatine system in general remained a *sine qua non* of social life for anyone in the élite or who aspired to join it, and incorporated all the major routes to achieving high social status.

Some possible comparators
The relationship between metropolitan élites and the court, on the one hand, and between the court and its current dominant faction on the one side, and the provincial élites, on the other, is one determining or structuring element in the distribution of political power and access to resources, therefore, which is of absolutely central consequence to the ways in which tributary state formations work. But this is not the only element: in many state formations, there are then further distinctions between different élites – between centrally-appointed provincial governors and locally-embedded élites, for example. If we compare the Byzantine case with that of the early Ottoman state, or with the Mughal state, a number of systemic similarities appear which are belied by the surface appearance of central authority and administration. The Ottoman example is the case par excellence where a state élite which is nominally neither hereditary nor representative, nor drawn from a pre-existing socio-economic élite, dominates or appears to dominate a political formation headed by an absolute ruler. The state must thus appear autonomous from the society in which it is rooted, but over which it appears to stand. But the appearance of this structure, perhaps because of its very strangeness to the predominantly European historical or sociological observer, belies the nature of the relationships it embodies. So wherever we look, whether at the centralised empires of central and South America, or the ancient states of China and Asia, the relationships between state élites, ruling classes and rulers are complex, dialectical and determined ultimately by the question of control over resources.[74] Most importantly, the relationship between metropolitan and provincial élites, the overlaps between them, and the interaction between their vested interests at court, on the one hand, and on the other their local interests in non-metropolitan society, inflects their political as well as their economic options. The political economy of such relationships is presented through an 'ideological' lens, as kinship or religious or political values, of course. But behind and below these lie the relations of production or of distribution of surplus, and it is these which underlie and are given expression through the dominant forms of political-ideological organisation.[75]

This tension between different sectoral interests focused on the political relations of appropriation and distribution of surplus is true of all pre-modern state systems dominated by what I have termed tributary production relations, from Merovingian and Carolingian

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[74] See the contributions in Alcock *et al.* 2001, for example; also Southall 1965; Marcus 1976.

[75] The point is not new – see, for example, Anderson 1979, 15-16. For a detailed comparative survey which looks at the whole of the late Roman world and the successor systems up to the ninth century, see Wickham 2005.

France, through the early Islamic states, to the Mughal and Ottoman Empires.[76] The problem of equilibrium and the nature of direct state intervention in the political relations of distribution are especially clear in the case of the cyclical transformations which distinguish Chinese states and their evolution from the earliest times, for example. Both in the long period preceding the Sung dynasty (960-1279) and thereafter, political power depended upon a complex balance between the interests of the centre and those of the (potentially) independent provincial élites. With the development and extension of the power of the middling and lower gentry under the interested patronage of the Sung, in the form of the meritocratic bureaucracy for which China is well-known, the state was able to maintain its pre-eminence more easily. The system that evolved was designed to fragment any opposition to the state's economic and political/ideological control by integrating the middle and lower gentry into the state apparatus and by increasing their dependence on the emperors, in respect of both incomes and social status/titles and so on, while at the same time reducing the hold of the wealthier class of magnates on the machinery of state in the provinces. Systemically, this is very similar to the way in which the Byzantine imperial court 'integrated' its potentially oppositional élite.[77] But, as has been pointed out, even in China, and in spite of the ideological pre-eminence of the notion of the imperial state and the single emperor, key elements of the mandarinate in the provinces were still able to usurp state power and revenues at the local level, with only occasional interference from the central government. And this did not threaten the federal unity of the empire directly.[78]

As I have noted already, these relationships are rarely expressed through economic categories, but are voiced through symbolic systems and ideologies in which authority and power are the terms of reference, whether earthly or divine.[79] Most importantly, power is not an abstract, nor is it a disembodied quality of political personalities and relationships. It is rooted in the differential access of individuals, groups and classes to resources, and hence is inscribed within economic relations – a point which, I would argue, applies equally to forms of charismatic power exercised at an individual level. For this is in itself the expression of the mobilisation of emotional narratives and contexts, in which the question of access to or exclusion from social resources (however this might be expressed in specific cultural formations) is at stake. Social resources, in other words, which permit control or lack of control over the process and means of reproduction of spiritual and material life.

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[76] For a comparative analysis, see Haldon 1993, chapts. 2-5; Haldon 2003.

[77] E.g. Eberhard 1977, 205ff.

[78] See Beattie 1979.

[79] The question of the specific forms of modes of distribution of power is particularly the concern of Runciman 1989, vol. II, especially as set out in his opening sections, 1-86. Poulantzas' detailed morphological analysis of power (1978, 99-119) combines both a useful critique of the numerous non-Marxist sociological attempts to define power in social theory; but it is constrained by a structuralist paradigm (structures – practices – overdetermination) which I do not find particularly helpful in generating a dynamic analysis of historical change; and by a class-centred method which tends to ignore the graded and emergent nature of the cline from constituted and constitutive social subjectivity to group and class ideologies and practices, and thus renders empirical analysis one-sided – structures become detached from human subjects (who remain their 'agents' or 'bearers') in a way which makes causal explanation in which human motivations play a role difficult.

The search for power, as has been cogently pointed out,[80] is a search for a means to an end – the (more) effective control or mobilisation of (certain) resources in order to facilitate the achievement of certain goals: the maintenance of political authority, for example, and thus the reproduction of a particular set of social, and hence also economic, relations. Examining the relationship between metropolitan centre and province, between local and regional élite society and court power élite, offers a fruitful approach to the dynamic underlying such phenomena.

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80 Mann 1986, 5-7.

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Empires and Migrational Trends:
The Case of Roman and Ottoman Greece

Björn Forsén

In this chapter I intend to discuss the effects created by pre-modern empires on migrational trends.[*] When an empire expanded and added new territory to its domain a certain restructuring of the conquered areas always took place. Further changes could also be added later on by the central government. Very often the restructuring of provinces included movement of people on a large scale that affected above all the ordinary man, but also to some extent the élite. Such population movements can be divided into two different types. Firstly we have forced movement of people, in connection with compulsory urbanization, politico-administrative foundations or large-scale population relocations or deportations. Secondly we have voluntary movement, due to tax incentives, new trade and market advantages or any other changes brought forward by imperial rule.

In order to limit the topic I will begin by scrutinizing migrational trends caused by the imposition of Roman and Ottoman rule in an area roughly corresponding to modern Greece (not including Crete). Thereafter I will on a more general level look for possible parallels among other pre-modern empires in the Eastern Mediterranean. But before going into detail concerning Roman and Ottoman Greece there is reason to recapitulate the very problematic source situation. Even though Roman demography has developed hugely during the last few decades,[1] we lack, except for Egypt,[2] access to vital demographic data such as nativity or mortality rates, the distribution of population among sex and age groups, life tables, the average life expectancy or migrational data. Nor is this situation likely to improve in the near future. A close study of skeletal data from cemeteries may help us to approximate some of these rates. However, as only very few data are available I will mainly rely on references in Roman literature and on archaeological and epigraphical remains, which can only give us some idea of the general trends, but no absolute figures.

The situation concerning the Ottoman period is slightly better thanks to the recent publication of data from *tahrir defter*s concerning several different regions of the Ottoman Empire. However, the use of *tahrir defter*s as demographic sources is not unproblematic.[3] The *tahrir*s were never intended as census documents, but rather as tax registers. In principle they only supply a list of adult male taxpayers, but do not include information on inhabitants in villages belonging to *vakıf*s, that is religious endowments, or on any other tax-exempt part of the population in the empire. Ottoman *cizye* registers or poll tax lists have been used as another way of estimating the population size. However, these lists only include adult male Christians with a moveable property of more than a certain value.

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[1] See recently e.g. Scheidel 2001 with all previous references.
[2] Bagnall and Frier 1994.
[3] For the pitfalls and limitations of the *tahrir defter*s as a source for social and economic history, see Lowry 1992, esp. 7-12.

In addition some villages managed to get away by paying the poll tax as a lump sum, thus making the use of these registers as a source for demographic changes extremely dangerous.[4] I should also mention that the *tahrir defter*s and *cizye* registers in most cases do not mention migrational movements straight out,[5] although we can try to reconstruct such movements on their basis. Regardless of these problems the *tahrir defter*s and *cizye* registers still give us more information about migrational movements than we would have had only on the basis of chronicles and archaeological or architectural remains.

After these *caveat*s concerning our sources I proceed to my real subject. First of all I shall touch briefly on the question of forced movement of people as a result of enslavement. In both the Roman and the Ottoman Empire it was common practice to slaughter or enslave the population in cities that refused to surrender and had to be captured by assault.[6] The losers could also suffer the same fate for smaller offences. This type of punishment was not uncommon in early warfare, but under empires the number of people who could be affected grew enormously. If we are to believe the ancient historians, the largest slave-hunting operation in Roman history took place in Epirus in 167 BC, when a total of 150,000 inhabitants were carried off as slaves by the soldiers of Aemilius Paullus.[7] As a comparison one could mention the 60,000 persons that Murâd II is said to have carried off as slaves after his Peloponnesian raid in 1446.[8]

The rationale behind this savage treatment of enemies can, and has been discussed. It clearly encourages surrender in the future, but can also be seen as part of a policy of intimidation or as a means of retaliation. Whatever the ultimate reason was, economic considerations must have played a role – the slave trade was indeed a lucrative business.[9]

But let us move onwards and look at the question of forced movement of people for the purpose of urbanization. This very common practice of the Hellenistic Empires of Alexander and his followers was continued by the Romans.[10] Just as in the Hellenistic period several of the Roman colonies were in reality re-foundations of urban centres. The urban character of the Ottoman Empire never reached the same level as in the Roman Empire, but nonetheless a similar way of re-population and urban renewal of existing cities also occurs in Ottoman history.

The Roman colony Patrai (*Colonia Aroe Augusta Patrensis*) and the *civitas libera* Nikopolis are two often quoted examples of Roman urbanization in Greece.[11] Both were

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[4] For the use of the *cizye* registers as a source for the understanding of demographic developments, see Kiel 1997, 319-320 and Faroqhi 1999, 93-94. The limit for the movable property was as a rule 300 *akçe* per year. Kiel suggests that approximately 20 to 30% of the people actually living in the villages do not appear in the poll tax lists.

[5] The *defter*s concerning sixteenth century Euboea constitute an exception. Here the proportion of immigrants in the villages ranges from 2% to 25%, although most immigrants came from settlements nearby. Cf. Balta 1990-1991, 97-98.

[6] This was actually part of the Islamic law, the *şerîat* (Inalcik 1973, 26).

[7] Liv. 45.34.1-6; Plut. *Aem.* 29; Strabo 7.7.3; Pol. 30.16.

[8] Doukas p. 223 (Bekker). These were the slaves taken in one single event. Just between 1437 and 1443 Bartholomew of Yano estimates Ottoman slave acquisitions to amount to as many as 400,000 persons, thus giving an idea of the numbers of people enslaved (Horden and Purcell 2000, 380).

[9] Ziolkowksi 1986, 69-80; Harris 1979, 54-105. Plundering played an especially important role in the Ottoman Empire. See e.g. Lowry 2003, who describes the early Ottoman Empire as a plundering confederacy.

[10] Woolf 1997, 3-4.

established by Augustus, who at the same time attached large territories to the new centres and settled Roman veterans in Patrai. Some of the communities attached to the new centres became subordinate to and dependent on them, whereas others apparently were completely abandoned. Even the population of formerly prominent regional centres such as Kassope and Ambrakia seem to have been transplanted in order to boost the population of the new centres.[12] Pausanias (7.18.7) even mentions that some of the smaller former towns, like Rhypes, were razed to the ground in connection with their inhabitants being moved away. We can get an idea of the number of people who must have been included in these movements by the fact that Nikopolis may have reached a population of ca. 100,000.[13]

Patrai and Nikopolis, as well as other Roman colonies in Greece such as e.g. Corinth or Philippi thrived and grew fast. After the first phase of veteran settlement, often combined with immigration of Greeks from neighbouring areas, most of these cities seem to have continued to attract new settlers, partly even from the Italian peninsula. This is probably due to their administrative and cultural importance as well as to their locations along militarily and commercially important routes such as the Via Egnatia leading from Dyrrhachium and Apollonia to Byzantion/Constantinople, or the east–west sea route along the Corinthian gulf (Fig. 1).[14] It is also due to the so-called "élite mobility", whereby existing Greek élites transferred their activities to new and more prestigious locations, that is larger urban centres endowed with attractive amenities and the presence of other wealthy and intellectual families. Prosperous citizens of other towns can e.g. be traced epigraphically in Corinth.[15]

The well-known urban repopulation scheme of Mehmed II largely follows the Roman practice of a combined "carrot and stick" approach. We can trace this process in detail in the cases of Constantinople and Thessaloniki.[16] Initially Mehmed tried to encourage voluntary immigrants through the promise of partial tax-exemption and free housing in unoccupied houses. When this failed to attract the population he turned to the practice of *sürgün*, or forced deportation of civilian population. These deportations were first conducted on a random basis, but later on individuals were targeted who possessed the craft and trade skills which would enable them to contribute to the urban economy. Thus Mehmed's policy undoubtedly reveals an awareness of the importance of trade and commerce and the role played in this circumstance by old centres such as Constantinople

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[11] Kahrstedt 1950; Alcock 1993, 133-143; Rizakis 1997. There has been much discussion concerning the status of the two cities. According to Purcell 1987, 78-90, both cities may even have had a dual status as *colonia* and *civitas libera*.

[12] Recently Gravani 2007 on the basis of archaeological evidence has argued that Molossians and Thesprotians were also displaced to Nikopolis even though this is not explicitly stated by any written source.

[13] For the founding of Nikopolis see also Büscher 1996. There are, however, no sources giving the number of inhabitants, and the estimate of Büscher 1996 is probably to be considered unrealistically high.

[14] See e.g. the excellent overview of Roman Corinth by Engels 1990. The Roman presence in Macedonia is evidenced by the frequent appearance of Roman *nomina* in inscriptions (Tataki 2006 with further references). The distribution of these *nomina* in Italy may even give indications concerning the specific origin of the Roman settlers in Macedonia (Salomies 1996).

[15] For élite mobility in general, see Alcock 1993, 154-160; in detail on Corinth see Spawforth 1996 and Rizakis 2001. For the same phenomenon in Macedonia, see Rizakis 2003.

[16] Lowry 1992, 47-63. Mehmed's approach can be compared to the Roman policy in connection with the founding of Constantinople in AD 324. See e.g. Dagron 1974, especially 518-521.

Fig. 1. Roman foundations in the provinces of Achaia and Macedonia (after Rizakis 1997, Fig. 2).

and Thessaloniki. Furthermore, in order to feed the growing population of Constantinople he settled some 30,000 peasants captured in Serbia and the Peloponnese in nearby uninhabited villages.[17]

We have already seen how the Romans founded colonies with veterans and other settlers from the Italian peninsula at strategic inland or coastal sites, linking Italy with Greece, Macedonia and Asia Minor. Through such settlements, tied to Rome either by commerce or by their privileged status, Rome reinforced its control of the provinces. Moreover they provided land to divide for the veterans, who required it after ending their

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[17] Inalcik 1973, 141. Mehmed succeeded in making Constantinople's population grow, but Thessaloniki needed another main infusion of people, which it received in connection with the arrival of the Sephardic Jews in the late fifteenth century. They had been forced to leave Spain and were welcomed by Bayezid II to settle in the Ottoman Empire. It is possible that Bayezid II ordered the authorities to direct the majority of Jews to Thessaloniki although no such instruction has survived. See Mazower 2004, 45-52.

service in the Roman army.[18] Although not being urban in its character the settlement policy of the Ottomans is in many ways similar to the Roman practice of founding colonies in conquered areas. Also in this case military and economic considerations played the biggest role next to the need to settle parts of temporary surplus population from Anatolia.

Like the Romans the Ottomans were aware of the importance of settling people that they could trust along the main highways. In the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they encouraged nomadic tribes from Anatolia, sometimes by forcible deportation, to settle in the Balkans, especially in Thrace and along the historic Via Egnatia in Macedonia and the main route through the Maritza and Tundja valleys towards the Danube in the north.[19] The reasons for the Ottoman migrational policy were apart from military (to secure the new conquests and the main routes in the peninsula) also political (to punish rebellious populations and problematic nomadic tribes) and economic (to move people from the overpopulated Anatolia to the desolated Balkans). Forced as well as voluntary settlers were given special social status and tax exemptions in varying degrees. Small groups of successful Ottomans were made *timar*-holders even further away in the Balkan provinces.

We get a better picture of how such a mass deportation could work from a preserved imperial decree concerning the newly conquered Cyprus in 1572.[20] Every tenth family in some Anatolian provinces, chosen from all levels of the society, was to be sent to Cyprus. However, the first to be sent were peasants with insufficient or infertile land, the poor, the idlers and the nomads, later to be followed by convicted usurers and criminals. The settlers were given a special taxation exemption for a period of two years, but apparently this was not considered attractive as the authorities were told to carry out the measures with firmness. The expressed motive for this deportation was the rehabilitation and security of Cyprus.

As far as voluntary migration is concerned, we have until now only touched upon it. Changes brought forward by imperial rule can be divided into two different types. Firstly we have tax-exemptions and other incentives offered by the central government in order to encourage voluntary movement. Secondly we have trade and market advantages as well as any other changes that indirectly resulted in voluntary migration. I have already presented examples of incentives meant to encourage migration and will therefore now concentrate on the second type of changes, which may have resulted in larger numbers of people moving. However, in this case we are faced with the problem that our sources seldom explicitly describe the process itself or the number of people included.

The small Cycladic island of Delos from 166 until the mid-first century BC is perhaps the best Roman example of such voluntary movement. As a result of the gradual rise of Rome to empire – a process that can be traced back to the centuries preceding Augustus – the slave trade in the Mediterranean grew. After the establishment of a free market on Delos in 166 BC the slave trade was to a large extent concentrated there. The small island, measuring only some 3.5 km² attracted traders from all over

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[18] In general on Roman colonies in Greece, see Sartre 2001 and the different contributions in Salmeri, Raggi and Baroni 2004.

[19] E.g. Barkan 1949-1950, 101-129; Inalcik 1954, 124-128. The voluntary movement of people from Anatolia to the Balkans continued until the sixteenth century as shown e.g. by Şahin, Emecen and Halaçoğlu 1989.

[20] Barkan 1949-1950, 89-101. For the most recent study of the attempt to people Cyprus with Anatolian settlers and a careful evaluation of the reasons this attempt ended in failure, see Çelik 2004.

the Mediterranean, quite a few of them from the Italic peninsula. At most the island is calculated to have had a population of some 20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants,[21] who all in one way or another had moved there because of market opportunities. As we have already seen there is evidence for a similar voluntary migration from many small Greek inland *poleis* to the new Roman coastal centres.

But let us turn to Ottoman Greece (Fig. 2), where we have better demographic sources. On the basis of *tahrir defter*s we can today show that the population in several parts of Greece between the mid-fifteenth and mid-sixteenth century followed the general European trend, i.e. it roughly doubled in a century, thus having an annual rate of growth around 0.7%.[22] However, the population in Boeotia seems to have quadrupled in the same period, reaching an annual population growth of up to 1.36%.[23] A similar rate of growth has been recorded on the Aegean island of Thasos between 1521 and 1570,[24] whereas the annual population increase in the Zagoria villages of Epirus reached as much as 3% between 1564 and 1579.[25] Such rates are not compatible with pre-modern demographic realities,[26] and can only be explained by regional migration.

The reasons for the migration vary from region to region. The people who moved to the Zagoria villages probably came from the area of Ioannina and Arta, where the population declined, most likely as a response to changes in the Ottoman taxation system after the battle of Lepanto and the conquest of Cyprus in 1571.[27] In the same way villages belonging to the large *vakıf*s or religious endowments in Macedonia as well as areas along the Aegean coast and its islands in general enjoyed certain exemptions of taxes and thereby attracted immigration.[28]

Similar migrational patterns are discernible during the seventeenth century, which is characterised by an economic crisis and deteriorating climatic conditions. In several regions the population starts declining already during the late sixteenth century. Thus, the population in Boeotia, Eastern Locris and Arcadia fell by some 40-45% between 1570 and 1642.[29] In the Megarid or on Thasos, as well as on Crete, Kythira and the Ionian islands that belonged to Venice, the population on the other hand continued growing well

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[21] See Roussel 1931 for a discussion of the number and origin of the Delian population in 119/118 BC. For a more recent overview concerning the question of the size of the Late Hellenistic population at Delos see Papageorgiou-Venetas 1981, 114-116, who suggests the number of 28,000. In general on the ability of islands to feed large populations, see Horden and Purcell 2000, 381-383.

[22] See e.g. Kiel and Sauerwein 1994, 44, for Eastern Locris; or Forsén and Forsén 2003, 328 for Arcadia. For the average European development, see e.g. Braudel 1972, 410.

[23] Kiel 1997, 325-326.

[24] Balta 2001. The number of households increased from 467 in 1521 to 955 in 1570, which would give an annual rate of increase of 1.46%. It should be noted that the high ratio of bachelors to households on the island in 1521 (1/1.57) indicates that the increase must have depended largely on immigration. As a comparison one could mention that the Asea valley in the *tahrir defter* of 1512-1520, i.e. at the time of fast population growth (0.71% annually), had a ratio of bachelors to households of 1/3.95 (Forsén and Forsén 2003, 328).

[25] Delilbaşı 1996. I owe many thanks to Melek Delilbaşı for discussing the results of her research with me.

[26] For the general characteristics of Europe's demographic 'old regime', see e.g. Livi Bacci 1999.

[27] Delilbaşı 1996.

[28] Adanır 1998, 290. High peasant mobility is in general typical of the Ottoman Empire. Another reason for the fast population increase in villages whose status was changed from *timar* to *vakıf* was, according to Balta 1995, 61-62, that Ottoman dignitaries used to settle prisoners of war and freed slaves on the *vakıf*s.

[29] Kiel 1997, 349, tab. VII for Boeotia (46% from 1570 to 1642); Kiel and Sauerwein 1994, 100, tab. 2 for Eastern Locris (47.8% from 1570 to 1642); Forsén and Forsén 2003, 328, fig. 187 for Arcadia (41% from 1583 to 1642).

Fig. 2. Areas discussed in connection with migrational trends in the Ottoman Empire.

into the seventeenth century, with the decline not appearing until later, possibly as late as the Cretan war (1645-1669).[30] In the same way, many of the Cycladic islands and parts of Thessaly remained prosperous and populous throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[31] In these cases the cotton industry in Thessaly and the economic possibilities created by trade along the coast and on the islands may have attracted people from the mountainous parts of Greece.

For the Ottoman Empire in decline we have some further clear examples of voluntary migration. Some small Aegean islands such as Hydra, Spetses and Psara, which after the treaty in Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 enjoyed a half-autonomous status and virtual monopoly of the grain trade on the Black Sea, experienced a remarkable immigration. Thus, the small island of Hydra reached a population of ca. 18,000 to 28,000 inhabitants in the 1820s in a way that is nearly comparable to the heyday of Delos in the second to

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[30] Balta 2001 (Thasos); Balta 2002, 111-113 (the Megarid); Greene 2000, 50-52 and Rackham and Moody 1996, 98-100 and fig. 8.3 (Crete); Kiel in press (Kythira); *Istoria* X-XI (Ionian islands). The figures for the Ionian islands are only rough estimates by travellers, but they clearly indicate the trend. The population of Kephallonia seems for instance to have grown steadily throughout the period between 1572 and 1660. The strong annual population increase indicated by the estimates (i.e. from 18,200 in 1572 to 70,000 in 1660, which would give an annual rate of 1.54%) suggests immigration, e.g. from the Peloponnese.

[31] Slot 1982, tabs. 1-2 and Dimitropoulos 2004, 173-326 (the Cyclades); Kiel 1996 (Thessaly).

first centuries BC.[32] Another late example is constituted by Smyrna on the west coast of modern Turkey that thanks to privileged trading conditions attracted immigrants in large numbers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Between 1840 and 1880 alone some 200,000 Greeks from all over the Aegean sea moved to Smyrna.[33]

What can we learn from all these examples of voluntary migration? Clearly mobility was high within the Roman and Ottoman Empires.[34] The creation of empires certainly facilitated migration. Regional differences within the early empires and their vassal states in taxation, laws etc. at the same time encouraged mobility. Furthermore, the empires stimulated demand by increasing the level of surplus extraction and the spending power. Thereby growth in long-distance trade and development of some commercial groups was fostered.[35] In this connection the development of large capitals and other populous urban centres definitely played a special role. It seems indeed as if the main reason for voluntary mobility lay in the economic opportunities created by the empires. Political and religious reasons seem to be less important, except perhaps for the élites, which I have not explicitly dealt with.

As we have seen there are striking similarities between the effects of the Roman and Ottoman Empires on migrational movements. But how should we understand these similarities? Are they to be considered coincidental, or are we dealing with features that are characteristic of empires in general? Forced movements of population or deportations are well attested for most of the early empires in the Eastern Mediterranean, whereas the lack of suitable sources makes it more difficult to look for parallels for voluntary movement of people.

Forced movements of people had already been undertaken by the Egyptian, Hittite and Babylonian Empires.[36] However, the Neo-Assyrian Empire in the late eighth century BC is the first for which we have more detailed sources dealing with deportations. The largest of the Assyrian deportations encompassed as many as 208,000 persons.[37] B. Oded identified several aims and objectives behind the Assyrian policy of deportations.[38] Firstly, mass deportations were used as punishment for rebellion as well as a means of liquidating rival powers and weakening centres of resistance. Deported minority groups tended in general to be loyal to the empire as they depended on the Assyrian king for protection. Thus they were well qualified to serve in the Assyrian administration. But deportees could also be sent off by the Assyrians to serve as soldiers strengthening fortified cities and fortresses on the borders and along highways, or to populate urban

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[32] For an overview of population estimates of Hydra, see Dimitropoulos 2004, 249-251. These brackets accommodate most of the estimates, although there are some lower estimates (15,000 and 16,000) as well as a couple of clearly exaggerated figures such as 30,000 or 40,000.

[33] Kleanthi 1997, 38. Interestingly enough a large number of these people left the new independent Greek state in order to move to Smyrna.

[34] In general on mobility in the Mediterranean in a diachronic perspective and on the varying constraints placed on people's freedom to move at different times, see most recently Moatti and Kaiser 2007.

[35] For trade and markets in early empires, see Bang 2003, 204-206.

[36] For references concerning these early deportations, see Oded 1979, 42-43.

[37] Most of the deportations seem to date to the reigns of Tiglath-Pileser III, Sargon II and Sennacherib. It was Sennacherib who deported 208,000 persons from Babylonia to Assyria, and he is also known for deporting a total of 200,155 persons from the Kingdom of Judah. See Oded 1979, 19-22 with further references.

[38] Oded 1979, 41-74.

centres, thus strengthening the economy and keeping trade routes under control. In some cases the deportees were sent to repopulate abandoned regions and to make them fit once again for agriculture. They could even be needed as craftsmen and unskilled workmen for the building of temples and palaces in the cities.

After the demise of the Neo-Assyrian Empire, the Neo-Babylonian and Persian Empires both continued to deport defeated people from one place to another within their territory. Well-known cases are constituted by the Chaldaeans who forced the inhabitants of Jerusalem and Judah to move to Babylonia (the Babylonian exile)[39], or the Persians who settled the Barcaeans of Cyrenaica in Bactria (Hdt. 4.202-204), and the Milesians (Hdt. 6.20) and Eretrians (Hdt. 6.120) in the neighbourhood of Susa in Mesopotamia.[40] Mass deportations were also used by many later empires, for instance the Byzantine Empire where the largest ones involved several hundreds of thousands of people.[41] Even Alexander the Great and later Hellenistic kings transferred people by force in order to populate their newly founded cities, although this was usually on a smaller scale.[42]

Oded's list of aims and objectives behind the Neo-Assyrian policy of mass deportations presents interesting parallels to the state of affairs among the Romans and Ottomans. Many of the Assyrian aims and objectives appear as well among the Neo-Babylonians and Persians[43] not to speak about the Seleucids or Ptolemies.[44] Similar aims and objectives can furthermore be found behind the Byzantine deportations; people were moved for military reasons as more manpower was needed in particular spots, in order to supply cities with dwindling population or to repopulate and economically rehabilitate various regions, and finally to contribute to the elimination of heretical groups and the assimilation of barbarians in the empire.[45]

Arnold Toynbee was the first to emphasize the general connection between pre-modern empires (or universal states as he puts it) and large-scale population movements, drawing heavily on examples from other empires than those mentioned here, such as China and especially the Inca Empire.[46] He also distinguishes the main categories of resettlements: punitive deportations, military colonies or garrisons along the frontiers and main roads, as well as civilian settlements established primarily for economic reasons. However, large-scale population movements have since then still not been further pursued as one of the basic characteristics of pre-modern empires.

Large-scale population movements are, as a matter of fact, also common among modern empires. Thus, when the Russian Empire expanded towards the south in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it quickly adopted deportation policies akin to the Ottoman ones and before the First World War some 2.5 million Muslims were deported

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[39] See e.g. Albertz 2003 and Lipschits 2005 with further references.

[40] About the Persians and their policy of moving people, see e.g. Asheri 1983, 30-35, 71 or Briant 1996, 521-523, 980-981. In general, the people deported by the Persians seem to have been provided with a permanent settlement and the use of land.

[41] Charanis 1961, 141-150. The largest deportations include some 200,000 Slavs moved from the Balkan peninsula to Anatolia in the mid-eighth century and the displacement of possibly as many as 400,000 Armenians to the west in the eleventh century.

[42] See e.g. Bosworth 1994, 867; Green 1990, 150-170; and especially Cohen 1983.

[43] See e.g. Briant 1996, 522-523.

[44] Cohen 1983.

[45] Charanis 1961, 150-151.

[46] Toynbee 1954, 108-163.

from the Crimea, the Balkan peninsula and the Caucasus while other people were invited to settle in the conquered areas. Even as late as at the end of the Second World War Stalin used the same policy transferring, e.g. 189,000 Tatars from the Crimea and over half a million Chechens and Ingush from the Caucasus to Central Asia accused of supporting the German invasion forces.[47] Mass migration also played an important role in laying the foundation of the British Empire.[48] Millions of Africans were forcibly transplanted to the new world as slaves in order to work the land, but one should not forget that the colonisers also included political prisoners, thieves, food rioters, radical weavers etc. in a way that brings the thoughts to Cyprus in 1572. In the British case we also have reliable demographic data which show the extent of voluntary migration, something that is lacking for all earlier empires.

Throughout history the establishment of empires has created larger markets and thus facilitated voluntary movement. At the same time the empires have forced or encouraged people to move especially to places located along important routes of connectivity[49] or on the borders, with the explicit purpose of consolidating their power over conquered areas. Large scale migration is thus inseparably connected to the development and life of empires. The existence of clear parallels between different pre-modern empires in the Eastern Mediterranean concerning the policies of mass deportations and voluntary migration definitely constitutes a good basis for further comparative studies. Drawing on data from the Ottoman Empire and other empires for which we have sufficient sources, we may gain a better understanding of the migrational trends in the Hellenistic and Roman Empires.

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[47] King 2004, 207-210, 229. For the deportations of Muslims between 1821 and 1922 see more detail in McCarthy 1995. For the new settlers in general see Khodarkovsky 2002. They included among others also Germans, who mainly settled along the big rivers: see Keller 1980 with fold-out map.

[48] There is a vast bibliography on this topic, see e.g. Ferguson 2003, 53-112. It should be noted that 1/2 to 2/3 of the Europeans moving to the new world between 1650 and 1780 did so under contract of indentured servitude, or as Ferguson puts it as "slaves on fixed-term contracts".

[49] For connectivity and routes of connectivity in the Mediterranean see Horden and Purcell 2000.

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‘διά δόξαν ἐκείνων καὶ κλέος τοῦ ἔθνους’
The Philomousos Society of Athens and Antiquities

Ilias Arnaoutoglou

In 1826, the fifth year of the Greek war of independence, the war effort of the Greeks in revolt was quickly fading under the heavy military pressure of the Egyptian armies which had landed in the Peloponnese a year earlier; they had conquered most of the region and helped the besiegers of Mesolonghi to sack the city.[*] However, Athens was still – but not for long – under the control of the Greek forces and the Acropolis continued to be their stronghold in eastern Greece. In this military and political context, it is surprising to discover that in Athens there was an undertaking to save antiquities.

In previous centuries, under Ottoman or Venetian rule, efforts to study and save antiquities were intertwined with West European perceptions of art, beauty, and history. Merchants, monks and travellers were mapping antique sites and were carrying away whatever they could, or were arranging for antiquities to be carried off by governors.[1] This activity is illustrated nicely in the story of the discovery, in the late sixteenth century, of the Hellenistic inscription recording the testament of Epikteta, on the island of Santorini, and its fate, as reconstructed by Serafino Ricci.[2] The first modern reference to the inscription is found in a letter of the 4th of May 1586 by Onorio Belli to Valerio Barbarano. The inscription was carried off to Candia, although Belli wished to have it carried to Venice. However, the stone found its way to Venice, since in the same year it appears in the collection of the Grimani family. The text of the inscription, as read by Belli, was published by J. Gruter.[3]

The inclusion of Greece in the ever increasing number of travels, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century meant the rediscovery of its past and its monuments by a large group of western European intellectuals.[4] In the late eighteenth century, with the development of what is called the Neohellenic Enlightenment movement, Greek intellectuals living in European countries established a link with their glorious past.[5] The new areas of interests (sciences), ideas (political and moral philosophy) and practices (education) were to be transplanted through the financial support of existing schools and the foundation of new schools. Soon, this approach was adopted by a significant part of the élite living in Ottoman Greece.[6]

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[1] See Malliares 1998 and Maltezou 1998.

[2] Ricci 1893.

[3] Gruter 1602. The standard edition is in *IG* XII (3) 330.

[4] See Tsigakou 1981, Constantine 1984, Stoneman 1987.

[5] For the birth and development of the movement of Neohellenic Enlightenment see Tabaki 2000 (with further bibliography).

[6] This ‘received’ interest in Greek antiquities created a series of paradoxes that resulted in the feeble and slow development of ancient Greek history studies; see Kyrtatas 2002 and Yakovake 2005. For the ambivalent attitude of Greeks and foreigners towards antiquities before and during the war of independence see Petrakos 2001.

Therefore it comes as no surprise to find that the preservation of antiquities was one of the concerns of the rudimentary administration established by the Greeks in revolt. An order of the Minister of Interior dated on the 10th of February 1825 about the rights and duties of the Ephors for Education authorizes the local authorities and schoolteachers to gather antiquities, that is coins, statues, inscriptions and any other remaining antiques, wherever they might be, in order to store them at schools so that in the course of time every school should have its Museum.[7] However, a centrally concerted effort to save antiquities would not have been adequate without the support and participation of local communities, since the war effort was absorbing the energy of the embryonic central government. The involvement of the local communities, with all its shortcomings, can be sketched out in the case of the Philomousos Society of Athens.

The Society was founded on the 1st of September 1813. Its constitution consisted of 10 articles and it was signed by 101 founding members, among them several British, something that has led some scholars to assume a heavy English influence behind it.[8] However, the social profile of the membership was quite varied and cosmopolitan. Half of the members were Greeks (52 out of 101), 10 from the British protectorate of Ionios Politeia. A major part of the local Athenian élite participated, among them the four δημογέροντες (elders) of the community for the year 1813, Sp. Logothetes, Sp. Kapetanakes, P. Zacharitsas and Sp. Trikalinos, as well as individuals who were involved later with the administration of communal affairs during the war of independence,[9] members of the clergy and intellectuals, such as I. Palamas, I. Marmarotyres and Dionysios Pyrrhos. The remaining members were mainly from Britain (38 out of 49) or British subjects residing in Smyrna and only 9 from other European countries. Some of them (Haller, Cockerell, Stackelberg, Gropius) were involved in unauthorised excavations and removal of antiquities. In the Society 12 women (8 Greeks and 4 foreigners) were enlisted, among them the well known Theresia Makre, who inspired Lord Byron the poem *Maid of Athens*.

The Society was run by four elected Ephors. Three articles pertain to antiquities and reveal the ideological influences of the Neohellenic Enlightenment, firmly entrenched by that time in élite circles.

The glorious past of the city lingers in the preamble of the constitution and in the three articles concerned with the preservation of antiquities. In particular, articles 4 and 5 pertain to the purpose of collecting and storing antiquities:

> Article 4: The aforementioned contribution will serve the purpose of cultivating and enlightening the
> Greek spirit of the young through the study of sciences, publications of useful books, help for poor

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[7] Daskalakes 1968, 3, 68-70 and Kokkou 1977, 41.

[8] The constitution was published in *Logios Ermes* 4 (1814), 98-100 and republished by Kampouroglou 1891, 215 and Velianites 1993, 47-50; a year later, on the 27th of September 1814, a regulation of the duties of the ephors was approved, Velianites 1993, 51-53. The list of members in Velianites 1993, 93 is different from the one published in Kampouroglou; on the English influence, Yotopoulou-Sisilianou 1984, 194-96; Velianites 1993, 91-92 and Petrakos 2004, 4.

[9] See apart from the well known Sp. Trikoupes and the information provided by Sourmeles 1846, 78-81, Sp. Venizelos (*ΑΕΠ* 1, 542); Damask. Petrakes (*ΑΕΠ* 1, 541; 3, 101, 111, 143-44; 12, 38; 16, 163); Sp. Kaloyeropoulos (*ΑΕΠ* 1, 430; 7, 57, 73, 78, 136; 8. 59, 67); Char. Chtenas (*ΑΕΠ* 1, 539, 542; 3, 233; 9, 21; 18, 114); Sp. Patousas (*ΑΕΠ* 1, 218, 539-40, 542-43; 3, 34, 39, 41, 233-34; 13, 62; 18, 114); N. Zacharitsas (*ΑΕΠ* 1, 217-18, 541, 543; 2, 171; 18, 114). G. Papazapheiropoulos was a prominent Eleian (*ΑΕΠ* 3, 137, 144; 9, 96-97, 127; 17, 27, 30-31, 41, 45).

students, discovery of antiquities, collection of stone inscriptions, statues and utensils and of anything else worthy of attention

    Article 5: The collected archaeological objects shall be stored in a place chosen, called Mouseion, in order that their lovers could look at them

    and article 9 stipulates:

The society selects from among its members here, men with expertise on antiquities and able to accompany the travellers frequenting this place, to each one of the ancient Greek monuments and to offer any available assistance and help.

    In the same spirit, the article 26, the last one of the regulation of the library, provides that "The care of antiquities in Athens and anywhere in Greece shall be one of the sacred duties of the Philomousos Society".[10]

    The archaeological activity of the Philomousos Society in Ottoman Athens during the period up to the beginning of the war of independence in 1821 remained rather limited. The published accounts of the Society for the years 1814-1815 and 1817-1819 reveal that only small amounts of money were devoted to buying antiquities.[11] The education of the younger generation was the main concern of the Society; the employment of teachers and grants provided to poor students strained its financial resources. A letter of the Society to bishop Ignatios dated to the 13/25 of June 1820 depicts its financial difficulties and the expenses incurred on teachers' salaries.[12] However, the correspondence between a leading member of the Society, A. Logothetes, and Fr. North (Earl of Guildford) reveals that A. Logothetes was undertaking some sort of excavations on behalf of Guildford. This activity was hardly conducive with the stated aims of the society.[13] The outbreak of the war of independence and the siege of the Ottoman garrison on the Acropolis resulted in a disruption of whatever activity the Philomousos Society had, until the surrender of the garrison on the 10th of June 1822.

    The Society was revived sometime in March 1824, as L. Stanhope mentions in a letter to J. Bowring.[14] On the 18th of April 1824 the elders of the local community approved the use of two mosques for educational purposes and the creation of a Museum on the Acropolis.[15] With a letter dated the 21st of July 1824 the Philomousos Society

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[10] See Kokkou 1977, 32 n. 3 and Velianites 1993, 60 and 312.

[11] Yotopoulou-Sisilianou 1984, 211 and Velianites 1993, 180-184.

[12] Protopsaltes 1957, 265-273 esp. 270-271: the ephors of the Society abolished the name Mouseion and preferred the title Bibliotheke, because "the former denotes particular collections of precious (or not) objects, and it does not befit a simple collection of books necessary to a school or gymnasium. The name Bibliotheke does not prevent the storing of artistic objects or antiquities, which fate may provide one day to the society, since at present its monies do not suffice other than for unavoidable expenses"; curriculum, Protopsaltes 1957, 281-282; Kokkou 1977, 34; financial difficulties, Protopsaltes 1957, 266-267. Cf. Velianites 1993, 324-326. For the bishop Ignatios see Protopsaltes 1961.

[13] Yotopoulou-Sisilianou 1984 and Velianites 1993, 97-105. For the association of the Earl of Guilford with Greece and especially Kerkyra, Bobou-Stamate 1995.

[14] Stanhope 1825, 143-144.

[15] See early references in Stanhope 1825, 130-131 and 136, dated in March 1824; Protopsaltes 1967, κγ´ and 16 no. 4; decision of the Legislature, *ΑΕΠ* 8, 47 no. 132/14-9-1824; reading of the decision of the Executive in the Legislature body, *ΑΕΠ* 7, 52; approval by the Ministry of Interior, Protopsaltes 1967, 17 no. 6 and the article in *Ephemeris Athenon* 21 (12-11-1824) [= Koumarianou 1971, 98].

thanked E. Blaquiere for covering the expenses for three young Athenians to study in Britain.[16] On the 1st of September 1824 the Society issued a proclamation, in which it is stated that antiquities shall be collected and stored in the temple of Athena so that anyone will be able to see them.[17]

On the 1st of October 1824 the ephors of the Society issued a second call for the resumption of its activities and an appeal for funds, while on the 10th of November 1824 the society asked the head of the armed forces on the Acropolis, I. Gouras, to take on the monument of the Erechtheion in order to transform it into a museum.[18]

In 1825 Gouras asked the Society to send him in Pyrgos (Peloponnese) several diplomas of membership. The Society replied with a long letter underlining the perennial problem of financing its educational activities and asking for financial assistance.[19]

Fig. 1. A view of Hadrian's Library in the mid eighteenth century (after LeRoy 1770, 409 pl. 6).

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[16] Blaquiere 1825, II, 131-132 and similarly Stanhope proposed to be sent "a virtuous and highly gifted man … to be instructed in the most improved systems of education", Stanhope 1825, 207. Educational activities: advertisement for the post of a teacher published in *Ephemeris Athenon* 1 (20-8-1824) [= Daskalakes 1968, 1, 55 no. 22 and Koumarianou 1971, 68], information on the schools operating in Athens, Daskalakes 1968, 1, 59 no. 25. News of the election of a new executive board in *Ephemeris Athenon* 7 (24-9-1824) [= Daskalakes 1968, 3, 2071 no. 25A] and in a letter of the 25th of November 1824 to Stanhope, Stanhope 1825, 456-459.

[17] Velianites 1993, 326.

[18] Appeal for funds, Protopsaltes 1957, 283-84, Daskalakes 1968, 1, 60 no. 26 and Velianites 1993, 197-198; letter to Gouras, Protopsaltes 1967, 16 no. 5, Velianites 1993, 327-328; answer by Gouras on the 10th of March 1825, Protopsaltes 1967, 18 no. 7 and Velianites 1993, 328-329. Appeal for funds issued on the 28th of September 1825 to the people of Zakynthos, Daskalakes 1968, 1, 96 no. 65. Invitation of the 20th of October 1825 to the teacher I. Distomites, Daskalakes 1968, 1, 97 no. 66 and intervention of the Philomousos Society in favour of I. Distomites, *ΑΕΠ* 7, 395. Description of the educational activity of the Philomousos in *Genike Ephemeris* 5 (21-10-1825) and 14 (21-11-1825), Daskalakes 1968, 1, 98 no. 67 and 103 no. 73. Petition of the Philomousos Society to the Executive to appoint I. Distomites as teacher, Daskalakes 1968, 1, 99 no. 68. Account of activity of a girls-only school run by the Philomousos Society, Daskalakes 1968, 1, 105 no. 74. Request of the Philomousos Society for the granting of two houses to be used as schools in May 1826, Daskalakes 1968, 3, 1964-1967 no. 951.

[19] *Ephemeris Athenon* 39 (27-1-1825) [= Daskalakes 1968, 3, 2074 no. 46A; Koumarianou 1971, 121-125 and Velianites 1993, 198-200].

There is no doubt that the Society's activities were limited as far as antiquities were concerned in the period 1813-1824. From 1824, it seems that a period of renewed activity had started. Poor Athenians still sold "stones, remnants of antiquity", as the Head of the Police of Athens reported on the 14th of July 1825.[20] The peak and the most significant impact on archaeological matters of the Society would be attained in 1826.

On the 18th of January 1826 the ephors of the Philomousos Society of Athens requested the Executive to authorize activities aimed at the protection of antiquities. In particular, they asked a) to form a commission made up of the local authorities and colonel Fabrier, a member of the Society, who in cooperation with the local committee for the sale of public land, would be authorized to refuse the sale of public land, when the preservation of antiquities is compelling, b) to authorize the demolition of buildings bordering and threatening antiquities, either with fire or with subsidence, and c) to make proposals for and proceed, following authorization, to the planning of streets.[21] This initiative should be seen in the light of the imminent implementation of a law concerning the sale by auction of publicly owned properties in order to raise funds for financing the army and the fleet.

Eight days later, on the 26th of January, the committee for the sale of public land[22] wrote a letter to the Central Committee in Nauplion suggesting an exchange of properties in which antiquities existed and the concentration of antiquities dispersed throughout Athens. This is what they suggested:

Fig. 2. J. Thürmer, The west side of Hadrian's Library, 1819 (after Matton 1963, pl. 73).

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[20] Protopsaltes 1967, 19 no. 8.

[21] Sourmeles 1853, 131-32, Protopsaltes 1967, 21 no. 11 and Daskalakes 1968, 1, 108 no. 75. An example of how the planning was done and the compensation for those affected is revealed in a letter read at the sitting of the Legislature on the 5th of April 1826, *ΑΕΠ* 7, 480.

[22] The Executive of the Greeks had decided in 1824 to start auctioning perishable landed property owned previously by the Ottoman Turks and confiscated after their expulsion, McGrew 1985, 65-66 and Psychoyos 1994, 24-30; for later developments see Nakos 1984. It is possible that the auction envisaged in this report did not, in the end, take place, since we hear of reactions in Athens in March 1826, Mamoukas 1839, 5, 92-94 (= *ΑΕΠ* 3, 246-249): "...τὰ ἔδωσεν ἡ ἐπιτροπὴ εἰς τ᾿ ἀνήκοντα μέρη καὶ ἐλπίσασα, ὅτι πλέον δὲν ϑ᾿ ἀπαντήσῃ οὐδεμίαν ἐναντιότητα, ἄρχισε καὶ ἐκ τρίτου τὰς ἐργασίας της, ἐτοιχοκόλλησε τὸν περὶ ἐκποιήσεως ΝΓ´ νόμον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔγγραφα μὲ τὰς περιγραφὰς τῶν ζητηϑέντων καὶ εἰς ἐκποίησιν ἐκτεϑέντων ὑποστατικῶν ... Χϑὲς πρωῒ ... ἐσυνάχϑη εἰς τὸ δημόσιον τῶν Ἀϑηνῶν πλῆϑος λαοῦ καὶ ἐπίτηδες ἐλϑόντες, ἵνα ἀναγνώσωσι καὶ τὰ ἀνέγνωσαν, ... ἀλλ᾿ αἴφνης σήμερον πρωῒ εἴδομεν ἐνυβρισϑέντα καὶ ἀτιμασϑέντα τὸν νόμον ... καὶ ἠκούσαμεν, ἢ τοὐλάχιστον ἤκουσα ἐγώ, φοβερισμοὺς διὰ πολλὰ χειρότερα καὶ ἀπευκταῖα...".

And some ruined houses, which obstruct and cover precious ancient buildings, as well as temples and the like, need not be sold but should be demolished so that the above mentioned radiant artefacts of our immemorial ancestors shall remain free standing, for the glory and the splendour of our nation; and in the middle of the town the portico of Hadrian, which is covered by a nation-owned and two privately owned workshops, that they should be exchanged with other nation-owned workshops in a different place and those becoming national property to be demolished, since the above mentioned buildings otherwise are subject to the possibility of destruction by fire.

   And for some antiquities which lie in the preserved national houses it would have been better to have taken away from there and to have stored in a separate place, handed over to the superintendents of the Philomousos Society, because when these houses are sold, they will remain in the ownership of the buyers, without offering for these antiquities any price, and even if this was possible, they would not have provided the price of these priceless antiquities.[23]

   The answer from the central Government arrived on the 31st of January 1826 in the form of an order of the Executive to the Governor of Athens to cooperate with the ephors of the Philomousos Society and the local committee for the sale of public lands in order to carry out the proposals of the Society and of the Committee.[24] Moreover, on the 8/9th of February 1826 the Legislature advised the Executive to order the Committee to consider as state property all antiquities that may be found in auctioned properties and the Philomousos Society to accept and store them.

Fig. 3. The west side of Hadrian's Library in 1829, *Expédition de Morée* (after Kokkou 1977, 42).

On the 21st of February 1826 the Executive issued an order to the Committee for the sale of public lands, a) to safeguard, together with the Governor and the Philomousos Society, all antiquities, b) to remove antiquities from auctioned properties, c) to exempt from auction any properties adjacent to ancient structures; these properties shall pass to the Philomousos Society to be administered in such a way that ancient structures will not be affected, d) the Philomousos Society together with the Governor will empty ancient buildings of dangerous material and find the safest building for the storage of antiquities.[25]

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[23] Full text in Greek in Appendix I, pages 2-3, *infra*. The report was read and discussed in the session of the 7th of February 1826 of the Legislature, and the proposals were endorsed, *ΑΕΠ* 7, 503; the acknowledgement of the decision to the Executive in Protopsaltes 1967, 24 no. 13 and *ΑΕΠ* 8, 415.

[24] Protopsaltes 1967, 23 no. 12 and Diamantes 1971, 374ff.

Apparently initial work involving the demolition of workshops was carried out, as we learn from a letter dated to the 16th of March 1826, sent by the ephors of the Philomousos Society to the Executive asking for an exchange of properties to be arranged with the owners of four workshops adjacent to a wall and columns.[26] All this is confirmed by a mere comparison between Figs. 1

Fig. 4. C. v. Heydeck, The mosque of Tsisdarakis with a view of Hadrian's Library, 1835 (after Matton 1963, pl. 74).

and 2 depicting the west side of Hadrian's library before 1826 and Figs. 3-5, dating to some years later, in which all the structures attached to the wall have been removed.

So far, most research has overlooked the fact that the clearings effectuated in 1826 were countenanced first in 1824 by Gropius in a letter to E. Blaquiere.[27] In particular, Blaquiere published a long letter sent to him by Gropius on the 15th of April 1824, in which Gropius, among other things, spelled out the efforts of the Philomousos Society to preserve antiquities. Central to his project was the removal of a line of shops adjacent to what he calls the Poikile Stoa (actually Hadrian's Library) and the removal of the old 'magazine' from the Erechtheion. Gropius in his letter mentioned also what he had proposed to the government. However, so far, there is no evidence of that motion in the published documents of the Executive. From this letter two further questions emerge, first, why the intervention of the Philomousos Society was focused on Hadrian's Library, and second, why it took almost two years to proceed with these demolitions. The location of the monument in the city centre and the existence of a marketplace created an imminent

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[25] Protopsaltes 1967, 24 no. 14. The decision was read and approved by the Legislature, *ΑΕΠ* 7, 449, Kokkou 1977, 43. See also the order of the Interior Minister (3218/15-3-1826) to the Governor of Athens, for compliance with the order of 21st of February 1826, Protopsaltes 1967, 25 no. 15.

[26] Protopsaltes 1967, 25 no. 16. The letter was read and approved by the Legislature, *ΑΕΠ* 7, 475.

[27] Blaquiere 1825, II, 155-157: "The Society of Philomusae, charged with the preservation of ancient monuments, has just proposed to the government to take down the line of shops which is built up against this magnificent remain, and which almost conceals it from review, as well as threatens it with total destruction, in the event of a fire. The town would gain a fine open space by this trifling sacrifice. The matter is still undecided, but we hope our request will be granted" and "We have not as yet been able to get the powder removed from the old magazine established by the Turks, which is, as you know, in the fine vestibule of the temple of Erechtheus. The matter is decided on, but money to construct the new magazine is wanting. I need not say how anxious the Society is to rescue this masterpiece of art, from the total ruin with which it is hourly threatened". For the archaeological activities of G. Chr. Gropius in Greece, see Protopsaltes 1947 and Callmer 1982.

danger to antiquities, a reason recurring constantly in the petitions of the Society.[28] As for the question of time, 1824 and 1825 were two years of open civil warfare between the factions of the Peloponnesians and the Roumeliotes. In addition, for these years the necessary restructuring and the educational activity of the Society, as we have already seen, had a central importance.

Ten days after the request, on the 26th of March 1826, the Legislature approved the petition of the Philomousos Society for further demolitions.[29] This is the last reference to the archaeological activities of the Society. Following the sack of Mesolonghi in April 1826, the Ottoman forces led by Mehmed Reshid Pasha (Kutahye) in August 1826 besieged the Acropolis, whose defenders eventually surrendered in May 1827.

Even though efforts to collect and store antiquities were continued throughout the governorship of I. Kapodistrias (appointment of A. Moustoxydis in 1829 as Director of the Greek National Museum in Aegina), no such thing is reported in Athens till 1833.[30] The founding of the Archaeological Society in Athens in 1837 heralded a new era of excavations, protection and preservation of antiquities in the city. G. Chr. Gropius, an early and active member of the Philomousos Society, was among the founding members of the new society, linking thus the Ottoman and revolutionary periods with the fresh start

Fig. 5. The west side of Hadrian's Library used as a repository of antiquities, 1840 (after Kokkou 1977, 177).

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[28] Protopsaltes 1967, 21 no. 11 (18-1-1826); the document published in Appendix 1 (26-1-1826); Protopsaltes 1967, 25 no. 16 (16-3-1826): "Διὰ νὰ ἐλευθερωθῇ ὅμως τελείως μία ἀξιοθέατος σειρὰ κολώνων κειμένη εἰς τὸ πλέον συχνασμένον μέρος τῆς ἀγορᾶς μας καὶ ἡ ὁποῖα ἀνήκει εἰς τὸν περίβολον τοῦ Διοικητικοῦ παλατίου τῆς πόλεως... Μὲ τοῦτο ἡ Διοίκησις εὐκολύνει μεγάλως τὴν πρόοδον τῆς φιλοκαλίας εἰς τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς πόλεις" (In order to free completely a magnificent series of columns, located in the most frequented place of our market, which sits in the court of the Governor's palace of the city … By doing that the Administration will greatly further the love of beauty in Greek towns).

[29] Protopsaltes 1967, 27 no. 17 and *ΑΕΠ* 8, 459; proceedings, *ΑΕΠ* 7, 475. The Executive proceeded as was recommended and on the 29th of March 1826 asked the Interior Ministry to proceed to the exchange, Protopsaltes 1967, 28 nos 19 and 20. In its turn the Ministry on the 7th of April 1826 ordered the provincial government of eastern Greece to proceed, Protopsaltes 1967, 29 no. 21.

[30] For the Kapodistrian period see Kaloyeropoulou 1981; see also the account of Rhangaves 1837 and Petrakos 2004, 6-15. For the efforts during the period of regency, Maurer 1976, 545-552.

in the study of antiquities.[31] Towards this end the contribution of the Philomousos Society – despite the often amateurish character of its efforts rooted in the cosmopolitan society of the last years of the Ottoman Empire in Athens – was not meaningless.

The Philomousos Society of Athens attempted to save as many antiquities as its financial means allowed; even if, in the first period, the outcome was rather poor, this was due to the focus on education and to the parallel 'archaeological' activities of, at least one, of its members. In the second period, despite the better focused archaeological activity, the Philomousos Society crippled by inadequate funding and hampered by administrative procedures managed to effectuate the clearing of the wall of Hadrian's Library. In this respect, the statement of Edward Blaquiere in 1825, that "had the Society of Philomusae been properly supported by the friends of art and learning, it might have done much towards preserving the Athenian monuments from the ruin into which they are fast falling; as it is, the members resident at Athens, have done their utmost" is a neat reflection of the situation of Athenian antiquities in the decade which saw the end of the Ottoman rule and the beginnings of the Greek state.[32]

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[31] See Petrakos 2004.
[32] Blaquiere 1825, I, 99.

Appendix I

Letter to the Commission for the Sale of State Lands
(ΓΑΚ 47 Β, φ. III αρ. 6)[33]

Page 1
Πρὸς τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν τῆς ἐκποιήσεως τῶν ἐθνικῶν κτημάτων

Καταγινόμενοι εἰς τὴν καταγραφὴν τῶν ἐθνικῶν κτη/μάτων, κ(αὶ) περιφερόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος ἐπιστατοδημο/γερόντων, κ(αὶ) ἄλλων, ἐπιτελοῦμεν τὰ διατατόμενα σημειώ/σαντες ὀνομαστί, τὰ μέτρα ἑκάστου οἴκου, τὸ ἐμβαδὸν, κ(αὶ) πε/ριφέρειαν αὐτῶν ἢ πᾶν ὅ,τι ἄλλο ἐμπεριέχεται εἰς αὐτούς.

Τὰ καταγραφέντα κ(αὶ) ἐκτιμηθέντα ὀσπήτια ἐπροκηρύχ/θησαν ἤδη κατὰ ἀπαιτουμένην τάξιν, εἰς τὰς 22» τοῦ τρέ/χοντος κ(αὶ) εἰς τὰς 27» τοῦ ἰδίου θέλειν βληθεῖ εἰς τὴν δημο/πρασίαν, ᵗ⁽ⁱᵒⁱ ᵗⁱⁿ ᵃⁱᵍᵃⁱⁱⁿ κ(αὶ) οὕτως ἀλληλοδιαδόχως καθὼς καταγράφονται/ κ(αὶ) ἐκτιμῶνται.

Ἓν μόνον στοχαζόμεθα, περὶ τῶν κτημάτων τούτων, /ὀσπητίων κ(αὶ) ἐρειπείων, ὅτι θέλει πολησῶσι παρὰ τιμήν, ἐπει/δὴ κ(αὶ) ἡ ἐλπὶς τῶν ἀγοραστῶν ἔχει βάσιν εἰς τὴν προγεγωνεί/αν ἐκποίησιν, ἥτις ἐγένετο τότε, κ(αὶ) ὅτι τὰ μείνοντα ὀσπή/τια, τὰ ὁποῖα θέλεν ἐκποιηθεῖ ἤδη, ἐξ ὧν μερικὰ εἶναι/ κατοικητά, εὑρεθέντων παροικηστῶν εἰς αὐτὰ κ(αὶ) μὲ πολλὰ/ ὀλίγον ἐννοίκιον, ὡς ἐπληροφορήθημεν παρ' αὐτῶν, τὰ/ δὲ κατάλοιπα εἶναι διόλου ἀκατοίκητα, ἄλλα μὲν ἔχον/τα ἡμίσειαν σκεπὴν, ἄλλα δὲ μὴ ἔχοντα πάτωμα/ παντελῶς, καὶ τὸ περισσότερον μέρος ἐρίπεια μέχρι τῶν/ θεμελίων κατεδαφισμένα, ἐν οἷς εὑρίσκονται καί τινα, μέ/ρος τὸν τοῖχον ἔχοντα, καθὼς θέλετε πληροφορηθῆ ἀκρι/βῶς κατόπιν παρατηροῦντες τὴν κατὰ σειρὰν καταγρα/

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φὴν αὐτῶν, ἥτις στέλλεται μετὰ τὴν τελείωσιν ἑκάστης δημο/πρασίας.

Εἰς τὴν ῥηθεῖσαν ἀκριβῆ καταγραφὴν ἓν μόνον θέλει λεί/ψει, οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἑκάστου οἴκου, κατὰ τὴν διαταγήν, ἐπειδὴ εὑ/ρισκόμενα τὰ ὀσπήτια σποράδην, ἀπὸ ἕναν μαχαλᾶν εἰς ἄλ/λον κ(αὶ) πλησιάζοντα ἄνω, κ(αὶ) κάτω, μεταξὺ τῶν ἐριπείων, διὰ/ τοῦτο δὲν ἐδυνήθημεν νὰ τὰ ἀριθμήσωμεν, διά τε τὸ ἀδύνα/τον τῆς ἐκτελέσεως, τούτου, κ(αὶ) διὰ τὴν μεγίστην παράτασιν/ τῆς ἀριθμοίσεως, ὥστε τοῦτο μὴ δυνάμενοι νὰ κατορθώσω/μεν, ἐκάμομεν τὴν τόσην λεπτομερίαν ἑκάστου οἴκου/ εἰς τὴν σημείωσιν.

Ἔτι δὲ στοχαζόμεθα, ὅτι τὰ ἐθνικὰ ἐργαστήρια κ(αὶ) οἱ μύ/λοι δὲν πρέπει νὰ πωλησῶσι διόλου, ἀλλὰ μόνον νὰ ἐννοικια/σθῶσι, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ποσότης, ἥτις θέλει δοθῆ εἰς τὴν ἐκποίησιν/ αὐτῶν μὲ τὸ διδόμενον (κατ' ἔτος) ἐννοίκιον ἀπὸ τοὺς ἐν/νοικιαστάς, εἰς δύο ἔτη συμπληρεῖ τὴν ποσότητα τῆς πω/λήσεως. Ὅθεν ἐὰν ἀντὶ τῆς ἐκποιήσεως ἐννοικιασθῶσι/ διὰ δημοπρασίας, εἰς δύο ἢ τρία ἔτη μὲ συμφωνίαν προ/πληρωμένου ἐννοικίου, θέλουν δώσει μεγαλητέραν πο/σότητα τῆς ἀγορᾶς κ(αὶ) τὰ ἐργαστήρια κ(αὶ) οἱ μύλοι μένουσι/ ἐθνικά, τοῦτο εὑρίσκει εὔλογον κ(αὶ) ὁ συνταγματάρχης φαβιέρος, κ(αὶ) ὁ κύριος ἔπαρχος κ(αὶ) οἱ πολῖται.

Καὶ μερικὰ ὀσπήτια ἐρίπεια τὰ ὁποῖα περιορίζουσι/

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[33] The document was first published by Diamantes 1971, 372, no. 282.

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κ(αὶ) ἀποσκεπάζουσι τὰς πολυτίμους ἀρχαίας οἰκοδομὰς καθὼς/ ναοὺς κ(αὶ) παρόμοια εἶναι ἀνάγκη νὰ μὴ πολιθῶσι, ἀλλὰ/ νὰ κατεδαφισθῶσι διόλου, ἵνα μείνωσι μεμονομένα κ(αὶ)/ ἐλεύθερα, τὰ ῥηθέντα λαμπρὰ τεχνουργήματα τῶν ἀει/μνήστων προγόνων μας, διά δόξαν ἐκείνων κ(αὶ) κλέος τοῦ/ ἔθνους, καὶ ἡ ἐν μέσῳ τῆς πόλεως στοὰ τοῦ Ἀδριανοῦ/ ἡ ὁποῖα ἀποσκεπάζεται ἀπὸ ἕν ἐθνικόν κ(αὶ) δύο ἰδιόκτη/τα ἐργαστήρια, τὰ ὁποῖα ἔπρεπε νὰ ἐναλαγῶσι μὲ/ ἄλλα ἐθνικὰ εἰς ἄλλο μέρος κ(αὶ) τὰ γινόμενα ἐθνικὰ/ διὰ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς νὰ κατεδαφισθῶσι, διότι ἀλλέως, ὑπό/κεινται αἱ ῥηθεῖσαι οἰκοδομαὶ κ(αὶ) εἰς φθορὰν ἐνδεχομένης/ πυρκαϊᾶς.

Καὶ μερικαὶ ἀρχαιότητες αἳ ὁποῖαι εἰσέτι εὑρίσκον/ται εἰς τὰ διασωθέντα ἐθνικὰ ὀσπήτια καλὸν ἦτο νὰ λει/φθῶσι ἐκεῖθεν, κ(αὶ) νὰ ταμιευθῶσι εἰς ξεχωριστὸν μέρος/ παραδιδόμεναι τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις τῆς φιλομούσου ἐται/ρείας, διότι πολουμένων τῶν ῥηθέντων ὀσπητίων, αὐταί θέλει μείνουν ἰδιοκτησία τῶν ἀγοραστῶν, χωρὶς/ νὰ προσφέρουν διὰ αὐτὰ παραμικρὰν τιμὴν, κ(αὶ) ἂν/ τοιοῦτον τι ἐδύνατο νὰ συμβῆ, δὲν ἤθελον δώσει τὴν τι/μὴν τοιούτων ἀνεκτιμήτων ἀρχαιοτήτων.

Προσέτι καθυποβάλλομεν εἰς τὴν σκέψιν σας, ὅτι/ διὰ μὲν τὰς σημαντικὰς κατὰ τὴν ποσότητα ἐκποιή/σεις μ' ὅλον ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι δυσαρέστως προσφέρον/ται ἀγορασταὶ στοχαζόμενοι, ὅτι μέλλουν κ(αὶ) αὐτόσε νὰ

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μεταβῶσιν ἀλλὰ βλέποντες τὴν μεγάλην ὠφέλειαν ἀναγκά/ζονται νὰ τὸ ἀκολουθήσωσι. Οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς μικρὰς ἀγορὰς/ διόλου δυσκολεύονται ν' ἀγοράσωσι ἂν μέλλη νὰ ἔλθωσιν/ εἰς Ναύπλιον, καθὼς κ(αὶ) οἱ ἐννοικιασταὶ τῶν μύλων κ(αὶ) ἐργα/στηρίων ἂν ἀκολουθήσῃ κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν τρόπον.

Διὸ περὶ πάντων νὰ ἔχωμεν ταχίστην ὁδιγίαν τοῦ/ πῶς νὰ ἀκολουθήσωμεν.

Ἐν Ἀθήναις τῇ 26 Ἰαννουαρί(ου) 1826

Οἱ ἐπιστάται τῆς ἐκποιήσεως

Νικόλα^{ος} Γερακάρης
Δ. Δενδρινός

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